TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
2021-06
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Certification Report
Cisco HyperFlex 4.5(2a) Systems HX Series
Sponsor and developer: Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-215885-CR2
Report version: 1
Project number: 215885_2
Author(s): Denise Cater
Date: 13 January 2022
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Cisco
HyperFlex 4.5(2a) Systems HX Series. The developer of the Cisco HyperFlex 4.5(2a) Systems HX
Series is Cisco Systems, Inc. located in San Jose, USA and they also act as the sponsor of the
evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when
judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE manages the storage of a storage cluster that has a minimum three servers (HyperFlex HX
Series Nodes (Converged Host)) with Solid-state disk (SSD) and Hard-disk drives (HDD) attached
storage. The clustered servers are networked with switches and fabric interconnects. Optionally, non-
storage servers, (compute nodes), can be included in the storage cluster. HX Data Platform manages
the storage for the data and VMs stored on the associated storage cluster.
The HyperFlex HX Series installer is loaded on a UCS platform that is networked to the storage cluster
to be managed. The initial cluster includes at least three HyperFlex HX Series Nodes. The HyperFlex
HX Series includes HyperFlex Connect (HX Connect) GUI, which is used as the primary management
tool for Cisco HyperFlex. Through this centralized point of control for the cluster, administrators can
create volumes, monitor the data plat-form health, and manage resource use.
The TOE was evaluated initially by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 25 November 2019. The re-evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS
Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 12 January 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The re-
certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands
Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes are the addition of a new hardware model and update of the software from version
3.5(2a) to 4.5(2a).
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Cisco HyperFlex 4.5(2a) Systems HX Series,
the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the
product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Cisco HyperFlex 4.5(2a)
Systems HX Series are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security
target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this
certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL2 assurance requirements for the evaluated security
functionality.
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Cisco HyperFlex 4.5(2a) Systems HX Series
from Cisco Systems, Inc. located in San Jose, USA.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
Cisco HyperFlex HXAF220c – M5SX All – Flash
Node
HXAF 220c – M5SX
Cisco HyperFlex HXAF240c – M5SX All – Flash
Node
HXAF 240c – M5SX
Cisco HyperFlex HX220c – M5SX Hybrid Node HXAF 240c – M4SX
Cisco HyperFlex HX240c – M5SX Hybrid Node HXAF 220c – M4S
Cisco HyperFlex HXAF220c - M5SN NVMe Node HXAF220c - M5SN NVMe
Cisco HyperFlex HX240c – M5L Hybrid Node HX220c – M5SX
Cisco HyperFlex HXAF220c – M4S All-Flash Node HX240c – M5SX
Cisco HyperFlex HXAF240c – M4SX All-Flash Node HX240c – M5L
Cisco HyperFlex HX220c – M4S Hybrid Node HX220c – M4S
Cisco HyperFlex HX240c – M4SX Hybrid Node HX240c – M4SX
Software
Cisco HyperFlex HX Data Platform Software for
VMware ESXi
4.5(2a)
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Cisco HyperFlex
4.5(2a) Systems HX Series. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above
consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.
 Security audit:
o The TOE generates audit messages that identify specific TOE operations.
 User data protection
o The TOE provides the Authorized Administrator with the ability to control remote host (VMs)
access to the TOE Converged hosts, clusters and datastores with whitelisting.
 Identification and authentication
o The TOE provides authentication services for the Authorized Administrator to connect to the
TOE’s HX Connect GUI and HXCLI administrator interfaces
 Secure Management
o The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE.
 Protection of the TSF
o The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication and limit configuration options to the Authorized Administrator.
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 Resource Utilization
o The TOE protects against unavailability of capabilities and system resources caused by failure
or degradation of services by supporting redundancy and failover capabilities of the storage
management network and the storage data networks.
 TOE Access
o The TOE enforces the termination of inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator
configurable time-period has expired.
 Trusted Path
o The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over
HTTPS/TLSv1.2 for remote HX Connect GUI and SSHv2 for remote HXCLI access.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is installed in a hypervisor environment, such as VMware vSphere where it manages the
storage clusters and data stores that has a minimum three servers, (TOE Converged hosts), with SSD
and HDD attached storage. The clustered servers (TOE Converged hosts) are networked with
switches and fabric interconnects. Optionally, non-storage servers, (compute nodes), can be included
in the storage cluster (TOE Converged hosts). HyperFlex HX Series manages the storage for the data
and VMs stored on the associated storage cluster (TOE Converged hosts).
The logical architecture of the TOE can be depicted as follows:
Figure 1. Logical architecture of the TOE.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Ref Identifier Version
[AGD] Cisco HyperFlex Systems HX Series Common Criteria Operational User
Guidance and Preparative Procedures
Version: 3.0
15 December 2021
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2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has testing of all TSFI identified in the functional specification. For both the original
evaluation and this re-evaluation, the evaluator’s strategy to identify which test cases to repeat took
into account the verification of the SSH and HTTPS protocols (which are remotely accessible) and
their configuration which can be prone to errors. In addition the evaluators devised independent test
cases focusing on the verification of other core security functions provided by the TOE and the
verification that the user guidance provides all the necessary steps for secure configuration of the
TOE.
The developer made a test environment available for use by the evaluators.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
To identify potential vulnerabilities the evaluator performed the following activities:
 SFR design analysis: Based on the information obtained in the evaluation evidence, the SFR
implementation details were examined. The aspects described in CEM annex B were considered.
During this examination several potential vulnerabilities were identified.
 Additional security analysis: When the implementation of the SFR was understood, a coverage
check was performed on the relevant aspects of all SFRs. This expanded the list of potential
vulnerabilities.
 Public vulnerability search: The evaluator performed public domain vulnerability search based on
the TOE name, TOE type, and identified 3rd party security relevant libraries and/or services.
Several additional potential vulnerabilities were identified during a search in the public domain.
 The potential vulnerabilities identified were analysed, and some of the potential vulnerabilities
were concluded not exploit within in the Basic attack potential, or covered by guidance. For
remaining potential vulnerabilities, penetration tests were devised.
For both the original evaluation and this re-evaluation, the evaluator focused on the following in the
generation of their penetration tests:
 Remote accessible interfaces/protocols.
 Trying to misuse (including brute force) SSH, Web GUI interface
 Performing generic IP fuzzing
 Trying to disrupt audit records (by remote means).
The total test effort expended by the evaluators in this re-evaluation was 8 days. During that test
campaign, 100% of the total time was spent on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The developer tested the TOE in a stretched cluster configuration using the TOE models of
HXAF220C-M5SX. The below diagram shows an overview of the TOE test configuration that was used
by the developer and evaluator for both the original evaluation and this re-evaluation:
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Figure 2 TOE test configuration overview (Site A, Site-B, and Site-C are located in the same location).
The evaluators examined the differences in the hardware and determined they were not security
relevant and the enforcement of the security functional requirements is independent of the hardware
differences. Therefore, it was concluded that the above test configuration is representative of the TOE
as described in the [ST].
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Cisco HyperFlex 4.5(2a) Systems HX
Series.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents,
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Cisco HyperFlex 4.5(2a)
Systems HX Series, to be CC Part 2 conformant, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 2. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in
Security Target [ST].
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2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. Please note that the documents contain relevant details
concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The user should pay particular attention to the use of whitelist access controls for this TOE, as
detailed in [AGD] Table 2 “Terminology”. The whitelist access is configured during installation, and
cannot be modified once the TOE is operational.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
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3 Security Target
The Cisco HyperFlex 4.5 Systems HX Series Common Criteria Security Target, Version: 3.0, 22
December 2021 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
HDD Hard-disk drives
HX HyperFlex
HXCLI HyperFlex Command Line Interface
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
SSD Solid-state disk
TOE Target of Evaluation
VMs Virtual Machines
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Cisco HyperFlex 4.5 Systems HX Series - Evaluation Technical Report EAL2,
21-RPT-608, Version 3.0, 10 January 2022
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[ST] Cisco HyperFlex 4.5 Systems HX Series Common Criteria Security Target,
Version: 3.0, 22 December 2021
(This is the end of this report.)