GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
BİLİŞİM VE BİLGİ GÜVENLİĞİ İLERİ TEKNOLOJİLER ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
ULUSAL ELEKTRONİK VE KRİPTOLOJİ ARAŞTIRMA ENSTİTÜSÜ
KERMEN PORTABLE V1.0
SECURITY TARGET
Document Code :
TEDL / SDIL :
Version : 1.7
Publication Date : 29.08.2013
DOCUMENT HISTORY
Title: Security Target Kermen Portable
Author: Dindar ÖZ Status: Release
Version: 1.7 Classification: Public
FileName: KermenPortable_ST.pdf Date: 29.08.2013
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Version Date Author Changes To the Previous Version
1.0 28.09.2012 Dindar Öz First Publication
1.1 21.11.2012 Dindar Öz
 EAL4 conformance changed to EAL4+(ALC_FLR.2)
 PP Claim removed.
1.2 25.01.2012 Dindar Öz  Document changes related to CC v3.1 updates.
1.3 08.03.2013 Dindar Öz  Minor document changes.
1.4 26.04.2013 Dindar Öz  Minor document changes
1.5 28.06.2013 Dindar Öz  New SFR's added
1.6 28.08.2013 Dindar Öz  CC Reference is corrected
1.7 29.08.2013 Dindar Öz  CEM Reference is corrected
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF TABLES.............................................................................................................5
FIGURE INDEX...................................................................................................................5
1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................7
1.1 ST Reference.............................................................................................................7
1.1.1 Operation Notation for Functional Requirements ................................................7
1.2 TOE Reference..........................................................................................................7
1.3 TOE Overview............................................................................................................7
1.3.1 TOE Definition .....................................................................................................7
1.3.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use..........................................8
1.3.3 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE...............................8
1.4 TOE Description.........................................................................................................8
1.4.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................8
1.4.2 TOE Definition Scope..........................................................................................9
1.4.3 Supported Platforms And Environment .............................................................10
1.4.4 Installation .........................................................................................................10
1.4.5 Configuration .....................................................................................................10
1.4.6 TOE Operation and Use....................................................................................11
1.4.7 TOE Environment and Physical Protection........................................................12
1.5 Related Standards and Documents .........................................................................12
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIM ..............................................................................................13
2.1 CC Conformance Claim ...........................................................................................13
2.2 PP Claim..................................................................................................................13
2.3 Package Claim.........................................................................................................13
2.4 Conformance Rationale ...........................................................................................13
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ENVIRONMENT .................................................14
3.1 Secure Usage Assumptions.....................................................................................14
3.2 Organizational Security Policies...............................................................................14
3.3 Threats.....................................................................................................................15
3.3.1 Assets and Agents.............................................................................................15
3.3.2 Threats addressed by the TOE .........................................................................15
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................17
4.1 Security Objectives For The TOE ............................................................................17
4.2 Security Objectives for the IT and non-IT Environment............................................18
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale ..................................................................................18
4.3.1 Security Objective Coverage .............................................................................18
4.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency .........................................................................19
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITIONS.................................................................22
6. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................................23
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements...................................................................23
6.1.1 Class FCS - Cryptographic Support ..................................................................23
6.1.2 Class FDP – User Data Protection ....................................................................25
6.1.3 Class FIA – Identification and Authentication ....................................................26
6.1.4 Class FMT – Security Management ..................................................................27
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements...................................................................28
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale.............................................................................29
6.3.1 Security Requirements Coverage......................................................................29
6.3.2 Functional Security Requirements Sufficiency ..................................................30
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6.3.3 Rationale of Selected Assurance Level.............................................................32
6.3.4 Security Requirements Dependency Analysis...................................................32
6.3.5 Internal Consistency and Mutual Support of SFRs............................................34
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ...............................................................................36
7.1 TOE Security Functions ...........................................................................................36
7.1.1 SF.KEYGEN- Key Generation...........................................................................36
7.1.2 SF.FILE_CRYPT - File encryption / decryption .................................................36
7.1.3 SF.FILE_SIGN – File signing ............................................................................36
7.1.4 SF.CHECK_INTEGRITY – File verification .......................................................36
7.1.5 SF.MANAGE .....................................................................................................36
7.1.6 SF.CLEAR.........................................................................................................37
7.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale....................................................................37
7.2.1 Security Functions Justifications .......................................................................38
7.2.2 Mutual Support of Security Functions................................................................40
7.2.3 Assurance Measures Rationale.........................................................................40
8. APPENDIX ....................................................................................................................41
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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INDEX OF TABLES
Table 1: Assets..................................................................................................................15
Table 2: Agents .................................................................................................................15
Table 3 Threats addressed by the TOE.............................................................................16
Table 4 Objectives related to threats,assumptions and policies ........................................19
Table 5 Sufficiency of objectives countering threats..........................................................20
Table 6 Sufficiency of objectives meeting assumptions.....................................................22
Table 7 Sufficiency of objectives meeting OSPs ...............................................................22
Table 8 Functional Requirements on the TOE...................................................................23
Table 9 Security Assurance Components .........................................................................29
Table 10 TOE Security objectives meeting SFRs..............................................................29
Table 11 TOE Security Objectives and the Rationale for Mapping to the SFRs................32
Table 12 Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE.....................................................34
Table 13 TOE Security Functions meeting SFRs and Vice Versa.....................................38
FIGURE INDEX
Figure 1 TOE Architecture and Boundaries.......................................................................10
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 ST Reference
ST Title: Kermen Portable v1.0 Security Target
Product Name: Kermen Portable
Product Version: 1.0
Assurance Level: EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.2)
CC Version: 3.1 R4
ST Author: Dindar Öz
ST Publication Date: 29/08/2013
ST Version: 1.7
Key Words: File Encryption / Decryption
1.1.1 Operation Notation for Functional Requirements
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration. Each of these operations is used in this ST.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a
requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word “refinement” in bold text
and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC requirement were
deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed. Refinements are written in
italic font in this ST.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. Selections are in bold font and inside square brackets and marked with “selection”.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as
the length of a password. Assignments are in bold font and inside square brackets and marked
with “assignment”.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iterated
functional requirement components are shown with a “/IDENTIFIER” for the components which
used more than once with varying operations.
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Identification: Kermen Portable Version 1.0
1.3 TOE Overview
1.3.1 TOE Definition
Kermen Portable is an application for file encryption on both Microsoft Windows and Pardus
platforms. The underlying platform for the evaluation is limited to the MS Windows XP and MS
Windows 7 operating systems. A FIPS approved open source cryptographic library cryptoPP is
used to implement all cryptographic related functions.
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Kermen Portable is a file encryption application intended to protect cofidential information when
transmitting and storing them in unprotected environments.
1.3.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use
Kermen Portable is used for secure transmisson of files over insecure channels. This files
can be any kind of confidential material. Kermen Portable encrypts those files with the
users’ certificates based on RFC 5652 standard. The encrypted files can only be
decrypted by the users’ corresponding private keys which are only accessible by the
users themselves. Kermen Portable also signs the encrypted files with users’ signing
certificates which protects the integrity of the files. Thus by using Kermen Portable,
sensitive and confidential data are protected against unauthorized reads and
modifications.
1.3.3 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
Kermen Portable requires Windows XP or newer versions of Microsoft windows installed
on the target machine. The target machine is assumed to be in a secure environment
which is not accessible by unauthorized people. The minimum system requirements for the
target machine ;
 Intel Celeron/Pentium II coequal processor
 512 MB memory
 500 MB harddisk space
1.4 TOE Description
This section describes the Target of Evaluation (TOE) in terms of the class of product, the
operational environment, and the provided security functionality. This chapter provides a general
description of the product without focusing on the evaluated configuration.
1.4.1 Introduction
Kermen Portable is a software only product for file encryption in both Microsoft Windows and
Pardus environments, running on a single user PC. The program requires X.509 certificates in
order to perform encryption operations.
Kermen Portable imlements asymmetric encryption by using EnvelopedData format defined in
[RFC 5652] to ensure the confidentiality of the information. It also signs the confidential data before
encrypting in order to detect any loss of integrity. The signing operation is performed again in
accordance with the CMS standard defined in the [RFC 5652]. Encrypted and signed files can be
decrypted and their signatures are validated by Kermen Portable according to the CMS standard.
X.509 certificates are used to identify individuals and perform asymmetric encryption. Kermen
Portable checks the validity of the certificates upon encryption and decryption operations. In order
a certificate to be accepted as valid by Kermen Portable,besides the other structural controls, the
certificate chain must end up with a trusted certificate defined in the certificate store. The trusted
certificates in the store are signed with a private key which is securely stored in a smartcard
belonging to a trusted authority and the public key to validate the signature is embedded in the
source code of the application which is not accessible by the user. Therefore, only the trusted
authority can define which certificates will be accepted as trusted certificates. Certificate validation
is performed according to the steps described in [RFC 5280].
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Kermen Portable stores also the X.509 user certificates locally in its own certificate store.The
private keys of asymmetric encryption and signing can be either in smartcards or in the certificate
store as encrypted by user defined passwords.User is responsible for the confidentiality of the
stored password. In case of smartcards, the security of the private keys is provided by the
smartcards.
Kermen Portable provides a viewer for the certificate store. By using this viewer, users can view
the stored certificates , import and export them if they need.
Kermen Portable does not remove the confidential data after encrypting it. The secure removal of
the confidential data is out of the scope of this TOE.
1.4.2 TOE Definition Scope
The target of evaluation is limited to the software application Kermen Portable, version 1.0,
developed by TÜBİTAK BİLGEM. Kermen Portable consist of three parts: Kermen SUR which is a
file encryption GUI, Kermen DEPO which is the viewer GUI for the certificate store and the
underlying API responsible for all of the cryptographic work. API depends on Crypto++ and
OpenSLL crypto libraries which are open source.
The GUI applications do only forward user request to the API and they can not implement any
cryptographic mechanism or other operations. For example, Kermen SUR’s the only job is to
identify for the underlying API what operation to perform on which file. Therefore the GUI
components is not security critical. In the following picture the architecture of TOE Kermen
Portable and its boundaries are shown.
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Figure 1 TOE Architecture and Boundaries
The physical scope of the TOE includes digital files of the application executables and APIs ,
user’s encrypted files and log files. These files are assumed to be protected by the physical
medium they are stored and by the underlying operating system.
1.4.3 Supported Platforms And Environment
The underlying platform for the evaluation is limited to the MS Windows XP and MS Windows 7
operating systems. No additional special equipment or infrastructure is needed.
1.4.4 Installation
No installation required in order to run Kermen Portable. Only copying program files is sufficient.
1.4.5 Configuration
Most security configurations of the application can not be configured at run time. The algorithms
used for encryption and key sizes all determined in the development process and constantly
defined in the application code. The password for the certficate store is specified by the user by
using Kermen DEPO.
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üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
User can also set up where the encrypted files will be copied , for whom the files will be encrypted ,
by whom the encrypted files will be signed , and other file operation options by using Kermen SUR.
1.4.6 TOE Operation and Use
1.4.6.1 Intended Use
By using Kermen Portable, two or more individuals can exchange electronic documents securely
over unprotected communication paths, eg. Networks, without risking any unauthorized persons
reading the document. To achieve this, the documents are encrypted before they are sent between
the two parties, and are thus made unreadable for anyone who are not included in the recipients of
the document defined by the sender.
The file encryption interface of Kermen Portable is Kermen SUR application. With Kermen SUR,
after configuration, encryption of files performed by the user in just one step. Dragging the files that
will be encrypted onto the application window is sufficient for encyption operation to be performed.
Likewise, in order to decrypt files that are encrypted for the user, all the user needs is to drag and
drop the encrypted files onto the application window. If the user’s private key stored in a smartcard
then that card must be plugged in for decryption and also while encrypting, to sign the document
with the user’s private signing key, his or her smartcard is needed. For the keys stored in the
certificate store, store password specified by the user is prompted to the user.
1.4.6.2 Security Roles
The TOE is not aware of any user roles or even the concept of users, so any user with access to
the TOE or the TOE environment is able to perform any operation.
1.4.6.3 Security Functionality
The following security features are provided by the TOE:
 Encryption of files: Files are encrypted using the EnvelopedData method defined in [RFC
5652]. In EnvelopedData, data is symmetrically encrypted and the encryption key is
asymmetricallay encrypted for the recipients with their asymmetric public keys. The
symmetric encryption algorithm is AES-CBC with a 256 bit key and asymmetric encryption
algorithm is defined by the certificates of the recipients. It can be either RSA with defined
key size or Elliptic Curve.
 Integrity protection of files: To detect the loss of integrity of data files , encrypted files are
signed by the senders private key just before the encryption. For signing files, again,
cryptographic message syntax is used and SignedData is created as described in [RFC
5652]. The signature algorithm is defined by the sender’s public key placed in the user’s
signature certificate.
 Decryption of files: Encrypted files are decrypted if the user posseses the corresponding
private key in his smart card or certificate store. Only those users who are defined as the
recipient during the encryption process, can decrypt files due to the security functions of
asymmetric encryption.
 Integrity Check of files: Since the encrypted files are also signed by the encryptor, After
decrpytion of the file the result is a signed file to be validated. By this validation the inegrity
of the original data file is ensured.
 Nonrepudiation of files: The private keys used in signing files are associated with a
X.509 certificate therefore the identity of the user. By the nature of the signature operation,
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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user can claim neither that the data is not signed by himself nor that it is modified after
signing.
 Key Storage: Soft private keys are stored in the certificate store in password based
encrypted form. For this purpose , the algorithm PBKDF2 desribed in [RFC 2898]
(PKCS#5) is used.
 Import/Export Keys: Certificates and associated private keys can be imported into and
exported from the certificate store by using Kermen DEPO GUI. In both cases, the user
must provide the store password.
1.4.7 TOE Environment and Physical Protection
The TOE is expected to be operated as a single user machine in a physically secure and well
managed environment without a direct connection to an untrusted network.
1.5 Related Standards and Documents
[CC] Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, revision 4, September 2012.
» Part 1: Introduction and general model. September 2012.
Version 3.1. CCMB-2012-09-001
» Part 2: Functional security components. September 2012.
Version 3.1. CCMB-2012-09-002
» Part 3: Assurance security components. September 2012.
Version 3.1. CCMB-2012-09-003
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation. Evaluation Methodology. September 2012. Version 3.1, Revision 4,
CCMB-2012-09-004
[GPPS] ISO/IEC TR 15446:2004(E), Guide for the production of
Protection Profiles and Security Targets, First edition 2004-07-01
[RFC 5280] Request For Comments: 5280, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, May 2008
[RFC 5652] Request For Comments: 5852, Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS),
September 2009
[RFC 2898] Request For Comments: 2898, PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
Specification Version 2.0 September 2000
[RFC 4056] Request For Comments: 4056, Use of the RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm in
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), June 2005
FIPS 197 AES Encryption Standart
FIPS 140 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
FIPS 140-2
Annex.A
Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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2. CONFORMANCE CLAIM
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This ST claims conformance to
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, [1]
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012,
[2], Comformant
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012,
[3], Comformant
The
 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, [4]
has to be taken into account.
2.2 PP Claim
This ST does not claim any conformance to any protection profile.
2.3 Package Claim
EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.2)
2.4 Conformance Rationale
An assurance requirement of EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.2) is required for this type of TOE since it is
intended to defend against attackers with attack potential of enhanced basic. In order to provide a
meaningful level of assurance that the TOE provides an adequate level of defense against such
attacks, the evaluators should have access to the low level design and source code. The lowest for
which such access is required is EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.2). The augmentation (ALC_FLR.2) is
selected as it is easily achievable since it requires no specialist techniques on the part of the
developer.
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ENVIRONMENT
3.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following conditions are assumed to exist in the TOE operational environment.These
assumptions include essential environmental constraints on the secure use of the TOE.
Assumptions about the intended usage of the TOE are not made.
A.SINGLE The TOE runs on a single user machine with access protected by the
TOE environment; i.e., only authorised users of the TOE environment
may access the TOE. This includes access control provided by the
operating system or equivalent and protection against malware.
A.KEYDIS It is assumed that private keys used for decrypting and signing files are
of high quality and are not disclosed to unauthorized users.
A.PASSWORDDIS It is assumed that passwords used for accessing the private keys in the
certificate store and in the smart card are of high quality and are not
disclosed to unauthorized users.
A.PHYSICAL The TOE is operated in a physically secure and well managed
environment.
A.USER The TOE user is trustworthy and trained to manage and perform
encryption of classified information in accordance with any existing
security policies and information classification policies. This means
especially that he knows how to classify information and how to deal
with, e.g.,encrypting all files containing sensitive information with the
appropriate key before exporting the file out of the TOE and/or its TOE
environment.
A.CONNECT The single user PC on which the TOE is running is not connected
directly to an untrusted network. This means that the PC is either
assumed not to be connected to any networks or it is connected to a
trusted network which is protected against attacks, so that no
undocumented security critical side effects on the security functions of
the TOE, which are resided in the PC, are assumed coming from this
network.
3.2 Organizational Security Policies
P.ALGORITHM The TOE shall only allow the use of approved encryption algorithms
and key lengths.
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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3.3 Threats
The threats described in this chapter are addressed by the TOE.
3.3.1 Assets and Agents
The assets and user agents used for the definition of threats are defined in the following tables.
Asset Description Type of Data
Data Files
(primary asset)
Any file that contain the information to
be protected.
User Data
Smartcard
Password
The password for the smarcard login User Data
Certificate Store
Password
The password for the certificate store User Data
Private Keys
Asymmetric private keys used for file
decryption and signing
User Data
Encryption Keys Symmetric encryption keys User Data
Table 1: Assets
Agent Description
Attacker
An attacker who has access to any communication channel over which the
integrity protected and encrypted files are transferred, e.g., networks or other
paths of transmission where communication media like CDs, DVDs including
the encrypted files could be shared.
Table 2: Agents
3.3.2 Threats addressed by the TOE and the TOE environment
The threats below must be countered by the TOE and the TOE environment.
Threat: T.DISCLOSE – Loss of confidentiality
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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Attack
An attacker of one of the communication paths over which the Kermen
Portable files are transferred succeeds in accessing the content of the file, i.e.
the attacker violates the confidentiality of the information included in the file.
The attack is achieved by passive attacks recording encrypted data during the
transfer (e.g. eavesdropping of network communication, interception of
dispatch services) and decoding the encrypted data.
In general the attacker has no access to the right key and has to perform
cryptanalysis to reveal the underlying plain text of the encrypted file.
Asset
Data Files, smart card passwords,certificate store password, private keys,
encryption keys
Agent Attacker
Threat: T.MODIFY – Loss of integrity
Attack
An attacker of one of the communication paths over which the Kermen
Portable files are transferred modifies the file, i.e. replacing or changing the
content of the file in a way that is not detected.
The attack is achieved by interrupting the transfer due to possess the file to
accomplish an active attack violating the integrity of the information included
in the file before sending it to the receiver. Therefore the attacker has either to
break the integrity protection of the file, modifying the content of the file and
reconstructing the protection again. Or the attacker replaces the whole file
and constructs the integrity protection. Afterwards the file is sent to the
intended destination. In both cases the attacker has to possess either the
right key used for integrity protection or he has to perform cryptanalysis to
reveal the right key. For possibilities to get the right key see T.DISCLOSE.
Asset Data Files
Agent Attacker
Table 3 Threats addressed by the TOE
In both threats described above the primary subject of the attacks is the information included in the
data files transferred over an unprotected communication path.
The attackers specified as threat agents in both threats above are assumed to possess very limited
opportunity of attacks, characterized as follows:
 Expertise: It is assumed that the passwords used to access private key material and the
keys used for signing and encrypting files have not been leaked (A.KEYDIS,
A.PASSWORDDIS) and the implementation is not flowed (A. PHYSICAL). The attackers
know IP and related networking protocol basics and are trying to find vulnerabilities publicly
known about cryptographic algorithms (systematic weaknesses). The attacker must be
familiar with the “alternative” distribution channels over which the encrypted data will be
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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sent. Therefore a high level of expertise is required to successfully gain the plain text from
encrypted data.
 Resources: The resource requirements to mount an attack of the types described above
are high – a very large amount of computing power, either distributed or within one unit
would be required to break the encryption in an appropriate time scale, expected to do not
exhaust the range of at maximum some man days. In contrast to the attack within
T.DISCLOSE the attack within T.MODIFY must be launched e.g. nearly on the fly, to
ensure that the attack could not be detected. Network attack tools, especially network
sniffers, available on the Internet are considered to be available, too. Further the attacker
has the possibility to buy the product and perform cryptanalysis on the algorithms used or
disassembling and reverse engineering the TOE. Therefore it is very easy for the attacker
to get information about how the TOE operates. But attackers have no access (neither
physical nor over the network – A.PHYSICAL, A.CONNECT) to the TOE where the
information is encrypted or decrypted.
 Motivation: The TOE aims to protect sensitive information during the transfer over any
communication paths. So, the attackers are assumed to be motivated by high-value assets
and e.g. by the fact to "hack" sensitive information.
As described above it is very easy for an attacker to get information about how the TOE is
operating in general – therefore an attacker will reveal easily that he has to combine the attacks
described in T.DISCLOSE and T. MODIFY to be successful in violating the integrity and/or
confidentiality of the file's content. Because the transferred file is first encrypted and afterwards the
encrypted file is integrity protected.
Attacks which modify the content of the transferred file without breaking the integrity protection are
as well conceivable. May by an attacker completely intercepts the communication so that the file
does not reach it's destination. This attacks have the same effects as errors during communication
have. Preliminary the availability of the information transferred is violated. The receiver fails e.g. in
validating the integrity of the file, the file will not be decrypted. This attacks will not be regarded
here deliberately, because it will be detected anyway.
If vulnerabilities were present in the TOE’s encryption algorithm, cryptographic functions used for
integrity protection, key generating algorithm or in there implementation, this may be exploited to
decrease the level of expertise or resource required for success.
The opportunity to mount all attacks depends on the fact that the transferred Kermen Portable file
is in general available for an attacker.
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
The security objectives provide a concise statement of the intended response to the security
problem. This section describes which security needs will be addressed by the TOE and which will
be addressed by the TOE environment, in the form of a statement of security objectives.
4.1 Security Objectives For The TOE
The following are the IT security objectives to be met by the TOE.
O.DISCLOSE The TOE must provide mechanisms that protect the information of a transmitted
files such that its content is confidentiality-protected and only accessible for
authorized users.
O.MODIFY The TOE must provide mechanisms that detect if an attacker has tampered with
a transmitted file ( i.e. replacing or modifying the content of the file);
mechanisms must be provided to detect loss of integrity of the information in the
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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file.
O.ALGORITHM The TOE must only allow the use of approved encryption algorithms and key
lengths, i.e. AES and 256 bit.
4.2 Security Objectives for the IT and non-IT Environment
The following are the security objectives that are to be satisfied without imposing technical
requirements on the TOE. That is, they do not require the implementation of functions in the TOE
hardware and/or software. These security objectives are assumed to be in place in the TOE
environment. They are included as necessary to support the TOE security objectives in addressing
the security problem defined in the TOE security environment.
Thus, the following environmental objectives may partly be IT specific and partly related to
administrative methods and/or procedural measures.
OE.KEYDIS Keys used to sign and encrypt files must be of high quality and must not
be disclosed to unauthorized users.
OE.PASSWORDDIS Passwords used to acces private keys in the certificate store or
smartcards must be of high quality and must not be disclosed to
unauthorized users.
OE.SINGLE The TOE must be run on a single user machine with access to the TOE
protected by the TOE environment; i.e., only authorised users of the TOE
environment have access to the TOE. This includes access control
provided by the operating system or equivalent and protection against
malware.
OE.PHYSICAL The TOE must be operated in a physically secure and well managed
environment.
OE.USER The TOE User is trustworthy and trained to perform all actions in
accordance with any existing security policies and information
classification policies.
OE.CONNECT The single user PC on which the TOE is running must not be connected
directly to an untrusted network. This means that the PC must either not
be connected to any networks or it must be connected to a trusted
network, which is protected against attacks, so that no undocumented
security critical side effects on the security functions of the TOE are
coming from this network.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Security Objective Coverage
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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The following tables provide a mapping of security objectives to the environment defined by the
threats, policies and assumptions, illustrating that each security objective covers at least one threat
and that each threat is countered by at least one objective, assumption or policy.
T.MODIFY
T.DISCLOSE
A.SINGLE
A.PHYSICAL
A.USER
A.CONNECT
A.KEYDIS
A.PASSWORDDIS
P.ALGORITHM
O.MODIFY X
O.DISCLOSE X
O.ALGORITHM X X X
OE.SINGLE X
OE.PHYSICAL X X
OE.USER X X X X
OE.PASSWORDDIS X X X
OE.KEYDIS X X X
OE.CONNECT X
Table 4 Objectives related to threats,assumptions and policies
4.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives are suitable to counter
each individual threat and that each security objective tracing back to a threat, when achieved,
actually contributes to the removal, diminishing or mitigation of that threat:
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The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives for the environment are
suitable to cover each individual assumption, that each security objective for the environment that
traces back to an assumption about the environment of use of the TOE, when achieved, actually
contributes to the environment achieving consistency with the assumption.
Threat Is addressed by
T.DISCLOSE O.DISCLOSE (existence of mechanism to protect confidentiality itself) requires
the TOE to provide mechanism of high quality to protect the confidentiality of the
file's content while transferring it over any unprotected communication channel.
OE.KEYDIS and OE.PASSWORDDIS requires in addition that the TOE only
uses keys for encryption / signing and passwords to access private keys of high
quality (e.g. exclusion of weak keys and providing a sufficient key length to
protect against successful brute-force key search or against attacks together
with methods of cryptanalysis). T.DISCLOSE is diminished by O.ALGORITHM
reducing the likelihood of a launched attack being successful; greater expertise
and greater resources are needed from the attacker to perform attacks based on
cryptanalysis.
T.DISCLOSE is diminished by restricting potential attackers in opportunities to
decrypt the private keys in certificate store. Also OE.KEYDIS requires the keys
not to be disclosed to unauthorized users. Thus and OE.USER requiring that
users to be trustworthy and well trained restricts the opportunity of unauthorized
users possessing the right keys as well. T.DISCLOSE is diminished by
O.DISCLOSE together with OE.KEYDIS , OE.PASSWORDDIS and OE.USER.
T.DISCLOSE is also diminished by OE.PHYSICAL which requires attacker can
not access target machine via unauthorized ways.
T.MODIFY
O.MODIFY(existence of mechanism to detect integrity violations itself) requires
the TOE to provide mechanism of high quality to detect integrity violations of the
file's content while transferring it over any unprotected communication channel.
OE.KEYDIS requires in addition that the TOE only uses keys of high quality for
integrity checks.
T.MODIFY is diminished by O.ALGORITHM reducing the likelihood of a
launched attack being successful; greater expertise and greater resources are
needed from the attacker to perform attacks based on cryptanalysis. T.MODIFY
is diminished since restricting potentialattackers in opportunities to decrypt the
keystore and get access to the key used for validating the integrity of transmitted
files.
Also OE.KEYDIS is requiring the key used for signing not to be disclosed to
unauthorized users. Thus and OE.USER requiring users to be trustworthy and
well trained restricts the opportunity of unauthorized users possessing the right
key.
T.MODIFY is diminished by O.MODIFY together with OE.KEYDIS and
OE.USER.
Table 5 Sufficiency of objectives countering threats
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Assumption Is fulfilled by
A.KEYDIS:
“It is assumed that keys used for
encryption/decryption and as well as the
associated keys used for signing are of
high quality and are not disclosed to
unauthorized users.”
OE.KEYDIS requires that keys used for
encryption/decryption as well as the keys used for
integrity checks must be of high quality and must not be
disclosed to unauthorized users. Therefore OE.KEYDIS
is only a restatement of A.KEYDIS i.e. OE.KEYDIS
fulfils exactly the assumption A.KEYDIS.
A.PASSWORDDIS:
“It is assumed that passwords used for
accessing private keys in the certificate
store or smartcards are of high quality
and are not disclosed to unauthorized
users.”
OE.PASSWORDDIS requires that passwords used for
accessing the private keys in the certificate store and
smartcards must be of high quality and must not be
disclosed to unauthorized users. Therefore
OE.PASSWORDDIS is only a restatement of
A.PASSWORDDIS i.e. OE.PASSWORDDIS fulfils
exactly the assumption A.PASSWORDDIS.
A.SINGLE:
“The TOE runs on a single user machine
with access protected by the TOE
environment; i.e. only authorised users of
the TOE environment may access the
TOE. This includes access control
provided by the operating system or
equivalent and protection against
malware.”
OE.SINGLE requires that the TOE must be run on a
single user machine with access to the TOE protected
by the TOE environment; i.e., only authorised users of
the TOE environment have access to the TOE. This
includes access control provided by the operating
system and protection against malware.
Therefore OE.SINGLE is only a restatement of
A.SINGLE; i.e. OE.SINGLE fulfils exactly the
assumption A.SINGLE.
A.PHYSICAL:
“The TOE is operated in a physically
secure and well managed environment.”
OE.PHYSICAL requires that the TOE must be run and
therefore operated n a physically secure and well
managed environment. Therefore OE.PHYSICAL is
merely a restatement of A.PHYSICAL; i.e.
OE.PHYSICAL fulfils the assumption A.PHYSICAL.
A.USER:
“The TOE user is trustworthy and trained
to manage and perform encryption of
classified information in accordance with
any existing security policies and
information classification policies. This
means especially that he knows how to
classify information and how to deal with,
e.g., encrypting all files containing
sensitive information with the appropriate
key before exporting the file out of the
TOE and/or its TOE environment.”
OE.USER requires that the TOE User is trustworthy
and trained to perform all actions in accordance with
any existing security policies and information
classification policies.
OE.USER is merely a restatement of A.USER where
the explanation of performing actions in accordance
with any existing security policies and information
classification policies is not given again because this
has to be be clear to the reader. Therefore OE.USER
fulfills the assumption A.USER.
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A.CONNECT:
“The single user PC on which the TOE is
running is not connected directly to an
untrusted network. This means that the
PC is either assumed not to be
connected to any networks or it is
connected to a trusted network which is
protected against attacks, so that no
undocumented security critical side
effects on the security functions of the
TOE, which is resided in the PC, are
assumed coming from this network.”
OE.CONNECT requires that the single user PC on
which the TOE is running must not be connected
directly to an untrusted network. This means that the
PC must either not be connected to any networks or it
must be connected to a trusted network, which is
protected against attacks, so that no undocumented
security critical side effects on the security functions of
the TOE are coming from this network.
Therefore OE.CONNECT is merely a restatement of
A.CONNECT; i.e. OE.CONNECT fulfils the assumption
A.CONNECT.
Table 6 Sufficiency of objectives meeting assumptions
The following rationale provides justification hat the security objectives are suitable to cover each
individual organizational security policy, that each security objective that traces back to an OSP,
when achieved, actually contributes to the implementation of the OSP, and that if all security
objectives that trace back to an OSP are achieved,the OSP is implemented:
OSP Is addressed by
P.ALGORITHM:
“The TOE shall only allow the use of
approved encryption algorithms and key
lengths.”
O.ALGORITHM requires that only approved encryption
algorithms and key lengths must be used. Therefore
O.ALGORITHM implements exactly the policy
P.ALGORITHM.
Table 7 Sufficiency of objectives meeting OSPs
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITIONS
This ST does not define extended components
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6. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The following table gives an overview of the functional components from the Common Criteria Part
2 that are relevant for this TOE.
Component Component Name
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptograhic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_DAU.2 Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor
FDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Table 8 Functional Requirements on the TOE
The TOE will implement only one Security Function Policy (SFP) called private key access control
SFP. The policy's name indicates that it is a policy regulating the access to the private key.
The SFP regulates that when the user wants to access the private key in the certificate store or
smartcards he must provide the corresponding password.
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
6.1.1 Class FCS - Cryptographic Support
6.1.1.1 FCS_CKM.1 – Cryptographic key generation (standard key)
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: random], and
specified cryptographic key sizes,[assignment: 256 bits], that meet the
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following: [assignment conform to the FIPS 197].
6.1.1.2 FCS_CKM.4 – Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method,[assignment: zeroization of
memory allocated to symmetric keys used in encryption and
decryption of files and the private keys just after the file operation is
completed. Symmetric keys and private keys are not stored in
anywhere else.] that meet the following:[assignment: none]
6.1.1.3 FCS__COP.1/KEYENC – Cryptographic Operation (key encryption)
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [assignment: encryption of symmetric keys] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm,[assignment: RSA]
and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 2048] that meet the
following:[assignment: conform to the FIPS 140-2 Annex.A.]
6.1.1.4 FCS__COP.1/KEYDEC – Cryptographic Operation (key decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [assignment: decryption of symmetric keys] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm,[assignment: RSA]
and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 2048] that meet the
following:[assignment: conform to the FIPS 140-2 Annex.A.]
6.1.1.5 FCS__COP.1/ENC – Cryptographic Operation (file encryption)
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [assignment: encryption of files] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm,[assignment: AES] and
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 256] that meet the
following:[assignment: conform to the FIPS 197.]
6.1.1.6 FCS__COP.1/DEC – Cryptographic Operation (file decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [assignment: decryption of encrypted files] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm[assignment: AES]
and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 256 that meet the
following:[assignment: conform to the FIPS 197].
6.1.1.7 FCS__COP.1/SIGN – Cryptographic Operation (file signing)
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [assignment: signing files] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm,[assignment: RSA] and cryptographic
key sizes,[assignment: 2048 ] that meet the following:[assignment:
conform to the RFC 4056].
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6.1.1.8 FCS__COP.1/VERIFY – Cryptographic Operation (file verification)
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [assignment: verification of signed files] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: RSA]
and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 2048] that meet the following:
[assignment:conform to the RFC 4056].
6.1.2 Class FDP – User Data Protection
6.1.2.1 FDP_ACC.1 – Subset access control (Private Key Access Control)
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce [assignment: the private key access control
SFP] on [assignment: all users, The private keys in the certificate
store and in the smartcards.]
6.1.2.2 FDP_ACF.1 – Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce [assigment: the private key access control SFP]
to objects based on the following: [assignment: users and the
password.]
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
[assignment:
 the user must enter the correct password to access the private
keys in the certificate store or smartcard.]
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules:[assignment: none.]
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [assignment:none.]
6.1.2.3 FDP_ITC.1 - Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: the private key access
control SFP] when importing user data, controlled under the SFP,
from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the
userdata when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: [assignment:
none].
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6.1.2.4 FDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security attributes
FDP_ETC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: the private key access control
SFP] when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the
TOE.
FDP_ETC.1.2
TSF shall export the user data without the user data's associated security
attributes.
6.1.2.5 FDP_DAU.2 –Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor
FDP_DAU.2.1
The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used
as a guarantee of the validity of [assignment: signed and encrypted
files.]
FDP_DAU.2.2
The TSF shall provide [assignment: users] with the ability to verify
evidence of the validity of the indicated information and the identity of the
user that generated the evidence.
6.1.3 Class FIA – Identification and Authentication
6.1.3.1 FIA_UID.1 – Timing of Identification
FIA_UID.1.1
The TSF shall allow [assignment: any operations except accessing to
the private keys] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.3.2 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: any operations except accessing to
the private keys] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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6.1.3.3 FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: dots as digits of the password
] to the user while the authentication is in progress.
6.1.4 Class FMT – Security Management
6.1.4.1 FMT_MSA.1 – Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: private key access control SFP]
to restrict the ability to [selection: modify] the security attributes
[assignment: certificate store password] to [assignment: any user
who knows the actual password.]
Application Note: The TOE is not aware of any user roles but controls the access to the certificate
store and smartcard via a password. The TOE is assumed to operate on a single user machine
with only one user having access to the TOE.
6.1.4.2 FMT_MSA.2 – Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.2.1
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security
attributes [assignment: symmetric keys]
Application Note: Only symmetric keys with a key length of 256 bits and with algorithm attributes
of cryptographic algorithms supported by the TOE are generated and used by the TOE.
6.1.4.3 FMT_MSA.3 – Static attribute initialization
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: private key access control SFP]
to provide [selection: no] default values for security attributes that are
used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
The TSF shall allow [assignment: any user who knows the certificate
store password] to specify alternative initial values to override the default
values when an object or information is created.
Application Note: There are no default values for certirficate store passwords; the user has to
choose a password himself starting the application the first time.
6.1.4.4 FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management
functions:
[assignment:
 change certificate store password
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 export private keys (only soft keys)
 import private keys (only soft keys) ]
Application Note: All management functions except delete private key requires the user to
present the password of the certificate store.
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The target assurance components for this TOE are those for EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.2) as specified in
Part 3 of the CC. The following table provides an overview of the assurance components that form
the assurance level for the TOE.
Assurance class Assurance components
ADV:Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic Modular design
AGD:Guidance and Documentation
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC:Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures
and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ASE:Security Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definitions
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE:Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
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ATE_DPT.1 Testing: high-level design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA:Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.3 Focused Vulnerability analysis
Table 9 Security Assurance Components
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Requirements Coverage
The following tables provide a mapping of the relationships of security functional requirements to
objectives, illustrating that each security requirement covers at least one objective and that each
objective is covered by at least one security requirement.
O.MODIFY
O.DISCLOSE
O.ALGORITHM
FCS_CKM.1 X X
FCS_CKM.4 X
FCS_COP.1/KEYENC X X
FCS_COP.1/KEYDEC X X
FCS_COP.1/ENC X X
FCS_COP.1/DEC X X
FCS_COP.1/SIGN X X
FCS_COP.1/VERIFY X X
FDP_ACC.1 X X
FDP_ACF.1 X X
FDP_DAU.2 X X
FDP_ETC.1 X
FDP_ITC.1 X
FIA_UID.1 X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X
FIA_UAU.7 X
FMT_MSA.1 X X
FMT_MSA.2 X
FMT_MSA.3 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
Table 10 TOE Security objectives meeting SFRs
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6.3.2 Functional Security Requirements Sufficiency
Objective Is fulfilled by the SFRs
O.MODIFY
The mechanisms to detect loss of integrity of the
information included in a transmitted file is achieved by
the cryptographic operations FCS_COP.1/SIGN
together with FCS_COP.1/VERIFY. On the sender side
the data is signed (FCS_COP.1/SIGN) first, before it
could be verified on the receiver side
(FCS_COP.1/VERIFY) where the properly detection of
potential integrity violation takes place.
FDP_DAU.2.1 and FDP_DAU.2.2 ensures that
transferred data is digitally signed and verified upon
receival.
With FMT_MSA.1 only users who know the password
could change it.
FMT_MSA.2 ensures that only keyed checksum
functions and key length are generated and used that
are supported by the TOE.
FMT_SMF.1 provides the specific management
functions for key generation.
FIA._UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 ensures that only
authenticated user have access to signing private keys
and authentication feedback is protected.
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O.DISCLOSE The mechanism to protect files during transmission
against confidentiality violation is achieved by the
cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1/KEYENC and
FCS_COP.1/ENC ensuring, that the files encrypted
such that the content
is confidentiality protected and that only parties who
has the privaye asymmetric key of one of the recipients
could decrypt the file. The cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/DEC and FCS_COP.1/KEYDEC providing
the file decryption on the receivers site is strictly spoken
not needed to achieve integrity protection but
implemented to provide access to the encrypted
information to those who are authorized.
These mechanisms are using keys, therefore
supporting requirements regarding keys are needed.
Symmetric encryption keys are generated
(FCS_CKM.1) on the sender side, and encrypted
asymmetrically to the private key on the receiver side.
The encryption key used for the private key decryption
in the certificate store on the receiver side is derived
from a password which has to be assigned first to the
certificate store during creation on the receiver side.
FCS_CKM.1 is needed.
FCS_CKM.4 ensures that all symmetric keys used for
content encryption is destructed just after their use.
With FMT_MSA.1 only users who know the password
could change it.
FMT_MSA.2 ensure that only the approved algorithms
for encryption/decryption and key length are generated
and used that are supported by the TOE.
FMT_SMF.1 provides the specific management
functions for key generation.
FIA._UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 ensures that anly
authenticated user have access to key-encryption
private keys.
FIA_UAU.7 ensures that authentication feedback is
protected.
FDP_ETC.1 and FDP_ITC.1 ensures that the private
keys of users are imported into and exported from the
certificate store.
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O.ALGORITHM
The key generation and derivation requirement
achieves that only approved key generation and
derivation algorithms with a specified key size are
allowed (FCS_CKM.1).
Further only approved algorithms with specified key
sizes are allowed for cryptographic operations in the
cryptographic operation requirements
(FCS_COP.1/KEYENC,FCS_COP.1/KEYDEC
FCS_COP.1/ENC,FCS_COP.1/DEC,
FCS_COP.1/SIGN, FCS_COP.1/VERIFY ). These
algorithms could not be managed by the user (see
FMT_SMF.1 – no management function exists) they
are fixed.
FMT_MSA..2 ensures that only the approved
algorithms for encryption and decryption as well as key
length are accepted by the TOE.
FMT_MSA.3 ensures that no insecure algorithms and
keys are in the keystore unless they have been
generated or exported. Thus leads to the fact that only
approved encryption algorithms and key length are
allowed and used by the TOE.
Table 11 TOE Security Objectives and the Rationale for Mapping to the SFRs
As stated in the tables above, every objective is addressed by at least one security functional
requirement and every SFR is necessitated to cover at least one objective. By showing that the
stated security objectives are met, we are able to demonstrate the suitability and sufficiency of the
chosen SFRs.
6.3.3 Rationale of Selected Assurance Level
The assurance level EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.2) has been chosen as appropriate for an application that
is encrypting files in a secure and well managed environment. The attacker is also assumed only to
attack the data exported or imported into the TOE and not the TOE itself, thereby limiting the
opportunity of an attacker. For these reasons EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.2) is considered a sufficient level
of assurance.
6.3.4 Security Requirements Dependency Analysis
Following the Common Criteria and choosing security requirements to be met by a TOE, certain
dependencies on other security requirements may arise. The following section shows whether
these dependencies are resolved and, in case they are not, gives reasons for that.
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6.3.4.1 Security Functional Requirements Dependency Analysis
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1 [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction,
Fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/ENC
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/KEYENC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes, FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/KEYDEC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes, FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/DEC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIGN [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/VERIFY [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access
control
Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1,
Fulfilled by FMT_MSA.3
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FDP_DAU.2 FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification Fullfilled by FIA_UID.1
FDP_ETC.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ITC.1 [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
Fulfilled by FMT_MSA.3
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Fulfilled by FIA_UAU.7
FMT_MSA.1
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
Fulfilled by FDP_SMF.1
The lack of FMT_SMR.1 is
justified below this table.
FMT_MSA.2
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
Fulfilled by FMT_MSA.1
The lack of FMT_SMR.1 is
justified below this table.
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_MSA.1
The lack of FMT_SMR.1 is
justified below this table.
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
Table 12 Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification of lack of FMT_SMR.1:
It is assumed that TOE runs in a secure environment with one type of user and there are no roles.
Only authorized users can access the TOE and this authorization is fulfilled by the operating
system.
6.3.4.2 Security Assurance Dependencies Analysis
The assurance level selected within this TOE is EAL4+(ALC_FLR.2). Since the dependency
analysis for EAL4+(ALC_FLR.2) has been performed by the authors of the CC and as all
dependent assurance components have been included, all dependencies of the assurance
components within this Security Target are resolved.
6.3.5 Internal Consistency and Mutual Support of SFRs
Section 6.3.2 has already demonstrated how the IT security requirements work together to
implement the individual objectives for the TOE and the IT environment. This section will elaborate
on the internal consistency and mutual support of the IT security requirements.
The TOE’s purpose is to enable users to exchange electronic documents securely over
unprotected communication paths by ensuring confidentiality with encryption and the detection of
loss of integrity by using electronic signature.
Therefore cryptographic keys have to be generated first (FCS_CKM.1). They are in smartcards or
in the hard disk within a password protected store file.
When using Kermen Portable for the first time an initial password for the certificate store has to be
set by the user. From this password the key for encryption/decryption of the private keys stored in
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the certificate store is derived. Therefore the private keys used in decryption or signing are
encrypted with the derived encryption key (FCS_COP.1/KEYENC).
Every further time the user starts Kermen Portable and tries to decrypt an encrypted file, if he has
private key in the certificate store, he has to decrypt the private key first. Therefore he has to enter
the actual password of the certificate store. The keys are derived by PKCS12PBKDF2 key
derivation algorithm (FCS_CKM.1). The user could perform some management functions on the
certificate store , such as importing new private keys or exporting existing keys only if he provide
the correct password.(FMT_SMF.1.) The certificate store passwords could be changed. When
private keys are stored in smartcards, the security of the keys are provided by the smartcards.
Private keys are only accessible after the smartcard password is provided and it is impossible to
extract private keys from the smartcards.
When the user wants to create an encrypted file for other user, he uses the public key of that user
placed in his certficate. Before the file is encrypted, it is signed by the users’ signing private key
placed in his smartcard or the certificate store, by providing the required password. The signature
protects the file against integrity attacks and corruptions. After signed-and-encrypted file is created,
it can be transported in insecure environments. The recipient of the encrypted file can decrypt it by
using his private key as explained previously. Then he verifies the signature of the sender and
accesses the plain file.
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
The TOE summary specification provides a complete high-level definition of the security functions
and assurance measures of the TOE and their relationship to the security functional and assurance
requirements of this ST.
The TOE summary specification identifies the security functions that the TOE implements to meet
the requirements defined in chapter 5 of the security target.
7.1 TOE Security Functions
This chapter describes the IT security functions of the TOE and their relation to the security
functional requirements which they are supposed to meet.
A mapping of security functions against requirements is provided in clause 7.2 of the rationale part.
7.1.1 SF.KEYGEN- Key Generation
Symmetric encryption keys are created randomly by using the seed provided by smartcards (if
applicable).
7.1.2 SF.FILE_CRYPT - File encryption / decryption
Data files are encrypted and decrypted using the CMS data encryption standard (enveloped data)
including asymmetric encryption of symmetric keys with RSA and symmetric encryption of the data
with AES algorithm in CBC mode with a 256-bit key. The format of the encrypted data in both
cases is based on EnvelopedData format [RFC 5652].
7.1.3 SF.FILE_SIGN – File signing
Encrypted Data files are signed and verified using the CMS data signature standard (Signed Data)
including asymmetric signature of data with RSA in order to ensure that the integrity of files are
preserved. The format of the Signed Data in both cases is based on SignedData format [RFC
5652].
7.1.4 SF.CHECK_INTEGRITY – File verification
The first step is to validate that the file is in CMS SignedData format Afterwards the integrity check
is implemented as stated in RFC 5652. Only if SF.CHECK_INTEGRITY is successful, decryption
according to SF.FILE_CRYPT is performed with the corresponding private key.
7.1.5 SF.MANAGE
The TOE allows the user to perform the following management functions:
 delete private key (only soft keys)
 change certificate store password
 export private keys (only soft keys)
 import private keys (only soft keys)
All management functions except the function deleting the private key requires the user to present
the correct password of the certificate store. The default certificate store can be deleted before the
password is given and SF.CHECK_INTEGRITY, SF.KEYGEN and SF.FILE_CRYPT (keystore
decryption) is performed.
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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For export of private keys, the keys are placed in a PFX file and a key unwrap password must be
assigned by the user. For import of private keys, the key unwrap password of the imported PFX file
must be entered by the user.
For changing the certificate password the user is called to enter the current password first.
7.1.6 SF.CLEAR
Encryption keys and soft private keys (private keys provided by PFX files) are cleared from the
memory just after their use and the memory locations allocated for them are zeroized.
7.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
The TOE IT security functions work together to satisfy the security functional requirements. Below
a justification is presented for each SFR, how the related security functions meet the requirements,
and as well for the sum of SARs.
By examining the TOE summary specification and this justification carefully, it becomes clear that
the security functions are a well defined set combined to build a sound application for file
encryption and therefore to meet the requirements defined
in this ST.
The following tables provide a mapping between security functions and security functional
requirements.
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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SF.KEYGEN
SF.FILE_CRYPT
SF.FILE_SIGN
SF.CHECK_INTEGRITY
SF.MANAGE
SF.CLEAR
FCS_CKM.1 X
FCS_CKM.4 X
FCS_COP.1/ENC X X
FCS_COP.1/DEC X X
FCS_COP.1/SIGN X
FCS_COP.1/VERIFY X
FDP_ACC.1 X X X
FDP_ACF.1 X X X
FDP_DAU.2 X X
FDP_ETC.1 X
FDP_ITC.1 X
FIA_UID.1 X X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X X
FIA_UAU.7 X X X
FMT_MSA.1 X
FMT_MSA.2 X X X
FMT_MSA.3 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
Table 13 TOE Security Functions meeting SFRs and Vice Versa
7.2.1 Security Functions Justifications
The following table shows that the IT security functions (SF) as specified in the TOE Summary
Specification meet all the security functional requirements (SFR) for the TOE and work together to
satisfy the TOE security functional requirements.
SFR Security Functions(TOE Summary Specification)
FCS_CKM.1
The requirement for key generation is satisfied by the security function
SF.KEYGEN, which will generate all symmetric encryption keys (AES
Keys).
FCS_CKM.4
The requirement for key desytruction is satisfied by the security function
SF.CLEAR which states that all encryption keys and soft private keys
are zeroized and cleared from memory..
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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FCS_COP.1
The requirement for file encryption is satisfied by the security function
SF.FILE_CRYPT, which specifies that asymmetric encryption algorithm
specified in user certificates is used for the encryption of symmetric keys
and AES in CBC mode with a 256 bit is used for data encryption,
conforming to [RFC 5652].The requirement for the file signing is
satisfied by the security function SF.FILE_CHECK_INTEGRITY and
SF_FILE_SIGN which specifies the hash and signature algorithms are
used in the file signing conforming to [RFC 5652].
FDP_ACC.1
The requirement for access control is satisfied by the management
function SF.MANAGE, implementing the private key access control SFP
for all users accessing the private key. Moreover, the requirement for
access control is also satisfied by SF.FILE_CRYPT and SF.FILE_SIGN
security functions implementing the private key access control SFP for
all users accessing the private key.
FDP_ACF.1
The requirement for access control rules is satisfied by the management
function SF.MANAGE, implementing that users must present the correct
certificate store password before performing the management functions,
except the function deleting the default keystore, this can be performed
without entering password as a emergency erase functionality.
Moreover, the requirement for access control rules is also satisfied by
SF.FILE_CRYPT and SF.FILE_SIGN security functions implementing
that users must present the correct certificate store password before
accessing the priavet keys.
FDP_DAU.2
The requirement for data authentication with identity of guarantor is
satisfied by the security function SF_CHECK_INTEGRITY and
SF_FILE_SIGN which implements signing and verification of encrypted
files
FDP_ETC.1
The requirement for export of user data without security attributes is
satisfied by the security function SF_MANAGE, which allows export of
private keys from the certificate store.
FDP_ITC.1
The requirement for import of user data without security attributes is
satisfied by the security function SF_MANAGE, which allows import of
private keys into the certificate store.
FIA_UID.1
The requirement for timing of identification is satisfied by the security
function SF.FILE_CRYPT and SF_FILE_SIGN implementing the private
key access control SFP for all users accessing the private key.
FIA_UAU.1
The requirement for timing of authentication is satisfied by the security
function SF.FILE_CRYPT and SF_FILE_SIGN implementing the private
key access control SFP for all users accessing the private key.
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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FIA_UAU.7
The requirement for protection of authentication is satisfied the security
function SF.FILE_CRYPT and SF_FILE_SIGN showing only dots as the
digits of passwords when the users trying to authenticate to access their
private keys.
FMT_MSA.1
The requirement for authorization of password changes for the
certificate store is implemented in SF.MANAGE, allowing password
changes only to those users who know the current password of the
certificate store.
FMT_MSA.2
The requirement for secure security attributes is satisfied by
SF.KEYGEN together SF.FILECRYPT. SF.KEYGEN ensures that only
secure values are generated
SF.FILECRYPT works with only secure attributes (key sizes). Therefore
only secure attributes could be used within Kermen Portable.
FMT_MSA.3
The requirement for static attribute installation is fulfilled by
SF.MANAGE, by not providing any default attributes that could be
insecure.
FMT_SMF.1
The requirement for the TSF to provide management functions is
satisfied by SF.MANAGE.
7.2.2 Mutual Support of Security Functions
The IT security functions provided by the TOE work together to satisfy the TOE security functional
requirements defined in this Security Target. The tight relationship between the defined
requirements and the fulfilment of these requirements by security functions, as illustrated above in
section 7.2.1, provides no room for the introduction of potential security weaknesses not identified
in this document.
7.2.3 Assurance Measures Rationale
Since TOE is defined on the information security domain,a valunerability analysis assuming an
attack potential of at least Enhanced-Basic is considered to be required. Therefore
EAL4+(ALC_FLR.2) is chosen which includes AVA_VAN.3
GİZLİLİK DERECESİ
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8. APPENDIX
A.1 Abbreviations
CCMB Common Criteria Maintenance Board
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
GUI Graphical User Interface
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
RFC Request for comments
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax