Copyright CANON INC 2016 1 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model Security Target Version 1.07 2017/06/14 Canon Inc. Significant portions of this document were excerpted from IEEE Std 2600.1 and 2600.2, -2009 - copyright IEEE 2009 and reproduced with permission from IEEE. , All rights reserved. An use beyond what is permitted, please contact mailto:stds-ipr@ieee.org. This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target written in Japanese. Copyright CANON INC 2016 2 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Table of Contents 1 ST introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 4 ST reference....................................................................................................................................... 4 TOE reference ................................................................................................................................... 4 TOE overview ................................................................................................................................... 4 Terms and Abbreviations................................................................................................................... 5 TOE description................................................................................................................................. 6 Scope of the TOE .............................................................................................................................. 8 1.6.1 Physical Scope of the TOE ........................................................................................................ 8 1.6.2 Logical Scope of the TOE.......................................................................................................... 9 Users of the TOE............................................................................................................................. 11 Assets............................................................................................................................................... 12 1.8.1 User Data ................................................................................................................................. 12 1.8.2 TSF Data.................................................................................................................................. 12 1.8.3 Functions.................................................................................................................................. 13 2 Conformance claims ...................................................................................................................................... 14 CC Conformance claim................................................................................................................... 14 PP claim, Package claim.................................................................................................................. 14 SFR Packages.................................................................................................................................. 14 2.3.1 SFR Packages reference........................................................................................................... 14 2.3.2 SFR Package functions............................................................................................................ 15 2.3.3 SFR Package attributes ............................................................................................................ 15 PP Conformance rationale............................................................................................................... 16 3 Security Problem Definition .......................................................................................................................... 18 Notational conventions.................................................................................................................... 18 Threats agents.................................................................................................................................. 18 Threats to TOE Assets ..................................................................................................................... 19 Organizational Security Policies for the TOE ................................................................................. 19 Assumptions.................................................................................................................................... 19 4 Security Objectives........................................................................................................................................ 21 Security Objectives for the TOE...................................................................................................... 21 Security Objectives for the IT environment .................................................................................... 21 Security Objectives for the non-IT environment............................................................................. 21 Security Objectives rationale........................................................................................................... 22 5 Extended components definition (APE_ECD) .............................................................................................. 26 FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces .............................................. 26 6 Security requirements .................................................................................................................................... 28 Security functional requirements..................................................................................................... 28 6.1.1 User Authentication Function .................................................................................................. 28 6.1.2 Function Use Restriction Function .......................................................................................... 30 6.1.3 Job Output Restriction Functions............................................................................................. 33 6.1.4 Forward Received Jobs Function............................................................................................. 36 6.1.5 HDD Data Erase Function ....................................................................................................... 37 6.1.6 HDD Data Encryption Function .............................................................................................. 37 6.1.7 LAN Data Protection Function................................................................................................ 38 6.1.8 Self-Test Function.................................................................................................................... 39 6.1.9 Audit Log Function.................................................................................................................. 39 6.1.10 Management Function ............................................................................................................. 42 Security Assurance Requirements ................................................................................................... 46 Copyright CANON INC 2016 3 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Security functional requirements rationale...................................................................................... 46 6.3.1 The completeness of security requirements............................................................................. 46 6.3.2 The sufficiency of security requirements................................................................................. 48 6.3.3 The dependencies of security requirements............................................................................. 50 Security assurance requirements rationale ...................................................................................... 51 7 TOE Summary specification.......................................................................................................................... 53 User Authentication Function.......................................................................................................... 53 Function Use Restriction Function.................................................................................................. 53 Job Output Restriction Functions.................................................................................................... 54 7.3.1 Job Cancel................................................................................................................................ 54 7.3.2 In The JOB Access Control...................................................................................................... 55 7.3.3 Temporarily Stored Jobs .......................................................................................................... 57 Forward Received Jobs Function .................................................................................................... 57 HDD Data Erase Function............................................................................................................... 57 HDD Data Encryption Function...................................................................................................... 58 7.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function ............................................................................................. 58 7.6.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function.............................................................................. 58 7.6.3 MFP Identification and Authentication Function..................................................................... 59 LAN Data Protection Function........................................................................................................ 59 7.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function ................................................................................................ 59 7.7.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function.............................................................................. 60 Self-Test Function ........................................................................................................................... 60 Audit Log Function ......................................................................................................................... 60 Management Functions................................................................................................................ 61 7.10.1 User Management Function..................................................................................................... 61 7.10.2 Device Management Function................................................................................................. 62 Trademark Notice - Canon, the Canon logo, imageRUNNER, imageRUNNER ADVANCE, imagePRESS, MEAP, and the MEAP logo are registered trademarks or trademarks of Canon Inc. - Microsoft, Internet Explorer and Active Directory are registered trademarks or trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the US and other countries. - eDirectory is a trademark of Novell, Inc. in the US. - All names of companies and products contained herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of the respective companies. Copyright CANON INC 2016 4 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 1 ST introduction ST reference This section provides the Security Target (ST) identification information. ST name: Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model Security Target Version: 1.07 Issued by: Canon Inc. Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 TOE reference This section provides the TOE identification information. TOE name: Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model Version: 1.0 The TOE is comprised of the following software and hardware. iPR Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.2 Common Criteria Certification Ver 1.00 HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Kit-E (Canon Security Chip 2.10) Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 TOE overview The TOE is a digital multi-function peripheral (MFP) known as < Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model >. This is a version of the standard model < Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 > which by installing/attaching the following 2 products and making the proper settings, makes up the < Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model > or TOE. - iPR Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.2 Common Criteria Certification - HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Kit-E In order to make various settings, the following 3 option licenses are required. - ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM KIT-B1: License option1 - Data Erase Kit-C1: License option1 - imagePRESS Printer Kit-D1: License option1 < iPR Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.2 Common Criteria Certification> contains the < Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 > control software. HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board is a hardware to encrypt all the data stored in the HDD (including software) and contains Canon Security Chip 2.10. < Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model > is capable of fully implementing the Protection Profile (PP) for Multi-Function Products indicated below, as well as the security functions required by 5 SFR Packages in the 7 SFR Packages defined in the PP, except for 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment B, and 2600.2-NVS, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device 1 Actual components of the license option are included in the control software provided as iPR Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.2 Common Criteria Certification. Copyright CANON INC 2016 5 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Nonvolatile Storage Functions, Operational Environment B. In addition, it has HDD encryption function to encrypt all the data stored in the HDD. Protection Profile - U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009) SFR Packages - 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment B - 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment B - 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment B - 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions, Operational Environment B - 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions, Operational Environment B Terms and Abbreviations The following terms and abbreviations are used throughout this ST. Table 1 —Terms and Abbreviations Terms/Abbreviations Description Multi-Function Peripheral (MFP) A machine which incorporates the functionality of multiple devices in one, such as copier, printer, and Universal Send, and containing a large capacity HDD to facilitate such capabilities. Control software Software that runs on the hardware of the device, and controls security functions. Control panel One of the hardware elements of the MFP, consisting of a touch panel and operation keys, which provides the interface for operation of the MFP. Remote UI An interface that provides access to the MFP from a Web browser via the LAN, to allow operations such as acquiring operating status, performing job operations or BOX operations, and making various settings. HDD Hard disk drive mounted on the MFP, where control software and assets are stored. I-Fax Short for Internet Fax. Uses the Internet instead of telephone line to receive and send faxes. Image file Image data generated within the MFP, from operations such as scan, print, and receive. Temporary image file Image files generated during jobs such as Copy and Print, which are needed only until the job completes. Roles Used by access restriction functions to restrict the functions that each user can use. One role is associated with each user. In addition to pre-defined default roles, default roles may be modified to create custom roles. The default roles are: Administrator, Power User, General User, and Limited User. A user assigned the Administrator role is capable of using management operations (administrative privileges). Administrator User assigned the Administrator role and has administrative privileges. Equivalent to U.ADMINISTRATOR defined in the PP. Job When a user uses the functions of the TOE to execute an operation on a document, a Job is the intended document data combined with the user instructions for processing those data. Copyright CANON INC 2016 6 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Terms/Abbreviations Description The operations that can be performed on a document are: Scan, Print, Copy, Fax TX, Save, and Delete. The processing phases for a Job issued by the user are: generation, execution, and completion. Document data User data processed within the MFP, consisting of image files and print setting. Memory RX (Reception) Allows data received by I-fax to be stored in the Memory RX Inbox for later processing. Box Collective name for Mail Boxes, Fax Inboxes, or the Memory RX Inbox wherein data from operations such as scan, print, and received I-faxes are stored in the MFP. *Use of Fax Inboxes is not included in this TOE. Mail Box Whether a general user feeds data to the MFP directly, or specifies a document for printing from a PC, data can be stored here to be printed or sent later. Memory RX Inbox When memory reception is set, documents received by I-fax are stored in the Memory RX Inbox. Stored documents can be printed or sent later. Mail server Server that facilitates I-fax transmission or email transmission of document data in the MFP. User authentication server Server that maintains user information such as user ID and password, for user authentication over the network. Firewall Device or system designed to protect the internal LAN against threats from the Internet. Time server Server that uses the Network Time Protocol to provide the accurate time over the Internet. [Secure Print] A button on the control panel that activates the function to operate secure print (print with PIN). [Copy] A button on the control panel that activates the Copy function. [Scan] Indicates the [Scan and Store] and [Scan and Send] buttons on the control panel, that allow the user to scan paper documents to be stored as files, or scanned documents to be sent to some location such as to an email address or a shared folder in a PC, respectively. [I-Fax Inbox] A button on the control panel that activates the I-Fax Inbox function. There are two types of I-Fax Inbox: the Memory RX Inbox and Confidential Fax Inbox. You can use both inboxes to store files received by I-Fax. [Access Stored Files] A button on the control panel that allows the user to access files stored in a Mail Box/Inbox. Remote UI [Access Received/Stored Files] A button on the remote UI that allows the user to access files stored in a Mail Box/Inbox. TOE description The TOE is a MFP that offers Copy, Print, Universal Send, I-Fax RX, and Mail Box capabilities. The TOE, which conforms to "U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009)" is designed to operate in an environment such as the one shown below (as excerpted from "IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600TM -2008 Operational Environment B" clause "1.1 Scope"). This standard is for a Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in a commercial information processing environment in which a moderate level of document security, network security, and security assurance are required. Typically, the day-to-day proprietary and nonproprietary information needed to operate an enterprise will be handled by this environment. This environment will be known as “Operational Environment B." Figure 1 shows the environment for which the TOE or < Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model > has been designed, with options included. Since not all of these features may be required, the actual operational environment is expected to differ than what is shown here. Copyright CANON INC 2016 7 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Figure 1 The assumed operational environment of the MFP < Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 > PC HDD LAN Firewall Mail server P r i n t （ P r i n t / S t o r e ） Mail Box/ Inbox Memory RX Inbox Send via I-Fax/E-Mail Receive I-Fax Hardcopy document C o p y S t o r e i n M a i l B o x S e n d Hardcopy document C o p y P r i n t Web browser Internet R e m o t e U I Multi-Function Peripheral User authentication server User authentication Authentication result Time server PC Print via USB connection In Figure 1, the MFP is connected by an internal LAN, to all of the other major components, namely the Mail Server, User Authentication Server, PC, and Firewall. Furthermore, the internal LAN is protected by Firewall from threats from the Internet. To send (via I-Fax or email) a previously scanned document or when receiving a document by I-Fax for example, the MFP connects to the Mail Server. By using a PC with a Web browser2 , functions such as printing, storing, or I-Fax can also be executed remotely. However, in order to print from a PC, the appropriate printer driver needs to be installed in the PC. Alternatively, a USB cable could be used to connect the PC directly, and print or store document data from the PC. In this case, some configuration is required initially, in order to protect against data being taken out of the MFP and stored in a PC or USB device. The TOE also obtains accurate time from the Time Server for time synchronization, and supports user authentication through the External Authentication Server. The TOE has HDD encryption function to encrypt all the data stored in its HDD. The functions available to the MFP in such an environment are listed below: - Copy function Produces duplicates of the hardcopy document by scanning and printing. - Print function Produces a hardcopy document from its electronic form (stored in the MFP or sent from a PC). 2 This evaluation was performed using Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 as the Web browser. Copyright CANON INC 2016 8 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 - I-Fax RX (receive) function Uses the Internet to receive faxes. Data received by I-fax is not printed immediately; rather it is stored in Memory RX Inbox for processing at a later time. Stored documents can be printed, sent or deleted later. - Universal Send function Scanned document data or electronic documents stored in Mail Box/Memory RX Inbox can be transmitted by email or I-fax, or sent to a shared folder on a PC, in TIFF or PDF file format. - Mail Box function Refers to the storage of image files into a Mail Box or in Memory RX Inbox, or to functions that utilize the Mail Box/inbox functionality. – Image files Stored in Mail Box Scanned document data or electronic data specified for storage from a PC, are stored in a Mail Box. – Functions that utilize Mail Box functionality The following functions can be executed on data stored in a Mail Box. – Edit (document/print setting) – Print – Send – Delete Scope of the TOE The TOE conforms to “U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009)” and is designed to meet the requirements specified therein, as described below. The physical and logical scopes of the TOE are described below. 1.6.1 Physical Scope of the TOE The TOE is a MFP consisting of hardware and software components. The physical scope of the TOE is illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 2 Hardware and software components of the TOE Control Software (TOE Software) Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 MFP Hardware (TOE: Hardware) HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board (TOE: Hardware) In Figure 2, "Control Software" refers to the < iPR Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.2 Common Criteria Certification>. Note also that the “MFP Hardware" together with the < iPR Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.2 Common Criteria Certification> make up the MFP main unit. Copyright CANON INC 2016 9 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 The TOE or < Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model > consists of the MFP main unit combined with HDD Encryption & Mirroring Board. < Canon imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 >, or the hardware making up the TOE, refers to the following product lineup. Table 2 —Line of Products Products iPR C850, iPR C750, iPR C650 The documentation for the TOE are listed below. (English Name) - iPR Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.2 Common Criteria Certification Administrator Guide [FT6- 1872 (000)] - Before Using the iPR Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.2 Common Criteria Certification [FT6-1873 (000)] - imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model User’s Guide CD (USE Version) [FT6-1874(000)] - imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model User’s Guide - ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Individual Management Configuration Administrator Guide - imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model User’s Guide CD (APE Version) [FT6-1875 (000)] - imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 User’s Guide - ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Individual Management Configuration Administrator Guide - HDD Data Encryption Kit Reference Guide [FT6-1333(010)] (Japanese Name) - iPR Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.2 Administrator Guide [FT6-1869 (000)] - Before Using the iPR Security Kit-B1 for IEEE 2600.2 [FT6-1870 (000)] - imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model User’s Guide CD [FT6-1871 (000)] - imagePRESS C850/C750/C650 2600 model User’s Guide - ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Individual Management Configuration Administrator Guide - HDD Data Encryption Kit User’s Guide [FT6-1331(010)] 1.6.2 Logical Scope of the TOE The logical scope of the TOE is illustrated in Figure 3 (excluding: User, User Authentication Server, Mail Server, PC, and Time Server). In the table, the security functions of the TOE are shown in blue. Figure 3 Functional configuration of the TOE Copyright CANON INC 2016 10 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 LAN Data Protection Function HDD UI Func User User Auth Server LAN Data Protection User Auth Function Mail Server LAN Data Protection Email Function PC LAN Data Protection Web Browser DocData DocData AuthInfo Hardcopy document Time Server Time Function TimeInfo Output Func Input Func Print Scan Send Copy Mail box Function Use Restriction Job Output Restriction User Authentication HDD Data Erase HDD Data Encryption Management Function Self-Test Audit Log LAN Data Protection Flow of data Operate/ Display Hardcopy document Forward Received Jobs Receive TOE PC DocData USB connection In addition to the capabilities described in Section 1.5, the TOE embodies the following basic functionality. - UI Functionality Enables the user to operate the TOE from the control panel, and the TOE to display information on the control panel. - Output Functionality Enables the TOE to output hardcopy documents. - Input Functionality Enables the TOE to input hardcopy documents. The TOE embodies the following security functions. - User Authentication Function Performs authentication on the user, to prevent any unauthorized access to the TOE. Copyright CANON INC 2016 11 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Two types of user authentication are supported: Internal Authentication wherein authentication takes place internally within the TOE, and External Authentication which uses an external user authentication server. External authentication uses Kerberos3 or LDAP4 authentication. - Function Use Restriction Function Uses role management to restrict the functions that each authenticated user can use. - Job Output Restriction Function This function restricts access to print, cancel, and other job operations, to the user that executed the job. - Forward Received Jobs Function This function restricts the machine from forwarding received data directly to the LAN. - HDD Data Erase Function Function for erasing unnecessary data from the hard disk by overwriting the data, in order to prevent unauthorized use of previously generated image data. - HDD Data Encryption Function HDD Encryption & Mirroring Board identifies the MFP main unit upon start-up and allows access to the HDD only if it is identified as the legitimate MFP in order to prevent unauthorized access to the HDD data by removing HDD alone or HDD and HDD Encryption & Mirroring Board together. In addition, all data stored in the HDD are encrypted in order to protect the confidentiality of the HDD data. - LAN Data Protection Function To protect LAN data from IP packet sniffing, IP packets are encrypted using IPSec. - Self-Test Function When the machine starts, this function checks to see that the primary security functions are running properly. - Audit Log Function Allows auditing of user operations by generating logs which are stored in the HDD. Stored audit logs are protected and can be viewed. The date/time recorded on the audit log is provided by the TOE. The TOE's date/time information is set by the Management Function, or is set by time synchronization when the accurate time is obtained from the Time Server. - Management Function Consists of user management functions such as user registration and role management, and device management functions which enable proper operation of various security functions, which can only be specified by Administrators. Users of the TOE The TOE has two types of users (U.USER): U.NORMAL and U.ADMINISTRATOR Table 3 —Users Designation Definition 3 This evaluation was performed using Active Directory Domain Services as the authentication server software for Kerberos authentication. 4 This evaluation was performed using eDirectory 8.8 SP8 as the authentication server software for LDAP authentication. Copyright CANON INC 2016 12 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 U.USER Any authorized User. U.NORMAL A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing functions of the TOE. U.ADMINISTRATOR A User who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions may affect the TOE security policy (TSP). Administrators may possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override portions of the TSP. Assets There are three types of assets: User Data, TSF Data, and Functions. 1.8.1 User Data User Data are created by the user, and have no effect on TOE security functions. There are two types of User Data: D.DOC and D.FUNC. Table 4 — User Data Designation Definition D.DOC User Document Data consists of the information contained in a user's document. This includes the original document itself in either hardcopy or electronic form, image data, or residually-stored data created by the hardcopy device while processing an original document and printed hardcopy output. D.FUNC User Function Data are the information about a user's document or job to be processed by the TOE. 1.8.2 TSF Data TSF Data are data that have an effect on TOE security functions. There are two types of TSF data: D.PROT and D.CONF. Table 5 — TSF Data Designation Definition D.PROT TSF Protected Data are assets for which alteration by a User who is neither an Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable. D.CONF TSF Confidential Data are assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User who is neither an Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE. A list of the TSF Data used in this TOE is given in Table 6. Table 6 — List of TSF data Type TSF Data Description Stored in D.PROT User name User identification information used by the user identification and authentication function. HDD Role Used by access restriction functions to restrict the functions that each user can use. HDD Lockout policy settings Settings for the lockout function, such as number of attempts before lockout and the lockout time. HDD Copyright CANON INC 2016 13 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Type TSF Data Description Stored in Password policy settings Policy for the password for user authentication, such as minimum password length, allowed characters, and combination of character types. HDD Auto Reset Time setting Settings for session timeout in the control panel. Non- volatile memory Date/Time setting Specifies the date and time that is set. RTC HDD Data Erase setting Settings for the HDD Data Erase function, including the settings to enable or disable the HDD Data Erase function. Non- volatile memory IPSec settings Settings for the LAN Data Protection function, including the settings to enable or disable the LAN Data Protection function. Non- volatile memory D.CONF Password Password used to authenticate the user in the User Identification and Authentication function. HDD Audit logs Logs generated by the Audit Log function. HDD Box PIN PIN used for access control to the Mail Box or the Memory RX Inbox where the data is stored, for Job Output Restriction functions. HDD 1.8.3 Functions Refer to the functions listed in Table 7. Copyright CANON INC 2016 14 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 2 Conformance claims CC Conformance claim This ST conforms to the following Common Criteria (CC). - Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Release 4 - Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant - Assurance level: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 PP claim, Package claim This ST conforms to the following Protection Profile (PP). - Title: U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009) - Version: 1.0 This ST is package-conformant to and package-augmented by the following SFR Packages: - 2600.2-PRT conformant - 2600.2-SCN conformant - 2600.2-CPY conformant - 2600.2-DSR conformant - 2600.2-SMI augmented SFR Packages 2.3.1 SFR Packages reference Title: 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment B Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as printers, paper-based fax machines, and MFPs) that perform a printing function in which electronic document input is converted to physical document output. Title: 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment B Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as scanners, paper-based fax machines, and MFPs) that perform a scanning function in which physical document input is converted to electronic document output. Title: 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment B Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Copyright CANON INC 2016 15 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Usage: This Protection Profile shall be used for HCD products (such as copiers and MFPs) that perform a copy function in which physical document input is duplicated to physical document output. Title: 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions, Operational Environment B Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as MFPs) that perform a document storage and retrieval feature in which a document is stored during one job and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs. Title: 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions, Operational Environment B Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products that transmit or receive User Data or TSF Data over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple users, such as wired network media and most radio frequency wireless media. This package applies for TOEs that provide a trusted channel function allowing for secure and authenticated communication with other IT systems. If such protection is supplied only by the TOE environment, then this package cannot be claimed. 2.3.2 SFR Package functions Functions perform processing, storage, and transmission of data that may be present in HCD products. The functions that are allowed, but not required in any particular conforming Security Target or Protection Profile, are listed in Table 7: Table 7 —SFR Package functions Designation Definition F.PRT Printing: a function in which electronic document input is converted to physical document output F.SCN Scanning: a function in which physical document input is converted to electronic document output F.CPY Copying: a function in which physical document input is duplicated to physical document output F.DSR Document storage and retrieval: a function in which a document is stored during one job and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs F.SMI Shared-medium interface: a function that transmits or receives User Data or TSF Data over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple users, such as wired network media and most radio-frequency wireless media 2.3.3 SFR Package attributes When a function is performing processing, storage, or transmission of data, the identity of the function is associated with that particular data as a security attribute. This attribute in the TOE model makes it possible to distinguish differences in Security Functional Requirements that depend on the function being performed. The attributes that are allowed, but not required in any particular conforming Security Target or Protection Profile, are listed in Table 8: Table 8 —SFR Package attributes Designation Definition Copyright CANON INC 2016 16 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 +PRT Indicates data that are associated with a print job. +SCN Indicates data that are associated with a scan job. +CPY Indicates data that are associated with a copy job. +DSR Indicates data that are associated with a document storage and retrieval job. +SMI Indicates data that are transmitted or received over a Shared-medium interface. PP Conformance rationale In addition to the primary functionality of the MFP (Copy, Print, and Scan), the TOE implements the document storage function, HDD encryption function, and the LAN data encryption function. As such, it is appropriate to conform to all of the SFR Package defined in the PP(Chapter 2.2 PP claim, Package claim). The PP to which this ST claims to be conformant conforms to IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600-2008, Operational Environment B and also includes the contents defined in CCEVS Policy Letter #20. In the following, the ST is compared against the PP containing the five SFR Packages. In terms of the Security Problem Definition, the ST is equivalent to the PP, except that the following two OSPs are added: P.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION, P.STORAGE.CRYPT These are the OSPs that restrict the TOE, not operation environment. As such: - All the TOEs that satisfy the Security Problem Definition of the ST also satisfy the Security Problem Definition of the PP. - All the operational environments that satisfy the Security Problem Definition of the PP also satisfy the Security Problem Definition of the ST. In terms of Objectives, when PP and ST are compared, there is no difference except that the following two Objectives are added. O.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED FPT.PHP.1 is added to realize this Objective. It is more restrictive in terms of the behavior of the TOE than the PP. Thus this objective restricts the TOE. O.STORAGE.CRYPTED FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(H) are added to realize this Objective. These are more restrictive in terms of the behavior of the TOE than the PP. Therefore, this objective restricts the TOE. As such: - All the TOEs that satisfy the Security Objectives for the TOE of the ST also satisfy the Security Objectives for the TOE of the PP. - All the operational environments that satisfy the Security Objectives for the operational environment of the PP also satisfy the Security Objectives for the operational environment of the ST. In terms of the functional requirements, the ST compared with the PP contains all functional requirements of the PP including the five SFR Packages, as well as additional functional requirements, as shown in Table 9. Note that “-“ in PP Package and PP functional requirement in the table indicates “not applicable”. Copyright CANON INC 2016 17 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Table 9 — Functional requirements specified in the PP and the ST PP_Package PP functional requirement ST functional requirement Common FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 Common FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.2 Common FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 Common FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.2 Common FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1 Common FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.4 Common FDP_ACC.1(a) FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) Common FDP_ACC.1(b) FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) Common FDP_ACF.1(a) FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) Common FDP_ACF.1(b) FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) Common FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1 Common FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 Common FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 Common FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 Common FIA_USB.1 FIA_USB.1 Common FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) Common FMT_MSA.3(a) FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) Common FMT_MSA.1(b) FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) Common FMT_MSA.3(b) FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) Common FMT_MTD.1(FMT_MTD.1.1(a)) FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt) Common FMT_MTD.1(FMT_MTD.1.1(b)) FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) Common FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 Common FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 Common FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 Common FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1 Common FTA_SSL.3 FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui) PRT FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) PRT FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) SCN FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) SCN FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) CPY FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) CPY FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) DSR FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) DSR FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) SMI FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 SMI FPT_FDI_EXP.1 FPT_FDI_EXP.1 SMI FTP_ITC.1 FTP_ITC.1 Common - FIA_AFL.1 Common - FIA_SOS.1 Common - FIA_UAU.7 - - FCS_COP.1(h) - - FCS_CKM.1(h) SMI - FCS_CKM.1(n) SMI - FCS_COP.1(n) SMI - FCS_CKM.2 - FPT_PHP.1 ‐ All TOEs that would meet the SFRs in the ST would also meet the SFRs in the PP. In terms of the Security Assurance Requirements, the ST and PP are equivalent. As such, this ST compared with the PP, specifies equal or greater restrictions on the TOE, and at most equal restrictions on the operational environment of the TOE. Therefore, this ST claims demonstrable conformance to the PP. Copyright CANON INC 2016 18 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 3 Security Problem Definition Notational conventions a) Defined terms in full form are set in title case (for example, “Document Storage and Retrieval"). b) Defined terms in abbreviated form are set in all caps (for example, “DSR"). c) In tables that describe Security Objectives rationale, a checkmark (“") placed at the intersection of a row and column indicates that the threat identified in that row is wholly or partially mitigated by the objective in that column. d) In tables that describe completeness of security requirements, a bold typeface letter “P" placed at the intersection of a row and column indicates that the requirement identified in that row performs a principal fulfillment of the objective indicated in that column. A letter “S" in such an intersection indicates that it performs a supporting fulfillment. e) In tables that describe the sufficiency of security requirements, a bold typeface requirement name and purpose indicates that the requirement performs a principal fulfillment of the objective in the same row. Requirement names and purposes set in normal typeface indicate that those requirements perform supporting fulfillments. f) In specifications of Security Functional Requirements (SFRs): 1) Bold typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been completed or refined in this Protection Profile, relative to the original SFR definition in Common Criteria Part 2 or an Extended Component Definition. 2) Italic typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that must be completed by the ST Author in a conforming Security Target. 3) Bold italic typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been partially completed or refined in this Protection Profile, relative to the original SFR definition in Common Criteria Part 2 or an Extended Component Definition, but which also must be completed by the ST Author in a conforming Security Target. g) The following prefixes are used to indicate different entity types: Table 10 — Notational prefix conventions Prefix Type of entity U. User D. Data F. Function T. Threat P. Policy A. Assumption O. Objective OE. Environmental objective + Security attribute Threats agents This security problem definition addresses threats posed by four categories of threat agents: a) Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the TOE b)Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE functions for which they are not authorized. c) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data in ways for which they are not authorized. Copyright CANON INC 2016 19 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 d)Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose the TOE to unanticipated threats. The threats and policies defined in this Protection Profile address the threats posed by these threat agents. Threats to TOE Assets This section describes threats to assets described in clause 1.8. Table 11 —Threats to User Data for the TOE Threat Affected asset Description T.DOC.DIS D.DOC User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons T.DOC.ALT D.DOC User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons T.FUNC.ALT D.FUNC User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons Table 12 —Threats to TSF Data for the TOE Threat Affected asset Description T.PROT.ALT D.PROT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons T.CONF.DIS D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons T.CONF.ALT D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons Organizational Security Policies for the TOE This section describes the Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) that apply to the TOE. OSPs are used to provide a basis for Security Objectives that are commonly desired by TOE Owners in this operational environment but for which it is not practical to universally define the assets being protected or the threats to those assets. Table 13 —Organizational Security Policies for the TOE Name Definition P.USER.AUTHORIZATION To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner. P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF. P.AUDIT.LOGGING To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel. P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment. P.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION*) To prevent access TOE assets in the HDD with connecting the other HCDs, TOE will have authorized access the HDD data. P.STORAGE.CRYPT**) The data to be stored in the HDD of the TOE must be encrypted. *) A policy that is generally assumed when HDD Encryption Board comprising the TOE is used. **) It is assumed that customers will have a policy to require HDD encryption function in the MFP. Assumptions The Security Objectives and Security Functional Requirements defined in subsequent sections of this Protection Profile are based on the condition that all of the assumptions described in this section are satisfied. Table 14 —Assumptions Copyright CANON INC 2016 20 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Assumption Definition A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE. A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures. A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures. A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes. Copyright CANON INC 2016 21 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 4 Security Objectives Security Objectives for the TOE This section describes the Security Objectives that are satisfied by the TOE. Table 15 — Security Objectives for the TOE Objective Definition O.DOC.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized disclosure. O.DOC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized alteration. O.FUNC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Function Data from unauthorized alteration. O.PROT.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorized alteration. O.CONF.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized disclosure. O.CONF.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized alteration. O.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE shall require identification and authentication of Users, and shall ensure that Users are authorized in accordance with security policies before allowing them to use the TOE. O.INTERFACE.MANAGED The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in accordance with security policies. O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF. O.AUDIT.LOGGED The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant events, and prevent its unauthorized disclosure or alteration. O.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED The TOE shall protect TOE assets in the HDD from accessing without the TOE authorization. O.STORAGE.CRYPTED The TOE shall encrypt the data when writing in the HDD. Security Objectives for the IT environment This section describes the Security Objectives for the IT environment. Table 16 — Security Objectives for the IT environment Objective Definition OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED If audit records are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records are protected from unauthorized access, deletion and modifications. OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED If audit records generated by the TOE are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records can be accessed in order to detect potential security violations, and only by authorized persons. OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED The IT environment shall provide protection from unmanaged access to TOE external interfaces. Security Objectives for the non-IT environment This section describes the Security Objectives for non-IT environments. Copyright CANON INC 2016 22 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Table 17 — Security Objectives for the non-IT environment Objective Definition OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that provides protection from unmanaged physical access to the TOE. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE Owner shall grant permission to Users to be authorized to use the TOE according to the security policies and procedures of their organization. OE.USER.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization and have the training and competence to follow those policies and procedures. OE.ADMIN.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that TOE Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, have the training, competence, and time to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures. OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED The TOE Owner shall establish trust that TOE Administrators will not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes. OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED The TOE Owner shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at appropriate intervals for security violations or unusual patterns of activity. Security Objectives rationale This section demonstrates that each threat, organizational security policy and assumption is mitigated/eased by at least one Security Objective, and that such security objectives counter the threat, implement the security policy and support assumption. Table 18 —Completeness of Security Objectives Threats. Policies, and Assumptions Objectives O.DOC.NO_DIS O.DOC.NO_ALT O.FUNC.NO_ALT O.PROT.NO_ALT O.CONF.NO_DIS O.CONF.NO_ALT O.USER.AUTHORIZED OE.USER.AUTHORIZED O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED O.AUDIT.LOGGED O.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED O.INTERFACE.MANAGED O.STORAGE.CRYPTED OE.PHYISCAL.MANAGED OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED OE.ADMIN.TRAINED OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED OE.USER.TRAINED T.DOC.DIS      T.DOC.ALT      T.FUNC.ALT     T.PROT.ALT     T.CONF.DIS     T.CONF.ALT    P.USER.AUTHORIZATION  P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION       P.AUDIT.LOGGING     P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT      P.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION       Copyright CANON INC 2016 23 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Threats. Policies, and Assumptions Objectives O.DOC.NO_DIS O.DOC.NO_ALT O.FUNC.NO_ALT O.PROT.NO_ALT O.CONF.NO_DIS O.CONF.NO_ALT O.USER.AUTHORIZED OE.USER.AUTHORIZED O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED O.AUDIT.LOGGED O.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED O.INTERFACE.MANAGED O.STORAGE.CRYPTED OE.PHYISCAL.MANAGED OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED OE.ADMIN.TRAINED OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED OE.USER.TRAINED P.STORAGE.CRYPT       A.ACCESS.MANAGED      A.ADMIN.TRAINING      A.ADMIN.TRUST  A.USER.TRAINING  Table 19 —Sufficiency of Security Objectives Threats. Policies, and Assumptions Summary Objectives and rationale T.DOC.DIS User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons O.DOC.NO_DIS protects D.DOC from unauthorized disclosure O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization T.DOC.ALT User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons O.DOC.NO_ALT protects D.DOC from unauthorized alteration O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization T.FUNC.ALT User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons O.FUNC.NO_ALT protects D.FUNC from unauthorized alteration O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization T.PROT.ALT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons O.PROT.NO_ALT protects D.PROT from unauthorized alteration O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization Copyright CANON INC 2016 24 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Threats. Policies, and Assumptions Summary Objectives and rationale OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization T.CONF.DIS TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons O.CONF.NO_DIS protects D.CONF from unauthorized disclosure O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization T.CONF.ALT TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons O.CONF.NO_ALT protects D.CONF from unauthorized alteration O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization P.USER.AUTHORIZA TION Users will be authorized to use the TOE O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization to use the TOE OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization P.SOFTWARE.VERIF ICATION Procedures will exist to self- verify executable code in the TSF O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED provides procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF P.AUDIT.LOGGING An audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, protected, and reviewed. O.AUDIT.LOGGED creates and maintains a log of TOE use and security-relevant events, and prevents unauthorized disclosure or alteration OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED protects exported audit records from unauthorized access, deletion and modifications OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of, the TOE Owner to provide appropriate access to exported audit records OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to ensure that audit logs are appropriately reviewed P.HDD.ACCESS.AUT HORIZATION To prevent access TOE assets in the HDD with connecting the other HCDs, TOE will have authorized access the HDD data. O.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED protects TOE assets in the HDD from accessing without the TOE authorization. P.INTERFACE.MANA GEMENT Operation of external interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment. O.INTERFACE.MANAGED manages the operation of external interfaces in accordance with security policies OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED establishes a protected environment for TOE external interfaces P.STORAGE.CRYPT The data to be stored in the HDD will be encrypted. O.STORAGE.CRYPTED encrypts the data when writing in the HDD. Copyright CANON INC 2016 25 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Threats. Policies, and Assumptions Summary Objectives and rationale A.ACCESS.MANAGE D The TOE environment provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE. OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED establishes a protected physical environment for the TOE A.ADMIN.TRAININ G TOE Users are aware of and trained to follow security policies and procedures OE.ADMIN.TRAINED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate Administrator training. A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes. OE.ADMIN.TRUST establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to have a trusted relationship with Administrators. A.USER.TRAINING Administrators are aware of and trained to follow security policies and procedures OE.USER.TRAINED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate User training. Copyright CANON INC 2016 26 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 5 Extended components definition (APE_ECD) Protection Profile defines components that are extensions to Common Criteria 3.1 Revision 2, Part 2. These extended components are defined in the Protection Profile but are used in SFR Packages, and therefore, are employed only in TOEs whose STs conform to those SFR Packages. FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces Family behaviour: This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of information from one external interface to another external interface. Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended to transform and process this information before it is transmitted on another external interface. However, some products may provide the capability for attackers to misuse external interfaces to violate the security of the TOE or devices that are connected to the TOE's external interfaces. Therefore, direct forwarding of unprocessed data between different external interfaces is forbidden unless explicitly allowed by an authorized administrative role. The family FPT_FDI_EXP has been defined to specify this kind of functionality. Component leveling: FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces, provides for the functionality to require TSF controlled processing of data received over defined external interfaces before these data are sent out on another external interface. Direct forwarding of data from one external interface to another one requires explicit allowance by an authorized administrative role. Management: FPT_FDI_EXP.1 The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: a) Definition of the role(s) that are allowed to perform the management activities b) Management of the conditions under which direct forwarding can be allowed by an administrative role c) Revocation of such an allowance. Audit: FPT_FDI_EXP.1 The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST: There are no auditable events foreseen. Rationale: Quite often a TOE is supposed to perform specific checks and process data received on one external interface before such (processed) data are allowed to be transferred to another external interface. Examples are firewall systems but also other systems that require a specific work flow for the incoming data before it can be FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces 1 Copyright CANON INC 2016 27 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 transferred. Direct forwarding of such data (i.e., without processing the data first) between different external interfaces is therefore a function that—if allowed at all—can only be allowed by an authorized role. It has been viewed as useful to have this functionality as a single component that allows specifying the property to disallow direct forwarding and require that only an authorized role can allow this. Since this is a function that is quite common for a number of products, it has been viewed as useful to define an extended component. The Common Criteria defines attribute-based control of User Data flow in its FDP class. However, in this Protection Profile, the authors needed to express the control of both User Data and TSF Data flow using administrative control instead of attribute-based control. It was found that using FDP_IFF and FDP_IFC for this purpose resulted in SFRs that were either too implementation-specific for a Protection Profile or too unwieldy for refinement in a Security Target. Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component to address this functionality. This extended component protects both User Data and TSF Data, and it could therefore be placed in either the FDP or FPT class. Since its purpose is to protect the TOE from misuse, the authors believed that it was most appropriate to place it in the FPT class. It did not fit well in any of the existing families in either class, and this lead the authors to define a new family with just one member. FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles. FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: list of external interfaces] from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to [assignment: list of external interfaces]. Copyright CANON INC 2016 28 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 6 Security requirements Security functional requirements This section describes the security functional requirements for the TOE. The text in brackets following the component identifier or element name denotes iteration operations. 6.1.1 User Authentication Function FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within[assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events]. [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within[assignment: range of acceptable values]] - an administrator configurable positive integer within 1 to 10 [assignment: list of authentication events] - Login attempts from the control panel or remote UIs. FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions]. [selection: met, surpassed] - met [assignment: list of actions] - Lockout FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [assignment: list of security attributes]. [assignment: list of security attributes]. - User name, role FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Copyright CANON INC 2016 29 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-controlled Functions of the TOE] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-controlled Functions of the TOE] - Submission of print jobs, I-fax jobs FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the authentication is in progress. [assignment: list of feedback] - * FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-controlled Functions of the TOE] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-controlled Functions of the TOE] - Submission of print jobs, I-fax jobs FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes]. [assignment: list of user security attributes]. - User name, role Copyright CANON INC 2016 30 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]. [assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]. - None FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]. [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes] - None FTA_SSL.3(lui) TSF-initiated termination Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. FTA_SSL.3.1(lui) The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of userinactivity]. [assignment: time interval of userinactivity]. - User inactivity at the control panel lasting for the specified period of time. FTA_SSL.3(rui) TSF-initiated termination Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. FTA_SSL.3.1(rui) The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of userinactivity]. [assignment: time interval of userinactivity]. - User inactivity at the remote UI lasting for 15 minutes. 6.1.2 Function Use Restriction Function FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) Management of security attributes Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions Copyright CANON INC 2016 31 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 FMT_MSA.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP, [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles]. [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] - None [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] - query, modify, delete, create [assignment: list of security attributes] - Role [assignment: the authorised identified roles]. - U.ADMINISTRATOR FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) Static attribute initialisation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MSA.3.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control Policy, [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] - None [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] - Restrictive [refinement] - TOE Function Access Control Policy -> TOE Function Access Control SFP FMT_MSA.3.2(exec-job) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. [assignment: the authorized identified roles] - Nobody FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) Subset access control Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACC.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP on users as subjects, TOE functions as objects, and the right to use the functions as operations. FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) Security attribute based access control Copyright CANON INC 2016 32 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_ACF.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP to objects based on the following: users and [assignment: list of TOE functions and the security attribute(s) used to determine the TOE Function Access Control SFP]. [assignment: list of TOE functions and the security attribute(s) used to determine the TOE Function Access Control SFP] - objects controlled under the TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 20, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 20. FDP_ACF.1.2(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [selection: the user is explicitly authorized by U.ADMINISTATOR to use a function, a user that is authorized to use the TOE is automatically authorized to use the functions [assignment: list of functions], [assignment: other conditions]]. [selection: the user is explicitly authorized by U.ADMINISTATOR to use a function, a user that is authorized to use the TOE is automatically authorized to use the functions [assignment: list of functions], [assignment: other conditions]] - [assignment: other conditions] [assignment: other conditions] - rules specified in the TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 20 governing access among controlled users as subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects FDP_ACF.1.3(exec-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: the user acts in the role U.ADMINISTRATOR, [assignment: other rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: other rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects] - None FDP_ACF.1.4(exec-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects] - None Table 20 —TOE Function Access Control SFP Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Attribu te Access control rule [Secure Print] +PRT Use of the function, using U.USER Role For the attribute of the Object, the role associated with the Copyright CANON INC 2016 33 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 pointer to the Object. Subject, must be authorized to perform the Operation. [Copy] +CPY +DSR Use of the function, using pointer to the Object. U.USER Role For the attribute of the Object, the role associated with the Subject, must be authorized to perform the Operation. [Scan] +SCN +DSR Use of the function, using pointer to the Object. U.USER Role For the attribute of the Object, the role associated with the Subject, must be authorized to perform the Operation. [I-Fax Inbox] +DSR Use of the function, using pointer to the Object. U.USER Role For the attribute of the Object, the role associated with the Subject, must be authorized to perform the Operation. [Access Stored Files] +DSR Use of the function, using pointer to the Object. U.USER Role For the attribute of the Object, the role associated with the Subject, must be authorized to perform the Operation. Remote UI [Access Received/Stored Files] +DSR Use of the function, using pointer to the Object. U.USER Role If the role associated with the Subject is Administrator, the Operation is permitted. 6.1.3 Job Output Restriction Functions 6.1.3.1 Delete Job FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) Management of security attributes Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MSA.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22, [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles]. [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] - In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] - Refer to “Operation" in Table 21. [assignment: list of security attributes] - Refer to “Security Attributes" in Table 21. [assignment: the authorised identified roles] - Refer to “Role" in Table 21. Copyright CANON INC 2016 34 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Table 21 —Management of security attributes Security Attributes Operation Role User name delete, create, query U.ADMINISTRATOR Box PINs modify, create U.ADMINISTRATOR PIN of own Mail Box Modify U.NORMAL FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) Static attribute initialisation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MSA.3.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22, [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] - Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 - In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] - restrictive FMT_MSA.3.2(delete-job) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. [assignment: the authorized identified roles] - Nobody FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) Subset access control Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACC.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 on the list of users as subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22. FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) Security attribute based access control Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control Copyright CANON INC 2016 35 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_ACF.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 to objects based on the following: the list of users as subjects and objects controlled under the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 22. FDP_ACF.1.2(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules specified in the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 governing access among controlled users as subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects. FDP_ACF.1.3(delete-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects] - U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to delete any D.DOC/D.FUNC. - U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to modify any +CPY, +SCN, +DSR D.FUNC. FDP_ACF.1.4(delete-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects] - None Table 22 —Common Access Control SFP Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Access control rule D.DOC +PRT,+SCN,+CPY, +DSR Delete U.NORMAL Denied, except for his/her own documents D.FUNC +PRT,+SCN,+CPY, +DSR Modify; Delete U.NORMAL Denied, except for his/her own function data 6.1.3.2 In The Job FDP_ACC.1(in-job) Subset access control Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACC.1.1(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23 on the list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23. FDP_ACF.1(in-job) Security attribute based access control Copyright CANON INC 2016 36 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_ACF.1.1(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23 to objects based on the following: the list of subjects and objects controlled under the In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 23. FDP_ACF.1.2(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules specified in the In The Job Access Control SFPin Table 23 governing access among Users and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects. FDP_ACF.1.3(in-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects] - U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to read any +DSR D.DOC FDP_ACF.1.4(in-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects] - None Table 23 —In The Job Access Control SFP Object Attribute(s) Operation Subject Access control rule D.DOC +PRT Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents D.DOC +SCN Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents D.DOC +CPY Read U.USER Denied D.DOC +DSR Read U.NORMAL Denied, except for his/her own documents 6.1.4 Forward Received Jobs Function FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles. FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on any external Interface from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to any Shared- medium Interface. Copyright CANON INC 2016 37 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 6.1.5 HDD Data Erase Function FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: D.DOC, [assignment: list of objects]. [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] - deallocation of the resource from [assignment: list of objects] - None 6.1.6 HDD Data Encryption Function 6.1.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic operation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1.1(h) The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] - Encryption of data written to the HDD - Decryption of data read out from the HDD [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] - AES [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] - 256 bit [assignment: list of standards] - FIPS PUB 197 6.1.6.2 MFP Identification and Authentication Function FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies Copyright CANON INC 2016 38 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambigouous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF. [refinement] physical tampering  replacement of HDD and HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board with malicious intention FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF’s devices or TSF’s elements has occurred. [refinement] physical tampering  replacement of HDD and HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board with malicious intention 6.1.7 LAN Data Protection Function 6.1.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function FCS_COP.1(n) Cryptographic operation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1.1(n) The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] - Encryption of IP packets sent to the LAN - Decryption of IP packets received from the LAN [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] - Refer to "Cryptographic Algorithm" in Table 24. [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] - Refer to "Cryptographic Key Sizes" in Table 24. [assignment: list of standards] - Refer to "List of Standards" in Table 24. Table 24 — IPSec cryptographic algorithm, key sizes and standards cryptographic algorithm cryptographic key sizes list of standards 3DES-CBC 168 bit FIPS PUB 46-3 AES-CBC 128 bit, 192bit, 256 bit FIPS PUB 197 AES-GCM 128 bit, 192bit, 256 bit SP800-38D FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. Copyright CANON INC 2016 39 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for communication of D.DOC, D.FUNC, D.PROT, and D.CONF over any Shared-medium Interface. 6.1.8 Self-Test Function FPT_TST.1 TSF testing Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]. [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] - during initial start-up [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF] - Cryptographic algorithms used with the LAN Data Protection Function (AES, 3DES) FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF data]. [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF data] - [assignment: parts of TSF] [assignment: parts of TSF] - Audit log FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. 6.1.9 Audit Log Function FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps Copyright CANON INC 2016 40 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] level of audit; and c) All Auditable Events as each is defined for its Audit Level (if one is specified) for the Relevant SFR in Table 25; [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]. [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] - not specified [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events] - None FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, for each Relevant SFR listed in Table 25: (1) information as defined by its Audit Level (if one is specified), and (2) all Additional Information (if any is required); [assignment: other audit relevant information]. [assignment: other audit relevant information] - None Table 25 —Audit data requirements Auditable event Relevant SFR Audit level Additional information Job completion FDP_ACF.1 Not specified Type of job Both successful and unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism FIA_UAU.1 Basic None required Both successful and unsuccessful use of the identification mechanism FIA_UID.1 Basic Attempted user identity, if available Use of the management functions FMT_SMF.1 Minimum None required Modifications to the group of users that are part of a role FMT_SMR.1 Minimum None required Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 Minimum None required Termination of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism5 FTA_SSL.3 Minimum None required Failure of the trusted channel functions FTP_ITC.1 Minimum None required FAU_GEN.2 User identity association Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 5 See “Section 14.1 IEEE Std 2600.2 Errata" in the PP Guide. In IEEE Std 2600.2, this is indicated as “Locking of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism" but notes that this is a transcription error. Copyright CANON INC 2016 41 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event. FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to read [assignment: list of audit information] from the audit records. [assignment: authorised users] - U.ADMINISTRATOR [assignment: list of audit information] - Refer to the audit logs listed in Table 25. FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access. FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion. FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail. Copyright CANON INC 2016 42 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] - prevent FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events" , “prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights" , “overwrite the oldest stored audit records" ] and [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full. [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events" , “prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights" , “overwrite the oldest stored audit records" ] - “overwrite the oldest stored audit records" [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] - None 6.1.10 Management Function 6.1.10.1 User Management Function FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [assignment: a defined quality metric]. [assignment: a defined quality metric] - Use a password 4 to 32 characters in length - Prohibit the use of 3 or more consecutive characters - Use at least one uppercase character (A to Z) - Use at least one lowercase character (a to z) - Use at least one number (0-9) - Use at least one non-alphabet characters (^-@[]:;,./¥!"#$%&'()=~|{`+*}_?><) - Allowed characters  All characters other than control characters FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) Management of TSF Data Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions Copyright CANON INC 2016 43 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 FMT_MTD.1.1 (user-mgt) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF Data associated with a U.NORMAL or TSF Data associated with documents or jobs owned by a U.NORMAL] to [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, the U.NORMAL to whom such TSF Data are associated]]. [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] - Refer to “Operation" in Table 26. [assignment: list of TSF Data associated with a U.NORMAL or TSF Data associated with documents or jobs owned by a U.NORMAL] - Refer to “TSF Data" in Table 26. [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, the U.NORMAL to whom such TSF Data are associated]] - Refer to “Role" in Table 26. Table 26 — User information management TSF Data Role Operation User name U.ADMINISTRATOR delete, create, query Role U.ADMINISTRATOR modify, delete, create, query Passwords U.ADMINISTRATOR modify, delete, create Own password U.NORMAL Modify FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles U.ADMINISTRATOR, U.NORMAL, [selection: Nobody, [assignment: the authorised identified roles]]. [selection: Nobody, [assignment: the authorised identified roles]] - Nobody FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles, except for the role “Nobody" to which no user shall be associated. 6.1.10.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function FCS_CKM.1(h) Cryptographic key generation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.1.1(h) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. Copyright CANON INC 2016 44 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] - Random number generation algorithm according to SP800-90A using Hash_DRBG [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] - 256 bit [assignment: list of standards] - Not specified FCS_CKM.1(n) Cryptographic key generation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.1.1(n) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] - Cryptographic key generation algorithm according to FIPS PUB 186-2 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] - 128bit, 168bit, 192bit, 256 bit [assignment: list of standards] - FIPS PUB 186-2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [assignment: cryptographic key distribution method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards]. [assignment: cryptographic key distribution method] - DH (Diffie Hellman) and ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman) [assignment: list of standards] - SP800-56A 6.1.10.3 Device Management Function Copyright CANON INC 2016 45 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt) Management of TSF Data Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MTD.1.1(device-mgt) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, [assignment: the authorized identified roles except U.NORMAL]]]. [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] - Refer to “Operation" in Table 27. [assignment: list of TSF data] - Refer to “TSF Data Table 27. [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, [assignment: the authorized identified roles except U.NORMAL]]] - Refer to “Role" in Table 27. Table 27 — Device management function TSF Data Role Operation Date/Time settings U.ADMINISTRATOR Modify HDD Data Erase settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify IPSec settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify Auto Reset settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify Lockout policy settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify Password policy settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify Audit log U.ADMINISTRATOR query, delete FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]. [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF] - Refer to “Management Function" in Table 28. Table 28 —The management of security requirements Management Function Operation Date/Time settings modify HDD Data Erase settings query, modify IPSec settings query, modify Copyright CANON INC 2016 46 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Management Function Operation Auto Reset settings query, modify Lockout policy settings query, modify Password policy settings query, modify Audit log query, delete Username delete, create, query Role modify, delete, create, query Password modify, delete, create Box PIN modify, create Own password modify PIN of own Mail Box modify Security Assurance Requirements Table 29 lists the Security Assurance Requirements for 2600.2-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment B, and related SFR Packages, EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2. Table 29 — IEEE 2600.2 Security Assurance Requirements Assurance class Assurance components ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_TDS.1 Basic design AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures (augmentation of EAL2) ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition ASE_INT.1 ST introduction ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis Security functional requirements rationale 6.3.1 The completeness of security requirements Table 30 provides a mapping of TOE Security Objectives and security functional requirements. This shows how each of the security functional requirements corresponds to at least one TOE Security Objective. Bold typeface items provide principal (P) fulfillment of the objectives, and normal typeface items provide supporting (S) fulfillment. Copyright CANON INC 2016 47 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Table 30 —The completeness of security requirements SFRs Objectives O.DOC.NO_DIS O.DOC.NO_ALT O.FUNC.NO_ALT O.PROT.NO_ALT O.CONF.NO_DIS O.CONF.NO_ALT O.USER.AUTHORIZED O.INTERFACE.MANAGED O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED O.AUDIT.LOGGED O.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED O.STORAGE.CRYPTED FIA_AFL.1 S FIA_ATD.1 S FIA_UAU.1 P P FIA_UAU.7 S FIA_UID.1 S S S S S S P P S FIA_USB.1 P FTA_SSL.3(lui) P P FTA_SSL.3(rui) P P FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) S FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) S FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) P FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) S FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) S S S FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) S S S FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) P P P FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) S S S FDP_ACC.1(in-job) P FDP_ACF.1(in-job) S FPT_FDI_EXP.1 P FDP_RIP.1 P FCS_COP.1(h) S S P FPT_PHP.1 P FCS_COP.1(n) S S S S S S FTP_ITC.1 P P P P P P FCS_CKM.1(h) S S P FCS_CKM.1(n) S S S S S S FCS_CKM.2 S S S S S S FPT_TST.1 P FAU_GEN.1 P FAU_GEN.2 P FAU_SAR.1 P FAU_SAR.2 P FAU_STG.1 P FAU_STG.4 P Copyright CANON INC 2016 48 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 SFRs Objectives O.DOC.NO_DIS O.DOC.NO_ALT O.FUNC.NO_ALT O.PROT.NO_ALT O.CONF.NO_DIS O.CONF.NO_ALT O.USER.AUTHORIZED O.INTERFACE.MANAGED O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED O.AUDIT.LOGGED O.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED O.STORAGE.CRYPTED FPT_STM.1 S FIA_SOS.1 S FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) P P P FMT_SMR.1 S S S S S S S FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt) P P P FMT_SMF.1 S S S S S S 6.3.2 The sufficiency of security requirements This section provides the rationale on how the security functional requirements are sufficient to satisfy the Security Objectives. O.DOC.NO_DIS is the security objective that ensures user document data is protected from unauthorized disclosure. O.DOC.NO_DIS is addressed by the following: Based on user identification information resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for access control. The identified users are allowed to cancel only his/her own job according to FMT_MSA.1(delete- job)/FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)/FDP_ACF.1(delete-job). The identified users are allowed to access only his/her own document data in print job, according to FDP_ACC.1(in-job)/FDP_ACF.1(in-job), and Nobody is allowed to access any document data in other job types. Furthermore, by FDP_RIP.1, complete deletion of residual information of user document data created as a result of job processing is ensured. By FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(h), User Data and TSF Data in the HDD are protected from unauthorized disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, User Data and TSF Data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FMT_SMF.1, management functions related to these actions, are provided. O.DOC.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of user document data from unauthorized alteration. O.DOC.NO_ALT is addressed by the following: Based on user identification information resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for access control. The identified users are allowed to operate only his/her own job according to FMT_MSA.1(delete- job)/FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)/FDP_ACF.1(delete-job). Furthermore, by FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(h), User Data and TSF Data in the HDD are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, User Data and TSF Data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FMT_SMF.1, management functions related to these actions, are provided. Copyright CANON INC 2016 49 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 O.FUNC.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of user function data from unauthorized alteration. O.FUNC.NO_ALT is addressed by the following: Based on user identification information resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for access control. The identified users are allowed to operate only his/her own job according to FMT_MSA.1(delete- job)/FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)/FDP_ACF.1(delete-job). Furthermore, by FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(h), User Data and TSF Data in the HDD are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, User Data and TSF Data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FMT_SMF.1, management functions related to these actions, are provided. O.PROT.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of TSF protected data from unauthorized alteration. O.PROT.NO_ALT is addressed by the following: Based on user identification information managed by FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) and resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for the Device Management function as specified by FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), and FMT_SMF.1. Furthermore, by FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(h), User Data and TSF Data in the HDD are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, User Data and TSF Data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. O.CONF.NO_DIS is the security objective that ensures protection of TSF confidential data from unauthorized disclosure. O.CONF.NO_DIS is addressed by the following: Based on user identification information managed by FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) and resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for the Device Management function as specified by FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), and FMT_SMF.1. Furthermore, by FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(h), User Data and TSF Data in the HDD are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, User Data and TSF Data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. O.CONF.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of TSF confidential data from unauthorized alteration. O.CONF.NO_ALT is addressed by the following: Based on user identification information managed by FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) and resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for the Device Management function as specified by FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), and FMT_SMF.1. Furthermore, by FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(h), User Data and TSF Data in the HDD are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, User Data and TSF Data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. O.USER.AUTHORIZED is the security objective that ensures user identification and authentication. O.USER.AUTHORIZED is addressed by the following: Users authenticated by the identification and authentication mechanism specified by FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.7, and FIA_AFL.1, with user sessions managed by FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1, and FTA_SSL.3(lui)/FTA_SSL.3(rui), are granted use of the function, as determined by access control specified by FDP_ACC.1(exec-job)/FDP_ACF.1(exec-job). Furthermore, authorized user information are managed by FIA_SOS.1, FMT_MSA.1(exec-job), FMT_MSA.3(exec-job), and FMT_SMR.1. O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is the security objective that ensures control of operations of the I/O interfaces in accordance with security policy. O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is addressed by the following: By FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, and FTA_SSL.3(lui)/FTA_SSL.3(rui), the user interface is managed. By FPT_FDI_EXP.1, restricted forwarding of data to the LAN is specified. O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED is addressed by providing the self-test procedures specified by FPT_TST.1. Copyright CANON INC 2016 50 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 O.AUDIT.LOGGED is addressed by providing the Audit Log function as specified by FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, and FAU_STG.4. FIA_UID.1 and FPT_STM.1 provide the means for user information and timestamps generated on audit logs. O.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED is addressed by providing MFP identification and authentication function as specified by FPT_PHP.1 before HDD access. O.STORAGE.CRYPTED is addressed by providing encryption/decryption function of FCS_COP.1(h) and cryptographic key management function of FCS_CKM.1(h). 6.3.3 The dependencies of security requirements This section provides the justification for any dependencies not met. Table 31 —The dependencies of security requirements Functional Requirement Dependencies required by CC Dependencies satisfied by ST Reason for not meeting dependencies FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FIA_UID.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FTA_SSL.3(lui) No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FTA_SSL.3(rui) No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) FMT_SMR.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) FMT_SMR.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_ACC.1(in-job) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_ACF.1(in-job) FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FPT_FDI_EXP.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FCS_COP.1(h) [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1(h)] FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1(h) FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, and disappear when power is shut off. Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is prevented by the design of the system. As such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FPT_PHP.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) Copyright CANON INC 2016 51 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Functional Requirement Dependencies required by CC Dependencies satisfied by ST Reason for not meeting dependencies FTP_ITC.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FCS_COP.1(n) [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1(n)] FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1(n) FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, and disappear when power is shut off. Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is prevented by the design of the system. As such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FCS_CKM.1(h) FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1(h) FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, and disappear when power is shut off. Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is prevented by the design of the system. As such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FCS_CKM.1(n) [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1(n) FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, and disappear when power is shut off. Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is prevented by the design of the system. As such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FCS_CKM.2 [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1(n) FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, and disappear when power is shut off. Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is prevented by the design of the system. As such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FPT_TST.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1 FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FPT_STM.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FIA_SOS.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_MTD.1(device- mgt) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) Security assurance requirements rationale This Protection Profile has been developed for Hardcopy Devices to be used in commercial information processing environments that require a moderate level of document security, network security, and security assurance. The TOE will be exposed to only a low level of risk because it is assumed that the TOE will be located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides almost constant protection from unauthorized Copyright CANON INC 2016 52 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 and unmanaged access to the TOE and its data interfaces. Agents cannot physically access any nonvolatile storage without disassembling the TOE except for removable nonvolatile storage devices, where protection of User and TSF Data are provided when such devices are removed from the TOE environment. Agents have limited or no means of infiltrating the TOE with code to effect a change and the TOE self-verifies its executable code to detect unintentional malfunctions. As such, the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 is appropriate. EAL 2 is augmented with ALC_FLR.2, Flaw reporting procedures. ALC_FLR.2 ensures that instructions and procedures for the reporting and remediation of identified security flaws are in place, and their inclusion is expected by the consumers of this TOE. Copyright CANON INC 2016 53 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 7 TOE Summary specification This section describes the TOE summary specifications. User Authentication Function - Supported functional requirements: FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1, FIA_AFL.1, FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui) When the control panel or a remote UI is used to operate the MFP, before permitting such operations, the TOE requires user authentication in order to identify and authenticate valid users. However, the submission of print jobs, and I-fax jobs is always permitted. [FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1] Two methods of user authentication are supported: - External Authentication Authentication is based on user information registered in the authentication server. This may be an Active Directory server that uses Kerberos authentication, or LDAP server that uses LDAP authentication. - Internal Authentication Authentication is based on user information registered in the device. For user authentication, the TOE prompts input of the user name, password, and the login destination. User authentication succeeds only if the user name and password matches the one at the specified destination. For security, note that the password is masked by asterisks in the text field. [FIA_UAU.7] The TOE issues an Access Control Token (ACT) to each user successfully authenticated. The ACT is an object that contains the user's name and role, as well as the access permissions to the application functions that are specified for each user role. [FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1] The TOE provides a lockout function in order to minimize invalid login attempts. [FIA_AFL.1] - This function locks out any user that fails to login successfully within the maximum number of failed authentication attempts. A value from 1 to 10 can be specified as the number of attempts before lockout (Initial value: 3). - Any user that is locked out will not be able to login until the lockout time passes. A value from 1 to 60 minutes can be specified as the lockout time (Initial value: 3 minutes). The TOE terminates an interactive session when there is no user activity at the control panel or remote UI lasting for a specified period of time. [FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui)] - At the control panel, session timeout occurs after a specified period of user inactivity. A value from 10 seconds to 9 minutes can be specified (Initial value: 2 minutes). - At a remote UI, session timeout occurs after 15 minutes of user inactivity. Function Use Restriction Function - Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(exec-job), FDP_ACF.1(exec-job), FMT_MSA.1(exec-job), FMT_MSA.3(exec-job), FMT_SMF.1 Copyright CANON INC 2016 54 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 For each UI, the TOE provides Function Use Restriction, which controls access based on the contents of the ACT issued to authenticated users. Any queries, modifications, deletions, and additions to the role contained in the ACT, are performed by U.ADMINISTRATORs only. For Function Use Restriction, the attribute of the Object is the functions itself, and is therefore fixed. When the control panel is used, Function Use Restriction Function permits or denies use of functions depending on the settings in “Application Restrictions", which are based on the role contained in the ACT. When a remote UI is used, Function Use Restriction Function permits or denies use of functions based on attribute values associated with the role in the ACT. Only U.ADMINISTRATORs are allowed use of all functions. Table 32 — Function Use Restriction Policy UI Object Condition Operation Control panel Pointer to [Secure Print] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Secure Print] function. Executed by activating the Object. Pointer to [Copy] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Copy] function Executed by activating the Object. Pointer to [Scan and Send] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Scan and Send] function Executed by activating the Object. Pointer to [I-Fax Inbox] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Access Stored Files] function Executed by activating the Object. Pointer to [Access Stored Files] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Access Stored Files] function Executed by activating the Object. Pointer to [Scan and Store] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Scan and Store] function Executed by activating the Object. Remote UI Pointer to [Access Received/Stored Files] The role associated with U.USER is anything other than Administrator. Cannot be executed. Job Output Restriction Functions For Print, Copy, and Scan jobs, the TOE provides the following security functions. Job Output Restriction restricts access to submitted jobs, to the user that executed the job. 7.3.1 Job Cancel - Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(delete-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FMT_SMF.1 TOE can delete Print, Copy, and Scan jobs according to following. The user name of these jobs is initialized by username of the user that executed the job. - U.NORMAL is authorized to delete his/her own job. - U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to delete all jobs. With the cancellation of the job, the attribute value to be attached to the job is deleted. Copyright CANON INC 2016 55 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 7.3.2 In The JOB Access Control - Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(in-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job), FDP_ACF.1(in-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FMT_SMF.1 TOE provides the following access control functions for documents in each jobs. User name of these jobs is initialized by username of the user that executed the job. Copy, Scan Jobs - Nobody is authorized to read documents in any copy jobs. - Nobody is authorized to read documents in any scan jobs, except in case of 7.3.3 Temporarily Stored Jobs. Temporarily Stored Print Jobs If a print job with PIN is submitted, the job is temporarily stored in the machine without being output. Additionally, it uses the user name associated with the print job to determine its owner, in order to realize access restriction as described below. For temporarily stored jobs, the following operations are available to U.USERs, only if the user's name matches the user name associated with the desired job. - Print - Change priority for printing - Delete For jobs to which print is instructed, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed to execute the following: - Delete Received I-Fax Jobs For documents received by I-fax, the TOE provides the Memory RX Inbox where these jobs may be stored as files, to be output at a later time. Since these are stored in the Memory RX Inbox, access control to this inbox, is equivalent to access control to the stored document data. A seven digit PIN can be assigned to the Memory RX Inbox, to prevent unauthorized access by other users. Only U.ADMINISTRATORs are authorized to initialize, set, modify, or delete the PIN on the Memory RX Inbox, which means only U.ADMINISTRATORS are allowed access to the stored document data. The TOE realizes access restriction, by determining the U.ADMINISTRATOR that enters the correct PIN to be the owner of the stored document data, preventing any U.NORMAL from executing print or send operations on the document data. If the control panel is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations without entering any PIN. - Print - Send - Delete Copyright CANON INC 2016 56 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 If a remote UI is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations only by entering the correct PIN. - Print - Send - Delete Document Data Stored in Mail Box For Copy, Scan, or Send jobs, the TOE provides Mail Boxes where these jobs may be stored as document data, to be printed or sent at a later time. Since these are stored in Mail Boxes, access control to Mail Boxes, is equivalent to access control to the stored document data. A seven digit PIN can be assigned to a Mail Box, to help prevent unauthorized access by other users. No PIN is required when storing document data in a Mail Box. The TOE realizes access restriction, by determining the U.USER that enters the correct PIN, to be the owner of the stored document data. For document data stored in a Mail Box, the following operations are made available to U.NORMAL only by entering the correct PIN. - Print - Change print settings - Preview - Send - Delete If the control panel is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations without entering any PIN. - Print - Change print settings - Preview - Send - Delete If a remote UI is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations only by entering the correct PIN. - Print - Change print settings - Preview - Send - Delete [Box PIN] Copyright CANON INC 2016 57 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 For the PIN set on Mail Boxes/Memory RX Inbox, only U.ADMINISTRATORs assigned the Administrator role are allowed to set/change any PIN. Note however, that U.NORMALs are allowed to change the PIN for the Mail Box they use. 7.3.3 Temporarily Stored Jobs - Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(in-job), FDP_ACF.1(in-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) Send Jobs are Scan jobs. And there are Delayed Send function and Preview function as Temporarily Stored Jobs function to store jobs temporarily. Delayed Send When the TOE receives a TX job with transmission time specified, it is first stored temporarily, until sending at the specified time. For temporarily stored TX jobs, the following operations are available to U.NORMALs, only if the user's name matches the user name associated with the desired job. - Change destination For all temporarily stored TX jobs, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed to execute the following: - Change destination Preview When the TOE receives a TX job with Preview setting, it is first stored temporarily and previewed, later it is sent. For temporarily stored TX jobs, the following operations are available to U.USERs, only if the user's name matches the user name associated with the desired job. - Preview - Delete Pages - Cancel Jobs Forward Received Jobs Function - Supported functional requirements: FPT_FDI_EXP.1 The design of the TOE prevents received data from being forwarded directly to a server or computer. This function enables the user to restrict forwarding of received jobs to the LAN. HDD Data Erase Function - Supported functional requirements: FDP_RIP.1 By overwriting with random data, the TOE permanently erases document data (including temporary image files) in the HDD, to ensure that no trace of the document data remains on the HDD. The user can choose one of the following erasure methods: Copyright CANON INC 2016 58 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 - Overwrite using the DoD standard - Overwrite with random data three times - Overwrite once with random data - Overwrite once with null data The timing in which data are erased is specified below. - Image files temporarily stored in the HDD as a result of job processing is completely erased during or after processing of the job. - Document data are completely erased from the HDD, immediately after being deleted from Mail Box/Memory RX Inbox. - Residual information that remained unerased due to a sudden power shutdown, are completely erased from the HDD upon startup of the TOE. HDD Data Encryption Function The security functions provided by the “HDD data encryption & mirroring board” of the TOE are described below. The encryption/decryption function and MFP identification and authentication function provide confidentiality protection for User Data and TSF Data stored in the HDD. 7.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function - Supported functional requirements: FCS_COP.1(h) To protect the confidentiality of User Data and TSF Data stored in the HDD, the TOE performs the following cryptographic operations to encrypt all data stored in the HDD. - Encryption of data written to the HDD. - Decryption of data read out from the HDD. The cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key size are specified below: - AES algorithm (FIPS PUB 197) - 256 bit key length 7.6.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function - Supported functional requirements: FCS_CKM.1(h) The TOE uses the following specifications for generating the cryptographic key that is used by the HDD data encryption function. - Uses a random number generation algorithm according to NIST SP800-90A Hash_DRBG(SHA-256) for cryptographic key generation - Generates a cryptographic key with 256 bit key length The cryptographic key is managed as follows. Copyright CANON INC 2016 59 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 - Upon startup, the TOE reads the seed information stored in FlashROM and generates a cryptographic key. - After generating the cryptographic key, the TOE stores the key in RAM. No method is available for acquiring the seed from the encryption board. Note also, that because the cryptographic key is stored in volatile RAM memory, it disappears when power is shut off. 7.6.3 MFP Identification and Authentication Function – Supported functional requirements: FPT_PHP.1 HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board identifies the MFP each time it is started and allows access to the HDD only when it is the legitimate digital MFP. With this function, HDD data cannot be accessed even if HDD are connected to other digital MFP together with the HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board. [Registration of authentication ID] HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board receives MFP authentication ID from the MFP when the board is installed and stores it in FlashROM. [Steps for identification and authentication] HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board generates, upon start-up, pseudo random number and passes it to the MFP as the random number for challenge. The MFP, in turn, calculates a hash value (SHA-1) from the MFP authentication ID and random number for challenge and returns it to the encryption board. HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board performs a similar calculation and verifies the response. If HDD Data Encryption & Mirroring Board cannot confirm that it is installed on the legitimate MFP, it does not allow access to the HDD. LAN Data Protection Function LAN Data Protection Function encrypts/decrypts all IP packets that are used in communication with an IT device. 7.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function - Supported functional requirements: FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1 To ensure confidentiality and integrity of User Data and TSF Data communicated to and from an IT device, the TOE uses IPSec to encrypt/decrypt all IP packets. - Encryption of IP packets sent to the LAN - Decryption of IP packets received from the LAN The following cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key sizes are used. - See Table 24 Copyright CANON INC 2016 60 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 7.7.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function - Supported functional requirements: FCS_CKM.1(n), FCS_CKM.2 The TOE uses the following specifications for generating the cryptographic key that is used by the IP packet encryption function. - Uses a cryptographic key generation algorithm according to FIPS PUB 186-2 - Generates a cryptographic key with 128/168/192/256 bit key length The following method is used by the TOE, to transmit the cryptographic key used by the IP Packet Encryption Function, to the other party - ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman) and DH (Diffie Hellman) according to SP800-56A Self-Test Function - Supported functional requirements: FPT_TST.1 Upon startup, the TOE performs the following self-test. - Checks whether cryptographic algorithms are running properly (AES, 3DES) - Checks the integrity of the audit log - Checks the integrity of the executable code of the cryptographic algorithm Audit Log Function - Supported functional requirements: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4 The TOE generates logs for the following events. - Startup - Shutdown - Job completion - User authentication success/failure - Logout - Use of device management functions - Use of user management functions - Changes to the date/time setting - IPSec connection failures The items that are recorded on each log, are listed below. The date/time is provided by the TOE. The TOE's date/time information is set by the Management Function, or is set by time synchronization when the accurate time is obtained from the Time Server. - Date/Time, User Name, Event Type, Outcome (Success/Failed) Copyright CANON INC 2016 61 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 Other log events may have additional items as described below. - Job type (job completion) - Name of the user that failed authentication (authentication failure) Also, export of audit logs can be performed from a remote UI, in order to read out log records, although use of this function is restricted to U.ADMINISTRATORs only. Users other than U.ADMINISTRATOR are not allowed to export audit logs when logged in to the TOE from a remote UI. When accessing the TOE from a remote UI, another capability restricted to U.ADMINISTRATORs only is the deletion of log records from the [Deleting Collected Logs] menu. Users other than U.ADMINISTRATOR are not allowed access to this capability when logged in to the TOE from a remote UI, thus preventing unauthorized alterations from occurring. A maximum of 40,000 audit records can be maintained. Once this becomes full, the oldest audit record is overwritten with the newest. Management Functions 7.10.1 User Management Function - Supported functional requirements: FIA_SOS.1 , FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt), FMT_MSA.1(exec- job), FMT_MSA.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1 In the TOE, only U.ADMINISTRATORs assigned the Administrator role can set, change, or delete user, role, and access restriction information and box PINs. General users or U.NORMAL, can only change their own passwords and the PIN for the Mail Box they use. [Setting/Changing/Deleting User, Role, and Access Restriction Information] New users are registered by setting the user name and password, and assigning a role to the user. Registered user information can be modified by changing the password, or the assigned role, or the user's registration can be deleted altogether. User specified passwords are checked to see that they are consistent with the password policy. Four roles exist, which are called "Base Roles": Administrator, Power User, General User, and Limited User. To create a new "Custom Role" different than these, any one of these four base roles is used as a template for the new role, which can then be registered. The Administrator role is a role whose base role is "Administrator", and has administrative privileges. The access restriction information that determines whether use of certain functions is permitted or denied, is specified by the “Application Restrictions" setting, which depends on what role is assigned. Although the initial value for “Application Restrictions" is fixed for base roles, the initial value of “Application Restrictions" can be changed for custom roles. [Types of Users] There are two types of users: U.ADMINISTRATOR and U.NORMAL. - U.ADMINISTRATOR User assigned the Administrator role and has administrative privileges. - U.NORMAL General user assigned a role other than Administrator role. Copyright CANON INC 2016 62 Date of Issue: 2017/06/14 7.10.2 Device Management Function - Supported functional requirements: FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), FMT_SMF.1 To provide for the effective enforcement of security functions, the TOE allows only U.ADMINISTRATORs to set the device management settings in Table 27. The following settings are also provided. [Password Policy Settings] To encourage the use of strong passwords, the following password policy may be set. - Use a password 4 to 32 characters in length - Prohibit the use of 3 or more consecutive characters - Use at least one uppercase characters (A to Z) - Use at least one lowercase characters (a to z) - Use at least one number (0-9) - Use at least one non-alphabet characters (^-@[]:;,./¥!"#$%&'()=~|{`+*}_?><) - Allowed characters: All characters other than control characters [Lockout Policy Settings] The number of attempts before lockout and the lockout time can be set. - Number of attempts before lockout Select a value from 1 to 10 (Initial value: 3) - Lockout time Select a value from 1 to 60 minutes (Initial value: 3 minutes) END