TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
NL-9351 VT Leek
P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
(KVK), under number 27288788.
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2022-01
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Certification Report
NXP JCOP6.x on SN200.C04 Secure Element
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Troplowitzstrasse 20
22529 Hamburg
Gernmany
Evaluation facility: Riscure B.V.
Delftechpark 49
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-235773-CR3
Report version: 1
Project number: 235773_3
Author(s): Hans-Gerd Albertsen
Date: 05 September 2022
Number of pages: 15
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.3.1 Assumptions 8
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 10
2.6 IT Product Testing 11
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 11
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 11
2.6.3 Test configuration 12
2.6.4 Test results 12
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 12
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 12
2.9 Evaluation Results 12
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 13
3 Security Target 14
4 Definitions 14
5 Bibliography 15
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the NXP
JCOP6.x on SN200.C04 Secure Element. The developer of the NXP JCOP6.x on SN200.C04 Secure
Element is NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany and they also act as
the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective
consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular
requirements.
The TOE consists of an embedded Secure Element SN200.C04 with Crypto Library loaded with a
Java Card operating system image JCOP 6.x. The embedded secure element is based on a Flash-
based secure microcontroller platform, based on an ARM SC300 core along with cryptographic
hardware coprocessors. The eSE includes Security Software, composed of Services Software and a
Crypto Library, that is used by the Security IC Embedded Software (the Java Card operating system).
The operating system is a Java Card operating system supporting GlobalPlatform specifications for
card management. This operating system image is loaded in the flash memory of the embedded SE,
together with an update OS image. The update OS is a component which facilitates the secure update
of the TOE. The Java Card operating system provides a runtime environment with APIs for Java Card
applications. These applications are not part of the TOE.
The usage of the TOE is focused on security critical applications in small form factors. One main
usage scenario is the use in mobile phones, which can use the TOE to enable mobile payment or
mobile ticketing with the phone based on the security of the TOE.
The hardware of the Micro Controller already protects against physical attacks by applying various
sensors to detect manipulations and by processing data in ways which protect against leakage of data
by side channel analysis. With the software stack the TOE provides many cryptographic primitives for
encryption, decryption, signature generation, signature verification, key generation, secure
management of PINs and secure storage of confidential data (e.g. keys, PINs). Also, the software
stack implements several countermeasures to protect the TOE against attacks.
The TOE has been originally evaluated by Riscure B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 08. July 2019. The first re-evaluation also took place by Riscure B.V. and was completed
on 09 October 2020 with the approval of the ETR. The second re-evaluation took place by Riscure
B.V. as well and was completed on 05 September 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The re-
certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands
Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This third issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes are the addition of JCOP6.4 (R1.06.0) on hardware configuration SN200 (UART
Interface) and SN210 (SPMI Interface), comprising the following updates compared to JCOP6.0
(R1.13.0) and JCOP61 (R1.04.0):
- Extended functionality
- Security hardening.
- Performance improvement
- Bugfixes and implementation improvements, not security relevant.
A further minor change was a typo correction in the UGM Anomaly Sheet for JCOP6.0 (v1.13 ->
v1.14) and JCOP6.1 (v3.3 -> v3.4) with no security impact.
The major functional changes are ‘OneShot Crypto APIs’, ‘Integer Support’, and ‘Proprietary Transient
Memory Management’.
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the NXP JCOP6.x on SN200.C04 Secure
Element, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which
the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the NXP JCOP6.x on
SN200.C04 Secure Element are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the
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security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in
this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures), AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis), ASE_TSS.2 (TOE summary
specification with architectural design summary), and ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the NXP JCOP6.x on SN200.C04 Secure
Element from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery item
type
Identifier Version
Hardware SN200 Secure Element (as part of the platform certification) B1.1 C04
Configuration
Data
Factory Page (as part of platform certification)
System Page Common (as part of the platform certification)
BootOS Patch (as part of the platform certification)
19554
20103
7.0.5 PL3 v9
Software
(platform)
Crypto Library (as part of the platform certification)
Services Software (as part of the platform certification)
V1.0.0
4.13.3.0
Software
Java Card OS with proprietary extensions, implements Java
Card 3.0.4 Classic
6.0 R1.13.0
6.1 R1.04.0
6.4 R1.06.0
The TOE has 5 versions:
 JCOP6.0 R1.13.0 "SN200" (UART as NFC interface)
 JCOP6.1 R1.04.0 "SN200" (UART as NFC interface)
 JCOP6.1 R1.04.0 "SN210" (SPMI as NFC interface)
 JCOP6.4 R1.06.0 "SN200" (UART as NFC interface)
 JCOP6.4 R1.06.0 "SN210" (SPMI as NFC interface)
Note: "SN200" and "SN210" both identify the same hardware platform with one unique certificate.
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the NXP JCOP6.x on
SN200.C04 Secure Element. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.4.
2.2 Security Policy
The usage of the TOE is focused on security critical applications in small form factors where an
attacker potentially has direct physical access to the TOE. One main usage scenario is the use in
mobile phones, which can use the TOE to enable mobile payment or mobile ticketing with the phone
based on the security of the TOE.
The TOE provides a variety of security features. The hardware of the Micro Controller already protects
against physical attacks by applying various sensors to detect manipulations and by processing data
in ways which protect against leakage of data by side channel analysis.
With the software stack the TOE provides many cryptographic primitives for encryption, decryption,
signature generation, signature verification, key generation, secure management of PINs and secure
storage of confidential data (e.g. keys, PINs). Also, the software stack implements several
countermeasures to protect the TOE against attacks.
For a detailed description of the collaboration of the base TOE components and JCOP operating
system refer to the TOE summary specification in the security target and the security target of the
base TOE.
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2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is a Java Card Operating System embedded on an NXP SN200 Series Secure Element. The
SN200 Series Secure Element is a product which integrates an NFC Controller and a Secure micro-
controller, comparable to a smart card controller, on a single die. It also provides Power Management
and IC specific software services.
The component of the SN200 on which the TOE executes is the embedded Secure Element (eSE),
abbreviated to SN200_SE. The eSE and associated IC Dedicated Software is Common Criteria
certified to EAL6. The IC dedicated software includes IC Dedicated Support Software (Boot O/S,
Factory O/S, Flash Driver Software) and Security Software (Crypto Library and Services Software,
providing Flash memory support functionality such as wear-levelling and anti-tear protection). Figure 1
provides an overview of the TOE and the communication Interfaces.
"SN200" and "SN210" both identify the same hardware platform with one unique certificate but in two
different configurations. "SN210" denomination is used to distinguish from "SN200" in the way the
NFC controller communicates with the Host Processor. On the "SN200", the NFC Controller
communicates with the Host Processor though and UART interface. On the "SN210", the NFC
Controller communicates with the Host Processor through a SPMI interface. This distinction does not
affect the TOE (see Figure 1) since the UART/SPMI interfaces are outside the scope of the TOE.
Please note, only SN200 denomination will be used in the rest of this certification report.
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The TOE directly supports an I2C communication interface and communicates with the integrated
NFC controller via the System Mailbox. The integrated NFC controller is not in scope of this
evaluation, however, provides up to 4 gates for external users to communicate with the TOE
supporting Card Emulation Mode Type A, Type B and Type F as well as a wired Interface using
APDUCard Gate. Extended length APDU communication is supported for Card Emulation and wired
mode, up to 32kBytes.
The TOE can be further split into the following components:
 Software that implements the Java Card Virtual Machine and a Java Card Runtime Environment,
called JCVM and JCRE.
 Software that implements the Java Card Application Programming Interface, called JCAPI.
 Software for implementing content management according to GlobalPlatform, called GP.
 Software that implements a proprietary programming interface, called Extension API.
 Software that implements low level functionality, called Native OS.
 Software for implementing third party functionality, called Native Applications - including support
for MiFARE and Felica applications.
 Software that handles personalization and configuration, called Config Applet.
 Software to update JCOP6.0/6.1 OS or updatable components of the IC Dedicated Software
called OS Update. This component ensures that only NXP Authorized updates may be applied.
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 Software to transfer personalization applet data from an old to a new version of an applet on
applet update time, called Applet Migration (AMD).
 Software that provides customer control on the Applet Migration and OS Update processes and
ensures that only customer authorized OS updates can be performed in predefined states of the
TOE. This software feature is called Image4 (IM4).
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
JCOP6.0 R1.13.0 User Guidance Manual 1.16
JCOP6.0 R1.13.0 UGM Addendum 1.13
JCOP6.0 R1.13.0 UGM Anomaly 1.14
JCOP6.1 R1.04.0 User Guidance Manual 3.5
JCOP6.1 R1.04.0 UGM Addendum 3.3
JCOP6.1 R1.04.0 UGM Anomaly 3.4
JCOP6.4 R1.06.0 User Guidance Manual 5.9
JCOP6.4 R1.06.0 UGM Addendum 5.7
JCOP6.4 R1.06.0 UGM Anomaly Sheet 5.7
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2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-
enforcing module level.
All parameter choices have been addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified have been
tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions have been covered probabilistically.
The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts
were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto library test results are extendable to composite evaluations, as
the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
Amount of developer testing performed:
 The tests are performed on security mechanisms and on subsystem and module level with a total
amount of several thousand test scenarios.
 As demonstrated by ATE_COV.2 the developer has tested all security mechanisms and TSFIs.
 As demonstrated by ATE_DPT.3 the developer has tested all the TSF subsystems and modules
against the TOE design and against the security architecture description.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a test
environment. During the baseline evaluation the evaluators verified the execution of a selection of the
developer tests and conducted a number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The evaluator independent penetration tests were conducted according to the following testing
approach:
 During evaluation of the ADV, ATE and ALC classes the evaluators hypothesized possible
vulnerabilities. This resulted in a shortlist of possible vulnerabilities to be further analysed in AVA
using the design knowledge gained in particular from the source code analysis in IMP. This
resulted in a shortlist of potential vulnerabilities to be tested.
 Next the evaluators analyzed the TOE design and implementation for resistance against the JIL
attacks. This resulted in further potential vulnerabilities to be tested.
 The evaluators made an analysis of the TOE in its intended environment to check whether the
developer vulnerability analysis in ARC has assessed all information.
 The evaluators concluded that a number of areas could be potentially vulnerable for attackers
possessing a high attack potential. Consequently, practical penetration testing was performed for
absolute assurance.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators during this re-evaluation was 10 weeks. During that
test campaign, 40% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 20% on retrieving keys with
FA, 20% on side-channel testing, and 20% on logical tests.
For the second certification (2020) in total 6 tests have been performed, 2 fault injection attacks, 2 side
channel attacks, 1 combined attack and 1 logical security test. The overall time spent for penetration
testing was approx. 14 weeks.
For the first certification (2019) in total 9 test have been performed, 7 fault injection attacks, 2 side
channel attacks. The overall time spent for penetration testing was approx. 14 weeks.
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2.6.3 Test configuration
Testing was performed on the TOE (JCOP6.4 R1.06.0). Because it has identical countermeasures
with JCOP6.0 R1.13.0 and JCOP6.1 R1.04.0 the test results of the TOE (JCOP 6.4) covering common
functionality are also valid for JCOP6.0 and JCOP6.1 The tests for JCOP6.4 were based on the
vulnerability analysis of the TOE as a whole and did not focus only on the changes between JCOP6.0
and JCOP6.1 to JCOP6.4. As such, there are tests that were used to verify the security of existing
features, as well as tests to check the modifications made from JCOP6.0 and JCOP6.1 to JCOP6.4.
The tests were chosen such that all security relevant changes are tested through one or more tests.
Details can be found in [ETRfC].
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including those with sufficient algorithmic
security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused
by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number NXP JCOP6.x on SN200.C04 Secure
Element (with configurations “JCOP6.0 R1.13.0 (SN200), JCOP6.1 R1.04.0 (SN200/210) and
JCOP6.4 R1.06.0 (SN200/210)).
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document provides details of
the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite
evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the NXP JCOP6.x on SN200.C04
Secure Element, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of
EAL 5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, AVA_VAN.5, and ASE_TSS.2. This implies that
the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘demonstrable’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
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2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations:
 FELICA (out of scope as there are no security claims)
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The NXP JCOP6.x on SN200.C04 Secure Element Security Target, Version 3.4, 30 August 2022 [ST]
is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block-cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
MITM Man-in-the-Middle
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RMI Remote Method Invocation
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SM Secure Messaging
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
Page: 15/15 of report number: NSCIB-CC-235773-CR3, dated 05 September 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report for NXP JCOP6.x on SN200.C04, Doc ID
20210537-D3, Version 1.1, 30 August 2022
[ETRfC] ETR for composite evaluation NXP JCOP6.x on SN200.C04, Doc ID
20210537-D4, Version 1.1, 30 August 2022
[HW-CERT] Certification Report SN200 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library
SN200_SE B1.1 C04, NSCIB-CC-217812-CR3, Version 1.0, 05 October
2021
[HW-ETRfC] ETR for composite evaluation SN200 Series – Secure Element with Crypto
Library B1.1 C04, Doc ID 20210060-D6, Version 3.1, 29 September 2021
[HW-ST] SN200 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library Security Target, Version
1.3, 4 August 2021
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January
2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PP] Java Card Protection Profile – Open Configuration, registered under the
reference BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017, Version 3.0.5, 21. December 2017
[ST] NXP JCOP6.x on SN200.C04 Secure Element Security Target, Version 3.4,
30 August 2022
[ST-lite] NXP JCOP6.x on SN200.C04 Secure Element Security Target Lite, Version
3.4, 30 August 2022
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)