TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
NL-9351 VT Leek
P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
(KVK), under number 27288788.
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2022-02
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Certification Report
ZTE OTN Solution v1.10
Sponsor and developer: ZTE Corporation
R&D Building 1, ZTE Industrial Plaza LiuXian Avenue Xili
Nanshan District, Shenzhen
P.R.C
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0648132-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0648132
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 19 April 2023
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 6
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 9
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the ZTE
OTN Solution v1.10. The developer of the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10 is ZTE Corporation located in
Shenzhen, P.R.C. and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification
Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security
properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is the ZTE OTN solution aimed to build broadband and intelligent full connection for the ICT
field in the 5G era. Based on cloud datacenters (DCs), ZTE OTN solution establishes large-capacity
interconnection pipes between DCs and between DCs and services, to implement unified transport of
fixed/wireless networks and vertical industries
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 27 June 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in
the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10 are advised
to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration
to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL3 augmented (EAL3+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw reporting procedures).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10 from ZTE
Corporation located in Shenzhen, P.R.C..
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery item
type
Identifier Software version
Hardware
models
ZXONE 9700 S3K
ZXONE 9700 G2K
ZXONE 9700 NX41
ZXONE 9700 OX42
ZXONE 9700 NXG0
ZXONE 9700 NXG1
ZXONE19700V1.10.010.002B500, including the
following patches:
ZXONE19700V1.10.010.002B500CP001
ZXONE19700V1.10.010.002B500CP002
ZXONE19700V1.10.010.002B500CP003
Hardware
models
ZXONE 7000 C2
ZXONE7000V2.00R5B111, including the following
patches:
ZXONE7000V2.00R5B111_C01
ZXONE7000V2.00R5B111_C02
Hardware
models
ZXMP M721 CX66A(E)
ZXMP M721 CX63A(E)
ZXMP M721 DX63(E)
ZXMPM721V5.10.070.001B100, including the
following patches:
ZXMPM721V5.10.070.001B100CP001
ZXMPM721V5.10.070.001B100CP002
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the ZTE OTN
Solution v1.10. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
2.2 Security Policy
The major security features of the TOE are:
 Secure management and usage of the TOE, to ensure that only properly authorized staff can
manage and/or use the TOE
 Secure interaction between various parts of the TOE and between the TOE and various
machines in the environment, so that the management data and commands cannot be read or
modified in-between
 Logging and auditing of user actions
 Information flow control for management traffic.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is the ZTE OTN solution aimed to build broadband and intelligent full connection for the ICT
field in the 5G era. Based on cloud datacentres (DCs), ZTE OTN solution establishes large-capacity
interconnection pipes between DCs and between DCs and services, to implement unified transport of
fixed/wireless networks and vertical industries.
Page: 7/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0648132-CR, dated 19 April 2023
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The TOE is widely used in metro network (including core layer, aggregation layer, and access layer)
and backbone network. They provide transmission solutions with various capacities, transmission
distances, and intelligent service applications.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Reference Name Version Date
[UG CONF] ZXONE 9700 ZXONE 7000 ZXMP
M721 Common Criteria Security
Evaluation - Certified Configuration
v3.0 2023-03-27
[UG CLI] OTN Product CLI User Manual.en-US V1.5, 2023-01-04
[UG QX] OTN Product QX Interface
Specification.en-US
V1.2, 2022-10-19
[UG-RTN] ZXONE 9700 ZXONE 7000 ZXMP
M721 Interface Specification Return
Value.en-US
V1.0 N/A
[UG
NETCONF]
ZXONE 7000 NETCONF Interface
Specification.en-US
V1.3, 2023-01-04
[UG 9700] ZXONE 9700 Quick Installation Guide R1.7, 2019-07-18
Unitrans ZXONE 9700 Packet OTN
Equipment Routine
Maintenance(V4.20)
R1.1, 2022-02-28
Unitrans ZXONE 9700 Packet OTN
Equipment Alarm Handling(V4.20)
R1.0, 2021-06-15
Unitrans ZXONE 9700 Packet OTN
Equipment Performance
Reference(V4.20)
R1.0, 2021-06-15
Unitrans ZXONE 9700 Packet OTN
Equipment Security Description(V4.20)
R1.0, 2021-06-25
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Reference Name Version Date
Unitrans ZXONE 9700 Packet OTN
Equipment Hardware
Description(V4.20)
R1.1, 2022-03-30
[UG 7000] ZXONE 7000 Quick Installation Guide R1.1, 2018-01-23
Unitrans ZXONE 7000 Cloud OTN
Equipment Routine Maintenance
Guide(V2.00)
R1.0, 2019-07-03
Unitrans ZXONE 7000 Cloud OTN
Equipment Alarm Handling (V2.00)
R1.0, 2022-06-10
Unitrans ZXONE 7000 Cloud OTN
Equipment Performance Reference
(V2.00)
R1.0, 2022-06-10
Unitrans ZXONE 7000 Cloud OTN
Equipment Security Description (V2.00)
R1.0, 2022-06-10
Unitrans ZXONE 7000 Cloud OTN
Equipment Hardware
Description(V2.00)
R1.2, 2021-12-26
[UG M721] ZXMP M721 Quick Installation Guide R2.0, 2022-04-30
Unitrans ZXMP M721 Metro-Edge OTN
Equipment Routine Maintenance
(V5.10)
R1.0, 2021-04-25
Unitrans ZXMP M721 Metro-Edge OTN
Equipment Alarm Handling (ZENIC
ONE R22)(V5.10)
R1.0, 2021-06-30
Unitrans ZXMP M721 Metro-Edge OTN
Equipment Performance Reference
(ZENIC ONE R22)(V5.10)
R1.0, 2021-06-30
Unitrans ZXMP M721 Metro-Edge OTN
Equipment Security Description(V5.10)
R1.0, 2021-06-10
Unitrans ZXMP M721 Metro-Edge OTN
Equipment Hardware
Description(V5.10)
R1.4, 2022-08-27
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer based the functional test plan on the security function requirements defined in the ST
and developer documents. These tests cover the security related aspects of the TOE functions. In
total 30 test cases are defined in test plan which covers the SSH, QX and NETCONF interfaces
consisting of 30 test cases. These test cases were then divided into four categories based on the
security relevant subsystems.
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The developer has performed all the test on all the TOE hardware models with the corresponding
software packages specified in chapter 2.1.
The evaluator created additional test cases test to confirm verification of the version of the TOE to
further exercise the behaviour of critical functionality.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
To identify potential vulnerabilities the evaluator performed the following activities:
 SFR design analysis: SFR implementation details were examined in the SFR design analysis.
During this examination potential vulnerabilities were identified.
 CWE vulnerability focus: Using the CWE weaknesses collection, the evaluator collected a list
of security questions and related answers. This approach ensured that the evaluator was
forced to think in terms of vulnerabilities from all different angles and improved completeness
in the vulnerability analysis. Also during this examination several potential vulnerabilities were
identified.
 Use of Scanning tools: The evaluator runs vulnerability scanning tools to identify potential
vulnerabilities.
 Public vulnerability search: Several additional potential vulnerabilities were identified during a
search in the public domain.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 40 hours. During that test campaign, 100% of the
total time was spent on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The evaluator has performed the tests on the following hardware models:
 ZXONE 9700 NXG1 running ZXONE 19700 V1.10.010.002B500 (with patches)
 ZXONE 7000 C2 running ZXONE 7000 V2.00R5B111 (with patches)
 ZXMP M721 DX63(E) running ZXMPM721 v5.10.070.001B100 (with patches)
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There is no reuse of evaluation results in this certification.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number ZTE OTN Solution v1.10.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10, to
be CC Part 2 conformant, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 3
augmented with ALC_FLR.2. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
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2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
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3 Security Target
The ZTE OTN Solution Security Target v1.1, 18 May 2023 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
ACL Access Control List
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BAC Basic Access Control
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
LAN Local Area Network
MAC Message Authentication Code
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
OTE Optical Transmission Equipment
OTN Optical Transmission Network
PP Protection Profile
SSH Secure Shell
TACACS+ Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System Plus
TOE Target of Evaluation
VLAN Virtual LAN
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “ZTE OTN Solution v1.10” – EAL3+, 22-RPT-
1377, Version 3.0, 19 May 2023
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[ST] ZTE OTN Solution Security Target v1.1, 18 May 2023
(This is the end of this report.)