BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021
for
Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware
from
Swissbit AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021 (*)
Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware
from Swissbit AG
PP Conformance: Security Module Application for Electronic Record-
keeping Systems (SMAERS) Version 0.7.5, 6 March
2019, BSI-CC-PP-0105-2019
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bonn, 12 March 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................19
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................20
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................20
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................24
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized under CCRA-2014 for all assurance components selected.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware has undergone the certification procedure
at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-2019. Specific results from
the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-2019 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware was conducted by MTG
AG. The evaluation was completed on 11 March 2021. MTG AG is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Swissbit AG.
The product was developed by: Swissbit AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 12 March
2021 is valid until 11 March 2029. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
4. to conduct a re-assessment after 5 years (i.e. the re-assessment must be finalized
before 11.03.2026 in order to assess the robustness of the product against new
state-of-the-art attack methods. This has to be done on the developer‘s own
initiative and at his own expense. As evidence a report regarding a re-assessment
or a re-certification according to the regulations of the BSI-certification-scheme shall
be provided.
5. to provide updates for the product in consultation with the Certification Body at BSI
if vulnerabilities have been identified that affect the security of the product. This
includes vulnerabilities of security functions provided by the underlying CSP, which
also might affect the security of the TOE under consideration in this certificate.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Swissbit AG
Industriestraße 4
9552 Bronschhofen
Schweiz
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware, i.e. the TOE mainly consists of software, but also
includes the following hardware components:
● the AES unit in the CPU of the controller of the TSE, and
● the communication capabilities of the controller of the TSE for USB or SD/microSD
communication
The TOE exists in three different physical configurations namely, as a:
● micro SD-Card,
● SD-Card or
● USB-Token.
The three physical configurations of the TOE only differ in their physical form factor and
the usage of a different flash controller. The difference in the hardware used is required to
implement the different external interface standards (USB or SD). Accordingly, their Basis
Firmware differs to realize the file system accessible via the communication interfaces.
Apart from this, the usage of all TOE configurations is the same as well as the SMAERS
Firmware implementing the TOE’s business logic. Also, the same certified CSP (see [32])
is used for all TOE configurations.
The table 5 shows the hardware and software version numbers of the evaluated TOE
configurations.
The Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) used is the certified PP [10] certified “TCOS
CSP 2.0 Release1/P60D145” (BSI certification id: BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020) and is
technically identified by its Chip-Information-Data (see [15] Annex " B.2 Get Version Info "):
Product Information
Hardware manufacturer id (cf. ISO/IEC 7816-6) ' ‘04’ (NXP)
Hardware-ID (major ǁ minor version-number) ' ‘3007’
Software manufacturer id '01' (=T-Systems)
Product id '14'' (=TCOS CSP Module)
COS version (version ǁ release number) ‘01BE’
Patch version (major ǁ minor version-number) '0041'
Table 1: Certified version of the TCOS CSP Module
The TOE Software Version number 1.1.0 includes the versions of the Flash Controller’s
Basis Firmware (depending on the TOE configuration):
TOE configuration: Basis Firmware version
USB 190717_1.06_21
μSD/SD 190614_1.03_15
Table 2: Flash controller Basis Firmware version for TOE Software version 1.1.0
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021
and the version of the Firmware Extension of Swissbit. The versions are those specified in
the Security Target [6].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security Module Application for Electronic Record-keeping Systems
(SMAERS) Version 0.7.5, 6 March 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0105-2019 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6].
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.Log After successful boot and self-test, the TOE allows the host /
ERS to provide transaction data via commands, which the TOE
uses to create Transaction logs, being signed by the CSP. The
corresponding signed logs are returned to the host and stored
within the TOE. To do so, the TOE manages a transaction
counter and keeps track, which transactions are open, see [12].
SF.Crypto The TOE implements cryptographic operations to establish a
PACE channel with the CSP and a random number generator,
being required for PACE. In addition, the TOE encrypts incoming
Update Code Packages (UCP) to make them unavailable, if they
fail to get verified by the CSP. Thus, the TOE provides
cryptographic support for secure communications and protection
of information.
SF.Management The TOE provides administrative services for management of
general TOE configuration data, e.g. setting, updating the time of
the CSP, management of ERS Serial Numbers, terminating open
transactions, updating the TOE Firmware. The TOE uses a role-
based access control system implementing the fixed roles
“Unidentified User”, “Admin” and “Time Admin”. The
authentication mechanism implemented to assign a role is based
on PIN and PUK verification during the login command.
SF.Audit The TOE fetches audit records from the CSP and stores them. In
addition, it creates system log messages and also stores them in
the flash memory as required. These logs can be exported in the
same way as the Transaction logs or a filtered export can be
used to export non-transaction logs only.
Table 3: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8 .
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3 .
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in the Security Target [6]
chapter 1.4.1.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021 Certification Report
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release
Version
Form of Delivery
1a HW/
SW
Swissbit TSE SMAERS
Firmware USB
Software 1.1.0
Hardware 1.1.0
• TSE containing the TOE is packed on trays.
• Trays are packed into standard paper or carton
boxes.
• Boxes are wrapped with parcels.
• Parcels are delivered by logistics partners of
Swissbit to customers.
• If the parcels will not be delivered by direct
delivery, the parcels are additionally wrapped in
sealed bags.
1b HW/
SW
Swissbit TSE SMAERS
Firmware SD
Software 1.1.0
Hardware 1.1.0
• TSE containing the TOE is packed on trays.
• Trays are packed into standard paper or carton
boxes.
• Boxes are wrapped with parcels.
•Parcels are delivered by logistics partners of
Swissbit to customers.
• If the parcels will not be delivered by direct
delivery, the parcels are additionally wrapped in
sealed bags.
1c HW/
SW
Swissbit TSE SMAERS
Firmware microSD
Software 1.1.0
Hardware 1.1.0
•TSE containing the TOE is packed on trays.
• Trays are packed into standard paper or carton
boxes.
• Boxes are wrapped with parcels.
• Parcels are delivered by logistics partners of
Swissbit to customers.
• If the parcels will not be delivered by direct
delivery, the parcels are additionally wrapped in
sealed bags.
2 DOC Swissbit TSE SMAERS
Firmware – Guidance
Manual for ERS-User [25]
Document
Version: 1.4.1
Signed email.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021
No Type Identifier Release
Version
Form of Delivery
3 DOC Swissbit TSE SMAERS
Firmware – Integrator‘s
Guidance Manual [26]
Document
Version: 1.4.1
Signed email.
4 DOC swissbit TSE - Functional
Specification [28]
Document
Version: 1.3.0
Signed email.
5 DOC swissbit TSE –
Verpackungsprufanweisung
[27]
Document
Version: 1.3.1
Signed email.
6 DOC Swissbit TSE Data Sheets
USB [22]
SD [23]
micro SD [24]
Version: 1.1.0,
Version: 1.1.0
Version: 1.1.0
Signed email.
7 DOC revocation passwords for
certificate revocation
- Signed email.7
8 DOC optional: host library for
TSE communication
- Download server7
Table 4: Deliverables of the TOE
Note that the Swissbit TSE Data Sheet exists for each configuration of the TOE. The
documents Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware - Guidance Manual, Swissbit TSE -
Functional Specification [9], Swissbit TSE - Verpackungsprüfanweisung and Swissbit TSE
Data Sheets will be delivered electronically to customer, each time Swissbit TSEs are
delivered to a customer. This electronic delivery also contains the revocation passwords.
The fingerprint of the root CA can be found in the Security Target [6].
In addition, the host library is an optional component, which is not certified. It eases the
communication with the TSE and therefore the TOE by wrapping the TOE’s interface to an
API. The library can be obtained from Swissbit
The sourcing process for customers who are ordering a Swissbit device is described in a
precise manner. Starting from the contact between customer and Swissbit to order the
devices, followed by the description of the packaging and delivery until the identification
while opening a batch of TOEs by the customer him self. Also the case for malformed
deliverals and the RMA Process in case of a faulty device is covered. For details please
refer to the Verpackungsprüfanweisung [27], the integrator guidance documentation [26]
section 2.2 and the lifecycle documentation Swissbit TSE - Delivery of TOE (ALC_DEL)
[29].
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Protection of transaction data of Electronic Record Keeping Systems
● Role-based access control policy to control administrative access to the TOE
● Usage of a certified cryptographic service provider (CSP) for the signing of Log-
Messages
7
Not in scope of this certification.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021 Certification Report
● Implementation of cryptographic operations to establish a PACE channel with the CSP
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
6 and 7 of the Security Target (ST) [6]
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.ERS: Trustworthy electronic record-keeping system
● OE.CSP: Cryptographic service provider component
● OE.Transaction: Verification of Transaction
● OE.SecOEnv: Secure operational environment
● OE.SUCP: Signed Update Code Packages
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2. ff.
5. Architectural Information
A short description about the TOE subsystem is outlined below:
● Hardware
The parts of the TSE flash controller, which belong to the TOE are the controller’s AES
Unit and its communication capabilities implementing the USB or (Micro-) SD interface,
which allows the communication of the TOE with the Electronic Cash register (ERS).
These hardware components constitute the Hardware subsystem.
● Basis Firmware
The Basis Firmware subsystem is the host for the Firmware Extension, which consists of
the subsystems Transaction Handling, Dispatcher, CryptoServices, CSP
Communication,Update and Management. It loads and executes the Firmware Extension,
forwards events (for example in the file system) to corresponding callbacks of the
Firmware Extension and offers communication with the CSP.
● Dispatcher
The Dispatcher subsystem is responsible to manage communication with the subsystem
Basis Firmware and forwards triggered callbacks to the corresponding subsystems of the
Firmware Extension.
● Transaction Handling
The subsystem Transaction Handling is responsible to implement the TOE’s core
functionality: import, storage, and export of transaction data. Besides, it offers functionality
for other subsystems to create and store log messages and to fetch the CSP audit data.
● Management
The subsystem Management manages all configurations and settings of the TOE, which
the Admin / TimeAdmin can manipulate and store. It also includes the authentication of
users to roles, being managed by the TOE.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021
● Update
The Update subsystem is responsible to accept, verify and install incoming Update Code
Packages.
● Crypto Services
The subsystem Cryptographic Services contains all implementations of cryptographic
algorithms which the TOE requires. APDUs are built in the subsystem Crypto Services for
the establishment of the trusted channel to the CSP using PACE. The cryptographic
primitives necessary for that purpose are implemented in this subsystem.
● CSP Communication
The subsystem CSP Communication implements the low-level layers of the
communication protocol with the CSP.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 5 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
During the ATE related actions, the developer as well as the ITSEF, respectively,
conducted tests which intend to satisfy the needs of the EAL 2 assurance families
ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1 and ATE_IND.2.
Regarding developer ATE tests:
● The developer performed extensive tests to verify the claimed security functionality in
the Security Target [6]. Together with the developer provided mapping of SFRs to
commands, this provides a strong evidence that the tests sufficiently cover all the
Security Functional Requirements from the ST[6].
Regarding ITSEF ATE tests:
● For independent testing the evaluators specified test cases with the intention to cover all
SFRs from the ST. For that purpose, all of the developer’s tests have been chosen as
independent. That set of tests has been expanded by testing parts of the device which
are only reachable with a none production firmware. The independent testing was
performed in the evaluator lab. The overall test result is that no deviations were found
between the expected and the actual test results.
Regarding ITSEF AVA tests:
● The approach chosen by the evaluators is appropriate for the assurance component
AVA_VAN.2, requiring the resistance of the TOE to an attacker with the Basic attack
potential. Based on the attack scenarios AS.1 potential scenarios have been chosen,
explored and tested. The chosen attack vectors which have been tested are showing
that the TOE, when installed and configured and operated as described in the
operational guidance documentation, fulfils the security functionality as claimed in the
Security Target [6].
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021 Certification Report
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
TOE Identifier and Type Hardware Version Software Version
Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware USB
Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware SD
Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware microSD
1.1.0
1.1.0
1.1.0
1.1.0
1.1.0
1.1.0
Table 5: TOE identification
Their differences are solely based on the physical form factor (USB, SD, microSD) and a
different controller. This means the hardware, which the TOE is executed on differs,
depending on the configuration This is required to implement the different external
interface (USB or SD). Accordingly, their Basis Firmware differs, to realize the file system
via the different interfaces. Still, the usage of all TOE configurations is the same, as well as
the software, implementing the TOE’s business logic. Also, the same certified CSP with the
certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 is used internally.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Technical Guideline BSI TR-03151 Secure Element API (SE API), BSI, Version
1.0.1, 20 December 2018 [11]
(ii) Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03153 Technische Sicherheitseinrichtung für
elektronische Aufzeichnungssysteme, BSI, Version 1.0.1, 20 December 2018 [12]
(iii) Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116 Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der
Bundesregierung, Teil 5: Anwendungen der Secure Element API, BSI, 01 February
2019 [13]
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security Module Application for Electronic Record-keeping
Systems (SMAERS) Version 0.7.5, 6 March 2019, BSI-CC-PP-
0105-2019 [8]
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● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table 6 gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE
to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Standard of
Application
1 Encryption/ decryption
of UCP
AES-CBC FIPS 197 [17] 256 Yes -
2 Cipherbased message
authentication code for
providing the integrity of
the Trusted Channel to
the CSP
CMAC-AES FIPS 197 [17],
NIST SP 800-38B
[19]
256 No -
3 hash based determi-
nistic random number
generation for AES key
generation and in PACE
key establish-ment
HASH-DRBG
with SHA2-256
NIST 800-90A
Revision 1 [18]
None N/A BSI
TR-03116
[13]
4 Cryptographic hashing
for partial hash of data
to be signed by CSP &
hash function for the
DRBG
SHA2-256
SHA2-384
FIPS 180-4 [20] None N/A BSI
TR-03116
[13]
5 PACE for key estab-
lishment for Trusted
Channel
PACE with brainpool
P256r1 and Generic
Mapping in PCD role
ICAO, Doc 9303,
Part 11 [21]
256 N/A BSI TR-
03110-3
[31]
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Table 6: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 5 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
As the TOE relies on security functionality provided by the underlying CSP, it must be
operated in conjunction with the CSP of the evaluated configuration. For details
concerning the CSP and its certification refer to the certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-
1118-2020.
In regard of the further operational environment, it is to be noted that the certification and
evaluation were conducted under the condition, that the objective for the operational
environment “OE.SecOEnv: Secure operational environment” (Security Target [6]) is
upheld. In detail, the objective states:
OE.SecOEnv: Secure operational environment :
The operational environment shall protect the electronic record-keeping system and
the certified technical security system including the TOE against manipulation,
perturbation and misuse. It protects the integrity of the communication between the
electronic record-keeping system and the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Also note that the UCP (Update Code Package) mechanism itself is certified according to
this certificate’s evaluation assurance level and the respective Security Target’s Security
Functional Requirements. However, installation and usage of other TOE configuration
items than specified in the Security Target [6] (and thus evaluated during the course of this
certification) will, void the certification status. Recertifications are required in order to
maintain a valid certification status in cases where such TOE changes are to be applied.
As a consequence, only certified updates of the TOE should be used via a respective
UCP deployment procedure. If non-certified Update Code Packages are available, TOE
user discretion is advised on whether the sponsor should provide a re-certification. In the
meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE should investigate and
decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or take additional measures
in order to maintain system security.
Regarding Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) it is to be noted, that neither the Protection
Profile [8] nor the Security Target [6] address (security-assurance- or security-functional)
requirements concerning a PKI. Therefore, no PKI aspects were CC evaluated by the
ITSEF in the course of the underlying CC evaluation. Hence the CC certification scope
does not cover the Public Key Infrastructure. However, the developer Swissbit AG
provided a (confidential) PKI concept document [14], outlining relevant PKI structures,
definitions and processes. The document was considered by a dedicated BSI Section and
deemed suitable.
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The TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 5) which contains obligations and
guidelines for the user and/or developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use
this certified TOE and which measures have to be taken in order to fulfil the overall
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.
If the TOE is subject to an evaluation in a composite product or system, it must be
examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the
product layer on top.
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused, there might be an
updated documentation available. Therefore, the certified products list on the BSI website
has to be checked for latest information on reassessments, recertifications or maintenance
result available for the product.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● Usage of the CSP which is listed under the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced encryption standards
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSP Crypto Service Provider
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ERS Electronic Record-keeping System
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PKI Public key infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RMA Return Merchandize Authorization
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TDS TOE Design
TOE Target of Evaluation
TR Technische Richtlinie
TSE Technische Sicherheitseinrichtung
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UCP Update code package
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021, Version 1.9.7, 26.November.2020,
Swissbit TES SMAERS Firmware – Common Criteria Security Target, Swissbit
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.4, 11 March 2021, ETR Part Summary, MTG
AG Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit, (confidential document)
[8] Security Module Application for Electronic Record-keeping Systems (SMAERS)
Version 0.7.5, 6 March 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0105-2019
[9] Functional Specification Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware, Swissbit AG, Version
1.3.0, 24 June 2020
[10] Common Criteria Protection Profile, Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP),
BSI ,Version 0.9.8, 19 February 2019
[11] Technical Guideline BSI TR-03151 Secure Element API (SE API), BSI, Version
1.0.1, 20 December 2018
[12] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03153 Technische Sicherheitseinrichtung für
elektronische Aufzeichnungssysteme, BSI, Version 1.0.1, 20 December 2018
8
specifically
• AIS14, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 03.08.2010, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
• AIS19, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9,
• AIS 20, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, 15.05.2013, Version 3, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
• AIS 32, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 0.7, 08.06.2011,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• AIS 46, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende
Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 04.12.2013, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
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[13] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116 Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der
Bundesregierung, Teil 5: Anwendungen der Secure Element API, BSI, 01 February
2019
[14] Swissbit TSE - PKI Concept, Swissbit AG, Version 1.6.3, 26 November 2019
[15] TCOS CSP Module - User's Guidance Manual, T-Systems International GmbH,
Version 1.0.4, 24 March 2020, State: Certified Version, Confidential
[16] Swissbit TSE - PKI Concept, Swissbit AG, Version 1.6.3, 26 November 2019
[17] ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES) (FIPS PUB 197), 26 November
2001
[18] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators, NIST 800-90A Revision 1, 12 August 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-90a.pdf
[19] NIST Special Publication 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication , May 2005
[20] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, October 2015
[21] Machine Readable Travel Documents , ICAO, Doc 9303,Part 11: Security
Mechanisms for MRTDSs, Seventh Edition, 2015
[22] Swissbit Product Data Sheet – Swissbit USB TSE, Swissbit AG, Revision: 1.1.0, 12
June, 2020
[23] Swissbit Product Data Sheet – Swissbit SD TSE, Swissbit AG, Revision: 1.1.0, 12
June 2020
[24] Swissbit Product Data Sheet – Swissbit microSD TSE, Swissbit AG, Revision: 1.1.0,
12 June 2020
[25] Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware – Guidance Manual, Swissbit AG, Version 1.4.0,
03 November 2020
[26] Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware – Integrator’s Guidance Manual, Swissbit AG,
Version 1.4.1, 03 November 2020
[27] Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware – Verpackungsprüfanweisung, Swissbit AG,
Version 1.3.1, 26 November 2020
[28] Functional Specification Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware, Swissbit AG, Version
1.3.0, 24 June 2020
[29] Swissbit TSE - Delivery of TOE (ALC_DEL), Swissbit AG, Version 1.4.1, 25 June
2020
[30] Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware – TOE Design, Swissbit AG, Version 1.4.1, 24
June 2020
[31] Technical Guideline TR-03110 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token - Part 3: Common Specifications,
BSI, Version 2.21, 21. December 2016
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1121-V2-2021
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Swissbit TSE SMAERS Firmware (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 12 March 2021, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.2, ALC_CMS.2, ALC_DEL.1) are
fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Function Address
TOE development Swissbit München
Leuchtenbergring 3
81667 München
Production and Delivery Cleantek Business Park Berlin
Wolfener Straße 36
12681 Berlin
Table 7: Sites of the TOE
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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