National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
LG Electronics Inc.
LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6)
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10912-2018
Dated: December 14, 2018
Version: 0.3
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
LG Android 8 devices Validation Report Version 0.3, December 14, 2018
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
John Butterworth
Michelle Carlson
Jenn Dotson
Stelios Melachrinoudis
The MITRE Corporation
McLean, VA
Kenneth Stutterheim
The Aerospace Corporation
Columbia, MD
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Raymond Smoley
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 6
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 7
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 7
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 7
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
8 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 8
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 9
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 9
8.3 Test Environment................................................................................................ 9
8.4 Testing Tools ...................................................................................................... 9
9 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 10
10 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 11
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 11
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 11
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 11
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 12
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 12
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 12
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 13
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 13
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 14
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 14
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 14
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 15
LG Android 8 devices Validation Report Version 0.3, December 14, 2018
(G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6)
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ,
V30, G6) solution provided by LG Electronics Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of
the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either
expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in December 2018. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. Those reports are summarized in the publicly available Assurance
Activity Report (AAR) for this evaluation. The evaluation determined that the product is
both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance
requirements of the Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16
June 2017 (MDFPP31) and the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended
Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016
(WLANCEP10).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30,
G6). The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version
of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the LG Electronics Inc.
LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6) (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10)
Security Target, version 0.6, November 26, 2018 and analysis performed by the Validation
Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6)
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017
(MDFPP31) and the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended
Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08
February 2016 (WLANCEP10)
ST LG Electronics Inc. LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6)
Security Target, version 0.6, November 26, 2018
Evaluation
Technical Report
Evaluation Technical Report for LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ,
V30, G6), version 0.3, December 3, 2018
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, rev
4
Conformance
Result
CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor LG Electronics Inc.
Developer LG Electronics Inc.
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Item Identifier
Common Criteria
Testing Lab
(CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators John Butterworth, MITRE Corporation
Michelle Carlson, MITRE Corporation
Jenn Dotson, MITRE Corporation
Stelios Melachrinoudis, MITRE Corporation
Kenneth Stutterheim, The Aerospace Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a mobile device that can support both enterprises and individual users. Based
upon Android 8.0 with 4.9, 4.4, and 3.18 Linux kernels in the ThinQ, V30, and G6 devices
respectively, and improved by LG (for example, by adding NIST approved cryptographic
algorithms, strengthening X.509 certificate checking, bolstering keystore protection, and
applying security patches) to meet the MDFPP requirements, the TOE provides wireless
connectivity and provides an execution environment for mobile applications.
The TOE allows basic telephony features (make and receive phone calls, send and receive
SMS/MMS messages) as well as advanced network connectivity (allowing connections to
both 802.11 Wi-Fi and 2G/3G/4G LTE mobile data networks). The TOE supports using
client certificates to connect to access points offering WPA2 networks with 802.1x/EAP-
TLS, or alternatively connecting to cellular base stations when utilizing mobile data.
The TOE offers mobile applications an Application Programming Interface (API) including
those provided by the Android framework and through extensions to the Android
DevicePolicyManager API by LG.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration consists of the following models:
Product Carrier Security SW Version OS version Build number WFA Cert#
LG G7 ThinQ
G710VM
Verizon MDF v3.1 Release 3 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA76595
LG G7 ThinQ
G710PM
Sprint MDF v3.1 Release 3 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA76600
LG G7 ThinQ
G710TM
T-Mobile MDF v3.1 Release 3 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA76597
LG G7 ThinQ
G710ULM
Open MDF v3.1 Release 3 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA76840
LG V35 ThinQ
V350AWM / LG
AT&T MDF v3.1 Release 3 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA76799
WFA76601
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Product Carrier Security SW Version OS version Build number WFA Cert#
V35+ ThinQ
V350AWA
LG V35 ThinQ
V350ULM
Open MDF v3.1 Release 3 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA76841
LG V30 H931 AT&T MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA72469
LG V30 VS996 Verizon MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA72468
LG V30+
LS998U
Sprint MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA72470
LG V30 H932 T-Mobile MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA72471
LG V30 US998
LG V30+
US998U
Open,
U.S.
Cellular,
LRA
MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA72472
LG G6 H871 AT&T MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA69452
LG G6 VS988 Verizon MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA69251
LG G6 LS993 Sprint MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA69457
LG G6 H872 T-Mobile MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA69454
LG G6 US997 Open,
U.S.
Cellular,
LRA
MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA69455
During the evaluation, Gossamer utilized a Verizon model of each phone for all testing.
Furthermore, one must configure the TOE into its Common Criteria Mode in order to utilize
the TOE in its evaluated configuration. As described in the Admin Guide, one must select
the following options to configure the TOE into Common Criteria Mode:
1. Enable the password on the lock-screen (done by an MDM Agent or by the user
through the UI)
2. Enable SD card encryption (via MDM Agent or UI)
3. Set CC mode (using an MDM API either through an MDM Agent or through the
standalone app referenced in the Admin Guide)
Doing this ensures that the phone complies with the MDFPP requirements (for example
restricting TLS/HTTPS ciphersuites, disallowing ‘Download Mode’, disabling ‘Smart
Lock’, disallowing VPN split-tunneling).
Please refer to the Admin Guide for more details on how to accomplish the necessary
configuration steps.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a rich API to mobile applications and provides users installing an
application the option to either approve or reject an application based upon the API access
that the application requires (or to grant applications access at runtime).
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The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption,
including all user and mobile application data stored in the user’s data partition. The TOE
uses a key hierarchy that combines a REK with the user’s password to provide protection to
all user and application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE. Moreover, the TOE provides
users the ability to AES encrypt data and files stored on an SD Card inserted into the device.
Finally, the TOE can interact with a Mobile Device Management system (not part of this
evaluation) to allow enterprise control of the configuration and operation of the device so as
to ensure adherence to enterprise-wide policies (for example, enabling CC mode, or
restricting use of the device’s camera, etc.).
The TOE includes several different levels of execution including (from lowest to highest)
hardware, a Trusted Execution Environment, Android’s Linux kernel, Android’s user space,
Android’s Android Runtime (ART) environment for mobile applications, and the mobile
applications themselves.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure (without the rear
access cover present, so that one can access and replace the device’s battery, SIM, and SD
Card).
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic components (including its BoringSSL library, its Kernel
Loadable Cryptographic module, and its Application Processor) with CAVP certified
algorithms for a wide range of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation
and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing
and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random
bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key
storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are
used to implement security protocols such as TLS and HTTPS and to encrypt Data-At-Rest
(including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications running
on the TOE.
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4.2 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of
the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data
using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The
TOE supports Android for Work profiles to provide additional separation between
application and application data belonging to the Android for Work profile. Please see the
Admin Guide for additional details regarding how to set up and use Android for Work
profiles.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports features related to identification and authentication. From a user
perspective, except for FCC mandated (making phone calls to an emergency number) or non-
sensitive functions (e.g., choosing the keyboard input method or taking screen shots), a
password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the
TOE. Also, even if the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the
password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's
display. The frequency of password entry is limited and when a configured number of
password entry failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can
be constructed using upper and lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters.
Password lengths up to 16 characters are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an IEEE 802.1X supplicant and can both use X.509v3 and validate
certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified
throughout the Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices.
Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while others are restricted
to administrators who may be operating through a Mobile Device Management solution if
the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and is then later un-enrolled, it
will remove Enterprise applications, MDM policies, and disable CC mode.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements functions to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.
It protects sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or
exportable. It provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is
available (e.g., for log accountability). The TOE enforces read, write, and execute memory
page protections, uses address space layout randomization and stack-based buffer overflow
protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It protects against
modification by applications and will isolate the address spaces of applications from one
another to protect those applications.
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The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will
not enter into its operational mode. It includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital
signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the
updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital
signature checking functionality extends to verifying applications prior to their installation
as all applications must have signatures, even if self-signed.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can be locked either by the user or after a configured interval of inactivity thereby
obscuring its display. The TOE also has the capability to display an administrator specified
(using the TOE’s MDM API) advisory message (banner) when the user unlocks the TOE for
the first use after reboot.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to secure
communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017 and
the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless
Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016 (WLANCEP10)
That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10 should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP31/WLANCEP10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
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 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and the
Wireless Local Area Network Clients Extended Package and performed by the
evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10 and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were
not covered by this evaluation.
 Android for Work functionality can be used to account for BYOD scenarios where
personal data and Enterprise data are separated; however, it is not required for
compliance to the PPs. Therefore, its use is out of scope and it has not been evaluated.
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 LG Electronics Inc. LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6)
Guidance Documentation, Version 0.2, October 12, 2018
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon
when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the LG Electronics Inc. LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30,
G6) Guidance Documentation, Version 0.2, October 12, 2018. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guide from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured
as evaluated.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report
(MDFPP31/WLANCEP10) for LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6),
Version 0.3, November 30, 2018 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity
Report.
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8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10 including the tests
associated with optional requirements.
8.3 Test Environment
8.4 Testing Tools
 Standard Windows utilities (e.g., notepad, snip tool)
 Putty version 2013-11-27:r10097
 HxD (Hexeditor) version 1.7.7.0
 LGUP version 1.15
 adb (Android Debug Bridge) version 1.0.31
 Wireshark version 2.6.1
 OpenSSL version 1.0.2g-fips
 freeradius version 3.0.15
 strongswan version 5.1.2.0
 micro-httpd
 tcpdump
Figure 1 Evaluator Test Setup
Ubuntu
RADIU
S
Kali
Linux
Wireshark
Ubuntu
Linux
Windows
Network – Putty
Connection
USB Connection
USB Connection /
Wireless adb
LG Device
LG Device
Evaluator Sniffing Configuration
Evaluator Direct Connect
Configuration
Access Point
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 adb (Android Debug Bridge) version 1.0.39
 Evaluator developed test scripts
 Developer provided TOE device apps (*.apk files) and scripts (*.sh
files) – the developer created a number of apps and scripts for the
purpose of testing the TOE devices. The scripts, complied apps, and
app source files were provided to the evaluators. Each applicable
app and script is identified in the context of relevant test cases – the
scripts are included verbatim and the apps are described (based on
evaluator use and examination of app sources).
 airmon-ng
 Wireshark version 1.12.3
 Mobile Device Management app LGMDMClient7_1_16_debug.apk
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following series and models:
Product Carrier Security SW Version OS version Build number WFA Cert#
LG G7 ThinQ
G710VM
Verizon MDF v3.1 Release 3 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA76595
LG G7 ThinQ
G710PM
Sprint MDF v3.1 Release 3 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA76600
LG G7 ThinQ
G710TM
T-Mobile MDF v3.1 Release 3 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA76597
LG G7 ThinQ
G710ULM
Open MDF v3.1 Release 3 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA76840
LG V35 ThinQ
V350AWM / LG
V35+ ThinQ
V350AWA
AT&T MDF v3.1 Release 3 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA76799
WFA76601
LG V35 ThinQ
V350ULM
Open MDF v3.1 Release 3 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA76841
LG V30 H931 AT&T MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA72469
LG V30 VS996 Verizon MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA72468
LG V30+
LS998U
Sprint MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA72470
LG V30 H932 T-Mobile MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA72471
LG V30 US998
LG V30+
US998U
Open,
U.S.
Cellular,
LRA
MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA72472
LG G6 H871 AT&T MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA69452
LG G6 VS988 Verizon MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA69251
LG G6 LS993 Sprint MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA69457
LG G6 H872 T-Mobile MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA69454
LG G6 US997 Open,
U.S.
MDF v3.1 Release 2.1 Android 8.0 OPR1.170623.032 WFA69455
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Product Carrier Security SW Version OS version Build number WFA Cert#
Cellular,
LRA
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Android 8
devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6) TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs
contained in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the LG Android 8 device (G7 ThinQ, V35
ThinQ, V30, G6) products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluation team
performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10 related to the
examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
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to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10 and recorded the
results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover
any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and the Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 9/5/2018 using the following search terms:
"LG", "LGE", "Judy", "LG Judy", "LG V30", "V30", "BoringSSL", "Android", "Android
8", "Kernel Loadable Cryptographic Module", "Application Processor Cryptographic",
"Kernel Loadable Cryptographic Module Algorithm", "Application Processor
Cryptographic Algorithm", “LG Lucy”, “LG Joan”, “LG V30”, “LG G6” , “G6”, “V30”.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay attention to the evaluated configuration of the
appliances as the functionality that was evaluated was scoped exclusively to the security
functional requirements specified in the Security Target. For example, although mentioned
in the configuration guide and available on the devices, the LG VPN client was not part of
this evaluation.
Additionally, the validators encourage the consumers of these products to understand the
relationship between the products and any functionality that may be provided via Mobile
Device Management solutions. This evaluation neither covers nor endorses the use of any
particular MDM solution and only the MDM interfaces of the products were exercised as
part of the evaluation.
As tested, the LG Android 8 devices utilized security software MDF v3.1 Release 3. No
earlier or later versions of the software were tested, and hence their use would place the
device outside the evaluated configuration. Mobile devices may come preloaded with
software from both the vendor and carrier. That software was not evaluated and therefore no
claims can be made as to their effectiveness nor to its correct operation.
In practice, the LG MDM is not available, though the TOE settings could be managed via a
suitable MDM and corresponding agent. Alternatively, LG has developed a downloadable
application that can be utilized to put the device into CC mode – MDM Test.apk. The LG
Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6) Guidance Documentation contains
instructions on how the application can be acquired. As of the conclusion of this evaluation,
an administrator can send an e-mail to support-enterprise-mobility@lge.com to request the
application.
Over-The-Air (OTA) updates were not available during the evaluation; these are created by
Google and the mobile device vendors, then distributed to the wireless carriers (Verizon,
AT&T, etc.), for deployment to the respective devices via the carrier’s network. Therefore,
the OTA update functionality was not directly tested. The TOE, in its evaluated CC mode,
prevents a user from installing a new software image via USB, as CC mode prevents the
phone from entering its download mode during boot. Thus, in CC mode, the phone can only
update via Firmware Over The Air (FOTA). The update can be made available by the carrier,
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but the administrator/enterprise administrator would still need to evaluate and approve the
installation of the update.
The consumer should note that the LG G6 model supports Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR) to applications but not ASLR to the kernel.
When FCS_CKM_EXT.5 was tested, the audit record for “Failure of the wipe” showed a
date that was not within the timeframe of the evaluation. The lab confirmed that this
information represents the date of the kernel and does not represent the current date that the
audit record was generated.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: LG Electronics Inc. LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ,
V35 ThinQ, V30, G6) (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10) Security Target, Version 0.6, November
26, 2018.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
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 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[4] Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017 and
the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless
Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016
(WLANCEP10).
[5] LG Electronics Inc. LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6)
(MDFPP31/WLANCEP10) Security Target, Version 0.6, November 26, 2018 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10) for LG Android 8 devices
(G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6), Version 0.3, December 3, 2018 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10) for LG Android 8 devices (G7
ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6), Version 0.3, November 30, 2018 (DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ,
V30, G6), Version 0.3, December 3, 2018 (ETR)
[9] LG Electronics Inc. LG Android 8 devices (G7 ThinQ, V35 ThinQ, V30, G6)
Guidance Documentation, Version 0.2, October 12, 2018