C040 Certification Report
Juniper Networks Junos Pulse Secure Access Service
7.2 R4
File name: ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Version: v1a
Date of document: 15 July 2013
Document classification: PUBLIC
For general inquiry about us or our services,
please email: mycc@cybersecurity.my
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page i of ix
PUBLIC
C040 Certification Report
Juniper Networks Junos Pulse Secure Access Service
7.2 R4
15 July 2013
ISCB Department
CyberSecurity Malaysia
Level 5, Sapura@Mines, No 7 Jalan Tasik,
The Mines Resort City
43300 Seri Kembangan, Selangor, Malaysia
Tel: +603 8992 6888 Fax: +603 8992 6841
http://www.cybersecurity.my
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page ii of ix
PUBLIC
Document Authorisation
DOCUMENT TITLE: C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks Junos Pulse
Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
DOCUMENT REFERENCE: ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
ISSUE: v1a
DATE: 15 July 2013
DISTRIBUTION: UNCONTROLLED COPY - FOR UNLIMITED USE AND
DISTRIBUTION
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page iii of ix
PUBLIC
Copyright Statement
The copyright of this document, which may contain proprietary information, is the property
of CyberSecurity Malaysia.
The document shall be held in safe custody.
©CYBERSECURITY MALAYSIA, 2013
Registered office:
Level 5, Sapura@Mines,
No 7, Jalan Tasik,
The Mines Resort City,
43300 Seri Kembangan
Selangor Malaysia
Registered in Malaysia – Company Limited by Guarantee
Company No. 726630-U
Printed in Malaysia
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page iv of ix
PUBLIC
Forward
The Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme has been
established under the 9th Malaysian Plan to increase Malaysia’s competitiveness in quality
assurance of information security based on the Common Criteria (CC) standard and to build
consumers’ confidence towards Malaysian information security products.
The MyCC Scheme is operated by CyberSecurity Malaysia and provides a model for licensed
Malaysian Security Evaluation Facilities (MySEFs) to conduct security evaluations of ICT
products, systems and protection profiles against internationally recognised standards. The
results of these evaluations are certified by the Malaysian Common Criteria Certification
Body (MyCB) Unit, a unit established within Information Security Certification Body (ISCB)
Department, CyberSecurity Malaysia.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the MyCB asserts that the product complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated Security Target. A Security Target is a
requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The
consumer of certified IT products should review the Security Target, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the
evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of
confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the security
requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 15 July
2013, and the Security Target (Ref [6]). The certification report, Certificate of product
evaluation and security target are posted on the MyCC Scheme Certified Product Register
(MyCPR) at www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria Portal (the official website
of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement at www.commoncriteriaportal.org).
Reproduction of this report is authorised provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page v of ix
PUBLIC
Disclaimer
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report and its
associate certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility
established under the Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC)
Scheme (Ref [4]) using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1
revision 3 (Ref [3]), for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
version 3.1 revision 3 (Ref [2]). This certification report and its associated certificate apply
only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The
evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the MyCC Scheme and
the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent
with the evidence adduced. This certification report and its associated certificate is not an
endorsement of the IT product by CyberSecurity Malaysia or by any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certification report and its associated certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by CyberSecurity Malaysia or by any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page vi of ix
PUBLIC
Document Change Log
RELEASE DATE PAGES
AFFECTED
REMARKS/CHANGE REFERENCE
v1 24 June 2012 All Final Released.
v1a 15 July 2013
Page iv Add the date of the certification.
Page 5
Add Figure 1 based on comments
received from Certification Committee
(to clearly identify the physical
boundary).
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page vii of ix
PUBLIC
Executive Summary
The Juniper Networks Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4 (hereafter referred as Secure
Access) from Juniper Networks is the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance
Level 3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 (EAL3+ ALC_FLR.2) evaluation.
Secure Access or the TOE acts as a secure application-layer gateway that intermediates all
requests between remote computers and internal corporate resources. All requests from
remote computers to a Secure Access appliance and from a Secure Access appliance to
remote computers are encrypted using SSL/HTTPS 168-bit encryption. All unencrypted
requests (e.g. HTTP) are redirected to HTTPS, which ensures the connection is encrypted.
Each request is subject to administratively defined access control and authorisation policies,
such as dual-factor or client-side digital certificate authentication, before the request is
forwarded to an internal resource. Users gain authenticated access to authorised resources
via an extranet session hosted by the appliance. From any Internet-connected Web browser,
users can access Web-based enterprise applications, Java applications, file shares and
terminal hosts. Secure Access generates audit records for security events. The administrator
and read-only administrator are the only roles with access to the audit trail and have the
ability to view the audit trail.
The functions of the TOE that are within the scope of evaluation covering the auditing of
security relevant events, cryptographic operations, user data protection, user identification
and authentication, management and protection of the security functions.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target (Ref [6]), which identifies
assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, the security
functional requirements, and the evaluation assurance level at which the product is intended
to satisfy the security requirements. Prospective consumers are advised to verify that their
operating environment is consistent with the evaluated configuration, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
This report confirms the findings of the security evaluation of the TOE to the Common
Criteria (CC) EAL3 Augmented with ALC_FLR.2. The report confirms that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the relevant criteria and the requirements of the Malaysian
Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme (Ref [4]). The evaluation was
performed by the BAE Systems Detica evaluation facility (the ‘BAE Systems Detica MySEF’)
and completed on 28 May 2013.
The Malaysian Common Criteria Certification Body (MyCB), as the MyCC Scheme Certification
Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all the Arrangement on the Recognition of
Common Criteria certificates and the product will be listed in the MyCC Scheme Certified
Products Register (MyCPR) at www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria portal
(the official website of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) at
www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the Secure Access meets their requirements.
It is recommended that a potential user of the Secure Access to refer to the Security Target
(Ref [6]) and this Certification Report prior to deciding whether to purchase the product.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page viii of ix
PUBLIC
Table of Contents
1 Target of Evaluation...........................................................................1
1.1 TOE Description............................................................................................... 1
1.2 TOE Identification............................................................................................ 1
1.3 Security Policy.................................................................................................. 2
1.4 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................. 3
1.4.1 Logical Boundaries........................................................................... 3
1.4.2 The Physical Boundaries ................................................................. 5
1.5 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................... 6
1.6 Assumptions .................................................................................................... 6
1.6.1 Usage assumptions......................................................................................... 6
1.6.2 Environmental assumptions........................................................................... 6
1.7 Evaluated Configuration................................................................................. 6
1.8 Delivery Procedures ........................................................................................ 7
1.9 Documentation ................................................................................................ 8
2 Evaluation............................................................................................9
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities ........................................................................ 9
2.1.1 Life-cycle support............................................................................ 9
2.1.2 Development..................................................................................... 9
2.1.3 Guidance documents..................................................................... 10
2.1.4 IT Product Testing.......................................................................... 10
3 Result of the Evaluation...................................................................13
3.1 Assurance Level Information ....................................................................... 13
3.2 Recommendations......................................................................................... 13
Annex A References.........................................................................................15
A.1 References...................................................................................................... 15
A.2 Terminology................................................................................................... 15
A.2.1 Acronyms........................................................................................................ 15
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms ......................................................................................... 16
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page ix of ix
PUBLIC
Index of Tables
Table 1: TOE identification.................................................................................................................. 1
Table 2: Independent Functional Testing ....................................................................................... 11
Table 3: List of Acronyms.................................................................................................................. 15
Table 4: Glossary of Terms ............................................................................................................... 16
Index of Figures
Figure 1: TOE Boundry......................................................................................................................... 5
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 1 of 17
PUBLIC
1 Target of Evaluation
1.1 TOE Description
1 The Target of Evaluation (TOE), Juniper Networks Junos Pulse Secure Access Service
7.2 R4 (hereafter referred as Secure Access) is the appliance and software client
running on a remote IT system. The TOE provides secure remote access to internal
network resources.
2 The TOE acts as a secure application-layer gateway that intermediates all request
between remote computers and internal corporate resources. All requests from
remote computers to a Secure Access appliance and from a Secure Access appliance
to remote computers are encrypted using SSL/HTTPS 168-bit encryption. All
unencrypted requests (e.g. HTTP) are redirected to HTTPS, which ensures the
connection is encrypted. Each request is subject to administratively defined access
control and authorisation policies, such as dual-factor or client-side digital
certificate authentication, before the request is forwarded to an internal resource.
Users gain authenticated access to authorised resources via an extranet session
hosted by the appliance. From any Internet-connected Web browser, users can
access Web-based enterprise applications, Java applications, file shares and terminal
hosts. Secure Access generates audit records for security events. The administrator
and read-only administrator are the only roles with access to the audit trail and have
the ability to view the audit trail.
3 In the context of the evaluation, the TOE provides the following major security
features; which will be discussed further in Section 1.4.1 of this document:
a) Generates audit records for security events.
b) Cryptographic support for secure communications between users and the TOE
and between TOE components.
c) Provides information flow security policy that limits traffic to URLs and
resource types, such as file servers, to specific user roles.
d) Identification and authentication before any information flows are permitted
and user must be authenticated before performing any administrative
functions.
e) Security management functions for administrator to configure the TOE,
manage users, information flow policy and auditing activities.
f) Protection of the TOE security function (TSF) by enforcing session timeouts.
1.2 TOE Identification
4 The details of the TOE are identified in Table 1 below.
Table 1: TOE identification
Evaluation Scheme
Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
(MyCC) Scheme
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 2 of 17
PUBLIC
Project Identifier C040
TOE Name Juniper Networks Junos Pulse Secure Access Service
TOE Version v7.2 R4
Security Target Title
Security Target: Juniper Networks Junos Pulse Secure
Access Service 7.2 R4
Security Target Version v1.4
Security Target Date 15 May 2013
Assurance Level
Evaluation Assurance Level 3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2
(EAL3+ ALC_FLR.2).
Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, July 2009, Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Ref [2])
Methodology
Common Evaluation Methodology for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, July 2009, Version 3.1
Revision 3 (Ref [3])
Protection Profile
Conformance
None
Common Criteria
Conformance
CC Part 2 Conformant
CC Part 3 Conformant
Package conformant to EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2
(EAL3+ ALC_FLR.2)
Sponsor and Developer
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1194 North Matilda Avenue,
Sunnyvale, California 94089-1206
United States
Evaluation Facility BAE Systems Detica MySEF
1.3 Security Policy
5 The TOE enforces an information flow security policy between authenticated users
and protected resources logically behind the appliance. Before any access is granted,
users must log into the TOE. Each user account is associated with one or more user
roles. The administrator sets up roles and access rules associated with the roles. The
access rules can address URLs or resource types. URL rules permit specific user roles
to access specific URLs. Rules can be specified using exact URLs or URLs can contain
wildcard designations. The last type of rule is based on rules that permit specific
user roles to access specific resources such as file servers or web servers.
6 The details of the security policy are described in Sections 6 and 7 of the Security
Target (Ref [6]).
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 3 of 17
PUBLIC
1.4 TOE Architecture
7 The TOE includes both logical and physical boundaries which are described in detail
Section 1.7 of the Security Target (Ref [6]).
1.4.1 Logical Boundaries
8 The TOE implements and controls the security features listed below:
a) Security audit
The TOE generates audit records for security events. The logs are divided into
several categories and are maintained separately as follows:
i. Event logs – used to track system related events such as start-up and
shutdown,
ii. Admin access logs – used to record administrator generated event, and
iii. User access logs – record user access events such as retrieving a file.
The log details and list of events where the TOE will generate the logs are
listed in Section 6.1.1.1 and Section 7.2 of the Security Target (Ref [6]).
Only administrator and the read-only administrator can access to the audit trail
and have the ability to view and save the audit log via the web-based
administrative interface. The administrator also has the ability to change the
log settings.
The TOE maintains a circular buffer for audit records. When the audit log is
full, the oldest audit records are overwritten.
b) Cryptographic operations
The TOE supports secure communications between users and the TOE and
between TOE components. The secure communication ensures that the data
are protected from unauthorised modification and disclosure. Several
algorithms are used for specific cryptographic operations to support encrypted
communication between users and the TOE as listed in Section 6.1.2.4 of the
Security Target (Ref [6]).
c) User data protection
The TOE enforces an information flow policy between authenticated users and
protected resources logically behind the appliance. Before any access is
granted, users must log into the TOE. Each user account is associated with one
or more user roles. The administrator sets up roles and access rules associated
with the roles. The access rules can be addressed based on:
i. URLs: rules that permit specific user roles to access specific URLs, or
ii. resource types: rules that permit specific user roles to access specific
resources such as file servers or web servers.
The TOE tracks all packet information including packet length and ensures that
no residual data is exposed to users.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 4 of 17
PUBLIC
d) Identification and authentication
All users and administrators are required to perform identification and
authentication before any information flows are permitted or perform any
administrative functions. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE will perform
the identification and authentication locally using username and password. If
the authentication succeeds, the user receives a session token that is used for
identification of subsequent requests during that session.
e) Security management
The TOE provides security management functions via a web-based interface.
Administrators can configure the TOE including: user management,
information flow policy management, audit management, and system start-up
and shutdown.
The TOE also provides a console port for certain management capabilities,
such as configuring the network relevant information pertaining to the internal
and external network interfaces. However, the console port does not provide
the management capabilities necessary to utilise the security management
functionalities claimed within the Security Target (Ref [6]).
Administrators set the information flow policy rules on a per user basis. When
the Administrator adds a new user, the Administrator defines the user access.
By default, user access is restrictive but the Administrator may override the
default upon rule creation.
The TOE supports the following roles:
i. Administrator – provide a user within the administrator’s authentication
realm access to perform all management functionalities available from
the Administrator Console,
ii. read-only administrator - provides a user within the administrator’s
authentication realm read-only access to the various configurations and
logs available from within the Administrator Console,
iii. The user and user admin roles provide a user within the user’s
authentication realm access to initiate an information flow request and
access internal resource, if permitted. Additionally, the user admin role
allows a user within the user’s authentication realm to create, modify or
delete existing user’s within the user’s authentication realm.
Users within the administrator’s authentication realm are only permitted to
access the TOE via the Administrator Console. Meanwhile users within the
user’s authentication realm are only permitted to access the TOE via the End-
User Interface.
f) Protection of the TSF
The TOE provides a timestamp for its own use. The timestamp is generated
from the clock provided in the hardware. The TOE protects all current sessions
from compromise by enforcing a timeout. When a session becomes idle for
more than 10 minutes or reaches a maximum lifetime of 60 minutes, the
session times out and is deleted from the session table. Session timeouts are
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 5 of 17
PUBLIC
enforceable on sessions initiated on both the administrator and user interfaces
of the TOE.
1.4.2 The Physical Boundaries
9 The TOE includes the appliance and software client running on a remote IT system.
The appliance TOE component is completely self-contained, housing the software
and hardware necessary to perform all functions. The TOE boundary is shown in
Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: TOE Boundry
10 The TOE is composed of the following components:
a) SA Engine – provides the internal infrastructure to perform the security
functions of the TOE including access control system, authentication system,
protocol and connection handlers, request handler, and system logging facility.
This includes a proprietary web server developed by Juniper, which provides
the main interface for both users and administrators of the TOE. The web
server provides users an interface to submit connection requests via an HTTPS
encrypted tunnel.
b) Management Engine – provides features to handle TOE management
commands that are received from the management platform in the IT
environment. An administrator or read-only administrator uses it to access
management features associated with their respective roles.
c) Software clients - open and manage a secure connection to the appliance for
user connections.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 6 of 17
PUBLIC
11 The details of the TOE physical boundaries are described in Section 1.7.1 of the
Security Target (Ref [6]).
1.5 Clarification of Scope
12 The TOE is designed to be suitable for use in well-protected environments that have
effective countermeasures such as physical access protection, non-hostile and well-
managed user community in accordance with administrator guidance that is supplied
with the product. The information flow between internal and external networks
should also passes through the TOE.
13 Section 1.4 of this document described the scope of the evaluation which was limited
to those claims made in the Security Target (Ref [6]). The operating systems and the
hardware running the software clients are outside the scope of the evaluation.
14 Potential consumers of the TOE are advised that some functions and services may
not have been evaluated as part of the evaluation. Potential consumers of the TOE
should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services outside
of the evaluated configuration.
1.6 Assumptions
15 This section summarises the security aspects of the environment/configuration in
which the IT product is intended to operate. Consumers should understand their own
IT environments and that required for secure operation of the TOE as defined in
subsequent sections and in the Security Target Ref ([6]).
1.6.1 Usage assumptions
16 Assumptions for the TOE usage listed in the Security Target are:
a) The administrators will be non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance.
b) There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the ability to
execute arbitrary code or applications) and storage repository capabilities on
the TOE.
c) The TOE does not host any public data.
d) Information cannot flow among the internal and external network unless it
passes through the TOE.
1.6.2 Environmental assumptions
17 Assumptions for the TOE environment listed in the Security Target are:
a) The TOE will be located within controlled access facilities to prevent
unauthorized physical access.
1.7 Evaluated Configuration
18 The TOE is the appliance and software client running on a remote IT system, as
described in Section 1.7.1 of the Security Target (Ref [6]). The assurance gained via
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 7 of 17
PUBLIC
evaluation applies specifically to the TOE in the defined evaluated configuration
according to the documented preparative user guidance (Ref 29b) and 29c)).
19 The evaluated configuration for the TOE encompasses three components:
a) Appliance software: Juniper Networks Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4,
b) Appliance hardware: as per listed in Table 3 of the Security Target (Ref [6]), and
c) Client software: as per listed in Table 3 of the Security Target (Ref [6]).
1.8 Delivery Procedures
20 Secure Access is delivered to the customers using the delivery procedure (Ref 29a)),
which ensures that the TOE is securely transferred from the development
environment into the responsibility of the customer. The delivery procedures are
outlined below.
21 Upon receipt by Juniper, customer orders are processed by Juniper Order
Management where all subsequent processing (shipment transaction, package slip
generation, and invoice generation) will take place.
22 Secure Access will be produced by authorised contract manufacturers. The
appliances are uniquely labelled using an adhesive-backed thermal label that
contains unit model number, unit serial number and in some instances the MAC
address. These labels are printed during the manufacturing process by the contract
manufacturers and affixed to the unit during final packaging of the box.
23 Juniper packages and labels the product in accordance with the current bill of
material (BOM) and any applicable package specification for the product to be
shipped.
24 Each hardware appliance is wrapped in a plastic bag to provide resistance against
moisture. Then the appliance is enclosed in cardboard shipping boxes and sealed
with tape that does not contain a Juniper logo. A shipping label identifying the exact
product (including the serial number for the included device) and the customer name
is provided on the outside of the shipping box.
25 Juniper employs commercial carrier for its shipment of goods. The commercial
carrier provides a tracking service for both the sender (Juniper) and the receiver to
track delivery and receipt of the package.
26 The recipient can verify that they have received a product that has not been
tampered with:
a) Outside packaging: If the outside shipping box and tape have not been broken,
and the outside shipping label properly identifies the customer and the
product, then the product has not been tampered with.
b) Inside packaging: If the plastic bag or seal on the plastic bag are damaged or
removed, the device may have been tampered with.
c) Delivery times: If delivery times coincide with the tracking information from the
carrier, it can be assumed that the package was not tampered. It is assumed
that the trusted carriers provide reasonable measures to protect the products
from tampering during shipping.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 8 of 17
PUBLIC
27 There are several mechanisms provided in the above process for a customer to
ensure that they are receiving a box sent by Juniper that has not been masqueraded
by another company or entity:
a) When an appliance is shipped, an Advanced Shipment Notification is sent to
the email address provided by the customer when the order is taken. This
email includes the following information:
i) Purchase Order Number
ii) Juniper Order Number to be used to track the shipment
iii) Carrier tracking number to be used to track the shipment
iv) List of Items shipped including serial numbers
v) Address and contacts of the customer who ordered the product and who
the product will be shipped to.
b) If a customer wants to verify that a box they have received was sent by Juniper
they can do the following:
i) Compare the carrier tracking number or the Juniper order number listed in
the Juniper shipment notification with the tracking number on the package
received.
ii) Log onto the Juniper online customer support portal at
https://www.juniper.net/customers/csc/management/ to view the Order
Status. Compare the carrier tracking number or the Juniper order number
listed in the Juniper shipment notification with the tracking number on the
package received.
1.9 Documentation
28 To ensure secure usage of the product, it is important that the TOE is used in
accordance with guidance documentation.
29 The following documentation is provided by the developer to the end user as
guidance to ensure secure delivery, installation, and operation of the product:
a) Secure Delivery Processes and Procedures : Juniper Networks Junos Pulse
Secure Access Service 7.2 R4, v1.1, 30 October 2012
b) Juniper Networks : Junos Pulse® Secure Access Service Complete Software
Guide, v7.2, 15 May 2012
c) Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures Supplement : Juniper
Networks Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4, v1.1, 30 October 2012
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 9 of 17
PUBLIC
2 Evaluation
30 The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Common
Criteria, Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Ref [2]) and the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Ref [3]). The evaluation was
conducted at Evaluation Assurance Level 3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 (EAL3+
ALC_FLR.2). The evaluation was performed conformant to the MyCC Scheme Policy
(MyCC_P1) (Ref [4]) and MyCC Scheme Evaluation Facility Manual (MyCC_P3) (Ref [5]).
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities
31 The evaluation activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE, including the
following components:
2.1.1 Life-cycle support
32 An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated
documentation was performed. The evaluators confirmed that the configuration list
which includes the TOE and the evaluation evidence were clearly and uniquely
labelled, and that the access control measures as described in the configuration
management documentation are effective in preventing unauthorised access to the
configuration items. The developer’s configuration management system was also
observed during the site visit, and it was found to be consistent with the provided
evidence.
33 It is evaluated that the implemented configuration management system can control
changes to those items that have been placed under configuration management
system. The developer’s configuration management system was also observed
during the site visit, and it was found security flaws under configuration
management ensures that security flaw reports are not lost or forgotten, and allows
a developer to track security flaws to their resolution. This is evaluated to be
consistent with the provided evidence.
34 During the site visit the evaluators examined the development security
documentation and determined that it detailed sufficient security measures for the
development environment to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE
design and implementation. The evaluators confirmed that the developer used a
documented life-cycle model which provides necessary control over the development
and maintenance of the TOE by using the procedures, tools and techniques
described by the life-cycle model.
35 The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it
described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during
distribution to the consumer.
2.1.2 Development
36 The evaluators analysed the TOE functional specification and design documentation;
they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 10 of 17
PUBLIC
security functionality (TSF) interfaces, and the TSF subsystems. The design described
the TOE subsystems to sufficiently determine the TSF boundary. It provides a
detailed description of the SFR-enforcing subsystems and enough information about
the SFR supporting and SFR-non-interfering subsystems for the evaluator to
determine that the SFRs are completely and accurately implemented.
37 The evaluators analysed the TOE security architectural description and determined
that the delivery and installation process was secure and the security functions are
protected against tamper and bypass. The evaluators also independently verified that
the correspondence mappings between the design documents were correct.
2.1.3 Guidance documents
38 The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user
guidance, and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously described how to
securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration, and how to use and
administer the product in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational
environment. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational
guidance, and determined that they were complete and sufficiently detailed to result
in a secure configuration.
2.1.4 IT Product Testing
39 Testing at EAL3 consists of assessing developer tests, performing independent
function test, and performing penetration tests. The TOE testing was conducted by
evaluator from BAE Systems Detica MySEF at BAE Systems Detica MySEF Lab, Kuala
Lumpur where it was subjected to comprehensive suite of formally documented,
independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities,
including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and actual results
are documented in a separate Test Plan Reports.
2.1.4.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
40 The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by
examining their test plans, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the
Evaluation Technical Report (Ref [7]) (not a public document because it contains
information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator).
41 The evaluators analysed the developer’s test coverage and depth analysis, and found
them to be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified
in the developer’s test documentation and the interfaces in the implementation
representative, functional specification, TOE design and security architecture
description was complete.
2.1.4.2 Independent Functional Testing
42 Independent functional testing is the evaluation conducted by evaluator based on the
information gathered by examining design and guidance documentation, examining
developer’s test documentations, executing a sample of the developer’s test plan,
and creating test cases that augmented the developer test.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 11 of 17
PUBLIC
43 All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow
repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The results of the independent
functional tests were developed and performed by the evaluators to verify the TOE
functionality as follows:
Table 2: Independent Functional Testing
DESCRIPTION SECURITY
FUNCTION
TSFI RESULTS
To test that the TOE perform
identification and authentication
before any information flows are
permitted. In conjunction with
user authentication, this test is
also focused on the security
management functions part. For
example TOE configurations,
User management, Information
flow policy, audit and other
maintenance activities.
FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_SOS.1,
FIA_UAU.2,
FIA_UID.2,
FMT_MOF.1,
FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_MSA.2,
FMT_MSA.3,
FMT_MTD.1,
FMT_SAE.1,
FMT_SMF.1
and
FMT_SMR.1
Administrator
Interface, User
Interface and
Serial Interface
PASS. The TOE
does perform
identification and
authentication,
TOE configuration
and user
management.
To test that the TOE provides an
information flow security policy.
The security policy limits traffic
to URLs and resource types, such
as file servers, to specific user
roles. In addition to that, this
test will also be focusing on
session timeout. Secure Access
protects all current sessions
from compromise by enforcing a
timeout.
FDP_IFC.1,
FDP_IFF.1,
FDP_RIP.1,
FPT_STM.1,
FTA_SSL.3,
FPT_ITT.1 and
FTP_TRP.1
Administrator
Interface, User
interface and
Network
Interface
PASS. The TOE
does provide an
information flow
security policy and
session timeout.
To test that the TOE supports
secure communications between
users and the TOE and between
TOE components. This encrypted
traffic prevents modification and
disclosure of user information.
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.2,
FCS_CKM.4
and
FCS_COP.1
Administrator
Interface, User
Interface and
Network
Interface
PASS. The TOE
does supports
secure
communications
between users and
the TOE and
between TOE
components.
To test that the TOE generates
audit records for security events.
FAU_GEN.1,
FAU_SAR.1,
Administrator
Interface, User
PASS. The TOE
does generate
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 12 of 17
PUBLIC
DESCRIPTION SECURITY
FUNCTION
TSFI RESULTS
FAU_STG.1
and
FAU_STG.3
Interface and
Serial Interface
audit records for
security events.
44 All tests performed by the evaluators produced the expected results and as such the
TOE behaved as expected.
2.1.4.3 Penetration Testing
45 The evaluators performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE in order to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE and to determine whether these were exploitable
in the intended operating environment of the TOE. This vulnerability analysis
considered public domain sources and an analysis of guidance documentation,
functional specification, TOE design, security architecture description, and
implementation representation.
46 From the vulnerability analysis, the evaluators conducted penetration testing to
determine that the TOE, in its operational environment, is resistant to attack
performed by an attacker possessing a Basic attack potential. The following factors
have been taken into consideration during penetration tests:
a) Time taken to identify and exploit (elapsed time);
b) Specialist technical expertise required (specialised expertise);
c) Knowledge of the TOE design and operation (knowledge of the TOE);
d) Window of opportunity; and
e) IT hardware/software or other requirement required for exploitation.
47 The penetration tests focused on:
a) Injection;
b) Man in the middle attack;
c) Reverse engineering attack; and
d) Fuzzing.
48 The results of the penetration testing note that there is no exploitable vulnerability
and/or residual vulnerability found. However, it is important to ensure that the TOE
is use only in its evaluated configuration and in secure environment.
2.1.4.4 Testing Results
49 Tests conducted for the TOE produced the expected results and demonstrated that
the product behaved as specified in its Security Target and functional specification.
50 Based on the results of penetration testing, the evaluators determined that the TOE
is resistant to an attacker possessing a Basic attack potential.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 13 of 17
PUBLIC
3 Result of the Evaluation
51 After due consideration during the oversight of the execution of the evaluation by
the certifiers and of the Evaluation Technical Report (Ref [7]), the Malaysian Common
Criteria Certification Body certifies the evaluation of Juniper Networks Junos Pulse
Secure Access Service 7.2 R4 performed by the BAE Systems Detica MySEF.
52 The BAE Systems Detica MySEF found that Juniper Networks Junos Pulse Secure
Access Service 7.2 R4 upholds the claims made in the Security Target (Ref [6]) and
supporting documentation, and has met the requirements of the Common Criteria
(CC) assurance level EAL3+ ALC_FLR.2.
53 Certification is not a guarantee that a TOE is completely free of exploitable
vulnerabilities. There will remain a small level of risk that exploitable vulnerabilities
remain undiscovered in its claimed security functionality. This risk is reduced as the
certified level of assurance increases for the TOE.
3.1 Assurance Level Information
54 EAL3 provides assurance by a full Security Target (ST) and an analysis of the security
functions in the ST, using a functional and interface specification, guidance
documentation, and an architectural description of the TOE design, to understand
the security behaviour.
55 The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TOE security functions,
evidence of developer testing based on the functional specification and TOE design,
selective independent confirmation of the developer test results, and a vulnerability
analysis (based upon the functional specification, TOE design, security architecture
description and guidance evidence provided) demonstrating resistance to
penetration attackers with a Basic attack potential. However, in this evaluation, the
lifecycle support evaluation is performed by the evaluator assuming a flaw reporting
procedures of High based on ALC_FLR.2 requirements.
56 EAL3 also provides assurance through the use of development environment controls,
TOE configuration management, and evidence of secure delivery procedures.
57 EAL3 represents a meaningful increase in assurance by requiring more complete
testing coverage of the security functionality and mechanisms and/or procedures
that provide some confidence that the TOE will not be tampered with during
development.
3.2 Recommendations
58 In addition to ensure secure usage of the product, below are additional
recommendations for Juniper Networks Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
consumers:
a) The users and administrators of the TOE should make themselves familiar with
the developer guidance provided with the TOE and pay attention to all security
warnings.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 14 of 17
PUBLIC
b) Appropriate network layer protection, the network on which the TOE is
installed must be both physically and logically protected.
c) System Administrator ensures that the TOE is correctly configured and
performs annual testing to confirm that all vulnerabilities have been suitably
addressed.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 15 of 17
PUBLIC
Annex A References
A.1 References
[1] Arrangement on the recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of
Information Technology Security, May 2000.
[2] The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 3, July 2009.
[3] The Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009.
[4] MyCC Scheme Policy (MyCC_P1), v1a, CyberSecurity Malaysia, December 2009.
[5] MyCC Scheme Evaluation Facility Manual (MyCC_P3), v1, December 2009.
[6] Security Target: Juniper Networks Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4, v1.4, 15
May 2013.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report EAL3+ ALC_FLR.2 Evaluation of Juniper Networks Junos
Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4, v1.1, 28 May 2013.
A.2 Terminology
A.2.1 Acronyms
Table 3: List of Acronyms
Acronym Expanded Term
CB Certification Body
CC Common Criteria (ISO/IEC15408)
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology (ISO/IEC 18045)
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISCB Information Security Certification Body
ISO International Standards Organisation
MyCB Malaysian Common Criteria Certification Body
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 16 of 17
PUBLIC
Acronym Expanded Term
MyCC Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
MyCPR MyCC Scheme Certified Products Register
MySEF Malaysian Security Evaluation Facility
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TOE Security Functions Interface
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms
Table 4: Glossary of Terms
Term Definition and Source
Certificate The official representation from the CB of the certification of a
specific version of a product to the Common Criteria.
Certification Body An organisation responsible for carrying out certification and
for overseeing the day-today operation of an Evaluation and
Certification Scheme. Source CCRA.
Consumer The organisation that uses the certified product within their
infrastructure.
Developer The organisation that develops the product submitted for CC
evaluation and certification.
Evaluation The assessment of an IT product, IT system, or any other valid
target as defined by the scheme, proposed by an applicant
against the standards covered by the scope defined in its
application against the certification criteria specified in the rules
of the scheme. Source CCRA and MS ISO/IEC Guide 65.
Evaluation and
Certification Scheme
The systematic organisation of the functions of evaluation and
certification under the authority of a certification body in order
to ensure that high standards of competence and impartiality
are maintained and that consistency is achieved. Source CCRA.
Interpretation Expert technical judgement, when required, regarding the
meaning or method of application of any technical aspect of the
criteria or the methodology.
Certifier The certifier responsible for managing a specific certification
task.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C040 Certification Report - Juniper Networks
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service 7.2 R4
ISCB-5-RPT-C040-CR-v1a
Page 17 of 17
PUBLIC
Term Definition and Source
Evaluator The evaluator responsible for managing the technical aspects of
a specific evaluation task.
Security Evaluation
Facility
An organisation (or business unit of an organisation) that
conducts ICT security evaluation of products and systems using
the CC and CEM in accordance with Evaluation and Certification
Scheme policy
Sponsor The organisation that submits a product for evaluation and
certification under the MyCC Scheme. The sponsor may also be
the developer.
User Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE
that interacts with the TOE.
User data Data created by and for the user that does not affect the
operation of the TSF.
--- END OF DOCUMENT ---