Australian Information Security
Evaluation Program
Certification Report
Juniper SRX4700, SRX4120 and SRX2300
for Junos OS 25.2R1
Version 1.0, 14 August 2026
Document reference: AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0
(Certification expires five years from certification report date)
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 ii
Table of contents
Executive Summary 1
Introduction 2
Overview 2
Purpose 2
Identification 2
Target of Evaluation 4
Overview 4
Description of the TOE 4
TOE Functionality 5
TOE Physical Boundary 5
Architecture 6
Clarification of Scope 8
Security Policy 9
Secure Delivery 9
Version Verification 10
Documentation and Guidance 10
Secure Usage 10
Evaluation 12
Overview 12
Evaluation Procedures 12
Functional Testing 12
Entropy Testing 12
Penetration Testing 12
Certification 14
Overview 14
Assurance 14
Certification Result 14
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 iii
Recommendations 14
Annex – References and Abbreviations 16
References 16
Abbreviations 17
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 1
Executive Summary
This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of Juniper SRX4700, SRX4120 and SRX2300 for Junos OS
25.2R1 appliances against Common Criteria approved Protection Profiles (PPs).
This report concludes that the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has complied with the following PPs and functional package
[4]:
 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version, 3.0e, 06 December 2023 (CPP_ND_V3.0E)
 PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3, 16 August 2023 (MOD_VPNGW_v1.3)
 PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020
(MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E)
 PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Version 1.0, 11 May 2021 (MOD_IPS_V1.0)
 Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (PKG_SSH_V1.0).
Additionally, the above PPs can be grouped together using a certified PP-Configuration. This evaluation used the
following PP-Configuration [4]:
 PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Intrusion Prevention Systems, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and Virtual
Private Network Gateways, Version 2.0, 25 April 2024 (CFG_NDcPP-IPS-FW-VPNGW_V2.0).
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and the requirements of the Australian
Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP). The evaluation was performed by Teron Labs with the final
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) submitted on 24 July 2026.
With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australian Certification Authority recommends that
administrators:
 Potential users of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are
comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed
 The users should make themselves familiar with the guidance provided with the TOE and pay attention to all
security warnings
 The system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically
 Security administrators should ensure that an IDP security licence and package is installed and kept up to date to
correctly use and enforce [MOD_IPS_v1.0] requirements for the following platforms: SRX4700
 Security administrators shall follow the hardening and configuration instructions described in the guidance [6] to
mitigate any security relevant issues associated with the TOE.
This report includes information about the underlying security policies and architecture of the TOE, and information
regarding the conduct of the evaluation.
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For this reason, it is recommended
that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security Target [8] and read this Certification Report prior to deciding
whether to purchase the product.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 2
Introduction
Overview
This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to identify the TOE.
Purpose
The purpose of this Certification Report is to:
 report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the TOE against the requirements of the
Common Criteria [1,2,3] and Protection Profiles [4]
 Provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any interested parties.
This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE’s Security Target [8] which provides a full description of the
security requirements and specifications that were used as the basis of the evaluation.
Identification
The TOE is Juniper SRX4700, SRX4120 and SRX2300 for Junos OS 25.2R1.
Description Version
Evaluation scheme Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
TOE Juniper SRX4700, SRX4120 and SRX2300 for Junos OS 25.2R1
Software version Junos OS 25.2R1
Hardware platforms SRX4700, SRX4120 and SRX2300
Security Target Security Target Juniper SRX4700, SRX4120 and SRX2300 for Junos OS
25.2R1, Version 1.0, 18 July 2026
Evaluation Technical Report Evaluation Technical Report 1.0, Dated 24 July 2026
Document reference EFT-T065-ETR 1.0
Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, April 2017, Version 3.1 Rev 5
Methodology Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017
Version 3.1 Rev 5
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 3
Conformance  Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e,
06 December 2023 (CPP_ND_V3.0E)
 PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3, 16 August 2023
(MOD_VPNGW_v1.3)
 PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata
20200625, 25 June 2020 (MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E)
 PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Version 1.0, 11
May 2021 (MOD_IPS_V1.0)
 Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May
2021 (PKG_SSH_V1.0)
 PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Intrusion Prevention
Systems, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and Virtual Private
Network Gateways, Version 2.0, 25 April 2024 (CFG_NDcPP-IPS-
FW-VPNGW_V2.0).
Developer HPE Juniper Networking
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale 94089 CA
USA
Evaluation facility Teron Labs
Level 2, 14 Moore St
Canberra ACT 2601
Australia
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 4
Target of Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including a description of functionality
provided, its architectural components, the scope of evaluation, its security policies and its secure usage.
Description of the TOE
The TOE is a non-virtual and non-distributed network device with complex security functionality. It is a suite of
appliances meeting the security requirements stated in Base-PP, the Functional Package, and the PP-Modules. The
TOE is a suite of Juniper Networks SRX-series Universal Routing Platforms illustrated in Figure 1. The TOE is an instance
of the Juniper Networks portfolio of the software-defined networking (SDN)-enabled routing platforms.
Figure 1 – TOE Variants
The TOE is purpose-built to protect network environments and provide Internet Mix (IMIX) firewall with high
throughput. The TOE incorporates multiple security services and networking functions for a non-virtual appliance. This
allows the TOE to provide highly customizable threat protection, automation, and integration capabilities. Advanced
security capabilities on the TOE are offered as high throughput Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW), an Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS), and a high-speed IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) in the data centre, enterprise campus,
and regional headquarters deployments with IMIX traffic patterns.
The TOE can operate in a single mode or in a Multinode High Availability (HA) Mode. In Multinode HA Mode, a pair of
devices, called nodes, executing the same software, is connected and configured to operate like a single device to
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 5
provide high availability. The two nodes back up each other. The Active node is the primary device, and the other is
the backup device. If the primary device fails, the secondary device takes over processing of traffic. The
interconnection of the two nodes is protected with IPsec. The configuration of the nodes is with Netconf over SSH.
The TOE supports definition and enforcement of information flow policies among network nodes. Stateful inspection
is applied on each packet that traverses the network. The TOE provides a central point of control to manage the
network security policy. The network topology enforces that each information flow from one network node and
subnetwork to another passes through an instance of the TOE. The TOE then controls the information flows between
the nodes and subnetworks based on network node addresses, protocol, type of access requested, and services
requested. The TOE ensures that each security-relevant activity is audited and that the TOE functions are protected
from potential attacks. The TOE also provides tools to manage all security functions.
The TOE is composed of the chassis and the Junos OS Operating System. In concert, they implement the routing and
management plane functions for a complete network appliance. The chassis variants are illustrated in Figure 1. The
TOE implements all security functions required for controlling access to the management functions. The management
functions of the TOE are only accessible to legitimate administrators through a Command Line Interface (CLI). No
other means but the CLI are available for administering the TOE. The TOE may be managed locally or remotely.
Remote management sessions are protected with Secure Shell (SSH).
The TOE implements a set of security functions and security mechanisms required for conformance with the Base-PP
[4.a] enhanced with VPN Gateway [4.b], Stateful traffic filtering firewall [4.c], Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) [4.d]
and SSH [4.e].
TOE Functionality
The TOE functionality that was evaluated is described in section 1.3 of the Security Target [8].
TOE Physical Boundary
The physical boundary of the TOE includes all hardware and software parts and the security guidance of the TOE. The
parts of the TOE included in the physical boundary are detailed in Table 1 below:
Part of the TOE Identification Description
TOE Hardware SRX4700, SRX4120 and
SRX2300
The hardware platform and the casing of the TOE.
Includes the processor, the memories, the physical
ports, network cards, and the persistent storage.
TOE Software Juniper Junos OS 25.2R1 The Junos OS included in the TOE is Juniper Junos
OS 25.2R1.
TOE software is distributed as an installation
package. The following installation packages are
used for different variants of the TOE:
 SRX4700: junos-vmhost-install-srxhe2-x86-
64-25.2R1.9.tgz
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 6
 SRX4120: junos-vmhost-install-srxmr2-x86-
64-25.2R1.9.tgz
 SRX2300: junos-vmhost-install-srxmr2-x86-
64-25.2R1.9.tgz
Security Guidance Juniper SRX4700, SRX4120,
SRX2300 for Junos OS 25.2R1
Common Criteria Guidance
Supplement
The Common Criteria Guidance supplement for
the TOE. The security guidance is distributed as a
document in PDF format.
Table 1 - Parts Included in the Physical Scope of the TOE
Architecture
The variants of the TOE are a suite of network devices with an architecture illustrated in Figure 2. The TOE includes
the chassis of the TOE. The Chassis implements the casing, the physical ports, and the hardware foundation for all
those functions of the TOE which require hardware.
The KVM Hypervisor virtualizes the hardware for access by the software parts of the TOE. The software implements
the routing engine and the packet forwarding engine of the TOE. Together, the two implement all routing plane and
management plane functions of the TOE. Jointly, all software constitutes the Juniper Junos operating system.
The TOE is connected to the management console and to a syslog server. The management console may be local or
remote. The TOE is also connected to the networks which it interconnects. Only the routing plane functions are
implemented on the network traffic to and from the interconnected networks. All management plane functions are
implemented on the devices connected to the dedicated management ports of the TOE.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 7
The TOE implements the following distinct sets of interfaces:
 The operationally required interfaces, including power management, and the mechanical interfaces used for the
cooling and ventilation of the TOE as well as the LEDs informing the user of the status of the TOE.
 Network interfaces used for connecting the TOE to the interconnected networks. Network interfaces are the
interfaces for the ingress and egress network traffic. They are physically separate from all other network
interfaces. The TOE implements the networking functionality for the network traffic to traverse through it.
 High Availability interfaces for the Multinode HA Mode.
 Management interfaces are used by the administrators to manage the TOE. Management interface is through
dedicated network ports and may be accessed locally from console or remotely over SSH. The management
interface implements a CLI which is the only means of administering the TOE.
While offering identical functionality, the variants of the TOE offer different capabilities for different applications. The
capabilities of different variants of the TOE are fully detailed in their datasheets given in Table 2.
TOE Variant Datasheet URL
SRX4700 https://www.juniper.net/documentation/us/en/hardware/srx4700/index.html
SRX4120 https://www.juniper.net/documentation/us/en/hardware/srx4120/index.html
SRX2300 https://www.juniper.net/documentation/us/en/hardware/srx2300/index.html
Table 2 Hardware Capabilities of the Variants of the TOE
The TOE can set up the Multinode HA Mode for High Availability. Multinode HA Mode is common for both variants of
the TOE. It supports two instances of the TOE presenting themselves as independent nodes to the rest of the network.
The nodes are connected to adjacent infrastructure belonging to the same or different networks, all depending on the
deployment mode. These nodes can either be collocated or separated across geographies. Participating nodes back up
each other to ensure a fast synchronized failover in case of system or hardware failure.
Several models for network deployment of Multinode HA Mode are supported. Two instances of the TOE are
connected through the vNICs mapped to the physical NICs of the platform. The connection is through an Interchassis
Link (ICL) which connects the nodes over a routed part (instead of a dedicated Layer 2 network seen in some high
availability implementations). The nodes are configured by the administrator of the TOE with Netconf over SSH. Once
the nodes are configured, the ICL communication is protected with IPsec. An example configuration of the TOE in a
Multinode HA Mode over the ICL is given in Figure 3.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 8
Clarification of Scope
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and associated methodologies.
The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target [8].
Evaluated Functionality
Functional tests performed during the evaluation were taken from the Protection Profiles [4] and Supporting
Documents [12] and sufficiently demonstrate the security functionality of the TOE. Some of the tests were combined
for ease of execution.
Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The TOE is the entire network appliance. Yet, it does require external IT devices to operate properly. Specifically, the
TOE requires the following items for operation:
 Network connectivity
 Syslog server including a SSHv2 client for connecting to the TOE for the TOE to send audit logs
 A management station with a SSHv2 client for remote administration of the TOE
 A Certification Authority to use in the validation of the X.509 public key certificates by the TOE
 NTP server for synchronizing TOE time when so configured
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 9
 A management station with a serial connection client for local administration of the TOE.
Non-evaluated Functionality and Services
Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been evaluated as part of the
evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services
outside of the evaluated configuration.
Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5] for policy
relating to using an evaluated product in an unevaluated configuration.
The following components are considered outside of the scope of the TOE:
 Telnet, FTP and SNMP are not considered secure. They violate the trusted path and trusted channel
requirements and must not be used.
 SSL and TLS are not included in the certification and must not be used.
 The TOE must not be managed via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope. Neither is included in the certification. All
administration of the TOE must be through the CLI.
 No user must be assigned super-user or FreeBSD root account privileges.
Security Policy
The TOE Security Policy is a set of rules that defines the required security behaviour of the TOE; how information
within the TOE is managed and protected. The Security Target [8] contains a summary of the functionality that is
evaluated.
Secure Delivery
There are several mechanisms provided in the delivery process to ensure that a customer receives a product that has
not been tampered with. The customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the
integrity of the platform:
 Shipping label - Ensure that the shipping label correctly identifies the correct customer name and address as well
as the device
 Outside packaging - Inspect the outside shipping box and tape. Ensure that the shipping tape has not been cut or
otherwise compromised. Ensure that the box has not been cut or damaged to allow access to the device
 Inside packaging - Inspect the plastic bag and seal. Ensure that the bag is not cut or removed. Ensure that the
seal remains intact.
If the customer identifies a problem during the inspection, they should immediately contact the supplier providing the
order number, tracking number and a description of the identified problem to the supplier.
Additionally, there are several checks that can be performed to ensure that the customer has received a box sent by
Juniper Networks and not a different company masquerading as Juniper Networks. The customer should perform the
following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the authenticity of the device:
 Verify that the device was ordered using a purchase order. Juniper Networks devices are never shipped without
a purchase order
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 10
 When a device is shipped, a shipment notification is sent to the e-mail address provided by the customer when
the order is taken. Verify that this e-mail notification was received and contains the following information:
 Purchase order number
 Juniper Networks order number used to track the shipment
 Carrier tracking number used to track the shipment
 List of items shipped including serial numbers
 Address and contacts of both the supplier and the customer
 Verify that the shipment was initiated by Juniper Network, performing the following tasks:
 compare the carrier tracking number of the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks
shipping notification with the tracking number on the package received
 Log on to the Juniper Networks online customer support portal at
https://www.juniper.net/customers/csc/management to view the order status
 Compare the carrier tracking number or the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks
shipment notification with the tracking number on the package received.
Installation of the TOE
The Configuration Guide [6] contains all relevant information for the secure configuration of the TOE.
Version Verification
The verification of the TOE is largely automatic, including the verification using hashes. The TOE cannot load a
modified image. Valid software images can be downloaded from https://www.juniper.net. In addition to the
automated verification, the site includes individual hashes for each image. The administrator should verify the hash of
the software before installing it into the hardware platform.
Security Administrators are able to query the current version of the TOE firmware using the CLI command ‘show
version’.
Documentation and Guidance
It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance documentation in order to ensure secure usage. The
following documentation is available to the consumer when the TOE is purchased. The evaluated configuration guide
(System Admin Guide) document for the Juniper SRX4700, SRX4120, SRX2300 for Junos OS 25.2R1 is available for
download at https://www.juniper.net/documentation. The title is:
 Juniper SRX4700, SRX4120, SRX2300 for Junos OS 25.2R1 Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, version 1.0, 18
July 2026 [6].
All Common Criteria guidance material is available at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Australian Government Information Security Manual is available at https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism [5].
Secure Usage
The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational environment. These
assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives of the TOE are met.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 11
The network device is assumed to be physically secured within its operational environment, protected from physical
attacks that could compromise its security or interfere with its physical connections and correct operation. This level
of protection is expected to be sufficient to safeguard the device and the sensitive data it handles.
The TOE is expected to provide networking functionality as its primary purpose and should not offer any general-
purpose computing capabilities, such as running compilers or user applications unrelated to its networking functions.
This ensures that the device remains focused solely on its intended security and networking roles.
The network device's administrator(s) are assumed to be trustworthy, acting in the best interests of the organization’s
security. This includes being well-trained, adhering to established policies, and following all guidance documentation.
Administrators are responsible for ensuring that passwords and credentials used within the TOE are strong and
secure. The TOE is not expected to protect against a malicious administrator who deliberately seeks to bypass or
compromise its security features.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully
validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the
TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
The TOE’s firmware and software are assumed to be regularly updated by an administrator, particularly in response to
newly discovered vulnerabilities. This ensures that the TOE remains protected against emerging threats.
The credentials (such as private keys) used by administrators to access the TOE must be securely protected on any
platform where they are stored. Administrators must also ensure that sensitive residual information, including
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, and passwords, is not accessible to unauthorized individuals when
networking equipment is discarded or removed from service.
The TOE is assumed to be connected to distinct networks in a way that ensures its security policies are enforced on all
relevant network traffic flowing between these networks.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 12
Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the evaluation, the testing conducted as
part of the evaluation and the certification result.
Evaluation Procedures
The criteria against which the TOE has been evaluated are contained in the relevant Protection Profiles [4] and
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5, Parts 2 and 3 [1, 2].
Testing methodology was drawn from Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version
3.1 Revision 5 [3] and relevant Supporting Documents [12].
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the Australian Information Security
Evaluation Program [10].
In addition, the conditions outlined in the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field
of Information Technology Security [9] and the document CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based
SFRs, Optional SFRs [13] were also upheld.
Functional Testing
All functional tests performed by the evaluators were taken from the Protection Profiles [4] and Supporting
Documents [12]. The tests were designed to provide the required testing coverage for the security functions claimed
by the TOE.
Entropy Testing
The entropy design description, justification, operation and health tests are assessed and documented in a separate
report [11].
Penetration Testing
The evaluators performed the evaluation activities for vulnerability assessment specified by the NDcPP Supporting
Document [12] that follow a flaw hypothesis methodology. Accordingly, four types of flaw hypotheses have been
considered:
 Type 1 - public vulnerabilities
 Type 2 - ND-iTC (Network international Technical Community) sourced
 Type 3 - evaluation team generated
 Type 4 - tool generated.
The evaluators conducted a review of public vulnerability databases and technical community sources to determine
potential flaw hypotheses using searches that include TOE device name and components, protocols supported by the
TOE and terms relating to the device type of the TOE. These searches were conducted up to the 14 May 2026
coinciding with the conclusion of the evaluation. There was no identifiable Type 2 hypotheses for this evaluation.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 13
The evaluation team devised one test to check a potential vulnerability within the TOE’s boot process. The evaluation
team also conducted tool-generated vulnerability testing of the TOE as per the Supporting Document [12].
Based on the results of this testing, the evaluators determined that the TOE is resistant to an attacker possessing a
basic attack potential.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 14
Certification
Overview
This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an overview of the assurance provided and
recommendations made by the certifiers.
Assurance
This certification is focused on the evaluation of product compliance with Protection Profiles that cover the
technology area of network devices with added security functionality including stateful traffic firewall functions, VPN
gateway functions, intrusion prevention functions and functional package for SSH. Organisations can have confidence
that the scope of an evaluation against an ASD-approved Protection Profile covers the necessary security functionality
expected of the evaluated product and known threats will have been addressed.
The analysis is supported by testing as outlined in the PP Supporting Documents [12] and Protection Profile Module
activities, and a vulnerability survey demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential.
Compliance also provides assurance through evidence of secure delivery procedures.
The effectiveness and integrity of cryptographic functions are also within the scope of product evaluations performed
in line with the Protection Profiles (PPs) [4]. PPs provide assurance by providing a full Security Target, and an analysis
of the Security Functional Requirements in that Security Target, guidance documentation, and a basic description of
the architecture of the TOE.
Certification Result
Teron Labs has determined that the TOE upholds the claims made in the Security Target [8] and has met the
requirements of the Protection Profiles CPP_ND_V3.0E [4.a], MOD_VPNGW_v1.3 [4.b], MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E [4.c],
MOD_IPS_V1. [4.d], PKG_SSH_V1.0 [4.e] and PP configuration for NDcPP, IPS, FW and VPNGW [4.f].
After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as reported to the certifiers, and of the Evaluation Technical
Report [7], the Australian Certification Authority certifies the evaluation of the Juniper SRX4700, SRX4120 and
SRX2300 for Junos OS 25.2R1 performed by the Australian Information Security Evaluation Facility, Teron Labs.
The Australian Certification Authority certifies that the Security Target [8] have met the requirements of the Network
Device Protection Profiles [4].
Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities.
Recommendations
Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for Australian Government users. For further
guidance, Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5].
In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment are fulfilled, and the guidance
document is followed, the Australian Certification Authority also recommends that users and administrators:
 Potential users of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are
comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 15
 The users should make themselves familiar with the guidance provided with the TOE and pay attention to all
security warnings
 The system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically
 Security administrators should ensure that an IDP security licence and package is installed and kept up to date to
correctly use and enforce [MOD_IPS_v1.0] requirements for the following platforms: SRX4700
 Security administrators shall follow the hardening and configuration instructions described in the guidance [6] to
mitigate any security relevant issues associated with the TOE.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 16
Annex – References and Abbreviations
References
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
3. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, April 2017,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
4. Protection Profiles:
a) Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December 2023
(CPP_ND_V3.0E).
b) PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3, 16 August 2023 (MOD_VPNGW_v1.3)
c) PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020
(MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E)
d) PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Version 1.0, 11 May 2021 (MOD_IPS_V1.0)
e) Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (PKG_SSH_V1.0)
f) PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Intrusion Prevention Systems, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls,
and Virtual Private Network Gateways, Version 2.0, 25 April 2024 (CFG_NDcPP-IPS-FW-
VPNGW_V2.0).
5. Australian Government Information Security Manual: https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism
6. Juniper SRX4700, SRX4120, SRX2300 for Junos OS 25.2R1 Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, version 1.0,
18 July 2026
7. Evaluation Technical Report Juniper SRX4700, SRX4120 and SRX2300 for Junos OS 25.2R1, Version 1.0, dated
24 July 2026 (Document reference EFT-T065-ETR 1.0)
8. Security Target Juniper SRX4700, SRX4120 and SRX2300 for Junos OS 25.2R1, Version 1.0, 18 July 2026
9. Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology
Security, 2 July 2014
10. AISEP Policy Manual (APM): https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-
03/2022_AUG_REL_AISEP_Policy_Manual_6.3.pdf
11. Entropy Documentation:
a) Entropy Assessment Report (SRX2300 & SRX4120), Junos OS Physical Entropy Source – Intel Xeon D-
10 Series (Ice Lake-D-10) Die with FCBGA2227 Package 1.0, version 1.0, 20 February 2025
b) Entropy Assessment Report (SRX4700), Junos OS 25.2 for HPE Juniper Networking SRX4700 Series
Products, Version 1.0, 03 March 2026
12. Protection Profile Supporting Documents
a) Supporting Document, Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 3.0e, 06 December 2023
(CPP_ND_V3.0E_SD)
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 17
b) Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, Evaluation Activities for Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls PP-Module, Version 1.4 +Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020 (MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E_SD)
c) Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3,
16 August 2023 (MOD_VPNGW_V1.3_SD)
d) Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, PP-Module for Intrusion Protection Systems
(IPS), Version 1.0, 11 May 2021 (MOD_IPS_V1.0_SD)
13. CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs 30 September 2021, Version 2.0,
CCDB-013-v2.0
Abbreviations
AISEP Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
ASD Australian Signals Directorate
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CLI Command Line Interface
Gbps Gigabits per second
HA High Availability
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IMIX Internet Mix
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
IPSEP Intrusion Prevention Systems Extended Package
LED Light-emitting diode
NAT Network Address Translation
NDcPP CCRA-approved collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
NDFW iTC Network Device Fundamentals and Firewalls international Technical Community
Netconf Network Configuration Protocol
NGFW Next-Generation Firewall
NIC Network Interface Card
Mbps megabits per second
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T065-CR-v1.0 18
OS Operating System
PFE Packet Forwarding Engine
PP Protection Profile
RE Routing Engine
SDN Software-Defined Networking
SPC Services Processing Card
SPU Services Processing Unit
SSH Secure Shell
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
Disclaimer
The material in this guide is of a general nature and should not be regarded as legal advice or relied on for assistance
in any particular circumstance or emergency situation. In any important matter, you should seek appropriate
independent professional advice in relation to your own circumstances.
The Commonwealth accepts no responsibility or liability for any damage, loss or expense incurred as a result of the
reliance on information contained in this guide.
Copyright
© Commonwealth of Australia 2026
With the exception of the Coat of Arms, the Australian Signals Directorate logo and where otherwise stated, all
material presented in this publication is provided under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence
(www.creativecommons.org/licenses).
For the avoidance of doubt, this means this licence only applies to material as set out in this document.
The details of the relevant licence conditions are available on the Creative Commons website as is the full legal code
for the CC BY 4.0 licence (www.creativecommons.org/licenses).
Use of the Coat of Arms
The terms under which the Coat of Arms can be used are detailed on the Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet website (www.pmc.gov.au/government/commonwealth-coat-arms).
For more information, or to report a cyber security incident, contact us:
cyber.gov.au | 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371)