Certification Report
HP BladeSystem c7000 and c3000 Enclosure with
Onboard Administrator (running firmware version 3.71),
Virtual Connect (running firmware version 4.01), and HP
Integrated Lights-Out 3 (version 1.50)
Issued by:
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Certification Body
Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
© Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada, 2013
Document number: 383-4-209-CR
Version: 1.1
Date: 09 December 2013
Pagination: i to iii, 1 to 12
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DISCLAIMER
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its
associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established
under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) – using the
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision
4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4. This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to
the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This
report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by the
Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that recognizes
or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product
by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or
implied.
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FOREWORD
The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a
third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology
(IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria
Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is
managed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the
Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the
Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the
Standards Council of Canada.
The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is CGI IT Security Evaluation & Test Facility.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the
product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A
security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the
evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target,
in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions
made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements,
and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the
security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 09
December 2013, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the
CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
Common Criteria Project).
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Disclaimer....................................................................................................................................... i
Foreword........................................................................................................................................ii
Executive Summary...................................................................................................................... 1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation................................................................................. 3
2 TOE Description ................................................................................................................... 3
3 Evaluated Security Functionality........................................................................................ 4
4 Security Target...................................................................................................................... 4
5 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................... 4
6 Security Policy....................................................................................................................... 6
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................................. 6
7.1 SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................... 6
7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................... 6
7.3 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE .......................................................................................... 6
8 Evaluated Configuration...................................................................................................... 7
9 Documentation ...................................................................................................................... 7
10 Evaluation Analysis Activities ............................................................................................. 8
11 ITS Product Testing.............................................................................................................. 9
11.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS .......................................................................... 9
11.2 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING ........................................................................ 9
11.3 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING..................................................................... 10
11.4 CONDUCT OF TESTING ............................................................................................. 10
11.5 TESTING RESULTS.................................................................................................... 10
12 Results of the Evaluation.................................................................................................... 10
13 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations ......................................... 10
14 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations................................................................... 11
15 References............................................................................................................................ 12
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Executive Summary
HP BladeSystem c7000 and c3000 Enclosure with Onboard Administrator (running firmware
version 3.71), Virtual Connect (running firmware version 4.01), and HP Integrated Lights-
Out 3 (version 1.50) (hereafter referred to as HP BladeSystem), from Hewlett-Packard
Development Company, L.P., is the Target of Evaluation for this Evaluation Assurance Level
(EAL) 4 augmented evaluation.
HP BladeSystem implements the BladeSystem c-Class architecture, and is optimized for
enterprise data center applications (c7000) and midmarket applications (c3000). The
enclosures fit into standard 19 inch racks; accommodates BladeSystem c-Class server blades,
storage blades, and interconnect modules; and provides all the power, cooling, and I/O
infrastructure needed to support them. The Onboard Administrator, Virtual Connect, and
iLO components provide the majority of BladeSystem functionality.
The Onboard Administrator is a Linux-based appliance that performs four management
functions for the entire enclosure:
• Detecting component insertion and removal
• Identifying components and required connectivity
• Managing power and cooling
• Controlling components
Virtual Connect technology is a set of interconnect modules and embedded software for c-
Class enclosures that simplifies the setup and administration of server connections.
The Integrated Lights-Out (iLO) management built into BladeSystem blade servers and
storage blades is an autonomous management subsystem embedded directly on the server.
iLO monitors each server’s overall status, reports issues, and provides a means for setup and
managing of power and thermal settings.
CGI IT Security Evaluation & Test Facility is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This
evaluation was completed on 21 October 2013 and was carried out in accordance with the
rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions
made during the evaluation, the intended environment for HP BladeSystem, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) to which it is asserted
that the product satisfies its security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their
operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
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The results documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)1
for this product provide
sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 4 augmented assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4. The following augmentation is claimed: ALC_FLR.2 – Flaw
Reporting Procedures.
Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body, declares
that the HP BladeSystem evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the
Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the CCS
Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
Common Criteria Project).
1
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 augmented
evaluation is HP BladeSystem c7000 and c3000 Enclosure with Onboard Administrator
(running firmware version 3.71), Virtual Connect (running firmware version 4.01), and HP
Integrated Lights-Out 3 (version 1.50) (hereafter referred to as HP BladeSystem), from
Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
2 TOE Description
HP BladeSystem implements the BladeSystem c-Class architecture, and is optimized for
enterprise data center applications (c7000) and midmarket applications (c3000). The
enclosures fit into standard 19 inch racks; accommodates BladeSystem c-Class server blades,
storage blades, and interconnect modules; and provides all the power, cooling, and I/O
infrastructure needed to support them. The Onboard Administrator, Virtual Connect, and
iLO components provide the majority of BladeSystem functionality.
The Onboard Administrator is a Linux-based appliance that performs four management
functions for the entire enclosure:
• Detecting component insertion and removal
• Identifying components and required connectivity
• Managing power and cooling
• Controlling components
Virtual Connect technology is a set of interconnect modules and embedded software for c-
Class enclosures that simplifies the setup and administration of server connections.
The Integrated Lights-Out (iLO) management built into BladeSystem blade servers and
storage blades is an autonomous management subsystem embedded directly on the server.
iLO monitors each server’s overall status, reports issues, and provides a means for setup and
managing of power and thermal settings.
A detailed description of the HP BladeSystem architecture is found in Section 1.6 of the
Security Target (ST).
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3 Evaluated Security Functionality
The complete list of evaluated security functionality for HP BladeSystem is identified in
Section 1.6 of the ST.
The following cryptographic modules were evaluated to the FIPS 140-2 standard:
Cryptographic Module Certificate #
HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Firmware
(Firmware Version: 3.71)
#2174
iLO 3 Cryptographic Module
(Firmware Version: 1.50)
#2173
The following Government of Canada approved cryptographic algorithms were evaluated for
correct implementation in HP BladeSystem:
Cryptographic Algorithm Standard Certificate #
Triple-DES (3DES) FIPS 46-3 #1439, #1443, #1444,
#1445, #1567(VC)
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) FIPS 197 #2289, #2294, #2295,
#2296, #2297, #2298,
#2600(VC)
Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) FIPS 186-2 #1178, #1183, #1182,
#1328(VC)
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) FIPS 180-2 #1972, #1973, #1977,
#1978, #1979, #2184(VC)
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC)
FIPS 198 #1406, #1410, #1607(VC)
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) FIPS 186-2 #716, #720, #788(VC)
ANSI x9.31 Appendix A.4.2 Pseudo
Random Number Generator(PRNG)
ANSI x9.31 #1140
4 Security Target
The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following nomenclature:
Title: Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. BladeSystem c7000 and c3000
Security Target
Version: 1.16
Date: 9 December 2013
5 Common Criteria Conformance
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
HP BladeSystem is:
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a. Common Criteria Part 2 conformant, with security functional requirements based
only upon functional components in Part 2;
b. Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, with security assurance requirements based
only upon assurance components in Part 3; and
c. Common Criteria EAL 4 augmented, containing all security assurance requirements
in the EAL 4 package, as well as the following: ALC_FLR.2 – Flaw Reporting
Procedures.
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6 Security Policy
HP BladeSystem implements a role-based access control policy to control user access to the
system, as well as an information flow control policy to control information entering the
system; details of these security policies can be found in Section 7.1 of the ST.
In addition, HP BladeSystem implements other policies pertaining to security audit, user data
protection, identification and authentication, and security management. Further details on
these security policies may be found in Section 7.1 of the ST.
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Consumers of HP BladeSystem should consider assumptions about usage and environmental
settings as requirements for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This
will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following Secure Usage Assumptions are listed in the ST:
• Only FIPS-approved ciphers are used by connecting clients (SSH and HTTPS clients)
to access VC interconnect modules.
• There are one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE, its
operating environment, and the security of the information it contains. The
individuals are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all guidance.
• The TOE software will be protected from unauthorized modification.
7.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following Environmental Assumptions are listed in the ST:
• The TOE is located within a controlled access facility. If the optional external
authentication mechanisms are used, such as LDAP, those external authentication
servers are also located within the same controlled access facility and physically and
logically on the same secure network as the TOE.
7.3 Clarification of scope
The Virtual Connect cryptography (VC) is only used for secure communication with the
TOE, and as such was only validated against CAVP.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration for HP BladeSystem comprises:
Blade Enclosure HP BladeSystem c3000 Enclosure;
HP BladeSystem c7000 Enclosure
Virtual Connect HP Virtual Connect Flex-10 10 Gb Ethernet Module;
HP Virtual Connect FlexFabric 10 Gb/24-Port
Module;
HP Virtual Connect Flex-10/10D Module
iLO14 HP iLO 3 Gromit LP on ProLiant G7 server blades;
HP iLO 3 Gromit XE on ProLiant G7 server blades
Onboard Administrator HP BladeSystem c7000 DDR2 Onboard Administrator
with KVM ;
HP BladeSystem c3000 Tray with embedded DDR2
Onboard Administrator ;
HP BladeSystem c3000 Dual DDR2 Onboard
Administrator Module
The publication entitled HP BladeSystem Guidance Documentation Supplement Version 1.0,
October 2013 describes the procedures necessary to install and operate HP BladeSystem in
its evaluated configuration.
9 Documentation
The Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. documents provided to the consumer are
as follows:
a. Technologies in the HP BladeSystem c7000 Enclosure (Part Number 1108878 –
December 2011);
b. HP BladeSystem c-Class Solution Overview, Part Number 413339-006, March 2012
(Sixth Edition);
c. HP Integrated Light-Out (iLO) for HP ProLiant Servers (Overview) Part Number DA-
12362, September 2012;
d. HP Proliant iLO 3 Scripting and Command Line Guide, Part Number 616297-005,
September 2013 (First Edition);
e. HP Integrated Lights-Out security (Technology Brief, 7th Edition) Part Number
101208TB, December 2012;
f. HP iLO 3 User Guide, Part Number 616301-005, September 2013 (First Edition);
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g. HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator Command Line Interface User Guide, Part
Number 695523-003, September 2013 (20th Edition);
h. HP BladeSystem Onboard Administrator User Guide, Part Number 695522-004,
September 2013 (19th Edition);
i. HP Virtual Connect Manager Command Line Interface for c-Class BladeSystem Version
v4.01 User Guide, Part Number 911532-002, June 2013 (Second Edition); and
j. HP Virtual Connect for c-Class BladeSystem Version 4.01 User Guide, Part Number
711534-002, June 2013 (Second Edition).
10 Evaluation Analysis Activities
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of HP BladeSystem,
including the following areas:
Development: The evaluators analyzed the HP BladeSystem functional specification and
design documentation; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes
the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the TSF subsystems and how the TSF
implements the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the HP
BladeSystem security architectural description and determined that the initialization process
is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that
security domains are maintained. The evaluators also independently verified that the
correspondence mappings between the design documents are correct.
Guidance Documents: The evaluators examined the HP BladeSystem preparative user
guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and
unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration
and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the
preparative and operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently
detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Life-cycle support: An analysis of the HP BladeSystem configuration management system
and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the HP BladeSystem
configuration items were clearly marked. The developer’s configuration management system
was observed during a site visit, and it was found to be mature and well-developed.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of
the procedures required to maintain the integrity of HP BladeSystem during distribution to
the consumer.
The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by developer for the HP
BladeSystem. During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence generated by
adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to
track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to
consumers of the product.
All these evaluation activities resulted in PASS verdicts.
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11 ITS Product Testing
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing
independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.
11.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining
their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR2
.
The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage analysis and found it to be complete
and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s test
documentation and the functional specification was complete.
11.2 Independent Functional Testing
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining
design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation,
executing a sample of the developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the
developer tests.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability
of the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test coverage approach is the
following list of CGI IT Security Evaluation & Test Facility test goals:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The objective of this test goal is to repeat a subset of the
developer's tests;
b. Hardware failure/CLI tampering: The objective of this test goal is to confirm that the
TOE detects hardware failure or tampering from the CLI;
c. FIPS mode: The objective of this test goal is to verify the correct operation of the TOE
when FIPS mode is enabled/disabled;
d. User privilege: The objective of this test goal is confirm correct validation and
enforcement of user privileges;
e. Login Delays: The objective of this test goal is to verify that login delays between failed
login attempts are enforced; and
f. VC external host connections: The objective of this test goal is to confirm that external
hosts can/cannot initiate communication to the blade server.
2
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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11.3 Independent Penetration Testing
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all
evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted.
The penetration tests focused on:
a. Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and
application layer vulnerabilities;
b. Testing whether any useful information might be disclosed to an attack by querying the
TOE’s network interfaces prior to authentication;
c. Attempting a Denial of Service attack on TOE’s web interface; and
d. Attempting to connect to the open SNMP port to see if the TOE can be manipulated to
cause a security breach.
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the
intended operating environment.
11.4 Conduct of Testing
HP BladeSystem was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented,
independent functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the Information
Technology Security Evaluation and Test (ITSET) Facility at CGI IT Security Evaluation &
Test Facility; the CCS Certification Body witnessed a portion of the independent testing. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results
and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.
11.5 Testing Results
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results,
providing assurance that HP BladeSystem behaves as specified in its ST and functional
specification.
12 Results of the Evaluation
This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL 4+ level of assurance. The overall verdict
for the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
13 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations
The evaluator performed public search for vulnerabilities during independent penetration
testing and found invaluable information from the HP security advisories web site. The
evaluator recommends the client to subscribe to automatically receive new HP Security
Bulletins from the HP IT Resource Center at http://itrc.hp.com.
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14 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations
Acronym/Abbreviation/
Initialization
Description
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and
Certification Scheme
CPL Certified Products list
CM Configuration Management
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSET Information Technology Security Evaluation
and Testing
PALCAN Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories
- Canada
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
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15 References
This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:
a. CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October 2010.
b. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, September 2012.
c. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
d. Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. BladeSystem c7000 and c3000
Security Target, 1.16, 9 December 2013.
e. EAL4+ Common Criteria Evaluation of HP BladeSystem c7000 and c3000 Enclosure
with Onboard Administrator (running firmware version 3.7), Virtual Connect
(running firmware version 4.01), and HP Integrated Lights-Out (version 1.5), v1.0,
October 21, 2013.