BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
for
genuscreen 8.0
from
genua GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.45
BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 (*)
Firewall
genuscreen 8.0
from genua GmbH
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2, ASE_TSS.2,
AVA_VAN.4 and ALC_PAM.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and
ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 6 April 2023
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................21
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................21
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................21
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................23
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................25
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................26
5 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
• Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
• BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
• BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
• DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
• BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
• BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
6 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 Certification Report
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ALC_FLR.2,
ASE_TSS.2 and AVA_VAN.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the
provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these
assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product genuscreen 8.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-
certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1142-2020. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-1142-2020 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product genuscreen 8.0 was conducted by secuvera. The evaluation
was completed on 30 March 2023. secuvera is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised
by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: genua GmbH.
The product was developed by: genua GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 6 April 2023
is valid until 5 April 2028. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product genuscreen 8.0 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
genua GmbH
Domagkstraße 7
85551 Kirchheim
9 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The TOE genuscreen 8.0 is a distributed stateful packet filter firewall system with VPN
capabilities and central configuration.
It consists only of software and documentation. It protects networks at the border to the
Internet by filtering incoming and outgoing data traffic. It also protects the data flowing
between several protected networks against unauthorised inspection and modification.
One part of the TOE runs on a number (at least 2) of machines (genuscreen appliances)
that work as network filters and IPsec routers. The other part of the TOE runs on the
machine to manage the network of genuscreens. This machine, the genucenter
management system, is a central component. The genuscreens are installed on a secure
network from the genucenter or using an USB install image. The genucenter itself is
installed from an USB or optical installation medium. The TOE supports IPv4 and IPv6.
The genuscreen filters incoming and outgoing traffic for multiple networks and can thus
enforce a given security policy on the data flow. The filter is implemented in the kernel of
the genuscreen’s operating system, OpenBSD. The genuscreen can work as bridges or
routers. The genuscreens can be used in an optional high availability (HA) setup where the
genuscreens synchronise their internal states.
The genuscreens can provide confidentiality and integrity for data traffic passing between
the networks. This Virtual Private Network function is achieved by IPsec encryption and
authentication mechanisms.
Optionally, a SIP module can be installed on the genuscreen components in order to
integrate a Session Border Controller (SBC). The SIP relay is not included in the basic
installation image but must be installed as an optional module at the genucenter. The SIP
relay software is then installed on all appliances that use the relay.
The genucenter provides administrators with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to initialise
and manage the genuscreens from a central server. The genucenter also allows collecting
audit data and monitoring.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details)
and some of them are newly defined. The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2, ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.4
and ALC_PAM.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_PF Packet Filter
SF_NS Network Separation
11 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_IPSEC IPsec Filtering
SF_SIP SIP Relay
SF_IA Identification and Authentication
SF_AU Audit
SF_SSH SSH Channel
SF_ADM Administration
SF_GEN General Management Facilities
SF_PI Patch installation
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational
Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
genuscreen 8.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
12 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Two or more genuscreen
firewall components Model:
genuscreen XS (revision 2),
genuscreen S (revision 2 and
3), genuscreen M (revision 2
and 3), genuscreen L (revision
2 and 3), genuscreen XL
(revision 2 and 3),
cryptOHBguard
Management Server
genucenter:
genucenter S (revision 2 and
3), genucenter M (revision 2
and 3), genucenter L (revision
2 and 3)
N/A Hardware (not part of the
TOE)
2 SW genuscreen
Installationsmedium Version
8.0
8.0p11 CD-ROM / USB image
3 SW genucenter
Installationsmedium Version
8.0
8.0p5 CD-ROM / USB image
4 SW SIP Module, sip-800_011-
amd64.tgz
8.0p11 TAR archive
5 Doc. genuscreen Installations- und
Konfigurationshandbuch
Version 8.0, Ausgabe 17.
Februar 2023, Revision
3a6fcd2b [8]
8.0 PDF download
6 Doc. genucenter Installations- und
Konfigurationshandbuch
Version 8.0, Ausgabe 17.
Februar 2023, Revision
3a6fcd2b [9]
8.0 PDF download
7 Doc. Lizenzschreiben N/A Letter
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware of the TOE (not part of the TOE) is composed at the supplier company
“Pyramid Computer GmbH” and shipped by a parcel service to the customer site on behalf
of genua. This delivery includes the genuscreen software (CD-ROM or USB-Stick). The
licence information is sent to the customer by genua. The SIP relay and the documentation
has to be downloaded from the genua Kundenportal by a secure connection via TLSv1.2
or TLSv1.3. The software of the genuscreen and genucenter is alternatively also available
at the genua Kundenportal, however, this form of delivery is not covered by the evaluation.
The user shall verify the authenticity of the delivered TOE. The procedure is described in
detail in the guidance documentation. The integrity verification of the SIP module by
SHA256-checksums is done equivalent to the checks of the genuscreen and genucenter.
The valid checksums are published on the genua website. The valid checksums of the
TOE components, which are also published on the genua “Kundenportal,” are:
genucenter, CD/ROM, checksum of the tgz-archives and the manual (SHA256):
13 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
ef49e32a001a1736bf83217bcbaa0fb3e1b224e9775e4836ec4ec3f409ed8fbe
appsoft.tgz
d088e07185e64556c7aa63773fcaa75b7dd944ce2360c0952e2cb66d067fd86f
base.tgz
43ff8b3d7cbc3433f0caa690b11a318437c90ecbd8ea8dbc9f8fff30b4705259
center_assets.tgz
b20c6d7581da4baf546907f3fedb51b73c2c1ab15d36de06504d5008e3bb6d0d
center.tgz
0aa014627fbf330d44ebe906ceee7a5045089c05560af0627841d42f20330b93
comp.tgz
0ba25778198704851cc6415d1c0349fbeeba48620c144e624db183cc179879c5
etc.tgz
d1d15120852219ce895e40547e5588fcf1665b87b1b6cc07a0c66f82b941ad85
firmware.tgz
f281f5539d1be73e97654ee2f7e2d83aa2a5e3b6b1963a91822f188be66a51f9
gems.tgz
3229a6c37c72db7d4a123e6d34c8b5c9e70fcb91c737a02cdefa0e8e7c40a097
genuos_center.tgz
e704e4eeb3b3baac08c41af23b089a685556e89f68e5da81d4cfa02de0111a50
ports.tgz
48793f2d09bbd1fdadc6b0aa64b21e8b3ec42b173bd1b56eede6394b0b0d6a71
Z800_000.manual-zert.de.pdf
genucenter USB- and CD-Image (SHA256):
846eb4cf4930b6477834c804bf057baea780e7b3e8e0ba5ce52342b6c8b4926e
Z800_005.img
fbf311597b97e64b59569b041d9879d35156355236de98d1899139488da33df3
Z800_005.iso
genuscreen, CD/ROM, Checksum of all binaries and the manual (SHA256):
a5798184dafbe2e44408b8f0adc9df9d02af25ea13d54f96329cce7546295851
bsd.amd64
40e01a2a5d312436e56ba33b485d61d080cbb983ef99c739b91f96ac79a22d79
bsd.i386
05270cfb075cb1d01421de75f920b9da4e262f97a9fad6fcb832825265674619
genuscreen-800-handbuch-zert-de.pdf
genuscreen USB- and CD-Image (SHA256):
7f63a6411a26b9d73cc372616a22a31bd162a411ec53949a50b9ed0266f8b732
S800_011.img
5f2ae4a44c8be3f15342023444619ab76412ac41f824e6b321127b95cdbf7656
S800_011.iso
SIP Relay module sip-700_011-amd64.tgz (SHA256):
06a2f4feb0b1f859f03d03516da7d197418c3e742995f26264ea05186f59619e
sip-800_011-amd64.tgz
14 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 Certification Report
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. The following security policies are defined for the TOE.
The following policies are defined by the ST [6]:
• Firewall SFP: creation, modification, deletion and application of firewall security policy
rules.
• Network Separation SFP: network separation using routing domains.
• IPSEC: flow control functions in relation to the VPN connections between the firewall
components.
• IKE-SFP: cryptographic functions in relation to the key management of the VPN
connections between the firewall components.
• SSH-SFP: flow control functions in relation to the communication between the
management system and the firewall components.
• SIP Relay: access control by the SIP relay.
• Administration: administration of the TOE.
• Identification and Authentication: identification and authentication of administrators,
service users and revisors.
• Audit: audit capabilities of the TOE.
• General Management Facilities: general management of the TOE.
• Random Number Generation: generation of random numbers.
• Patch Installation: patch installation process.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the environment of the TOE. The topics as
depicted in the ST [6], chapter 4.2 are of relevance.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is the firewall system genuscreen 8.0 developed by genua GmbH.
The TOE consists of
• several genuscreens that work as network filters and encrypting gateways,
• a central Management Server (genucenter) that is used to configure, administrate and
monitor the firewall components (genuscreens).
The genucenter allows authorised administrators to configure filter rules and protection
policies on the genuscreens by use of a web-based graphical user interface (GUI) at the
genucenter. It also enables authorised administrators to update the software on the
genuscreens. The GUI must be used from a trusted machine connected to the genucenter
through a trusted network.
15 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
After installation, all communication between the genucenter and the genuscreens is
protected by Secure Shell (SSH).
The genuscreens employ IPsec based encryption and authentication to protect data flows
between the subnets assigned to them by the authorised administrators.
The genuscreens can be used in an optional high availability (HA) setup where the
genuscreens synchronize their internal states. In case one system breaks down, the
function of this component is resumed by the other.
Management consists of definition/modification and transmission of firewall policies and
security policies for network traffic. The GUI also allows transfer of audit data from the
firewall components.
The TOE provides VPN and firewall functionality protects networks at the border of the
Internet by filtering data. It also protects data flowing between several protected networks
against unauthorised inspection and modification. It consists of software on at least two
genuscreens, which filter incoming and outgoing traffic for multiple networks. The
genuscreens provide confidentiality and integrity for data traffic passing between the
networks by using IPsec encryption/authentication functionality. The genuscreens can
work as bridges and routers. Cryptographic operations are part of the TOE. The TOE
provides IPv4 and basic IPv6 support.
The TOE includes an optional SIP relay to allow the usage of a Session Border Controller
(SBC). The SIP relay is not included in the basic installation image but can be installed as
an optional module at the genucenter. The SIP relay software is then installed on all
appliances that use the relay.
Administrators can initialise and manage the genuscreens using a graphical user interface
(GUI) of the genucenter. That GUI supports different types of user roles. The genucenter
allows to collect audit data and monitoring.
The genuscreens have a local GUI which can be activated (i.e. when the connectivity to
the genucenter got lost). The GUI of the genuscreens also supports different types of
roles. The genuscreens can locally store log files.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer Tests
Tests are done by the developer and quality assurance (QAU) teams.
Tests of the developer team and QAU run in a virtualised test environment. In that
environment the Open Source Cloud Computing Infrastructure OpenStack is used.
The test environment includes six machines installed with the TOE. Three of these
machines are used as IPsec-Gateways. Two are used as data source and data sink,
therefore they need wide open filter rules. The sixth machine takes over the routing
16 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 Certification Report
functions, but is also used to test filter rules. All machines are using IPv4 and IPv6
addresses.
The tests itself are running on the developer server, which is also used for configuration
functions. Tests are performed on virtual machines as well as on real ones. When virtual
tests are performed first a set of different clients is build up in the test environment.
Quality assurance tests are used to test different aspects of the TOE. QAU is using
proprietary test clients and a proprietary git repository to store test scripts. Initially the
tested software components and tests are loaded from the corresponding repositories and
are installed in the test environment.
The Security Target specifies ten assumptions about the environment of the TOE:
A.PHYSEC, A.NOEVIL, A.REMOTE_AUTH and A.REST are not applicable to the test
environment, A.INIT, A.SINGEN, A.ADMIN, A.HANET and A.LOCAL are given in the test
environment, A.TIMESTMP is given in all TOE configurations because of the properties of
the underlying operation system.
Integrated scripts compare the actual result with the expected one. The output is the status
value OK respectively pass (if the real result is equal the expected one) or FAIL (if the real
result is not equal the expected one). Using the test scripts, the developer automatically
ensures that the entrance conditions and the dependencies between tests are considered.
The specified tests cover all security functions and the testing is performed against the
TOE design. All real test results are equal with the expected test results.
Independent Evaluator Tests
The test equipment provided by the developer consists of the following hardware:
genucenter L, Revision 3.0, genuscreen S, Revision 3.0, genuscreen M, Revision 3.0,
genuscreen L, Revision 3.0, cryptOHBguard 10scs, genuscreen XS, Revision 3,
genuscreen XS, Revision 2.0 (used at genua onsite testing), genucenter S, Revision 2.0
(used at genua onsite testing).
According to the Security Target the evaluator has installed the genuscreens and
genucenter in a separate administrator network. All components were installed on physical
hardware, the installation of the TOE on virtual machines is out of scope of the evaluated
configuration. For the operational configuration the genuscreens and the genucenter were
integrated over the communication server in one network. The test configuration was
enhanced with internal networks for each genuscreen.
The configuration is therefore consistent with the configuration given in the Security Target.
To observe the behaviour of the genuscreens the behaviour of the systems was monitored
with the Webshell in the WebGUI of the genucenter and with the serial console of the
genuscreens.
According to the assumptions identified in the Security Target the following is stated:
A.ADMIN, A.INIT und A.SINGEN are given in the test environment, A.PHYSEC,
A.NOEVIL, A.LOCAL and A.REST are not applicable to the test environment,
A.TIMESTMP is given in all TOE configurations because of the properties of the underlying
operation system, A.HANET and A.REMOTE_AUTH are not considered as these were not
required while testing.
A sample of developer tests have been retested as part of the ITSEF tests. Testing in the
own premises covers among the complex installation all security functions.
17 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results.
Penetration Tests
The evaluator has done an independent vulnerability analysis. As a result additionally
vulnerability tests have been designed. Penetration testing was divided in the parts along
the threat paths manipulation of the installation, manipulation of the boot process,
exploiting over a network (internet, internal interfaces), and special operation modes. All
penetration testing was performed with the test equipment provided by the developer.
Additionally, a source code analysis was done.
If all operational measures required by the developer are applied, no attack scenario with
moderate attack potential was actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as
defined in the ST.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE configuration consists of software on at least two firewall components
(genuscreen appliances) that work as network filters. Another machine to manage this
network of firewall components is called management system (genucenter management
system) which is a central component.
The firewall components are initialised on a secure network from the management system.
After initialisation, the firewall components can be distributed to the locations of the
networks they are protecting.
The genuscreen firewall components filter incoming and outgoing traffic for multiple
networks and can thus enforce a given security policy on the data flow. The firewall
components can work as bridges or routers. The firewall components can be used in an
optional high availability (HA) setup where the firewall components synchronize their
internal states.
At the same time the firewall components can provide confidentiality and integrity for data
traffic passing between the networks. This Virtual Private Network function is achieved by
IPsec connections.
The TOE includes an optional SIP relay to allow the usage of a Session Border Controller
(SBC). The SIP relay is not included in the basic installation image but must be installed as
an optional module at the genucenter. The SIP relay software is then installed on all
appliances that use the relay.
The connection between genucenter and genuscreen is encrypted with SSH.
All HW and the platform OpenBSD Version 6.8, kernel and user space programs, HTTP/S
server, DHCP server, TFTP server are not part of the TOE and belong to the environment.
The TOE contains cryptographic functionality. The cryptographic algorithms are part of the
TOE.
Please note that, as detailed in the Security Target [6] chapter 1.4.11, several functions
(such as genucard and no deployment server, Smartcard, Secure Boot, IKEv2 X.509
Certificates, VPN to Other Appliances or Mobile Clients, L2TP VPN, MOBIKE VPN,
Dynamic Routing, genucenter HA, Remote Maintenance, getimagesfromcpt) are out of
scope of the evaluated configuration.
18 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 Certification Report
All information contained in the Security Target [6] and the guidance documentation ([8]
and [9]) have to be followed in order to set-up, configure and use the TOE in a secure
manner conformant to the evaluated configuration.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
• All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
• The components ALC_FLR.2, ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.4 and ALC_PAM.1 augmented for
this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1142-2020, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the general product evolution
and the addition of ALC_PAM.1.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• PP Conformance: None
• for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target, Common Criteria Part 2
extended
• for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2, ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.4 and
ALC_PAM.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
19 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
For details of the cryptographic algorithms that are used by the TOE to enforce its security
policy, please refer to the table in chapter 8 of the Security Target [6]. Any Cryptographic
Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of that table with 'no'
achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
For a secure operation it is necessary to follow all recommendations of the “Installations-
und Konfigurationshandbuch” of the genuscreen and genucenter and to follow all
requirements for the environment described in the Security Target. Especially all
recommendations regarding configuration of the packet filter in combination with SSH-
based VPN-tunnels should be read carefully, see also genucenter manual chapter 5.7
"Nutzung der Sicherheitseigenschaften” respectively genuscreen manual chapter D.6
"Nutzung der Sicherheitseigenschaften”.
In case of a lost appliance (e.g. theft) the procedures in the manual should be followed,
see genuscreen manual chapter C “Vorgehen bei Verlust einer Appliance” and genucenter
manual chapter C “Vorgehen bei Verlust einer Appliance”.
Before the installation the checksums of the manuals and software has to be verified. The
procedure and checksums to verify the manuals and software, including the SIP-module,
are available for logged in users on the genua Kundenportal https://kunde.genua.de
The verification procedure and checksums are available via the following menu entries:
• “Produkte” > “genuscreen” > “Checksummen” > “genuscreen 8.0 Checksummen
Zertifiziert“
• “Produkte” > “genucenter” > “Checksummen” > “genucenter 8.0 Checksummen“
The download of the manuals is available via the following menu entries:
• “Produkte” > “genuscreen” > “Handbücher” > “genuscreen 8.0 Handbücher zertifiziert”
The procedure to verify the software is also described in the genucenter manual chapter
2.1.4 “Verifizierung der Software” respectively genuscreen manual chapter 2.9
“Verifizierung der Software”.
The assumptions for the IT environment in the Security Target suppose that the TOE
operates in a physically secure environment which prevents access from unauthorised
users (A.PHYSEC). Comparable protection mechanisms must be implemented to logically
20 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 Certification Report
and physically protect backups files of the genucenter management system. See the
recommendations given in genucenter-manual, chapter 2.5.
Administration and revision of the TOE should only be performed by personnel who
dispose of solid knowledge about networking (especially IP and TCP/UDP), packet filter
firewalls and secure use of public key procedures.
There should be regularly performed inspections (revisions) of the TOE configuration,
especially of the packet filter rules. During those revisions the procedures to import public
keys should also be examined.
After installation of a genuscreen by using the genucenter, PXE boot must be disabled
(system hardening).
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
API Application Program Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
DH Diffie-Hellman
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DRG Deterministic Random Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
eIDAS Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Services
ESP Encapsulated Security Payload
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GUI Graphical User Interface
HA High Availability
21 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
Ipsec Internet Protocol Security protocol suite
ipsecctl a utility foe Control Flow in IPsec, to determine which packets are to be
processed by IPsec.
ISAKMP Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol
ISAKMPD The name of the OpenBSD ISAKMP daemon implementation.
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
L2TP Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MOBIKE Mobility and Multihoming
NAT Network address translation
PP Protection Profile
PXE Preboot eXecution Environment
QES Qualified Electronic Signatures
RDR Redirect rule
REST Representational State Transfer
RFC Request for comment
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SBC Session Border Controller
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control protocol
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
22 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 Certification Report
UDP User Datagram Protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
23 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023, genuscreen 8.0, Version 8.0.7 (a57d3b3),
Date: 2023-03-09, genua GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 for genuscreen 8.0 from
genua GmbH, Version 3, Date: 30.03.2023, secuvera GmbH (confidential
document)
[8] Guidance documentation for the TOE, genuscreen Installations- und
Konfigurationshandbuch; Version 8.0; Ausgabe 17. Februar 2023, Revision
3a6fcd2b, genua GmbH
[9] Guidance documentation for the TOE, genucenter Installations- und
Konfigurationshandbuch; Version 8.0; Ausgabe 17. Februar 2023, Revision
3a6fcd2b, genua GmbH
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen
und ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
24 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
25 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1194-2023
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
26 / 26