UNCLASSIFIED
COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dell EMC™ SupportAssist Enterprise 4.0
with Policy Manager 6.8
Dell EMC
6 August 2020
487 EWA 2019
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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This
certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian CC Scheme,
and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report,
and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other
organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product
by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its
associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your department has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Contact Centre and Information Services
Edward Drake Building
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation
Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) for
the Canadian CC Scheme and posted on the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common
Criteria Project).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE Description................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................................... 8
2 Security Policy......................................................................................................................................... 9
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................................................................................... 9
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ......................................................................................................10
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.............................................................................................................10
3.2 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................................................10
4 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................11
4.1 Documentation.................................................................................................................................................11
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities....................................................................................................................12
5.1 Development....................................................................................................................................................12
5.2 Guidance Documents........................................................................................................................................12
5.3 Life-Cycle Support ............................................................................................................................................12
6 Testing Activities ....................................................................................................................................13
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests.........................................................................................................................13
6.2 Conduct of Testing...........................................................................................................................................13
6.3 Independent Functional Testing ........................................................................................................................13
6.3.1 Functional Test Results.................................................................................................................................13
6.4 Independent Penetration Testing.......................................................................................................................14
6.4.1 Penetration Test results................................................................................................................................14
7 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................15
7.1 Recommendations/Comments..........................................................................................................................15
8 Supporting Content..................................................................................................................................16
8.1 List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................16
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8.2 References.......................................................................................................................................................16
LIST OF FIGURES
TOE Architecture..................................................................................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification ................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s).........................................................................................................................9
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Dell EMC™ SupportAssist Enterprise 4.0 with Policy Manager 6.8 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or
TOE), from Dell EMC , was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section
1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in
Section 1.1 for the evaluated security functionality.
EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 6 August 2020 and was carried
out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that
their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of
the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common
Criteria Project).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version Dell EMC™ SupportAssist Enterprise 4.0 with Policy Manager 6.8
Developer Dell EMC
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The TOE claims the following conformance:
EAL 2+ (ALC_FLR.2)
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is an asynchronous messaging system in which all communications are initiated from the customer site. All
communications between the customer's SAE implementation and the Dell EMC Enterprise servers use the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) protocol with end-to-end Transport Layer Security (TLS) tunneling.
The TOE is used by Dell EMC hardware and software at customer sites to send a variety of information including
configuration data, logs, error messages, usage and performance data to Dell EMC and to allow identified Dell EMC support
personnel remote access to those systems for troubleshooting.
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1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channel
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following cryptographic implementation has been evaluated by the CMVP and is used by the TOE:
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation
Cryptographic Module Certificate Number
OpenSSL FIPS Object Module (2.0.2) #1747
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 The TOE is connected to the network in such a way that it is able to access all of the access-controlled resources.
 The operational environment will be responsible for protecting the communications link between the Policy Manager
and the SupportAssist Enterprise Server and between the Policy Manager and administrative users.
 The TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
The following features are excluded from this evaluation:
 Remote user authentication verified through Dell EMC network security
 Automatic software updates
Additionally, it should be noted that security provided by the managed product is not part of the evaluated functionality. If a
connection from the Dell EMC infrastructure to the managed product is allowed, the connection then relies on the security
functionality provided by the managed product itself. If authentication is enforced by the managed product, then Dell EMC
support personnel must be provided with the appropriate credentials for logging in.
Implementers must ensure that if multiple managed products are available on the same subnet, that all these products are
appropriately configured to control access. Otherwise, a support representative granted access to troubleshoot one device,
may inadvertently have access to other devices on that subnet as well.
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
The TOE software (SAE VE 4.00.00.08 and Policy Manager 6.8.3 Build 129692) running on:
 A server running VMware ESXi 6.7 (Virtualized SAE running on SLES 12 SP3)
 A server running Windows Server 2012 R2 (Policy Manager 6.8)
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a) SupportAssist Enterprise Version 4.0 Technical Description Guide, July 2019
b) Secure Remote Services Policy Manager, Version 6.8, Operations Guide, 2018
c) Dell EMC™ SupportAssist Enterprise 4.0 Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version 1.3
d) SupportAssist Enterprise Version 4.0 User’s Guide, July 2019
e) SupportAssist Enterprise Version 4.0 Troubleshooting Guide, July 2019
f) SupportAssist Enterprise Version 4.0 Reportable Items, July 2019
g) SupportAssist Enterprise Version 4.0 Alert Policy Guide, July 2019
h) SupportAssist Enterprise Version 4.0 Support Matrix, July 2019
i) Secure Remote Services Policy Manager, Version 6.8, Policy Manager
j) Installation Guide using Locally-Installed Directory Service (OpenDS), November 2018
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and
accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected
against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and
performing penetration tests.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests
identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance
documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developer's tests
b. Verification of the Cryptographic Implementation: The evaluator verified that the claim implementation was present
and used by the TOE
c. Concurrent Management Sessions: The evaluator verified that multiple concurrent management sessions can be
accommodated
d. Inter-TSF Confidentiality: The evaluator verified that communication between the TOE and Dell EMC is protected
6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE
behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING
The penetration testing effort focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.
 Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
 Technical community sources (Type 2)
 Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
 Tool Generated (Type 4)
The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and
technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to
discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators
formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their penetration testing effort.
6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS
Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on 3/11/2020 and included the following search terms:
 SupportAssist Enterprise 4.0
 Policy Manager 6.8
 Policy Manager 6.8.3
Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:
 National Vulnerability Database: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search
 EMC support: https://support.emc.com/
 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: http://google.ca
CVE-2018-15764 and CVE-2017-4976 were found for Policy Manager 6.8. Users are instructed to follow the guidance
provided by the vendor to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This
certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This is not an
endorsement of the IT product by CCCS or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by CCCS or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, is
expressed or implied.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CM Configuration Management
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GC Government of Canada
IT Information Technology
ITS Information Technology Security
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Security Target Dell EMC™ SupportAssist Enterprise 4.0 with Policy Manager 6.8, 9 April 2020, v1.2
Evaluation Technical Report Dell EMC™ SupportAssist Enterprise 4.0 with Policy Manager 6.8, 6 August 2020, v1.0