UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ
560-LSS
COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless
Controllers and Access Points 17.6
20 March 2023
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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE).
This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common
Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or
any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT
product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report,
and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your organization has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
Contact Centre and Information Services
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security.
A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the
official website of the International Common Criteria Program).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation.....................................................................................................................7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance......................................................................................................................7
1.2 TOE Description............................................................................................................................................7
1.3 TOE Architecture ..........................................................................................................................................8
2 Security Policy.....................................................................................................................................................9
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality...........................................................................................................................9
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope...............................................................................................................12
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions ........................................................................................................12
3.2 Clarification of Scope..................................................................................................................................13
4 Evaluated Configuration......................................................................................................................................14
4.1 Documentation...........................................................................................................................................15
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities .............................................................................................................................17
5.1 Development..............................................................................................................................................17
5.2 Guidance Documents..................................................................................................................................17
5.3 Life-Cycle Support.......................................................................................................................................17
6 Testing Activities...............................................................................................................................................18
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests....................................................................................................................18
6.2 Conduct of Testing .....................................................................................................................................18
6.3 Independent Testing ...................................................................................................................................18
6.3.1 Independent Testing Results....................................................................................................................18
6.4 Vulnerability Analysis..................................................................................................................................19
6.4.1 Vulnerability Analysis Results...................................................................................................................20
7 Results of the Evaluation ....................................................................................................................................21
7.1 Recommendations/Comments.....................................................................................................................21
8 Supporting Content ............................................................................................................................................22
8.1 List of Abbreviations...................................................................................................................................22
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8.2 References.................................................................................................................................................22
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: TOE Architecture.......................................................................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification .....................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s)................................................................................................................9
Table 3: Wi-Fi Alliance Certificates..........................................................................................................................9
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless Controllers and Access Points 17.6 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation,
or TOE), from Cisco Systems, Inc. , was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be
found in Section 1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance
claim listed in Section 1.1 for the evaluated security functionality.
Lightship Security is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 20 March 2023 and was
carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify
that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of
the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Program).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version Cisco Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless Controllers and Access Points 17.6
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The TOE claims the following conformance:
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP) Version 2.2e, 23-March-2020
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - Extended Package for Wireless LAN Access Systems Version 1.0, May
29 2015
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is a distributed Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) access system consisting of a Wireless LAN Controller (WLC)
and one or more Access Points (AP). A WLAN Access System ensures wireless clients are authenticated by a centralized
authentication server and provides an encrypted IEEE 802.11 link to protect wireless communications from unauthorized
disclosure and/or modification. A WLAN Access System also provides for central management and administration of the
wireless infrastructure within an organization.
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1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
Figure 1: TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:
 Security Audit
 Communication
 Cryptographic Support
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following cryptographic implementations are used by the TOE and have been evaluated by the CAVP:
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s)
Cryptographic Module Certificate Number
CiscoSSL FOM 7.0a A877
CiscoSSL FOM 7.0b A2452
IOS Common Cryptographic Module Rel5a A1462
Cisco Aironet 3800 88W8964C AES 4114
Qualcomm Lithium AES engine-256w v1.1 AES 5663
Broadcom Crypto Hardware Module aes_core_gcm.vhd(bca) rev 1.1 C1273
Broadcom Crypto Hardware Module aes_core_gcm.vhd(bca) rev 1.2 C1275
The following wireless implementations are used by the TOE and have been certified by the Wi-Fi Alliance:
Table 3: Wi-Fi Alliance Certificates
Wireless Module Certificate Number
Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 Wireless Controller and Cisco C9130AX AP WFA98109
Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 Wireless Controller and Cisco C9120AX AP WFA98120
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Wireless Module Certificate Number
Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 Wireless Controller and Cisco C9115AX AP WFA98113
Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 Wireless Controller and Cisco C9105AX AP WFA100774
Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 1560 Series AP WFA97683
Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 4800 Series AP WFA97651
Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 3800 Series AP WFA97641
Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 2800 Series AP WFA97646
Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 Wireless Controller and Cisco Catalyst Industrial Wireless 6300 Series AP WFA98227
Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 Wireless Controller and Cisco 6300 Series Embedded Services AP WFA98232
Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 Wireless Controller and Cisco C9130AX AP WFA98108
Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 Wireless Controller and Cisco C9120AX AP WFA98119
Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 Wireless Controller and Cisco C9115AX AP WFA98112
Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 Wireless Controller and Cisco C9105AX AP WFA100773
Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 1560 Series AP WFA97655
Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 4800 Series AP WFA97650
Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 3800 Series AP WFA97640
Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 2800 Series AP WFA97645
Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 Wireless Controller and Cisco Catalyst Industrial Wireless 6300 Series AP WFA98226
Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 Wireless Controller and Cisco 6300 Series Embedded Services AP WFA98231
Cisco Catalyst 9800-L Wireless Controller and Cisco C9130AX AP WFA97958
Cisco Catalyst 9800-L Wireless Controller and Cisco C9120AX AP WFA98117
Cisco Catalyst 9800-L Wireless Controller and Cisco C9115AX AP WFA97959
Cisco Catalyst 9800-L Wireless Controller and Cisco C9105AX AP WFA100294
Cisco Catalyst 9800-L Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 1560 Series AP WFA97654
Cisco Catalyst 9800-L Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 4800 Series AP WFA97649
Cisco Catalyst 9800-L Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 3800 Series AP WFA97429
Cisco Catalyst 9800-L Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 2800 Series AP WFA97644
Cisco Catalyst 9800-L Wireless Controller and Cisco Catalyst Industrial Wireless 6300 Series AP WFA98225
Cisco Catalyst 9800-L Wireless Controller and Cisco 6300 Series Embedded Services AP WFA98230
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Cloud Wireless Controller and Cisco C9130AX AP WFA98110
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Cloud Wireless Controller and Cisco C9120AX AP WFA98121
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Cloud Wireless Controller and Cisco C9115AX AP WFA98114
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Cloud Wireless Controller and Cisco C9105AX AP WFA100775
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Wireless Module Certificate Number
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Cloud Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 1560 Series AP WFA97684
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Cloud Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 4800 Series AP WFA97652
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Cloud Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 3800 Series AP WFA97642
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Cloud Wireless Controller and Cisco Aironet 2800 Series AP WFA97647
Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Wireless Controller and Cisco Catalyst Industrial Wireless 6300 Series AP WFA98228
Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Wireless Controller and Cisco 6300 Series Embedded Services AP WFA98233
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical
attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation.
This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP does
not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not
expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data,
bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the physical
platform on which the VM runs.
 The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example the device should not
provide computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following Case 2 vNDs as specified in Section 1.2, the VS is considered part of
the TOE with only one vND instance for each physical hardware platform. The exception being where components of
a distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. In Case 2 vND, no non-TOE guest
VMs are allowed on the platform.
 A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses
it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include
administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity,
is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs for particular types of
Network Devices (e.g., firewall).
 The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of
security for the organization. This includes appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance
documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy
and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of
defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully
validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into
the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
 The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in
response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
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 The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are protected by the platform on
which they reside.
 For distributed TOEs it is assumed that the availability of all TOE components is checked as appropriate to reduce
the risk of an undetected attack on (or failure of) one or more TOE components. It is also assumed that in addition
to the availability of all components it is also checked as appropriate that the audit functionality is running properly
on all TOE components.
 The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g.
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is
discarded or removed from its operational environment.
 The Security Administrators for the VS are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the
organization. This includes not interfering with the correct operation of the device. The Network Device is not
expected to be capable of defending against a malicious VS Administrator that actively works to bypass or
compromise the security of the device.
 The VS software is assumed to be updated by the VS Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of
product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
 For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS provides, and is configured to provide sufficient isolation between software
running in VMs on the same physical platform. Furthermore, it is assumed that the VS adequately protects itself
from software running inside VMs on the same physical platform.
 For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS and VMs are correctly configured to support ND functionality implemented in
VMs.
 It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a manner that ensures that the TOE security policies
will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.
3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
The functionality listed below is not included in the evaluated configuration.
 Operating in non-FIPS 140-2 and non-CC mode
 WPA and WPA2 with TKIP encryption
 Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL for public cloud
 Cisco CleanAir
Additionally, the TOE includes a number of functions where there are no Security Functional Requirements that apply from
the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices v2.2e. The excluded functionality does not affect the TOE’s
conformance to the claimed Protection Profile.
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
TOE Software/Firmware Cisco Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless Controllers 17.6.01
 C9800-L-universalk9_wlc.17.6.01.SPA.bin
 C9800-40-universalk9_wlc.17.6.01.SPA.bin
 C9800-80-universalk9_wlc.17.6.01.SPA.bin
 C9800-CL-universalk9.17.6.01.ova
Note: The Access Points software images v17.6.01 are embedded in each WLC v17.06.01
image and are not separately downloaded and installed.
TOE Hardware Wireless Controllers (WLC):
 Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 (C9800-80-K9)
 Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 (C9800-40-K9)
 Cisco Catalyst 9800-L (C9800-L-F-K9, C9800-L-C-K9)
Access Points (AP):
 Cisco Catalyst 9130 Series Wi-Fi 6 Access Points (C9130AXI-x, C9130AXE-x,
C9130AXE-STA-x)
 Cisco Catalyst 9120 Series Wi-Fi 6 Access Points (C9120AXI-x, C9120AXE-x,
C9120AXP-x)
 Cisco Catalyst 9115 Series Wi-Fi 6 Access Points (C9115AXI-x, C9115AXE-x)
 Cisco Catalyst 9105 Series Wi-Fi 6 Access Points (C9105AXI-x, C9105AXW-x,
C9105AXIT-x, C9105AXWT-x)
 Cisco Catalyst IW6300 Series Access Points (IW-6300H-AC-X-K9, IW-6300H-DC-X–
K9, IW-6300H-DCW-X–K9)
 Cisco ESW6300 Access Point (ESW-6300-CON-X-K9)
 Cisco Aironet 1562 Series Access Points (AIR-AP1562I-x-K9, AIR-AP1562E-x-K9,
AIR-AP1562D-x-K9)
 Cisco Aironet 4800 Access Point (AIR-AP4800-x-K9, AIR-AP4800-x-K9C)
 Cisco Aironet 3800 Series Access Points (AIR-AP3802I-x-K9, AIR-AP3802I-x-K9C,
AIR-AP3802e-x-K9, AIR-AP3802E-x-K9C, AIR-AP3802p-x-K9, AIR-AP3802p-x-K9C)
 Cisco Aironet 2800 Series Access Points (AIR-AP2802I-x-K9, AIR-AP2802I-x-K9C,
AIR-AP2802E-x-K9, AIR-AP2802E-x-K9C)
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TOE Virtual Wireless Controllers (WLC):
 Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL (C9800-CL-K9) on VMware ESXi 6.7 running on Cisco Rack
Servers UCSC-C220-M5, UCSC-C240-M5, or UCSC-C480-M5
Environmental Support  EST Server
 Certificate Authority
 RADIUS Authentication Server (FreeRADIUS 3.0.x or higher)
 Syslog Server
 Management Workstation (with a TLS web browser or SSH client)
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
 Cisco Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless Controllers and Access Points 17.6, CC Configuration Guide, v0.8 February 10,
2023
The following documents are available for download to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a) Cisco Catalyst 9800-L Wireless Controller Hardware Installation Guide
b) Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 Wireless Controller Hardware Installation Guide
c) Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 Wireless Controller Hardware Installation Guide
d) Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Cloud Wireless Controller Installation Guide
e) Cisco Catalyst C9800-CL Wireless Controller Virtual Deployment Guide
f) Cisco Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless Controller Software Configuration Guide
g) Cisco Catalyst 9800 Wireless Controller Series Deployment Guide
h) Cisco Catalyst 9800 Wireless Controller Series Web UI Deployment Guide
i) Understanding Catalyst 9800 Wireless Controllers Configuration Mode
j) Understand FlexConnect on Catalyst 9800 Wireless Controller
k) C9800 Radio Resource Management Deployment Guide
l) Security Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Gibraltar 17.4.x
m) Cisco Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless Controller Command Reference, Cisco IOS XE Bengaluru 17.6.x
n) Cisco Catalyst 9130AX Series Access Point Getting Started Guide
o) Cisco Catalyst 9120AX Series Access Point Getting Started Guide
p) Cisco Catalyst 9115AX Series Access Point Getting Started Guide
q) Cisco Catalyst 9105AX Series Access Point Getting Started Guide
r) Cisco Catalyst IW6300 Heavy Duty Series Access Point Hardware Installation Guide
s) Cisco ESW6300 Embedded Services Access Point
t) Cisco Aironet 1560 Series Outdoor Access Point Hardware Installation Guide
u) Getting Started Guide - Cisco Aironet 2800 Series Access Points
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v) Getting Started Guide - Cisco Aironet 3800 Series Access Points
w) Cisco Aironet Series 2800/3800 Access Point Deployment Guide
x) Cisco Aironet 4800 Series Access Points Getting Started Guide
y) Cisco Aironet Series 4800 Access Point Deployment Guide
z) Cisco Catalyst 9130 Series Access Point Deployment Guide
aa) Security for VPNs with IPsec Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE 17
bb) Release Notes for Cisco Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless Controller, Cisco IOS XE Bengaluru 17.6.x
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and
accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected
against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a
vulnerability analysis.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests
identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and
guidance documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP
b. Cryptographic Implementation Verification: The evaluator verified that the claimed cryptographic implementations
were present in the TOE.
6.3.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as
specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
The vulnerability analysis focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.
 Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
 Technical community sources (Type 2)
 Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
 Tool Generated (Type 4)
The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and
technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to
discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators
formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their vulnerability analysis.
Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on 19 October 2022 and included the following search terms:
Cisco Catalyst 9800-40 Wireless
Controller
Cisco ESW6300 Access Point ACT2lite (Anti-Counterfeit
Technology 2 Lite) 15-14497-02
Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Wireless
Controller for Private Cloud (vSphere)
Cisco Aironet 1562 Series Access
Points
Microsemi SmartFusion2 SoC FPGA
M2S010TS
Cisco Catalyst 9800-80 Wireless
Controller
Cisco Aironet 4800 Access Point Cisco IOS-XE 17.6.01
Cisco Catalyst 9800-L Wireless
Controller
Cisco Aironet 3800 Series Access
Points
OpenResty 1.15.8.3
Cisco UCSC-C220-M5 Cisco Aironet 2800 Series Access
Points
CiscoSSL 7.1.3
Cisco UCSC-C240-M5 Intel Xeon Silver 4116T IC2M Rel5a
Cisco UCSC-C480-M5 Intel Xeon Broadwell D-1548 CiscoSSH 1.7.22
Cisco Catalyst 9130 Series Wi-Fi 6
Access Points
Intel Xeon Broadwell D-1563N Lightweight AP software 17.6.01
Cisco Catalyst 9120 Series Wi-Fi 6
Access Points
Intel Xeon Platinum 8160M CiscoSSL 7.1.220
Cisco Catalyst 9115 Series Wi-Fi 6
Access Points
Qualcomm IPQ8078 ARMv8 dnsmasq 2.83-1
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Cisco Catalyst 9105 Series Wi-Fi 6
Access Points
Broadcom BCM49408 ARMv8 U-Boot
Cisco Catalyst 9105 Series Wi-Fi 6
Access Points
Broadcom BCM47622 ARMv7
Cisco Catalyst IW6300 Series Access
Points
Marvell Armada 390 88F6920 ARMv7
Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:
Vendor security advisories
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/softwarechecker.x
US-CERT
https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/html/search
NIST National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD)
https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
CISA - Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-
catalog
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
https://cve.mitre.org/cve/
OpenSSL Vulnerabilities
https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html
6.4.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS
The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating
environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. This certification
report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration.
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ
8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITS Information Technology Security
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless Controllers and Access Points 17.6 Security Target, version 1.7, March 17,
2023
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless Controllers and Access Points 17.6 Evaluation Technical Report, version 1.2,
March 20, 2023
Cisco Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless Controllers and Access Points 17.6 Assurance Activity Report, version 1.2,
March 20, 2023