Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005
for
IBM z/VM
Version 5, Release 1 with RSU1
from
IBM Corporation
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005
IBM z/VM
Version 5, Release 1 with RSU1
from
IBM Corporation
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”,
Version 1.1, February 2002 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for compliance with Common
Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Issue 1.b, 08.10.1999 and
Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue 1.d, 08.10.1999
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL3 augmented by ADV_SPM.1 (Informal TOE security policy model)
and ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw reporting procedures)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, October 26, 2005
The Vice President of the Federal Office for Information Security
Hange L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005
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Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• CEM supplementation on “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005
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2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005 Certification Report
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3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM z/VM Version 5, Release 1 with RSU1 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IBM z/VM Version 5, Release 1 with RSU1 was
conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The atsec information security
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The developer and sponsor is:
IBM Corporation
1701 North Street
Endicott, NY 13760 - USA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on October 26, 2005.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given
in the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005
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4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-24.
The product IBM z/VM Version 5, Release 1 with RSU1 has been included in
the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
IBM Corporation
1701 North Street
Endicott, NY 13760, USA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005
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Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 10
3 Security Policy 12
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 12
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 15
7 IT Product Testing 16
8 Evaluated Configuration 18
9 Results of the Evaluation 19
10 Comments/Recommendations 21
11 Annexes 21
12 Security Target 21
13 Definitions 21
14 Bibliography 24
BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005 Certification Report
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1 Executive Summary
IBM z/VM is a secure, scalable, enterprise operating system on which to build
and deploy mission-critical applications, providing a comprehensive and diverse
application execution environment. IBM z/VM is the virtual machine operating
system for IBM zSeries mainframe computers.
The TOE includes software components only and provides LSPP and CAPP
compliant security functionality plus product specific extensions. Among these
functions are:
• Audit
• Discretionary access control
• Mandatory access control and support for security labels
• Separation of virtual machines
• Identification and authentication
• Object reuse functionality
• Security management
• TSF protection
The TOE is one instance of z/VM running on an abstract machine as the sole
operating system on the level of the abstract machine and exercising full control
over this abstract machine regardless which software runs inside of virtual
machines. This abstract machine can be provided by:
• a logical partition of an IBM zSeries or System z9 machine (PR/SM)
• native mode (no PR/SM logical partition) on z800 and z900
For more details concerning the software version defining the TOE, the abstract
machine the TOE runs on and the user guidance documentation delivered with
the TOE please refer to the remainder of this report.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) used in the Security Target
are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following table:
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005
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Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
SFRs from CC Part 2, contained in LSPP/CAPP
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit
FAU_STG.1 Guarantees of audit data availability
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FDP_ACC.1 Discretionary access control policy
FDP_ACF.1 Discretionary access control functions
FDP_ETC.1 Export of unlabeled user data
FDP_ETC.2 Export of labeled user data
FDP_IFC.1 Mandatory access control policy
FDP_IFF.2 Mandatory access control functions
FDP_ITC.1 Import of unlabeled user data
FDP_ITC.2 Import of labeled user data
FDP_RIP.2 Object residual information protection
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1 Strength of authentication data
FIA_UAU.1 Authentication
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.1 Identification
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management
BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005 Certification Report
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Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FMT_REV.1 Revocation of attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security management roles
FPT_RVM.1 Reference mediation
FPT_SEP.1 Domain separation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
SFRs not in CC Part 2 (Part 2 extended), contained in
LSPP/CAPP
„Note1“
as defined in LSPP/CAPP
Subject Residual Information Protection
SFRs from CC Part 2, not contained in LSPP/CAPP
FMT_SMF.18
Specification of Management Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FRU_FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerance
Note that some of the SFRs have been iterated in the Security Target. For
details on the iteration and the required security functionality please refer to [6],
chapter 5.1.
The IT product IBM z/VM Version 5, Release 1 with RSU1 was evaluated by
atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on
28.09.2005. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)9
recognised by BSI.
The developer and sponsor is:
IBM Corporation
1701 North Street
Endicott, NY 13760 - USA
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
8
Added because of AIS32, Final Interpretation 065
9
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005
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The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL3+
(Evaluation Assurance Level 3 augmented).
The assurance level is augmented by: ADV_SPM.1 – Informal TOE security
policy model and ALC_FLR.2 – Flaw reporting procedures. For the evaluation of
the CC component ALC_FLR.2 the mutually recognised CEM supplementation
“ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 was used.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE security functions are:
Identification and authentication: The TOE provides identification and
authentication of users by the means of an alphanumeric user ID and a system-
encrypted password.
Discretionary access control: The TOE performs access control between
software running in virtual machines acting on behalf of a user and resources
protected by the Discretionary and (in LSPP mode) Mandatory access control
policies. The TOE uses user and resource profiles stored in the RACF database
to decide if a subject has access to a resource.
Mandatory access control: In addition to DAC, z/VM provides Mandatory
Access Control (MAC) in LSPP mode, which imposes access restrictions to
information based on security classification. Each user and each RACF
controlled object can have a security classification specified in its profile. The
security classification can be a security level and zero or more security
categories. Security labels are maintained separately from privilege classes in
RACF.
The access control enforced by the TOE ensures that users may only read
labeled information if their security label dominates the information’s label, and
that the may only write to labeled information containers if the container’s label
dominates the subject’s.
Separation of virtual machines: The TOE restricts results of software failures
(such as program checks) occurring in a virtual machine to this machine, thus
not affecting other virtual machines or the CP. Operating system failures that
occur in virtual machines do not normally affect the z/VM operating system
running on the real processor. If the error is isolated to a virtual machine, only
that virtual machine fails, and the user can re-IPL without affecting the testing
and production work running in other virtual machines.
Audit: The TOE provides an audit capability that allows generating audit
records for security critical events. It provides a number of logging and reporting
functions that allow resource owners and auditors to identify users who attempt
to access the resource. The audit records generated by RACF are collected into
files residing on disks that are protected from unauthorized modification or
deletion by the DAC and (in LSPP mode) MAC mechanism.
Object re-use: The TOE ensures the re-usability of protected objects and
storage before making it accessible to further use.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005 Certification Report
B-7
Security management: The TOE provides a set of commands and options to
adequately manage the TOE’s security functions. Several roles are recognized
that are able to perform the different management tasks related to the TOE’s
security.
TSF protection: TSF protection is based on several protection mechanisms
that are provided by the underlying abstract machine the TOE is executed upon.
Only a brief summary of the security functionality was provided here. For a
precise definition of the SF please refer to the Security Target of the TOE ([6],
chapter 6).
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed medium (SOF-medium) for the
authentication function using passwords as indicated in the Security Target [6],
chapter 6.4.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
In compliance with LSPP and CAPP all security objectives are derived from
OSP. Therefore no threats have been defined in [6].
The TOE has to comply to the following Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs). Note that only a summary of the policies is provided here. For the
detailed and precise definition refer to [6], chapter 3.4:
P.AUTHORIZED_USERS
Only users who have been authorised to access information within the
system may access the system.
P.NEED_TO_KNOW
The system must limit the access to, modification of, and destruction of the
information in protected resources to those authorized users who have a
“need to know” for that information.
P.ACCOUNTABILITY
The users of the system shall be held accountable for their actions within
the system.
P.CLASSIFICATION
The system must limit the access to information based on sensitivity and
formal clearance of users (LSPP mode only).
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.3.1 and
subsequent chapters of the Security Target [6] and are summarised here
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005
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(please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed
description):
• Installation and configuration of the TOE components as detailed in chapter
2 and 6 of this report is required
• The Target of Evaluation, IBM z/VM Version 5 Release 1 with Required
System Update (RSU) 1, requires the following software elements to be
installed:
• Conversational Monitor System (CMS) for operating RACF and TCP/IP
• Control Program (CP) with with RSU1 (PTF UMRSU01) and APAR
VM63578 (PTF UM31248)
• RACF for z/VM version 1 release 10 with APARs VM63563 (PTF
UV60855) and VM63613 (PTF UV60870)
• TCP/IP for z/VM with RSU1 (PTF UQRSU01)
• The following optional elements may be used in the system without
changing the security characteristics as described in this Security Target:
• SSL support for the network communication
• The evaluated configuration is restricted to one z/VM instance running
directly on an abstract machine
• Sharing of one RACF database between z/VM and z/OS is explicitly
excluded from this evaluation
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions about the technical environment in which the TOE is
intended to be used are defined in the ST [6], chapter 2.4.3 and are
summarized here:
The TOE is one instance of z/VM running on an abstract machine as the sole
operating system on the level of the abstract machine and exercising full control
over this abstract machine regardless which software runs inside of virtual
machines. This abstract machine can be provided either by a logical partition of
an IBM zSeries or System z9 machine (PR/SM) or native mode (no PR/SM
logical partition) on z800 and z900 processors.
For details on peripherals which can be used with the TOE, while still preserving
the security functionality please refer to [6], chapter 2.4.3.
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target. They are based on the assumptions defined in [6], chapter 3.2.
(Please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed definition):
BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005 Certification Report
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Identifier Summary
A.LOCATE Location of TOE processing resources in facilities
with controlled access.
A.PROTECT Protection against physical modification (of TOE
hardware and software).
A.MANAGE Management of the TOE is done by competent
individuals.
A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN Administrative personnel are not careless, willfully
negligent, or hostile.
A.COOP Authorised users possess the necessary
authorization to access at least some of the
information managed by the TOE and are
expected to act in a co-operating manner.
A.CLEARANCE
(LSPP mode only)
Procedures exist for granting users authorization
for access to specific security levels.
A.SENSITIVITY
(LSPP mode only)
Procedures exist for establishing the security
level of all information imported into the system,
for establishing the security level for all peripheral
devices (such as printers, tape drives, and disk
drives) attached to the TOE, and marking a
sensitivity label on all output generated.
A.PEER Any other system with which the TOE
communicates is assumed to be under the same
management control and operate under the same
security policy constraints.
A.CONNECT All connections (to peripherals and other
systems) not using the secured protocols TLS v1
SSL v3 or IPSec reside within the controlled
access facilities.
The following constraints are based on Security Objectives which have to be
met by the TOE environment. Theses objectives are defined in [6], chapter 4.2.
(Please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed definition):
Identifier Summary
OE.INSTALL The installation, management and operation of
the TOE has to be done in a secure manner.
OE.CREDEN User Authentication Data has to be treated
securely.
OE.HW_SEP The underlying abstract machine has to provide
separation mechanisms.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005
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1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation is called: IBM z/VM Version 5, Release 1 with RSU1.
The following product components represent the TOE:
IBM z/VM Version 5 Release 1 consisting of
• Conversational Monitor System (CMS) for operating RACF and TCP/IP
• Control Program (CP)
• RACF for z/VM Version 1 Release 10
• TCP/IP for z/VM
The RSU 1 and required PTFs for CP, RACF and TCP/IP i.e.
• CP: RSU1 (PTF UMRSU01) and APAR VM63578 (PTF UM31248)
• RACF: APAR VM63563 (PTF UV60855) and APAR VM63613 (PTF
UV60870)
• TCP/IP: RSU1 (PTF UQRSU01)
• The z/VM 5.1 CD Collection Kit (SK2T-2067-22) September 2004 containing
z/VM related guidance documentation except the Secure Configuration
Guide.
Guidance Documents:
To install and configure the TOE in conformance with the configuration
described in the Security Target the administrator must follow the guidance
documentation for installation and configuration provided in the Secure
Configuration Guide and containing references to other z/VM 5.1 related
guidance.
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 Secure Configuration Guide SC24-6138-01,
Second Edition (October 2005)
BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005 Certification Report
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• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 CP Command and Utilities Reference Guide,
SC24-6081-00, First Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 System Messages and Codes – CP, GC24-
6119-00, First Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 CP Planning and Administration, SC24-6083-
01, Second Edition (December 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 CP Programming Services, SC24-6084-00,
First Edition (September 2004)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 Auditor’s Guide, SC28-1342-13, Fourteenth
Edition (August 2003)
• RACF Version1 Release 10 Command Language Reference, SC28-0733-
18, Nineteenth Edition (August 2004)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 Diagnosis Guide, GY28-1016-08, Ninth Edition
(August 2003)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 General User’s Guide, SC28-1341-10,
Eleventh Edition (August 2003)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 Messages and Codes, SC38-1014-18,
Nineteenth Edition (August 2003)
• RACF Macros and Interfaces Version 1 Release 10, SC28-1345-09, Tenth
Edition (August 2003)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 Security Administrator’s Guide, SC28-1340-14,
Fifteenth Edition (August 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 System Operation, SC24-6121-00, First Edition
(September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 TCP/IP Diagnosis Guide, GC24-6123-00, First
Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 TCP/IP Messages and Codes, GC24-6124-00,
First Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 TCP/IP Planning and Customization, SC24-
6125-00, First Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 TCP/IP Programmer's Reference, SC24-6126-
00, First Edition (September 2004)
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0258-2005
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3 Security Policy
The TOE implements several policies which are specified in the Security Target
by the TOE security functional requirements. Those policies are:
• An Audit Policy defined by the SFRs FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2,
FAU_SEL.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.2,
FAU_STG.3, FAU_STG.4, FIA_USB.1, FMT_MTD.1, FPT_STM.1
• An Identification & Authentication Policy that is defined by the SFRs
FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_USB.1, FIA_SOS.1,
FMT_MTD.1, FMT_REV.1
• A Mandatory Access Control Policy defined by the SFRs FDP_IFC.1,
FDP_IFF.2, FDP_ETC.2, Note 1, FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_USB.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_REV.1
• A Discretionary Access Control Policy that is defined by the SFRs
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ACF.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1,
FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_REV.1
In addition to the Security Target the Security Policy of the TOE has been
described in a separate Informal TOE security policy model as required by the
CC assurance component ADV_SPM.1.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the personnel and procedural assumptions the following usage
conditions exist. Refer to [6], chapter 3.2 for more details:
• The TOE is configured in accordance to the given constraints
(A.CONFIGURATION).
• The TOE is managed by competent individuals (A.MANAGE).
• Administrative personnel are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile
(A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN).
• Users of the TOE are co-operative (A.COOP).
LSPP mode only:
• Procedures for granting users authorization for access to specific security
levels exist (A.CLEARANCE).
• Procedures for establishing the security level exist (A.SENSITIVITY)
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4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.2):
• The TOE is located in an access controlled facility (A.LOCATE).
• The TOE (Hardware used by the TOE and the TOE software itself) is
protected against physical modification (A.PROTECT).
• Any other system with which the TOE communicates is assumed to be
under the same management control and operate under the same security
policy constraints. (A.PEER)
• All connections (to peripheral devices and other systems) not using TLSv1,
SSLv3 or IPSec reside within the controlled access facilities (A.CONNECT).
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 2 and 8 of this report.
4.3 Clarification of scope
No threats to be averted by the TOE environment have been defined in the
Security Target [6].
5 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the z/VM virtual machine operating system
with the software components as described in chapter 2 and 8 of this report.
IBM z/VM is the virtual machine operating system for IBM zSeries mainframe
computers. z/VM can be used by multiple users simultaneously to perform a
variety of functions requiring controlled, separated access to the information
stored on the system.
The TOE is seen as one instance of z/VM running on an abstract machine as
the sole operating system on the level of the abstract machine and exercising
full control over this abstract machine regardless which software runs inside of
virtual machines.
This underlying abstract machine can be provided by one of the following:
• a logical partition of an IBM zSeries or System z9 machine (PR/SM)
• native mode (no PR/SM logical partition) on z800 and z900
The abstract machine itself is not part of the TOE, but belongs to the TOE
environment. The evaluated configuration is restricted to one z/VM instance
running directly on an abstract machine.
Multiple instances of the TOE may be connected with the instances sharing
their RACF database.
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The TOE security functions (TSF) are provided by the z/VM operating system
core (called Control Program – CP), by applications running within virtual
machines, and by the Resource Access Control Facility (RACF), which is used
by different services as the central instance for identification and authentication
and for access control decisions. z/VM provides management functions that
allow configuring the TSF and tailor them to the customer’s needs. Some
elements have been included in the TOE which do not provide security
functions, but run in authorized mode and could therefore, if misbehaved,
compromise the TOE. Since these elements are substantial for the operation of
many customer environments, they are included as trusted applications within
the TOE.
In its evaluated configuration, the TOE allows two modes of operation: LSPP-
compliant and CAPP-compliant. In both modes, the same software elements
are used. The two modes have different RACF settings with respect to the use
of security labels. All other configuration parameters are identical in the two
modes.
Intended Method of Use
z/VM provides a general computing environment that allows users to gain
controlled access to its resources in different ways:
• Using Control Program (CP) commands from the virtual machine console
accessible locally or remotely by Telnet connections via the Telnet service
provided by the TCP/IP stack application running in a dedicated virtual
machine.
• Access of resources assigned to this virtual machine (the operating system
just “sees” those resources which are assigned to the virtual machine).
• Execution of a processor instruction by software running inside a virtual
machine causing the SIE instruction to terminate and to return the processor
control to the CP for simulating the instruction.
• Communication with CP from inside the virtual machine using the
processor’s DIAGNOSE instruction.
All users of the TOE are assigned a unique user identifier (user ID). This user
ID is used as the basis for access control decisions and for accountability
purposes and associates the user with a set of security attributes. The TOE
authenticates the claimed identity of a user before allowing this user to perform
any further actions. After successful authentication, the user’s associated virtual
machine is created based on the virtual machine definition. The virtual machine
identifier is identical with the user ID. Hence, the virtual machine ID is used as a
synonym to the user ID and managed identically by the TOE.
The TOE mediates access of subjects to TOE-protected objects based on
discretionary and/or mandatory access rights. Subjects in the TOE are called
virtual machines. They are the active entities that may act on behalf of users.
Data is stored in named objects. The TOE can associate a set of security
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attributes with each named resource, which includes the description of the
access rights to that object and (in LSPP mode) a security label.
The TOE is intended to operate in a networked environment with other
instantiations of the TOE as well as other well-behaved systems operating
within the same management domain. All those systems need to be configured
in accordance with a defined common security policy.
The primary security features of the product are:
• Identification and authentication
• Discretionary access control
• Mandatory access control and support for security labels in LSPP mode
• Separation of virtual machines
• Audit
• Object reuse functionality
• Security management
• TSF protection
These primary security features are supported by domain separation and
reference mediation, which ensure that the features are always invoked and
cannot be bypassed.
6 Documentation
To install and configure the TOE in conformance with the configuration
described in the Security Target the administrator must follow the guidance
documentation for installation and configuration provided in the Secure
Configuration Guide [10] and containing references to other z/VM 5.1 related
guidance.
The following guidance documentation assessed during evaluation is delivered
to the user as part of the z/VM 5.1 CD Collection Kit (SK2T-2067-22):
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 CP Command and Utilities Reference Guide,
SC24-6081-00, First Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 System Messages and Codes – CP, GC24-
6119-00, First Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 CP Planning and Administration, SC24-6083-
01, Second Edition (December 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 CP Programming Services, SC24-6084-00,
First Edition (September 2004)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 Auditor’s Guide, SC28-1342-13, Fourteenth
Edition (August 2003)
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• RACF Version1 Release 10 Command Language Reference, SC28-0733-
18, Nineteenth Edition (August 2004)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 Diagnosis Guide, GY28-1016-08, Ninth Edition
(August 2003)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 General User’s Guide, SC28-1341-10,
Eleventh Edition (August 2003)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 Messages and Codes, SC38-1014-18,
Nineteenth Edition (August 2003)
• RACF Macros and Interfaces Version 1 Release 10, SC28-1345-09, Tenth
Edition (August 2003)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 Security Administrator’s SC28-1340-14,
Fifteenth Edition (August 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 System Operation, SC24-6121-00, First Edition
(September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 TCP/IP Diagnosis Guide, GC24-6123-00, First
Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 TCP/IP Messages and GC24-6124-00, First
Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 TCP/IP Planning and SC24-6125-00, First
Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 TCP/IP Programmer's SC24-6126-00, First
Edition (September 2004)
7 IT Product Testing
Test configuration
The Security Target requires the software packages comprising the TOE to be
run on an abstract machine implementing the z/Architecture machine interface
as defined in the "z/Architecture Principles of Operation". This abstract machine
can be provided either by a logical partition of an IBM zSeries or System z9
machine (PR/SM) or native mode (no PR/SM logical partition) on z800 and
z900 processors.
Test were performed by IBM using the System Assurance Kernel (SAK) tool to
verify full compliance to the z/Architecture.
Developer tests have been performed on a TOE running within a logical
partition of a zSeries z900 server in LPAR mode. For all platforms listed as
being able to provide the abstract machine for the TOE, the developer
performed additional testing to verify that capability. Therefore, all platforms can
be considered equivalent with respect to the abstract machine they provide for
the TOE.
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Independent evaluator tests were executed on the same machine as the
developer test.
Depth/Coverage of Testing
The developer has done substantial functional testing of all identified interfaces
(TSFI), some of them by direct stimulation as part of test cases, some indirectly.
The developer testing was performed to the depth of the high-level design, i.e.
the developer test-depth analysis demonstrated that the TOE subsystems have
been subject to test cases exercising the TSFI and the security functionality
implemented by those components.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The developer tests were performed on the system specified above. The
software was installed and configured as required in the guidance documents
(refer to chapter 6).
Testing approach:
The developer designed a specific CC related test suite that contains several
test scenarios covering the TOE security functions. Some of the TSFI were
tested directly, some indirectly by the test cases performed.
The developer performed a significant amount of testing verifying that the
interface provided towards the virtual machines managed by the TOE is
compliant with the z/Architecture definition.
Testing results:
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The evaluator used the same abstract machines as the developer. The
configuration of the TOE was conformant to the Security Target requirements
and has been set up according to the guidance documents.
Testing approach:
The evaluation facility decided to re-run a subset of the developer tests covering
all security functions without striving for exhaustive testing. In addition evaluator
tests were defined and executed by the evaluation facility.
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Testing results:
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Evaluator penetration testing:
Due to the fact that there are no vulnerabilities not already addressed by the
developer, no penetration tests were performed by the evaluation facility.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation is called: IBM z/VM Version 5, Release 1 with RSU1.
The following product components represent the TOE:
IBM z/VM Version 5 Release 1 consisting of
• Conversational Monitor System (CMS) for operating RACF and TCP/IP
• Control Program (CP)
• RACF for z/VM Version 1 Release 10
• TCP/IP for z/VM
The RSU 1 and required PTFs for CP, RACF and TCP/IP i.e.
• CP: RSU1 (PTF UMRSU01) and APAR VM63578 (PTF UM31248)
• RACF: APAR VM63563 (PTF UV60855) and APAR VM63613 (PTF
UV60870)
• TCP/IP: RSU1 (PTF UQRSU01)
• The z/VM 5.1 CD Collection Kit (SK2T-2067-22) September 2004 containing
z/VM related guidance documentation except the Secure Configuration
Guide.
Guidance Documents:
To install and configure the TOE in conformance with the configuration
described in the Security Target the administrator must follow the guidance
documentation for installation and configuration provided in the Secure
Configuration Guide [10] and containing references to other z/VM 5.1 related
guidance.
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 CP Command and Utilities Reference Guide,
SC24-6081-00, First Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 System Messages and Codes – CP, GC24-
6119-00, First Edition (September 2004)
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• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 CP Planning and Administration, SC24-6083-
01, Second Edition (December 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 CP Programming Services, SC24-6084-00,
First Edition (September 2004)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 Auditor’s Guide, SC28-1342-13, Fourteenth
Edition (August 2003)
• RACF Version1 Release 10 Command Language Reference, SC28-0733-
18, Nineteenth Edition (August 2004)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 Diagnosis Guide, GY28-1016-08, Ninth Edition
(August 2003)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 General User’s Guide, SC28-1341-10,
Eleventh Edition (August 2003)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 Messages and Codes, SC38-1014-18,
Nineteenth Edition (August 2003)
• RACF Macros and Interfaces Version 1 Release 10, SC28-1345-09, Tenth
Edition (August 2003)
• RACF Version 1 Release 10 Security Administrator’s Guide, SC28-1340-14,
Fifteenth Edition (August 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 System Operation, SC24-6121-00, First Edition
(September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 TCP/IP Diagnosis Guide, GC24-6123-00, First
Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 TCP/IP Messages and Codes, GC24-6124-00,
First Edition (September 2004)
• z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 TCP/IP Planning and Customization, SC24-
6125-00, First Edition (September 2004)
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE (this includes especially the methodology for flaw
remediation, [5]).
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL3.
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The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL3
augmented by ALC_FLR.2 and ADV_SPM.1) and the class ASE for the
Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table.
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Security Target CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Authorisation controls ACM_CAP.3 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.1 PASS
Delivery and Operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery Procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.2 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Examination of guidance AVA_MSU.1 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conform to the PPs “Controlled Access Protection Profile” [9]
and “Labeled Security Protection Profile” [8]
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• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL3
augmented by ALC_FLR.2 and ADV_SPM.1.
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of
Function (SOF-medium):
SF F.I&A (Identification and Authentication)
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for the TOE Security Function F.I&A (Identification and
Authentication)
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the product IBM z/VM
Version 5, Release 1 with RSU1 in the configuration as defined in the Security
Target and summarised in this report (refer to the Security Target [6] and the
chapters 2, 4, and 8 of this report). The validity can be extended to new
versions and releases of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-
certification or assurance continuity of the modified product, in accordance with
the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the modified product does
not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational document [10] contains necessary information about the usage
of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
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CAPP Controlled Access Protection Profile
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CP Control Program
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
LSPP Labeled Security Protection Profile
IPL Initial Program Load
IT Information Technology
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
PP Protection Profile
RACF Resource Access Control Facility
SIE Start Interpretive Execution
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
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Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS33, Version 2 –
“Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw Remediation”, 26.07.2002
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0258-2005, Version 1.6, 10.05.2005 , Security
Target for IBM z/VM Version 5 Release 1 with Required System Update
(RSU) 1, IBM Corporation (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 28.09.2005, Evaluation
Technical Report: IBM z/VM Version 5 Release 1 with RSU1 (confidential
document)
[8] Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Version 1.b, Information
Systems Security Organization, 8 October 1999
[9] Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Version 1.d, Information
Systems Security Organization, 8 October 1999
[10] z/VM Version 5 Release 1.0 Secure Configuration Guide SC24-6138-01,
Second Edition (October 2005)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“
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