

**CC Huawei iTrustee Software V5.0**

# **Security Target**

**Issue**            **1.6**  
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## **Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.**

Address: Huawei Industrial Base  
Bantian, Longgang  
Shenzhen 518129  
People's Republic of China

Website: <http://www.huawei.com>

# About This Document

## Purpose

This document is the Security Target of the iTrustee software V5.0.

## Change History

Changes between document issues are cumulative. The latest document issue contains all the changes made in earlier issues.

| Date       | Revision Version | Section Number | Change Description  | Author   |
|------------|------------------|----------------|---------------------|--|
| 2019.12.05 | 1.0              | ALL            | Initial Draft       | iTrustee Team<br>Certification Team<br>French office |
| 2020.02.13 | 1.1              | ALL            | Review and comments | Certification Team<br>French office                  |
| 2020.02.18 | 1.2              | ALL            | Review and update   | iTrustee Team<br>Certification Team<br>French office |
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| 2021.07.26 | 1.6              | ALL            | Review and update.  | iTrustee Team<br>Certification Team<br>French office |

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# 1 Introduction

This Security Target is for the evaluation of the Huawei iTrustee Operating system, which is a simplified Real-time Operating System (OS) aiming to provide the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) on the Android platform for managing digital copyright and protecting mobile payment and sensitive data. The TOE version is provided in chapter. 1.2.

## 1.1 Security Target Identification

| Security Target Identification |  |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Document title                 | CC Huawei iTrustee Software V5.0 Security Target |
| Document reference             | iTrustee_ST_V5                                   |
| Document version               | 1.6  |
| Document publication date      | 2021.07.26                                       |
| Document author                | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd                     |

## 1.2 TOE Identification

| TOE Identification    |                               |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| TOE name              | Huawei iTrustee               |
| Version               | 5.0                           |
| Software binary image | 6.1.2                         |
| Developer name        | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. |

Note that the TOE consists of software only. The SoC is out of the scope of the evaluation.

The following guidance documents must be provided in order to ensure the secure usage of the Huawei iTrustee V5.0 after delivery.

| Reference | Document  |
|-----------|---|
| [AGD_PRE] | Huawei iTrustee Software V5.0 Preparative Procedures for User. Version 1.1. |
| [AGD_OPE] | Huawei iTrustee Software V5.0 Operational User Guidance. Version 1.2.       |

## 1.3 TOE Overview

### 1.3.1 TOE Type

The TOE type is the Trusted OS, which is only the software part of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) defined by [TEE PP]. It is for embedded devices implementing GlobalPlatform TEE specifications (see TEE System Architecture [SA], TEE Internal API [IAPI] and TEE Client API [CAPI]). However, this ST does not claim full functional compliance with GlobalPlatform TEE APIs specifications.

The TOE is an execution environment isolated from any other execution environment, including the usual Rich Execution Environment (REE), and their applications. The TOE hosts a set of Trusted Applications (TA) and provides them with a comprehensive set of security services including: integrity of execution, secure communication with the Client Applications (CA) running in the REE, trusted storage, key management and cryptographic algorithms, time management and arithmetical API.

### 1.3.2 TOE Usage

The TOE enables the use of mobile devices for a wide range of services that require security protection, for instance:

- Corporate services: Enterprise devices that enable push e-mail access and office applications give employees a flexibility that requires a secure and fast link to their workplace applications through Virtual Private Networking (VPN), secure storage of their data, and remote management of the device by the IT department.
- Content management: Today's devices offer HD video playback and streaming, mobile TV broadcast reception, and console-quality 3-D games. This functionality often requires content protection, through Digital Rights Management (DRM) or Conditional Access.
- Personal data protection: Devices store increasing amounts of personal information (such as contacts, messages, photos and video clips) and even sensitive data (credentials, passwords, health data, etc.). Secure storage means are required to prevent exposure of this information in the event of loss, theft, or any other adverse event, such as a malware.
- Connectivity protection: Networking through multiple technologies—such as 3G, 4G or Wi-Fi/WiMAX, as well as personal communication means, such as Bluetooth® and Near Field Communication (NFC) — enables the use of mobile devices for peer-to-peer communication and for accessing the Internet. Such access, including web services or remote storage relying on cloud computing, typically uses SSL/TLS or IPsec internet secure protocols. Often the handling of the key material or the client end of the session needs to be secured.
- Mobile financial services: Some types of financial services tend to be targeted at smart phones, such as mobile banking, mobile money transfer, mobile authentication (e.g. use with One-Time Password – OTP technology), mobile proximity payments, etc. These services require secure user authentication and secure transaction, which can be performed by the device potentially in cooperation with a Secure Element.

We refer to the TEE White Paper [WP] for an overview of the main TEE use cases.

### 1.3.3 TOE and Non-TOE parts

The TOE comprises:

- Software used to provide the TEE security functionality
- The guidance for the secure usage of the TOE after delivery.

The TOE does not comprise:

- Hardware and firmware used to provide the TEE security functionality, the secure boot and AT firmware.
- The Trusted Applications
- The Rich Execution Environment
- The Client Applications.

The TOE can be running on Huawei Mate/P series Mobile Phones, and the necessary Non-TOE hardware in the mobile phone consists at least the following parts:

- Huawei Kirin series SoC, such as Kirin 990
- RAM, which can be configured as secure memory and non-secure memory
- ROM, which contain sensitive information for secure boot
- Flash memory, where Android OS and iTrustee stored
- Crypto Module, which provides cryptographic mechanisms functions related mainly to key generation
- Necessary peripherals such as display screen, Power button etc.

The following Non-TOE software is also required:

- Bootloader which its version is 2.0
- BI31 monitor which its version is 2.1
- EMUI, Huawei customized Android OS, which its version is 10.1
- Device driver for iTrustee in Android
- SDK for Android app to communicate with iTrustee

The TOE enables a wild range of enhanced security services for mobile device, the instances of those use cases are as below:

- Mobile Payment and banking such as Huawei Pay, IFFA, FIDO etc.,
- Device Protection such as Phone Finding Back, Secboot, File Cabinet and File Encryption,
- System Protection such as kernel integrity checking for Android system,
- Digital Right Management.

In the following, TOE and iTrustee are used interchangeably.



# 1.4 TOE Description

## 1.4.1 Architecture Overview

The TEE is embedded in the device and runs alongside a standard OS or Rich Execution Environment. Figure 1 provides a high level view of the software components of a TEE-enabled device, independently of any hardware architecture.




Figure 1: The architecture of a TOE-enabled device

The TEE software architecture identifies two distinct classes of components:

- The Trusted Applications that run on the TEE and use the TEE Internal API
- The Trusted OS Components whose role is to provide communication facilities with the REE software and the system level functionality required by the Trusted Applications, accessible from the TEE Internal API

The REE software architecture identifies also two distinct classes of components:

- The Client Applications which make use of the TEE Client API to access the secure services offered by TAs running on the TEE
- The Rich OS, which provides the TEE Client API and sends requests to the TEE

The TEE software external interface comprises the TEE Internal API (used by the Trusted Applications) and the TEE Communication Agent protocol (used by the REE).

The trusted peripherals including timer modules which are provided by the SoC. The TOE acquires reliable time and RNG from trusted peripherals via the Trustzone internal Hardware interface.

The TOE is composed of four components as below:

| iTrustee Component      | Description  |
|-------------------------|--|
| iTrustee Kernel         | iTrustee Kernel provides task creation, memory management, IPC etc.  |
| TEE Communication Agent | TEE communication Agent will send/receive SMC calls to/from REE, resolve SMC messages and forward messages to other components of the TOE. |
| Trusted Core Framework  | Trusted Core Framework will manage the tasks already created.  |
| Trusted Device Drivers  | Trusted Device Drivers will talk to Trusted Peripherals, and provide trusted functions to the TOE.   |

Table 1: TOE components

## 1.4.2 TOE Physical Scope

The TOE consists of the following components:

| Title  | Version | Format |
|--|---------|--------|
| iTrustee binary image “sec_trustedcore.img”                    | 6.1.2   | img    |
| Huawei iTrustee Software V5.0 Preparative Procedures for User. | 1.1     | pdf    |
| Huawei iTrustee Software V5.0 Operational User Guidance.       | 1.2     | pdf    |

Table 2: TOE physical scope

## 1.4.3 TOE Security Functionality

The TOE security functionality in the end-user phase which is in the scope of the evaluation consists of:

- **Protection of TSF** Including TSF secure initialization, TSF failure with preservation of secure state, isolation between REE and TEE, integrity protection of TEE data, and security management.
- **Trusted Storage** Providing confidentiality, consistency and integrity protection of TA data; Binding TA data to the TEE.
- **Reliable time stamps** Providing reliable, monotonic secure clock whenever TOE falling into deep sleep or not, and it will be reset if the TOE is restarted.
- **User Identification and Authentication** Both CAs and TAs should be identified and authenticated by the TOE before any more actions.
- **Security Audit** The TOE detect potential security violation such as violation of TA data, TA code or TEE data, and generate audit log. The log will be sent to REE.
- **Protection of TA** The TOE provide TA protection during the life cycle from its loading to exiting. For each TA, the TSF will create an isolated user space, and it can't be accessed by other TAs. TAs can access kernel functions only by internal core API, and every time it access the kernel, the TSF will perform security policy to ensure correct execution.
- **Security Instantiation** TEE instantiation through a secure initialization process that ensures the integrity of the TOE internal tasks.

- **Cryptographic Support** The TOE provides: (i) cryptographic operations to support TOE's security functions as listed in Table 3; (ii) cryptographic key destruction; (iii) cryptographic operations to TAs via TEE Internal API as listed in [AGD\_OPE].

| Algorithm name          | Supported Modes                                    | Key sizes (default bits)             | Supported standard   |
|-------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|
| Symmetric ciphers (AES) | CBC  | 256                                  | FIPS 197 (AES)<br>NIST SP800-38A (CBC)                         |
|                         | XTS  | 256                                  | FIPS 197 (AES)<br>NIST SP800-38E &<br>IEEE Std 1619-2007 (XTS) |
| Hash                    | SHA256   | -                                    | FIPS 180-4   |
| MAC                     | HMAC: SHA256                                       | block size<br>not exceed<br>64 bytes | FIPS 198-1 & FIPS 180-4  |
|                         | AES-CMAC   | 256                                  | NIST SP800-38B   |
| ECC                     | ECDH   | 256                                  | NIST SP 800-56A  |
| RSA                     | OAEP for encryption<br>PKCS1_V1.5 for<br>signature | 2048                                 | PKCS #1  |

Table 3: TOE Cryptographic algorithms supporting TOE's security functions

The TOE security functionality defines the logical boundary of the TOE. The interfaces of this boundary are the Software External Interface, introduced in section 1.4.1.

The security functionality provided by the Trusted Applications is out of the scope of the TOE.

## 1.5 TOE Device Life Cycle

The device life cycle outlined here is an overall life cycle from which implementations can deviate according to development, manufacturing and assembly processes. It is split in six phases:

- Phase 1 corresponds to the design of firmware, software and hardware; it covers both TEE and additional components.
- Phase 2 corresponds to the overall design of the hardware platform supporting the TEE.
- Phase 3 corresponds to chipset and other hardware components manufacturing. The root key and material use to generate TEE identifier are set in this phase.
- Phase 4 covers software integration (linking the TEE software and other software)
- Phase 5 consists of device assembling; it includes any initialization and configuration step necessary to bring the device to a secure state prior delivery to the end-user. Trusted ROM will be formatted in this phase.
- Phase 6 stands for the end-usage of the device.

Figure 2 together with Table 4, show the whole life cycle of TEE-enabled device.

As the TOE is only the software part of the TEE defined in [TEE PP], the related life cycle actor is colored with green in the figure 2.




Figure 2: Life Cycle of TEE-enabled Device

| Phases                                       | Actors   |
|--|--|
| 1 & 2: Firmware / Software / Hardware design | <p><b><u>TOE development:</u></b></p> <p>The software developer (iTrustee team) is in charge of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Developing TEE software (the TOE) and testing compliant with GlobalPlatform specifications.</li> <li>• Specifying TEE software linking requirements.</li> </ul> <p><b><u>Non-TOE development:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Hardware/firmware designer is in charge of:                     <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Designing (part of) the processor(s) where the TEE software runs and designing (part of) the hardware security resources used by the TEE.</li> <li>• Developing TEE initialization code that instantiates/initializes the TEE (e.g. part of the secure boot code).</li> </ul> </li> <li>- The software integrator (Terminal Product Line team) may design: (i) additional REE software that will be linked with the TEE in phase 4 to provide REE controlled resources; (ii) Trusted Applications that they will be integrated in phase 4 also.</li> <li>- The software developer (iTrustee team) may design also Trusted Applications that they will be integrated in phase 4.</li> <li>- The silicon vendor designs the ROM code and the secure portion of the TEE chipset. If the silicon vendor is not designing the full TEE hardware, the silicon vendor integrates (and potentially augments) the TEE hardware designed by the Hardware/firmware team.</li> </ul> |

|                         |  |
|-------------------------|--|
| 3: TEE manufacturing    | The silicon vendor produces the TEE chipset and enables, sets or seeds the root of trust of the TEE. The root key and material use to generate TEE identifier are set in this phase.   |
| 4: Software integration | The software integrator (Terminal Product Line team) is responsible for the integration, validation and preparation of the software to load in the product that will include the iTrustee, any pre-installed Trusted Application, and additional software required to use the product (e.g. REE, Client Applications). |
| 5: Device manufacturing | The device manufacturer is responsible for the device assembling and initialization and any other operation on the device (including loading or installation of Trusted Applications) before delivery to the end-user.   |
| 6: End-usage phase      | The end user gets a device ready for use.<br>The Trusted Applications manager is responsible for the loading, installation, and removal of Trusted Applications post-issuance.   |

Table 4: Actors in the Device Life Cycle

The phase related to the iTrustee during the whole device life cycle (mentioned in green in the figure) is the following:

Phase 1: TEE software design. Developing iTrustee image and delivering it to software integrator.

The point of delivery is at the end of Phase 1. Hence, the TOE operational phase starts effectively in Phase 4 since Phases 2 and 3 are not part of the TOE delivery process.

The TOE doesn't provides TA management.

The involved actors and sites are described in the following table.

| Actors                         | Identification  | Covered by                           |
|--------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| Software developer             | iTrustee team:<br>Huawei Beijing Research Institute<br>Dongguan and Langfang data centers | ALC & site audit                     |
| TEE Hardware/Firmware designer | Huawei Hisilicon  | Not part of the TOE delivery process |
| Silicon vendor                 | TSMC Limited<br>ASE Technology Co., Ltd<br>SPIL Co., Ltd                                  | Not part of the TOE delivery process |
| Software integrator            | Terminal Product Line team:<br>Huawei Mobile Dept- Shanghai, China                        | AGD                                  |
| Device manufacturer            | Huawei Machine Co., Ltd<br>Shenzhen FuTaiHong Precision Industry Co., Ltd                 | AGD                                  |
| End user                       | -   | AGD                                  |

# 2 Conformance Claim

## 2.1 Conformance Claim

This Security Target claims conformance to Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5 as follows:

- Part 1 [CC1].
- Part 2 [CC2], extended with FPT\_INI.1 as defined in chap.5.
- Part 3 [CC3], more precisely EAL4, augmented with ALC\_FLR.1.

## 2.2 PP Claim

This Security Target is built using items from the BASE-PP of GlobalPlatform Device Committee TEE Protection Profile Version1.2 [TEE PP], and claims no conformance to this PP.

The TOE defined by this Security Target is the trusted OS, which is one of the components defined by [TEE PP]. The hardware components defined in [TEE PP] are considered as the environment of the TOE, thus the corresponding security objectives and SFRs are moved to the TOE environment, and new assumptions or objectives are added to the operational environment.

The following table shows the SPDs of the [TEE PP] that are applicable to the current ST:

| TOE SPDs                    | TEE PP | iTrustee Included   |
|-----------------------------|--------|---|
| <b>Assumptions</b>          |        |   |
| A.PROTECTION_AFTER_DELIVERY | ×      | ×   |
| A.ROLLBACK                  | ×      | ×   |
| A.TA_DEVELOPMENT            | ×      | ×   |
| A.INTEGRATION               |        | ×   |
| A.SECUREBOOT                |        | ×   |
| A.SECURE_HARDWARE/FIRMWARE  |        | ×   |
| A.RNG                       |        | x   |
| <b>Threats</b>              |        |   |
| T.ABUSE_FUNCT               | ×      | ×   |
| T.CLONE                     | ×      | ×   |
| T.FLASH_DUMP                | ×      | ×   |
| T.IMPERSONATION             | ×      | ×   |
| T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION      | ×      | ×   |
| T.PERTURBATION              | ×      | ×   |
| T.RAM                       | ×      | ×   |
| T.RNG                       | ×      | The RNG is provided by the SoC.<br>Considered in A.RNG and OE.RNG |
| T.SPY                       | ×      | ×   |
| T.TEE_FIRMWARE_DOWNGRADE    | ×      | ×   |
| T.STORAGE_CORRUPTION        | ×      | ×   |

| Organizational Security Policies |   |   |
|----------------------------------|---|---|
| OSP.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION    | × | × |
| OSP.SECRETS                      | × | × |

Table 5: TEE PP SPDs vs iTrustee ST

The following table shows the security objectives of the [TEE PP] that are applicable to the current ST:

| TOE Objectives   | TEE PP | iTrustee Included  |
|--|--------|--|
| <b>Security Objectives for the TOE</b>                     |        |  |
| O.CA_TA_IDENTIFICATION                                     | ×      | ×  |
| O.KEYS_USAGE   | ×      | ×  |
| O.TEE_ID   | ×      | Changed into O.TEE_ID<br>+<br>OE.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION<br>+<br>OE.INITIALIZATION |
| O.INITIALIZATION   | ×      | Changed into OE.INITIALIZATION   |
| O.INSTANCE_TIME  | ×      | ×  |
| O.OPERATION  | ×      | ×  |
| O.RNG  | ×      | Changed into OE.RNG. The RNG is provided by SoC                                      |
| O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY                                  | ×      | ×  |
| O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY  | ×      | ×  |
| O.TA_AUTHENTICITY  | ×      | ×  |
| O.TA_ISOLATION   | ×      | ×  |
| O.TEE_DATA_PROTECTION                                      | ×      | ×  |
| O.TEE_ISOLATION  | ×      | ×  |
| O.TRUSTED_STORAGE  | ×      | ×  |
| O.INI_INTERNAL   |        | ×  |
| <b>Security Objectives for the Operational Environment</b> |        |  |
| OE.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION                               | ×      | ×  |
| OE.PROTECTION_AFTER_DELIVERY                               | ×      | ×  |
| OE.ROLLBACK  | ×      | ×  |
| OE.SECRETS   | ×      | ×  |
| OE.TA_DEVELOPMENT  | ×      | ×  |
| OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE  |        | ×  |
| OE.RNG   |        | ×  |
| OE.INITIALIZATION  |        | ×  |

Table 6: TEE PP Security Objectives vs iTrustee ST

The following table shows the SFRs of the [TEE PP] that are applicable to the iTrustee ST:

| SFRs in [TEE PP]                                    | iTrustee Included | Applicable to Hardware/Firmware |
|---|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| <b>1. Identification</b>                            |                   |                                 |
| FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition                 | ×                 |                                 |
| FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action     | ×                 |                                 |
| FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding                      | ×                 |                                 |
| FMT_SMR.1 Security roles                            | ×                 |                                 |
| <b>2. Confidentiality, Integrity and Isolation</b>  |                   |                                 |
| FDP_IFC.2/Runtime Complete information flow control | ×                 |                                 |
| FDP_IFF.1/Runtime Simple security attributes        | ×                 |                                 |
| FDP_ITT.1/Runtime Basic internal transfer           |                   | Hardware Only                   |

|   |           |  |
|---|-----------|--|
| protection  |           |  |
| FDP_RIP.1/Runtime Subset residual information protection          | ×         |  |
| FPT_ITT.1/Runtime Basic internal TSF data transfer protection     |           | Hardware Only  |
| <b>3.Cryptography</b>   |           |  |
| FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation                                 | ×         |  |
| FDP_ACC.1/TA_keys Subset access control                           | ×         |  |
| FDP_ACF.1/TA_keys Security attribute based access control         | ×         |  |
| FMT_MSA.1/TA_keys Management of security attributes               | ×         |  |
| FMT_MSA.3/TA_keys Static attribute initialization                 | ×         |  |
| <b>4.Initialization, Operation and Firmware Integrity</b>         |           |  |
| FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms   | ×         |  |
| FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action             | ×         |  |
| FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state               | ×         |  |
| FPT_INI.1 TSF initialization                                      | ×         | SFR modified to cover only the secure initialization process that ensures the integrity of the TOE's internal tasks. |
| FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions                   | ×         |  |
| FPT_TEE.1 Testing of external entities                            | ×         |  |
| <b>5.TEE Identification</b>                                       |           |  |
| FAU_SAR.1 Audit review  | ×         |  |
| FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage                           | ×         |  |
| <b>6.Instance Time</b>  |           |  |
| FPT_STM.1/Instance time Reliable time stamps                      | ×         |  |
| FCS_RNG.1 Random numbers generation                               |           | -Hardware Only   |
| 7.Trusted Storage   |           |  |
| FDP_ACC.1/Trusted Storage Subset access control                   | ×         |  |
| FDP_ACF.1/Trusted Storage Security attribute based access control | ×         |  |
| FDP_ROL.1/Trusted Storage Basic rollback                          | ×         |  |
| FMT_MSA.1/Trusted Storage Management of security attributes       | ×         |  |
| FMT_MSA.3/Trusted Storage Static attribute initialization         | ×         |  |
| FDP_ITT.1/Trusted Storage Basic internal transfer protection      | ×         |  |
| Additional SFRs in this ST  |           |  |
|   | FCS_CKM.4 |  |

Table 7: SFRs of the [TEE PP] that are applicable to iTrustee ST



# 3 TOE Security Problem Definition

## 3.1 Assets

This section presents the assets of the TOE and their properties: authenticity, consistency, integrity, confidentiality, monotonicity, randomness, atomicity, read-only and device binding.

### TEE identification

TEE identification data that is globally unique among all GlobalPlatform TEEs whatever the manufacturer, vendor or integrator. This data is typically stored in the Trusted OTP memory of the TEE.

Properties: unique and non-modifiable.

*Application Note:* The TEE identifier is intended to be public and exposed to any software running on the device, not only to Trusted Applications.

### TA code

The code of the installed Trusted Applications. This data is typically stored in external non-volatile memory shared with REE and potentially accessible by it.

Properties: authenticity and consistency (which implies runtime integrity).

### TA data and keys

Data and keys managed and stored by a TA using the TEE security services. Data and keys are owned either by the user (the owner of the TEE-enabled device) or by the TA service provider. This data is typically stored in external non-volatile memory shared with REE and potentially accessible by it.

Properties: authenticity, consistency (which implies runtime integrity), atomicity, confidentiality and device binding.

### TA instance time

Monotonic time during TA instance lifetime. Not affected by transitions through low power states. Not persistent over TEE reset or TA shut-down.

Properties: monotonicity.

### TEE runtime data

Runtime TEE data, including execution variables, runtime context, etc. This data is stored in volatile memory.

Properties: consistency (or integrity as these notions are equivalent for non-persistent data) and confidentiality, including random numbers generated by the TEE.

### TEE persistent data

TEE persistent data, including TEE cryptographic keys (for instance keys to authenticate TA code) and TA properties. This data is typically stored in external non-volatile memory shared with REE and potentially accessible by it.

Properties: authenticity, consistency (which implies runtime integrity), confidentiality and device binding.

#### **TEE firmware**

The TEE binary, containing TEE code and constant data such as versioning information. This asset is typically stored in external non-volatile memory shared with REE and potentially accessible by it.

Properties: authenticity, integrity.

#### **TEE initialization code and data**

Initialization code and data (for instance cryptographic certificates) used from iTrustee start-up to the complete activation of the TEE security services. Authentication of the TEE is part of its initialization.

Properties: integrity.

#### **TEE storage root of trust**

The root of trust of the TEE storage that is used to bind the stored data and keys to the TEE.

Properties: integrity and confidentiality.

## **3.2 Users / Subjects**

There are two kinds of users of the TOE: Trusted Applications, which use the TOE services through the TEE Internal API, and the Rich Execution Environment (including Client Applications), which uses the TOE's services exported by the Trusted Applications.

#### **Trusted Application (TA)**

All the Trusted Applications running on the TEE are users of the TOE, through the TEE Internal API.

#### **Rich Execution Environment (REE)**

The Rich Execution Environment, hosting the standard OS, the TEE Client API and the Client Applications (CA) that use the services of the Trusted Applications, is a user of the TOE.

## **3.3 Threats**

This section presents threats by providing the general goal, the assets threatened and in some cases, typical identification and/or exploitation attack paths. Some of the threats constitute in fact steps of longer attack paths related for instance to the disclosure or modification of assets. Nevertheless, they are stated separately to facilitate the tracing of the countermeasures.

#### **T.ABUSE\_FUNCT**

An attacker accesses TEE functionalities outside of their expected availability range thus violating irreversible phases of the TEE life cycle or state machine.

An attacker manages to instantiate an illegal TEE or to start-up the TEE in an insecure state or to enter an insecure state, allowing the attacker to obtain sensitive data or compromise the TSF (bypass, deactivate or change security services).

Assets threatened directly: TEE initialization code and data (integrity), TEE runtime data (confidentiality, integrity), TA code (authenticity, consistency).

Assets threatened indirectly: TA data and keys (confidentiality, authenticity, consistency) including instance time.

*Application Note:*

Attack paths may consist, for instance, in using commands in unexpected contexts or with unexpected parameters, impersonation of authorized entities or exploiting badly implemented reset functionalities that provides undue privileges.

In particular a fake application running in the Rich OS which masquerades as a security application running in the TEE can grab PINs and passwords and run the real security application on behalf of the user. However, such threat is not countered by the TEE alone and must be taken into account in the design of the use case, for instance by using an applicative authenticated communication channel between the client and the TA.

### **T.CLONE**

An attacker manages to copy TEE related data of a first device on a second device and makes this device accept them as genuine data.

Assets threatened directly: All data and keys (authenticity, device-binding), TEE identification data (authenticity, integrity).

### **T.FLASH\_DUMP**

An attacker partially or totally recovers the content of the external Flash in clear text, thus disclosing sensitive TA and TEE data and potentially allowing the attacker to mount other attacks.

Assets threatened directly (confidentiality, authenticity, consistency): TA data and keys, TEE persistent data.

*Application Note:*

An attack path consists for instance in performing a (partial) memory dump through the REE, purely via software or with a USB connection.

During identification, another example consists of unsoldering a flash memory and dumping its content, revealing a secret key that provides privileged access to many devices of the same model.

### **T.IMPERSONATION**

An attacker impersonates a Trusted Application to gain unauthorized access to the services and data of another Trusted Application.

Assets threatened directly (confidentiality, integrity): TEE runtime data.

Assets threatened indirectly: All data and keys (confidentiality, authenticity, consistency).

### **T.ROGUE\_CODE\_EXECUTION**

An attacker imports malicious code into the TEE to disclose or modify sensitive data.

Assets threatened directly (confidentiality, integrity): TEE runtime data.

Assets threatened indirectly (confidentiality, authenticity, consistency): All.

*Application Note:*

Import of code within REE is out of control of the TEE.

### **T.PERTURBATION**

An attacker modifies the behavior of the TEE or a TA in order to disclose or modify sensitive data or to force the TEE or the TA to execute unauthorized services.

Assets threatened directly: TEE initialization code and data (integrity), TEE storage root of trust (confidentiality, integrity), TEE runtime data (confidentiality, integrity).

Assets threatened indirectly: All data and keys (confidentiality, authenticity, consistency) including TA instance time.

#### *Application Note:*

Unauthorized use of commands (one or many incorrect commands, undefined commands, hidden commands, invalid command sequence) or buffer overflow attacks (overwriting buffer content to modify execution contexts or gaining system privileges) are examples of attack paths. The TEE can also be attacked through REE or TA "programmer errors" that exploit e.g. multi-threading or context/session management or closed sessions or by triggering system resets during execution of commands by the TEE.

### **T.RAM**

An attacker partially or totally recovers RAM content, thus disclosing runtime data and potentially allowing the attacker to interfere with the TEE initialization code and data.

Assets threatened directly: TEE initialization code and data (integrity), TEE storage root of trust (confidentiality, integrity), TEE runtime data (confidentiality, integrity).

Assets threatened indirectly: All data and keys (confidentiality, authenticity, consistency).

#### *Application Note:*

When the REE and the TEE have shared memory, an attack path consists in the (partial) memory dump (read/write) by the REE. During the identification phase, another example of attack path is to snoop on a memory bus, revealing code that is only decrypted at run-time, and finding a flaw in that code that can be exploited.

### **T.SPY**

An attacker discloses confidential data or keys by means of runtime attacks or unauthorized access to storage locations.

Assets threatened directly (confidentiality): All data and keys, TEE storage root of trust.

#### *Application Note:*

Exploitation of side-channels by a CA or TA (e.g. timing, power consumption), obtention of residual sensitive data (e.g. improperly cleared memory) or use of undocumented or invalid command codes are examples of attack paths. The data may be used to exploit the device it was obtained on, or another device (e.g. shared secret key).

During the identification phase, the attacker may for instance probe external buses.

### **T.TEE\_FIRMWARE\_DOWNGRADE**

An attacker backs up part or all the TEE firmware and restores it later in order to use obsolete TEE functionalities.

Assets threatened directly (integrity): TEE firmware.

Assets threatened indirectly: All data and keys (confidentiality, authenticity, consistency).

## **T.STORAGE\_CORRUPTION**

An attacker corrupts all or part of the non-volatile storage used by the TEE including the trusted storage, in an attempt to trigger unexpected behavior from the storage security mechanisms. The ultimate goal of the attack is to disclose and/or modify TEE or TA data and/or code.

Assets threatened directly: TEE storage root of trust (confidentiality, integrity), TEE persistent data (confidentiality, consistency), TEE firmware (authenticity, integrity), TA data and keys (confidentiality, authenticity, consistency), TA instance time (integrity), TA code (authenticity, consistency).

*Application Note:*

The attack can rely, for instance, on the REE file system or the Flash driver.

## **3.4 OSP**

This section presents the organizational security policies that have to be implemented by the TOE and/or its operational environment.

### **OSP.INTEGRATION\_CONFIGURATION**

Integration and configuration of the TOE by the device manufacturer shall rely on guidelines defined by the TOE provider, which fulfill the requirements set in GlobalPlatform TEE specifications and state all the security requirements for the device manufacturer issued from the TOE evaluation.

### **OSP.SECRETS**

Generation, storage, distribution, destruction, injection of secret data in the TEE or any other operation performed outside the TEE shall enforce integrity and confidentiality of these data. This applies to secret data injected before end-usage phase (such as the root of trust of TEE storage) or during the end-usage phase (such as cryptographic private or symmetric keys, confidential data).

## **3.5 Assumptions**

This section states the assumptions that hold on the TEE operational environment. These assumptions have to be met by the operational environment.

### **A.PROTECTION\_AFTER\_DELIVERY**

It is assumed that the TOE is protected by the environment after delivery and before entering the final usage phase. It is assumed that the persons manipulating the TOE in the operational environment apply the TEE guidelines (e.g. user and administrator guidance, installation documentation, personalization guide). It is also assumed that the persons responsible for the application of the procedures contained in the guides, and the persons involved in delivery and protection of the product have the required skills and are aware of the security issues.

### **A.ROLLBACK**

It is assumed that TA developers do not rely on protection of TEE persistent data, TA data and keys and TA code against full rollback.

## **A.TA\_DEVELOPMENT**

TA developers are assumed to be competent and trustworthy individuals who will comply with the TA development guidelines set by the TEE provider. In particular, TA developers are assumed to consider the following principles during the development of the Trusted Applications:

- CA identifiers are generated and managed by the REE, outside the scope of the TEE. A TA must not assume that CA identifiers are genuine
- TAs must not disclose any sensitive data to the REE through any CA (interaction with the CA may require authentication means)
- Data written to memory that are not under the TA instance's exclusive control may have changed at next read
- Reading twice from the same location in memory that is not under the TA instance's exclusive control can return different values.
- When using the trusted storage TOE security function, the TA developers must use a random data structure when updating TA data.

## **A.INTEGRATION**

It is assumed that the TOE will be installed and configured correctly on the dedicated hardware according to the installation guidance documentation, and all the hardware, firmware components of TEE will be adequately protected. The internal communication data transferred between separated physical components will be protected from disclosure and modification by the TOE environment. It is assumed also that the firmware installed in the device is the version that was intended.

## **A.SECUREBOOT**

It is assumed that the TOE will be started in a secure mode which will ensure:

- the authenticity of the TOE firmware
- the integrity of the TEE initialization code and data
- the integrity of the storage root of trust
- the integrity of the TEE identification data
- the version of the firmware to prevent downgrade to previous versions

## **A.SECURE\_HARDWARE/FIRMWARE**

It is assumed that the TOE will run on secure hardware/firmware as defined in [TEE PP]; i.e hardware/firmware provide the security features required by the TOE and are sufficiently protected from any attack that may cause those features to provide false results. In particular, it is assumed that the TOE will run in an isolated environment based on ARM trustzone, which provides protection of internal data transfer between physically separated components of the TOE and isolation between the REE and TEE.

## **A.RNG**

It is assumed that the random number generator provided by the trusted peripherals will have a good quality. The generated random number will not be predictable and will have sufficient entropy.

# 4 Security Objectives

## 4.1 Objectives for the TOE

This section states the security objectives for the TOE.

### **O.CA\_TA\_IDENTIFICATION**

The TOE shall provide means to protect the identity of each Trusted Application from usage by another resident Trusted Application and to distinguish Client Applications from Trusted Applications.

*Application Note:*

Client properties are managed either by the Rich OS or by the Trusted OS and these must ensure that a Client cannot tamper with its own properties in the following sense:

- The Client identity of TOE resident TAs **MUST** always be determined by the Trusted OS and the determination of whether it is a TA or not **MUST** be as trustworthy as the Trusted OS itself
- When the Client identity corresponds to a TA, then the Trusted OS **MUST** ensure that the other Client properties are equal to the properties of the calling TA up to the same level of trustworthiness that the target TA places in the Trusted OS
- When the Client identity does not correspond to a TA, then the Rich OS is responsible for ensuring that the Client Application cannot tamper with its own properties. However this information is not trusted by the Trusted OS.

### **O.KEYS\_USAGE**

The TOE shall enforce on cryptographic keys the usage restrictions set by their creators.

### **O.TEE\_ID**

The TOE shall provide means to retrieve the TEE identifier.

### **O.INI\_INTERNAL**

The TOE shall be started through a secure initialization process that ensures the integrity of the TOE's internal tasks.

### **O.INSTANCE\_TIME**

The TOE shall provide TA instance time and shall ensure that this time is monotonic during TA instance lifetime - from TA instance creation until the TA instance is destroyed - and not impacted by transitions through low power states.

## **O.OPERATION**

The TOE shall ensure the correct operation of its security functions. In particular, the TOE shall

- Protect itself against abnormal situations caused by programmer errors or violation of good practices by the REE (and the CAs indirectly) or by the TAs
- Control the access to its services by the REE and TAs: The TOE shall check the validity of any operation requested from either the REE or a TA, at any entry point into the TOE
- Enter a secure state upon failure detection, without exposure of any sensitive data.

*Application Note:*

- Programmer errors or violation of good practices (e.g. that exploit multi-threading or context/session management) might become attack-enablers. The REE may be harmful but < the TOE implementation still guarantees the stability and security of TOE > (cf. [CAPI]). In any case, a Trusted Application **MUST NOT** be able to use a programmer error on purpose to circumvent the security boundaries enforced by an implementation (cf. [IAPI] and [SA])
- Entry points (cf. [SA]): Software in the REE must not be able to call directly to TOE Functions or Trusted Core Framework. The REE software must go through protocols such that the Trusted OS or Trusted Application performs the verification of the acceptability of the operation that the REE software has requested.

## **O.RUNTIME\_CONFIDENTIALITY**

The TOE shall ensure that confidential TEE runtime data and TA data and keys are protected against unauthorized disclosure. In particular,

- The TOE shall not export any sensitive data, random numbers or secret keys to the REE
- The TOE shall grant access to sensitive data, random numbers or secret keys only to authorized TAs
- The TOE shall clean up sensitive resources as soon as it can determine that their values are no longer needed.

## **O.RUNTIME\_INTEGRITY**

The TOE shall ensure that the TEE runtime data, the TA code and the TA data and keys are protected against unauthorized modification at runtime when stored in volatile memory.

## **O.TA\_AUTHENTICITY**

The TOE shall verify code authenticity of Trusted Applications.

## **O.TA\_ISOLATION**

The TOE shall isolate the TAs from each other based on the hardware MMU: Each TA shall access its own execution and storage space, which is shared among all the instances of the TA but separated from the spaces of any other TA.

*Application Note:*

This objective contributes to the enforcement of the confidentiality and the integrity of the TOE.



**O.TEE\_DATA\_PROTECTION**

The TOE shall ensure the authenticity, consistency and confidentiality of TEE persistent data.

**O.TEE\_ISOLATION**

The TOE shall prevent (based on the hardware MMU) the REE and the TAs from accessing the TEE own execution and storage space and resources.

*Application Note:*

This objective contributes to the enforcement of the correct execution of the TOE. Note that resource allocation can change during runtime as long as it does not break isolation between TEE resources during their usage and REE/TAs.

**O.TRUSTED\_STORAGE**

The TOE shall provide Trusted Storage services for persistent TA general-purpose data and key material such that:

- The confidentiality of the stored data and keys is enforced
- The authenticity of the stored data and keys is enforced
- The consistency of each TA stored data and keys is enforced
- The atomicity of the operations that modify the storage is enforced.

The TOE Trusted Storage shall be bound to the hosting device, which means that the storage space must be accessible or modifiable only by authorized TAs running on the same TOE and device as when the data was created.

The table below summarizes which security objectives relate to the assets stored in non-volatile and/or volatile memory.

| Asset               | In non-volatile memory | In volatile memory    |
|---------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| TEE runtime data    | N/A                    | O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY   |
| TA code             | O.TA_AUTHENTICITY      | O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY   |
| TA data and keys    | O.TRUSTED_STORAGE      | O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY   |
| TEE persistent data | O.TEE_DATA_PROTECTION  | O.TEE_DATA_PROTECTION |

Table 8 Assets store location

## 4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment

This section states the security objectives for the TOE operational environment covering all the assumptions and the organizational security policies that apply to the environment.

The following security objectives apply to any TOE operational environment that does not implement any additional security feature.

**OE.INTEGRATION\_CONFIGURATION**

The TOE shall be installed and configured correctly to ensure the TOE running in a secure state. The device manufacturer shall apply the TOE preparative guidance [AGD\_PRE] for performing the secure installation of the TOE.

The process of TEE identifier generating shall ensure statistical uniqueness of the TEE identifier.

**OE.PROTECTION\_AFTER\_DELIVERY**

The TOE shall be protected by the environment after delivery and before entering the final usage phase. The persons manipulating the TOE in the operational environment shall apply the TOE guidance documents defined in [AGD\_PRE] and [AGD\_OPE].

The persons responsible for the application of the procedures contained in the guides, and the persons involved in delivery and protection of the product must have the required skills and are aware of the security issues.

**OE.ROLLBACK**

The TA developer shall take into account that the TOE does not provide full rollback protection of TOE persistent data, TA data and keys and TA code.

**OE.SECRETS**

Management of secret data (e.g. generation, storage, distribution, destruction, loading into the product of cryptographic private keys, symmetric keys, user authentication data) performed outside the TOE shall enforce integrity and confidentiality of these data.

**OE.TA\_DEVELOPMENT**

TA developers shall comply with the TA development guidelines set by the TOE provider. In particular, TA developers shall apply the following security recommendations during the development of the Trusted Applications:

- CA identifiers are generated and managed by the REE, outside the scope of the TOE; TAs do not assume that CA identifiers are genuine
- TAs do not disclose any sensitive data to the REE through any CA (interaction with the CA may require authentication means)
- TAs shall not assume that data written to a shared buffer can be read unchanged later on; TAs should always read data only once from the shared buffer and then validate it
- TAs should copy the contents of shared buffers into TA instance-owned memory whenever these contents are required to be constant.
- TA developers should apply for TA identifiers from the TOE manufacture before deploying the TA into the TOE. All of the TA identifiers are generated, issued and managed by the TOE manufacture.
- When using the trusted storage TOE security function, the TA developers shall use a random data structure when updating TA data.

**OE.INITIALIZATION**

The TEE shall be started through a secure initialization process that ensures:

- the integrity of the TEE initialization code and data used to load the TEE firmware
- the authenticity of the TEE firmware
- the TEE is bound to the SoC of the device. In particular, the TEE shall protect the TEE firmware against downgrade attacks
- the integrity of the storage root of trust
- the integrity of the TEE identification data.

After completion of the initialization process the TOE is running in a secure state.

*Application Note:*

The fact that the process is bound to the SoC means that the root of trust for the TEE data cannot be modified or tampered with (cf. [SA]).

**OE.RNG**

The hardware which the TOE runs on shall provide a random number generator's quality. Random numbers shall not be predictable and shall have sufficient entropy.

**OE.TRUSTED\_HARDWARE**

Trusted hardware/firmware which the TOE runs on shall provide the essential security features required by the TOE and shall be sufficiently protected from any attack that may cause those features to provide false results. In particular, trusted hardware shall provide:

- a protection of the communication between physically separated parts of the TOE.
- security mechanisms to implement trust storage function and more information to implement log service when error is detected.
- a timer to provide reliable time.

*Application Note:*

Trusted hardware includes Huawei Kirin series SoC, secure storage, RAM mapped to secure world, etc.

## 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

### 4.3.1 Coverage

The following tables provide mappings between TOE SPD and Security Objectives.

| Threats       | Security Objectives   |
|---------------|---|
| T.ABUSE_FUNCT | O.INI_INTERNAL, O.OPERATION, O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY, O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY, O.TEE_DATA_PROTECTION, O.TEE_ISOLATION, OE.TA_DEVELOPMENT, O.KEYS_USAGE, O.TA_AUTHENTICITY, OE.INITIALIZATION, OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE |
| T.CLONE       | O.TEE_ID, O.INI_INTERNAL, OE.INITIALIZATION, O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY, O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY, O.TEE_DATA_PROTECTION, O.TRUSTED_STORAGE, OE.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION, OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE                        |
| T.FLASH_DUMP  | O.TRUSTED_STORAGE, OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE  |

|                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| T.IMPERSONATION          | O.CA_TA_IDENTIFICATION,<br>O.OPERATION,<br>O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY,<br>OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE  |
| T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION   | O.OPERATION,<br>O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY,<br>O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY,<br>O.TEE_DATA_PROTECTION,<br>O.TRUSTED_STORAGE,<br>OE.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION,<br>OE.PROTECTION_AFTER_DELIVERY,<br>O.TA_AUTHENTICITY,<br>O.INI_INTERNAL, OE.INITIALIZATION,<br>OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE |
| T.PERTURBATION           | O.INI_INTERNAL, OE.INITIALIZATION,<br>O.OPERATION, O.INSTANCE_TIME,<br>O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY,<br>O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY,<br>O.TA_ISOLATION,<br>O.TEE_DATA_PROTECTION,<br>O.TEE_ISOLATION,<br>O.TA_AUTHENTICITY,<br>OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE                                 |
| T.RAM                    | O.INI_INTERNAL, OE.INITIALIZATION,<br>O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY,<br>O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY,<br>O.TA_ISOLATION, O.TEE_ISOLATION   |
| T.SPY                    | O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY,<br>O.TA_ISOLATION, O.TEE_ISOLATION,<br>O.TRUSTED_STORAGE,<br>OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE   |
| T.TEE_FIRMWARE_DOWNGRADE | OE.INITIALIZATION,<br>OE.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION,<br>OE.PROTECTION_AFTER_DELIVERY   |
| T.STORAGE_CORRUPTION     | O.OPERATION,<br>OE.ROLLBACK,<br>O.TEE_DATA_PROTECTION,<br>O.TRUSTED_STORAGE,<br>O.TA_AUTHENTICITY,<br>OE.INITIALIZATION,<br>OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE   |

Table 9: Threats and Security Objectives – Coverage

| Security Objectives    | Threats  |
|------------------------|--|
| O.CA_TA_IDENTIFICATION | T.IMPERSONATION                                    |
| O.KEYS_USAGE           | T.ABUSE_FUNCT                                      |
| O.TEE_ID               | T.CLONE  |
| O.INI_INTERNAL         | T.ABUSE_FUNCT, T.CLONE,<br>T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION, |

|                              |  |
|------------------------------|--|
|                              | T.PERTURBATION, T.RAM  |
| O.INSTANCE_TIME              | T.PERTURBATION   |
| O.OPERATION                  | T.ABUSE_FUNCT, T.IMPERSONATION,<br>T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION,<br>T.PERTURBATION,<br>T.STORAGE_CORRUPTION                                      |
| O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY    | T.ABUSE_FUNCT, T.CLONE,<br>T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION,<br>T.PERTURBATION, T.RAM, T.SPY   |
| O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY          | T.ABUSE_FUNCT, T.CLONE,<br>T.IMPERSONATION,<br>T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION,<br>T.PERTURBATION, T.RAM  |
| O.TA_AUTHENTICITY            | T.ABUSE_FUNCT,<br>T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION,<br>T.PERTURBATION,<br>T.STORAGE_CORRUPTION   |
| O.TA_ISOLATION               | T.PERTURBATION, T.RAM, T.SPY   |
| O.TEE_DATA_PROTECTION        | T.ABUSE_FUNCT, T.CLONE,<br>T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION,<br>T.PERTURBATION,<br>T.STORAGE_CORRUPTION  |
| O.TEE_ISOLATION              | T.ABUSE_FUNCT, T.PERTURBATION,<br>T.RAM, T.SPY   |
| O.TRUSTED_STORAGE            | T.CLONE, T.FLASH_DUMP,<br>T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION, T.SPY,<br>T.STORAGE_CORRUPTION   |
| OE.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION | T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION,<br>T.TEE_FIRMWARE_DOWNGRADE  |
| OE.PROTECTION_AFTER_DELIVERY | T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION,<br>T.TEE_FIRMWARE_DOWNGRADE  |
| OE.ROLLBACK                  | T.STORAGE_CORRUPTION   |
| OE.SECRETS                   |  |
| OE.TA_DEVELOPMENT            | T.ABUSE_FUNCT  |
| OE.INITIALIZATION            | T.ABUSE_FUNCT, T.CLONE,<br>T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION,<br>T.PERTURBATION, T.RAM,<br>T.TEE_FIRMWARE_DOWNGRADE,<br>T.STORAGE_CORRUPTION          |
| OE.RNG                       |  |
| OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE          | T.ABUSE_FUNCT, T.CLONE, T.FLASH_DUMP,<br>T.IMPERSONATION, T.ROGUE_CODE_EXECUTION,<br>T.RAM, T.SPY, T.STORAGE_CORRUPTION,<br>T.PERTURBATION |

Table 10: Security Objectives and Threats – Coverage

| Organizational Security Policies | Security Objectives          |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| OSP.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION    | OE.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION |
| OSP.SECRETS                      | OE.SECRETS                   |

Table 11: OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage

| Security Objectives          | Organizational Security Policies |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| OE.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION | OSP.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION    |
| OE.SECRETS                   | OSP.SECRETS                      |

Table 12: Security Objectives and OSPs – Coverage

| Assumptions                 | Security Objectives for the Operational Environment                  |
|-----------------------------|--|
| A.PROTECTION_AFTER_DELIVERY | OE.PROTECTION_AFTER_DELIVERY   |
| A.ROLLBACK                  | OE.ROLLBACK  |
| A.TA_DEVELOPMENT            | OE.TA_DEVELOPMENT  |
| A.SECUREBOOT                | OE.INITIALIZATION  |
| A.INTEGRATION               | OE.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION, OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE, OE.INITIALIZATION |
| A.SECURE_HARDWARE/FIRMWARE  | OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE  |
| A.RNG                       | OE.RNG   |

Table 13: Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment – Coverage

| Security Objectives for the Operational Environment | Assumptions                               |
|---|---|
| OE.INTEGRATION_CONFIGURATION                        | A.INTEGRATION                             |
| OE.PROTECTION_AFTER_DELIVERY                        | A.PROTECTION_AFTER_DELIVERY               |
| OE.ROLLBACK   | A.ROLLBACK                                |
| OE.SECRETS  |   |
| OE.TA_DEVELOPMENT                                   | A.TA_DEVELOPMENT                          |
| OE.TRUSTED_HARDWARE                                 | A.SECURE_HARDWARE/FIRMWARE, A.INTEGRATION |

|                   |                             |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| OE.INITIALIZATION | A.SECUREBOOT, A.INTEGRATION |
| OE.RNG            | A.RNG                       |

Table 14: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage

## 4.3.2 Rationale

### 4.3.2.1 Threats

**T.ABUSE\_FUNCT** The combination of the following objectives ensures protection against abuse of functionality:

- o O.INI\_INTERNAL and OE.INITIALIZATION ensures that the TEE security functionality is correctly initialized
- o O.OPERATION ensures correct operation of the security functionality and a proper management of failures
- o O.RUNTIME\_CONFIDENTIALITY prevents exposure of confidential data
- o O.RUNTIME\_INTEGRITY ensures protection against unauthorized modification of security functionality at runtime
- o O.TA\_AUTHENTICITY ensures that the authenticity of TA code is verified
- o O.TEE\_DATA\_PROTECTION ensures that the data used by the TEE are authentic and consistent
- o O.TEE\_ISOLATION enforces the separation between the TEE and the outside (REE and TAs)
- o O.KEYS\_USAGE controls the usage of cryptographic keys
- o OE.TA\_DEVELOPMENT enforces TA development principles, which are meant in particular to prevent disclosing information or performing modifications upon request of unauthorized entities
- o OE.TRUSTED\_HARDWARE ensures that the trusted hardware/firmware which the TOE runs on provide the required essential security features.

**T.CLONE** The combination of the following objectives ensures protection against cloning:

- o O.TEE\_ID provides the unique TEE identification means
- o O.INI\_INTERNAL and OE.INITIALIZATION ensure that the TEE is bound to the SoC of the device
- o O.RUNTIME\_CONFIDENTIALITY prevents exposure of confidential data, in particular TSF data used to bind the TEE to the device
- o O.RUNTIME\_INTEGRITY prevents against unauthorized modification at runtime of security functionalities or data used to detect or prevent cloning
- o O.TEE\_DATA\_PROTECTION prevents the TEE from using TEE data that is inconsistent or not authentic
- o O.TRUSTED\_STORAGE ensures that the trusted storage is bound to the device and prevents the TEE from using data that is inconsistent or not authentic

- o OE.INTEGRATION\_CONFIGURATION ensures that the TEE identifier is in fact unique when generated outside the TOE
- o OE.TRUSTED\_HARDWARE ensures that the trusted hardware/firmware which the TOE runs on provide the required essential security features.

**T.FLASH\_DUMP** The combination of the following objectives ensures protection against flash dump attacks:

- o O.TRUSTED\_STORAGE ensures the confidentiality of the data stored in external memory.
- o OE.TRUSTED\_HARDWARE ensures that the trusted hardware/firmware which the TOE runs on provide the required essential security features.

**T.IMPERSONATION** The combination of the following objectives ensures protection against application impersonation attacks:

- o O.CA\_TA\_IDENTIFICATION ensures the protection of Client identities and the possibility to distinguish Client Applications and Trusted Applications
- o O.OPERATION ensures the verification of Client identities before any operation on their behalf
- o O.RUNTIME\_INTEGRITY prevents against unauthorized modification of security functionality at runtime
- o OE.TRUSTED\_HARDWARE ensures that the trusted hardware/firmware which the TOE runs on provide the required essential security features.

**T.ROGUE\_CODE\_EXECUTION** The combination of the following objectives ensures protection against import of malicious code:

- o O.INI\_INTERNAL and OE.INITIALIZATION ensures that the TEE security functionality is correctly initialized and the integrity of TEE firmware
- o O.OPERATION ensures correct operation of the security functionality
- o O.RUNTIME\_CONFIDENTIALITY covers runtime TEE data which might influence the behavior of the TEE
- o O.TA\_AUTHENTICITY ensures that the authenticity of TA code is verified
- o O.RUNTIME\_INTEGRITY ensures protection against unauthorized modification of security functionality at runtime
- o O.TEE\_DATA\_PROTECTION covers persistent TEE data which might influence the behavior of the TEE
- o O.TRUSTED\_STORAGE ensures protection of the storage from which code might be imported
- o OE.INTEGRATION\_CONFIGURATION covers the import of foreign code in a phase other than the end-user phase
- o OE.PROTECTION\_AFTER\_DELIVERY covers the import of foreign code in a phase other than the end-user phase
- o OE.TRUSTED\_HARDWARE ensures that the trusted hardware/firmware which the TOE runs on provide the required essential security features.

**T.PERTURBATION** The combination of the following objectives ensures protection against perturbation attacks:



- o O.INI\_INTERNAL and OE.INITIALIZATION ensures that the TEE security functionality is correctly initialized
- o O.OPERATION ensures correct operation of the security functionality and a proper management of failures
- o O.RUNTIME\_CONFIDENTIALITY covers runtime TEE data which might influence the behavior of the TEE
- o O.TA\_AUTHENTICITY ensures that the authenticity of TA code is verified
- o O.RUNTIME\_INTEGRITY ensures protection against unauthorized modification of security functionality at runtime
- o O.TA\_ISOLATION ensures the separation of the TA
- o O.TEE\_DATA\_PROTECTION covers persistent TEE data which might influence the behavior of the TEE
- o O.TEE\_ISOLATION enforces the separation between the TEE and the outside (REE and TAs).
- o O.INSTANCE\_TIME and OE.TRUSTED\_HARDWARE ensure the reliability of instance time stamps.

**T.RAM** The combination of the following objectives ensures protection against RAM attacks:

- o O.INI\_INTERNAL and OE.INITIALIZATION ensures that the TEE security functionality is correctly initialized and that the initialization process is protected from the REE
- o O.RUNTIME\_CONFIDENTIALITY prevents exposure of confidential data at runtime
- o O.RUNTIME\_INTEGRITY protects against unauthorized modification of code and data at runtime
- o O.TA\_ISOLATION provides a memory barrier between TAs
- o O.TEE\_ISOLATION provides a memory barrier between the TEE and the REE
- o OE.TRUSTED\_HARDWARE ensures that the trusted hardware/firmware which the TOE runs on provide the required essential security features.

**T.SPY** The combination of the following objectives ensures protection against disclosure:

- o O.RUNTIME\_CONFIDENTIALITY ensures protection of confidential data at runtime
- o O.TA\_ISOLATION ensures the separation between TAs
- o O.TEE\_ISOLATION ensures that neither REE nor TAs can access TEE data
- o O.TRUSTED\_STORAGE ensures that data stored in the trusted storage locations is accessible by the TA owner only
- o OE.TRUSTED\_HARDWARE ensures that the trusted hardware/firmware which the TOE runs on provide the required essential security features.

**T.TEE\_FIRMWARE\_DOWNGRADE** The combination of the following objectives ensures protection against TEE firmware downgrade:

- o OE.INITIALIZATION ensures that the firmware that is executed is the version that was intended

- o OE.INTEGRATION\_CONFIGURATION ensures that the firmware installed in the device is the version that was intended
- o OE.PROTECTION\_AFTER\_DELIVERY ensures that the firmware has not been modified after delivery.

**T.STORAGE\_CORRUPTION** The combination of the following objectives ensures protection against corruption of non-volatile storage:

- o O.OPERATION ensures the correct operation of the TEE security functionality, including storage
- o O.TEE\_DATA\_PROTECTION ensures that stored TEE data are genuine and consistent
- o O.TRUSTED\_STORAGE enforces detection of corruption of the TA's storage
- o O.TA\_AUTHENTICITY ensures that the authenticity of TA code is verified
- o OE.INITIALIZATION ensures that the firmware that is executed is the version that was intended
- o OE.ROLLBACK states the limits of the properties enforced by the TSF
- o OE.TRUSTED\_HARDWARE ensures that the trusted hardware/firmware which the TOE runs on provide the required essential security features.

#### 4.3.2.2 OSPs

**OSP.INTEGRATION\_CONFIGURATION** The objective OE.INTEGRATION\_CONFIGURATION directly covers this OSP.

**OSP.SECRETS** The objective OE.SECRETS directly covers this OSP.

#### 4.3.2.3 Assumptions

**A.PROTECTION\_AFTER\_DELIVERY** The objective OE.PROTECTION\_AFTER\_DELIVERY directly covers this assumption.

**A.ROLLBACK** The objective OE.ROLLBACK directly covers this assumption.

**A.TA\_DEVELOPMENT** The objective OE.TA\_DEVELOPMENT directly covers this assumption.

**A.INTEGRATION** The combination of the following objectives covers this assumption:

- o OE.INTEGRATION\_CONFIGURATION ensures that the hardware, firmware and other components will be installed and configured correctly in the device.
- o OE.TRUSTED\_HARDWARE ensures that the trusted hardware/firmware which the TOE runs on provide the required essential security features.
- o OE.INITIALIZATION ensures that the firmware installed in the device is the version that was intended.

**A.SECUREBOOT** The objective OE.INITIALIZATION directly covers this assumption.

**A.SECURE\_HARDWARE/FIRMWARE** The objective OE.TRUSTED\_HARDWARE directly covers this assumption.

**A.RNG** The objective OE.RNG directly covers this assumption.

# 5 Extended Components Definition

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## 5.1 Extended Family FPT\_INI - TSF initialization

### 5.1.1 Description

To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FPT\_INI) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is introduced here. This family describes the functional requirements for the initialization of the TSF by a dedicated function of the TOE that ensures the initialization in a correct and secure operational state.

The family TSF Initialization (FPT\_INI) is specified as follows.

### 5.1.2 Family behavior

#### Description

FPT\_INI.1 Requires the TOE to provide a TSF initialization function that brings the TSF into a secure operational state at power-on.

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Management: No management activities are foreseen.

Audit: No actions are defined to be auditable.

#### Definition

FPT\_INI.1 TSF initialization

**FPT\_INI.1.1** The TOE initialization function shall verify [*assignment: list of implementation-dependent verifications*] prior to establishing the TSF in a secure initial state.

**FPT\_INI.1.2** The TOE initialization function shall detect and respond to errors and failures during initialization such that the TOE either successfully completes initialization or is halted.

**FPT\_INI.1.3** The TOE initialization function shall not be able to arbitrarily interact with the TSF after TOE initialization completes.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

# 6 Security Requirements

## 6.1 Conventions

The conventions used in descriptions of the SFRs are as follows:

- (1) Assignment: Indicated with *italicized text*;
- (2) Refinement: Indicated with **bold text** and ~~strikethroughs~~, if necessary;
- (3) Selection: Indicated with underlined text;
- (4) Assignment within a Selection: Indicated with *italicized and underlined text*;
- (5) Iteration: Indicated by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g. (1), (2), (3) and /or by adding a string starting with “/”;
- (6) Application Notes are marked as '*Application Note:*' formatted with *italicized text*;
- (7) References: Indicated with [square brackets].

## 6.2 Definitions of security policies

The statement of the security functional requirements rely on the following characterization of the TEE in terms of users, subjects, objects, information, user data, TSF data, operations and their security attributes (cf. CC Part 1 [CC1] for the definition of these notions).

**Users** stand for entities outside the TOE:

- Client Applications (CA), with security attribute "CA\_identity" (CA identifier)
- Trusted Applications (TA), with security attribute "TA\_identity" (TA identifier), "TA\_properties".

**Subjects** stand for active entities inside the TOE:

- S.TA\_INSTANCE: any TA instance with security attribute "TA\_identity" (TA identifier)
- S.TA\_INSTANCE\_SESSION: any session within a given TA instance, with security attribute "client\_identity" (CA identifier)
- S.API: the TEE Internal API, with security attributes "caller" (TA identifier)
- S.RESOURCE: Software component which may be used alternatively by the TEE or the REE, with security attribute "state" (TEE/REE). Note: When the state is REE, the TEE may access the resource.
- S.RAM\_UNIT: RAM addressable unit, with security attribute "rights: (TA identifier/REE) ->(Read/Write/ReadWrite/NoAccess). For instance, an addressable unit may be allocated or have its access rights changed upon TA instance creation or when sharing memory references between a client (CA, TA) and a TA. Notes: 1) A RAM\_UNIT typically stands for a byte in the C language; 2) there is no RAM access restriction applicable to the TEE itself
- S.COMM\_AGENT: proxy between CAs in the REE and the TEE and its TAs.

**Objects** stand for passive entities inside the TOE:

- OB.TA\_STORAGE (user data): Trusted Storage space of a TA, with security attributes "owner" (TA identifier), "inExtMem" (True/False) and "TEE\_identity" (TEE identifier).
- OB.SRT (TSF data): the TEE Storage Root of Trust, with security attribute "TEE\_identity" (TEE identifier).

Cryptographic objects are a special kind of TEE objects:

- OB.TA\_KEY (user data): (handle to a) user key (persistent or transient), with security attributes "usage", "owner" (TA identifier), "isExtractable" (True/False).

**Information** stands for data exchanged between subjects:

- I.RUNTIME\_DATA (user data or TSF Data depending on the owner): data belonging to the TA or to the TEE itself. Stands for parameter values, return values, content of memory regions in cleartext. Note: Data that is encrypted and authenticated is not considered I.RUNTIME\_DATA.

**TSF data** consists of runtime TSF data and TSF persistent data (also called TEE persistent data) necessary to provide the security services. It includes all the security attributes of users, subjects, objects and information.

**Cryptographic operations** on user keys performed by S.API on behalf of TA\_INSTANCE:

- OP.USE\_KEY: any cryptographic operation that uses a key
- OP.EXTRACT\_KEY: any operation that populates a key.

**Trusted Storage operations** performed by S.API on behalf of TA\_INSTANCE:

- OP.LOAD: any operation used to get back persistent objects (data and keys) to be used by the TA
- OP.STORE: any operation used to store persistent objects (data and keys). It stands for object creation, object deletion, object renaming, object truncation and write to an object.

Other operations:

- Any operation executed by the TEE on behalf of a TA\_INSTANCE.

This ST defines the following access control and information flow security functional policies (SFP):

Runtime Data Information Flow Control SFP:

- Purpose: To control the flow of runtime data from and to executable entities and memory. This policy contributes to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of runtime data
- Subjects: S.TA\_INSTANCE, S.TA\_INSTANCE\_SESSION, S.API, S.COMM\_AGENT, S.RESOURCE, S.RAM\_UNIT
- Information: I.RUNTIME\_DATA
- Security attributes: S.RESOURCE.state, S.RAM\_UNIT.rights and S.API.caller
- SFR instances: FDP\_IFC.2/Runtime, FDP\_IFF.1/Runtime.

**TA Keys Access Control SFP:**

- Purpose: To control the access to TA keys, which is granted to the TA that owns the key only. This policy contributes to the confidentiality of TA keys.
- Subjects: S.API, S.TA\_INSTANCE and any other subject in the TEE
- Objects: OB.TA\_KEY
- Security attributes: OB.TA\_KEY.usage, OB.TA\_KEY.owner, OB.TA\_KEY.isExtractable, and S.API.caller
- Operations: OP.USE\_KEY, OP.EXTRACT\_KEY
- SFR instances: FDP\_ACC.1/TA\_Keys, FDP\_ACF.1/TA\_keys, FMT\_MSA.1/TA\_keys, FMT\_MSA.3/TA\_keys, FMT\_SMF.1.

**Trusted Storage Access Control SFP:**

- Purpose: To control the access to TA storage where persistent TA data and keys are stored, which is granted on behalf of the owner TA only. This policy also enforces the binding of TA trusted storage to the TEE storage root of trust OB.SRT
- Subjects: S.API
- Objects: OB.TA\_STORAGE, OB.SRT
- Security attributes: S.API.caller, OB.TA\_STORAGE.owner, OB.TA\_STORAGE.inExtMem, OB.TA\_STORAGE.TEE\_identity and OB.SRT.TEE\_identity
- Operations: OP.LOAD, OP.STORE
- SFR instances: FDP\_ACC.1/Trusted Storage, FDP\_ACF.1/Trusted Storage, FDP\_ROL.1/Trusted Storage, FMT\_MSA.1/Trusted Storage, FMT\_MSA.3/Trusted Storage, FMT\_SMF.1.

## 6.3 Security Functional Requirements

### 6.3.1 Identification

#### **FIA\_ATD.1 User attribute definition**

**FIA\_ATD.1.1** The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: *CA\_identity*, *TA\_identity*, *TA\_properties*.

*Application Note:*

The lifespan of the attributes in such a list is the following:

- *CA\_identity*: The lifetime of this attribute is that of the lifetime of the client session to the TA
- *TA\_identity*: The availability of this attribute is that of the availability of the TA to clients, limited further by the TAs presence in the system
- *TA\_properties*: The lifetime of this attribute is that of the availability of the TA to clients,

limited further by the TAs presence in the system.

### **FIA\_UID.2 User identification before any action**

**FIA\_UID.2.1** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

*Application Note:*

User stands for Client Application or Trusted Application.

### **FIA\_USB.1 User-subject binding**

**FIA\_USB.1.1** The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user:

*o Client (CA or TA) identity, codified into the client\_identity of the requested TA session*

**FIA\_USB.1.2** The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users:

*o If the client is a TA, then the client\_identity must be equal to the TA\_identity of the TA subject that is the client*

*o If the client is a CA, then the client identity must indicate the CA client.*

**FIA\_USB.1.3** The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:

*o No modification of client\_identity is allowed after initialization*

*Application Note:*

The TOE Internal API defines the codification rules of the CA identity.

### **FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles**

**FMT\_SMR.1.1** The TSF shall maintain the roles

*o TSF*

*o TA\_User*

**FMT\_SMR.1.2** The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

*Application Note:*

The TA\_User role is the TSF running on behalf of a TA, upon request from the REE (by Client Applications) or from other TAs.

## 6.3.2 Confidentiality, Integrity and Isolation

### FDP\_IFC.2/Runtime Complete information flow control

**FDP\_IFC.2.1/Runtime** The TSF shall enforce the *Runtime Data Information Flow Control SFP* on

*o Subjects: S.TA\_INSTANCE, S.TA\_INSTANCE\_SESSION, S.API, S.COMM\_AGENT, S.RESOURCE, S.RAM\_UNIT*

*o Information: I.RUNTIME\_DATA*

and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.

**FDP\_IFC.2.2/Runtime** The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.

*Application Note:*

The flow control policy specifies the conditions to communicate runtime data from one subject to another. It applies to operations that are standard interfaces of these subjects.

### FDP\_IFF.1/Runtime Simple security attributes

**FDP\_IFF.1.1/Runtime** The TSF shall enforce the *Runtime Data Information Flow Control SFP* based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: *S.RESOURCE.state, S.RAM\_UNIT.rights and S.API.caller*.

**FDP\_IFF.1.2/Runtime** The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold:

*o Rules for information flow between S.TA\_INSTANCE and S.RAM\_UNIT:*

- *Flow of I.RUNTIME\_DATA from S.TA\_INSTANCE to S.RAM\_UNIT is allowed only if S.RAM\_UNIT.rights(S.TA\_INSTANCE) is Write or ReadWrite*
- *Flow of I.RUNTIME\_DATA from S.RAM\_UNIT to S.TA\_INSTANCE is allowed only if S.RAM\_UNIT.rights(S.TA\_INSTANCE) is Read or ReadWrite*

*o Rules for information flow from and to S.COMM\_AGENT:*

- *Flow of I.RUNTIME\_DATA from S.COMM\_AGENT to S.RAM\_UNIT is allowed only if S.RAM\_UNIT.rights(REE) is Write or ReadWrite*
- *Flow of I.RUNTIME\_DATA from S.RAM\_UNIT to S.COMM\_AGENT is allowed only if S.RAM\_UNIT.rights(REE) is Read or ReadWrite*

*o Rules for information flow from and to S.API:*

- *Flow of I.RUNTIME\_DATA from S.API to S.RAM\_UNIT is allowed only if S.RAM\_UNIT.rights(S.API.caller) is Write or ReadWrite*
- *Flow of I.RUNTIME\_DATA from S.RAM\_UNIT to S.API is allowed only if S.RAM\_UNIT.rights(S.API.caller) is Read or ReadWrite*

*o Rules for information flow from and to S.RESOURCE:*

- *Flow of I.RUNTIME\_DATA between S.API and S.RESOURCE is allowed only if the resource is under TEE control (S.RESOURCE.state = TEE).*



**FDP\_IFF.1.3/Runtime** The TSF shall enforce the *none*.

**FDP\_IFF.1.4/Runtime** The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules:

*o Rules for information flow from and to S.TA\_INSTANCE\_SESSION:*

- *Flow of I.RUNTIME\_DATA that are parameter or return values is allowed between S.TA\_INSTANCE\_SESSION and S.COMM\_AGENT*
- *Flow of I.RUNTIME\_DATA that are parameter or return values is allowed between S.TA\_INSTANCE\_SESSION and S.API.*

**FDP\_IFF.1.5/Runtime** The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: *Any information flow involving a TEE subject unless one of the conditions stated in FDP\_IFF.1.1/1.2/1.3/1.4 holds.*

### **FDP\_RIP.1/Runtime Subset residual information protection**

**FDP\_RIP.1.1/Runtime** The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the following objects: *TEE and TA runtime objects.*

*Application Note:*

This operation applies in particular upon:

- o Failure detection (cf. FPT\_FLS.1)
- o TA instance and TA session closing.

## **6.3.3 Cryptography**

### **FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation**

**FCS\_COP.1.1** The TSF shall perform *cryptographic operations* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm (*algorithm name and supported modes listed in Table 3*) and cryptographic key sizes (*key sizes listed in Table 3*) that meet the following: (*standard listed in Table 3*).

### **FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction**

**FCS\_CKM.4.1** The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method *physical deletion of key value by overwriting with a constant pattern* that meets the following: *none*.

### **FDP\_ACC.1/TA\_keys Subset access control**

**FDP\_ACC.1.1/TA\_keys** The TSF shall enforce the *TA Keys Access Control SFP* on

- o Subjects: S.API, S.TA\_INSTANCE and any other subject in the TEE*
- o Objects: OB.TA\_KEY*
- o Operations: OP.USE\_KEY, OP.EXTRACT\_KEY.*

**FDP\_ACF.1/TA\_keys Security attribute based access control**

**FDP\_ACF.1.1/TA\_keys** The TSF shall enforce the *TA Keys Access Control SFP* to objects based on the following: *OB.TA\_KEY.usage*, *OB.TA\_KEY.owner*, *OB.TA\_KEY.isExtractable* and *S.API.caller*.

**FDP\_ACF.1.2/TA\_keys** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

*o OP.USE\_KEY is allowed if the following conditions hold:*

- *The TA instance that requested the operation to the API owns the key (S.API.caller = OB.TA\_KEY.owner)*
- *The intended usage of the key (OB.TA\_KEY.usage) matches the requested Operation*

*o OP.EXTRACT\_KEY is allowed if the following conditions hold:*

- *The TA instance that requested the operation to the API owns the key (S.API.caller = OB.TA\_KEY.owner)*
- *The operation attempts to extract the public part of OB.TA\_KEY or the key is extractable (OB.TA\_KEY.isExtractable = True).*

**FDP\_ACF.1.3/TA\_keys** The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: *none*.

**FDP\_ACF.1.4/TA\_keys** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

*o Any access to a user key attempted directly from S.TA\_INSTANCE or any other subject of the TEE that is not S.API*

*o Any access to a user key attempted from S.API without valid caller (S.API.caller is undefined)*

**FMT\_MSA.1/TA\_keys Management of security attributes**

**FMT\_MSA.1.1/TA\_keys** The TSF shall enforce the *TA Keys Access Control SFP* to restrict the ability to change default, query and modify the security attributes *OB.TA\_KEY.usage*, *OB.TA\_KEYS.isExtractable* and *OB.TA\_KEY.owner* to the following roles:

*o change\_default, query and modify OB.TA\_KEY.usage to TA\_User role*

*o query OB.TA\_KEY.owner to the TSF role.*

**FMT\_MSA.3/TA\_keys Static attribute initialization**

**FMT\_MSA.3.1/TA\_keys** The TSF shall enforce the *TA Keys Access Control SFP* to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

**FMT\_MSA.3.2/TA\_keys** The TSF shall allow the *TA\_User role* to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

## 6.3.4 Initialization and Operation Integrity

### FAU\_ARP.1 Security alarms

**FAU\_ARP.1.1** The TSF shall *enter a safe state* upon detection of a potential security violation.

**Refinement:**

**The TSF shall take the following actions upon detection of a potential security violation:**

- o detection of consistency violation of TA data, TA code or TEE data: reject the error or malicious data.**

### FDP\_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action

**FDP\_SDI.2.1** The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for *integrity errors* on all objects, based on the following attributes: *user data attributes*.

**Refinement:**

**The TSF shall monitor TEE runtime data, TEE persistent data, TA data and keys and TA code stored in containers controlled by the TSF for authenticity and consistency errors on all objects, based on the following attributes: TEE runtime data, TEE persistent data, TA data and keys and TA code.**

**FDP\_SDI.2.2** Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall *take secure action that does not depend on the compromised data*.

**Refinement:**

- o Upon detection of authenticity or consistency errors in TEE runtime data or TEE persistent data, the TSF shall stop the execution of the TSF and return an error**
- o Upon detection of TA code authenticity or consistency errors, the TSF shall abort the execution of the TA instance**
- o Upon detection of TA data or TA keys authenticity or consistency errors, the TSF shall not give back any compromised data**

*Application Note:*

This SFR applies to TEE runtime data in volatile memory (this data is not stored in non-volatile memory) and to TEE persistent data, TA data and keys and TA code in both volatile and non-volatile memory.

This SFR is used for both TSF and user data as similar mechanisms are involved to protect the consistency of this data.

**FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state**

**FPT\_FLS.1.1** The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:

- o Device binding failure*
- o Cryptographic operation failure*
- o Invalid CA requests, in particular bad-formed requests*
- o Panic states*
- o TA code, TA data or TA keys authenticity or consistency failure*
- o TEE data (in particular TA properties, TEE keys and all security attributes) authenticity or consistency failure*
- o TEE initialization failure*
- o Unexpected commands in the current TEE state*

*Application Note:*

Device binding failure occurs when (part of) the stored data has not been bound by the same TEE.

If everything goes well since TOE start, the TOE works in normal state. When failure occurred, the TOE stop the failure module running so that the TOE will not leak any sensitive information like encryption key, key structure data to REE world.

**FPT\_INI.1 TSF initialization**

**FPT\_INI.1.1** The TOE initialization function shall verify *the integrity of the TOE internal tasks* prior to establishing the TSF in a secure initial state.

**FPT\_INI.1.2** The TOE initialization function shall detect and respond to errors and failures during initialization such that the TOE either successfully completes initialization or is halted.

**FPT\_INI.1.3** The TOE initialization function shall not be able to arbitrarily interact with the TSF after TOE initialization completes.

**FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions**

**FMT\_SMF.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- o Management of TA keys security attributes*
- o Provision of Trusted Storage security attributes to authorized users.*

**FPT\_TEE.1 Testing of external entities**

**FPT\_TEE.1.1** The TSF shall run a suite of tests *prior execution* to check the fulfillment of *authenticity of TA code*.

**FPT\_TEE.1.2** If the test fails, the TSF shall *not start the execution of the TA instance*.

## 6.3.5 TEE Identification

### FAU\_SAR.1 Audit review

**FAU\_SAR.1.1** The TSF shall provide *all users* with the capability to read *TEE identifier* from the audit records.

**FAU\_SAR.1.2** The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

### FAU\_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

**FAU\_STG.1.1** The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.

**FAU\_STG.1.2** The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

*Application Note:*

The audit record in this SFR refer to the TEE identifier.

The TEE identifier is generated on-TEE, and the generating algorithm is defined by the manufacturer who will guarantee the TEE identifier to be unique.

When the TOE startup, TOE will read DIEID and HUK from Efuse and generate the TEE identifier based on that two parameters. The TEE identifier is stored in TEE's volatile memory and will be lost when TOE shutdown.

This identifier shall not be modified during the end-usage phase.

## 6.3.6 Trusted Storage

### FDP\_ACC.1/Trusted Storage Subset access control

**FDP\_ACC.1.1/Trusted Storage** The TSF shall enforce the *Trusted Storage Access Control SFP* on

*o Subjects: S.API*

*o Objects: OB.TA\_STORAGE, OB.SRT*

*o Operations: OP.LOAD, OP.STORE.*

### FDP\_ACF.1/Trusted Storage Security attribute based access control

**FDP\_ACF.1.1/Trusted Storage** The TSF shall enforce the *Trusted Storage Access Control SFP* to objects based on the following: *S.API.caller, OB.TA\_STORAGE.owner, OB.TA\_STORAGE.inExtMem, OB.TA\_STORAGE.TEE\_identity and OB.SRT.TEE\_identity.*

**FDP\_ACF.1.2/Trusted Storage** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

*o OP.LOAD of an object from OB.TA\_STORAGE is allowed if the following conditions hold:*

- *The operation is performed by S.API*
  - *The load request comes from an instance of the owner of the trusted storage space (S.API.caller = OB.TA\_STORAGE.owner)*
  - *OB.TA\_STORAGE is bound to the TEE storage root of trust OB.SRT (OB.TA\_STORAGE.TEE\_identity = OB.SRT.TEE\_identity)*
  - *If OB.TA\_STORAGE is located in external memory accessible to the REE (OB.TA\_STORAGE.inExtMem = True) then the object is authenticated and decrypted before load*
- o OP.STORE of an object to OB.TA\_STORAGE is allowed if the following conditions hold:*
- *The operation is performed by S.API*
  - *The store request comes from an instance of the owner of the trusted storage space (S.API.caller = OB.TA\_STORAGE.owner)*
  - *OB.TA\_STORAGE is bound to the TEE storage root of trust OB.SRT (OB.TA\_STORAGE.TEE\_identity = OB.SRT.TEE\_identity)*
  - *If OB.TA\_STORAGE is located in external memory accessible to the REE (OB.TA\_STORAGE.inExtMem = True) then the object is signed and encrypted before storage.*

**FDP\_ACF.1.3/Trusted Storage** The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: *none*.

**FDP\_ACF.1.4/Trusted Storage** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- o Any access to a trusted storage attempted from S.API without valid caller (S.API.caller = undefined)*
- o Any access to a trusted storage that was bound to a different TEE (OB.TA\_STORAGE.TEE\_identity different from OB.SRT.TEE\_identity)*
- o Any access to a trusted storage from a subject different from S.API*

#### **FDP\_ROL.1/Trusted Storage Basic rollback**

**FDP\_ROL.1.1/Trusted Storage** The TSF shall enforce *Trusted Storage Access Control SFP* to permit the rollback of the *unsuccessful or interrupted OP.STORE operation on the storage*.

**FDP\_ROL.1.2/Trusted Storage** The TSF shall permit operations to be rolled back within the *store operation failed*.

*Application Note:*

This SFR enforces atomicity of any write operation [IAPI].

#### **FMT\_MSA.1/Trusted Storage Management of security attributes**

**FMT\_MSA.1.1/Trusted Storage** The TSF shall enforce the *Trusted Storage Access Control SFP* to restrict the ability to *query* the security attributes *OB.TA\_STORAGE.owner*, *OB.TA\_STORAGE.inExtMem*, *OB.TA\_STORAGE.TEE\_identity* and *OB.SRT.TEE\_identity* to

*TA\_User* role.

#### **FMT\_MSA.3/Trusted Storage Static attribute initialization**

**FMT\_MSA.3.1/Trusted Storage** The TSF shall enforce the *Trusted Storage Access Control SFP* to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

**FMT\_MSA.3.2/Trusted Storage** The TSF shall allow the *TA\_User* to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

#### **FDP\_ITT.1/Trusted Storage Basic internal transfer protection**

**FDP\_ITT.1.1/Trusted Storage** The TSF shall enforce the *Trusted Storage Access Control SFP* to prevent the disclosure and modification of user data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.

## 6.3.7 Instance Time

#### **FPT\_STM.1/Instance time Reliable time stamps**

**FPT\_STM.1.1/Instance time** The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

##### **Refinement:**

**The TSF shall be able to provide time stamps to TA instances such that time stamps are monotonic during the TA instance lifetime.**

*Application Note:*

The refinement provides the meaning of the reliability that is expected.

## 6.4 Security Functional Requirements Rationale

### 6.4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

**O.CA\_TA\_IDENTIFICATION** The following requirements contribute to fulfill the objective:

- o FIA\_ATD.1 enforces the management of the Client and TA identity and properties as security attributes, which then become TSF data, protected in integrity and confidentiality
- o FIA\_UID.2 requires the identification of Client application or TA before any action, thus allowing the access to services and data to authorized users only
- o FIA\_USB.1 enforces the association of the user identity to the active entity that acts on behalf of the user and to check that this is a valid identity.

**O.KEYS\_USAGE** The following requirements contribute to fulfill the objective:

- o FCS\_COP.1 allows to specify the cryptographic operations in the scope of the evaluation if any
- o FDP\_ACC.1/TA\_keys, FDP\_ACF.1/TA\_keys, FMT\_MSA.1/TA\_keys, FMT\_MSA.3/TA\_keys, FMT\_SMR.1 and FMT\_SMF.1 state the key access policy, which grants access to the owner of the key only.

**O.TEE\_ID** The following requirements contribute to fulfill the objective:

- o FAU\_SAR.1 enforces TEE identifier access capabilities
- o FAU\_STG.1 enforces TEE identifier storage capabilities

**O.INI\_INTERNAL** The following requirements contribute to fulfill the objective:

- o FPT\_FLS.1 states that the TEE has to reach a secure state upon initialization or device binding failure
- o FPT\_INI.1 enforces the initialization of the TSF through a secure process including the verification of the integrity of the TOE internal tasks.

**O.INSTANCE\_TIME** The following requirement fulfills the objective:

- o FPT\_STM.1/Instance time enforces the reliability of TA instance time.

**O.OPERATION** The following requirements contribute to fulfill the objective:

- o FAU\_ARP.1 states the TEE responses to potential security violations
- o FDP\_SDI.2 enforces the monitoring of consistency and authenticity of TEE data and TA, and it states the behavior in case of failure
- o FIA\_ATD.1, FIA\_UID.2 and FIA\_USB.1 ensure that actions are performed by identified users
- o FMT\_SMR.1 states the two operational roles enforced by the TEE
- o FPT\_FLS.1 states that abnormal operations have to lead to a secure state
- o FDP\_ACC.1/Trusted Storage, FDP\_ACF.1/Trusted Storage, FMT\_MSA.1/Trusted Storage, FMT\_MSA.3/Trusted Storage and FMT\_SMF.1 state the policy for controlling access to TA storage
- o FDP\_IFC.2/Runtime and FDP\_IFF.1/Runtime state the policy for controlling access to TA and TEE execution spaces
- o FDP\_ACC.1/TA\_keys, FDP\_ACF.1/TA\_keys, FMT\_MSA.1/TA\_keys, FMT\_MSA.3/TA\_keys and FMT\_SMF.1 state the key access policy.

**O.RUNTIME\_CONFIDENTIALITY** The following requirements contribute to fulfill the objective:

- o FDP\_IFC.2/Runtime and FDP\_IFF.1/Runtime ensure read access to authorized entities only
- o FDP\_RIP.1/Runtime states resource clean up policy.

**O.RUNTIME\_INTEGRITY** The following requirements contribute to fulfill the objective:



- o FDP\_IFC.2/Runtime and FDP\_IFF.1/Runtime state TEE and TA runtime data policy, which grants write access to authorized entities only
- o FDP\_SDI.2 monitors the authenticity and consistency of TEE code, the TEE runtime data, the TA code and the TA data and keys and states the response upon failure.

**O.TA\_AUTHENTICITY** The following requirements contribute to fulfill the objective:

- o FDP\_SDI.2 enforces the consistency and authenticity of TA code during storage
- o FPT\_TEE.1 enforces the check of authenticity of TA code prior execution
- o FCS\_COP.1 states the cryptography used to verify the authenticity of TA code

**O.TA\_ISOLATION** The following requirements contribute to fulfill the objective:

- o FDP\_ACC.1/Trusted Storage, FDP\_ACF.1/Trusted Storage, FMT\_MSA.1/Trusted Storage, FMT\_MSA.3/Trusted Storage and FMT\_SMF.1 state the policy for controlling access to TA storage
- o FCS\_COP.1 state the cryptographic algorithms used for Trusted Storage to ensure confidentiality and authenticity of TA data
- o FDP\_IFC.2/Runtime and FDP\_IFF.1/Runtime state the policy for controlling access to TA execution space
- o FPT\_FLS.1 enforces TA isolation by maintaining a secure state, in particular in case of panic states.

**O.TEE\_DATA\_PROTECTION** The following requirements contribute to fulfill the objective:

- o FCS\_COP.1 states the cryptography used to protect consistency and confidentiality of the TEE data in external memory, if applicable
- o FDP\_SDI.2 monitors the authenticity and consistency of TEE persistent data and states the response upon failure

**O.TEE\_ISOLATION** The following requirements contribute to fulfill the objective:

- o FDP\_IFC.2/Runtime and FDP\_IFF.1/Runtime state the policy for controlling access to TEE execution space.

**O.TRUSTED\_STORAGE** The following requirements contribute to fulfill the objective:

- o FCS\_COP.1 states the cryptography used to protect integrity and confidentiality of the TA data in external memory, if applicable
- o FDP\_ACC.1/Trusted Storage, FDP\_ACF.1/Trusted Storage, FDP\_ROL.1/Trusted Storage, FMT\_MSA.1/Trusted Storage, FMT\_MSA.3/Trusted Storage and FMT\_SMF.1 state Storage state the policy for accessing TA trusted storage and protecting the confidentiality of data
- o FDP\_SDI.2 enforces the consistency and authenticity of the trusted storage
- o FDP\_ITT.1/Trusted Storage ensure protection against disclosure of TEE and TA data that is transferred between resources
- o FPT\_FLS.1 maintains a secure state.

## 6.4.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs

| Security Objectives       | Security Functional Requirements   | Rationale     |
|---------------------------|--|---------------|
| O.CA_TA_IDENTIFICATION    | FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UID.2, FIA_USB.1  | Section 6.4.1 |
| O.KEYS_USAGE              | FDP_ACC.1/TA_keys, FDP_ACF.1/TA_keys, FMT_MSA.1/TA_keys, FMT_MSA.3/TA_keys, FMT_SMF.1, FCS_COP.1, FMT_SMR.1, FCS_CKM.4   | Section 6.4.1 |
| O.TEE_ID                  | FAU_SAR.1, FAU_STG.1   | Section 6.4.1 |
| O.INI_INTERNAL            | FPT_FLS.1, FPT_INI.1   | Section 6.4.1 |
| O.INSTANCE_TIME           | FPT_STM.1/Instance time  | Section 6.4.1 |
| O.OPERATION               | FAU_ARP.1, FDP_SDI.2, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UID.2, FIA_USB.1, FMT_SMR.1, FPT_FLS.1, FDP_IFC.2/Runtime, FDP_IFF.1/Runtime, FMT_SMF.1, FDP_ACC.1/Trusted Storage, FDP_ACF.1/Trusted Storage, FMT_MSA.1/Trusted Storage, FMT_MSA.3/Trusted Storage, FDP_ACC.1/TA_keys, FDP_ACF.1/TA_keys, FMT_MSA.1/TA_keys, FMT_MSA.3/TA_keys | Section 6.4.1 |
| O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY | FDP_IFC.2/Runtime, FDP_IFF.1/Runtime, FDP_RIP.1/Runtime,   | Section 6.4.1 |
| O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY       | FDP_IFC.2/Runtime, FDP_IFF.1/Runtime, FDP_SDI.2  | Section 6.4.1 |
| O.TA_AUTHENTICITY         | FDP_SDI.2, FCS_COP.1, FPT_TEE.1, FCS_CKM.4   | Section 6.4.1 |
| O.TA_ISOLATION            | FDP_ACC.1/Trusted Storage, FDP_ACF.1/Trusted Storage, FDP_IFC.2/Runtime, FDP_IFF.1/Runtime, FMT_MSA.1/Trusted Storage, FMT_MSA.3/Trusted Storage, FMT_SMF.1, FCS_COP.1, FPT_FLS.1, FCS_CKM.4   | Section 6.4.1 |
| O.TEE_DATA_PROTECTION     | FDP_SDI.2, FCS_COP.1, FCS_CKM.4  | Section 6.4.1 |
| O.TEE_ISOLATION           | FDP_IFC.2/Runtime, FDP_IFF.1/Runtime   | Section 6.4.1 |
| O.TRUSTED_STORAGE         | FDP_ACC.1/Trusted Storage, FDP_ACF.1/Trusted Storage, FDP_ROL.1/Trusted Storage, FDP_SDI.2, FMT_MSA.1/Trusted Storage, FMT_MSA.3/Trusted Storage, FCS_COP.1, FMT_SMF.1, FPT_FLS.1, FDP_ITT.1/Trusted Storage, FCS_CKM.4  | Section 6.4.1 |

Table 15: Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage

| Security Functional Requirements | Objectives  |
|----------------------------------|---|
| FIA_ATD.1                        | O.CA_TA_IDENTIFICATION, O.OPERATION   |
| FIA_UID.2                        | O.CA_TA_IDENTIFICATION, O.OPERATION   |
| FIA_USB.1                        | O.CA_TA_IDENTIFICATION, O.OPERATION   |
| FMT_SMR.1                        | O.KEYS_USAGE, O.OPERATION   |
| FDP_IFC.2/Runtime                | O.OPERATION, O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY,<br>O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY, O.TA_ISOLATION,<br>O.TEE_ISOLATION  |
| FDP_IFF.1/Runtime                | O.OPERATION, O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY,<br>O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY, O.TA_ISOLATION,<br>O.TEE_ISOLATION  |
| FDP_RIP.1/Runtime                | O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY   |
| FCS_COP.1, FCS_CKM.4             | O.KEYS_USAGE, O.TA_AUTHENTICITY, O.TA_ISOLATION,<br>O.TEE_DATA_PROTECTION, O.TRUSTED_STORAGE        |
| FDP_ACC.1/TA_keys                | O.KEYS_USAGE, O.OPERATION   |
| FDP_ACF.1/TA_keys                | O.KEYS_USAGE, O.OPERATION   |
| FMT_MSA.1/TA_keys                | O.KEYS_USAGE, O.OPERATION   |
| FMT_MSA.3/TA_keys                | O.KEYS_USAGE, O.OPERATION   |
| FAU_ARP.1                        | O.OPERATION   |
| FDP_SDI.2                        | O.OPERATION, O.RUNTIME_INTEGRITY,<br>O.TA_AUTHENTICITY, O.TEE_DATA_PROTECTION,<br>O.TRUSTED_STORAGE |
| FPT_FLS.1                        | O.INI_INTERNAL, O.OPERATION, O.TA_ISOLATION,<br>O.TRUSTED_STORAGE                                   |
| FPT_INI.1                        | O.INI_INTERNAL  |
| FMT_SMF.1                        | O.KEYS_USAGE, O.OPERATION, O.TA_ISOLATION,<br>O.TRUSTED_STORAGE                                     |
| FPT_TEE.1                        | O.TA_AUTHENTICITY   |
| FAU_SAR.1                        | O.TEE_ID  |
| FAU_STG.1                        | O.TEE_ID  |
| FPT_STM.1/Instance time          | O.INSTANCE_TIME   |
| FDP_ACC.1/Trusted Storage        | O.OPERATION, O.TA_ISOLATION,<br>O.TRUSTED_STORAGE   |
| FDP_ACF.1/Trusted Storage        | O.OPERATION, O.TA_ISOLATION,<br>O.TRUSTED_STORAGE   |
| FDP_ROL.1/Trusted Storage        | O.TRUSTED_STORAGE   |
| FMT_MSA.1/Trusted Storage        | O.OPERATION, O.TA_ISOLATION,<br>O.TRUSTED_STORAGE   |
| FMT_MSA.3/Trusted Storage        | O.OPERATION, O.TA_ISOLATION,<br>O.TRUSTED_STORAGE   |
| FDP_ITT.1/Trusted Storage        | O.TRUSTED_STORAGE   |

Table 16: SFRs and Security Objectives

### 6.4.3 SFRs Dependencies

The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained in section 6.4.4. The following table shows the dependencies between the SFRs of the TOE.

| SFRs                      | CC Dependencies  | Satisfied Dependencies                               |
|---------------------------|--|--|
| FIA_ATD.1                 | No Dependencies  |  |
| FIA_UID.2                 | No Dependencies  |  |
| FIA_USB.1                 | (FIA_ATD.1)  | FIA_ATD.1  |
| FMT_SMR.1                 | (FIA_UID.1)  | FIA_UID.2  |
| FDP_IFC.2/Runtime         | (FDP_IFF.1)  | FDP_IFF.1/Runtime                                    |
| FDP_IFF.1/Runtime         | (FDP_IFC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)                              | FDP_IFC.2/Runtime                                    |
| FDP_RIP.1/Runtime         | No Dependencies  |  |
| FCS_CKM.4                 | (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)                    |  |
| FCS_COP.1                 | (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)    | FCS_CKM.4  |
| FDP_ACC.1/TA_keys         | (FDP_ACF.1)  | FDP_ACF.1/TA_keys                                    |
| FDP_ACF.1/TA_keys         | (FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)                              | FDP_ACC.1/TA_keys, FMT_MSA.3/TA_keys                 |
| FMT_MSA.1/TA_keys         | (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) | FMT_SMR.1, FDP_ACC.1/TA_keys, FMT_SMF.1              |
| FMT_MSA.3/TA_keys         | (FMT_MSA.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)                              | FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MSA.1/TA_keys                         |
| FAU_ARP.1                 | (FAU_SAA.1)  |  |
| FDP_SDI.2                 | No Dependencies  |  |
| FPT_FLS.1                 | No Dependencies  |  |
| FPT_INI.1                 | No Dependencies  |  |
| FMT_SMF.1                 | No Dependencies  |  |
| FPT_TEE.1                 | No Dependencies  |  |
| FAU_SAR.1                 | (FAU_GEN.1)  |  |
| FAU_STG.1                 | (FAU_GEN.1)  |  |
| FPT_STM.1/Instance time   | No Dependencies  |  |
| FDP_ACC.1/Trusted Storage | (FDP_ACF.1)  | FDP_ACF.1/Trusted Storage                            |
| FDP_ACF.1/Trusted Storage | (FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)                              | FDP_ACC.1/Trusted Storage, FMT_MSA.3/Trusted storage |
| FDP_ROL.1/Trusted Storage | (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)                                 | FDP_ACC.1/Trusted storage                            |
| FMT_MSA.1/Trusted Storage | (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) | FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1, FDP_ACC.1/Trusted Storage      |
| FMT_MSA.3/Trusted Storage | (FMT_MSA.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)                              | FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MSA.1/Trusted Storage                 |
| FDP_ITT.1/Trusted Storage | (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)                                 | FDP_ACC.1/Trusted storage                            |

Table 17: SFRs Dependencies

## 6.4.4 Rationale for the exclusion of Dependencies

**The dependency FMT\_MSA.3 of FDP\_IFF.1/Runtime is discarded.** There is no management of security attributes by authorized users for this information flow control SFP as all security attributes are exclusively managed by the TSF, therefore the dependency FMT\_MSA.3 is not applicable.

**The dependency FCS\_CKM.1 or FDP\_ITC.1 or FDP\_ITC.2 of FCS\_COP.1 is discarded.** The TEE storage root of trust cryptographic key used for cryptographic operations in FCS\_COP.1 is set during manufacturing.

**The dependency FAU\_SAA.1 of FAU\_ARP.1 is discarded.** The potential security violations are explicitly defined in the FAU\_ARP.1 requirement. There is no audited event defined in the SFR of this ST.

**The dependency FAU\_GEN.1 of FAU\_SAR.1 is discarded.** This dependency is discarded as the only audit record considered is the TEE identifier and this identifier is set before TOE delivery and non-modifiable afterwards.

**The dependency FAU\_GEN.1 of FAU\_STG.1 is discarded.** This dependency is discarded as the only audit record considered is the TEE identifier and this identifier is set before TOE delivery and non-modifiable afterwards.

## 6.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The assurance level defined in this ST consists of the predefined assurance package EAL 4 with the augmentation ALC\_FLR.1.

EAL4 allows a TOE developer to attain a reasonably high assurance level without the need for highly specialized processes and practices. It is considered to be the highest level that could be applied to an existing product line without undue expense and complexity. As such, EAL4 is appropriate for commercial products that can be applied to moderate to high security functions.

The augmentation with FLR.1 ensures that the TOE will be maintained and supported in the future, requiring the TOE developer to have the procedures to track and correct flaws in the TOE and to distribute the flaw information and corrections to TOE users. The following table shows the dependencies between the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs).

| Requirements | CC Dependencies                                | Satisfied Dependencies             |
|--------------|--|------------------------------------|
| ADV_ARC.1    | (ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)                    | ADV_FSP.4, ADV_TDS.3               |
| ADV_FSP.4    | (ADV_TDS.1)                                    | ADV_TDS.3                          |
| ADV_IMP.1    | (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1)                    | ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1               |
| ADV_TDS.3    | (ADV_FSP.4)                                    | ADV_FSP.4                          |
| AGD_OPE.1    | (ADV_FSP.1)                                    | ADV_FSP.4                          |
| AGD_PRE.1    | No Dependencies                                |                                    |
| ALC_CMC.4    | (ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1)<br>and (ALC_LCD.1) | ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DVS.1,<br>ALC_LCD.1 |
| ALC_CMS.4    | No Dependencies                                |                                    |

| Requirements | CC Dependencies   | Satisfied Dependencies   |
|--------------|---|--|
| ALC_DEL.1    | No Dependencies   |  |
| ALC_DVS.1    | No Dependencies   |  |
| ALC_LCD.1    | No Dependencies   |  |
| ALC_FLR.1    | No Dependencies   |  |
| ALC_TAT.1    | (ADV_IMP.1)   | ADV_IMP.1  |
| ASE_CCL.1    | (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1)<br>and (ASE_REQ.1)  | ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,<br>ASE_REQ.2   |
| ASE_ECD.1    | No Dependencies   |  |
| ASE_INT.1    | No Dependencies   |  |
| ASE_OBJ.2    | (ASE_SPD.1)   | ASE_SPD.1  |
| ASE_REQ.2    | (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2)   | ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2   |
| ASE_SPD.1    | No Dependencies   |  |
| ASE_TSS.1    | (ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1)<br>and (ASE_REQ.1)  | ADV_FSP.4, ASE_INT.1,<br>ASE_REQ.2   |
| ATE_COV.2    | (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1)   | ADV_FSP.4, ATE_FUN.1   |
| ATE_DPT.1    | (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.2)<br>and (ATE_FUN.1)  | ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.3,<br>ATE_FUN.1   |
| ATE_FUN.1    | (ATE_COV.1)   | ATE_COV.2  |
| ATE_IND.2    | (ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1)<br>and (AGD_PRE.1) and<br>(ATE_COV.1) and (ATE_FUN.1)                                       | ADV_FSP.4, AGD_OPE.1,<br>AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2,<br>ATE_FUN.1                          |
| AVA_VAN.3    | (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4)<br>and (ADV_IMP.1) and<br>(ADV_TDS.3) and (AGD_OPE.1)<br>and (AGD_PRE.1) and<br>(ATE_DPT.1) | ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.4,<br>ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3,<br>AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,<br>ATE_DPT.1 |

Table 18: SARs Dependencies

# 7 TOE Summary Specification

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For every security function a short identifier is specified in brackets to allow direct referencing to single items in other documents.

## 7.1 Protection of TSF

The TOE provides several security mechanisms to ensure TOE's self-security. Detailed functions include:

- o The TOE can run internal TA and external TA. Internal TA is encrypted signed together with iTrustee image by Huawei, will be checked signature and decrypted in the secure boot process, External TAs are encrypted and signed independently by Huawei, will be decrypted and check the signature before loading into the TOE. The TOE will stop loading TA if tampering detected.
  - o The TOE will enter a secure state when some key operation error occurred, to protect the TOE's data from leaking out.
  - o The TOE will stop the TSF execution if an integrity error of the TEE runtime data or the TEE persistent data is detected.
- (FPT\_TEE.1, FPT\_FLS.1, FDP\_SDI.2, FMT\_SMF.1, FMT\_SMR.1)

## 7.2 Trusted Storage

The TOE provides trusted storage service for its security functions. The trust storage resides in Trusted core framework. TAs running in the TEE can load or store its owning files through Trusted Storage service, but any intention to access other TA's file will be prevented.

- o The trusted storage service is the only task that have the permission to access the file in Trusted Storage. The TOE will reject any request to access trusted file from other tasks.
- o The trusted storage service in TOE will receive trusted file access request from other TA, if the request is illegal or the TA has no permission to access the trusted file, the request will be denied.

o The trusted storage service will encrypt the data before write the data into the trusted file, and the encrypted key is binding to the request TA, Different TA use different key. The trusted storage service will decrypt the data and send back to the reading request TA.

o If the file write operation failed, The TOE will detect the failure and rollback to previous state.

(FDP\_ACC.1/Trusted storage, FDP\_ACF.1/Trusted Storage, FDP\_ROL.1/Trusted Storage, FMT\_MSA.1/Trusted Storage, FMT\_MSA.3/Trusted Storage, FDP\_ITT.1/Trusted Storage, FMT\_SMF.1)

## 7.3 Cryptographic Support

The TOE provides software cryptographic operations to support TOE's security functions such as CA Authentication which will verify the signature of CA, TA signature verification, trust storage etc. For that, The TOE provides a series of cryptographic operations such as hash calculation, HMAC calculation, signature generation, encryption and decryption in accordance with the cryptographic algorithms specified in Table 3. The TOE provides also:

O Cryptographic key destruction.

O TA\_Keys in accordance with GP Internal API Specification [IAPI], including management of keys security attributes.

(FCS\_COP.1, FDP\_ACC.1/TA\_Keys, FDP\_ACF.1/TA\_keys, FMT\_MSA.1/TA\_keys, FMT\_MSA.3/TA\_keys, FCS\_CKM.4, FMT\_SMF.1)

## 7.4 User Identification and Authentication

The TOE must identify and authenticate CA when opening a session, by verifying the signature of CA and checking if the target TA is allowed. After successful authentication, the TOE provides the identity of CA to the target TA for the white-CA-list comparing. The TOE must identify and authenticate TA by its signature. Any further actions performing by CA/TA user must be prevent before successful authentication. Both identifiers of CA and TA cannot be modified during their life cycle.

(FIA\_ATD.1, FIA\_UID.2, FIA\_USB.1)

## 7.5 Security Audit

The TOE will detect potential security violation such as violation of TA data, TA code or TEE data, and generate audit log. The TOE will send the log info from TEE to REE, which can be read by human with tool.

Every audit log record of TOE contains TEE identifier which is generated on-TEE. The users can retrieve the TEE identifier from the TOE through a proprietary API.

Audit log records are only accessible to the root user, so they are protected from unauthorized deletion and modification.

(FAU\_ARP.1, FAU\_SAR.1, FAU\_STG.1)



## 7.6 Protection of TA

When TA is loaded, the TSF will check the signature of it so that integrity and authenticity are ensured.

For each loaded TA, the TSF will create an isolated running environment, any reading or writing accesses from other TAs are forbidden. And TSF will monitor the authenticity and consistency of TA code, data and keys, when a failure occurs, the TSF will cleanup all those data and the TA will exit.

(FDP\_IFC.2/Runtime, FDP\_IFF.1/Runtime, FDP\_RIP.1/Runtime, FDP\_SDI.2)

## 7.7 Security Instantiation

TEE instantiation through a secure initialization process using assets bound to the SoC that ensures the authenticity and contributes to the integrity of the TEE code running in the device.

Each step of the startup process contains components that are cryptographically signed to ensure integrity and that proceed only after verifying the chain of trust. This includes the onchiprom, fastboot, bootloaders, kernel, and so on. This secure boot chain helps ensure that TOE's instantiation aren't tampered with.

(FPT\_INI.1)

## 7.8 Reliable time stamps

The TOE get security time from the SoC and provides unified time stamps to all the TAs. The time stamp provided by the TOE will increase monotonically from the TOE starting-up, no matter the TOE is running or sleeping.

(FPT\_STM.1)

# 8 Abbreviations, Terminology and References

## 8.1 Abbreviations

|            |   |
|------------|---|
| <b>AES</b> | Advanced Encryption Standard (defined in [AES])                   |
| <b>CA</b>  | Client Application  |
| <b>CC</b>  | Common Criteria   |
| <b>CEM</b> | Common Evaluation Methodology                                     |
| <b>CM</b>  | Configuration Management  |
| <b>DRM</b> | Digital Rights Management   |
| <b>EAL</b> | Evaluation Assurance Level  |
| <b>IPC</b> | Inter-Process Communication                                       |
| <b>NFC</b> | Near Field Communication  |
| <b>OS</b>  | Operating System  |
| <b>OSP</b> | Organizational Security Policy                                    |
| <b>PCB</b> | Printed Circuit Board   |
| <b>PP</b>  | Protection Profile  |
| <b>RAM</b> | Random Access Memory  |
| <b>REE</b> | Rich Execution Environment  |
| <b>RFC</b> | Request For Comments  |
| <b>ROM</b> | Read Only Memory  |
| <b>RSA</b> | Rivest / Shamir / Adleman asymmetric algorithm (defined in [RSA]) |
| <b>SAR</b> | Security Assurance Requirement                                    |
| <b>SE</b>  | Secure Element  |
| <b>SFR</b> | Security Functional Requirement                                   |
| <b>SFP</b> | Security Function Policy  |
| <b>SFR</b> | Security Functional Requirement                                   |
| <b>SHA</b> | Secure Hash Algorithm (defined in [SHA])                          |
| <b>SoC</b> | System-on-Chip  |
| <b>SPD</b> | Security Problem Definition                                       |
| <b>ST</b>  | Security Target   |

|            |                               |
|------------|-------------------------------|
| <b>TA</b>  | Trusted Application           |
| <b>TEE</b> | Trusted Execution Environment |
| <b>TOE</b> | Target of Evaluation          |
| <b>TSF</b> | TOE Security Functions        |
| <b>TSS</b> | TOE Summary Specification     |

## 8.2 Terminology

This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this document. Terms defined in the [CC1], [CC2] and [CC3] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.

| <b>Term</b>                                    | <b>Definition</b>  |
|--|--|
| <b>Application Programming Interface (API)</b> | A set of rules that software programs can follow to communicate with each other.   |
| <b>Client Application (CA)</b>                 | An application running outside of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) making use of the TEE Client API that accesses facilities provided by the Trusted Applications inside the TEE.<br>Contrast Trusted Application.  |
| <b>Consistency</b>                             | A property of the TEE persistent storage that stands at the same time for runtime and startup consistency.<br>Runtime consistency stands for the guarantee that the following clauses hold: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Read/Read: Two successful readings from the same storage location give the same value if the TEE did not write to this location and the TEE was not reset in between</li> <li>• Write/Read: A successful reading from a given storage location gives the value that the TEE last wrote to this location if the TEE was not reset in between.</li> </ul> Startup consistency stands for the guarantee that the following clause holds: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• During a given power cycle, the stored data used at startup is the data for which runtime consistency was enforced on the same TEE on a previous power cycle.</li> </ul> Consistency implies runtime integrity of what is unsuccessfully written and read back – values or code. However the stored data used at startup may be restored from an old power cycle, not the latest one. It is still consistent at start-up because it corresponds to a memory snapshot at a given time, but it represents an integrity loss compared with the latest power cycle.<br>This notion is weaker than integrity that must be preserved between power cycles. |
| <b>Device binding</b>                          | Device binding is the property of data being only usable on a unique given system instance, here a TEE.  |
| <b>Execution Environment (EE)</b>              | A set of hardware and software components that provide facilities (computing, memory management, input/out, etc.) necessary to support applications.   |
| <b>Monotonicity</b>                            | Monotonicity is the property of a variable whose value is either always increasing or always decreasing over time.   |
| <b>Power cycle</b>                             | A power cycle is the lapse between the moment a device is turned on and the moment the device is turned off afterwards.  |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>Production TEE</b>                        | A TEE residing in a device that is in the end user phase of its life cycle.  |
| <b>REE Communication Agent</b>               | An REE Rich OS driver that enables communication between the REE and the TEE.<br>Contrast TEE Communication Agent.   |
| <b>Rich Execution Environment (REE)</b>      | An environment that is provided and governed by a Rich OS, potentially in conjunction with other supporting operating systems and hypervisors; it is outside of the TEE. This environment and applications running on it are considered un-trusted.<br>Contrast Trusted Execution Environment.   |
| <b>Rich OS</b>                               | Typically an OS providing a much wider variety of features than that of the OS running inside the TEE. It may be very open in its ability to accept applications. It will have been developed with functionality and performance as key goals, rather than security. Due to the size and needs of the Rich OS it will run in an execution environment that may be larger than the TEE hardware (often called an REE – Rich Execution Environment) with much lower physical security boundaries. From the TEE viewpoint, everything in the REE has to be considered un-trusted, though from the Rich OS point of view there may be internal trust structures.<br>Contrast Trusted OS. |
| <b>Root of Trust (RoT)</b>                   | Generally the smallest distinguishable set of hardware, firmware, and/or software that must be inherently trusted and which is closely tied to the logic and environment on which it performs its trusted actions.   |
| <b>System-on-Chip (SoC)</b>                  | An electronic system all of whose components are included in a single integrated circuit.  |
| <b>TA instance time / TA persistent time</b> | Time value available to a Trusted Application through the TEE Internal API. The API offers two types of time values: System Time, which exists only during runtime, and Persistent time, which persists over resets. System Time must be monotonic for a given TA instance, and the returned value is called “TA instance time”. Persistent time depends only on the TA but not on a particular instance, it must be monotonic even across power cycles. Its monotonicity across power cycles is related to the Time and Rollback optional PP-module [TEE PP].   |
| <b>TEE Client API</b>                        | The software interface used by clients running in the REE to communicate with the TEE and with the Trusted Applications executed by the TEE.   |
| <b>TEE Communication Agent</b>               | A TEE Trusted OS driver that enables communication between REE and TEE. Contrast REE Communication Agent.  |
| <b>TEE Internal API</b>                      | The software interface exposing TEE functionality to Trusted Applications.   |
| <b>TEE Service Library</b>                   | A software library that includes all security related drivers.   |
| <b>Trusted Application (TA)</b>              | An application running inside the Trusted Execution Environment that exports security related functionality to Client Applications outside of the TEE.<br>Contrast Client Application.   |
| <b>Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)</b>   | An execution environment that runs alongside but isolated from an REE. A TEE has security capabilities and meets certain security related requirements: It protects TEE assets from general software attacks, defines rigid safeguards as to data and functions that a program can access, and resists a set of defined threats. There are   |

|                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
|                        | multiple technologies that can be used to implement a TEE, and the level of security achieved varies accordingly. For more information, see OMTP ATE TR1 [OMTP-TR1].<br>Contrast Rich Execution Environment.   |
| <b>Trusted OS</b>      | The operating system running in the TEE. It has been designed primarily to enable the TEE using security-based design techniques. It provides the GlobalPlatform TEE Internal API to Trusted Applications and a proprietary method to enable the GlobalPlatform TEE Client API software interface from other EE.<br>Contrast Rich OS.  |
| <b>Trusted Storage</b> | In GlobalPlatform TEE documents, trusted storage indicates storage that is protected to at least the robustness level defined for OMTP Secure Storage (in section 5 of [OMTP-TR1]). It is protected either by the hardware of the TEE, or cryptographically by keys held in the TEE. If keys are used they are at least of the strength used to instantiate the TEE. A GlobalPlatform TEE Trusted Storage is not considered hardware tamper resistant to the levels achieved by Secure Elements. |

### 8.3 References

|            |  |
|------------|--|
| [CC1]      | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-001.   |
| [CC2]      | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional requirements. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-002. |
| [CC3]      | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance requirements. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-003.  |
| [TEE PP]   | GlobalPlatform Device Committee - TEE Protection Profile Version 1.2.1, Public Release November 2016, Document Reference: GPD_SPE_021                            |
| [OMTP-TR1] | Open Mobile Terminal Platform Advanced Trusted Environment<br>OMTP TR1 v1.1  |
| [WP]       | The Trusted Execution Environment: Delivering Enhanced Security at a Lower Cost to the Mobile Market, GlobalPlatform White paper, Feb 2011                       |
| [SA]       | TEE System Architecture, GlobalPlatform (Last applicable version)  |
| [IAPI]     | TEE Internal API Specification, GlobalPlatform (Last applicable version)   |
| [CAPI]     | TEE Client API Specification, GlobalPlatform (Last applicable version)   |
| [AES]      | ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES). FIPS PUB 197. November 2011.   |
| [RSA]      | RSA Cryptographic Standard. PCKS#1 v2.2. October 2012  |
| [SHA]      | SECURE HASH STANDARD. FIPS PUB 180-4. March 2012   |

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END