National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
High Sec Labs SK41D-4TR KVM Firmware Version 44404-
E7E7
Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11193-2021
Dated: September 15, 2021
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Daniel Faigin: Senior Validator
Patrick Mallett: Lead Validator
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 8
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 9
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 10
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................10
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................12
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 13
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 14
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................14
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................14
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 15
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................15
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................15
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 16
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................16
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................16
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................17
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................17
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................17
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................18
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 19
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 20
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 21
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 22
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 23
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions, Threats and Clarification of Scope in
Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated
configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the High Sec Labs SK41D-4TR KVM Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Target of
Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and
no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific
version and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in September 2021. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing
Device, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices, which references the Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0 [PP_PSD_V4.0], the PP‐Module for
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and the PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version
1.0.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP-approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and
Video/Display Devices, which references the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device
Version 4.0 [PP_PSD_V4.0], the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and the
PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0. This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with
the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
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these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted
product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE High Sec Labs SK41D-4TR KVM Firmware Version 44404-E7E7
Protection Profile PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Keyboard/Mouse Devices and
Video/Display Devices, which references the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Device Version 4.0 [PP_PSD_V4.0], the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices,
Version 1.0 and the PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0
Security Target High Sec Labs SK41D-4TR KVM Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Security Target,
v1.7, September 14, 2021
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for High Sec Labs SK41D-4TR KVM Firmware Version
44404-E7E7, v1.3, September 14, 2021
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor High Sec Labs Ltd.
Developer High Sec Labs Ltd.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd, Rockville MD 20850
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Item Identifier
CCEVS Validators Daniel Faigin, Patrick Mallett
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3 Architectural Information
The High Sec Labs (HSL) SK41D-4TR Keyboard, Video, Mouse (KVM) switch allows users to
share keyboard, video, and mouse peripherals between a number of connected computers.
Security features ensure isolation between computers and peripherals to prevent data leakage
between connected systems.
The evaluated features of the TOE are described further in Section 4.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above
consists of several security functionalities, as identified below:
 Security Audit
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below.
4.1 Security Audit
Audit entries are generated for security related events.
4.2 User Data Protection
The TOE provides secure switching capabilities for keyboard, video and mouse. The TOE
ensures that only authorized peripheral devices may be used.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
Administrators must be identified and authenticated prior to accessing administrative functions.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides management capabilities in support of the ‘Restore to factory default’
function. The Administrator role restricts this functionality to authorized administrators.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE ensures a secure state in the case of failure, provides only restricted access, and
performs self-testing. The TOE provides both passive detection of physical attack and resistance
to physical attack.
4.6 TOE Access
The TOE provides a continuous indication of which computer is currently selected.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 1 TOE Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.NO_TEMPEST Computers and peripheral devices connected
to the PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
The TSF may or may not isolate the ground
of the keyboard and mouse computer
interfaces (the USB ground). The Operational
Environment is assumed not to support
TEMPEST red‐black ground isolation.
A.PHYSICAL The environment provides physical security
commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it processes and contains.
A.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES The environment includes no wireless
peripheral devices.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN PSD Administrators and users are trusted to
follow and apply all guidance in a trusted
manner.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the PSD and its
operational environment follow the applicable
security configuration guidance.
A.USER_ALLOWED_ACCESS All PSD users are allowed to interact with all
connected computers. It is not the role of the
PSD to prevent or otherwise control user
access to connected computers. Computers or
their connected network shall have the
required means to authenticate the user and to
control access to their various resources.
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Assumption Assumption Definition
A.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG
_CAPABILITIES
The computers connected to the TOE are not
equipped with special analog data collection
cards or peripherals such as analog to digital
interface, high performance audio interface,
digital signal processing function, or analog
video capture function.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Table 2 TOE Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.DATA_LEAK A connection via the PSD between one or
more computers may allow unauthorized data
flow through the PSD or its connected
peripherals.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK A connection via the PSD between one or
more computers may allow unauthorized data
flow through bit‐by‐bit signaling.
T.RESIDUAL_LEAK A PSD may leak (partial, residual, or echo)
user data between the intended connected
computer and another unintended connected
computer.
T.UNINTENDED_USE A PSD may connect the user to a computer
other than the one to which the user intended
to connect.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES The use of an unauthorized peripheral device
with a specific PSD peripheral port may allow
unauthorized data flows between connected
devices or enable an attack on the PSD or its
connected computers.
T.LOGICAL_TAMPER An attached device (computer or peripheral)
with malware, or otherwise under the control
of a malicious user, could modify or
overwrite code or data stored in the PSD’s
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Threat Threat Definition
volatile or non‐volatile memory to allow
unauthorized information flows.
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER A malicious user or human agent could
physically modify the PSD to allow
unauthorized information flows.
T.REPLACEMENT A malicious human agent could replace the
PSD during shipping, storage, or use with an
alternate device that does not enforce the PSD
security policies.
T.FAILED Detectable failure of a PSD may cause an
unauthorized information flow or weakening
of PSD security functions.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device,
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices, which references the Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0 [PP_PSD_V4.0], the PP‐Module for
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and the PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices,
Version 1.0.
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 HSL Quick Installation Guide 4 Ports Secure Ruggedized DVI-D KVM Switch,
HDC23220 Rev 1.0
 HSL Administrator Guide, HDC19968, Rev. C
 High Sec Labs SK41D-4TR KVM Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Common Criteria
Guidance Supplement, Version 0.5, September 14, 2020
Only the Administrator Guides listed above, and the specific sections of the other documents
referenced by that guide should be trusted for the installation, administration, and use of this
product in its evaluated configuration.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
Figure 1 – KVM Switch Evaluated Configuration
Figure 1 shows a basic evaluated configuration. The TOE is connected to four computers. The
video input and output format is DVI-D, and a single display is connected to the KVM. The TOE
uses ruggedized 32 pin connectors that support both DVI-D and USB 2.0 protocols. The KVM is
used with a wired remote control.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The ST does not describe excluded functionality.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Test Report for High Sec Labs SK41D-4TR KVM Firmware Version
44404-E7E7, Ver 1.2, August 27, 2021, which is not publicly available. The specific test
configurations and test tools utilized may be found in Section 4.1 of the AAR.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device
Version 4.0, the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and the PP‐Module for
Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the
Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the High Sec Labs SK41D-4TR
KVM Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in
the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the Protection
Profile and claimed modules.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the High Sec Labs SK41D-4TR KVM Firmware
Version 44404-E7E7 that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements. The evaluation team also performed an
assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Device Version 4.0, PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for
Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version
4.0, PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for Video/Display
Devices, Version 1.0 related to the examination of the information contained in the TOE
Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
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9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0, PP‐
Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices,
Version 1.0 related to the examination of the information contained in the operational guidance
documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Device Version 4.0, PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for
Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0 and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the
Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0, PP‐Module for
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0,
and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed
a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any
issues with the TOE.
The evaluator searched the Internet for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE using the web sites
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listed below. The sources of the publicly available information are provided below.
 High Security Labs Support: http://www.highseclabs.com/support/
 National Vulnerability Database: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search
 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: https://google.com
The evaluator performed the public domain vulnerability searches using the following key
words: (The search was performed on August 27, 2021.):
 HighSecLabs
 Stryker
 Stryker KVM
 Stryker Firmware
 NAK transaction
 SYNC Signal
 HPD signal
 EDID traffic
 ARC signal
 HDCP signal
 USB HID traffic
 SK41D-4TR
 WR40-4R
 44404-E7E7
 STMircoelectronics 32-bit
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Device Version 4.0, PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for
Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0, PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices,
Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, and correctly verified that
the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the High Sec Labs SK41D-4TR KVM
Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version 0.4, August 24
July 8, 2020 document. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were
evaluated. Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security
functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the
product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in
the operational environment, such as the syslog server, need to be assessed separately and no
further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Of special note is that the SK41D-4TR KVM does not provide the user any indication of CAPS
LOCK, NUM LOCK, or SCROLL LOCK status on either the TOE chassis or the remote, and the
nature of the PSD PP precludes using the indicator lights built into the keyboard, as it is shared
between computers. Users should be advised of this, and if there is anomalous behavior
regarding CAPITAL LETTERS the numeric keypad, or scrolling, they should try changing the
CAPS LOCK, NUM LOCK, or SCROLL LOCK states.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
High Sec Labs SK41D-4TR KVM Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Security Target, v1.7, September 14, 2021
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
5. HSL Quick Installation Guide 4 Ports Secure Ruggedized DVI-D KVM Switch,
HDC23220 Rev 1.0
6. HSL Administrator Guide, HDC19968, Rev. C
7. High Sec Labs SK41D-4TR KVM Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Common Criteria
Guidance Supplement, Version 0.5, September 14, 2020