Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007
for
Outbound Downgrade Filter
of ASDE Link-1 Forward Filter version 1.5
from
NATO C3 Agency
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007
Outbound Downgrade Filter
of ASDE Link-1 Forward Filter version 1.5
from
NATO C3 Agency Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 14. June 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Outbound Downgrade Filter of ASDE Link-1 Forward Filter version
1.5 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Outbound Downgrade Filter Link-1 Forward Filter
version 1.5 was conducted by CSC Deutschland Solutions GmbH. The CSC
Deutschland Solutions GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by
BSI.
The sponsor is:
NATO C3 Agency
Oude Waalsdorperweg 61
p/o Postbus 174
2501 CD The Hague
The Netherlands
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 14. June 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-24.
The product Outbound Downgrade Filter of ASDE Link-1 Forward Filter version
1.5 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
NATO C3 Agency
Oude Waalsdorperweg 61
p/o Postbus 174
2501 CD The Hague
The Netherlands
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 13
3 Security Policy 14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 15
5 Architectural Information 16
6 Documentation 17
7 IT Product Testing 18
8 Evaluated Configuration 19
9 Results of the Evaluation 19
10 Comments/Recommendations 21
11 Annexes 21
12 Security Target 21
13 Definitions 21
14 Bibliography 24
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The TOE is the Outbound Downgrade Filter of ASDE Link-1 Forward Filter
version 1.5. It is a software application of an Air Situation Data Exchange
(ASDE) that will permit one-way Link-1 message streams to be securely and
automatically screened for the contents considered to be classified within a
trusted and secure environment (typically a transmitting NATO facility such as a
Control and Reporting Centre). The screening rules applied depend upon a
mode of operation (peace, exercise, crisis response or article 5 operational
mode).
The Link-1 Forward Filter aims at downgrading sanitized outbound
CLASSIFIED8
Link-1 Messages into NATO UNCLASSIFIED/Partner Nations
RELEASABLE Link-1 Messages. When classified messages are encountered,
the content of these messages will not be transmitted. When Link-1 message
fields containing information considered to be classified are encountered, the
bits in those fields will be set to zero before the message itself will be
transmitted. The Link-1 Forward Filter sends the downgraded and sanitized
messages out over unencrypted and unprotected serial communications lines.
The Link-1 Forward Filter can also be used to verify that the Link-1 data
received from the Partner Nations equals the Link-1 format but this is not a
function under evaluation.
The Link-1 Forward Filter runs mandated on a secure and certified operating
system, that is served by an accompanying hardware platform, which is located
in a secured location, that can only be accessed by authorised personnel who
have been ‘screened’ as a condition of their employment by NATO.
The IT product Outbound Downgrade Filter of ASDE Link-1 Forward Filter
version 1.5 was evaluated by CSC Deutschland Solutions GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 13. April 2007. The CSC Deutschland Solutions
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)9
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor is
NATO C3 Agency
Oude Waalsdorperweg 61
p/o Postbus 174
2501 CD The Hague
The Netherlands
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1],
8
‘CLASSIFIED‘ is used as placeholder for the real classification (e.g. NATO CONFIDENTIAL)
9
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007
part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance
level EAL4 (TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed).
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security audit
FDP User data protection
FMT Security Management
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FRU Resource utilisation
FTP Trusted path/channels
Table 1: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE. :
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security audit
FDP User data protection
FIA Identification and Authentication
FMT Security Management
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
Table 2: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.4.
All security functional requirements for the IT environment are implemented by
Secure_IT_Platform.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.Downgrade This function aims at downgrading sanitized O.Data_Class
from the classified to unclassified partition on the Secure
Operating System.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF. Audit_Export This function aims at recording audit logs of all operations
done by the security functions in order to trace all changes
made on the Link-1 data.
SF.Check_Integrity This function aims at checking the integrity of the downgraded
O.Data_Unclass by recalculating its cyclic redundancy check.
SF.Check_Sanitarization This function aims at verification and sanitization of
O.Data_Class mandated by the O.Filter_Rule_Set appropriate
for the current SA.Oper_Mode.
SF.Disregard This function aims at disregarding and deleting invalid
outcomes of other security functions in a controlled manner to
prevent unelaborated distribution of O.Data_Class or
O.Data_Unclass.
SF.Pack This function shall add a cyclic redundancy check to the
sanitized O.Data_Class. The added cyclic redundancy check
is used to verify after the downgrade the resulting
O.Data_Unclass is not altered
SF.Sanitize This function aims at the sanitization of O.Data_Class as
mandated by the O.Filter_Rule_Set appropriate for the current
SA.Oper_Mode
SF.Set_Mode This function will set the appropriate set of filter rules that will
be enforced by the operation R.Sanitize.
SF.StartStop This function records the date and time of the testframe start-
up and shutdown.
SF.Test This function will test the correct operation of the filter and the
Secure_IT_Platform.
SF.Verify_Outbound This function aims at verification of syntactical compliance of
the O.Data_Class received from the L1-Provider.
SF.Consider_Logout This function aims at recognition of an (unexpected) end of
the operator console process.
SF.Operator_Input This security function records start and stop of the operator
console as well as all user input.
SF.Keep_Alive This function aims at sending O.Ping to the testframe every 10
seconds when no other O.Command will be sent.
SF.Sec_Com_Op This function aims at building up a secure network connection
to the testframe part in order to be able to exchange
O.Command and O.Output_Message in a secure way.
SF.Sec_Com_Testframe This function aims at building up a secure network connection
to the operator console in order to be able to exchange
O.Command and O.Output_Message in a secure way
SF. Keep_Alive_Check This function aims at receiving O.Command (including O.Ping)
from the operator console and controlling the information flow
between the L1-providing System and LIFOS.
Table 3: Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
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1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE does not use any probabilistic or permutational mechanisms, and thus
a Strength of Function claim is not appropriate. Therefore, no Strength of
Function is claimed.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
1.4.1 Definition of subjects, objects and operations
Non-human Subjects
The systems (equipment) that interact with the TOE are:
L1-Provider Link-1 Providing System (or equivalent system such as
an ASDE Buffer) that supplies a Link-1 Stream to the
TOE. The L1-Provider is located in an IT environment
with the same regime as the TOE, which is authorised to
process CLASSIFIED information.
LIFOS Accredited hardware system consisting of information
diodes that ensure the flow of serial line data in one
direction only. LIFOS is connected to the TOE and to a
non-NATO system, which is expected to follow similar
rules as within the NATO establishment, but is not under
NATO control. LIFOS is located in an IT environment that
is authorised to contain NATO crypto equipment.
Secure_IT_Platform Certified secure IT Platform on which the TOE runs,
consisting of a secure operating system and
accompanying hardware. The secure software is the
SUN Trusted Solaris 8 operating system as specified in
[9]. The hardware comprises the SUN Blade/SPARC
100/150 and serial communication cards.
Authorized human subjects
The only user that interacts with the TOE is:
S.SysOper User role defined by Secure_IT_Platform. This role is the
operator of the TOE and is allowed to start and stop the
TOE (both parts) via the Console. In addition, the role
may start and stop the system, allocate system
resources such as disks, start and stop queues, etc.
The users that are present within the TOE environment are:
S.Audit User role defined by Secure_IT_Platform. This role is the
Auditor of the audit output of the TOE and of audits in the
TOE IT environment. Only the S.Audit role can analyse,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007 Certification Report
back up and restore system audit logs when the
testframe part of the TOE is not running. The audit logs
are regularly reviewed.
S.ISSO User role defined by Secure_IT_Platform. This role is the
Information System Security Officer of the TOE IT
environment. Only the S.ISSO role can create new user
accounts and establish or change security related
settings like contents of the label encoding file, user
clearance limits, etc. At least two on-site named persons
shall always be allocated to this role.
S.SysAdmin User role defined by Secure_IT_Platform. This role is the
system administrator of the TOE IT environment.
S.SysAdmin shall undertake normal UNIX administration
duties such as maintaining user passwords, etc.
S.SysAdmin is the only role able to modify user
accounts, but cannot create new accounts. No user able
to operate in the S.SysAdmin role shall also have the
possibility to operate in the S.ISSO or S.Audit role. At
least two on-site named persons shall always be
allocated to this role.
S.SysOper, S.Audit, S.ISSO and S.SysAdmin are all authorised to access the
IT environment of the TOE. Authorisation is settled conform to NATO
regulations. These persons are characterized as follows:
• Competent to perform their duties;
• Able to perform the appropriate security procedures;
• Have an appropriate screening of at least the site level of accreditation;
• Are trusted not to abuse his authority;
• Are trusted not to compromise security measures;
• Are not considered to be hostile;
• Are capable of making mistakes (although not intentionally).
Security Attributes of Subjects
SA.Oper_Mode This security attribute defines the four possible
operational modes of the L1-Provider and the TOE.
• Peace Operational Mode
• Exercise Operational Mode
• Crisis Response Operational Mode
• Article 5 Operational Mode
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SA.OS_MAC_Level This security attribute defines the four mandatory access
control operational levels of the Secure_IT_Platform10
.
These levels are (from highest to lowest classification):
• Admin high, Classified,
• Unclassified,
• Software,
• Admin Low.
SA.OS_Priv_Level This security attribute defines the privileges (privileged or
unprivileged) to determine if a subject may execute a
trusted system call, or a general system call of the
Secure_IT_Platform in a trusted manner (i.e., file write
with MAC override). SA.OS_Priv_Level is independent of
SA.OS_MAC_Level.
SA.Subject_Identity Associated security attribute for a subject that equals the
name of the subject, i.e. L1-Provider and LIFOS.
Objects
For all objects the following security attribute holds:
SA.Security_Label This security attribute defines the two classification levels
that data processed by the TOE and its environment can
have. The classification levels are CLASSIFIED and
NATO UNCLASSIFIED/PN RELEASABLE.
The (data) objects for the TOE that the TOE will operate upon are:
O.Data_Audit Audit data log record produced by the TOE. The data
has SA.Security_Label ‘CLASSIFIED‘.
O.Data_Class A packet of data having a sequence number and
SA.Security_Label ‘CLASSIFIED’. The packet can take
the following forms:
1. Bit stream: Series of bits that are probably a Link-1
message.
2. Link-1 Message: Link-1 Message.
3. Sanitized Link-1 Message: Link-1 Message sanitized
by the operation R.Sanitize (see section operations).
O.Data_Unclass A sanitized O.Data_Class having SA.Security_Label
‘NATO UNCLASSIFIED/PN RELEASABLE’.
10
All authorized human subjects have a SA.OS_MAC_Level defining in which operation
level they are allowed to operate:
- S.SysOper, S.Audit, S.ISSO operate at SA.OS_MAC_Level ‘Admin high, Classified’
- S.SysAdmin operates at SA.OS_MAC_Level ‘Admin Low’.
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O.Filter_Rule_Set The set of rules that define which (parts of)
O.Data_Class need to be sanitized given by the
SA.Oper_Mode of the L1-Provider of this ST. The set
has SA.Security_Label ‘CLASSIFIED’.
O.Command Messages send from the operator console to the
testframe part of the TOE. These messages contain
commands for the testframe entered by the user at the
operator console.
O.Ping A special O.Command the operator console sends
regularly to the testframe. This informs the testframe that
the operator console is running.
O.Output_Message Messages send from the testframe part of the TOE to the
operator console. These messages contain information
the operator console has to display.
Operations
R.Audit_Trail This operation writes O.Data_Audit to an audit trail of the
Secure_IT_Platform.
R.CRC_Check This operation confirms or denies whether the cyclic
redundancy check of O.Data_Unclass equals the cyclic
redundancy check calculated by R.CRC_Pack for the
corresponding sanitized O.Data_Class.
R.CRC_Pack This operation calculates a cyclic redundancy check over
a sanitized O.Data_Class and the cyclic redundancy
check is added to this sanitized O.Data_Class.
R.Disregard This operation disregards all data in O.Data_Class or
O.Data_Unclass.
R.Downgrade This operation generates a new O.Data_Unclass with the
data of a sanitized O.Data_Class.
R.Sanitize This operation applies O.Filter_Rule_Set on
O.Data_Class. This means this operation generates a
new O.Data_Class that contains a Link-1 Message which
fulfils O.Filter_Rule_Set (some bits are zeroed or a blank
message).
R.Set_Mode This operation sets the O.Filter_Rule_Set to one of the
SA.Oper_Mode values.
R.Test This operation checks the integrity of the TOE and the
presence of the Secure_IT_Platform.
R.Verify_Outbound This operation confirms or denies whether O.Data_Class
coming from L1-Provider conforms syntactically to [11].
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Non-Authorized subjects (Threat Agents)
The following subjects are capable to effectuate threats for the TOE (i.e. Threat
Agents):
TA.Erroneous_User S.SysOper, S.Audit, S.ISSO or S.SysAdmin capable of
making mistakes with organizational security policies or
accidentally modifying the Secure_IT_Platform or the
TOE configuration, thereby allowing security violations to
occur.
TA.Unclass_Receiver Entity, human person or IT system not authorised to
receive O.Data_Class. This entity is capable of receiving
an outgoing Link-1 data stream from the TOE outside the
TOE environment.
1.4.2 Threats
T.BYPASS
O.Data_Class are passed from the Link-1 Providing System to the TOE. In the
TOE these data are processed and recorded. After the processing these data
become NATO UNCLASSIFIED/PN RELEASABLE. The O.Data_Class are only
available on the interface with the Link-1 Providing System, within the TOE or
from the recording (Audit_Trail).
A TA.Unclass_Receiver is able to read O.Data_Class either immediately, or in
some point in the future, because TA.Erroneous_User has logically or physically
bypassed the protection functions of the TOE. This may be possible due to
errors in or an erroneous configuration of the underlying operating system or
failures of the physical access controls to the hardware. This threat may occur
at each time a TA.Erroneous_User has logical or physical access to the
hardware, operating system or the TOE or when an already existing bug within
the operating system becomes effect.
T.MODE_SYNC
A TA.Unclass_Receiver is able to read O.Data_Class because
TA.Erroneous_User has not synchronized SA.Oper_Mode of the TOE with
SA.Oper_Mode of the L1-Provider. This threat occurs when TA.Erroneous_User
does not perform a required change of SA.Oper_Mode. Due to the fact that
TA.Erroneous_User is allowed to change SA.Oper_Mode, only communication
problems with the other L1-Provider or human failure could be the reason.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0342-2007 Certification Report
T.NEGLIGENCE
A TA.Erroneous_User makes a mistake, for instance inserting a wrong
operational mode in the TOE (e.g. Exercise instead of Peace) that possibly
violates P.DECLASSIFICATION_POLICY causing that TA.Unclass_Receiver is
able to read O.Data_Class and S.Audit does not notice. This threat may occur
when TA.Erroneous_User performs a change of SA.Oper_Mode. Due to the
fact that TA.Erroneous_User is allowed to change SA.Oper_Mode, only human
failures could be the reason.
T.OPERATOR_DOES_NOT_EXIT
A TA.Erroneous_User logs out of the operating system but does not exit the
operator console before. This may happen because the user starts the operator
console as independent process in the background or the operating system
puts the process in the background during log off of the user. Therefore, this
threat may occur at any time. The operator console keeps running and the time-
out mechanism of the TOE testframe part does not work. Therefore, there is no
human operator to monitor the warning messages the TOE generates. This may
result in O.Data_Class sent out without appropriate sanitization to
TA.Unclass_Receiver.
T.TOE_REPROGRAM
A TA.Erroneous_User may reprogram or modify the TOE binary stored on the
hard disk, causing it to pass through O.Data_Class either immediately or in
some point in the future. For this purpose TA.Erroneous_User can use the tools
usually installed with the underlying operating system. This threat is possible
because TA.Erroneous_User must have access to the TOE binary for his
normal work and the appropriate tools are installed on the system. Due to the
fact that the access to the TOE is not restricted for TA.Erroneous_User, this
attack or mistake may occur every time TA.Erroneous_User works on the
system.
1.4.3 Organisational Security Policies
P.DECLASSIFICATION_POLICY
The TOE shall implement and comply with the NATO declassification policy
appropriate for downgrading classified information. This policy defines the
• Filter rules: the set of rules for the circumstances under which information
will be allowed for declassification.
• Condition: the condition for an automated system under which the filter rules
are allowed to be applied. The condition is: It shall be retrievable when an
O.Data_Class has been sent out.
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P.INTER-TOE-COMMUNICATION
The two parts of the TOE shall establish a communication in such a way that
• the testframe receives all O.Command’s from the operator console
• only the testframe receives the O.Command’s
• the operator console receives all O.Output_Message’s from the testframe
• only the operator console receives the O.Output_Message’s
P.KEEP-ALIVE-POLICY
• If there is no other O.Command communication the operator console must
send an O.Ping message to the testframe every 10 seconds.
• The testframe must be able to work without a running operator console but
for three (3) minutes maximum.
• After this period of time the testframe has to stop working. This means,
O.Data_Class from L1-Provider must be blocked.
P.TOE_DATA_INPUT
Outbound is defined as coming from the L1-Provider to the TOE.
The TOE shall be able to handle input streams with the following
characteristics:
A bit stream coming from an L1-Provider can have any form and can possibly
conform to [11].
P.TOE_FAIL_INSECURE
If the testframe part of the TOE software fails, a TA.Unclass_Receiver is able to
read O.Data_Class either immediately or in some point in the future because
the failure results in a forwarding of unsanitized messages.
The TOE shall be able to handle failures in the hardware, in the operating
system or the TOE itself in such a way that unsanitized messages will not be
forwarded.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE runs on a secure evaluated IT Platform and is connected via a
security-accredited NC3A Link-1 Fibre Optic Secure Modem (LIFOS) to the
receiving site at the partner nation ensuring that the sanitized data flows only
from the classified side to the unclassified side to the Partner Nation as
specified in [9].
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1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
• From the outside, attacks can only be performed via a data stream from the
Partner Nation. It is assumed that this data stream has to pass a LIFOS and
can therefore not reach the TOE.
• It is assumed that from the inside, Link-1 messages are received from a
Link-1 Provider, which is assumed to be a NATO certified system.
• The NATO security policy concerning security principles, personnel security,
physical security, security of information and information security
(INFOSEC) is mandated for the TOE and its IT environment [NATO-SP].
The IT environment operates within a CLASSIFIED accredited facility for
boundary protection devices and crypto devices.
• It is assumed that the operating system does not deny a communication
between the two parts of the TOE.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Outbound Downgrade Filter of ASDE Link-1 Forward Filter version 1.5
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Testframe part of the Outbound
Downgrade Filter of ASDE Link-1
Forward Filter version 1.5 including
the configuration file
1.5 installed on hard-drive
2 SW Operator Console of the Outbound
Downgrade Filter of ASDE Link-1
Forward Filter version 1.5 including
the configuration file
1.5 installed on hard-drive
3 DOC System Installation Manual 1.5 hardcopy
4 DOC System User Manual 1.5 hardcopy
Table 4: Deliverables of the TOE
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The TOE will be installed together with the Trusted Operating System on a
hard-drive and then delivered via courier separated from the other hardware.
The hard-drive containing the TOE is a classified registered item and will be
handled in accordance with standard NATO procedures for the transport and
registration of classified items. In particular the courier certificates assigned to
the transport of the hard drive containing the TOE will carry serial numbers of
the hard-drive as well as identification and stock numbers. Acknowledgement of
proper reception of classified items shall be retransmitted to the registry of the
sending party.
In order to protect the integrity of the binary, the TOE performs a self check at
its start-up and prints out the calculated CRC checksum of the binary. This
checksum will be sent to the final user by a separate letter transported by a
courier or NATO secure intranet. The user checks the integrity by comparison of
the checksums.
3 Security Policy
The Link-1 messages received by the TOE from a Link-1 providing system may
be classified. It is not allowed that these messages or at least the classified
parts of these messages will be sent out to partner nations.
Therefore, the classified parts of the messages shall be sanitized in order to be
admissible to declassify the message to NATO UNCLASSIFIED/PN
RELEASEABLE.
The sanitization and the declassification process shall comply with the NATO
declassification policy appropriate for sanitization and declassification of
classified information. This policy defines the
• Filter rules: The set of rules for the circumstances under which information
will be allowed for declassification. This includes the rules for sanitization of
(or parts of) classified messages. This rule set can be considered as
definition of the NATO declassification policy. The TOE implements these
rules.
• Condition: The condition for an automated system under which the filter
rules are allowed to be applied. The condition is: It shall be retrievable when
a classified Link-1 message has been sent out. More specific:
- It must be prevented that a message with classified content will be
sent out
- It must be retrievable when a unclassified message derived from a
classified message
- It must be retrievable when an unclassified message has been sent
out
The TOE and its IT environment must comply with the condition requirements.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
A.U.ONLY_WAY
The TOE assumes that it is the only path for the O.Data_Class to be
downgraded to O.Data_Unclass so it can be passed on from an L1-Provider to
LIFOS.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
A.E.OUTSIDE
From the outside, attacks can only be performed via a data stream from the
Partner Nation. It is assumed that this data stream has to pass a LIFOS and
can therefore not reach the TOE.
Therefore, it exist no possibility that incoming messages from the outside
interfere with the sanitization and downgrading process.
A.E.INSIDE
It is assumed that from the inside, Link-1 messages are received from a Link-1
Provider, which is assumed to be a NATO certified system.
A.E.RECORDING
The Trusted Operating System keeps a record of all actions on the system on
the level of the operating system.
A.E.NATO_SECURITY_POLICY
The NATO security policy concerning security principles, personnel security,
physical security, security of information and information security (INFOSEC) is
mandated for the TOE and its IT environment. The IT environment operates
within a CLASSIFIED accredited facility for boundary protection devices and
crypto devices. Application of the policy includes the following:
1. Logical
a. Only authorized personnel can have access to the Secure_IT_Platform.
b. Remote access to the Secure_IT_Platform is not allowed.
c. All users of the Secure_IT_Platform are appropriately identified and
authenticated, and have the appropriate access rights and are held
accountable for their actions.
d. No user (program or human) of the Secure_IT_Platform can
unintentionally delete, overwrite or manipulate any system programs,
logs, or data.
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2. Organisational
a. S.Audit shall immediately notify S.ISSO in case of any threats or
vulnerability that impacts P.DECLASSIFICATION_POLICY.
b. Information shall be used only for its authorized purpose(s).
3. Personnel
a. The personnel who need access to the TOE or the environment running
the TOE must be screened according to site accreditation requirements.
b. S.SysOper, S.Audit, S.ISSO and S.SysAdmin shall be held accountable
for their actions.
c. Only S.SysOper, S.Audit, S.ISSO and S.SysAdmin shall be able to access
O.Data_Class.
4. Physical
a. The TOE shall be located in a physically secured room within a NATO
facility accredited for the site level of accreditation.
b. Access to this room is restricted to authorized persons listed in access
lists.
A.E.TOE_ACCESS_POLICY
S.SysOper is the only user role that is allowed to interact with the TOE.
A.E.INTER-TOE-COMMUNICATION
It is assumed that the operating system does not deny a communication
between the two parts of the TOE.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of two software applications. The testframe part and the
operator console.
The testframe part is the actual filter and responsible for filtering and forwarding
the frames flowing from the Link1 providing system to LIFOS.
The operator console is the interface to the user and controls the filter. It is
responsible for getting the input of the human operator. The user is able to input
commands at the Operator Console.
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Testframe
Admin high, classified Unclassified
Trusted Operating System
Filter functionality
SF.Keep_alive_check
Operator Console
SF.Consider_Logout
SF.Keep_alive
SF.Sec_Com_Op
SF.Sec_Com_Testframe
SF.Operator_Input
Trusted Operating System
Figure 1: Overview of the Security Functions of the communication functionality
and their relation.
6 Documentation
The following documentation belongs to the TOE:
[9] System Installation Manual, Link 1 Forward Filter (LFF) for Air Situation
Data Exchange (ASDE) with Partner Nations (PN), Version 1.5, Feb
2007
[10] User Manual, Link 1 Forward Filter (LFF) for Air Situation Data Exchange
(ASDE) with Partner Nations (PN), Version 1.5, Feb 2007
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7 IT Product Testing
The following figure gives an overview over the test configuration employed by
the developer and the evaluator for testing.
TOE
ASDE Link-1
Forward Filter
outbound
System 2
System 1a
TOE
ASDE Link-1
Forward Filter
outbound
System 1b
Figure 2: Test Configuration
Figure 2 shows the hardware configuration on a high level. Normally, the tests
will be performed on System 1a. System 2 acts as Link-1 providing system and
as Partner Nation. For technical reasons, some tests will be performed on
System 1b. For these tests, the physical connections between System 1a and
System 2 will be unlinked and the physical connection between System 1b and
System 2 will be established.
SYSTEM 1a
This system works as ASDE L1FF system and is therefore installed and
configured appropriately.
SYSTEM 1b
Some tests cannot be performed on a system running Trusted Solaris 8
because the additional software required for these tests cannot be installed
there. Therefore, these tests will be performed on a system running Standard
Solaris 8.
This system also works as ASDE L1FF system and is therefore installed and
configured appropriately.
The hardware connection from SYSTEM 1a to SYSTEM 2 will be disconnected
from SYSTEM 1a and connected to SYSTEM 1b, if appropriate.
The very first test case performs a TOE installation on the SYSTEM 1a. Due to
the fact that the installation instructions for the TOE do not cover the installation
of the operating system, SYSTEM 1b will be installed without performing a
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special test case. It is presupposed that the SYSTEM 1b is already installed and
configured at the start of the tests.
SYSTEM 2
This system works as Link-1 providing system and as Partner Nation system
and is therefore installed and configured appropriately.
Developer Tests
The developer testing was performed successfully on the evaluated
configuration of the TOE.
Complete coverage was achieved for all the TOE security functions as specified
in the security target an the functional specification.
The overall test depth of the developer tests comprises the high-level design
subsystems and the internal interfaces of those subsystems as required for the
assurance level of the evaluation.
Evaluator Tests
A selected subset from the security test suite have been successfully repeated by
the evaluation facility. The achieved test results matched the expected results as
documented by the developer in the developer test documentation. Furthermore, a
set of independent tests has been performed successfully by the evaluation facility.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The Outbound Downgrade Filter of ASDE Link-1 Forward Filter version 1.5 was
evaluated in the configuration as described in the ETR [8] and summarised in
this certification report. There is only one configuration of the TOE.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4 and
the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the
following table:
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.2 PASS
Table 5: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 conformant,
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Outbound Downgrade
Filter of ASDE Link-1 Forward Filter version 1.5 as identified in table 4.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [9]/[10] contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete security target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
AIS Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen (Guidance and
Interpretations)
ASDE Air Situation Data Exchange
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
L1 Link-1
L1FF Link-1 Forward Filter
LIFOS Link-1 Fibre Optic Secure System
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NC3A NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency
PN Partner Nations
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
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Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version
2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0342, version 1.12, date of issue:
01.02.2007 , Link1 Forward Filter (L1FF), NATO C3 Agency (confidential
document)
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0342, 1.13, date of issue: 06.02.2007 ,
Link1 Forward Filter (L1FF), NATO C3 Agency (sanitized public
document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, version 1.0, 13.04.2007, CSC Deutschland
Solutions GmbH (confidential document)
[9] System Installation Manual, Link 1 Forward Filter (LFF) for Air Situation
Data Exchange (ASDE) with Partner Nations (PN), Version 1.5, Feb
2007
[10] User Manual, Link 1 Forward Filter (LFF) for Air Situation Data Exchange
(ASDE) with Partner Nations (PN), Version 1.5, Feb 2007
[11] NATO-MAS, Standardization Agreement Tactical Data Exchange - Link 1
(point-to-point), edition 4 (NATO UNCLASSIFIED)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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