BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009
for
Processor Resource / Systems Manager (PR/SM)
for the IBM z10 EC GA2 and z10 BC GA1
from
International Business Machines Corporation
(IBM)
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.29
BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009
Processor Resource / Systems Manager (PR/SM)
for the IBM z10 EC GA2 and z10 BC GA1
from International Business Machines Corporation (IBM)
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice
of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 4 May 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................20
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................20
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................22
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................23
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................23
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................24
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................24
11 Security Target............................................................................................................24
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................24
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................24
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................25
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................27
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................29
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ACM_SCP.3, ADV_FSP.3, ADV_HLD.3,
ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.1, ADV_RCR.2, ADV_SPM.3, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.2,
AVA_CCA.1 and AVA_VLA.3 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the
provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance
families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Processor Resource / Systems Manager (PR/SM) for the IBM z10 EC GA2
and z10 BC GA1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification
based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0460-2008. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-
CC-0460-2008 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Processor Resource / Systems Manager (PR/SM) for the
IBM z10 EC GA2 and z10 BC GA1 was conducted by atsec information security GmbH.
The evaluation was completed on 6 April 2009. The atsec information security GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009 Certification Report
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: International Business
Machines Corporation (IBM)
The product was developed by: International Business Machines Corporation (IBM)
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Processor Resource / Systems Manager (PR/SM) for the IBM z10 EC GA2
and z10 BC GA1 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: http://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information
can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM)
2455 South Road
P329, Poughkeepsie
NY 12601
USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Licensed Internal Code (LIC) kernel of the Processor
Resource / System Manager (PR/SM) running on the IBM hardware platform z108
. LIC is
microcode licensed by IBM.
PR/SM is intended for use in environments where separation of workloads is a
requirement, but where the use of a single hardware platform is desirable for reasons of
economy, flexibility, security or management. Where confidentiality is a concern, PR/SM
provides separation of workloads, and prevents the flow of information between partitions.
This trusted separation may be used where the separation is based on need to know, or
where data at differing national security classifications must be isolated.
PR/SM is a hardware facility that enables the resources of a single physical machine to be
divided between distinct, predefined logical machines called "logical partitions". Each
logical partition is a domain of execution, and is considered to be a subject capable of
running a conventional system control program (SCP) such as z/OS, z/VM, VIF, VM/ESA,
VSE/ESA, TPF or Linux. These operating systems run in a PR/SM partition.
The TOE assures the separation of logical partitions. The separation policy can be
configured. For instance, there can be an authorised partition, sending service calls (i.e.
for changing the configuration) to other partitions.
The TOE is implemented in LIC. The use of LIC prevents untrusted code from
masquerading as part of the TOE and abusing TOE privileges. The TOE is composed of:
a) Logical partition (LPAR) LIC, which is the LIC that is responsible for maintaining the
isolation of partitions;
b) Hardware Management Console/Support Element LIC, which provides the system
administration, functions to maintain the current configuration.
The Hardware Management Console (HMC) / Support Element (SE) workplace is the
window from where users start tasks for monitoring and operating the CPC (central
processor complex). User profiles determine which tasks and controls users can use on
the workplace. Not all tasks are available for each user.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2.
Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant .
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.2.
8
HiperSockets, IBM®, Processor Resource/Systems Manager, PR/SM, S/390®, System z, System z10,
System z10 BC, System z10 EC, VM/ESA®, VSE/ESA, z10 BC, z10 EC, z/OS®, z/VM® are trademarks or
registered trademarks of the International Business Corporation in the United States, other countries, or
both.
Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009 Certification Report
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
Logical Partition Identity The TOE implemented an image profile to define the initial operational
characteristics of a logical partition. In a given configuration each logical
partition is uniquely named and has a corresponding Image profile. One of
the parameters in the Image profile is the logical partition identifier (i.e.
zone number). If a logical partition is in the current configuration, then the
zone number uniquely identifies that partition.
Authorized Administration The authority level specified when defining a new user determines the
tasks made available to that user. This capability allows an authorized
administrator to effectively manage the TOE and its security functions.
Authorized Operations The authority level specified when defining a new user determines the
tasks made available to that user. This capability allows an authorized
administrator to effectively operate the TOE and its security functions
Audit and Accountability The TOE implemented a Security Log that is always enabled and contains
a record of security relevant events. The log data assists an administrator
in detection of potential attack or misconfiguration of the TOE security
features.
Object Reuse The TOE ensures that the contents of physical processors, storage or I/O
utilized by different logical partitions will be cleared of any residual
information before being utilized by the receiving logical partition.
Reliability of Service The TOE implemented a Reset profile to define the initial operational
characteristics of the physical processors. Two of the parameters in the
Reset profile are the processor running time and wait completion. These
parameters provide the ability to share physical processor resources on
either an event-driven basis or a time-driven basis. Disabling event driven
dispatching causes shared physical processor resources to be distributed
on the basis of time intervals according to the weights specified to
effectively prevent unauthorized denial of service.
Self Test The TOE implemented a set of self-test functions that are executed when
the TOE is started or reset, and periodically during normal execution.
These functions ensure that critical hardware functions work properly and
that the TOE has not been tampered with when it was powered off.
Alternate Support Element The TOE implemented functions that permit a quick switch to another
Support Element when the primary Support Element has a hardware
problem. Mirroring functions are performed on a regular basis to
communicate any hard disk changes from the primary SE to the alternate
SE. The Support Elements communicate using TCP/IP over a private
Ethernet network that connects cage controllers and support elements.
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.3.
The strength of function claim is not applicable since no TOE security function is based on
permutational or probabilistic mechanisms.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapters 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: Driver Level D73 Control
Level 3 running on the IBM z10 EC or IBM z10 BC hardware platforms. For details refer to
chapter 8.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Processor Resource / Systems Manager (PR/SM) for the IBM z10 EC GA2 and z10
BC GA1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW IBM PR/SM for IBM z10 EC / BC
hardware platforms including:
● LPAR kernel LIC
● Support Element (SE) LIC
● Hardware Management Console
(HMC) LIC
Driver D76
Control Level 3
Delivered with IBM z10 EC / BC
hardware
2 DOC System z Hardware Management
Console Operations Guide
First Edition,
October 2008
Delivered with IBM z10 EC / BC
hardware
3 DOC System z Input/Output Configuration
Program User's Guide for ICP IOCP
Eighth Edition,
October 2008
Delivered with IBM z10 EC / BC
hardware
4 DOC System z10 Enterprise Class
Processor Resource/Systems
Manager Planning Guide
Second Edition,
October 2008
Delivered with IBM z10 EC / BC
hardware
5 DOC System z10 and System z9 Stand-
Alone Input/Output Configuration
Program User's Guide
Fourth Edition,
October 2008
Delivered with IBM z10 EC / BC
hardware
6 DOC System z10 Support Element
Operations Guide
First Edition,
October 2008
Delivered with IBM z10 EC / BC
hardware
7 DOC System z10 Enterprise Class Service
Guide
Third Edition,
October 2008
Delivered with IBM z10 EC
hardware
8 DOC System z10 Business Class Service
Guide
First Edition,
October 2008
Delivered with IBM z10 BC
hardware
9 DOC System z10 Enterprise Class
Installation Manual for Physical
Planning
Fourth Edition,
October 2008
Delivered with IBM z10 EC
hardware
10 DOC System z10 Business Class
Installation Manual for Physical
Planning
First Edition,
October 2008
Delivered with IBM z10 BC
hardware
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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PR/SM is a hardware facility that enables the resources of a single physical machine to be
divided between distinct, predefined logical machines, called “logical partitions”. The TOE
can be run only on a special hardware. Thus, an IBM technician delivers the TOE
personally either as part of installation of new hardware or by upgrading the the Licensed
Internal Code and HMC/SE. The TOE is delivered with IBM z10 EC and IBM z10 BC
hardware platforms.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
TOE Security Function Policy Addressed issue
Access Control The TOE implements an access control policy between subjects
(users) and objects. The subjects or users are logical partitions and the
System Administrator. The objects are the physical resources of the
processor (CPs, storage, CHPIDS, audit data, performance data,
IOCDSs, profiles, …). Access to objects by subjects will be mediated
by this policy to insure that subjects are only able to gain access to
authorized objects.
Information Flow Control The TOE implements an information flow control policy between
subjects (users) and objects, and between objects and objects. The
subjects or users are logical partitions and the System Administrator.
The objects are the physical resources of the processor (CPs, storage,
CHPIDS, audit data, performance data, IOCDSs, profiles, …) and the
logical processors instantiated on a physical processor on behalf of a
logical partition. Flow of information between objects and subjects, and
between objects and objects will be mediated by this policy to insure
that information flow is only possible when subjects and objects are
associated with the same logical partition.
Table 3: TOE Security Function Policies
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
● It is the customer’s responsibility to back-up the audit log prior to the log reaching
capacity. Physical access of archived audit log data is also the responsibility of the
customer.
● Physical protection of processor, I/O (including LAN) and HMC is required.
● The remote support facility must be disabled.
● To be used as a strict separation virtual machine monitor, PR/SM must be configured in
the following manner:
1. Devices must be configured so that no device is accessible by any partition
other than the partition to be isolated (although they may be accessible by
more than one channel path).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009
2. Each I/O (physical) control unit must be allocated only to an isolated partition
in the current configuration.
3. The Security Administrator must not reconfigure a channel path owned by an
isolated partition unless all attached devices and control units are attached to
that path only.
4. The Security Administrator must ensure that all devices and control units on
a reconfigurable path owned by an isolated partition are reset before the path
is allocated to another partition.
5. No channel paths may be shared between an isolated partition and any other
partition(s).
6. The System Administrator must ensure that the number of processors
dedicated to activated partitions is less than the total number available.
7. Dynamic I/O configuration changes must be disabled.
8. If I/O Priority Queuing is enabled for the system an isolated partition’s
minimum and maximum I/O Priority values must be equal.
9. For isolated partitions, Workload Manager must be disabled so that CPU and
I/O resources are not managed across partitions.
10.An isolated partition must not be configured to enable hipersockets (Internal
Queued Direct I/O).
11. Partitions must be prevented from receiving performance data from
resources that are not allocated to them (global performance data control
authority must be disabled).
12.At most one partition can have I/O configuration control authority (i.e. no
more than one partition must be able to update any IOCDS) and this partition
must be administered by a trustworthy administrator (i.e. the administrator of
this partition is considered a System Administrator of the TOE).
13.The Security Administrator must ensure that write access is disabled for each
IOCDS, unless that IOCDS is to be updated (the current IOCDS must not be
updated).
14.The Security Administrator must verify any changed IOCDS after a power-on
reset with that IOCDS, before any partitions have been activated (the
Security Administrator may determine whether the IOCDS has been changed
by inspecting the date of the IOCDS).
15.No partition may have cross-partition control authority (i.e. no partition should
be able to reset or deactivate another partition).
16.No isolated partition may have coupling facility channels that would allow
communication to a Coupling Facility partition.
17.The ’Use dynamically changed address’ and ’Use dynamically changed
parameter’ checkboxes must not be selected in the Image or Load profile.
18.No Isolated partition should have the following Counter Facility Security
Options enabled:
• Crypto activity counter set authorization control
• Coprocessor group counter sets authorization control
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009 Certification Report
Disabling these options will ensure that its crypto and coprocessor activities
are not visible to any other partitions.
● The hardware of a Central Electronics Complex must be partitionable into several
independent partitions.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9] chapters 3.2 and 3.4.
5 Architectural Information
PR/SM is a hardware facility that enables the resources of a single physical machine to be
divided between distinct, predefined logical machines called "logical partitions". Each
logical partition is a domain of execution, and is considered to be a subject capable of
running a conventional system control program (SCP) such as z/OS, z/VM, VIF, VM/ESA,
VSE/ESA, TPF or Linux. These operating systems run in a PR/SM partition.
The TOE is implemented in LIC. The use of LIC prevents untrusted code from
masquerading as part of the TOE and abusing TOE privileges. The TOE is composed of:
a) Logical partition (LPAR) LIC, which is the LIC that is responsible for maintaining the
isolation of partitions;
b) Hardware Management Console/Support Element LIC, which provides the system
administration functions to maintain the current configuration.
The Hardware Management Console (HMC) / Support Element (SE) workplace is the
window from where users start tasks for monitoring and operating the CPC (central
processor complex). A user profile determines which tasks and controls users can use on
the workplace. Not all tasks are available for each user.
The following predefined default user IDs are established as part of a base Hardware
Management Console:
User ID Description
Operator A person with Operator authority typically performs basic system startup and
shutdown operations using predefined procedures.
Advanced Operator A person with Advanced Operator authority possesses Operator authority plus
the ability to perform some additional recovery and maintenance tasks.
System Programmer A person with System Programmer authority has the ability to customize the
system in order to determine its operation.
Access Administrator A person with Access Administrator authority has the ability to create, modify,
or delete user profiles on the Hardware Management Console or for service
mode on the support element. A user profile consists of a user identification, a
password, managed resource roles and task roles
Service Representative A person with Service Representative authority has access to tasks related to
the repair and maintenance of the system.
Table 4: User IDs
In addition to the predefined user roles supplied with the console the ability to define
customized user roles is also provided. A user role is a collection of authorizations. A user
role can be created to define the set of tasks allowed for a given class of user (task roles)
or it can be created to define the set of managed objects that are manageable for a user
(managed resource roles). A customized user role is based on one of the predefined user
roles from which objects or tasks are removed. Once user roles are defined or customized
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0557-2009
they can be used to create new users with their own permissions. A user can be created
with one or more user roles.
A table identifying all specific tasks allowed for each of the 5 user IDs is provided in [6]
resp. [9], chapter 2.2.
The address space of the TSF is isolated from the address space of the partitions by
hardware protection mechanisms (the SIE instruction provided by the underlying processor
as described below), and by the provision of separate hardware for the Support Element
and I/O (SAP) processors. The TSF LIC and data is therefore protected from modification
or tampering.
The Security Administrator uses an I/O configuration utility (IOCP) to define an
Input/Output configuration data set (IOCDS) of the I/O resources and their allocation to
specific logical partitions. The IOCDS should be verified by the Security Administrator prior
to activating the partitions. PR/SM allows I/O resources to be dedicated to a single
partition, relocatable among a defined set of partitions, or shared by a defined set of
partitions. When a System Administrator wishes to activate a partition, the activation
request is initiated from the HMC. LPAR will receive an external interrupt and issue an
instruction to obtain the description of the partition the System Administrator wishes to
activate. LPAR will attempt to construct the partition and will inform the HMC of the
success or failure of the command.
Several different configurations may be stored, but only one is in effect at any time. The
configuration becomes effective as part of the activation sequence.
Standard hardware resources such as a central processor, including computation and
control registers, timers, clocks and storage; and I/O resources are objects allocated to
logical partitions. These objects are subject to a non-discretionary access control policy
under which each logical partition is only permitted access to resources allocated to it.
Logical partitions are logical objects that are built from existing physical objects. These
logical objects fall into one of three classes:
a) Logical processor facilities, which are supported by similar physical objects. Each
such logical object is represented by an internal control block that contains current
state information each time context is switched to a different logical partition.
b) Logical storage, both central and expanded, is represented by the same amount of
contiguous physical storage. PR/SM does not perform paging or move logical
partitions once they have been placed in real storage. Physical storage can be de-
allocated from one logical partition and reallocated to another. This feature can be
disabled, and is subject to full object reuse control.
c) Logical I/O resources (channels) are implemented by physical resources of the
same type. Such resources can be configured so that they are not shared by
partitions. A channel can be de-allocated from one logical partition and reallocated
to another, under the control of the Security Administrator.
The zArchitecture and S/390 architecture support two instruction states: problem and
supervisor. Problem state instructions can be executed in either problem or supervisor
state. Semi-privileged instructions can be executed in supervisor state, or in problem state
subject to one or more additional authorizations. Privileged instructions can be executed
only in supervisor state. PR/SM exports a virtual machine including all architected
instructions, and initiates the execution in supervisor state, so that all three classes of
instruction can be executed within the logical partition. Thus each logical partition has both
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execution states available. PR/SM does not interfere with the logical partition's use of
those states.
A system control program (SCP) running in a logical partition can support System z and
S/390 architectural mode. This is set when a partition is defined, and cannot be altered
while the partition is activated. PR/SM supports and uses the "start interpretive execution"
(SIE) instruction to create an interpretative execution environment in which the logical
partitions execute. PR/SM begins execution in non-SIE mode. When a logical partition is to
be activated PR/SM establishes the parameters for each logical processor allocated to the
partition in a control block called a "state description". PR/SM executes a SIE instruction,
which dispatches the logical processor in SIE mode. The PR/SM hardware executes
instructions in the logical processor in SIE mode until an exception condition occurs, which
causes control to return to PR/SM in non-SIE mode. The exception conditions are events
that cannot be handled in interpretative mode. PR/SM receives control in non-SIE mode.
PR/SM maintains a state description for each logical processor of each logical partition so
that each time a logical processor is dispatched, it is in the same context as when it last
had control. Since this state description is updated by the hardware, it is impossible for
one logical partition to acquire control with the wrong context (i.e. the context of another
logical partition). The non-SIE/SIE distinction is a powerful privilege differentiation between
PR/SM and the logical partitions.
In LPAR mode, the System z10 provides support for several features that are very helpful
in many customer environments. However, these features are not recommended in a
secure environment. As a result, the TOE provides security related controls to disable such
features assuring separation of the logical partition(s). The security related controls are
outlined below:
● Logical Partition Isolation
This control reserves reconfigurable unshared channel paths for the exclusive use of a
logical partition. Channel paths assigned to an isolated logical partition are not
available to other logical partitions and remain reserved for that LP when they are
configured offline.
● I/O Configuration Control Authority
This control can limit the ability of the logical partition to read or write any IOCDS in the
configuration locally or remotely. Logical partitions with control authority for the
I/O configuration data can read and write any non-write protected IOCDS in the
configuration and can change the I/O configuration dynamically.
● Global Performance Data Control Authority
This control limits the ability of a logical partition to view central processor activity data
for other logical partitions. Logical partitions with control authority for global
performance data can view CP utilization data and Input/Output (IOP) busy data for all
of the logical partitions in the configuration. A logical partition without control authority
for the performance data can view only the CP utilization data for itself.
● Cross-Partition Authority
This control can limit the capability of the logical partition to issue certain control
program instructions that affect other logical partitions. Logical partitions with cross-
partition authority can issue instructions to perform a system reset of another logical
partition, deactivate any other logical partition, and provide support for the automatic
reconfiguration facility.
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In addition to the security controls mentioned above, the TOE also insures that central and
expanded storage for each logical partition is isolated and cannot be shared with other
logical partitions. The TOE rigidly enforces this “no sharing” rule during logical partition
definition, logical partition activation, logical partition reconfiguration and during logical
partition execution.
The TOE also “removes” central processors (CPs) from logical partitions by virtualizing
physical CPs. Virtualized physical CPs are referred to as logical processors. Within the
TOE, each logical CP is represented as a data structure that is associated with its specific
logical partitions preventing the transfer of data between partitions.
Thus, when PR/SM is initialized for secure operation, one partition cannot gain access to
the data within another partition nor modify any aspect of another partition.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The TOE is available on different models of the System z10 server family. All models
possess the common z/Architecture, system software, applications, channel I/O and
operational environment. Therefore, the identical LIC for the TOE can be run without any
modification on each model that is part of that family of servers. For a list of supported
models see the tables provided in chapter 8.
Developer tests have been performed on those platforms. It should be noted that it was
not deemed necessary by the evaluator to test on all possible platforms from the lists
provided, since the models listed for each of the server families only differ in the total
amount of processors available.
Evaluator tests were executed on a System z10 EC server and a System z10 BC server.
The machines were made available to the evaluator by the developer during the
evaluator’s visit at the IBM development site in Poughkeepsie, NY.
Developer Tests
Test configuration and approach
The test platforms were set up by the developer according to the ST and all relevant
guidance, ensuring that the evaluated configuration as defined in the ST was tested. The
security functionality of the TOE was tested at a level of SFR. The security relevant test
cases are combined in a specific security test suite.
Test results
The developer testing was performed successfully on the evaluated configuration of the
TOE as listed above. Actual test results are kept under configuration control. The actual
test results matched the expected results for the respective test case as documented in
the developer test documentation.
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Test coverage
The security functionality of the TOE was covered by the developer’s security test suite
and the executed tests. As for the TSFI as detailed in the Functional Specification they are
completely covered by the security test suite.
Test depth
The evaluator verified that developer tests provide for a sufficient depth as required by
EAL5. The security test suite provided by the developer covers the subsystems as defined
in the high-level design documentation of the TOE as well as the modules as defined in
the low-level design.
The overall test depth of the developer tests comprises the low-level design modules, the
high-level design subsystems and the internal interfaces of those subsystems and
modules as required for the assurance level of the evaluation.
Evaluator Tests
Test configuration and approach
The evaluator performed independent evaluator tests at the developer site in
Poughkeepsie, NY.
The evaluator testing effort comprised two major test sessions: Both sessions
concentrated on repeating selected test of the security test suite provided by the
developer. There was a test session designated to each of the IBM System z10 server
families, with a specific focus on the newly introduced System z10 BC server. During the
test sessions the evaluator applied variations on the test case. The objective of those
variations was to determine whether TOE security mechanisms can be disabled,
circumvented, or behave differently.
The sessions were performed on a System z10 EC server as well as on a System z10 BC
server. The driver levels of the machines used for independent testing were identified by
the evaluator as being the TOE as defined in chapter 8.
Prior to testing on either machines, the evaluator verified the driver level and the machine
type and set up the TOE according to the Security Target and all relevant guidance,
ensuring that all evaluator tests were performed on the evaluated configuration of the
TOE.
Developer tests performed
The evaluator successfully performed a set of selected developer tests from the security
test suite. The actual test results achieved by the evaluator matched the expected results
as documented by the developer in the developer test documentation.
Additional evaluator tests
The evaluator devised tests additional to the developer tests, as suggested by the CEM.
Those test cases were derived by variation of the developer test cases. The evaluator
identified one potential vulnerability with an attack potential rated low. As for the
corresponding attack paths, the evaluator performed a source code analysis rather than
actual penetration tests. That source code analysis revealed that the identified attack
paths do not exist; therefore the identified vulnerability is not exploitable.
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Since no other vulnerabilities with a low or moderate attack potential were discovered
during the vulnerability assessment, no additional penetration tests were performed by the
evaluator.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE, as stated in table 2, uses Driver D76 Control Level 3.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
z10 EC Model Number Feature Codes CPs (depending on Feature Code)
E12 6700 – 6712 09
– 12
E26 6713 – 6726 13 – 26
E40 6727 – 6740 27 – 40
E56 6741 – 6756 41 – 56
E64 6757 – 6764 57 – 64
Table 5: Supported z10 EC hardware (not part of the TOE)
z10 BC Model Number Feature Codes Model Capacity ID CPs (depending on Feature Code)
E10 5013 – 5018 A00 – A05 010
– 5
E10 5019 – 5023 B01 – B05 1 – 5
E10 5024 – 5028 C01 – C05 1 – 5
E10 5029 – 5033 D01 – D05 1 – 5
E10 5034 – 5038 E01 – E05 1 – 5
E10 5039 – 5043 F01 – F05 1 – 5
E10 5044 – 5048 G01 – G05 1 – 5
E10 5049 – 5053 H01 – H05 1 – 5
E10 5054 – 5058 I01 – I05 1 – 5
E10 5059 – 5063 J01 – J05 1 – 5
E10 5064 – 5068 K01 – K05 1 – 5
E10 5069 – 5073 L01 – L05 1 – 5
E10 5074 – 5078 M01 – M05 1 – 5
E10 5079 – 5083 N01 – N05 1 – 5
E10 5084 – 5088 O01 – O05 1 – 5
E10 5089 – 5093 P01 – P05 1 – 5
E10 5094 – 5098 Q01 – Q05 1 – 5
E10 5099 – 5103 R01 – R05 1 – 5
E10 5104 – 5108 S01 – S05 1 – 5
9
Model z10 EC E12 ordered with 0 CPs has no central processors but could be all IFLs or all ICFs (see [6]
resp. [9], Appendix B.2 “Processor Unit” for details).
10
Model z10 BC E10 ordered with 0 CPs has no central processors but could be all IFLs or all ICFs (see [6]
resp. [9], Appendix B.2 “Processor Unit” for details).
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z10 BC Model Number Feature Codes Model Capacity ID CPs (depending on Feature Code)
E10 5109 – 5113 T01 – T05 1 – 5
E10 5114 – 5118 U01 – U05 1 – 5
E10 5119 – 5123 V01 – V05 1 – 5
E10 5124 – 5128 W01 – W05 1 – 5
E10 5129 – 5133 X01 – X05 1 – 5
E10 5134 – 5138 Y01 – Y05 1 – 5
E10 5139 – 5143 Z01 – Z05 1 – 5
Table 6: Supported z10 BC hardware (not part of the TOE)
The assumptions outlined in chapter 4 of this report, especially those concerning
configurations, have to be considered.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 [4] (AIS 34).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL 5 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0460-2008, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the added underlying hardware
platform System z10 BC.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5
A strength of function claim is not applicable since no TOE security function is based on a
permutational or probabilistic mechanism.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include crypto algorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the
assessment.
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CP Central Processor
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
HMC Hardware Management Console
IOCDS Input/Output configuration data set
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LIC Licensed Internal Code
LPAR Logical Partition
PP Protection Profile
PR/SM Processor Resource / System Manager
SE Support Element
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SIE Start Interpretive Execution
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
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TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
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TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.11
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0557, Version 8.3, January 29, 2009, Security Target
for PR/SM for the IBM System z10 Enterprise Class and IBM System z10 Business
Class, IBM Corporation (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.0, April 6, 2009, Evaluation Technical Report
PR/SM for the IBM System z10 at Driver D76 Control Level 3, atsec information
security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration lists for the TOE (confidential documents):
July 03, 2008, HMC Configuration List ZHMC
July 03, 2008, SE Configuration List ZSE
February 02, 2009, zSeries z10 EC GA2 and z10 MR GA2 (D76) LPAR Module List
December 18, 2008, RPM Configuration Mgmt Report
October 28, 2008, z10 EC and z10 BC publications: by Title
March 13, 2008, ODTs Solved or Dropped in z10EC GA2 - z10BC GA1
[9] Public Version of the Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0557, Version 8.3, January 29,
2009, Security Target for PR/SM for the IBM System z10 Enterprise Class and IBM
System z10 Business Class, IBM Corporation (sanitised public document)
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE, First Edition, October 2008, System z
Hardware Management Console Operations Guide
[11] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Eighth Edition, October 2008, System z
Input/Output Configuration Program User's Guide for ICP IOCP
[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Second Edition, October 2008, System z10
Processor Resource/Systems Manager Planning Guide
[13] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Fourth Edition, October 2008, System z10
and System z9 Stand-Alone Input/Output Configuration Program User's Guide
11
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 34, Version 2.00, 24 October 2008, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes
for EAL5+
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[14] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Fifth Edition, October 2008, System z10
Enterprise Class Installation Manual
[15] Guidance documentation for the TOE, First Edition, October 2008, System z10
Business Class Installation Manual
[16] Guidance documentation for the TOE, First Edition, October 2008, System z10
Enterprise Class Support Element Operations Guide
[17] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Third Edition, October 2008, System z10
Enterprise Class Service Guide
[18] Guidance documentation for the TOE, First Edition, October 2008, System z10
Business Class Service Guide
[19] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Fourth Edition, October 2008, System z10
Enterprise Class Installation Manual for Physical Planning
[20] Guidance documentation for the TOE, First Edition, October 2008, System z10
Business Class Installation Manual for Physical Planning
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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