TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
NL-9351 VT Leek
P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
(KVK), under number 27288788.
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2021-06
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Certification Report
Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00 with IC Dedicated Software
Sponsor and developer: Shenzhen Goodix Technology Co., Ltd.
Fl3, Phase B, Tengfei Industrial Building, Futian Free Trade
Zone.
Shenzhen
P.R. China
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0369941-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0369941
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 24 February 2022
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 2/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0369941-CR, dated 24 February 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
Page: 3/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0369941-CR, dated 24 February 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 4/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0369941-CR, dated 24 February 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
Page: 5/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0369941-CR, dated 24 February 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Security
Chip GSEA01.x.D00 with IC Dedicated Software. The developer of the Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00
with IC Dedicated Software is Shenzhen Goodix Technology Co., Ltd. located in Shenzhen, P.R.
China and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is
intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of
the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is an Embedded-Flash-based secure microcontroller platform with IC Dedicated Software.
The applications can be executed securely and with good performance in this platform.
This TOE is critically dependent on the operational environment to provide countermeasures against
specific attacks as described in the Security User Guidance Manual section 3.2 and 5.6. Therefore, it
is vital to maintain meticulous adherence to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 24 February 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00 with IC
Dedicated Software, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance
level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Security
Chip GSEA01.x.D00 with IC Dedicated Software are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
Page: 6/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0369941-CR, dated 24 February 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00 with IC
Dedicated Software from Shenzhen Goodix Technology Co., Ltd. located in Shenzhen, P.R. China .
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware GSE A0
Software Boot OS 0101
Software Root0 0101
Software Analysis OS 0101
Software HAL 0101
Software Flash Loader 0101
Software Crypto Library 0102
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Security Chip
GSEA01.x.D00 with IC Dedicated Software. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this
report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.3.4.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following main features:
• ARM SC300 processor supporting unprivileged and privileged modes for access control
• CPU Monitor that further protects CPU
• SAHB with masking and integrity protection
• MMU supporting access control to memories and SFRs of the hardware components
• Memory encrypted and integrity protection for all embedded memories
• Register integrity protection
• AES with countermeasures against SCA and DFA attacks
• TDES with countermeasures against SCA and DFA attacks
• RSA cryptography with countermeasures against SCA and DFA attacks
• ECC cryptography with countermeasures against SCA and DFA attacks
• Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and Galois Message and Authentication Code (GMAC) for
AES
• TRNG conforming to class PTG.2 of AIS-20/31
• DRNG conforming to class DRG.3 of AIS-20/31
• Metal Shielding resisting physical attacks
• Security Sensors
• Test Mode, Analysis Mode and Flash Loader Mode protection
Page: 7/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0369941-CR, dated 24 February 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Please note that the TOE contains additional HW accelerators, HAL and CL APIs not explicitly claimed
in the [ST]. The functionality and security of these features have not explicitly been addressed in this
certification. Therefore, if these features are required by the composite product the
developer/evaluator should do their own security analysis and/or testing. In case of some specific
functionalities, in order to support this analysis, the Vendor asked the Lab to carry out additional
analysis that is included in the [ETRfC].
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST], can be depicted as follows:
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version Date
GSEA01 Preparative Procedures 1.1 2022-01-18
GSEA0 Data Sheet 1.7 2021-12-30
GSEA01 User Manual 1.0 2022-01-11
GSEA01 Security User Guidance Manual 1.11 2022-01-18
Page: 8/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0369941-CR, dated 24 February 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
HAL and Crypto Library Header File 0101 N/a
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer combines the different testing techniques of wafer testing, simulation testing, emulator
testing, engineering sample testing, and quality testing to ensure the correct functioning of the TSF.
This testing approach is complemented by an extensive coverage analysis for both hardware and
software parts of the TOE to ensure that the correct depth of testing and coverage of interfaces is
reached.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge
gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed according to the attack methods in [JIL-
AAPS] and [JIL-AM].
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 37 weeks. During that test campaign, 32% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks and 68% on side-channel testing.
2.6.3 Test configuration
Part of the independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was performed on an earlier revision
of the TOE. The assurance gained from testing on an earlier revision has been assessed to be valid
for the final TOE version, because the changes introduced were minimal and did not have an impact
on the TSF.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
Page: 9/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0369941-CR, dated 24 February 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the production of the
TOE, by use of 4 Site Technical Audit Reuse report{s}.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00 with IC
Dedicated Software, with the specific configuration GSEA01.0 and GSEA01.1.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and Site Technical Audit Report(s) for the site(s)
[STAR-GZJ] 2, [STAR-GHQ], [STAR-GCD], [STAR-GSZ], [STAR-JSCC] and [STAR-TSMC]. To
support composite evaluations according to [COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and
approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this
TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00
with IC Dedicated Software, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product
satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE.
This TOE is critically dependent on the operational environment to provide countermeasures against
specific attacks as described in the Security User Guidance Manual section 3.2 and 5.6. Therefore, it
is vital to maintain meticulous adherence to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
2 The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
Page: 10/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0369941-CR, dated 24 February 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
Page: 11/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0369941-CR, dated 24 February 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
3 Security Target
The Security Target of Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00 with IC Dedicated Software, version 1.31, 18
January 2022 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block-cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IC Integrated Circuit
MAC Message Authentication Code
RNG Random Number Generator
RMI Remote Method Invocation
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TRNG True Random Number Generator
Page: 12/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0369941-CR, dated 24 February 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00 with IC Dedicated
Software” – EAL5+, 21-RPT-658, version 6.0, 24 February 2022
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00
with IC Dedicated Software” – EAL5+, 22-RPT-039, v5.0, 24 February 2022
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PP_0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, registered
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13 January 2014
[ST] Security Target of Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00 with IC Dedicated Software,
version 1.31, 18 January 2022
[ST-lite] Security Target Lite of Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00 with IC Dedicated
Software, version 1.31, 21 January 2022
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
[STAR-GZJ] Site Technical Audit Report - Goodix Shanghai Zhangjiang Site, 21-RPT-528,
v2.0, 08 February 2022
[STAR-GHQ] Site Technical Audit Report - Goodix Shanghai Hongqiao Site, 21-RPT-529,
v1.0, 18 January 2022
[STAR-GCD] Site Technical Audit Report - Goodix Chengdu Site, 21-RPT-530, v1.0, 18
January 2022
[STAR-GSZ] Site Technical Audit Report - Goodix Shenzhen Site, 21-RPT-531, v1.0, 18
January 2022
[STAR-JSCC] Site Technical Audit Report - JSCC Site, 21-RPT-532, v1.0, 18 January 2022
[STAR-TSMC] Site Technical Audit Report – TSMC Fab3, 21-RPT-533, v1.0, 18 January 2022
(This is the end of this report.)