BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
for
Cisco Catalyst 6500-E Series Switches - Cisco IOS
Software, Version 15.1(1)SY1, RELEASE
SOFTWARE (fc5)
from
Cisco Systems, Inc.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.75
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
Network Device
Cisco Catalyst 6500-E Series Switches
Cisco IOS Software, Version 15.1(1)SY1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc5)
from Cisco Systems, Inc.
PP Conformance: U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile -
Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 1.0
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 20 February 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department SOGIS Recognition
Agreement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
5 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................21
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
6 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Cisco Catalyst 6500-E Series Switches, Cisco IOS Software, Version
15.1(1)SY1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc5) has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI.
The evaluation of the product Cisco Catalyst 6500-E Series Switches, Cisco IOS Software,
Version 15.1(1)SY1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc5) was conducted by media transfer AG.
The evaluation was completed on 19 February 2014. media transfer AG is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Cisco Systems, Inc.
The product was developed by: Cisco Systems, Inc.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Cisco Catalyst 6500-E Series Switches, Cisco IOS Software, Version
15.1(1)SY1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc5) has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
9 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
This page is intentionally left blank.
10 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
11 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
1 Executive Summary
The TOE is the “Cisco Catalyst 6500-E Series” switching and routing platform, i.e. a
network device composed of hardware and software that is connected to the network and
has an infrastructure role in the overall enterprise.
The TOE is used to construct IP networks by interconnecting multiple smaller networks or
network segments. As a Layer2 switch, it performs analysis of incoming frames, makes
forwarding decisions based on information contained in the frames, and forwards the
frames toward the destination. As a Layer3 switch/router, it supports routing of traffic
based on tables identifying available routes, conditions, distance, and costs to determine
the best route for a given packet.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the U.S. Government
Approved Protection Profile - Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 1.0 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Security Audit The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit
logs that identify specific TOE operations. For
each event, the TOE records the date and time of
each event, the type of event, the subject identity,
and the outcome of the event.
Cryptographic Support The TOE provides cryptography support for
secure communications and protection of
information.
User Data Protection The TOE supports three mechanisms to filter
traffic and enforce flow control: VLANs, ACLs and
VACLs.
Identification and Authentication All users wanting to use TOE services are
identified and authenticated prior to being allowed
to access any of the services. The TOE performs
authentication, using Cisco IOS platform
authentication mechanisms, to authenticate
access to user EXEC and privileged EXEC
command modes.
Security Management The TOE provides secure administrative services
for management of general TOE configuration
and the security functionality provided by the
TOE. All TOE administration occurs either
through a secure IPSec tunnel, or a local console
connection (serial port).
12 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Protection of the TSF The TOE provides secure transmission when
TSF data is transmitted between separate parts
of the TOE.
Resource Utilization The TOE provides the capability of controlling
and managing resources so that a denial of
service will not occur. The resource allocations
are configured to limit the number of concurrent
administrator sessions.
TOE Access The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an
authorized administrator configurable time period.
Once a session has been terminated the TOE
requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a
new session.
Trusted Path/channels The TOE establishes a trusted path between the
appliance and the CLI and the syslog server
using IPSec encrypted connection. The TOE can
also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer VPN
tunnels.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] , chapter 6.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] , chapter 3.3 .
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for cryptographic algorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9,
Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Cisco Catalyst 6500-E Series Switches, Cisco IOS Software, Version 15.1(1)SY1,
RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc5)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
13 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
No Type Identifier Form of Delivery
1 SW Software version id: IOS 15.1(1)SY1
TOE Image name: s2t54-adventerprisek9-mz.SPA.151-1.SY1.bin
SHA-256 hash value of TOE image file:
67951355B24F7E8EF26FA0A19635748CAD5EC57BEB713C4BEE976EF042971574
Download from
Cisco website.
2 DOC Guidance documentation, Cisco Catalyst 6500-E Series Switches,
Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative
Procedures, Cisco Systems, Inc., EDCS 1182242, Version 1.0
SHA-256 value of PDF file:
C815F1B3F730CD83DE321AA8C83D8628F1E838C0CD70A749404E9385AB64A59F
Download from
Cisco website.
3 HW One or more WS-C6503-E, WS-C6504-E, WS-C6506-E,
WS-C6509-E, or WS-C6513-E Switch Chassis
One or more Supervisor 2T (Sup2T) Cards (VS-S2T-10G or
VS-S2T-10G-XL) per chassis
Each Sup2T running IOS 15.1(1)SY1
With one or more of the following Line Cards installed to one or more
chassis:
• WS-X6908-10G-2TXL / WS-X6908-10G-2T
• WS-X6848-SFP-2TXL / WS-X6848-SFP-2T
• WS-X6824-SFP-2TXL / WS-X6824-SFP-2T
• WS-X6848-TX-2TXL / WS-X6848-TX-2T
• WS-X6816-10G-2TXL / WS-X6816-10G-2T
• WS-X6816-10T-2TXL / WS-X6816-10T-2T
• WS-x6904 Estelle-4x40 GE / 16x10 GE (Lite or XL)
Package delivered
by trusted delivery
firm.
Perform
acceptance
procedures.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The following non-TOE parts are necessary to operate the TOE:
No Identification Version Required by the
TOE
1 Management
Workstation with
IPSec Client
Any server that supports the IPSec protocol may be
used.
YES
2 NTP Server Any server that supports NTPv1 (RFC 1059), NTPv2
(RFC 1119), or NTP v3 (RFC 1305) may be used.
NO
3 Syslog server Any server that supports the syslog functionality
according to RFC 5424.
YES
4 Authentication Server RADIUS RFC 2865, 2866, 2869 and RFC 3162 (IPv6)
and TACACS+ RFC 1492)
YES
Table 3: Components in the TOE Environment
14 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
2.1 Ordering of TOEs by customers:
TOEs can be ordered by customers with support contracts via the Cisco Connection
Online (CCO) procedures.
All orders are transferred electronically to Cisco manufacturing for processing. TOEs are
assembled from TOE parts.
TOE parts are TOE image and TOE hardware:
• The TOE image consists of TOE software and TOE documentation. The TOE
software in turn consists of the operating system IOS 15.1(1)SY1. The TOE
documentation in turn consists of guidance documentation, release notes and/or
defect reports.
• The TOE hardware consists of a set of chassis, supervisor engines, and line cards
according to the configuration list.
TOE images can be ordered separately, independent of TOE hardware.
2.2 Delivery of TOEs to customers:
The final packaged TOE product (TOE image and TOE hardware) is distributed together
with its shipping documents (traveller paperwork, license pack). Cisco uses trusted
delivery firms for the delivery of TOEs to their customers.
2.3 Acceptance of TOEs by customers:
The customer has to follow the procedures for “Secure acceptance of the TOE” when
receiving the shipped TOE product. Procedures for “Secure acceptance of the TOE” are
described in the guidance documentation [9], section 2.
Particularly, the customer has to check:
• Before unpacking, inspect the physical packaging of the equipment and verify that
the external cardboard packing is printed with Cisco logo and motifs.
• Verify that the packaging has not been opened and re-sealed.
• Verify that the packaging has white tamper-resistant Cisco bar coded labels applied.
• Compare the serial number of the TOE on the shipping documentation with the
serial number on the separately mailed invoice for the equipment.
• Verify that the box is indeed shipped from the expected delivery firm.
• Unpack the TOE package and inspect the contents.
• Verify the serial numbers on the components match the serial numbers of the
shipping documentation and the serial numbers of the invoice.
• Install the TOE hardware.
• Inspect the TOE documentation.
• If a TOE image has been downloaded, check the cryptographic SHA-256 checksum
of the image (e.g. Table 2, No. 1) and install the TOE image onto the TOE
hardware.
• Start the TOE as described in the guidance documentation [9] and verify the correct
(evaluated) version of the TOE is running.
15 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
If any of these checks fails, the customer has to inform the developer about it.
The TOE hardware components can be identified by the part number printed on the
tamper-resistant Cisco labels applied to each hardware component. See Table 2 for the list
of allowed part numbers with respect to chassis, supervisor engine cards and line cards.
Additionally, with a running TOE all hardware components can be listed using the following
IOS command “show inventory”. The printed part numbers can be checked against Table
2, No 3.
The TOE firmware can be identified using the IOS command “show version”. The IOS
version must match with the following information taken from the Guidance Documentation
[9]: The TOE displays "Cisco IOS Software, s2t54 Software
(s2t54-ADVIPSERVICESK9-M), Version 15.1(1)SY1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc5)
The TOE documentation can be identified by the document title, the version, and EDCS
number as well as by a cryptographic SHA-256 checksum (e.g. Table 2, No. 2).
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: Security Audit, Cryptographic
Support, User Data Protection, Identification and Authentication, Security Management,
Protection of the TSF, Resource Utilization, TOE Access and Trusted Path/channels.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE, OE.PHYSICAL, OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The Switch subsystem architecture is composed of the following functional blocks:
• Runtime Functionality:
The runtime functionality is the core/kernel operating system functionality for the
switch subsystem as well as the system runtime clock. It encompasses resource
management operations (e.g., device control), and operations creating the process
context in which other functionality operates.
• Crypto Engine Functionality:
The crypto engine functionality implements support for cryptographic operations
used by other parts of the subsystem. These functions include key generation, key
destruction, encryption, decryption, signature services, hashing and keyed-hash
authentication.
• IPsec Functionality and IPsec Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Functionality:
The IPsec functionality and IKE functionality cooperate to allow the TOE to use
authentication and encryption services to prevent unauthorized viewing or
modification of data as it travels over the connected networks.
16 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
• Firewall Functionality:
The firewall functionality monitors packets flowing through the switch subsystem.
This function of the switch subsystem can permit or deny traffic flows through the
TOE based on TOE security policies.
• CLI Functionality:
The CLI (Command Line Interface) functionality accepts administrative user input
from an external terminal connected via the serial line or via an IPsec secured
remote terminal connection.
• Logging Functionality:
The logging functionality receives system event messages that are generated as
normal part of TOE operation and stores them in an internal or external buffer so
they can be retrieved and reviewed by an authorized administrative user.
• AAA Functionality:
The AAA functionality is used primarily for local or remote authentication as well as
local authorization.
Using the functionality provided by the components listed above the TOE subsystem
implements the following logical interfaces:
• TSFI_1.1 Management Commands,
• TSFI_1.2 Security Audit Commands,
• TSFI_2.1 Network Traffic (External) Interface,
• TSFI_2.2 Network Traffic (Internal) Interface,
• TSFI_2.3 IPsec Network Interface,
• TSFI_3.2 Time Server Interface,
• TSFI_3.3 AAA Interface, and
• TSFI_3.4 Syslog Interface.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Description of the test configuration
The independent testing was performed in the test environment that has been installed
and configured at the evaluator’s lab using the hardware and software components
delivered by the developer.
The most advanced and complex TOE configuration, the Virtual Switching System (VSS)
configuration, was selected for independent testing, though any other configuration with
only one Supervisor Module could have been selected.
17 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
In the VSS configuration, the TOE consists of two Supervisor Modules in two switch
chassis building a highly available switch cluster. Nevertheless, at any time only one
Supervisor Module is active while the other module is in a hot-stand-by mode. All TSF is
provided by the active Supervisor Module.
The TOE consists of a 6503-E and a 6509-E chassis each equipped with the Sup2T
supervisor engine which constitute the VSS Domain 10. A laptop as test client is
connected to the TOE via the External Network 192.168.217.0/24.
A Linux server located on the Internal Network (10.1.1.0/24) provides the Syslog, NTP and
RADIUS service for the TOE. The SSH client on this server is used for remote admin
access, too. The Internal Network connects to the TOE via the IPsec (transfer) Network
(10.2.2.0/24). This IPsec network has been configured between the TOE and the
dedicated IPsec C2911 router.
A second Linux server with a Open Source IPsec implementation and a Open Source SSH
implementation is located on the Internal Network (199.99.99.0/24) and connects through
an IPsec tunnel (10.3.3.0/24) to the TOE. This server is used to test the IPsec SFRs
claimed in the ST and to provide a remote admin console using SSH within the IPsec
tunnel for connecting to the command line interface (CLI) of the TOE.
All mentioned networks (Internal, External, IPsec) are realised through the configuration of
separate VLANs on an auxiliary switch.
7.2 Independent testing approach:
For independent testing, the evaluators specified test cases with the intention of covering
all SFRs defined in the ST. For that purpose, some of the developer’s tests have been
chosen and additional evaluator tests have been specified.
For test case specification and test case execution documentation the evaluators used the
Open Source based test management tool “testlink”.
Independent test subset chosen, including a short justification:
The evaluators specified 107 individual test cases. A subset of 21 test cases are developer
provided tests that have been repeated to verify the developer test results. Another
approximately 60 test cases are motivated and derived from assurance activities required
by the NDPP. The remainder of the test cases are focused on testing boundary conditions
not tested by the developer.
7.3 Penetration testing approach
The penetration testing was performed in the test environment that has been installed and
configured at the evaluator’s lab using the hardware and software components delivered
by the developer.
The approach chosen by the evaluators is appropriate for the assurance component
AVA_VAN.2, requiring the resistance of the TOE to an attack with the Basic attack
potential. First the evaluators used publicly available sources to identify potential
vulnerabilities in the TOE, e.g.:
• Search with Internet Search Engines (e.g. Google) for vulnerabilities
• Search in CVE Repository for registered IOS vulnerabilities
• Search in OVAL Repository for registered IOS vulnerabilities
18 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
• Search the Cisco Security Intelligence Operations Portal
• Run the Cisco IOS Software Checker for known security advisories
• Search in Cisco Manuals and Cisco Whitepapers for the Catalyst 6500-E Switches
In addition the evaluators applied an “unstructured analysis” while evaluating the
developer provided Common Criteria evidence documentation to identify potential
vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE.
The evaluators analysed which of the potential vulnerabilities identified in the steps above
are not applicable to the TOE in its operational environment. For the remaining potential
vulnerabilities, the evaluators devised the attack scenarios where these potential
vulnerabilities could be exploited.
For each identified attack scenario they first performed a theoretical analysis on the related
attack potential. Where the attack potential was Basic, the evaluators conducted
penetration tests. They analyzed the results of these tests to determine, whether at least
one of the attack scenarios with the attack potential Basic was successful.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual penetration test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was
actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the Security Target
[6], provided that all configurations and measures as required by the developer in the
Guidance Documentation [9] are being applied.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is composed of hardware, software and documentation. To use the TOE in the
evaluated configuration, the TOE must be configured as specified in the “Cisco Catalyst
6500-E Series Switches, Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative
Procedures”.
The hardware of the evaluated configuration of the TOE consists of two chassis, one
supervisor engine per chassis, and one line card per chassis.
The software of the evaluated configuration of the TOE consists of an image for Cisco IOS
version 15.1(1)SY1, to be run identically on each supervisor engine.
The evaluated configuration of the TOE is uniquely referenced by labels found at different
locations of the components. The labels are both physically available as printed text on
hardware components, and they are electronically available as output text from the
configuration command line of the TOE.
See Table 2 for the precise description of the evaluated configuration of the TOE.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used. For RNG assessment the scheme
interpretation AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
19 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - Protection Profile
for Network Devices Version 1.0 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
1 Random bit
generation
AES-ECB
AES-CBC
FIPS PUB 197,
NIST SP 800-38A,
NIST SP 800-38D
NIST SP 800-90A
|k| = 256 n/a FCS_RBG
_EXT.1
2 Authentication IPsec:
RSA signature
generation and
verification for mutual
authentication using
SHA-1
FIPS PUB 186-3 Modulus
length =
2048
No FCS_IPSE
C_EXT.1
3 IPsec:
RSA signature
generation and
verification for mutual
authentication using
SHA-265, SHA-384
FIPS PUB 186-3 Modulus
length =
2048
Yes FCS_IPSE
C_EXT.1
20 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
4 IPsec:
Pre-shared keys:
n/a PSK of >=
22
characters
e.g.
Security
Target [6]
Yes FCS_IPSE
C_EXT.1
5 Key
Agreement
IPsec:
DH with diffie-hellman
group 14
RFC 2409
RFC 3526
plength =
2048
Yes FCS_IPSE
C_EXT.1
6 Confidentiality IPsec:
AES-CBC
FIPS PUB 197,
NIST SP 800-38A,
NIST SP 800-38D
|k| = 128
|k| = 256
Yes FCS_IPSE
C_EXT.1
7 Integrity IPsec:
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-512
FIPS PUB 180-3
FIPS PUB 198-1
|k| = 160
|k| = 256
|k| = 512
Yes FCS_IPSE
C_EXT.1
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security advisories therein have to be considered. In addition, all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
To repeat the most important information from the user guidance:
• Administrators must pay particular attention to the functionality excluded from the
evaluated configuration. Features such as HTTP/HTTPS, telnet, and SNMP are not
to be enabled in the Common Criteria compliant operational configuration.
• To be in the evaluated configuration, the TOE must be operated in “FIPS mode” of
operation to fulfill some cryptographic functional requirements.
• To be in the evaluated configuration, the system clock must be set to UTC time for
correct password timeout calculations.
21 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
• To be in the evaluated configuration, remote administration can only be done using
an IPsec secured connection between the admin console and the TOE. This is even
true if SSH is used as the protocol for accessing the command line interface.
If an IPsec secured connection between the admin console and the TOE cannot be
established, local administration via the console line must be used to operate the
TOE in its evaluated configuration.
• CMP (Connectivity Management Processor) interface provides a backup network
interface to the supervisor engine when the main Route Processor (RP) is
unreachable. To be in the evaluated configuration, the CMP must not be used.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
22 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
23 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014, Version: 1.0, 2014-01-31, ST for Cisco
Catalyst 6500-E Series Switches, EDCS 1186461, Cisco Systems, Inc.
[7] U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - Protection Profile for Network
Devices Version 1.0, Version 1.0, December 10, 2010, National Information
Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.4, Date 2014-2-18, ETR Part Summary,
media transfer AG, (confidential document)
[9] Guidance documentation, Cisco Catalyst 6500-E Series Switches, Common Criteria
Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures, Cisco Systems, Inc.,
EDCS 1182242, Version 1.0, 20 February 2014
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
24 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim chapter 10.4
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
25 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
26 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
27 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
28 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
29 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
30 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
31 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
32 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
33 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
This page is intentionally left blank
34 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
35 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0838-2014
This page is intentionally left blank.
36 / 36