TrustCB B.V.
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Certification Report
MF3E(c)x3
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Beierdorfstrasse 12
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300018-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300018-01
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 26 October 2024
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 9
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
MF3E(c)x3. The developer of the MF3E(c)x3 is NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in
Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification
Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security
properties of the product for their particular requirements.
NXP has developed the MF3E(c)x3 to be used with Proximity Coupling Devices (PCDs, also called
"terminal") according to ISO 14443 Type A. The communication protocol complies to part ISO 14443-
4. Alternatively, in specific configurations the MF3E(c)x3 can be used with a host MCU through the I2C
interface. The MF3E(c)x3 is primarily designed for secure contactless transport applications and
related loyalty programs as well as access control management systems as well as closed loop
payment systems. It fully complies with the requirements for fast and highly secure data transmission,
flexible memory organisation and interoperability with existing infrastructure.
The TOE is a smart card IC comprising a hardware platform and a fixed software package. The
software package is stored in ROM memory and provides an operating system with a set of functions,
used to manage the various kinds of data files stored in Flash memory. The operating system
supports a separation between the data of different applications and provides access control if
required by the configuration.
The TOE includes also IC Dedicated Software to support its start-up and for test purposes after
production. The Smart Card Controller hardware comprises a 32-bit CPU, volatile and non-volatile
memories, cryptographic coprocessors, security components and two communication interfaces.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 26 October 2024 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the MF3E(c)x3, the security requirements, and the
level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security
requirements. Consumers of the MF3E(c)x3 are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ASE_TSS.2 (TOE Summary
Specification).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the MF3E(c)x3 from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery item
type
Identifier Version
IC Hardware MF3E(c)x3 Hardware B0
IC Dedicated
Test Software
Test Software 3.0.11
IC Dedicated
Support
Software
Boot Software 3.0.11
Firmware 3.0.11
Crypto Library 2.4.2
Operating System 3.0.1
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the MF3E(c)x3. For
details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.4.3
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following features as listed in [ST]:
• Flexible file system that groups user data into applications and files within each application
• Support for different file types like Data files, Value files, Record files, including definition of
multiple file access conditions per file
• ECC-based Mutual and Reader-Unilateral Authentication
• ECC-based Card-Unilateral Authentication and generic ECDSA support
• AES-based Mutual Authentication and Secure Messaging (EV2 Secure Messaging)
• Authentication on application level with fine-grained access conditions for files
• Multi-application support that allows distributed management of applications and ensures
application segregation
• Delegated-application support that allows third party service providers to create their
applications onto the issued TOE
• Multiple application selection that allows transaction over files in two applications
• Data encryption on the communication path
• Message Authentication Codes (MAC) for replay attack protection
• Flexible key management (for symmetric and asymmetric keys) on PICC and application level
• ECC keypair generation
• Transaction system with rollback that ensures consistency for complex transactions
• Unique serial number for each device (UID) with optional random UID
• Key set rolling feature per application to switch to a predefined symmetric key set
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• Transaction MAC feature (via AES-based CMAC or ECDSA signature) to prevent fraudulent
merchant attacks
• ECC-based originality functionality that allows verifying the authenticity of the TOE
• Proximity check feature for protection against relay attacks on the TOE
• Secure Dynamic Messaging feature which allows confidential (via AES-based encryption) and
integrity protected data (via AES-based CMAC or ECDSA signature) exchange without
requiring a preceding authentication
If privacy is an issue, the TOE can be configured not to disclose any privacy-related information to
unauthorized users.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product
2.4 Architectural Information
The CPU of the MF3E(c)x3 has a 32-bit architecture. The on-chip hardware components are
controlled by the software via Special Function Registers. These registers are correlated to the
activities of the CPU, the memory protection unit, interrupt control, contactless communication, Flash,
timers, the AES co-processor and the ECC co-processor. The communication with the MF3E(c)x3 can
be performed through the contactless interface or in specific configurations using the I2C interface.
The ECC co-processor supports ECC operations with a key length of 256 bit over the NIST P-256 and
brainpoolP256r1 curves. The AES co-processor supports AES operations with a key length of 128 and
256 bit.
A hardware Random Number Generator provides true random numbers which are used to seed
deterministic random number generators, used internally by the operating system for security
purposes.
The IC Dedicated Test Software (Test ROM Software) located in ROM of the TOE is used by the TOE
Manufacturer to test the functionality of the chip. The test functionality is disabled before the
operational use of the smart card. The IC Dedicated Test Software includes the test operating system,
test routines for the various blocks of the circuitry and shutdown functions to ensure that security
relevant test operations cannot be executed illegally after phase 3 of the TOE Life cycle.
The TOE also contains IC Dedicated Support Software. The Boot Software which is stored in ROM is
part of the IC Dedicated Support Software. This software is executed after each reset of the TOE, i.e.
every time when the TOE starts. It sets up the TOE and does some basic configuration. The operating
system is also part of the IC Dedicated Software and provides the main functionality of the TOE in the
usage phase. The MF3E(c)x3 is primarily designed for secure contactless transport applications and
related loyalty programs as well as access control systems. It fully complies with the requirements for
fast and highly secure data transmission, flexible memory organization and interoperability with
existing infrastructure.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
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Identifier Version
MF3E(c)x3, Information on Guidance and Operation, User manual 1.2
MF3E(H)x3, MIFARE DUOX contactless smartcard IC, Product data sheet 1.0
MF3E(H)x3 PDC, MIFARE DUOX Post Delivery Configuration, Preliminary
data sheet addendum
0.1
MF3E(c)x3, Wafer and delivery specification, Product data sheet
addendum
1.2
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The tests cover all security functions and aspects of the TSF. The developer used a set of test suites
(mostly proprietary and compatibility ones) and tools to test the TOE. Since the TOE consists of
hardware and software components, each component is tested using specific test suites.
The OS was fully covered by unit testing. The Crypto Library was tested through the OS API. The
HW/FW of the TOE was covered by unit testing. This is complemented by end-to-end tests on TSFI
level (OS API), testing all relevant functionality on the actual TOE hardware thereby providing
assurance that the complete TOE was functioning properly (including the HW and the FW).
The developer used the TOE in SO28 or White Card package as well as Software simulators and
FPGA tool when some tests could only be performed in such environment. To further support the
hardware, component testing was used that verified several aspects (e.g. return values, registers,
CPU and others) in an automated manner. These tests are complemented by code inspection and
code coverage analysis done by the developer.
The developer used a distributed test environment to allow usage of a vast amount of simultaneously
driven testing equipment where results are logged automatically in XML/HTML-based files.
The tests were grouped in a number of categories including positive/negative tests, functional
acceptance or functional destructive tests, functional tests and non- functional tests.
The developer has performed extensive testing on FSP, subsystem, module and module interface
level. The tests were performed by the developer through execution of the test scripts using an
automated and distributed system. Test tools and scripts were extensively used to verify that the tests
return expected values. The identification was checked using tools to verify identification and versions
of the TOE Hardware and TOE software.
Code coverage analysis was used by the developer to verify overall test completeness. Test benches
for the various TOE parts were executed using code coverage measurement and analysis tools to
determine the code coverage (i.e. lines, branches and/or instructions, depending on tool) of each test
bench. Cases with incomplete coverage were analysed. For each tool, the developer has investigated
and documented inherent limitations that can lead to coverage being reported as less than 100%. In
such cases the developer provided a “gap” analysis with rationales (e.g. attack counter not hit due to
redundancy checks).
The ATE evaluation approach is based on code coverage analysis. The evaluator also used an
acceptable alternative approach (as described in the application notes, Section 14.2.2 in [CEM]) and
used analysis of the implementation representation (i.e. inspection of source code) to validate the
rationales provided by the developer.
In addition, the evaluator created additional test cases to confirm verification of the version of the TOE
/ to supplement coverage of SFRs and/or TSFI / to further exercise the behaviour of critical
functionality.
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2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge
gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed according to the attack methods in
section 5 of [JIL-AM].
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 17 weeks. During that test campaign, 35% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 60% on side-channel testing, and 5% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample was the same as described in the [ST]. Some tests were performed in
earlier versions of the firmware. Additional work in ADV and AVA concluded that changes did not
affect the testing results.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 25 Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number MF3E(c)x3.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the MF3E(c)x3, to be CC Part 2
extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 6 augmented with
ASE_TSS.2. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security
Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
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2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None
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3 Security Target
The MF3E(c)x3 Security Target, Revision 1.3, 03 September 2024 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “NXP MF3E(c)x3” – EAL6+, 24-RPT-1100,
Version 1.0, 26 September 2024
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November 2022
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, registered
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13 January 2014
[ST] MF3E(c)x3 Security Target, Revision 1.3, 03 September 2024
[ST-lite] MF3E(c)x3 Security Target Lite, Revision 1.0, 09 September 2024
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)