



# Certification Report

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## Target of Evaluation (TOE)

Application Date/ID	2015-01-05 (ITC-5525)
Certification No.	C0471
Sponsor	RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
TOE Name	MP C401 (Ricoh/nashuatec/Rex-Rotary/Gestetner/infotec)
TOE Version	EE-1.00
PP Conformance	U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2 <sup>TM</sup> -2009)
Assurance Package	EAL2 Augmented with ALC_FLR.2
Developer	RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
Evaluation Facility	ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center

This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE is certified as follows.

2015-03-31

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Information Security Certification Office  
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**Evaluation Criteria, etc.:** This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following standards prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme."

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation  
Version 3.1 Release 4
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation  
Version 3.1 Release 4

## Evaluation Result: Pass

"MP C401 (Ricoh/nashuatec/Rex-Rotary/Gestetner/infotec) EE-1.00" has been evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance with the provisions of the "Requirements for IT Security Certification" by Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.

Notice:

This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme.

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## 1. Executive Summary

This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT Security Evaluation of "MP C401 (Ricoh/nashuatec/Rex-Rotary/Gestetner/infotec) EE-1.00" (hereinafter referred to as "this TOE") developed by RICOH COMPANY, LTD., and the evaluation of the TOE was finished on 2015-03 by ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility"). It is intended to report to the sponsor, RICOH COMPANY, LTD., and provide security information to consumers and procurement personnel who are interested in this TOE.

Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter referred to as the "ST") that is the appendix of this report together. Especially, details of security functional requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements of this TOE are described in the ST.

This Certification Report assumes "general consumers and procurement personnel who purchase this TOE that is commercially available" to be readers. Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance requirements to which this TOE conforms, and does not guarantee an individual IT product itself.

### 1.1 Product Overview

An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described as follows. Refer to Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.

#### 1.1.1 Assurance Package

Assurance Package of this TOE is EAL2 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2.

#### 1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality

This TOE is a digital Multi Function Product (hereafter "MFP") made by RICOH COMPANY, LTD., which provides the functions of copy, scanner, printer, and fax (option) for digitising paper-based documents, document management, and printing.

This MFP is an IT product which incorporates each function of scanner, printer, and fax with Copy Function, and is generally connected to an office LAN and used for inputting, storing, and outputting documents.

This TOE provides Security Functions required for U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2™-2009) [14], which is a Protection Profile (hereafter, "conformance PP") for digital Multi Function Products, and also provides the Security Functions to accomplish the necessary security policy for an organisation which manages the TOE.

For these security functionalities, the evaluation for the validity of the design policy and the correctness of the implementation is conducted in the scope of the assurance package. The next clause describes the assumed threats and assumptions in this TOE.

### 1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives

This TOE assumes the following threats and provides the Security Functions to counter them.

For protected assets such as the documents that the TOE handles and the setting information relevant to the Security Functions, there are threats of disclosure and tampering caused by unauthorised access to both the TOE and the communication data on the network.

This TOE provides the Security Functions to prevent those protected assets from unauthorised disclosure and tampering.

### 1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions

The evaluated product is assumed to be operated under the following configuration and assumptions.

This TOE is equipped with Fax Controller Unit (hereafter, "FCU") that provides Fax Function, Printer Unit that provides Printer Function, and Scanner Unit that provides Scanner Function, for the MFP.

It is assumed that this TOE is located in an environment where physical components and interfaces of the TOE are protected from the unauthorised access. For the operation, the TOE shall be properly configured, maintained, and managed according to the guidance documents.

### 1.1.3 Disclaimers

This TOE is assumed to be operated while the following functions are deactivated. The case that the TOE is operated with these settings changed is not included in the assurance provided by this evaluation:

- Maintenance Function
- IP-Fax and Internet Fax Function
- Authentication methods except for Basic Authentication (when Basic Authentication is applied) and Windows Authentication using Kerberos Authentication method (when External Authentication is applied)

## 1.2 Conduct of Evaluation

Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed on 2015-03, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of this TOE according to the publicised documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme"[1], "Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.

### 1.3 Certification

The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] prepared by the Evaluation Facility and evaluation documentation, and confirmed that the TOE evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The Certification Body confirmed that the TOE evaluation had been appropriately conducted in accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or [7][8][9]) and the CEM (either of [10][11]). The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report submitted by the Evaluation Facility and fully concluded certification activities.

## 2. Identification

This TOE is identified as follows:

TOE Name:	MP C401 (Ricoh/nashuatec/Rex-Rotary/Gestetner/infotec)
TOE Version:	EE-1.00
Developer:	RICOH COMPANY, LTD.

Users can verify that a product is this TOE, which is evaluated and certified, by the following means.

After confirming that the name and version of the TOE described in the guidance documents are identical to the aforementioned name and version of the TOE, users can confirm that the installed product is this evaluated TOE by comparing the name that is displayed on the MFP exterior and the version of each component, which constitutes the TOE, displayed on the Operation Panel of the TOE with the applicable descriptions in the list of the TOE configuration items described in the guidance documents.



### 3. Security Policy

This chapter describes security function policies and organisational security policies.

The TOE provides the Security Functions to counter the unauthorised access to the stored documents in the MFP, and to protect the communication data on the network.

For meeting the organisational security policies, the TOE provides the functions to overwrite the internal stored data, to encrypt the stored data in an HDD, and to prevent the unauthorised access through telephone lines via fax I/F.

For each setting that is relevant to the above mentioned Security Functions, only administrators are permitted to set configurations in order to prevent the deactivation and unauthorised use of the Security Functions.

Tables 3-1 and 3-2 show the protected assets for the Security Functions of this TOE.

**Table 3-1 TOE Protected Assets (user data)**

Type	Asset
Document information	Digitised documents, deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments under the TOE control.
Function information	Active Job executed by users. (Hereafter, referred to as "user job.")

**Table 3-2 TOE Protected Assets (TSF data)**

Type	Asset
Protected data	The information that shall be protected from changes by users without edit permission; it includes Login user name, Number of Attempts before Lockout, year/month/day setting, time setting, and Minimum Character No. of password, etc. (Hereafter, referred to as "TSF protected data.")
Confidential data	The information that shall be protected from changes by users without edit permission, and also shall be protected from reading by users without viewing permission; it includes Login password, audit log, and HDD cryptographic key. (Hereafter, referred to as "TSF confidential data.")

### 3.1 Security Function Policies

The TOE possesses the security functions to counter the threats shown in Chapter 3.1.1 and to meet the organisational security policies shown in Chapter 3.1.2.

#### 3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies

##### 3.1.1.1 Threats

This TOE assumes the threats shown in Table 3-3 and provides the functions as countermeasures against them. Although the threats are expressed differently from the conformance PP, the evaluation process confirmed the equivalence of both threats.

**Table 3-3 Assumed Threats**

Identifier	Threat
T.DOC.DIS (Document disclosure)	Documents under the TOE management may be disclosed to persons without a login user name, or to persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the document.
T.DOC.ALT (Document alteration)	Documents under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the document.
T.FUNC.ALT (User job alteration)	User jobs under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the user job.
T.PROT.ALT (Alteration of TSF protected data)	TSF Protected Data under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the TSF Protected Data.
T.CONF.DIS (Disclosure of TSF confidential data)	TSF Confidential Data under the TOE management may be disclosed to persons without a login user name, or to persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the TSF Confidential Data.
T.CONF.ALT (Alteration of TSF confidential data)	TSF Confidential Data under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the TSF Confidential Data.

\* "Persons with a login user name" mean persons who are permitted to use the TOE.

### 3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats

All threats shown in Table 3-3 describe breaches (viewing or alteration) of user data and TSF data caused by persons who are not permitted users for the TOE, or by persons who do not have any valid authorities.

These threats are countered by the following Security Functions:

#### (1) User identification and authentication

The TOE verifies that a person who attempts to use the TOE is an authorised TOE user. For this, the TOE refers to the user identification and authentication information that is obtained from that person. If the person is confirmed as an authorised TOE user, the user receives the user privileges that are set in advance in accordance with the role assigned to the user. Accordingly, this user is allowed to use the TOE. As shown in "Table 4-2 TOE Users," the roles specified by the TOE are those of normal user, MFP administrator, supervisor, and RC Gate. The entry means are the input from Operation Panel of the TOE itself, the input on a Web browser of client computers, the input via drivers when using Printer Function and LAN-Fax Transmission, and the input from RC Gate.

User identification and authentication methods for normal users are Basic Authentication and External Authentication, and either of the methods is selected when the TOE is installed. Below are the explanations of both methods for user identification and authentication. (Note that user identification and authentication for an MFP administrator and supervisor is performed on the TOE.)

##### (Basic Authentication)

A user is required to enter his or her login user name and password, and the TOE confirms that the entered data are identical to the user authentication data managed internally by the TOE. In addition, as a means to ensure the necessary functional strength, the following functions are provided:

- If users fail to be authenticated consecutively until reaching the specified number of times set by the MFP administrator, the user accounts are forced to be locked out. (The user accounts cannot be used until the lockout time elapses or the lockout is released.)
- The login passwords are required, when they are set, to be composed of more than the level of quality that has been established in terms of the length (number of characters) and the character types.

##### (External Authentication)

A user is required to enter his or her login user name and password. The entered login user name and password are sent to the authentication server that is connected to the TOE. The server checks if the entered data match the user authentication data that the server manages. The result of the check is sent to the TOE.

There are several user identification and authentication methods using an external authentication server, but only Windows authentication that uses Kerberos authentication is subject to the evaluation of this TOE.

A certificate is used as the method for RC Gate identification and authentication. When the TOE receives a certificate from an IT device to access the TOE via RC Gate communication interface, the TOE checks if the certificate matches another certificate installed in the TOE. Only if the certificate sent from the IT device matches the one installed in the TOE so that the IT device is identified as RC Gate, the IT device whose user role is RC Gate is allowed to use the TOE.

As a means to support the Identification and Authentication Function, the following functions are provided:

- Display dummy characters in place of the entered login password on the input screen.
- After once logged in, if at any time the TOE is not operated by the user or anyone in a certain period of time, the user account will be automatically logged out.

(2) Access control (Access control against the user data)

For processing request by users, access control to the document information and the user jobs is performed, based on the login user names and permissions of each user role of the users. Stored documents are associated with specific information (a document user list) that stipulates which user is allowed to perform the operation (deletion, printing, and downloading, etc.). Access control to allow or deny the operation request by normal user is performed, according to the login user names and the information in the document user list. The MFP administrator is permitted to delete any stored documents, but is not permitted to perform any other operation on stored documents.

User jobs are associated with the login user names of the users that create the jobs, and the normal user who is associated with the login user name is allowed to delete the applicable job. The MFP administrator is allowed to delete all the user jobs. The supervisor and RC Gate are forbidden to perform any operations on the user data.

(3) Overwrite residual data

In order to protect from unauthorised access to documents that have been deleted but remain residually stored in the HDD, temporary documents and their fragments in the HDD, the residual data shall be overwritten by specified data when deleting the documents.

(4) Network protection

In order to prevent information leakage by being monitored via communication paths, SSL encrypted communication is used between the TOE and client computers for the operations via a Web browser, communications using Printer Function and LAN-Fax Transmission, and communication with RC Gate. IPsec communication and S/MIME communication are also used for the communications between the TOE and the clients.

(5) Security management

In order to protect the TSF data from unauthorised access beyond the user permissions, access control is performed on actions, such as viewing or altering TOE setting information, and newly creating or altering user data in accordance with the TOE user roles. As a permission policy of information alteration (modification), normal users are only authorised to alter their login passwords, and supervisor is only authorised to alter the login passwords of the supervisor and the MFP administrators. Only MFP administrators are allowed to alter the TSF data, except for the above mentioned permissions.

### 3.1.2 Organisational Security Policies and Security Function Policies

#### 3.1.2.1 Organisational Security Policies

Organisational security policies required in use of this TOE are shown in Table 3-4. The evaluation process has confirmed that the security policies except for P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION and P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT are identical to the security policies in the conformance PP.

P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION is the security policy that assumes writing data into the HDD not in a directly readable format, and P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is the security policy that assumes protecting the communication between the TOE and RC Gate.

**Table 3-4 Organisational Security Policies**

Identifier	Organisational Security Policy
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION (User identification and authentication)	Only users with operation permission of the TOE shall be authorised to use the TOE.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION (Software verification)	Procedures shall exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
PAUDIT.LOGGING (Management of audit log records)	The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant events. The audit log shall be protected from unauthorised disclosure or alteration, and shall be reviewed by authorised persons.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT (Management of external interfaces)	To prevent unauthorised use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operations of those interfaces shall be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.
P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION (Encryption of storage devices)	The data stored on the HDD inside the TOE shall be encrypted.
P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT (Protection of communication with RC Gate)	As for communication with RC Gate, the TOE shall protect the communication data between itself and RC Gate.

#### 3.1.2.2 Security Function Policies to Organisational Security Policies

The TOE provides the security functions to meet the Organisational Security Policies shown in Table 3-4.

- (1) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.USER.AUTHORIZATION"

This security policy requires that only officially registered TOE users be allowed to use the TOE.

The TOE implements this policy by the following Security Function:

## (a) User identification and authentication

Based on the user identification and authentication described in 3.1.1.2, whether a person who attempts to use the TOE is an authorised user will be verified with reference to the identification and authentication information obtained from the user. A person is provided with the user privileges that are set in advance in accordance with the role assigned to the user, so that the authorised person is allowed to use the TOE only if the person is confirmed as an authorised user.

## (2) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION"

This security policy requires the validity of the TOE executable code to be self-verified.

The TOE implements this policy by the following Security Function:

## (a) Self test

The TOE (component items except for FCU) runs a self test during the initialisation start-up after turning on the power, and it checks the integrity and the validity of executable codes in the MFP control software. The self test verifies the hash values of firmware and confirms the integrity of the executable code. The test verifies each application on the basis of a signature key and confirms the validity of the executable code.

If something abnormal is recognised in the MFP control software during the self test, an error message is displayed on the Operation Panel, and the TOE stops the operations so that normal users cannot use the TOE. If no abnormal operations are recognised, the TOE continues the start-up processing and makes itself usable for the users.

As for the FCU, the TOE provides the verification information that allows the users to confirm the integrity. To use the TOE, the users need to verify the FCU based on this information.

## (3) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.AUDIT.LOGGING"

This security policy requires audit logs for the security events of the TOE to be acquired, and the audit logs to be appropriately managed.

The TOE implements this policy by the following Security Function:

## (a) Security audit

When auditable security events occur, the TOE generates the audit logs that consist of such items as event type, user identification, occurrence date and time, and outcome, etc., to add and save to the audit logging file. Only successfully authenticated MFP administrators are allowed to read and delete the generated audit logging file. Reading the audit logging file is executed by text format through a Web browser of client computers.

In addition, in order to record the occurrence date and time of the audit event log, the date and time information are acquired from the system clock of the TOE.

## (4) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT"

This security policy requires that external interfaces (Operation Panel, LAN interface, USB interface, and telephone lines) of the TOE is appropriately managed without being

used by unauthorised persons.

The TOE implements this policy by the following Security Functions:

(a) User identification and authentication

Based on the user identification and authentication described in 3.1.1.2, whether a person who attempts to use the TOE is an authorised user will be verified with reference to the identification and authentication information obtained from the user. A person is provided with the user privileges that are set in advance in accordance with the role assigned to the user, so that the authorised person is allowed to use the TOE only if the person is confirmed as an authorised user.

(b) Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces

This function is not an implementation for active mechanism, but is addressed as architectural design of external interfaces. By its architecture, any information received from an external interface is processed by the TSF, and any information sent to an external interface is controlled by the TSF. Thus, unauthorised forwarding of data between the different external interfaces is prevented.

As for USB interfaces, unauthorised forwarding of data by using this interface is prevented by deactivating the use of USB interfaces.

(5) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION"

This security policy requires that the TOE encrypts the stored contents on the HDD inside the TOE.

The TOE implements this policy by the following Security Functions:

(a) Stored data protection function

The encryption and decryption by AES are performed for all data written into or reading out to the HDD. When encrypting and decrypting the data, the key of 256-bits length is used. The key is created from the administrator setting an initial value and stored in the TOE.

(6) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT"

This security policy requires that any communication between the TOE and the RC Gate be protected.

The TOE implements this policy by the following Security Function:

(a) Network protection

Based on the network protection functions described in 3.1.1.2, SSL encryption is applied to communications between the TOE and the RC Gate.

## 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate this TOE as useful information for the assumed readers to determine the use of this TOE.

### 4.1 Usage Assumptions

Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate this TOE. Although the assumptions in Table 4-1 are expressed differently from the conformance PP, the evaluation process confirmed the equivalence of both assumptions.

The effective performances of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these assumptions are upheld.


**Table 4-1 Assumptions in Use of the TOE**

Identifier	Assumptions
A.ACCESS.MANAGED (Access management)	According to the guidance document, the TOE is placed in a restricted or monitored area that provides protection from physical access by unauthorised persons.
A.USER.TRAINING (User training)	The responsible manager of MFP trains users according to the guidance document so that users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation and are competent to follow those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING (Administrator training)	Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation, and are competent to correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with the guidance document following those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST (Trusted administrator)	The responsible manager of MFP selects administrators who do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes according to the guidance document.

### 4.2 Environmental Assumptions

This TOE is installed in general offices and connected to the local area networks (hereafter, "LAN"), and it is used by client computers connected to the Operation Panel of the TOE itself as well as the LAN. Figure 4-1 shows the general operational environment as assumptions of this TOE.





**Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE**

Figure 4-1 gives an example environment to handle office documents in general offices where this TOE is assumed to be used. The TOE is connected to the LAN and telephone lines.

When the TOE is connected to the LAN that is connected to an external network such as the Internet, firewalls are installed at the boundaries between the external network and the LAN to protect the LAN and the TOE from attacks that originate from the external network. The LAN is connected to server computers such as an FTP server, an SMB server, an SMTP server, and an external authentication server, and is connected to client computers and RC Gate. The LAN performs the communication for the TOE to gather data such as documents and a variety of information.

The operation of the TOE includes both cases of using the Operation Panel of the TOE and using client computers. Installing printer drivers or fax drivers in client computers enables to process printing via the local area network from the client computers.

Although the reliability of hardware and software shown in this configuration is outside the scope of this evaluation, it is assumed to be trustworthy.

Table 4-2 shows the associated users to use of the TOE in this environment.

Table 4-2 TOE Users

User Definition		Explanation
Normal user		A user who is allowed to use the TOE. A normal user is provided with a login user name and can use normal functions of MFP.
Administrator	Supervisor	A user who is authorised to modify the login password of the MFP administrator.
	MFP administrator	A user who is allowed to manage the TOE and performs the management operations such as user data management of normal user, device management, file management, and network management.
RC Gate		An IT device connected to networks. This device is for operations such as collecting data via the RC Gate communication interface, so that @Remote can be performed, which is a set of remote diagnosis maintenance services for the TOE.

As shown in Table 4-2, the TOE users are classified into normal user, administrator, and RC Gate. According to the roles, administrators shall be identified as supervisor and MFP administrator. The users shown in Table 4-2 are direct users of the TOE. There is also a responsible manager of the MFP who, as an indirect TOE user, is authorised to select the MFP administrator and supervisor. The responsible manager of the MFP is assumed to be an organisational manager in the operational environment.

#### 4.3 Clarification of Scope

The scope of this TOE covers the entire products as sold to users that are equipped with the FCU that provides Fax Function to the MFP. The FCU is provided as an optional feature, and the developer installs it on the MFP in the user's environment. Following performance check(s), the MFP as the TOE is delivered to the user.

## 5. Architectural Information

This chapter explains the scope of this TOE and the main components (subsystems).

### 5.1 TOE Boundary and Components

Figure 5-1 shows the composition of the TOE. The TOE is the entire MFP product.




Figure 5-1 TOE Boundary

As shown in Figure 5-1, the TOE consists of the following hardware: Operation Panel Unit, Engine Unit, Fax Controller Unit, Controller Board, HDD, Ic Ctlr, Network Unit, USB Port, and SD Card Slot. The general description of each configuration item is described as follows:

[Operation Panel Unit (hereafter, referred to as "Operation Panel")]

The Operation Panel is attached to the TOE and is an interface device that the TOE users use for the TOE operation. It features the following devices: key switches, LED indicators, an LCD touch screen, and Operation Control Board.

**[Engine Unit]**

The Engine Unit contains a Scanner Engine that is an input device to read paper documents, Printer Engine that is an output device to print and eject paper documents, and Engine Control Board that controls each engine.

**[Fax Controller Unit (FCU)]**

The Fax Controller Unit is a unit that has a modem function and sends or receives fax data to and from other fax devices with G3 standard when connected to a telephone line.

**[Controller Board]**

The Controller Board is a device that contains Processors, RAM, NVRAM, Ic Key and FlashROM. The following describes the components of the Controller Board:

- Processor  
A semiconductor chip which carries out the basic arithmetic processing of MFP operations.
- RAM  
A volatile memory medium which is used as the image data.
- NVRAM  
A non-volatile memory medium which stores the MFP control data to configure the MFP operation.
- Ic Key  
A security chip which has the function of a random number generation and cryptographic key generation. It is used to detect alteration of the MFP Control Software.
- FlashROM  
A non-volatile memory medium in which the MFP Control Software is installed.

**[HDD]**

The HDD is a hard disk drive which image data and user data to be used for identification and authentication are written into.

**[Ic Ctlr]**

The Ic Ctlr is a security chip that has the functions to encrypt the information stored into the HDD and decrypt the information read from the HDD.

**[Network Unit]**

The Network Unit is an external interface to an Ethernet (100BASE-TX/10BASE-T) LAN.

**[USB Port]**

The USB Port is an external interface to connect a client computer to the TOE for printing directly from client computers. This interface is disabled at the time of installation.

**[SD Card Slot]**

The SD Card Slot is used for inserting an SD Card. The SD Card Slots are inside and on the front of the MFP. The SD Card Slot on the front of the device is disabled at the time of operation, and the SD Card is not operated by hand in normal operation.

## 5.2 IT Environment

The TOE is connected to the LAN and communicates with server computers, such as an FTP server, an SMB server, an SMTP server, and an external authentication server, as well as with RC Gate and client computers. The TOE communicates with fax devices via the telephone line.

The client computer connected via the LAN uses the TOE through the printer driver, the fax driver, and the Web browser. The client computer performs not only communication of document data to the TOE, but also an operation of some management functions and status checking of the TOE via the Web browser.

## 6. Documentation

The identification of documents attached to this TOE is listed below.

TOE users are required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in order to uphold the assumptions.

Document Name	Version
MP C401 series User Guide	D193-7502
MP C401 series Read This First	D193-7505
Notes on Using Multi-Function Printers Safely	D193-7580
Safety Information	A232-8561A
SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT	D645-7901
NOTICE TO USERS	D645-7902
About This Machine	D193-7512
Copy/Document Server	D193-7516
Fax	D193-7521
Print	D193-7526
Scan	D193-7531
Troubleshooting	D193-7536
Connecting the Machine/System Settings	D193-7541
Security Guide	D193-7547
Extended Feature Settings	D193-7551
PostScript 3	D193-7556
Appendix	D193-7564
Notes for Administrators: Using This Machine in a Network Environment Compliant with IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009	D193-7548
Notes on Security Functions	D146-7587
Operating Instructions Driver Installation Guide	D193-7576
About Open Source Software License	D193-7568
Help	83NHCVENZ1.10 v160

## 7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results

### 7.1 Evaluation Facility

ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center that conducted the evaluation as the Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE (National Institute of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which is agreed on mutual recognition with ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation). It is periodically confirmed that the above Evaluation Facility meets the requirements on the appropriateness of the management and evaluators for maintaining the quality of evaluation.

### 7.2 Evaluation Approach

Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in the CEM in accordance with the assurance components in the CC Part 3. Details for evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. The Evaluation Technical Report explains the summary of this TOE as well as the content of the evaluation and the verdict of each work unit in the CEM.

### 7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity

The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report as follows.

The evaluation has started on 2015-01 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation Technical Report dated 2015-03. The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. Additionally, the evaluator directly visited the development sites on 2014-04, and examined the procedural status conducted in relation to each work unit for configuration management and delivery by investigating records and interviewing staff.

Furthermore, the evaluator conducted the sampling check of the developer testing and the evaluator testing by using the developer testing environment at the developer site on 2014-04 and 2014-05.

## 7.4 IT Product Testing


The evaluator confirmed the validity of the testing that the developer had performed. As a result of the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation and the verification results of the testing performed by the developer, the evaluator performed the reproducibility testing, additional testing, and penetration testing based on vulnerability assessments judged to be necessary.

### 7.4.1 Developer Testing

The evaluator evaluated the integrity of the developer testing that the developer performed and the documentation of actual testing results. The content of the developer testing evaluated by the evaluator is explained as follows.

#### (1) Developer Testing Environment

Figure 7-1 shows the testing configuration performed by the developer, and Table 7-1 shows the main configuration items.



**Figure 7-1 Configuration of the Developer Testing**



**Table 7-1 Test Configurations**

Configuration Item	Detail
TOE	Ricoh MP C401SP Version EE-1.00
Client Computer	OS: Windows Vista Business SP2 Windows 7 Professional SP1 Windows 8 Web browser: Internet Explorer 7/8/9/10 Printer driver: PCL6 Driver 1.0.0.0 LAN-Fax driver: LAN-FAX Driver 5.0.0.0
SMTP Server	SMTP Server Function of Windows Server 2003 SP2
FTP Server	FTP Server Function of Windows Server 2003 SP2 FTP Server Function of Linux (Fedora8)
SMB Server	SMB Server Function of Windows Server 2003 SP2
External Authentication Server	Windows Server 2008 SP2
Telephone Switchboard Simulator	XF-A150 (Panasonic Corporation)
Fax Machine	Ricoh imagio MP C4002 SPF
RC Gate	Basil Emulator Ver.1.06.002

Although the TOE used in the developer testing is part of several MFPs that are identified in the ST, other models are OEM products of the MFPs used in the testing. They are the same models but have different names.

As mentioned above, the evaluator judged that the model of "Ricoh MP C401SP" selected as the target for the developer testing is consistent with the descriptions in the ST and covers the TOE configuration identified in the ST. The evaluator also judged that the developer testing was performed in the same TOE testing environment as the TOE configuration identified in this ST.

## (2) Summary of the Developer Testing

A summary of the developer testing is as follows.

### (a) Developer Testing Outline

An outline of the developer testing is as follows.

#### <Developer Testing Approach>

The testing approaches consisted of:

- stimulating the assumed external interfaces (Operation Panel, Web browser, and so on) in normal use of the TOE, and visually observing the results;
- analysing the generated audit log and the logging data for debug;
- checking the communication protocols between client computers/each server and the TOE with packet capture; and
- executing anomaly simulation tests to generate abnormal events by altering a part of the TSF implementation, and so on.

## &lt;Content of the Performed Developer Testing&gt;

The expected values of testing results described in testing specifications which are provided in advance by the developer were compared to the values of the actual developer testing results described in the testing result reports which are also provided by the developer. As a result, it was found that the values of the actual testing results are in conformity to those of the expected testing results.

## (b) Scope of the Performed Developer Testing

The developer testing was performed on approximately 580 items by the developer.

By the coverage analysis, it was verified that all security functions and external interfaces described in the functional specification had been tested.

## (c) Result

The evaluator confirmed an approach of the performed developer testing and the legitimacy of tested items, and confirmed consistencies between the testing approach described in the testing plan and the actual testing approach.

The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the testing results expected by the developer and the actual testing results performed by the developer.

## 7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing

The evaluator performed the sample testing to reconfirm the execution of the security functions by the testing items extracted from the developer testing, and the evaluator performed the evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as the "independent testing") to gain further assurance that security functions are certainly implemented, based on the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation.

The independent testing performed by the evaluator is explained below.

## (1) Independent Testing Environment

The configuration of the testing performed by the evaluator was the same as the configuration of the developer testing as shown in Figure 7-1.

## (2) Summary of Independent Testing

A summary of the Independent testing is as follows.

## (a) Independent Testing Viewpoints

The viewpoints for the independent testing that the evaluator designed from the developer testing and the provided evaluation documentation are shown below.

## &lt;Independent Testing Viewpoints&gt;

1. For TSFI that has many types of input parameters and to which the developer testing is insufficient in terms of completeness, the testing items such as parameter scheme, boundary values, and abnormal values are added.
2. For execution timing of several TSFs and combination of execution, the testing items to which conditions are added are performed.
3. The testing items to which the different variation from the developer testing is added are performed in regard to procedures of exception and cancellation.
4. The testing items are selected in the sampling testing from the following

viewpoints:

- The testing items are selected to include all of TSFs and TSFIs in terms of completeness.
- The testing items are selected to cover the different testing approaches and testing environments.
- The testing items involving TSFI that meet many of the SFRs are mainly selected in order to conduct tests efficiently.
- Considering the functionality difference from the similar products that have been CC-certified, the testing items for TSFs which are newly added in this TOE are preferably selected.

(b) Independent Testing Outline

An outline of the independent testing that the evaluator performed is as follows.

<Independent Testing Approach>

In setting the different initialisation and the different parameters from the developer testing, the independent testing approaches consisted of:

- stimulating the assumed external interfaces (Operation Panel, Web browser, and so on) in normal use of the TOE, and visually observing the results;
- analysing the generated audit log; and
- checking the communication protocols between client computers/each server and the TOE with packet capture, and so on.

<Content of the Performed Independent Testing >

Based on the viewpoints of the independent testing, 16 items for the independent testing and 23 items for the sampling testing were performed.

The outline of the main independent testing performed and corresponding viewpoints are shown in Table 7-2.

**Table 7-2 Viewpoints for the Independent Testing**

Viewpoints for the Independent Testing	Outline of the Independent Testing
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- By changing the authentication method and conditions, confirmed that the behaviours concerning the user account lock were as specified.</li> <li>- Confirmed that the access control was performed as specified when operating the internally stored documents from several interfaces.</li> </ul>
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Confirmed that the lockout process of accounts was performed as specified while normal users and administrators simultaneously log on.</li> <li>- Confirmed that the behaviours were as specified when user accounts were deleted while login status was maintained or when user privileges were changed.</li> </ul>

3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Confirmed that the variously assumed exception procedures were performed as specified when an external authentication server was used.</li> <li>- Confirmed that the S/MIME and IPsec procedures were performed as specified when using the expired certificates.</li> <li>- Confirmed that the TOE's exception procedures were performed as specified when an unexpected access from the RC Gate was executed.</li> <li>- Regarding the operational function for the internally stored documents, confirmed that the exception procedures were performed as specified when unexpected parameters were specified or when a process was interrupted.</li> <li>- Confirmed that the exception procedures were performed as specified when entering unauthorised inputs from the printer driver.</li> </ul>
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(c) Result

All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed, and the evaluator confirmed the behaviour of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected behaviour and all the testing results.

#### 7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing

The evaluator devised and performed the necessary evaluator penetration testing (hereinafter referred to as the "penetration testing") on the potentially exploitable vulnerabilities of concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level from the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation.

The penetration testing performed by the evaluator is explained below.

(1) Summary of the Penetration Testing

A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.

(a) Vulnerability of Concern

The evaluator searched into the provided documentation and the publicly available information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.

1. Unauthorised access to the TOE may be caused by unintentional network port interfaces.
2. Security Functions may be bypassed in case of entering data, for interfaces, which have the values and formats that are unintended by the TOE.
3. There may be some vulnerabilities when implementing secure channels, and

- consequently the Security Functions of the TOE may be bypassed.
4. Security Functions may be bypassed by maintaining the TOE overloaded.
  5. Security Functions may be bypassed if operation conflicts by multiple interfaces occur.

(b) Penetration Testing Outline

The evaluator performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially exploitable vulnerabilities.

< Penetration Testing Environment>

The penetration testing configuration is identical with those of the developer testing shown in Figure 7-1, and evaluator independent testing.

Table 7-3 shows tools used in the penetration testing.

**Table 7-3 Penetration Testing Tools**

Name (Version)	Outline
ZAP (2.3.0.1)	Inspection tool of Web vulnerabilities with Proxy traffic
nmap (6.25)	Port Scanning Tool
Netcat (1.11)	Packet Communication Tool
Nessus (5.2.6) Plugin 201405082316	Vulnerability Scanning Tool
Burp Suite (1.6)	Inspection tool of Web vulnerabilities with Proxy traffic
Wireshark (1.6.6)	Packet Capture Tool

<List of the Performed Penetration Testing>

Table 7-4 shows vulnerabilities concerned and the content of the related penetration testing. The evaluator performed 17 test cases in the following penetration testing to identify possibly exploitable vulnerabilities:

**Table 7-4 Outline of the Performed Penetration Testing**

Vulnerability	Outline of the Penetration Testing
1	Confirmed that the unnecessary network ports were not opened using the port scanning tool and the vulnerability scanning tool. Also checked no vulnerabilities to unauthorised inputs for available ports.
2	Checked no publicly-known vulnerabilities on Web interfaces to access the TOE. Confirmed that the Security Functions may not be bypassed by the specified URL at the time of connecting to the TOE via a Web browser.
3	Checked no implementation-specific vulnerabilities regarding the encryption communication with SSL and IPsec. Confirmed that parameters were not easily predicted by verifying the randomness of numbers as parameters used in Web interfaces. Confirmed that no implementation-specific vulnerabilities were identified when Windows authentication using Kerberos authentication was performed.
4	Confirmed that the TOE was not unsecured due to the overloaded CPU and insufficient resources.
5	Confirmed that Security Functions were not bypassed when user login was performed using multiple interfaces and user privileges were changed on various occasions.

**(c) Result**

In the penetration testing performed by the evaluator, the evaluator did not find any exploitable vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack potential could exploit.

**7.5 Evaluated Configuration**

In this evaluation, the configurations shown in Figure 7-1 were evaluated. IPv4 was used in the network. This TOE will not be used in the configuration which is significantly different from the above configuration components. Therefore, the evaluator determined the configuration of the above evaluation is appropriate.

## 7.6 Evaluation Results

The evaluator had concluded that this TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM by submitting the Evaluation Technical Report.

In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.

- PP Conformance:

U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2™-2009)

The TOE also conforms to the following SFR packages defined in the above PP.

- 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Document Storage and Retrieval Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions, Operational Environment B
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant

As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance components.

- All assurance components of EAL2 package
- Additional assurance component ALC\_FLR.2

The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE corresponding to the identification described in Chapter 2.

## 7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations

There is no evaluator recommendation to be addressed to consumers.

## 8. Certification

The Certification Body conducted the following certification based on the materials submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation process.

1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall properly be solved.
3. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the related work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
4. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall conform to the CEM.

Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight review, and it was sent to the Evaluation Facility. The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out in the certification oversight review were solved in the ST and the Evaluation Technical Report, and issued this Certification Report.

### 8.1 Certification Result

As a result of verification of the submitted Evaluation Technical Report, Observation Report, and related evaluation documentation, the Certification Body determined that this TOE satisfies all assurance requirements for EAL2 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 in the CC Part 3.

### 8.2 Recommendations

Any influences on the security functions of this TOE in the operation, in the case the Maintenance Functions are activated, are out of the scope of the assurance provided by this evaluation. Therefore, it is advised to make a judgment at the administrator's responsibility about the acceptance of maintenance.

It should be noted that the TOE users need to refer to the description of "4.3 Clarification of Scope" and to see whether or not the evaluated scope of this TOE and the operational requirement items can be handled in the actual operating environment of the TOE.



## 9. Annexes

There is no annex.

## 10. Security Target

Security Target [12] of this TOE is provided as a separate document along with this Certification Report.

MP C401 (Ricoh/nashuatec/Rex-Rotary/Gestetner/infotec)  
Security Target, Version 1.00, March 6, 2015, RICOH COMPANY, LTD.

## 11. Glossary

The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.

CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
PP	Protection Profile
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality

The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.

HDD	An abbreviation of Hard Disk Drive; in this document, it indicates the HDD installed in the TOE if simply described as "HDD."
IPsec	Secure Architecture for Internet Protocol; a protocol that provides the functions of data tampering prevention and data confidentiality with IP packets traffic using cryptographic technology.
MFP	An abbreviation of a digital multifunctional product.
PSTN	An abbreviation of Public Switched Telephone Networks.
S/MIME	Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions; a standard for e-mail encryption and digital signatures with a public key system.

The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.

Administrative role	<p>Pre-defined roles that enable administrators to be given. Although the following four types of administrative roles are defined and can be assigned to respective administrators, this TOE assumes the MFP administrator who is assigned to all the roles. (The access control for each subcategorised administrative role is excluded from this evaluation.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Device administrator (executes device administration and audit)</li> <li>- User administrator (executes the management of normal user)</li> <li>- Network administrator (executes the network connection management of the TOE)</li> <li>- File administrator (executes the management of stored documents and document user list)</li> </ul>
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Documents	General term for paper documents and electronic documents operated by the TOE.
Internet Fax	A function to perform fax communications with the system of sending or receiving e-mails. It also uses the Internet lines.
IP-Fax	A generic term of Realtime-Internet Fax of RICOH, conformant with the International Standard ITU-T T.38. It assigns IP address to a fax that is connected to a telephone line, instead of Fax number.
Kerberos Authentication	One of the network authentication methods. Although there are several network authentication methods using external authentication servers, only Windows authentication using Kerberos authentication is covered by this evaluation.
LAN-Fax Transmission	One of the Fax Functions. A function that transmits fax data and stores documents using the fax driver on client computers.
Lockout	The state of making the user accounts unavailable.
Lockout time	The time from being locked out to automatically releasing the user accounts.
Login password	A password corresponding to each login user name.
Login user name	An identifier assigned to normal users, an MFP administrator, and a supervisor. The TOE identifies users by this identifier.
Maintenance Function	A function to perform maintenance service for machine malfunctions. In the operation of this TOE, the Service Mode Lock Function is set to "ON" for deactivating this function.
Number of Attempts before Lockout	The number of consecutive failed attempts to identify and authenticate users, which is allowable until locking out the users. The MFP administrator can assign 1 to 5 as a setting value.
@Remote	General term for remote diagnosis maintenance services for the TOE via the Internet. The purpose of the remote operation includes the functions such as remote failure diagnosis, counter information collection, and toner information collection.
Stored Documents	Documents stored in the TOE so that they can be used with Document Server Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function, and Fax Function.
User job	A work, from beginning to end, for each of the following TOE functions: Copy, Document Server, Scanner, Printer, and Fax. A user job may be paused or cancelled during the process by a user. If a user job is cancelled, the user job will end.

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