BSI-DSZ-CC-0637-2010
for
IBM z/OS
Version 1 Release 11
from
IBM Corporation
BSI – Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-327 V4.34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0637-2010
Mainframe System
IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 11
from IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0,
01 June 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0067-2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Labeled Security,
Version 2.0, 28 May 2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Extended Identification
and Authentication, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010
Functionality: PP conformant with extensions specific to the product
CC part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 and guidance specific for the
technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 30 June 2010
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0637-2010
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0637-2010 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0637-2010
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................15
2.1 Overview of Delivery Procedure............................................................................16
2.2 Identification of the TOE by the User.....................................................................17
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................17
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................17
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
5.1 Intended Method of Use........................................................................................18
5.2 Summary of Security Features..............................................................................20
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................28
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................28
7.1 Test Configuration..................................................................................................28
7.2 Developer Testing..................................................................................................28
7.3 Evaluator Independent Testing..............................................................................31
7.4 Evaluator Penetration Testing................................................................................32
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................32
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................36
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................36
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................38
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................38
11 Security Target............................................................................................................38
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................39
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................39
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................40
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................43
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................45
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................55
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0637-2010 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic).
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0637-2010
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
● for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
● for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only)
became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates
based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously
issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being
continued.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 11 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0534-2009. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0534-2009 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 11 was conducted by atsec
Information Security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 7 June 2010. The atsec
Information Security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Corporation
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 11 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
IBM Corporation
2455 South Road P328
Poughkeepsie NY 1260
USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0637-2010 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 11.
z/OS is a general-purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system for enterprise
computing systems. Multiple users can use z/OS simultaneously to perform a variety of
functions that require controlled, shared access to the information stored on the system.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the following certified
Protection Profile and its extended packages:
Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0, 01 June 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0067-2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Labeled Security, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Extended Identification and Authentication, Version 2.0, 28
May 2010 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
Identification and
Authentication
z/OS provides identification and authentication of users by the means of:
• an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a system-encrypted password or
password phrase.
• an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a PassTicket, which is a
cryptographically-generated password substitute encompassing the
user ID, the requested application name, and the current date/time.
• an X.509v3 digital certificate presented to a server application that
uses System SSL or TCP/IP Application Transparent TLS (AT-TLS) to
provide TLS- or SSLv3-based client authentication, and then
“mapped” (using TOE functions) by that server application or by AT-
TLS to a RACF user ID.
• a Kerberos™ v5 ticket presented to a server application that supports
the Kerberos mechanism, and then mapped by that application
through the TOE-provided GSS-API programming services or
alternate functions that are also provided by the TOE (specifically the
R_ticketServ, and R_GenSec services).
• an LDAP bind DN, which is mapped to a RACF user ID by information
in the LDAP directory, together with a password.
Discretionary Access
Control
z/OS supports access controls that are capable of enforcing access limitations
on individual users and data objects. Discretionary access control (DAC)
allows individual users to specify how such resources as direct access storage
devices (DASDs), DASD and tape data sets, and tape volumes that are under
their control are to be shared. RACF makes access control decisions based
on the user’s identity, security attributes, group authorities, and the access
authority specified with respect to the resource profile.
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TOE Security Function Addressed issue
z/OS provides three DAC mechanisms:
• The z/OS standard DAC mechanism is used for most traditional (non-
UNIX) protected objects.
• The z/OS UNIX DAC mechanism is used for z/OS UNIX objects (files,
directories, etc.)
• The z/OS LDAP LDBM DAC mechanism is used to protect LDAP
objects in the LDAP LDBM backend data store. (Note: For this
evaluation the LDAP CDBM backend provides security functions
identical to LDBM, and thus all references to LDBM in this document
apply equally to CDBM.)
Mandatory Access Control
(in Labeled Security Mode)
In addition to DAC, z/OS provides Mandatory Access Control (MAC) functions
that are required for Labeled Security Mode, which impose additional access
restrictions on information flow on security classification. Users and resources
can have a security label specified in their profile. Security labels contain a
hierarchical classification (security level), which specify the sensitivity (for
example: public, internal use, or secret), and zero or more non-hierarchical
security categories (for example: PROJECTA or PROJECTB).
The access control enforced by the TOE ensures that users can only read
labeled information if their security labels dominate the information’s label, and
that they can only write to labeled information containers if the container’s
label dominates the subject’s, thus implementing the Bell-LaPadula model of
information flow control. The system can also be configured to allow write-
down for certain authorized users.
Security Management z/OS provides a set of commands and options to adequately manage the
TOE’s security functions. Additionally, the TOE provides the capability of
managing users and groups of users via the z/OS LDAP server, which can
accept LDAP-format requests from a remote administrator and transform them
into RACF administrative commands via its SDBM backend processing. The
TOE also provides a Java class that allows Java programs to issue
commands to manage users and groups. Both the LDAP SDBM and the Java
class ultimately create a RACF command and pass it to RACF using a
programming interface, and then RACF runs the command using the identity
associated with the SDBM session or the Java program. This behaves just the
same as when a local administrator issues the command, including all the
same security checking and auditing.
The TOE recognises several authorities that are able to perform the different
management tasks related to the TOE’s security:
• General security options are managed by security administrators.
• In Labeled Security mode: management of MAC attributes is
performed by security administrators.
• Management of users and their security attributes is performed by
security administrators.
• Management of groups (and to some extent users) can be delegated
to group security administrators.
• Users can change their own passwords or password phrases, their
default groups, and their user names (but not their user IDs).
• In Labeled Security mode: users can choose their security labels at
login, for some login methods.
• Auditors manage the parameters of the audit system (a list of audited
events, for example) and can analyse the audit trail.
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TOE Security Function Addressed issue
• Security administrators can define what audit records are captured by
the system.
• Discretionary access rights to protected resources are managed by
the owners of the applicable profiles (or UNIX objects) or by security
administrators.
• Security administrators can make use of a feature to automatically
assign unique UIDs and GIDs for users during generation of a RACF
OMVS segment required for using z/OS UNIX System Services.
Communication Security z/OS provides means of secure communication between systems sharing the
same security policy. In Labeled Security mode, communication within TOE
parts coupled into a sysplex can be multilevel, whereas other communication
channels are assigned a single security label.
z/OS TCP/IP provides the means for associating labels with all IP addresses
in the network. In Labeled Security mode, communication is permitted
between any two addresses that have equivalent labels. In Labeled Security
mode, communication between two multilevel addresses requires the explicit
labelling of each packet with the sending user's label and is only permitted
over XCF links within the sysplex.
z/OS TCP/IP provides the means to define Virtual IP addresses (VIPAs) with
specific labels on a multilevel system. z/OS TCP/IP considers the user's label
when choosing a source address for communications. z/OS UNIX System
Services also provides the means to run up to eight instances of the z/OS
TCP/IP stack which can each be restricted to a single label. Either of these
approaches can be used to ensure that most communications between
multilevel systems do not use a multilevel address on both ends and thereby
avoid the need for explicit labelling.
Means implemented in z/OS for securing the communication
• SSL/TLS optionally with x509-based client authentication
• IPSEC with IKE key exchange method
• KerberosTM
version 5 networking protocols
• IBM Ported Tools (SSH v2 implementation)
• Access controlled TCP/IP stacks
Auditing The TOE provides an auditing capability that allows generating audit records
for security-critical events. RACF provides a number of logging and reporting
functions that allow resource owners and auditors to identify users who
attempt to access resources.
Audit records are collected by the System Management Facilities (SMF) into
an audit trail, which is protected from unauthorized modification or deletion by
the DAC and (in Labeled Security mode) MAC mechanisms. This audit trail
can reside directly in MVS data sets, or in an MVS log stream (which can be
automatically off-loaded into MVS data sets), as configured by the
administrator.
Object Reuse The TOE ensures protected objects and storage being cleared before making
it accessible to further use.
TOE Self-Protection TSF protection is based on several protection mechanisms that are supported
by the underlying abstract machine the TOE is executed upon.
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
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The TOE is one instance of z/OS running on an abstract machine as the sole operating
system and exercising full control over this abstract machine. This abstract machine can
be provided by one of the following:
● a logical partition provided by a certified version of IBM PR/SM on an IBM System z™
processor (z890, z990, z9™ 109, z9™ Business Class, z9™ Enterprise Class, z10™
Business Class or z10™ Enterprise Class).
● a certified version of IBM z/VM®
executing in a logical partition provided by PR/SM on
one of the above-listed System z™ processors.
Multiple instances of the TOE may be connected in a basic sysplex or in a parallel sysplex
with the instances sharing their RACF database.
The individual TOEs can be run alone or within a network as a set of cooperating hosts,
operating under and implementing the same set of security policies.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.2.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.2.3 and 3.4.
For the configuration of the TOE covered by this certification please refer to chapter 8 of
this report or the Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.3.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG section 9, para. 4, clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this certification report.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 11
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
z/OS Version 1 Release 11 (V1R11) Common Criteria Evaluated Base Package:
z/OS Version 1 Release 11 (z/OS V1R11, program number 5694-A01)
1 SW z/OS V1R11 Common Criteria Evaluated Base (IBM
program number 5694-A01)
V1R11 Tape
2 DOC z/OS V1R11 Program Directory GI10-0670-11 Hardcopy
3 DOC z/OS CD Collection Kit SK3T-4271-23 CD-ROM
4 DOC z/OS Hot Topics Newsletter GA22-7501-17 Hardcopy
5 DOC ServerPac: IYO (Installing Your Order) n/a Hardcopy
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
6 DOC Memo to Customers of z/OS V1.11 Common Criteria
Evaluated Base
n/a Hardcopy
7 DOC z/OS V1R11.0 Planning for Multilevel Security and the
Common Criteria
GA22-7509-10 Hardcopy
IBM Print Services Facility™ Version 4 Release 3 for z/OS (PSF V4.3.0, program number 5655-M32)
8 SW IBM Print Services Facility™ Version 4 Release 3 for z/OS
(PSF V4.3.0, program number 5655-M32)
V4R3 Tape
9 DOC PSF V4.3 CDROM Kit BOOK SK3T-9927-03 CD-ROM
10 DOC PSF V4.3 CDROM Kit PDF SK3T-9928-03 CD-ROM
11 DOC PSF Tiers-AFP/IPDS Printers Z125-4564-18 Hardcopy
12 DOC PSF V4.3 Program Directory GI11-4308-00 Hardcopy
OGL/370 V1.1.0 (program number 5688-191)
13 SW Overlay Generation Language Version 1 (OGL V1R1,
program number 5688-191)
V1R1 Tape
14 DOC OGL/370 V1R1.0: Getting Started G544-3691-00 Hardcopy
15 DOC OGL/370 V1R1.0: LPS G544-3697-00 Hardcopy
16 DOC OGL: Command Summary and Quick Reference S544-3703-01 Hardcopy
17 DOC Program Directory OGL/370 GI10-0212-01 Hardcopy
IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.1.4 (program number 5655-M23)
18 SW IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.1.4 (program number 5655-
M23, optional)
V1.1.4 Tape
19 DOC Program Directory IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.1.4 GI10-0769-04 Hardcopy
20 DOC IBM Ported Tools for z/OS License Information GA22-7986-07 Hardcopy
Additional Media
21 SW PTFs (required):
UA52089, UA53151, UA52421, UA53256, UO01051/2/3/4
as appropriate, UA50501, UA90545, UA49157, UA51259,
UA53514, UA51977, UA51978, UA48897, UA50781
to be obtained electronically from ShopzSeries
(https://www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries)
n/a Electronic
22 SW PTFs (optional):
UA51213, UA51214, UA51254, UA51255, UA49976,
UA53262
those can be obtained electronically from ShopzSeries
(https://www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries)
n/a Electronic
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
2.1 Overview of Delivery Procedure
The evaluated version of z/OS can be ordered via an IBM sales representative or via the
ShopzSeries web application (http://www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries). When filing an
order via (secured) internet services, IBM requires customers to have an account with a
login name and password. Registration for such an account in turn requires a valid
customer ID from IBM.
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The delivery of the tapes, CDs and documentation occurs in one package, which is
manufactured specifically for this customer and shipped via courier services. Additional
maintenance can then be downloaded by the customer via the ShopzSeries web site,
following the instructions delivered with the package.
2.2 Identification of the TOE by the User
The tapes and documents delivered to the customer are labeled with the product,
document and version numbers as indicated in the table above and can be checked by the
users installing the system.
The TOE reference can be verified by the administrator during initial program load (IPL),
when the system identification is displayed on the system console. The operator can also
issue the operator command D IPLINFO, to display the z/OS version. The string "z/OS
01.11.00:" should be displayed among other information.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Identification and Authentication
● Discretionary Access Control
● in Labeled Security mode: Mandatory Access Control and support for security labels
● Communication security
● Security management
● Auditing
● Object re-use
● TOE Self-Protection
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Operational Environment. The
following topics are of relevance: Trained and trustworthy administrators, trusted remote IT,
environmental support for protection of information, correct TOE setup, maintenance,
prevention of physical attacks, recovery procedures and correct implementation of security
protocols by the remote it. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapters 4.2 and
6.
5 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the z/OS operating system with the software
components as listed in chapter 2 of this report. z/OS is a general-purpose, multi-user,
multi-tasking operating system for enterprise computing systems. Multiple users can use
z/OS simultaneously to perform a variety of functions that require controlled, shared
access to the information stored on the system.
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For purposes of evaluation, the TOE is seen as one instance of z/OS running on an
abstract machine as the sole operating system and exercising full control over this abstract
machine. This abstract machine can be provided by one of the following:
● a logical partition provided by a certified version of PR/SM on an IBM System z™
processor (z890, z990, z9™ 109, z9™ Business Class, z9™ Enterprise Class, IBM
System z10™ Business Class, or IBM System z10™ Enterprise Class)
● a certified version of IBM z/VM®
executing executing in a logical partition provided by
PR/SM on one of the above-listed System z™ processors.
The abstract machine itself is not part of the TOE; rather, it belongs to the TOE-
Operational Environment. Nevertheless the correctness of separation and memory
protection mechanisms implemented in the abstract machine is analysed as part of the
evaluation since those functions are crucial for the security of the TOE.
The TOE-Operational Environment, as part of the System z processor, also includes
specific hardware functions that provide support for the cryptographic operations involved
in communications security and for the digital signature operations involved with X.509v3
digital certificates.
Multiple instances of the TOE may be connected in a basic sysplex or in a parallel sysplex
with the instances sharing their RACF®
database.
The platforms selected for the evaluation consist of IBM products that are available when
the evaluation has been completed and will remain available for a substantial period of
time afterwards.
The individual TOEs can be run alone or within a network as a set of cooperating hosts,
operating under and implementing the same set of security policies.
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) network services, connections
and communication that occur outside of a sysplex are restricted to one security label; that
is, each system regards its peers as single-label hosts. Other network communication is
disallowed, with the exception of the Job Entry System 2 (JES2) Network Job Entry (NJE)
protocol.
Most of the TOE Security Functions (TSF) are provided by the z/OS operating system
Base Control Program (BCP) and the Resource Access Control Facility (RACF), a z/OS
component that is used by different services as the central instance for identification and
authentication and for access control decisions.
z/OS comes with management functions that allow configuring of the TOE security
functions to tailor them to the customer’s needs. Some elements have been included in the
TOE that do not provide security functions. These elements run in authorized mode, so
they could compromise the TOE if they do not behave properly. Because these elements
are essential for the operation of many customer environments, the inclusion of these
elements subjects them to the process of scrutiny during the evaluation and ensures that
they may be used by customers without affecting the TOE’s security status.
In its evaluated configuration, the TOE allows two modes of operation: standard mode and
Labeled Security mode. In both modes, the same software elements are used. The two
modes have different RACF settings with respect to the use of security labels. All other
configuration parameters are identical in the two modes.
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5.1 Intended Method of Use
z/OS provides a general computing environment that allows users to gain controlled
access to its resources in different ways:
● online interaction with users through Time Sharing Option Extensions (TSO/E) or z/OS
UNIX System Services
● batch processing (JES2)
● services provided by started procedures or tasks
● daemons and servers utilizing z/OS UNIX System Services that provide similar
functions as started procedures or tasks but based on UNIX interfaces
These services can be accessed by users local to the computer systems or accessing the
systems via network services supported by the evaluated configuration.
All users of the TOE are assigned a unique user identifier (user ID). This user ID, which is
used as the basis for access control decisions and for accountability, associates the user
with a set of security attributes. In most cases the TOE authenticates the claimed identity
of a user before allowing this user to perform any further security-relevant actions.
Exceptions to this authentication policy include:
1. Pre-specified identities:
a. The authorized administrator can specify an identity to be used by server or
daemon processes or system address spaces, which may be started either
automatically or via system operator commands;
b. The authorized administrator may configure a trusted HTTP server to access
selected data under a specified identity, rather than the identity of the end user
making the request. The HTTP server may optionally authenticate the user in
this case, or may serve the data to anyone asking for it, if the administrator has
determined that such anonymous access is appropriate.
2. Users are allowed to execute programs that accept network connections on ports
the user has access to. In this case the untrusted program has no knowledge about
the external "user" and cannot perform authentication. The program executes with
the rights of the z/OS user that started it, and any data access occurs using this
user’s authenticated identity.
The TOE provides mechanisms for both mandatory and discretionary access control. The
Security Target describes two modes of operation: the standard mode of operation with
discretionary access control only and the Labeled Security Mode with both discretionary
and Mandatory Access Control where the Mandatory Access Control is fully enabled for all
subjects and objects. In commercial environments it is often useful to activate only parts of
the Mandatory Access Control functions required in the Security Target for the Labeled
Security mode. While such a mode may be useful for specific environments and the
functions used have been evaluated, the claims about information flow control made in the
Security Target for the Labeled Security mode may not hold completely when only part of
the Mandatory Access Control functions are configured.
All TOE resources are under the control of the TOE. The TOE mediates the access of
subjects to TOE-protected objects. Subjects in the TOE are called tasks. Tasks are the
active entities that can act on the user’s behalf. Data is stored in named objects. The TOE
can associate a set of security attributes with each named resource, which includes the
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description of the access rights to that object and (in Labeled Security mode) a security
label.
Objects are owned by users, who are assumed to be capable of assigning discretionary
access rights to their objects in accordance with the organizational security policies.
Ownership of named objects can be transferred under the control of the access control
policy. In Labeled Security mode, security labels are assigned by the TOE, either
automatically upon creation of the object or by the trusted system administrator. The
security attributes of users, data objects, and objects through which the information is
passed are used to determine if information may flow through the system as requested by
a user.
Apart from normal users, z/OS recognizes administrative users with special authorizations.
These users are trusted to perform system administration and maintenance tasks, which
includes configuration of the security policy enforced by the z/OS system and attributes
related to it. Authorizations can be delegated to other administrative users by updating
their security attributes. The TOE also recognizes the role of an auditor, who uses the
auditing system provided by z/OS to monitor the system usage according to the
organizational security policies.
The TOE is intended to operate in a networked environment with other instantiations of the
TOE as well as other well-behaved client systems operating within the same management
domain. All of those systems need to be configured in accordance with a defined common
security policy.
5.2 Architecture of TSF
These primary security functions are supported by domain separation and reference
mediation, which ensure that the features are always invoked and cannot be bypassed.
5.2.1 Identification and authentication
z/OS provides identification and authentication of users by the means of
● an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a system-encrypted password or (for applications
that support it) password phrase.
● an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a PassTicket, which is a cryptographically-
generated password substitute encompassing the user ID, the requested application
name, and the current date/time.
● an X.509v3 digital certificate presented to a server application that uses System SSL or
TCP/IP Application Transparent TLS (AT-TLS) to provide TLS- or SSLv3-based client
authentication, and then mapped (using TOE functions) by that server application or by
AT-TLS to a RACF user ID.
● a Kerberos™ v5 ticket presented to a server application that supports the Kerberos
mechanism, and then mapped by that application through the TOE-provided GSS-API
programming services or alternate functions that are also provided by the TOE
(specifically the R_ticketServ, and R_GenSec services). These functions enable the
application server to validate the Kerberos ticket, and thus the authentication of the
principal. The application server then translates (or maps) the Kerberos principal (using
the TOE provided function of R_userMap) to a RACF user ID.
● an LDAP LDBM bind DN (which is mapped to a RACF user ID by information in the
LDAP directory) or an LDAP ICTX or SDBM bind DN (which contains a RACF user ID)
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together with a RACF password or password phrase. The bind processing then passes
the derived RACF user ID, and the password/phrase, to RACF to complete the
authentication process.
In the evaluated configuration, all human users are assigned a unique user ID. This user
ID supports individual accountability. The TOE security functions authenticate the claimed
identity of the user by verifying the password/phrase (or other mechanism, as listed above)
before allowing the user to perform any actions that require TSF mediation, other than
actions that aid an authorized user in gaining access to the TOE.
In some cases of external access to the system, such as the HTTP server, or LDAP server,
an installation may decide to define a user ID that is used for access checking of selected
resources for users that have not been authenticated. This allows an installation to define
resources unauthenticated users may access using that server via an appropriate client
program. Users may still authenticate to the server using their user ID and
password/phrase (or other authentication mechanism as above) to access additional
resources they have been assigned access to.
The required password quality can be tailored to the installation’s policies using various
parameters. When creating users, administrators are required to choose an initial
password and optionally a password phrase, that must usually be changed by the user
during the initial logon that uses the password/phrase.
5.2.2 Discretionary Access Control
z/OS supports access controls that are capable of enforcing access limitations on
individual users and data objects. Discretionary access control (DAC) allows individual
users to specify how such resources as direct access storage devices (DASDs), DASD
and tape data sets, and tape volumes that are under their control are to be shared.
RACF makes access control decisions based on the user’s identity, security attributes,
group authorities, and the access authority specified with respect to the resource profile.
z/OS provides three DAC mechanisms.
1. The z/OS standard DAC mechanism is used for most traditional (non-UNIX)
protected objects.
2. The z/OS UNIX DAC mechanism is used for z/OS UNIX objects (files, directories,
etc.)
3. The z/OS LDAP LDBM DAC mechanism is used to protect LDAP objects in the
LDAP LDBM back-end data store. (Note: For this evaluation the LDAP CDBM
backend provides security functions identical to LDBM, and thus all references to
LDBM in this document apply equally to CDBM.)
5.2.2.1 z/OS standard DAC mechanism
Access types that can be granted are NONE, EXECUTE, READ, UPDATE, CONTROL,
and ALTER, which form a hierarchical set of increasing access authorities.
Access authorities to resources are stored in profiles. Discrete profiles are valid for a
single, named resource and generic profiles are applicable to a group of resources,
typically with similar names. For access permission checks, RACF always chooses the
most specific profile for a resource. Profiles can have an access control list associated with
them that contains a potentially large number of entries for different groups and users, thus
allowing the modeling of complex, fine-grained access controls.
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Profiles are assigned to a number of resources within z/OS. This Security Target defines
the resource types analyzed during the evaluation. RACF profiles are also used to manage
and control privileges in z/OS and resources of subsystems that are not part of the
evaluated configuration (e. g. DB2, CICS, JES3).
Access rights for subjects to resources can be set by the profile owner and by the system
administrator.
The TOE allows access decisions by this mechanism for local applications or remote
applications. For local applications the application, or the TOE, uses the RACROUTE
programming interface to perform the access check. Remote applications can perform
similar access checking via LDAP interfaces, if the z/OS ITDS LDAP server is
appropriately configured, by first authenticating (binding) with an ICTX-style identity (DN),
and then providing an extended-operation request indicating that the applications wants do
perform an access check. LDAP will then invoke the ICTX extended operation processing
routine which will check the application’s authority to make such a request, and then will
process the request if authorized. The request specifies the resource to be checked and
the RACF user ID or group name whose access should be checked.
5.2.2.2 z/OS UNIX DAC mechanism
z/OS implements POSIX-conformant access control for such named objects in the UNIX
realm as UNIX file system objects and UNIX inter-process communication (IPC) objects.
Access types for UNIX file system objects are read, write, and execute/search, and read
and write for UNIX IPC objects. z/OS file system objects provide either access control
based on the permission bits associated with a file, or based on access control lists, which
are upward-compatible with the permission bits algorithm and implement the
recommendations from Portable Operating System Interface for UNIX (POSIX) 1003.1e
draft 17.
5.2.2.3 z/OS LDAP DAC mechanism
The z/OS LDAP server supports several back-end data stores as well as plug-ins. Two of
the data stores (LDBM, SDBM) and one plug-in (ICTX) can be used in the evaluated
configuration. The SDBM back-end allows RACF administration by remote administrators
for systems configured in CAPP mode. The ICTX plug-in allows remote servers to issue
authorization check or auditing requests to RACF in either CAPP or Labeled Security
Mode. The LDBM back-end allows storage of customer data in either CAPP or Labeled
Security Mode, and this back-end supports a standard LDAP access control mechanism to
control which authenticated users can access which data. It also supports the possibility of
“public” data, accessed by unauthenticated users, when the administrator has configured
this kind of data and access.
5.2.3 Mandatory Access Control and support for security labels in Labeled
Security mode
In addition to DAC, z/OS provides Mandatory Access Control (MAC) functions that are
required for Labeled Security Mode, which impose additional access restrictions on
information flow on security classification. Users and resources can have a security label
specified in their profile. Security labels contain a hierarchical classification (security level),
which specify the sensitivity (for example: public, internal use, or secret), and zero or more
non-hierarchical security categories (for example: PROJECTA or PROJECTB).
The access control enforced by the TOE ensures that users can only read labeled
information if their security labels dominate the information’s label, and that they can only
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write to labeled information containers if the container’s label dominates the subject’s, thus
implementing the Bell-LaPadula model of information flow control. The system can also be
configured to allow write-down for certain authorized users.
MAC checks are performed before DAC checks.
Note that security label checking will also occur in the standard mode of operation of the
TOE, if the administrator has configured security labels and if resources and users have
labels assigned to them. The exact effects (e.g., whether write-down can occur) depend on
several RACF options, and so the behavior may differ from that imposed by a Labeled
Security configuration, which mandates the setting of certain options.
Users with clearance for multiple security classifications can choose their label at login
time in TSO and for batch jobs submitted to JES, with appropriate defaults assigned if no
labels are chosen. The choice may be restricted by the label assigned to the point of
access (the logical or physical device the user has used to authenticate, e. g. the ID of the
terminal, the IP address, or the ID of the job entry station).
TCP/IP applications that process user login requests must either be restricted to a single
label or must restrict the user label by the label assigned to the point of access.
Specifically for the z/OS LDAP server:
● The LDBM back-end has no mechanisms to perform MAC checking. Instead, each
LDAP server must run with a single security label, matching the classification of the
data in the LDBM database. TCP/IP processing will then ensure that only users running
with that security label will have access to the LDAP data, thus fulfilling the required
MAC checking. As needed, customers may configure multiple z/OS LDAP servers,
each running with a single security label, and users must connect to the appropriate
server that matches their own security label when they want to access the data.
● The SDBM back-end is prohibited in Labeled Security Mode.
● The ICTX back-end does not provide any data access functions, and thus technically
does not need to provide MAC checking. However, if the administrator configures ICTX
in Labeled Security Mode then TCP/IP will still control an external server's connection
to LDAP based on the server's security label, and any remote authorization checking
requests will use that security label as part of the decision making process.
5.2.4 Auditing
The TOE provides an auditing capability that allows generating audit records for security-
critical events. RACF provides a number of logging and reporting functions that allow
resource owners and auditors to identify users who attempt to access resources. Audit
records are collected by the System Management Facilities (SMF) into an audit trail, which
is protected from unauthorized modification or deletion by the DAC and (in Labeled
Security Mode) MAC mechanisms. This audit trail can reside directly in MVS data sets, or
in an MVS log stream (which can be automatically off-loaded into MVS data sets), as
configured by the administrator.
The system can be configured to halt on exhaustion of audit trail space to prevent audit
data loss. Operators are warned when audit trail space consumption reaches a predefined
threshold.
RACF always generates audit records for such events as unauthorized attempts to access
the system or changes to the status of the RACF database. The security administrator,
auditors, and other users with appropriate authorization can configure which additional
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optional security events are to be logged. In addition to writing records to the audit trail,
messages can be sent to the security console to immediately alert operators of detected
policy violations. RACF provides SMF records for all RACF-protected resources (either
“traditional” or z/OS UNIX-based) as well as for LDAP-based resources.
Remote applications can use an LDAP interface to request that RACF generate an SMF
audit record, if the z/OS ITDS LDAP server is appropriately configured, by first
authenticating (binding) with an ICTX-style identity (DN) and then providing a extended-
operation request indicating that the applications wants do generate an audit record. LDAP
will then invoke the ICTX extended operation processing routine, which will check the
application’s authority to make such a request, and then will process the request if
authorized. The request specifies the information to be audited.
For reporting, auditors can unload all or selected parts of the SMF data for further analysis
in a human-readable formats and can then upload the data to a query or reporting
package, such as DFSORT™ if desired.
5.2.5 Object re-use functionality
Reuse of protected objects and of storage is handled by various hardware and software
controls, and by administrative practices.
All memory content of non-shared page frames is cleared before making it accessible to
other address spaces or data spaces. DASD data sets can be purged during deletion with
the RACF ERASE option and tape volumes can be erased on return to the scratch pool.
All resources allocated to UNIX objects are cleared before re-use. Other data pools are
under strict TOE control and cannot be accessed directly by normal users.
5.2.6 Security Management
z/OS provides a set of commands and options to adequately manage the TOE’s security
functions. Additionally, the TOE provides the capability of managing users and groups of
users via the z/OS LDAP server, which can accept LDAP-format requests from a remote
administrator and transform them into RACF administrative commands via its SDBM
backend processing. The TOE also provides a Java class that allows Java programs to
issue commands to manage users and groups. Both the LDAP SDBM and the Java class
ultimately create a RACF command and pass it to RACF using a programming interface,
and then RACF runs the command using the identity associated with the SDBM session or
the Java program. This behaves just the same as when a local administrator issues the
command, including all the same security checking and auditing.
The TOE recognizes several authorities that are able to perform the different management
tasks related to the TOE’s security:
● General security options are managed by security administrators.
● In Labeled Security Mode: management of MAC attributes is performed by security
administrators.
● Management of users and their security attributes is performed by security
administrators. Management of groups (and to some extent users) can be delegated to
group security administrators.
● Users can change their own passwords or password phrases, their default groups, and
their user names (but not their user IDs).
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● In Labeled Security Mode: users can choose their security labels at login, for some
login methods. (Note: this also applies in CAPP mode if the administrator chooses to
activate security label processing.)
● Auditors manage the parameters of the audit system (a list of audited events, for
example) and can analyse the audit trail.
● Security administrators can define what audit records are captured by the system.
● Discretionary access rights to protected resources are managed by the owners of the
applicable profiles (or UNIX objects) or by security administrators.
5.2.7 Communication Security
z/OS provides means of secure communication between systems sharing the same
security policy. In Labeled Security Mode, communication within TOE parts coupled into a
sysplex can be multilevel, whereas other communication channels are assigned a single
security label.
z/OS TCP/IP provides the means for associating labels with all IP addresses in the
network. In Labeled Security Mode, communication is permitted between any two
addresses that have equivalent labels. In Labeled Security Mode, communication between
two multilevel addresses requires the explicit labeling of each packet with the sending
user's label and is only permitted over XCF links within the sysplex.
z/OS TCP/IP provides the means to define Virtual IP addresses (VIPAs) with specific
labels on a multilevel system. z/OS TCP/IP considers the user's label when choosing a
source address for communications. z/OS UNIX Systems Services also provides the
means to run up to eight instances of the z/OS TCP/IP stack which can each be restricted
to a single label. Either of these approaches can be used to ensure that most
communications between multilevel systems do not use a multilevel address on both ends
and thereby avoid the need for explicit labelling.
z/OS TCP/IP provides the ability to filter all network traffic based on source and destination
IP-adresses, source and destination ports, and protocols used, with a pre-configured
default deny-all rule.
In its evaluated configuration, z/OS supports trusted communication channels for TCP/IP
connections. The confidentiality and integrity of network connections are assured by
Secure Sockets Layer / Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) encrypted communication for
TCP/IP connections, which can be used explicitly by applications or applied transparently
to their communications (AT- TLS) without changing the applications using it (assuming the
applications that do not make use of the SSL/TLS capabilities that allow clients to
authenticate to the system using a client-supplied X.509 digital certificate. If applications
accept client certificates then they do need to have specific SSL/TLS-related processing
within the applications.).
In addition to the SSL/TLS connection, z/OS also supports the IP Security (IPSec) protocol
with Internet Key Exchange (IKE) as the key exchange method. This is an additional way
to set up a trusted channel to another trusted IT product for IP-based connections. z/OS
also provides centralized policy management for IPSec policies across multiple z/OS
systems in the network. It also provides centralized management for digital certificates,
message signing, and message verification for IPSec across multiple z/OS systems in the
network.
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z/OS also supports KerberosTM
version 5 networking protocols, via the Integrated Security
Services Network Authentication Service component, hereafter called z/OS Network
Authentication Service. These protocols enable both the client and the server to mutually
authenticate. This authentication mechanism can be utilized with the GSS-API services
provided by the z/OS Network Authentication Service to provide security services to
applications. These services enable encrypted communications channels between clients
and servers that may reside on the same or on different systems.
z/OS also supports, via the optional add-on product IBM Ported Tools for z/OS, the SSH
v2 protocol and the ssh-daemon provided services of ssh (secure shell), scp (secure
copy), and sftp (secure ftp).
TCP/IP-based communication can be further controlled by the access control function for
TCP/IP connections, which allows controlling of the connection establishment based on
access to the TCP/IP stack in general, individual network address and individual ports on a
per-application or per-user basis.
z/OS provides also a variety of network services, all of which use RACF for identification,
authentication, and access control. In the evaluated configuration, terminal services are
provided by TN3270, telnet, rlogin, rsh, and rexec. File transfer services are provided by
the File Transfer Protocol (FTP), sftp and scp, Web serving functions are provided by the
z/OS HTTP Server.
5.2.8 TSF protection
TSF protection is based on several protection mechanisms that are provided by the
underlying abstract machine:
● Privileged processor instructions are only available to programs running in the
processor’s supervisor state
● Semi-privileged instructions are only available to programs running in an execution
environment that is established and authorized by the TSF
● While in operation, all address spaces, as well as the data and tasks contained therein,
are protected by the memory protection mechanisms of the underlying abstract
machine
The TOE’s address space management ensures that programs running in problem state
cannot access protected memory or resources that belong to other address spaces.
Access to system services – through supervisor call (SVC) or program call (PC)
instructions, for example – is controlled by the system, which requires that subjects who
want to perform security-relevant tasks be authorized appropriately.
The hardware and firmware components that provide the abstract machine for the TOE are
required to be physically protected from unauthorized access. The z/OS Base Control
Program mediates all access to the TOE’s hardware resources themselves, other than
program-visible CPU instruction functions.
Tools are provided in the TOE environment to allow authorized administrators to check the
correct operation of the underlying abstract machine.
In addition to the protection mechanism of the underlying abstract machine, the TOE also
uses software mechanisms like the Authorized Program Facility (APF) or specific
privileges for programs in the UNIX system services environment to protect the TSF.
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5.2.9 High-level Design
The subsystems considered in the high-level design of the TOE are the following:
1. Base Control Program (BCP)
2. System Management Facilities (SMF)
3. System REXX
4. Security Server (Resource Access Control Facility RACF)
5. System Operations
6. Communication Server (IP and SNA)
7. DFSMS – System Managed Storage
8. Job Entry Subsystem 2 – JES2
9. TSO/E
10. z/OS UNIX System Services
11. Print Services Facility (PSF)
12. Parallel Sysplex
13. Cryptographic Services
14. Hardware Configuration Definition (HCD) and Hardware Configuration Manager
(HCM)
15. Resource Management Facility – RMF
16. SDSF
17. System SSL
18. Network File System
19. HTTP Server
20. IBM Health Checker
21. IBM Tivoli Directory Server for z/OS (LDAP)
22. Network Authentication Service (Kerberos)
23. PKI Services
24. OpenSSH
25. Common Information Model (CIM) Server
26. EIM ICTX - LDAP backend for remote authorization and remote auditing
27. TSO/ISPF Client Gateway
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Test Configuration
The Security Target requires the software packages comprising the TOE to be run on an
abstract machine implementing the z/Architecture machine interface as defined in the
"z/Architecture Principles of Operation" [11]. The hardware platforms implementing this
abstract machine are:
● IBM zSeries model z890, optionally with CryptoExpress2 card or PCIXCC and PCICA
crypto cards
● IBM zSeries model z990, optionally with CryptoExpress2 card or PCIXCC and PCICA
crypto cards
● IBM System z9 109, z9 BC, or z9 EC, optionally with CryptoExpress2 card.
● IBM System z10 Business Class, optionally with CryptoExpress2 or CryptoExpress3
card.
● IBM System z10 Enterprise Class, optionally with CryptoExpress2 or CryptoExpress3
card.
The TOE may be running on those machines within a logical partition provided by a
certified version of IBM PR/SM. In addition, the TOE may run on a virtual machine
provided by a certified version of IBM z/VM.
For the peripherals that can be used with the TOE, please refer to the Security Target [6],
section 1.4.3.2.
IBM has tested the platforms (hardware and combinations of hardware with IBM PR/SM
and/or IBM z/VM) for z/OS individually for their compliance to the z/Architecture using the
Systems Assurance Kernel (SAK) suite of tests. These tests ensure that every platform
provides the abstract machine interface that z/OS requires.
The test systems were running z/OS Version 1 Release 11 in the evaluated configuration.
Due to the massive amount of tests, testing was performed throughout the development of
the TOE. To ensure proper testing of all security relevant behaviour of the TOE, the
evaluators verified that all tests that might have been affected by any security-relevant
change introduced late in the development cycle had been run on the evaluated
configuration.
7.2 Developer Testing
Following a brief summary of the developer test effort:
● IBM tests the platforms for z/OS individually for their compliance to the z/Architecture
using the Systems Assurance Kernel (SAK) suite of tests. These tests ensure that
every platform provides the abstract machine interface that z/OS requires to be run.
SAK testing is important not only to the z/OS evaluation, but to other evaluations
(PR/SM, z/VM) as well.
● FVT for z/OS is largely performed on the VICOM test system. This is an enhanced
z/VM system implementing the z/Architecture abstract machine interface. It allows
testers to bring up individual, virtual test machines running z/OS with access to
virtualized peripherals such as disks and network connections. For the purpose of the
security function tests, this environment is fully equivalent to the machines running
z/OS. This environment was also used by the evaluators for their independent testing.
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● IBM has provided a common test framework for tests that can be automated. COMSEC
is an environment that can be operated in standard mode or Labeled Security mode.
The BERD (Background Environment Random Driver) test driver submits the test
cases as JES2 jobs. IBM’s intention is to move more and more tests to this automated
environment, which will ease the test effort required for the evaluations substantially.
With V1R9, and continued in V1R10, a substantial number of tests has been ported to
this environment. Additionally, most test teams ran their manual tests in the COMSEC
test environment, which provides a complete test environment in the evaluated
configuration of the TOE in the different modes of operation.
● The test systems were running z/OS version 1 release 11 in the evaluated
configuration. The SDF team provided a pre-installed system image for VICOM and for
the machines running the COMSEC tests, thus ensuring that the CCEB software
version was used for all tests. The additional PTFs were applied to the VICOM and
COMSEC systems as they became available, with any security-relevant tests for the
PTFs being successfully re-run. For some APARs claimed by the ST, which have not
been installed on the test systems, an analysis of their security impact revealed that
they actually have no effect at all on the TOE functionality being tested.
The developer’s general test approach is defined in the process for Integrated Product
Development (IPD) with developer tests, functional verification tests (FVT), and system
verification tests (SVT). Per release, an overall effort of more than 100 person years is
spent on FVT and SVT for the z/OS components. FVT and SVT is performed by
independent test teams, with testers being independent from the developers. The different
test teams have developed their own individual test and test documentation tools, but all
implement the requirements set forth in the IPD documentation.
For the purpose of the evaluation, FVT is of interest to the evaluators, since the single
security functions claimed in the the security target [6] are tested here. IBM decided to
create a test bucket with the tests for the security functions, summarizing the tests in
individual test plans, so that the evaluators had a chance to deal with the otherwise
overwhelming complexity of the z/OS testing.
The developer’s test strategy for the evaluation had three cornerstones:
● The major internal security interface was the interface to RACF, which is tested
exhaustively by the RACF test group
● Components requiring Identification and Authentication or Access Control services call
RACF (with the exception of LDAP LDBM, which implements its own access control).
For most of these services, it is sufficient to demonstrate that these interfaces call
RACF, once the testing of the RACF interface (see above) has established confidence
in the correct inner workings of RACF.
● Due to the design of z/OS, a large number of internal interfaces is also visible
externally, although the interfaces are not intended to be called by external,
unprivileged subjects. For these interfaces, which are basically authorized programs,
operator commands, certain callable services, SVC and PC routines, testing
established only that these interfaces cannot be called by unauthorized callers.
Apart from these tests, all components providing external interfaces for security functions
were tested intensively. For the current version of z/OS this included the newly added
component BCPii, as well as additional tests for enhancements of the already existing
TOE components RACF, CS390, USS, RFM, PKI, and LDAP introduced in the current
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TOE version. All new test cases were determined to follow the approach of the already
existing tests for the respective component.
For components providing cryptographic functions, testing was performed with and without
hardware cryptographic support in order to test the correct usage of the hardware
cryptographic functions, if present, and the correct implementation of the software
implementation within the TOE.
The test results provided by the developer were generated on the configurations as
described above. Although different test teams used different tools and test tracking
databases, the evaluators verified that all provided results showed that tests had executed
successfully and yielded the expected results.
The testing provided was valid for both the standard mode and the Labeled Security mode
of operation, with the exception of tests for multilevel security features, which were
relevant to Labeled Security mode only. The test systems configured for Labeled Security
mode are compliant to standard mode as well, so that tests run on these systems were
always applicable to both modes of operation. For COMSEC, all applicable tests were run
in dedicated Labeled Security mode and standard mode configurations.
The developer provided a mapping between the TSF of the ST, the TSFI in the functional
specification and the tests performed. The evaluator checked this mapping and examined
the test cases to verify whether the tests covered the functions and their interfaces.
Although exhaustive testing is not required, the sponsor provided evidence that significant
detail of the security functions have been tested.
The evaluators determined that developer tests provided the required coverage: Testing
covered all TSF identified in the Security Target on all interfaces identified in the functional
specification.
Test depth was verified against the TOE subsystems and the security enforcing modules:
For most security functions relevant to this evaluation, subsystems invoke RACF functions
to take security-relevant decisions; access control, identification and authentication,
security management and the generation of security-relevant audit records are mostly
handled by RACF. All other security-relevant functions are implemented within the
subsystems themselves, thus keeping security functions isolated within them. For
cryptographic functions, hardware support provided by the TOE’s IT environment is
accessed through the ICSF component. Several components (like PKI Services) use the
System SSL component as an intermediate provider of cryptographic functions. System
SSL then checks and uses hardware support through ICSF. For the self-protection, BCP
and the underlying abstract machine work together to provide memory protection and
different authorization mechanisms such as APF or AKM.
The evaluators verified that all security-relevant details of the TOE design at the level of
subsystems had been taken into account for testing. In particular, testing of the RACF
subsystem interfaces was performed directly at these interfaces as well as over the
subsystems invoking RACF.
7.3 Evaluator Independent Testing
The independent evaluator testing followed the CEM guidance to test every security
function, without striving for exhaustive testing. For their own tests, the evaluators decided
to focus on the most important security functions of the TOE in order to provide
independent verification of their correct operation:
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● Identification and authentication: The evaluators would only devise some basic, mostly
manual testing of the Identification and authentication functions in TSO/E, telnet/rlogin,
ftp, su and JES, since these functions would be exercised during the test activity
implicitly by the testers.
● Discretionary access control: The evaluators focused on UNIX System Services ACLs,
which also implicitly test UNIX permission bits. Other DAC tests involved.
● USS IPC (all system calls for messages, semaphores and shared memory)
● DAC for different USS objects (device special files, IPC objects, directories)
● z/OS dataset access
● Security-relevant USS system calls
● Mandatory Access Control: The evaluators re-ran their own tests on Mandatory Access
Control checks for data sets and Unix System Services files as their own regression
tests. Testing of the writedown override capability provided by FACILITY class profiles
was also performed.
● Communication security: The evaluators chose to ensure that secure communications
channels (SSL) did not contain hidden platform specific implementation errors by
testing interoperability with non-zSeries systems. Application-transparent TLS (AT-TLS)
was also tested to work with a non-z/OS platform, checking different policy settings.
● Audit: Tests were used to check auditing of changes to the system clock.
● Security Management: The evaluators decided to devise no special tests here, since
the setup of the test environment and the setup/cleanup of the tests would already
include a major portion of the TSF found here.
● TOE Self-Protection: The only function to be suitably testable is object re-use, where
the evaluators decided to focus on the issue of memory pages probably containing left-
over information. All other self-protection features are properties that could not be
easily be "challenged" by evaluator tests.
For the set of developer tests to be re-run, the evaluators chose an approach
supplementing their own tests and focusing on functionality changed since the previous
evaluation.
The evaluators decided to focus on security functions claimed in the Security Target and
not to run tests demonstrating that functions requiring authorization would fail when
invoked unprivileged. This was in part due to the fact that the evaluators had experienced
already sufficient issues with protection of security functions while bringing up the system
in its evaluated configuration, following the guidance in [10].
Apart from the tests re-run by the evaluators or during dedicated sessions set up for the
evaluators to observe the testers running those tests, the evaluators gained confidence in
the developers’ test efforts during their extended stay at the developer site, where they
discussed with testers issues of testing or interpretations of the CC requirements, and
were witnessing test executions while the test bucket was being created. The evaluators
had already interviewed testers during the site visits and examined the test databases with
test cases and test results and test execution records.
All tests were run on the VICOM test system that had been set up by the evaluators
according to the specifications found in the guidance [10], and on the COMSEC system
set up by IBM and verified by the evaluators to be in the evaluated configuration.
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During their testing, the evaluators could verify that the test functions behaved as
expected.
7.4 Evaluator Penetration Testing
Since this evaluation was a re-evaluation of a product where several previous versions
had been evaluated before, and since the changes made were mainly to internals, the
evaluator decided this time to use a number of penetration tests used for previous
evaluations. A number of those tests are “fuzzy” tests, which test interfaces with random
parameter and therefore will test the interfaces with different parameter values than they
did when executed for previous evaluations.
A dedicated penetration test program was developed that would be able to detect if any
system program executing in a user’s address space would use key 8 storage for save
areas. The program systematically searches for such save areas, “chains” itself in and
waits in what state the “chained in” program is called (if ever).
In addition the evaluator performed a source analysis for some not publicly documented
TSFI, where from the provided internal description of the interface functionality it was not
clear if the functions sufficiently protect against a potential attacker.
All the penetration tests have been executed on the evaluated configuration used also for
independent testing. None of the penetration tests was able to get the TOE into a state
where the security objectives stated in the Security Target were violated.
It is worth noting that the tests did not explicitly search for covert channels violating the
MLS policy. It is clear from the design of the TOE that numerous such covert channels
exist and can be exploited.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The z/OS V1R11 Common Criteria Evaluated Base package, and (if used) IBM Ported
Tools for z/OS must be installed according to the directions delivered with the media and
configured according to the instructions in [10]. Also all required PTFs as listed as item no.
21 in table 2 above must be installed. Optional PTFs (see item no. 22 in table 2) can be
installed.
Installations may choose not to use any of the elements delivered within the ServerPac,
but are required to install, configure, and use at least the RACF component of the z/OS
Security Server element.
In addition, any software outside the TOE may be added without affecting the security
characteristics of the system, if it cannot run:
● in supervisor state
● as APF-authorized
● with keys 0 through 7
● with UID(0)
● with authority to FACILITY resources BPX.DAEMON, BPX.SERVER, or
BPX.SUPERUSER
● with authority to UNIXPRIV resources.
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This explicitly excludes:
● replacement of any element in the ServerPac providing security functions relevant to
this evaluation by other third-party products;
● installing system exits that run authorized (supervisor state, system key, or APF-
authorized), with the exception of the sample ICHPWX11 and its associated
IRRPHREX routine;
● installing IBM Tivoli Directory Server plug-ins that have not been evaluated;
● using the Authorized Caller Table (ICHAUTAB) in RACF to allow unauthorized
programs to issue RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY (RACINIT) or RACROUTE
REQUEST=LIST (RACLIST).
The evaluated software configuration is not invalidated by installing and operating other
appropriately-certified components that possibly run authorized. However the evaluation of
those components must show that the component and the security policies implemented
by the component do not undermine the security policies described in this document.
The IBM Tivoli Directory Server for z/OS (FMID HRSL380) component may be used as the
LDAP server, but:
● For client authentication via digital certificates the administrator must configure the
LDAP server to map the certificate to a RACF user ID and to fail the bind if the
certificate does not map to a RACF user ID. The allowable LDAP configuration
provides three options for forming an LDBM subject:
● LDAP may use the original DN from the certificate; or
● LDAP may replace the original DN with an SDBM-format DN based on the RACF user
ID; or
● LDAP may add the SDBM-format DN to the LDAP subject, giving a subject with two
DNs, either of which will work in LDAP ACLs.
● Client authentication using the Kerberos mechanism has not been evaluated for LDAP
and cannot be used in the evaluated configuration.
● Authentication via passwords stored in LDAP cannot be used. Authentication must
occur using RACF passwords or password phrases. Note that if an LDBM bind DN is
specified when binding to the server, the password/phrase specified must be for the
RACF user ID associated with that bind DN by the LDAP administrator;
● Only the LDBM back-end and the ICTX plug-in may be used in Labeled Security Mode.
In the standard mode of operation of the TOE the LDBM and SDBM back-ends and the
ICTX plug-in may be used. Other LDAP back-end configurations and plug-ins have not
been evaluated and must not be used.
● (Labeled Security Mode only) Each running instance of the LDAP server must run with
a single, non-SYSMULTI, non-SYSNONE, security label. Multiple server instances may
run at the same time, with the same or different security labels.
● The Advanced Replication functions of the LDAP server are not considered as part of
this evaluation and should not be used in an environment requiring an evaluated
configuration.
Each running instance of the HTTP server must run with a security label that is neither
SYSMULTI nor SYSNONE.
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SSHD (from IBM Ported Tools for z/OS), may be used, but if used:
● must be configured to use protocol version 2 and either Triple DES or one of the AES-
based encryption suites,
● must be configured in privilege separation mode, and
● must be configured to allow only password-based (including password phrase)
● authentication of users. rhost-based and public-key based user authentication may not
be used in the evaluated configuration. In Labeled Security Mode SSHD should be
configured with the SYSMULTI security label.
The Network Authentication Service component of the Integrated Security Services
component, if used, and applications exploiting it, must satisfy the following constraints:
● The Network Authentication Service must use the SAF (RACF) registry. The NDBM
registry is not a valid configuration for this evaluation.
● Cross Realm Trust relationships with foreign Kerberos realms is allowed, but the
foreign KDC must be capable of supporting the same cipher as does the z/OS KDC.
● In order to ensure strong cryptographic protection of Kerberos tickets, Triple DES or
AES should be utilized by the z/OS KDC and any KDC participating in a cross-realm
trust relationship with the z/OS KDC. DES should only be used in network
environments where the threat of cryptographic attacks against the tickets and
Kerberos-protected sessions is deemed low enough to justify the use of these weaker
encryption protocols.
● Applications supporting Kerberos may use a combination of application specific
protocols and the GSS-API functions or the equivalent native platform callable services
(the SAF R_TicketServ and R_GenSec callable services) to authenticate clients, and in
client-server authentication. Only the Kerberos mechanism may be used by
applications that utilize GSS-API or the equivalent native platform functions. The GSS-
API and R_GenSec services also enable the encryption of sensitive application
messages passed via application specific protocols. These services enable the secure
communication between client and server applications. The GSSAPI services include
the message integrity and privacy functions that validate the authenticity and secure
the communications between clients and servers.
The Network File System (NFS) server may be used, but must be configured with the SAF
or SAFEXPORT option, to ensure that all file and directory access (except possibly
directory mounting) has appropriate RACF security checks made.
SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) processing, if used, must use SSLv3 protocols. SSL and TLS
(Transport Layer Security), if used, must use either Triple DES (168-bit keys), AES (128- or
256-bit keys), or RC4 (128-bit keys) encryption. TLS re-negotiation is automatically
disabled by the TOE.
Any application performing client authentication using client digital certificates over SSL or
TLS must be configured to use RACF profiles in the RACDCERT or DIGTRING classes or
PKCS#11 tokens in ICSF to store the keyrings that contain the application private key and
the allowed Certificate Authority (CA) certificates that may be used to provide the client
certificates that the application will support. The use of gskkyman for this purpose is not
part of the evaluated configuration.
Any client that is delivered with the product that executes with the user's privileges must
be used with care, since the TSF can not protect those clients from potentially hostile
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programs. Passwords/phrases a user enters into those client programs that those clients
use to pass to the corresponding server to authenticate the user may potentially be
spoofed by hostile programs running in the user's address space. This includes client
programs for telnet, TN3270, ftp, r-commands, ssh, all LDAP utilities and Kerberos
administration utilities that require the user to enter his password/phrase. When using
those client programs the user should take care that no untrusted potentially hostile
program has been called during his session.
During interactive sessions with the TOE, users must lock their workstations when leaving
them unattended. Workstations shall be configured to lock the session after an interval of
user inactivity commensurate with the security policy.
The following elements and element components cannot be used in an evaluated system,
either because they violate the security policies stated in this Security Target or because
they have been removed from the evaluated configuration due to time and resource
constraints of the evaluation. As they are part of the base system, either they must be not
configured for use or they must be deactivated, as described in Chapter 7, “The evaluated
configuration for the Common Criteria” in z/OS Planning for Multilevel Security and the
Common Criteria:
● All Bulk Data Transfer (BDT) elements: BDT, BDT File-to-File, and BDT Systems
Network Architecture (SNA) NJE
● Connection Manager
● The Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) component (FMID HRSS190) of the
Integrated Security Services element
● DCE Base Services (FMID HMB3190)
● The DFS™ Server Message Block (SMB) and DFS DCE-DFS (FMID H0H2390)
components of the Distributed File Service element
● The Enterprise Identity Mapping component of the Integrated Security Services
element
● Infoprint® Server
● JES3
● The Advanced Program-to-Program Communication/ Multiple Virtual Storage
(APPC/MVS) component of the BCP
● Process Manager component from the UNIX System Services Element
● The z/OS LDAP Server component of the Integrated Security Services element (FMID
JRSL38A). For LDAP functionality in the evaluated configuration use the IBM Tivoli
Directory Server for z/OS (FMID HRSL380) component of z/OS instead.
The use of TCP/IP communication for JES2 NJE has not been part of the evaluation and
must not be used in the evaluated configuration.
The JES2 Execution Batch Monitor (XBM) facility has not been part of the evaluation and
must not be used in the evaluated configuration.
The RACF Remote Sharing Facility has not been part of the evaluation and must not be
used in the evaluated configuration.
The Data Facility Storage Management Subsystem (DFSMS) Object Access Method for
content management type applications must not be used.
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The IBM Ported Tools for z/OS HTTP Server V7.0 (FMID HHAP700) must not be used.
For the Communications Server:
● The z/OS FTP server and client, and the z/OS TN3270 server, support both manually-
configured SSL/TLS, or AT-TLS. This evaluation has considered only AT-TLS
configurations, and as a result manual configuration of those components to use SSL
or TLS is not allowed for evaluated configurations.
● The z/OS FTP server and client can support either the protocols from the draft
standard for securing FTP with TLS/SSL, or the protocols from the formal RFC 4217
level of Security FTP with TLS/SSL. This evaluation has considered only the formal
RFC 4217 level of support, and as a result that option must be used in the evaluated
configuration.
● The following applications must not be used in Labeled Security configurations, as
noted in the Communications Server IP Configuration Guide: HOMETEST command,
IUCV, LPD, LPQ command, LPR command, LPRM command, LPRSET command,
NCPROUTE, NPF, Portmapper, SMTP, SNMP NetView client, TELNET client
command, TESTSITE command, TNF, VMCF, z/OS UNIX Network SLAPM2 subagent,
z/OS UNIX OMPROUTE SNMP subagent, z/OS UNIX popper, z/OS UNIX RSVP
agent, z/OS UNIX SNMP client command, z/OS UNIX SNMP server and agent, z/OS
UNIX Trap Forwarder Daemon.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
● The component ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0534-2009, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the following functional
changes:
● System SSL now also supports TLSv1.1. This required an update of all SFRs dealing
with cryptographic operations previously only covering TLSv1. Updates to System SSL
specific description have been made to address conformance to RFC3280.
● Communication Server NSS also provided XMLAppliance services for certificate
management, private key operations and RSA signature creation and RSA decryption
using ICSF-protected keys.
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● BCPii functionality has been included, which allows for making available Hardware
Management functions (enforced by the underlying abstract machine, i.e. an LPAR) to
authorized TOE users. The HWICONN, HWQUERY, HWICMD, HWILIST, HWIEVENT,
HWIREVENT, and HWISET functions that allow for interaction with the Hardware
Management Console from within z/OS are protected by respective RACF resources in
the FACILITY class.
● The LDAP SDBM backend functionality available in the evaluated configuration was
updated to allow administrators to issue RACF commands (USER, GROUP,
CONNECT, RDEFINE, RDELETE, RALTER, SETROPTS) that are translated into
respective R_admin() calls by the backend.
● Additional information on the administrators ability to establish OMVS information for
users and groups has been added. This includes automatic assignment of unique UID
and GID for users that had not been assigned an OMVS segment before.
● For NFS logins it is no longer required - but still supported - for clients to use the
mvslogin command. If a client does not use mvslogin, the NFS server uses SAF and
RACF functions instead to map the Kerberos principal ID to a local RACF user ID to be
used.
● In order to comply with RFC3280, the certificate policies extension must be marked
critical and must satisfy the policies by the issuing certificate chain. Also the Basic
Constraints extension and the Key Usage extension must be present.
● Server certificates may be stored in a RACF keyring or a PCS#11 token in ICSF TKDS.
● PKI services can generate RSA keys up to 2048 bits for the certificates if requested.
The requestor is notified after generation of a key pair and can pick up the keys using
the link provided. End users also are enabled to recover previously requested
certificates and private keys by providing email address and passphrase.
● Packet Filtering functionality was added that allows for filtering network traffic based on
IP-addresses, ports and communication protocols used. That new feature also
implements a default "deny" policy for all network traffic.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance:
Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0,
01 June 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0067-2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Labeled Security, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Extended Identification and Authentication, Version 2.0, 28
May 2010 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant with extensions specific to the product
CC part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
Annex B in part D of this report.
The TOE design shows the TOE subsystems that implement the security functions defined
in the Security Target. Any modification to those subsystems may have security-critical
impacts and therefore needs to be assessed.
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Another critical area is the addition of a trusted program that has not been part of the
evaluation. Those programs also may have side-effects that are able to subvert the
security functions of the TOE and therefore need to be assessed.
Other programs, as long as they are not called by an administrative user running with
elevated privileges, are bound by the security policy enforced by the TOE and may be
installed and executed from normal user accounts without invalidating the results of this
evaluation.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
● the TOE Security Functions “RACF Passtickets”, “Authentication via Client Digital
Certificates”, “Authentication via Kerberos” and “Communication Security” and
● for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
ACEE Accessor Environment Element
AT-TLS Application-Transparent TLS
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CN common name
DAC Discretionary access control
DN distinguished name
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
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IOCDS input/output configuration data set
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MAC Mandatory Access Control
MVS Multiple Virtual Storage
PADS program access to data sets
POSIX Portable Operating System Interface for UNIX
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
PR/SM™ Processor Resource/Systems Manager™
PTF Program Temporary Fix
RACF Resource Access Control Facility
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SDSF System Display and Search Facility
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMF System Management Facility
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE security policy
12.2 Glossary
Abstract Machine - A processor design that is not intended to be implemented as
hardware, but which is the notional executor of a particular intermediate language
(abstract machine language) used in a compiler or interpreter. An abstract machine has an
instruction set, a register set, and a model of memory. It may provide instructions that are
closer to the language being compiled than any physical computer or it may be used to
make the language implementation easier to port to other platforms.
Access - If an authorized user is granted a request to operate on an object, the user is
said to have access to that object. There are numerous types of access. Examples include
read access, which allows the reading of objects, and write access, which allows the
writing of objects.
Access Control Policy - A set of rules used to mediate user access to TOE-protected
objects. Access control policies consist of two types of rules: access rules, which apply to
the behavior of authorized users, and authorization rules, which apply to the behavior of
authorized administrators.
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Accessor Environment Element - A RACF control block that describes the current user’s
security environment.
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Authorization - If an authorized user is granted a requested service, the user is said to
have authorization to the requested service or object. There are numerous possible
authorizations. Typical authorizations include auditor authorization, which allows an
administrator to view audit records and execute audit tools, and DAC override
authorization, which allows an administrator to override object access controls to
administer the system.
Authorized Administrator - An authorized user who has been granted the authority to
manage all or a defined subset of the functions of the TOE. Authorized administrators are
expected to use this authority only in the manner prescribed by the guidance that is given
to them.
Authorized User - A user who has been properly identified and authenticated. Authorized
users are considered to be legitimate users of the TOE. (Note: this is different from the
z/OS concept of an “authorized program” which is a program running in supervisor state,
or system key, or with APF authority.)
Category - See security category.
Classification (MLS) - A hierarchical designation for data that represents the sensitivity of
the information. The equivalent IBM term is security level.
Common Name (CN) - One component of an LDAP object’s complete name, usually
specified as cn=name.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) - An access control policy that allows authorized
users and authorized administrators to control access to objects based on individual user
identity or membership in a group (PROJECTA, for example).
Distinguished Name (DN) - The complete name of an object in an LDAP directory, or the
complete name of the subject or issuer of a digital certificate.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) - A client/server protocol for accessing a
directory service.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) - An access control policy that determines access
based on the sensitivity (SECRET, for example) and category (PERSONNEL or MEDICAL,
for example) of the information that is being accessed and the clearance of the user who is
trying to gain access to that information.
Mediation - When DAC and MAC policy rules are invoked, the TOE is said to be
mediating access to TOE-protected objects.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - A named set of either functional or assurance requirements (e.g. EAL 3).
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Password - For the purposes of this evaluation, a 6 to 8 character secret value used
during some forms of user authentication, and allowing upper- and lower-case alphabetic,
numeric, or national ($, #, @) characters. Passwords are initially assigned by
administrators, but may be changed by the user to whom they are assigned.
Password Phrase - A 14 to 100 character secret value used in a manner similar to a
password, except for its length and an expanded set of valid characters (upper- and lower-
case alphabetic, special (including blanks), or numeric). In addition to assigning a
password, administrators may assign a password phrase to a user.
Note: Phrase may be shorter (down to 9 characters) if enabled by an administrator-
installed exit (ICHPWX11) that RACF supplies.
Password/Phrase - A shorthand term for “password or password phrase” sometimes used
in this security target when statements apply equally to passwords or to password
phrases.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
SECLABEL - Synonym for security label.
SECLEVEL - Synonym for security level (IBM).
Security Category - A special designation for data at a certain level, which indicates that
only people who have been properly briefed and cleared for access to data with this
category can receive permission for access to the information.
Security Label - A name that represents the combination of a hierarchical level of
classification (IBM security level) and a set of non-hierarchical categories (security
category). Security labels are used as the base for Mandatory Access Control decisions.
Security labels are sometimes referred to as SECLABELs.
Security Level (IBM) - A hierarchical designation for data that represents the sensitivity of
the information. Security levels are sometimes referred to as SECLEVELs. The equivalent
MLS term is classification.
Security Level (MLS policy in the Bell-LaPadula model) - The combination of a
hierarchical classification (called security level in z/OS) and a set of nonhierarchical
categories that represents the sensitivity of information is known as the security level. The
equivalent term in other IBM documentation is security label.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Sensitivity Label - A specific marking attached to subjects or objects that indicates the
security level. The equivalent to this MLS term in other IBM documentation is security
label.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of
the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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Trusted channel - A means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT product can
communicate with necessary confidence.
User - A person who is trying to invoke a service that is offered by the TOE.
User data - Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF.
User ID - In z/OS, a string of up to eight characters defined as a RACF USER profile that
uniquely identifies a user. Users who may use UNIX services will additionally have a
numerical user identifier (UID) that is used by the UNIX subsystem for access decisions.
The user name is an additional attribute that usually holds the user’s full name. While
users can modify their user names, only administrators can change user IDs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0637-2010, Version 7.02, 2010-06-02, Security Target for
IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 11, IBM corp.
[7] Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0, 01 June 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0067-
2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Labeled Security, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Extended Identification and Authentication, Version 2.0,
28 May 2010
Federal Office for Information Security
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1, 2010-06-02, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, 2010-03-30, file name: cm.lists.r11.zip (confidential
document)
[10] MLSGUIDE z/OS Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria,
Eleventh Edition, Version GA22-7509-10, April 2010
[11] z/Architecture Principles of Operation, Eighth Edition, Version SA22-7832-07,
February 2009
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 September 2001, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 4, 3 December 2003, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0637-2010 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0637-2010 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 57
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0637-2010
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 11 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 30 June 2010, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_FLR.3, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site Address
Poughkeepsie (POK) 2455 South Rd, Poughkeepsie, NY 12601, USA
Research Triangle Park (RTP) Building 500, 4205 South Miami Blvd, Durham, NC, USA
Silicon Valley Labs (SVL) 555 Bailey Avenue, San Jose, CA 95141, USA
Böblingen (BOE) Schönaicher Straße 220, 71032 Böblingen, Germany
Boulder (BLD) 6300 Diagonal Highway, Boulder, CO 80301, USA
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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