TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-11
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Certification Report
NXP JCOP on SN100.C25 Secure Element
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors NV
High Tech Campus 60
5656 AG Eindhoven
The Netherlands
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300066-02-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300066-02
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 17 October 2024
Number of pages: 14
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 9
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 10
2.6.3 Test configuration 10
2.6.4 Test results 11
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 11
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 11
2.9 Evaluation Results 11
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 12
3 Security Target 13
4 Definitions 13
5 Bibliography 14
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the NXP
JCOP on SN100.C25 Secure Element. The developer of the NXP JCOP on SN100.C25 Secure
Element is NXP Semiconductors NV located in Eindhoven, Netherlands and they also act as the
sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective
consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular
requirements.
The TOE consists of a certified embedded Secure Element (eSE), including an associated Crypto
Library and Security Software, and a software stack which is stored and executed on the eSE. The
Hardware Secure Element is embedded in a micro-controller which also includes an Integrated NFC
controller and a System Mailbox which provides the communication interface for the TOE.
The TOE was evaluated initially by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 27 October 2023. The re-evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS
Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 17 October 2024 with the approval of the ETR. The re-
certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands
Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes are:
Changes to the JCOP product in order to:
Extend functionality by customer request (Feature Change or New Feature)
Fix non-security related functionality issues
Improve performance
Apply security hardening
Updated User guidance for the currently certified variants of the TOE
One new JCOP variant has been added to the certified TOE, namely JCOP 6.6 R1.06.0
The security evaluation has reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations where
valid. A full, up-to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the NXP JCOP on SN100.C25 Secure Element,
the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the
product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the NXP JCOP on SN100.C25
Secure Element are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target,
and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this
certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis), ASE_TSS.2 (TOE summary
specification with architectural design summary) and ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the NXP JCOP on SN100.C25 Secure Element
from NXP Semiconductors NV located in Eindhoven, Netherlands.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery item
type
Identifier Version
Hardware
(Part of
SN100
certificate,
[HW-CR])
“NXP SN100 Series Secure Element with Crypto Library”
SN100_SE B2.1 C25
B2.1 C25
Software /
Firmware
(Part of
SN100
certificate,
[HW-CR])
Factory OS 4.2.0
Boot OS 4.2.0
Flash Driver Software 4.0.8
Factory Page 18218
Systems Page Common 18468
BootOS Patch 4.2.0 PL3 v4
Services Software 4.13.3.0
Crypto Library 1.0.0
Software
JCOP5.0 OS, native applications and OS Update Component R1.11.0
JCOP6.0 OS, native applications and OS Update Component R1.13.0
JCOP6.1 OS, native applications and OS Update Component R1.04.0
JCOP6.4 OS, native applications and OS Update Component R1.06.0
JCOP6.5 OS, native applications and OS Update Component R1.04.0
JCOP 6.6 OS, native applications and OS Update Component R1.06.0
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the NXP JCOP on
SN100.C25 Secure Element. For details, see section 0 “The logical architecture, originating from the
Security Target [ST], of the TOE can be depicted as follows:
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The TOE provides a variety of security features. The hardware of the Micro Controller already protects
against physical attacks by applying various sensors to detect manipulations and by processing data
in ways which protect against leakage of data by side channel analysis. With the software stack the
TOE provides many cryptographic primitives for encryption, decryption, signature generation,
signature verification, key generation, secure management of PINs and secure storage of confidential
data (e.g. keys, PINs). Also, the software stack implements several countermeasures to protect the
TOE against attacks.
Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.3.2
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of a Java Card smart card operating system, an OS updater,
an applet migration feature, a restricted mode and an underlying platform, which is composed of a
library which provides cryptographic functions and a secure micro controller. The TOE provides Java
Card 3.0.4 functionality (and preparation for Java Card 3.0.5 functionality) with post-issuance applet
loading, card content management and secure channel features as specified in Global Platform 2.2.1
including SCP03.
It includes also NXP Proprietary Functionality
• Config Applet: JCOP OS includes a Config Applet that can be used for configuration of the
TOE.
• OS Update Component: Proprietary functionality that can update JCOP OS or UpdaterOS.
• Applet Migration: Keep User Data, Key Data or PIN Data after updating an applet.
• Restricted Mode: In Restricted Mode only very limited functionality of the TOE is available
such as, e.g.: reading logging information or resetting the Attack Counter.
• Error Detection Code (EDC) API.
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Cryptographic functionality includes 3DES, AES, RSA and RSA CRT ; SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms, HMAC, ECC over GF(p), Twisted Edwards Curve 25519 for
signature generation and verification (EdDSA), Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange on Montgomery Curve
(25519). Furthermore, the TOE provides random number generation according to class DRG.3 of AIS
20.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product
Note that proprietary applications have been included in the TOE, but as there are no security claims
on these functionalities, these applications’ functionality has not been assessed, only the self-
protection of the TSF.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST], of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
The TOE provides a variety of security features. The hardware of the Micro Controller already protects
against physical attacks by applying various sensors to detect manipulations and by processing data
in ways which protect against leakage of data by side channel analysis. With the software stack the
TOE provides many cryptographic primitives for encryption, decryption, signature generation,
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signature verification, key generation, secure management of PINs and secure storage of confidential
data (e.g. keys, PINs). Also, the software stack implements several countermeasures to protect the
TOE against attacks.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
For JCOP 5.0:
Identifier Version
JCOP 5.0 R1.11.0 (JCOP 5.0 9.3.11) User Guidance Manual Rev. 1.13, 26 April 2023
JCOP 5.0 R1.11.0 (JCOP 5.0 9.3.11) User Guidance Manual
Addendum
Rev. 1.8, 10 April 2018
JCOP 5.0 R1.11.0 (JCOP 5.0 9.3.11) Anomaly Sheet Rev. 1.12, 14 April 2021
For JCOP 6.0:
Identifier Version
JCOP 6.0 R1.13.0 (JCOP 6.0 11.3.13) User Guidance Manual Rev. 1.17, 10 May 2023
JCOP 6.0 R1.13.0 (JCOP 6.0 11.3.13) User Guidance Manual
Addendum
Rev. 1.13, 16 April 2019
JCOP 6.0 R1.13.0 (JCOP 6.0 11.3.13) Anomaly Sheet Rev. 1.14, 14 April 2021
For JCOP 6.1:
Identifier Version
NXP. JCOP 6.1 R1.04.0 (JCOP 6.1 13.3.04) User Guidance
Manual
Rev. 3.6, 28 April 2023
JCOP 6.1 R1.04.0 (JCOP 6.1 13.3.04) User Guidance Manual
Addendum
Rev. 3.3, 26 February 2020
NXP. JCOP 6.1 R1.04.0 (JCOP 6.1 13.3.04) Anomaly Sheet Rev. 3.4, 26 April 2023
For JCOP 6.4:
Identifier Version
JCOP 6.4 R1.06.0 (JCOP 6.4 17.3.06) User Guidance Manual Rev. 5.9.1, 01 May 2023
JCOP 6.4 R1.06.0 (JCOP 6.4 17.3.06) User Guidance Manual
Addendum
Rev. 5.8, 11 May 2022
JCOP 6.4 R1.06.0 (JCOP 6.4 17.3.06) Anomaly Sheet. Rev. 5.8, 11 May 2022
For JCOP 6.5:
Identifier Version
JCOP 6.5 R1.04.0 (JCOP 6.5 19.3.04) User Guidance Manual Rev. 7.6, 06 April 2023
JCOP 6.5 R1.04.0 (JCOP 6.5 19.3.04) User Guidance Manual
Addendum
Rev. 7.5, 27 March 2023
NXP. JCOP 6.5 R1.04.0 (JCOP 6.5 19.3.04) Anomaly Sheet Rev. 7.5, 02 March 2023
For JCOP 6.6:
Identifier Version
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JCOP 6.6 R1.06.0 (JCOP 6.6 20.3.06) User Guidance Manual Rev. 8.5.2, 22 March 2024
JCOP 6.6 R1.06.0 (JCOP 6.6 20.3.06) User Guidance Manual
Addendum
Rev. 8.5, 29 February 2024
JCOP 6.6 R1.06.0 (JCOP 6.6 20.3.06) Anomaly Sheet Rev. 8.5, 29 February 2024
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The tests cover all security functions and aspects of the TSF. Testing was performed during
development as well as for acceptance/release. The developer used a set of test suites (industry
standard and proprietary) and tools to test the TOE as well as an emulator, PC Platform and FPGA
tool as some tests could only be performed in such environment. The identification was checked
based on the SVN number. The developer used a distributed test environment to allow usage of a vast
amount of simultaneously driven testing equipment.
The developer has performed extensive testing on FSP, subsystem, module and module interface
level. The tests are performed by the developer through execution of the test scripts using an
automated and distributed system. Test tools and scripts are extensively used to verify that the tests
return expected values.
Code coverage analysis is used by NXP to verify overall test completeness. Test benches for the
various TOE parts are executed using code coverage measurement and analysis tools to determine
the code coverage (i.e. lines, branches and/or instructions, depending on tool) of each test bench.
Cases with incomplete coverage were analysed. For each tool, the developer investigated and
documented inherent limitations that could lead to coverage being reported as less than 100%. In
such cases the developer provided a “gap” analysis with rationales explaining the reason for these
results.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations, as
the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a test
environment. The evaluators have reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small
number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
Tests from different test benches that test different parts of the functionality of the TOE were selected
for witnessing at the developer location. The tests were running at the network of the developer.
Besides the repetition of developer tests, the evaluator defined spot-checks on the calculation of code-
coverage as used by the developer to demonstrate their completeness of testing. As developer
functional testing is rigorous, no other tests were defined by the evaluator.
The TOE exists in six configurations, i.e.: “JCOP 5.0 R1.11.0”, “JCOP 6.0 R1.13.0”, “JCOP 6.1
R1.04.0”, “JCOP 6.4 R1.06.0”, “JCOP 6.5 R1.04.0” and “JCOP 6.6 R1.06.0”. Each configuration exists
in a single evaluated configuration.
For this re-certification, the evaluator checked that the updated developer tests covered all changes in
the configurations of the TOE being re-certified and also where previous testing remained valid.
The evaluator then verified that the added configuration, i.e. JCOP 6.6 R1.06.0, was tested and then
performed its own independent testing on this configuration. This means that all tests have been
performed on all configurations of the TOE.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
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• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ADV and AGD potential vulnerabilities were
identified from generating questions relating to the type of TOE and the specified behaviour. From
the ASE class, no potential vulnerabilities were identified.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection against the attack scenarios was analysed using
the knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This resulted in the identification of
additional potential vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed according to the attack list in [JIL-
AP]. An important source for assurance against attacks in this step was the [ETRfC-HW] of the
underlying platform; no additional potential vulnerabilities were concluded from this.
• All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes
and the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these potential vulnerabilities
were not exploitable. For most of the potential vulnerabilities a penetration test was defined.
Several potential vulnerabilities were found to be not exploitable due to an impractical attack path.
For the first certification the total test effort expended by the evaluators was 11 weeks. During that test
campaign, 28% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 36% on side-channel testing, and
36% on logical tests.
In this first re-certification, the total test effort expended by the evaluators was 6 weeks. During that
test campaign, 16% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 67% on side-channel testing,
and 17% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE was tested to provide assurance for all configurations i.e. “JCOP 5.0 R1.11.0”, “JCOP 6.0
R1.13.0” “JCOP 6.1 R1.04.0”, “JCOP 6.4 R1.06.0”, JCOP 6.5 R1.04.0 and “JCOP 6.6 R1.06.0”
Note that for some tests intermediate and related versions that share the same code base were used.
The used TOE versions provide assurance for the TOE configurations as the code base and security
concepts are shared. The following versions were used for some tests: “JCOP 5.1 R1.00.1”, JCOP 5.2
R1.01.1”, “JCOP 6.0 R1.11.0”, “JCOP 6.3 R2.04.0”, “JCOP 6.0 R2.02.0”, “JCOP 6.5 R1.04.0” and
“JCOP 6.6 R1.06.0”. The difference in these versions have been analysed and all test are applicable
to the actual version of the TOE in all of its configurations.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that for some cryptographic
functionality the security level could be reduced from an algorithmic security level above 100 bits to a
practical remaining security level lower than 100 bits. The remaining security level still exceeds 80 bits,
so this is considered sufficient. Therefore, no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the
independent penetration tests.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
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2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 7 Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number NXP JCOP on SN100.C25 Secure
Element (with configurations JCOP 5.0 R1.11.0”, “JCOP 6.0 R1.13.0” “JCOP 6.1 R1.04.0”, “JCOP 6.4
R1.06.0”, “JCOP 6.5 R1.04.0” and “JCOP 6.6 R1.06.0”).
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document provides details of
the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite
evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the NXP JCOP on SN100.C25
Secure Element, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of
EAL 5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5, ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1. This implies that
the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘demonstrable’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 0 “The logical architecture, originating from the Security
Target [ST], of the TOE can be depicted as follows:
Page: 13/16 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300066-02-CR, dated 17 October 2024
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The TOE provides a variety of security features. The hardware of the Micro Controller already protects
against physical attacks by applying various sensors to detect manipulations and by processing data
in ways which protect against leakage of data by side channel analysis. With the software stack the
TOE provides many cryptographic primitives for encryption, decryption, signature generation,
signature verification, key generation, secure management of PINs and secure storage of confidential
data (e.g. keys, PINs). Also, the software stack implements several countermeasures to protect the
TOE against attacks.
Documentation” contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the
TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate
conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are
no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance.
Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain
attacks
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
For users of previous certification results regarding this TOE: Note that the RNG claim has been
changed from DRG.4 to DRG.3 when recertified.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Page: 15/16 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300066-02-CR, dated 17 October 2024
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
3 Security Target
The NXP JCOP on SN100.C25 Secure Element Security Target, Revision 5.3, 19 August 2024 [ST] is
included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DES Data Encryption Standard
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
TOE Target of Evaluation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
Page: 16/16 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300066-02-CR, dated 17 October 2024
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “NXP JCOP on SN100.C25 Secure Element
(versions: JCOP 5.0 R1.11.0 - JCOP 6.0 R1.13.0 - JCOP 6.1 R1.04.0 - JCOP
6.4 R1.06.0 - JCOP 6.5 R1.04.0 - JCOP 6.6 R1.06.0)” – EAL5+, 23-RPT-903,
Version 8.0, 23 September 2024
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “NXP JCOP on SN100.C25
Secure Element (versions: JCOP 5.0 R1.11.0 - JCOP 6.0 R1.13.0 - JCOP 6.1
R1.04.0 - JCOP 6.4 R1.06.0 - JCOP 6.5 R1.04.0 - JCOP 6.6 R1.06.0)” –
EAL5+, 23-RPT-904, Version 8.0, 23 September 2024
[HW-CR] SN100 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library versions B2.1
C25/C48/C58, Report number NSCIB-CC-2400058-01-CR, version 1, 05 July
2024
[HW-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition SN100 Series - Secure Element
with Crypto Library B2.1 C25/C48/C58 – EAL6+, 24-RPT-522, Version 4.0, 30
May 2024
[HW-ST] Security Target, SN100 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library, Rev. 3.5,
21 April 2021
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November 2022
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP-JC] Java Card System – Open Configuration Protection Profile Version 3.1, April
2020, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0099-V2-2020, 06 May 2020
[ST] NXP JCOP on SN100.C25 Secure Element Security Target, Revision 5.3, 19
August 2024
[ST-lite] NXP JCOP on SN100.C25 Secure Element Security Target Lite, Revision 5.3,
19 August 2024
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)