March 2018
Xerox VersaLink C405
Color Multifunction Printer
Diskless model
Security Target
Version 1.2.3
This document is a translation of the evaluated
and certified security target written in Japanese.
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- Table of Contents -
1. ST INTRODUCTION.............................................................. 1
1.1. ST Reference ................................................................................. 1
1.2. TOE Reference................................................................................ 1
1.3. TOE Overview ................................................................................ 1
1.3.1. TOE Type and Major Security Features.........................................................1
1.3.2. Environment Assumptions ......................................................................4
1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware and Software ...................................................5
1.4. TOE Description.............................................................................. 7
1.4.1. User Assumptions................................................................................7
1.4.2. Logical Scope and Boundary....................................................................7
1.4.3. Physical Scope and Boundary.................................................................14
1.4.4. Guidance........................................................................................15
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ...................................................... 16
2.1. CC Conformance Claims ...................................................................16
2.2. PP Claims, Package Claims.................................................................16
2.2.1. PP Claims .......................................................................................16
2.2.2. Package Claims.................................................................................16
2.2.3. Conformance Rationale .......................................................................16
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION............................................ 17
3.1. Threats ......................................................................................17
3.1.1. Assets Protected by TOE.......................................................................17
3.1.2. Threats..........................................................................................19
3.2. Organizational Security Policies ...........................................................20
3.3. Assumptions ................................................................................20
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES........................................................ 21
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................21
4.2. Security Objectives for the Environment..................................................22
4.3. Security Objectives Rationale..............................................................22
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION..................................... 26
5.1. Extended Components.....................................................................26
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6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................... 27
6.1. Security Functional Requirements.........................................................32
6.1.1. Class FAU: Security audit....................................................................32
6.1.2. Class FCS: Cryptographic support ............................................................37
6.1.3. Class FDP: User data protection ............................................................38
6.1.4. Class FIA: Identification and authentication................................................42
6.1.5. Class FMT: Security management............................................................45
6.1.6. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF............................................................52
6.1.7. Class FTP: Trusted path/channels ..........................................................53
6.2. Security Assurance Requirements .........................................................54
6.3. Security Requirement Rationale...........................................................55
6.3.1. Security Functional Requirements Rationale ................................................55
6.3.2. Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements........................................60
6.3.3. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.................................................62
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION.............................................. 63
7.1. Security Functions ..........................................................................63
7.1.1. Flash Memory Data Encryption (TSF_CIPHER)..............................................64
7.1.2. User Authentication (TSF_USER_AUTH) ....................................................64
7.1.3. System Administrator’s Security Management (TSF_FMT)................................68
7.1.4. Customer Engineer Operation Restriction (TSF_CE_LIMIT)................................69
7.1.5. Security Audit Log (TSF_FAU).................................................................70
7.1.6. Internal Network Data Protection (TSF_NET_PROT) .......................................72
7.1.7. Fax Flow Security (TSF_FAX_FLOW)..........................................................74
7.1.8. Self Test (TSF_S_TEST) ........................................................................74
8. ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY............................................. 76
8.1. Acronyms....................................................................................76
8.2. Terminology.................................................................................77
9. REFERENCES.................................................................... 80
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- List of Figures and Tables –
Figure 1: General Operational Environment......................................................................5
Figure 2: MFD Units and TOE Logical Scope .....................................................................8
Figure 3: Authentication Flow for Store Print and Faxbox ....................................................10
Figure 4: MFD Units and TOE Physical Scope ..................................................................14
Figure 5: Assets under and not under Protection ..............................................................18
Table 1: Function Types and Functions provided by the TOE ...................................................2
Table 2: User Role Assumptions ...................................................................................7
Table 3: TOE Basic Functions ......................................................................................8
Table 4: Categories of TOE Setting Data .......................................................................18
Table 5: Threats Addressed by the TOE.........................................................................19
Table 6: Organizational Security Policy .........................................................................20
Table 7: Assumptions.............................................................................................20
Table 8: Security Objectives for the TOE ........................................................................21
Table 9: Security Objectives for the Environment..............................................................22
Table 10: Assumptions / Threats / Organizational Security Policies and the Corresponding Security
Objectives ....................................................................................................23
Table 11: Security Objectives Rationale for Security Problem ................................................23
Table 12: Auditable Events of TOE and Individually Defined Auditable Events.............................32
Table 13: Operations between Subjects and Objects Covered by MFD Access Control SFP................38
Table 14: Rules for Access Control...............................................................................39
Table 15: Rules for Explicit Access Authorization ..............................................................40
Table 16: Subjects, Information, and Operations that cause the information to flow .....................40
Table 17: List of Security Functions .............................................................................46
Table 18: Security Attributes and Authorized Roles ...........................................................47
Table 19 Initialization property ................................................................................47
Table 20: Operation of TSF Data................................................................................48
Table 21: Security Management Functions Provided by TSF .................................................49
Table 22: Security Assurance Requirements....................................................................54
Table 23: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding Security Objectives..................55
Table 24: Security Objectives to SFR Rationale ................................................................56
Table 25: Dependencies of Functional Security Requirements ...............................................60
Table 26: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding TOE Security Functions .............63
Table 27: Management of security attributes..................................................................66
Table 28: Access Control .........................................................................................67
Table 29: Details of Security Audit Log Data...................................................................70
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1. ST INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes Security Target (ST) Reference, TOE Reference, TOE Overview, and TOE
Description.
1.1. ST Reference
This section provides information needed to identify this ST.
ST Title: Xerox VersaLink C405 Color Multifunction Printer
Diskless model Security Target
ST Version: V 1.2.3
Publication Date: March 22, 2018
Author: Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
1.2. TOE Reference
This section provides information needed to identify this TOE.
The TOE is VersaLink C405.
The TOE is identified by the following TOE name and ROM version.
TOE
Identification:
Xerox VersaLink C405 Color Multifunction Printer
Diskless model
Version: Controller ROM Ver.1.0.31
Manufacturer: Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
NOTE: Diskless model refers to a configuration in which the optional mass storage is not installed.
1.3. TOE Overview
1.3.1. TOE Type and Major Security Features
1.3.1.1. TOE Type
This TOE, categorized as an IT product, is the VersaLink C405 (hereinafter referred to as “MFD”)
which has the copy, print, network scan, and fax functions.
The TOE is the product which controls the whole MFD and protects the data that are transmitted
over the encryption communication protocols.
These protocols protect the security of the TOE setting data, the security audit log data and the
document data on the internal network between the TOE and the remote.
The TOE also prevents the document data and the used document data in the eMMC memory
from being disclosed by unauthorized person.
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1.3.1.2. Function Types
Table 1 shows the function types and functions provided by the TOE.
Table 1: Function Types and Functions provided by the TOE
Function types Functions provided by the TOE
Basic Function
- Control Panel
- Copy
- Print
- Network Scan
- Fax
- Embedded Web Server
Security Function
- Flash Memory Data Encryption
- User Authentication
- Administrator’s Security Management
- Customer Engineer Operation Restriction
- Security Audit Log
- Internal Network Data Protection
- Fax Flow Security
- Self Test
・ To use print functions, the printer driver shall be installed to the external client for general
user and that for system administrator.
・ There are two types of user authentication, local authentication and remote
authentication, and the TOE behaves with either one of the authentication types
depending on the setting.
In this ST, the difference of the TOE behavior is described if the TOE behaves differently
depending on the type of authentication being used. Unless specified, the behavior of the
TOE is the same for both authentication types.
There are two types of remote authentication: LDAP authentication and Kerberos
authentication.
Note)
・ Since the TOE’s functions to print from USB and store to USB are set to disabled, they are
not included in the target of evaluation. Therefore, the [Store to USB] and [Media Print]
buttons do not appear on the control panel.
1.3.1.3. Usage and Major Security Features of TOE
The TOE is mainly used to perform the following functions:
・ Copy function and Control Panel function are to read the original data from IIT and print
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them out from IOT according to the general user’s instruction from the control panel.
When more than one copy of an original data is ordered, the data read from IIT are first
stored into the MFD eMMC memory. Then, the stored data are read out from the eMMC
memory for the required number of times so that the required number of copies can be
made.
・ Print function is to decompose and print out the print data transmitted by a general user
client.
・ Embedded Web Server enables a system administrator to refer to and rewrite TOE setting
data via Web browser.
・ Network Scan function and Control Panel function are to read the original data from IIT
and transmit the document data to FTP server, or Mail server, according to the information
set in the MFD. This function is operated according to the general user’s instruction from
the control panel.
・ Fax function and Control Panel function are to send and receive fax data. According to the
general user’s instruction from the control panel to send a fax, the original data are read
from IIT and then sent to the destination via public telephone line. The document data are
received from the sender’s machine via public telephone line and then printed out from
the recipient’s IOT or stored in the Faxbox.
The TOE provides the following security features:
(1) Flash Memory Data Encryption
The document data and the security audit log data are encrypted before being stored into
the eMMC memory when using any function of copy, print, fax, etc. or configuring various
security function settings.
(2) User Authentication
Access to the TOE functions is restricted to the authorized user and this function identifies
and authenticates users. This function identifies and authenticates a user using his/her ID
and password entered from the control panel or Embedded Web Server of a general user
client, and enables access control over use of the TOE.
When a print job is received from a user client, the TOE identifies a registered user ID and
stores the print job, without authenticating the user.
(3) System Administrator’s Security Management
This function allows only the system administrator identified and authorized from the
control panel or system administrator client to refer to and change the TOE security
function settings.
(4) Customer Engineer Operation Restriction
A system administrator can prohibit CE from referring to and changing the TOE security
function settings.
(5) Security Audit Log
The important events of TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user
operation are traced and recorded based on when and who used what function.
(6) Internal Network Data Protection
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This function protects the communication data on the internal network such as document
data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data. (The following general encryption
communication- protocols are supported: TLS, IPSec, and S/MIME.)
(7) Fax Flow Security
This function prevents unauthorized access to the TOE or the internal network from public
telephone line via Fax card.
(8) Self Test
This function verifies the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data.
1.3.2. Environment Assumptions
This TOE is assumed to be used as an IT product at general office and to be connected to public
telephone line, user clients, and the internal network protected from threats on the external
network by firewall etc.
Figure 1 shows the general environment for TOE operation.
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Figure 1: General Operational Environment
1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware and Software
In the operational environment shown in Figure 1, the TOE (MFD) and the following non-TOE
hardware/software exist.
(1) General user client:
The hardware is a general-purpose PC. When a client is connected to the MFD via the internal
network and when the printer driver is installed to the client, the general user can request the
MFD to print.
When the client is connected to the MFD directly via USB and printer is installed to the client,
the user can request the MFD to print the document data.
ＴＯＥ
Public
Telephone
Line
CE
General System
Administrator
General User Client
-Printer Driver
DNS Server
External
Network
Firewall
Internal
Network
System
Administrator
System Administrator
Client
-Web Browser
General User Client
-Printer Driver
-Web Browser
General
User
USB
Mail Server
FTP Server
LDAP Server
Kerberos Server
General
User
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(2) System administrator client:
The hardware is a general-purpose PC. A system administrator can refer to and change TOE
setting data via Web browser.
(3) Mail server:
The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD sends/receives document data
to/from Mail server via mail protocol.
(4) FTP server:
The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD sends document data to FTP
server via FTP.
(5) DNS server:
The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD retrieves an IP address from the
DNS server using the DNS protocol.
(6) LDAP server
The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD acquires identification and
authentication information from LDAP server via LDAP. In addition, it acquires SA information
of user role assumptions.
(7) Kerberos server
The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD acquires identification and
authentication information from Kerberos server via Kerberos.
The OS of (1) general user client and (2) system administrator client are assumed to be Windows 7
and Windows 8.1.
The (6) LDAP server and (7) Kerberos server are assumed to be Windows Active Directory.
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1.4. TOE Description
This section describes user assumptions and logical/physical scope of this TOE.
1.4.1. User Assumptions
Table 2 specifies the roles of TOE users assumed in this ST.
Table 2: User Role Assumptions
Persons concerned Role Description
Administrator of the
organization
An administrator or responsible official of the organization
which owns and uses TOE.
User
General user A user of TOE functions such as copy, print and fax.
System administrator
(Key operator + System
Administrator Privilege
[SA])
A user who is authorized to manage the device using the
system administrator mode. A system administrator can
refer to and rewrite the TOE setting for device operation
and that for security functions via TOE control panel, and
Web browser.
Customer engineer (CE) A user who can configure the TOE operational settings
using the interface for CE.
1.4.2. Logical Scope and Boundary
The logical scope of this TOE consists of each function of the programs recorded on the controller
ROM.
Figure 2 shows the logical architecture of the MFD.
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Figure 2: MFD Units and TOE Logical Scope
1.4.2.1. Basic Functions
As shown in Table 3, the TOE provides the functions of control panel, copy, print, network scan,
fax, , and Embedded Web Server to general user.
Table 3: TOE Basic Functions
Function Description
Control Panel
Function
Control panel function is a user interface function for general user, CE, and
system administrator to operate MFD functions.
Controller ROM
Network Scan
Flash Memory
Data Encryption
Security
Audit Log
Embedded Web
Server
User
Authentication
Internal Network
Data Protection
Fax Flow
Security
Customer
Engineer
Operation
System
Administrator’s
Security
Management
eMMC Memory / NVRAM/SEEPROM
Document
Data
Audit
Log
Data
TOE
Setting
Data
Other
Setting
Data
Used
Document
Data
TOE
Fax
Print
(Decompose)
General User
Public
Telephone Line
FTP Server
Mail Server
System
Administrator
Client
-Web Browser
General User
Client
- Printer driver
- Web Browser
System
Administrator
Control Panel
Copy
Logical Scope
Customer
Engineer
LDAP Server
Kerberos
Server
DNS Server
Self Test
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Copy Function Copy function is to read the original data from IIT and print them out
from IOT according to the general user’s instruction from the control
panel.
When more than one copy of an original is ordered, the data read from IIT
are first stored into the MFD eMMC memory. Then, the stored data are
read out from the eMMC memory for the required number of times so that
the required number of copies can be made.
Print Function Print function is to print out the data according to the instruction from a
general user client. The print data created via printer driver are sent to the
MFD to be analyzed, decomposed, and printed out from IOT.
The print function is of two types: the normal print in which the data are
printed out from IOT directly after decomposed and the Store Print in
which the bitmap data are temporarily stored in the eMMC memory and
then printed out from IOT according to the general user’s instruction from
the control panel.
Network Scan
Function
Network scan function is to read the original data from IIT and
automatically transmit them to a general user client, FTP server, or Mail
server according to the information set in the MFD. A general user can
request this function from the control panel.
Fax Function Fax function is to send and receive fax data. According to the general
user’s instruction from the control panel to send a fax, the original data
are read from IIT and sent to the destination via public telephone line.
The document data are received from the sender’s machine via public
telephone line.
Embedded Web
Server Function
A system administrator can access and rewrite TOE setting data. For this, a
system administrator must be authenticated by his/her ID and password
entered from Web browser of a system administrator client.
1.4.2.2. Security Functions
The security functions provided by the TOE are the following.
(1) Flash Memory Data Encryption
Some data such as the security audit log data and the document data in Faxbox remain in the
eMMC memory even if the machine is powered off. To solve this problem, the document data
and security audit log data are encrypted before being stored into the eMMC memory when
operating any function of copy, print, and network scan, fax, or configuring various security
function settings.
(2) User Authentication
Access to the TOE functions is restricted to the authorized user.
A user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the Web browser of the general user
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client, or MFD control panel.
Only the authenticated user can use the following functions:
a) Functions controlled by the MFD control panel:
Copy, fax (send), network scan, Faxbox, and print (This print function requires the Store Print
preset from printer driver. A user must be authenticated from the control panel for print job.)
b) Functions controlled by Embedded Web Server:
Display of device condition, display of job status and its log.
Among the above functions which require user authentication, some particularly act as
security functions. The following are the security functions which prevent the unauthorized
reading of document data in the eMMC memory by an attacker who is impersonating an
authorized user:
・ The Store Print function and the Faxbox function, which require user authentication from
the control panel.
Figure 3 shows the authentication flow of the above functions.
Figure 3: Authentication Flow for Store Print and Faxbox
• Store Print Function
When a user sends a print request from the printer driver in which the Store Print is preset, the
print data are decomposed into bitmap data, classified according to the user ID, and
TOE
Print
Received Fax Data
User Client
Printer driver
Print Job
Store
Print
Faxbox
Classification
Authentication from Control Panel
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temporarily stored in the corresponding Store Print area within the eMMC memory.
To refer to the stored print data, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the
control panel. When the user is authenticated, the data on the waiting list corresponding to
the user ID are displayed. The user can request printing or deletion of the data on the list.
• Faxbox Function
The received fax data can be stored into Faxbox from Public Telephone Line (Fax card)
which are not shown in Figure 3.
To store the received fax data into Faxbox, user authentication is not required. The received
fax data transmitted over public telephone line are automatically stored into the Faxbox.
To print the stored data in the Faxbox, user authentication is required; the MFD compares the
user ID and password preset in the device against those entered by a System Administrator
from the control panel.
(3) System Administrator’s Security Management
To grant a privilege to a specific user, this TOE allows only the authenticated system
administrator to access the System Administrator mode which enables him/her to refer to and
set the following security functions from the control panel:
・ Refer to and set the Time/Date;
・ Refer to and set the TLS communication;
Additionally, this TOE allows only the system administrator, who is authenticated from the
system administrator client via Web browser using Embedded Web Server, to refer to and set
the following security functions via Embedded Web Server:
・ Refer to and set the Time/Date;
・ Refer to and set the Self Test;
・ Set the password of key operator (only a key operator is privileged);
・ Refer to and set the ID of SA / general user and set the password(with local authentication
only);
・ Refer to and set the access denial when system administrator’s authentication fails;
・ Refer to and set the limit of user password length (with local authentication only);
・ Refer to and set the Security Audit Log;
・ Refer to and set the TLS communication;
・ Refer to and set the IPSec communication;
・ Refer to and set the S/MIME communication;
・ Create/upload/download an X.509 certificate;
・ Refer to and set the User Authentication;
・ Refer to and set the general user permission;
・ Refer to and set the Customer Engineer Operation Restriction
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(4) Customer Engineer Operation Restriction
This TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to or enable/disable the
Customer Engineer Operation Restriction setting from the Embedded Web Server. For this, CE
cannot refer to or change the setting of each function described in (3) System Administrator’s
Security Management.
(5) Security Audit Log
The important events of TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation
are traced and recorded based on when and who operated what function. Only a system
administrator can supervise or analyze the log data by downloading them in the form of
tab-delimited text file via Web browser using Embedded Web Server. To download the log
data, TLS communication needs to be enabled.
(6) Internal Network Data Protection
The communication data on the internal network such as document data, security audit log
data, and TOE setting data are protected by the following general encryption
communication-protocols:
・ TLS
・ IPSec
・ S/MIME
(7) Fax Flow Security
This function prevents unauthorized access to the TOE or the internal network from public
telephone line via Faxcard that is connected to a controller board via the internal interface.
(8) Self Test
This TOE can execute the self test function to verify the integrity of TSF executable code and
TSF data.
1.4.2.3. Settings for the Secure Operation
System administrator shall set the following to enable security functions in 1.4.2.2.
・ Access denial when system administrator’s authentication fails
Default [5] Times.
・ User Passcode Minimum Length
Set to [9] characters
・ TLS
Set to [Enabled]
・ IPSec
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Set to [Enabled]
・ S/MIME
Set to [Enabled]
・ User Authentication
Set to [Local Authentication] or [Remote Authentication]
・ Store Print
Set to [authority of user to only Store Print]
・ Audit Log
Set to [Enabled]
・ Customer Engineer Operation Restriction
Set to [Enabled]
・ Self Test
Set to [Enabled]
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1.4.3. Physical Scope and Boundary
The physical scope of this TOE is the MFD. Figure 4 shows configuration of each unit and TOE
physical scope.
Figure 4: MFD Units and TOE Physical Scope
The MFD consists of the controller board and control panel, IIT, and IOT, ADF, and eMMC
Memory.
The controller board is connected to the control panel via the internal interfaces which transmit
control data, and the controller board is connected to the IIT board, Fax card, and IOT board via
the internal interfaces which transmit document data and control data.
Control Panel buttons, lamps, touch screen panel
NVRAM
SEEP
ROM
DRAM
Ethernet
USB
(device)
CPU
Controller ROM
Network
Scan
Flash
Memory
Data
Encryption
Print
(decompo
se)
Fax
Embedde
d Web
Server
Fax Flow
Security
Customer
Engineer
Operation
Restriction
System
Administrat
or’s
Security
Security
Audit Log
User_Auth
entication
Network
Data
Protection
: TOE
System Administrator
Client
General User Client
Mail Server
FTP Server
DNS Server
LDAP Server
Kerberos Server
General User Client
(USB)
Public Telephone Line
System
Administrator
General User
Customer Engineer
IOT
IOT
Board
IIT
IIT Board
ADF
ADF
Board
Copy Control
Panel
Controller Board
Self Test
eMMC Memory
Faxcard
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The controller board is a PWB which controls MFD functions of copy, print, network scan, and fax.
The board has a network interface (Ethernet), and local interfaces (USB) and is connected to the
IIT board and IOT board.
The control panel is a panel on which buttons, lamps, and a touch screen panel are mounted to
use and configure MFD functions of copy, print, network scan, and fax.
The IIT (Image Input Terminal) is a device to scan an original and send its data to the controller
board for copy, network scan, and fax functions.
The IOT (Image Output Terminal) is a device to output image data which was sent from the
controller board.
The ADF (Auto Document Feeder) is a device to automatically transfer original documents to IIT.
1.4.4. Guidance
The following are the guidance documents for this TOE.
• Xerox VersaLink C405 Color Multifunction Printer User Guide; Version 2.0 October 2017
(SHA1 Hash value: ebaffac28a7a76ec0e2112c4254ac49f8c04cb97)
• Xerox VersaLink Series Multifunction and Single Function Printers System Administrator
Guide; Version 2.0 October 2017
(SHA1 Hash value: 4ddc82babd4351f692018db85e37b397e915c9d7)
• Xerox VersaLink C405/B405 Multifunction Printer Security Function Supplementary
Guide; Version 1.0 March 2018
(SHA1 Hash value: 3079046e77b61e2368a22efbcb1b93017dc2ffa4)
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2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1. CC Conformance Claims
This ST and TOE conform to the following evaluation standards for information security (CC):
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4 Japanese Version 1.0
Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 4 Japanese Version 1.0
Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4 Japanese Version 1.0
The security functional requirements of this ST conform to CC Part 2.
The security assurance requirements of this ST conform to CC Part 3.
2.2. PP Claims, Package Claims
2.2.1. PP Claims
There is no applicable Protection Profile.
2.2.2. Package Claims
This Security Target claims EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
2.2.3. Conformance Rationale
There is no applicable PP rationale since this ST does not conform to PP.
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3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
This chapter describes the threats, organizational security policies, and the assumptions for the
use of this TOE.
3.1. Threats
3.1.1. Assets Protected by TOE
This TOE protects the following assets (Figure 5):
(1) Right to use MFD functions
The general user’s right to use each function of the TOE is assumed as an asset to be
protected.
(2) Document data stored for job processing
When a general user uses MFD functions of copy, print, fax, and network scan, the document
data are temporarily stored in the eMMC memory for image processing, transmission, and
Store Print. The stored data include general user’s confidential information and are assumed
as assets to be protected.
(3) Used document data
When a general user uses MFD functions of copy, print, fax, and network scan, the document
data are temporarily stored in the eMMC memory for image processing, transmission, and
Store Print. When the jobs are completed or canceled, only the management information is
deleted but the data itself remains. The residual data include general user’s confidential
information and are assumed as assets to be protected.
(4) Security audit log data
In the function of Security Audit Log, the important events such as device failure,
configuration change and user operation are recorded in the eMMC memory based on when
and who operated what function. For preventive maintenance and response to the events and
detection of unauthorized access, only a system administrator can retrieve the log data stored
in MFD by Embedded Web Server.
The log data are assumed as assets to be protected.
(5) TOE setting data
A system administrator can set TOE security functions from the MFD control panel or system
administrator client by the function of System Administrator’s Security Management. The
setting data stored in the TOE (see Table 4) can be a threat to other assets if used without
authorization and are assumed as assets to be protected.
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Figure 5: Assets under and not under Protection
Note) The data stored in a general client and server within the internal network and the general
data on the internal network are not assumed as assets to be protected. This is because TOE
functions prevent the access to the internal network from public telephone line and it cannot be a
threat.
Table 4 categorizes the TOE setting data recorded on NVRAM(Include eMMC memory) and
SEEPROM of the controller board.
Table 4: Categories of TOE Setting Data
Categories of TOE Setting Data (Note)
Data on minimum password length of user password
Data on password of key operator
Data on ID and password of SA/General user
Data on access denial due to authentication failures of system administrator
Public
Telephone
Line
External
Network
Firewall
Internal
Network
General Client
and Server
General User Client
System Administrator Client
- Printer Driver
- Web Browser
TOE
Document data, security audit log
data, and TOE setting data
transmitted in the internal network
General Data on
the Internal
Inaccessible
Document Data
Used Document Data
Security Audit Log
Data
TOE Setting Data
Internally Stored Data
Asset under protection
Asset not under protection
Other Setting Data
Internally Stored Data
- LDAP Server
- Kerberos Server
Internally Stored Data
TOE setting data
transmitted in the internal
t k
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Categories of TOE Setting Data (Note)
Data on Customer Engineer Operation Restriction
Data on Internal Network Data Protection
Data on Security Audit Log
Data on user permission
Data on User Authentication
Data on date and time*
Data on Self Test
Note: The setting data other than TOE setting data are also stored on NVRAM (Include eMMC
memory) and SEEPROM. Those setting data, however, are not assumed as assets to be protected
because they do not engage in TOE security functions.
* However, the present time data are not included.
3.1.2. Threats
Table 5 identifies the threats addressed by the TOE. An attacker is considered to have the disclosed
information on TOE operations and low-level attack capability.
Table 5: Threats Addressed by the TOE
Threat (Identifier) Description
T.CONFDATA
An attacker may access, read, or alter from control panel or system
administrator client, the TOE setting data which only a system
administrator is allowed to access.
T.DATA_SEC
An attacker may read or alter document data and security audit log
data from control panel or Web browser without authorization.
T.COMM_TAP
An attacker may intercept or alter document data, security audit log
data, and TOE setting data on the internal network.
T.CONSUME
An attacker may access the TOE and use TOE functions without
authorization.
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3.2. Organizational Security Policies
Table 6 below describes the organizational security policy the TOE must comply with.
Table 6: Organizational Security Policy
Organizational Policy
(Identifier)
Description
P.FAX_OPT
TOE shall ensure that the internal network cannot be accessed via
public telephone line.
P.VERIFY The TOE shall execute self-test to verify the integrity of TSF
executable code and TSF data.
P.CIPHER The TOE shall encrypt the document data and the security audit log
data in the eMMC memory.
(A cryptographic key does not need to be destructed.)
3.3. Assumptions
Table 7 shows the assumptions for the operation and use of this TOE.
Table 7: Assumptions
Assumption
(Identifier)
Description
Personnel Confidence
A.ADMIN
A system administrator shall have the necessary knowledge of TOE
security functions to perform the given role of managing the TOE
and shall not operate the TOE with malicious intent.
A.USER
TOE users shall be trained and have competence about the TOE
operation and precautions according to the policies of their
organization and the product guidance.
Protection Mode
A.SECMODE
A system administrator shall configure and set the TOE properly
according to the security policy of organization and the product
guidance document to manage the TOE and its external
environment.
A.ACCESS
The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that
provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical
components and data interfaces of the TOE.
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4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and for the environment and the
rationale.
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
Table 8 defines the security objectives to be accomplished by the TOE.
Table 8: Security Objectives for the TOE
Security
Objectives(Identifier)
Description
O.AUDITS
The TOE must provide the Security Audit Log function and its log
data which are necessary to monitor unauthorized access.
O.CIPHER
The TOE must encrypt the document data and security audit log
data to be stored into the eMMC memory.
O.COMM_SEC
The TOE must provide encryption communication function to protect
the document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on
the internal network between TOE and the remote from interception
and alteration.
O.FAX_SEC
The TOE must prevent the unauthorized access to the internal
network via Fax modem from public telephone line.
O.MANAGE
The TOE must inhibit a general user from accessing the TOE setting
data. The TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to
access the system administrator mode which enables him/her to
configure the security functions.
O.USER
The TOE must provide the function to identify TOE user and allow
only the authorized user to retrieve, and delete the document data
and to change the password.
O.RESTRICT
The TOE must inhibit an unauthorized user from using the TOE
functions.
O.VERIFY The TOE must provide self-test function to verify the integrity of TSF
executable code and TSF data.
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4.2. Security Objectives for the Environment
Table 9 defines the security objectives for the TOE environment.
Table 9: Security Objectives for the Environment
Security
Objectives(Identifier)
Description
OE.ADMIN
A system administrator who is assigned by an organization
administrator as an appropriate and reliable person for this TOE
management and who receives necessary training to manage the
TOE.
OE.USER
The system administrator shall ensure that users have competence by
training users about the TOE operation and precautions according to
the policies of their organization and the product guidance.
OE.SEC
A system administrator shall configure and set the TOE properly
according to the security policy of organization and the product
guidance document to manage the TOE.
In addition, a system administrator shall manage the external IT
environment according to the security policy of organization and the
product guidance document.
OE.PHYSICAL
The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that provides
protection from unmanaged physical access to the TOE.
4.3. Security Objectives Rationale
The security objectives are established to correspond to the assumptions specified in Security
Problem Definition, to counter the threats, or to realize the organizational security policies. Table
10 shows assumptions / threats / organizational security policies and the corresponding security
objectives. Moreover, Table 11 shows that each defined security problem is covered by the security
objectives.
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Table 10: Assumptions / Threats / Organizational Security Policies and the Corresponding Security
Objectives
Security Problems
Security Objectives
A.ADMIN
A.USER
A.SECMODE
A.ACCESS
T.CONFDATA
T.COMM_TAP
T.DATA_SEC
T.CONSUME
P.FAX_OPT
P.VERIFY
P.
CIPHER
O.AUDITS  
O.CIPHER 
O.COMM_SEC 
O.FAX_SEC 
O.MANAGE  
O.VERIFY 
O.USER  
O.RESTRICT 
OE.ADMIN 
OE.USER 
OE.SEC     
OE.PHYSICAL 
Table 11: Security Objectives Rationale for Security Problem
Security Problem Security Objectives Rationale
A.ADMIN
By satisfying the following objective, A.ADMIN can be realized:
By OE.ADMIN, a system administrator is assigned by an organization
administrator as an appropriate and reliable person for this TOE
management, and receives necessary training to manage the TOE
and performs the TOE management according to the guidance.
A.USER
By satisfying the following objective, A.USER can be realized:
By OE.USER, a system administrator trains users about the TOE
operation and precautions according to the policies of their
organization and the product guidance, and users have competence.
A.SECMODE
By satisfying the following objectives, A.SECMODE can be realized:
By OE.SEC, a system administrator shall configure and set the TOE
properly according to the security policy of organization and the
product guidance document to manage the TOE.
In addition, a system administrator shall manage the external IT
environment according to the security policy of organization and the
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Security Problem Security Objectives Rationale
product guidance document.
A.ACCESS
By satisfying the following objective, A.ACCESS can be realized:
By OE.PHYSICAL, a system administrator places the TOE in a secure
or monitored area that provides protection from unmanaged
physical access to the TOE.
T.CONFDATA
By satisfying the following objective, T.CONFDATA can be
countered:
By OE.SEC, it is necessary to enable the security functions (i.e. User
Authentication with Password, System Administrator Password,
Access Denial due to Authentication Failures, Customer Engineer
Operation Restriction, and Security Audit Log) and permits only the
authenticated system administrator to change the TOE setting data.
In addition, it is necessary to manage the external IT environment
according to the security policy of organization and the product
guidance document.
To be specific, this threat can be countered by the following security
objectives, O.MANAGE, O.USER, and O.AUDITS:
By O.MANAGE, only the authenticated system administrator is
allowed to enable/disable the TOE security functions and to refer to
/ update the TOE setting data.
By O.USER, only the authorized user is allowed to change the
password.
By O.AUDITS, the audit log function necessary to monitor
unauthorized access and the security audit log data are provided.
T.CONSUME
By satisfying the following objective, T.CONSUME can be countered.
By O.RESTRICT, the access to the TOE can be controlled.
T.COMM_TAP
By satisfying the following objectives, T.COMM_TAP can be
countered.
By OE.SEC, the document data, security audit log data, and TOE
setting data on the internal network can be protected from
interception.
By O.COMM_SEC, the client/server authentication function of
encryption communication protocol allows only the authorized user
to send/receive the communication data. Encrypting communication
data with encryption function also disables the interception and
alteration of the internal network data (incl. document data, security
audit log data, and TOE setting data).
T.DATA_SEC
By satisfying the following objectives, T.DATA_SEC can be countered.
By OE.SEC, it is necessary to enable the following passwords, user
authentication function, and security audit log function: User
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Security Problem Security Objectives Rationale
Password, System Administrator Password, Local Authentication or
Remote Authentication, Security Audit Log. Then, only the
authenticated user is allowed to access the security audit log data
and document data. In addition, it is necessary to manage the
external IT environment according to the security policy of
organization and the product guidance document.
By O.USER, only the authenticated user is allowed to read out or
delete the document data and security audit log data stored in the
eMMC memory.
By O.MANAGE, only the authenticated system administrator is
allowed to configure the TOE security functions.
By O.AUDITS, the audit log function necessary to monitor
unauthorized access and the security audit log data are provided.
P.FAX_OPT
By satisfying the following objectives, O.FAX_SEC can be countered.
By O.FAX_SEC, the access to the internal network via public
telephone line is disabled. This realizes P.FAX_OPT.
Since the data received from public telephone line are not sent to
the internal network, the internal network cannot be accessed.
P. VERIFY By satisfying the following objectives, P .VERIFY can be observed.
By OE.SEC, it is necessary to enable the following security function,
and execute self-test to verify the integrity of TSF executable code
and TSF data.
-Self Test
The TOE can execute the self test function to verify the integrity of
TSF executable code and TSF data.
P.CIPHER By satisfying the following objective, O.CIPHER can be countered.
-Flash Memory Data Encryption
This function makes unauthorized reading of document data or
security audit log data impossible by encrypting the document data
or security audit log data stored in the eMMC memory.
By satisfying this policy, P.CIPHER can be observed.
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5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
5.1. Extended Components
This ST conforms to CC Part 2 and CC Part 3, and there are no extended components which shall
be defined.
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6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
This chapter describes the security functional requirements, security assurance requirements, and
security requirement rationale.
The terms and phrases used in this chapter are defined below.
- Subject
Term/phrase Definition
System Administrator Process Operation upon using Faxbox and Store Print when
the user authentication of System Administrator
succeeded.
General User Process Operation upon using Store Print when the user
authentication of general user succeeded.
Receiving information from
public telephone line
To receive the document data from the sender’s
machine via public telephone line, as receiving fax
data.
Sending information to public
telephone line
To send the document data to the destination via
public telephone line according to the general user’s
instruction from the control panel or client PC, as
sending fax data.
Sending information to the
internal network
To send the Network Scan data to the destination, a
client PC, within the internal network.
Receiving information from the
internal network.
To receive the print data from a client PC, within the
internal network.
- Object
Term/phrase Definition
Faxbox A logical box created in the MFD eMMC memory.
Faxbox can store the document data received via fax.
Store Print A print function in which bitmap data (decomposed
print data) are temporarily stored in the MFD eMMC
memory and then printed out according to the
authenticated general user’s instruction from the
control panel.
Document data Document data means all the data including image
data transmitted across the MFD when any of copy,
print, network scan or fax functions is operated by a
general user.
Security Audit Log Data The chronologically recorded data of important
events of the TOE. The events such as device failure,
configuration change, and user operation are
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recorded based on when and who caused what event
and its result.
- Operation
Term/phrase Definition
Delivery MFD receives the data from public telephone line for
fax function.
Modify of behavior To change the settings of the following information:
User Authentication (Local, Remote)
Internal Network Data Protection (Certificate and
encryption type)
Modify Changes of TSF data and security attributes (user
identifier).
- Data
Term/phrase Definition
Data on public telephone line
Fax data
The data which flow on public telephone line for fax
communication.
- Security attributes
Term/phrase Definition
General User role Indicates the authority required for general user to
use the TOE.
System Administrator role Indicates the authority required for System
Administrator to use the TOE.
SA role Indicates the authority required for SA to use the
TOE.
Key Operator role Indicates the authority required for key operator to
use the TOE.
General User identifier User ID used to authenticate and identify general
user.
SA identifier User ID used to authenticate and identify SA.
Key Operator identifier User ID used to authenticate and identify key
operator.
Owner identifier of Store Print User ID of the user who sent a Store Print job.
- Entity outside the TOE
Term/phrase Definition
System Administrator This term covers both key operator and SA.
Key Operator An authorized user who manages MFD maintenance
and makes TOE security function settings.
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System Administrator Privilege
(SA)
The user(s) who manage MFD maintenance and
configure TOE security functions. SA can be
created/registered by key operator or the other SA
who is already registered.
General User Any person who uses copy, network scan, fax, and
print functions of MFD.
- Other terminology
Term/phrase Definition
SHA-2 algorithm The FIPS-standard cryptographic hash function used
for generation of a cryptographic key of eMMC
Memory data.
AES The FIPS-standard encryption algorithm used for
encryption/decryption of eMMC memory data.
Access denial due to
authentication failure of system
administrator ID
When the number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has exceeded the specified number of
times, Identification and authentication of relevant
user is inhibited until the TOE is cycled.
Data on minimum user password
length
Minimum user password length to set the User
password from MFD control panel.
Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on ID of key operator ID data for key operator authentication.
Data on password of key
operator
Password data for key operator authentication.
Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on ID of SA ID data for SA authentication. Included in the TOE
setting data.
Data on password of SA Password data for SA authentication. Included in the
TOE setting data.
Data on ID of General User ID data for general user authentication. Included in
the TOE setting data.
Data on password of General
User
Password data for general user authentication.
Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on access denial due to
authentication failures of system
administrator
The data on whether to enable/disable access denial
due to authentication failure of system administrator
ID. They also incorporate the data on the allowable
number of the failures before access denial. Included
in the TOE setting data.
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Data on Security Audit Log The data on whether to enable/disable the function
to trace/ record the important events of the TOE such
as device failure, configuration change, and user
operation, based on when and who operated what
function.
Data on User Authentication The data on whether to enable/disable the
authentication function using the data on user
authentication when copy, network scan, fax, and
print functions of MFD are used. It also incorporates
the data on the setting. Included in the TOE setting
data.
Data on User Permission The data on authority of U.NORMAL. Included in the
TOE setting data.
Data on Internal Network Data
Protection
The data on whether to enable/disable the general
encryption communication protocols to protect the
communication data on the internal network such as
document data, security audit log data, and TOE
setting data. They also incorporate the data on the
setting. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Customer Engineer
Operation Restriction
The data on whether to enable/disable Customer
Engineer Operation Restriction. Included in the TOE
setting data.
Data on date and time The data on the time zone / summer time
information / present date and time.. Included in the
TOE setting data.
Data on Self Test The data on whether to enable/disable the functions
related to Self Test. Included in the TOE setting data.
Public telephone line The line/network on which the data flow for fax
communication.
System Administrator mode An operation mode that enables a system
administrator to refer to and rewrite TOE setting for
device operation and that for security functions
according to the operational environment. This mode
is distinguished from the operation mode that
enables a general user to use the MFD functions.
Certificate Defined in the X.509 which is recommended by
ITU-T. The data for user authentication (name,
identification name, organization where he/she
belongs to, etc.), public key, expiry date, serial
number, signature, etc.
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Printer driver Software to convert the data on a general user client
into print data written in page description language
(PDL), a readable format for MFD. Used on the user
client.
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6.1. Security Functional Requirements
Security functional requirements which the TOE offers are described below. The security functional
requirements are based on the class and component which are specified by the [CC part 2].
6.1.1. Class FAU: Security audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum,
basic, detailed, not specified] level of audit; and
c) [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].
[selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified]
- not specified
[assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]
- the actions to be audited (defined by CC) and the corresponding
auditable events (events to be recorded as execution log) of TOE.
Shown in Table 12
Table 12: Auditable Events of TOE and Individually Defined Auditable Events
Functional
Requirements
Actions to be audited (defined by CC) Auditable events of
TOE
FAU_GEN.1 None -
FAU_SAR.1 a) Basic: Reading of information from the audit
records.
Basic: Successful
download of security
audit log data.
FAU_SAR.2 a) Basic: Unsuccessful attempts to read
information from the audit records.
Basic: Unsuccessful
download of security
audit log data.
FAU_STG.1 None -
FAU_STG.4 a) Basic: Actions taken due to the audit storage
failure.
None
FCS_CKM.1 a) Minimal: Success and failure of the activity.
b) Basic: The object attribute(s), and object
value(s) excluding any sensitive information
None
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(e.g. secret or private keys).
FCS_COP.1 a) Minimal: Success and failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation.
b) Basic: Any applicable cryptographic mode(s)
of operation, subject attributes and object
attributes.
None
FDP_ACC.1 None -
FDP_ACF.1 a) Minimal: Successful requests to perform an
operation on an object covered by the SFP.
b) Basic: All requests to perform an operation on
an object covered by the SFP.
c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used
in making an access check.
Basic:
User name, job
information, and
success/failure
regarding access to
Faxbox and execution
of Store Print.
FDP_IFC.1 None -
FDP_IFF.1 a) Minimal: Decisions to permit requested
information flows.
b) Basic: All decisions on requests for
information flow.
c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used
in making an information flow enforcement
decision.
d) Detailed: Some specific subsets of the
information that has flowed based upon policy
goals (e.g. auditing of downgraded material).
None
FIA_AFL.1 a) Minimal: the reaching of the threshold for the
unsuccessful authentication attempts and the
actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and
the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to
the normal state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal).
<Minimal>
Authentication lock of
system administrator
Authentication failure
FIA_ATD.1 None -
FIA_SOS.1 a) Minimal: Rejection by the TSF of any tested
secret;
b) Basic: Rejection or acceptance by the TSF of
any tested secret;
c) Detailed: Identification of any changes to the
defined quality metrics
<Individually defined
auditable events>
Registration of user and
changes in user
registration data
(password)
FIA_UAU.1 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the
authentication mechanism;
< Basic >
Success/failure of
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b) Basic: All use of the authentication
mechanism.
c) Detailed: All TSF mediated actions performed
before authentication of the user.
authentication
FIA_UAU.7 None -
FIA_UID.1 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user
identification mechanism, including the user
identity provided;
b) Basic: All use of the user identification
mechanism, including the user identity provided.
< Basic >
Success/failure of
authentication
FIA_USB.1 a) Minimal: Unsuccessful binding of user
security attributes to a subject (e.g. creation of a
subject).
b) Basic: Success and failure of binding of user
security attributes to a subject (e.g. success or
failure to create a subject).
< Basic >
Registration of system
administrator, and
changes in user
registration data (role)
FMT_MOF.1 a) Basic: All modifications in the behavior of the
functions in the TSF.
<Basic>
Changes in security
function configuration.
FMT_MSA.1 a) Basic: All modifications of the values of
security attributes.
<Basic>
User name, job
information, and
success/failure
regarding access to
Faxbox and execution
of Store Print.
FMT_MSA.3 a) Basic: Modifications of the default setting of
permissive or restrictive rules.
b) Basic: All modifications of the initial values of
security attributes.
None
FMT_MTD.1. a) Basic: All modifications to the values of TSF
data.
<Individually defined
auditable events>
Changes in registration
data (password) of
system administrator,
and in the setting of
security functions.
FMT_SMF.1 a) Minimal: Use of the management functions. < Minimal >
Access to system
administrator mode
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FMT_SMR.1 a) Minimal: modifications to the group of users
that are part of a role;
b) Detailed: every use of the rights of a role.
<Minimal>
Registration of system
administrator, changes
in user registration
data (role), and
deletion of system
administrator
FPT_STM.1 a) Minimal: changes to the time;
b) Detailed: providing a timestamp.
<Minimal>
Changes in time
setting.
FPT_TST.1 a) Minimal: Termination of an interactive
session by the session locking mechanism.
<Basic>
Execution of Self Test
and the test result
FTP_ITC.1 a)Minimal: Failure of the trusted channel
functions.
b) Minimal: Identification of the initiator and
target of failed trusted channel functions.
c) Basic: All attempted uses of the trusted
channel functions.
d) Basic: Identification of the initiator and
target of all trusted channel functions.
<Minimal>
Failure of the trusted
Communication within
a specified period of
time, and client host
data (host name or IP
address)
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions
of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment:
other audit relevant information].
[assignment: other audit relevant information].
- none
FAU_SAR.1: Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the
capability to read [assignment: list of audit information] from the
audit records.
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FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the
user to interpret the information.
[assignment: authorized users]
- system administrator
[assignment: list of audit information]
- all log information
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the
user to interpret the information.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except
those users that have been granted explicit read-access.
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from
unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect]
unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit
trail.
[selection, choose one of: prevent, detect]
- prevent
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”,
“prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorized user
with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”] and
[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]
if the audit trail is full.
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[selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited
events, except those taken by the authorized user with special rights”,
“overwrite the oldest stored audit records”]
- overwrite the oldest stored audit records
[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]
- no other actions to be taken
6.1.2. Class FCS: Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic
key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following:
[assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: list of standards]
- FIPS PUB 180-2
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
- SHA-2 algorithm
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
- 256bits
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
[assignment: list of standards]
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- FIPS PUB 197
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
- AES
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
- 256bits
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
- encryption of the document data and security audit log data to be
stored in the eMMC memory and decryption of the document data
and security audit log data retrieved from the eMMC memory.
6.1.3. Class FDP: User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects
and objects covered by the SFP].
[assignment: access control SFP]
- MFD access control SFP
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects
and objects covered by the SFP].
- subjects, objects, and operations between subjects and objects listed
in Table 13
Table 13: Operations between Subjects and Objects Covered by MFD Access Control SFP
Subject Object Operation
System Administrator
process
Faxbox Print of document data
System Administrator
process
General User Process
Store Print Deletion of document data
Print of document data
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects
based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects
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controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security
attributes].
[assignment: access control SFP]
- MFD access control SFP
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the
indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or
named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].
- General user identifier corresponding to the general user process,
System Administrator identifier corresponding to the System
Administrator process
- Owner identifier of Store Print
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and
controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and
controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].
- the rules, shown in Table 14, for controlling the access among
controlled subjects using the controlled operations on the controlled
objects
Table 14: Rules for Access Control
Rules for Faxbox Operation in the General User Process
-In the General User process, the Faxbox operation is not permitted.
Rules for Store Print Operation in the General User Process and System
Administrator Process
- Deletion and print of document data
When the general user identifier and System Administrator identifier of the general
user process and System Administrator process match the owner identifier of Store
Print, print and deletion of the document data inside are allowed. When the
document data are deleted, the corresponding Store Print area is also deleted.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security
attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly
authorise access of subjects to objects].
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- the rules, shown in Table 15, for explicitly authorizing access of the
subject to an object based on security attributes.
Table 15: Rules for Explicit Access Authorization
Rule for Faxbox Operation in the System Administrator Process
- In the System Administrator process, printing of the document data stored in the
Faxbox is allowed.
-Deletion of the document data stored in the Faxbox is not permitted.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules [assignment: rules, based on security
attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny
access of subjects to objects].
- no rules that explicitly deny the access
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP]
on [assignment: list of subjects, information, and operations that
cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled subjects
covered by the SFP].
[assignment: list of subjects, information, and operations that cause
controlled information to flow to and from controlled subjects covered
by the SFP]
- subjects, information, and operations that cause the information to
flow, which are listed in Table 16.
Table 16: Subjects, Information, and Operations that cause the information to flow
Subject Information Operation
Receiving information from public
telephone line
Sending information to the internal
network
Data on public
telephone line
Delivery
[assignment: information flow control SFP]
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- Fax information flow control SFP
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP]
based on the following types of subject and information security
attributes: [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled
under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes].
[assignment: information flow control SFP]
- Fax information flow control SFP
[assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the
indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes]
- none.
(Sending information to public telephone line, receiving information
from the internal network, and the corresponding data on the public
telephone line are not controlled under the Fax information flow
control SFP).
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following
rules hold: [assignment: for each operation, the security
attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and
information security attributes].
[assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based
relationship that must hold between subject and information security
attributes]
- the data received from public telephone line must not be sent to the
internal network at any case
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: additional information flow
control SFP rules].
[assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules]
- none.
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the
following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that
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explicitly authorize information flows].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly
authorize information flows]
- none.
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the
following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that
explicitly deny information flows].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny
information flows].
- none.
6.1.4. Class FIA: Identification and authentication
FIA_AFL.1 (1) Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 (1) The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer
number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
[assignment: list of authentication events]
- key operator authentication
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number] , an administrator
configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable
values]
- [assignment: positive integer number]
[assignment: positive integer number]
- 5
FIA_AFL.1.2 (1) When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts
has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of
actions].
[selection: met, surpassed]
- met
[assignment: list of actions]
- Identification and authentication of key operator is inhibited until
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TOE is cycled
FIA_AFL.1(2) Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 (2) The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer
number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
[assignment: list of authentication events]
- SA authentication (with local authentication)
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number] , an administrator
configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable
values]
- [assignment: positive integer number]
[assignment: positive integer number]
- 5
FIA_AFL.1.2 (2) When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts
has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of
actions].
[selection: met, surpassed]
- met
[assignment: list of actions]
- Identification and authentication of relevant user is inhibited until
TOE is cycled.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
belonging to individual users: [assignment: list of security attributes].
[assignment: list of security attributes].
- Key Operator role
- SA role
- General User role
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FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets (user
password when local authentication is used) meet [assignment: a
defined quality metric].
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
- Password length is restricted to 9 or more characters
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF mediated actions] on
behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
[assignment: list of TSF mediated actions]
- data receive from public telephone line
- storing the print job delivered from user client
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user
while the authentication is in progress.
[assignment: list of feedback]
- display of asterisks (“*”) to hide the entered password characters
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] on
behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
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[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
- fax receive from public telephone line
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user
security attributes].
[assignment: list of user security attributes].
- Key Operator role
- SA role
- General User role
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of
user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes].
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes].
- none
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the
user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf
of users: [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes].
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes].
- none
6.1.5. Class FMT: Security management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behavior
of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of] the functions [assignment:
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list of functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
[selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the
behavior of]
- enable, disable, or modify the behavior of
[assignment: list of functions]
- for security listed in Table 17
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
- the roles listed in Table 17
Table 17: List of Security Functions
Security Functions Operations Roles
Access denial due to authentication failure
of system administrator ID
enable, disable System
Administrator
User Authentication enable, disable,
modify
System
Administrator
Security Audit Log enable, disable System
Administrator
Internal Network Data Protection enable, disable,
modify
System
Administrator
Customer Engineer Operation Restriction enable, disable System
Administrator
Self Test enable, disable System
Administrator
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s),
information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection:
change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to
[assignment: the authorized identified roles].
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
- MFD access control SFP
[selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
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operations]]
- query, modify, delete,[assignment: other operations]
[assignment: other operations]
- create
[assignment: list of security attributes]
- user identifier, and Store Print owner identifier
[assignment: the authorized identified roles].
- the operations and roles listed in Table 18
Table 18: Security Attributes and Authorized Roles
Security Attribute Operations Roles
Key operator identifier query System
Administrator
SA identifier (with local
authentication only)
query, delete, create System
Administrator
General user identifier (with local
authentication only)
query, delete, create System
Administrator
Store Print owner identifier query, delete, create System
Administrator
General user
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information
flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive,
permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
- MFD access control SFP
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other
property]]
- [assignment: other property]
- Initialization property in Table 19
Table 19 Initialization property
Object Security Attributes Default
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store print Owner identifier of store
print
Creator’s user identifier and
available user identifier
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to
specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
- none
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment:
list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
[selection: change default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment:
other operations]]
- query, modify, delete
[assignment: other operations]]
- create
[assignment: list of TSF data]
- TSF data listed in Table 19
[assignment: the authorized identified roles].
- the roles listed in Table 20
Table 20: Operation of TSF Data
TSF Data Operations Roles
Data on key operator Password modify Key operator
Data on SA ID (with local
authentication only)
query, delete, create System
Administrator
Data on SA Password (with local
authentication only)
modify System
Administrator
Data on General user ID (with local
authentication only)
query, delete, create System
Administrator
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Data on General user Password (with
local authentication only)
modify System
Administrator
General user
Data on User Authentication query, modify System
Administrator
Data on minimum password length of
user password (with local
authentication only)
query, modify
System
Administrator
Data on User permission
query, modify
System
Administrator
Data on Access denial due to
authentication failure of system
administrator
query, modify System
Administrator
Data on Security Audit Log query, modify System
Administrator
Data on Internal Network Data
Protection
query, modify, delete System
Administrator
Data on Customer Engineer
Operation Restriction
query, modify System
Administrator
Data on date and time query, modify System
Administrator
Data on Self Test query, modify System
Administrator
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [assignment: list of management functions to be provided
by the TSF].
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
- Security Management Functions listed in Table 21
Table 21: Security Management Functions Provided by TSF
Functional
requirements
Management items defined by CC Management functions of
TOE
FAU_GEN.1 There are no management activities
foreseen.
Management of data on
Security Audit Log settings
FAU_SAR.1 a) maintenance (deletion, modification,
addition) of the group of users with read
Management of data on
key operator (password)
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access right to the audit records. Management of data on SA
(ID and password) (with
local authentication only)
FAU_SAR.2 None -
FAU_STG.1 None -
FAU_STG.4 a) maintenance (deletion, modification,
addition) of actions to be taken in case
of audit storage failure.
None
Reason: The control
parameter of audit log is
fixed and is not managed.
FCS_CKM.1 None -
FCS_COP.1 None -
FDP_ACC.1 None -
FDP_ACF.1 a) Managing the attributes used to make
explicit access or denial based decisions.
Management of owner
identifier of store print
Management of data on
user permission
FDP_IFC.1 None -
FDP_IFF.1 a) Managing the attributes used to make
explicit access based decisions.
None
Reason: Access is restricted
and does not need to be
managed.
FIA_AFL.1 a) Management of the threshold for
unsuccessful authentication attempts;
b) Management of actions to be taken in
the event of an authentication failure.
Management of allowable
number of system
administrator’s
authentication failures
Management of Access
Denial
FIA_ATD.1 a) if so indicated in the assignment, the
authorized administrator might be able
to define additional security attributes
for users.
None
Reason: There are no
additional security
attributes and there are no
additional security
attributes to be managed.
FIA_SOS.1 a) the management of the metric used to
verify the secrets.
- Management of data on
minimum password length
of user password
FIA_UAU.1 a) Management of the authentication
data by an administrator;
b) Management of the authentication
data by the associated user;
c) Managing the list of actions that can
be taken before the user is authenticated.
- Management of data on
key operator(password)
- Management of data on
SA and general user (ID and
password) (with local
authentication only)
- Management of data on
user authentication.
FIA_UAU.7 None -
FIA_UID.1 a) The management of the user
identities.
b) If an authorised administrator can
change the actions allowed before
- Management of data on
SA and general user (ID)
(with local authentication
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identification, the managing of the
action lists.
only)
- Management of data on
user authentication.
FIA_USB.1 a) an authorized administrator can
define default subject security attributes.
b) an authorized administrator can
change subject security attributes.
None
Reason: Action and security
attributes are fixed and are
not managed.
FMT_MOF.1 a) Managing the group of roles that can
interact with the functions in the TSF;
Management of data on
Customer Engineer
Operation Restriction
FMT_MSA.1 a) managing the group of roles that can
interact with the security attributes;
b) management of rules by which
security attributes inherit specified
values.
None
Reason: The role group is
fixed and is not managed.
FMT_MSA.3 a) managing the group of roles that can
specify initial values;
b) managing the permissive or restrictive
setting of default values for a given
access control SFP;
c) management of rules by which
security attributes inherit specified
values.
None
Reason: The role group is
only a system administrator
and is not managed.
FMT_MTD.1. a) Managing the group of roles that can
interact with the TSF data.
Management of data on
Customer Engineer
Operation Restriction
FMT_SMF.1 None -
FMT_SMR.1 a) Managing the group of users that are
part of a role.
None
Reason: The role group is
fixed and is not managed
FPT_STM.1 a) management of the time. Management of time and
data.
FPT_TST.1 a) management of the conditions under
which TSF self testing occurs, such as
during initial start-up, regular interval, or
under specified conditions;
b) management of the time interval if
appropriate.
Management of data on
Self Test.
FTP_ITC.1 a) Configuring the actions that require
trusted channel, if supported.
Management of data on
Internal Network Data
Protection.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
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FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorized
identified roles].
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
- system administrator, SA, general user
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.1.6. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised
user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test
should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [selection:
[assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF].
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation,
at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment:
conditions under which self test should occur]]
- at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test
should occur]
[assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]
- at initiation under which self test is set
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF].
- [assignment: parts of TSF]
- TSF executable code
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data].
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data]
- [assignment: parts of TSF data]
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- TSF data (excluding audit log data and present time data)
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF].
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF]
- assignment: parts of TSF
- TSF executable code
6.1.7. Class FTP: Trusted path/channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] to
initiate communication via the trusted channel.
[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
- the TSF, another trusted IT product
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required].
[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required].
- TOE communication service via Web, communication service for
printer driver, communication service for LDAP, communication service
for Kerberos, communication service for SMTP, communication service
for FTP, and communication service for DNS.
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6.2. Security Assurance Requirements
The requirements for the TOE security assurance are described in Table 22.
The evaluation assurance level of the TOE is EAL2.
The added security assurance component is ALC_FLR.2.
Table 22: Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Assurance Component
ADV:
Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2
Security-enforcing functional
specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD:
Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC:
Life-cycle
support
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ASE:
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE:
Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
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6.3. Security Requirement Rationale
6.3.1. Security Functional Requirements Rationale
Table 23 lists security functional requirements and the corresponding security objectives. As shown
in Table 23, each security functional requirement corresponds to at least one security objective of
the TOE.
Table 24 shows the rationale demonstrating that each security objective is assured by TOE security
functional requirements.
Table 23: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding Security Objectives
Security Objectives
Security Functional
Requirements
O.AUDITS
O.CIPHER
O.COMM_SEC
O.FAX_SEC
O.MANAGE
O.RESTRICT
O.USER
O.VERIFY
FAU_GEN.1 
FAU_SAR.1 
FAU_SAR.2 
FAU_STG.1 
FAU_STG.4 
FCS_CKM.1 
FCS_COP.1 
FDP_ACC.1 
FDP_ACF.1 
FDP_IFC.1 
FDP_IFF.1 
FIA_AFL.1   
FIA_ATD.1 
FIA_SOS.1  
FIA_UAU.1   
FIA_UAU.7   
FIA_UID.1   
FIA_USB.1 
FMT_MOF.1 
FMT_MSA.1 
FMT_MSA.3 
FMT_MTD.1  
FMT_SMF.1 
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Security Objectives
Security Functional
Requirements
O.AUDITS
O.CIPHER
O.COMM_SEC
O.FAX_SEC
O.MANAGE
O.RESTRICT
O.USER
O.VERIFY
FMT_SMR.1  
FPT_STM.1 
FPT_TST.1 
FTP_ITC.1 
Table 24: Security Objectives to SFR Rationale
Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale
O.AUDITS
O. AUDITS is the objective that provides the function to record
auditable events and its log data.
By satisfying the following security requirements, O.AUDITS can be
realized.
By FAU_GEN.1, the security audit log data are generated for the
auditable events: (However, audit is unnecessary for the following
functional requirements for each reason described below.)
- FAU_STG.4: The total number of security audit log data events is
fixed. The data are stored and updated automatically.
- FCS_CKM.1: When cryptographic key generation fails, a system error
occurs at the time of booting of the MFD.
- FSC_COP.1: An encryption failure is monitored as job status.
- FDP_IFF.1: The flow is fixed. No event is to be monitored.
- FMT_MSA.3: No change is to be applied to default values and rules.
By FAU_SAR.1, the authorized system administrator can read the
security audit log data from an audit log file.
By FAU_SAR.2, only the authorized system administrator can access
the security audit log data.
By FAU_STG.1, the security audit log data stored in an audit log file is
protected from unauthorized deletion and alteration.
By FAU_STG.4, when the security audit log data is full, the oldest
stored audit record is overwritten and a new audit event is stored into
the audit log file.
By FPT_STM.1, the auditable events are recorded with time stamp in
the audit log, using highly reliable clock of the TOE.
O.CIPHER O. CIPHER is the objective that encrypts the used document data and
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Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale
the security audit log data in the eMMC memory so that they cannot
be analyzed even if retrieved without authorization.
By satisfying the following security requirements, O.CIPHER can be
realized.
By FCS_CKM.1, the cryptographic key is generated in accordance with
the specified cryptographic key size (256 bits).
By FCS_COP.1, the document data and security audit log data to be
stored into the eMMC memory are encrypted and then decrypted
when the data are read, in accordance with the determined
cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key size.
O.COMM_SEC
O.COMM_SEC is the objective that protects the document data,
security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network
from interception and alteration.
By satisfying the following security requirements, O.COMM_SEC can
be realized:
By FTP_ITC.1, a highly reliable communication channel is provided
through communication data encryption protocol so that the
document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the
internal network between the TOE and the IT product can be
protected from threats.
O.FAX_SEC
O.FAX_SEC is the objective that prevents the unauthorized access to
the internal network via public telephone line.
By satisfying the following security requirements, O.FAX_SEC can be
realized:
By FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1, the internal network to which the TOE is
connected is prevented from being accessed via public telephone line
from the communication path of TOE fax modem.
O.MANAGE
O. MANAGE is the objective that allows only an authenticated system
administrator to access the system administrator mode for security
function setting and inhibits a general user from accessing the TOE
setting data. By satisfying the following security requirements,
O.MANAGE can be realized:
In order to prevent attackers from using privileges given to system
administrators and accessing protected assets, the power needs to be
cycled in cases when the number of the key operator authentication
failures by By FIA_AFL.1 (1), because the power needs to be cycled
when the number of key operator authentication failures reaches the
defined number of times.
By FIA_AFL.1 (2), successive attacks are prevented because the power
needs to be cycled when the number of SA authentication failures (at
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Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale
local authentication) reaches the defined number of times.
By FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1, user authentication is performed to
identify an authorized system administrator or general user.
By FIA_UAU.7, unauthorized disclosure of the authentication
information (password) is prevented because the authentication
feedback is protected.
By FMT_MOF.1, the person who enables/disables TOE security
functions and makes functional settings is limited to system
administrator.
By FMT_MTD.1, the person who can make settings of TOE security
functions is limited to system administrator. Thus, only system
administrators can query, modify, and create TSF data.
By FMT_SMF.1, TOE security management functions are provided for
system administrator.
By FMT_SMR.1 (1), the role related to the security is limited to system
administrator by maintaining the role of system administrator as a
user who has special authority.
O.RESTRICT
O.RESTRICT is the objective that offers the function to inhibit an
unauthorized person from using the TOE.
By satisfying the following security requirements, O.RESTRICT can be
realized:
In order to prevent attackers from using privileges given to system
administrators and accessing protected assets, the power needs to be
cycled in cases when the number of the key operator authentication
failures by By FIA_AFL.1 (1), because the power needs to be cycled
when the number of key operator authentication failures reaches the
defined number of times.
By FIA_AFL.1 (2), successive attacks are prevented because the power
needs to be cycled when the number of SA authentication failures (at
local authentication) reaches the defined number of times.
By FIA_SOS1, the minimum length of password for SA and general
user is limited.
By FIA_UIA.1 and FIA_UID.1, user authentication is performed to
identify an authorized general user and system administrator.
By FIA_UAU.7, unauthorized disclosure of the authentication
information (password) is prevented because the authentication
feedback is protected.
O.USER
O.USER is the objective that identifies the TOE user and allows only
the authorized user to retrieve, and delete the document data and to
change password.
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Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale
By satisfying the following security requirements, O.USER can be
realized:
By FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1, user authentication is performed. Only
authorized user is allowed to operate the objects.
In order to prevent attackers from using privileges given to system
administrators and accessing protected assets, the power needs to be
cycled in cases when the number of the key operator authentication
failures by By FIA_AFL.1 (1), because the power needs to be cycled
when the number of key operator authentication failures reaches the
defined number of times.
By FIA_AFL.1 (2), successive attacks are prevented because the power
needs to be cycled when the number of SA authentication failures (at
local authentication) reaches the defined number of times.
By FIA_ATD.1 and FIA_USB.1, each role of key operator, SA, and
general user is maintained and only the authorized users are
associated with the subjects.
By FIA_SOS1, the minimum length of password for user is limited.
By FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1, user authentication is performed to
identify an authorized general user and system administrator.
By FIA_UAU.7, unauthorized disclosure of the authentication
information (password) is prevented because the authentication
feedback is protected.
By FMT_MSA.1, the query, modify, deletion, and creation of security
attributes are managed.
By FMT_MSA.3, the suitable default values are managed.
By FMT_MTD.1, the setting of password for key operator is limited to
key operator, that for SA is limited to key operator and SA, and that for
general user is limited to system administrator and the general user
(when it is his/her own).
By FMT_SMF.1, TOE security management functions are provided for
authorized users.
By FMT_SMR.1, the role of general user and system administrator is
maintained and associated with the general user and system
administrator.
O. VERIFY
O. VERIFY is the objective that provides the function to verify the
integrity of TSF executable code.
By satisfying the following security requirements, O. VERIFY can be
realized.
By FPT_TST.1 the TOE can execute the self test function to verify the
integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data upon initiation.
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6.3.2. Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements
Table 25 describes the functional requirements that security functional requirements depend on
and those that do not and the reason why it is not problematic even if dependencies are not
satisfied.
Table 25: Dependencies of Functional Security Requirements
Functional Requirement Dependencies of Functional Requirements
Requirement and its
name
Requirement
that is
dependent on
Requirement that is not dependent on
and its rationale
FAU_GEN.1
Audit data generation
FPT_STM.1 -
FAU_SAR.1
Audit review
FAU_GEN.1 -
FAU_SAR.2
Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.1 -
FAU_STG.1
Protected audit trail
storage
FAU_GEN.1 -
FAU_STG.4
Prevention of audit data
loss
FAU_STG.1 -
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation
(The stored data in the
Flash memory)
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4:
As specified in the Organizational Security
Policies, a cryptographic key does not need to be
destructed.
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation
(The stored data in the
Flash memory)
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4:
As specified in the Organizational Security
Policies, a cryptographic key does not need to be
destructed.
FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 -
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based
access control
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
-
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow
FDP_IFF.1 -
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Functional Requirement Dependencies of Functional Requirements
Requirement and its
name
Requirement
that is
dependent on
Requirement that is not dependent on
and its rationale
control
(Fax information flow)
FDP_IFF.1
Simple security attributes
(Fax information flow)
FDP_IFC.1
FMT_MSA.3:
A static attribute initialization is not required
because Fax Information Flow has no security
attribute.
FIA_AFL.1
Authentication failure
handling
FIA_UAU.1 -
FIA_ATD.1
User attribute definition
None
FIA_SOS.1
Verification of secrets
None
FIA_UAU.1
Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.7
Protected authentication
feedback
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1
Timing of identification
None
FIA_USB.1
User-subject binding
FIA_ATD.1 -
FMT_MOF.1
Management of security
functions behavior
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
-
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security
attributes
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
-
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute
initialization
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
-
FMT_MTD.1
Management of TSF
data
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
-
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of
management functions
None
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Functional Requirement Dependencies of Functional Requirements
Requirement and its
name
Requirement
that is
dependent on
Requirement that is not dependent on
and its rationale
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FIA_UID.1
FPT_STM.1
Reliable time stamp
None
FPT_TST.1
TSF testing
None
FTP_ITC.1
Inter-TSF Trusted
Channel
None
6.3.3. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
This TOE is for a MFD, a commercial product. The following threats are assumed to be caused by a
low-level attacker: attack or interception/alteration of data on internal network via a MFD external
interface from control panel, Web browser of system administrator’s client; and reading-out of
information by removing the eMMC memory and connecting it to a commercial tool.
To counter these threats, this TOE is required to provide the security functions which assure
security.
ALC_FLR.2 ensures that instructions and procedures for the reporting and remediation of
identified security flaws are in place, and their inclusion is expected by the consumers of this TOE.
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7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
This chapter describes the summary specifications of the security functions provided by this TOE.
7.1. Security Functions
Table 26 shows security functional requirements and the corresponding TOE security functions.
The security functions described in this section satisfy the TOE security functional requirements
that are specified in section 6.1 of this ST.
Table 26: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding TOE Security Functions
Security Functions
Security Functional
Requirements
TSF_CIPHER
TSF_USER_AUTH
TSF_FMT
TSF_CE_LIMIT
TSF_FAU
TSF_NET_PROT
TSF_FAX_FLOW
TSF_SELF_TEST
FAU_GEN.1 
FAU_SAR.1 
FAU_SAR.2 
FAU_STG.1 
FAU_STG.4 
FCS_CKM.1 
FCS_COP.1 
FDP_ACC.1 
FDP_ACF.1 
FDP_IFC.1 
FDP_IFF.1 
FIA_AFL.1 (1) 
FIA_AFL.1 (2) 
FIA_ATD.1 
FIA_SOS.1 
FIA_UAU.1 
FIA_UAU.7 
FIA_UID.1 
FIA_USB.1 
FMT_MOF.1  
FMT_MSA.1  
FMT_MSA.3 
FMT_MTD.1   
FMT_SMF.1   
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Security Functions
Security Functional
Requirements
TSF_CIPHER
TSF_USER_AUTH
TSF_FMT
TSF_CE_LIMIT
TSF_FAU
TSF_NET_PROT
TSF_FAX_FLOW
TSF_SELF_TEST
FMT_SMR.1   
FPT_STM.1 
FPT_TST.1 
FTP_TRP.1 
The summary of each TOE security function and the corresponding security functional
requirements are described below.
7.1.1. Flash Memory Data Encryption (TSF_CIPHER)
The document data and security audit log data are encrypted before stored into the eMMC
memory when operating any function of copy, print, Network Scan, fax, or configuring various
security function settings.
(1) FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
The TOE generates a 256-bit encryption key with SHA-2 algorithm based on FIPS PUB 180-2.
(2) FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Before storing the document data and security audit log data into the eMMC memory, the
TOE encrypts the data using the 256-bit cryptographic key and the AES algorithm based on
FIPS PUBS 197. When reading out the stored data, the TOE decrypts the data also using the
256-bit cryptographic key and the AES algorithm.
7.1.2. User Authentication (TSF_USER_AUTH)
Access to the TOE functions is restricted to the authorized user.
A user needs to enter his/her ID and password from Web browser of the user client, or MFD
control panel. After a user enters his/her ID and password, an MFD identifies and authenticates
the user based on user information stored in the MFD or an external server.
There are the following two types of authentication depending on how user information is
registered.
a) Local Authentication
In local authentication, authentication is managed by using the user information registered in
the TOE.
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b) Remote Authentication
Authentication is performed by remote authentication server. User information is not
registered in the TOE. In remote authentication, authentication is performed by using the user
information managed by remote authentication server (LDAP server or Kerberos server).
Only the authenticated user can use the following functions:
a) Functions controlled by the MFD control panel
Copy, fax (send), network scan, Faxbox operation, and print (This print function requires the
Store Print preset from printer driver. A user must be authenticated from the control panel
for print job.)
b) Functions controlled by Embedded Web Server
Display of device condition, display of job status and its log.
In addition, access to and setting change of the TOE security functions are restricted to the
authorized system administrator. A system administrator needs to enter his/her ID and password
from MFD control panel or system administrator client.
(1) FIA_AFL.1 (1), FIA_AFL.1 (2) Authentication failure handling
The function of the authentication failures is provided for the System Administrator
authentication which is performed before accessing the TOE. After the number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts with a system administrator ID reaches 5 time upon local
authentication, the system administrator with the said ID will not be authenticated until the
TOE is powered off/on.
(2) FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
The function of the TOE to define and retain the roles of System Administrator and general
user.
(3) FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
When setting a password of System Administrator and general user, the TOE rejects settings if
the password is less than the minimum number of characters.
(4) FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
The TOE requests a user to enter his/her ID and password before permitting him/her to
operate the MFD function via Web browser of a user client, or the control panel. The entered
user ID and password are verified against the data registered in the TOE setting data.
This identification (FIA_UID.1) and the authentication (FIA_UAU.1) are simultaneously
performed, and the operation is allowed only when both of the identification and
authentication succeed.
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When receiving fax data by the public telephone line, the TOE receives the fax data without
user identification and authentication.
When a print job is received from a user client, the TOE identifies a registered user ID and
stores the job without authenticating the user.
(5) FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
The TOE offers the function to display the same number of asterisks (`*`) as the
entered-password characters on the control panel, or Web browser, in order to hide the
password at the time of user authentication.
(6) FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
With the authenticated ID, TOE associates the roles of System Administrator, and general user
with the subjects.
(7) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
With the user authentication function, the TOE permits the authenticated user to handle the
security attributes as shown in Table 27.
Table 27: Management of security attributes
Security Attributes Operations Roles
Key operator identifier query System Administrator
SA identifier (with local
authentication only)
query, delete, create System Administrator
General user identifier (with
local authentication only)
query, delete, create System Administrator
Store Print owner identifier query, delete, create System Administrator
General user
(8) FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
The TOE provides the user interface for setting password only to the authenticated authorized
user.
The setting of password for key operator is limited to key operator, that for SA (with local
authentication only) is limited to key operator and SA, and that for general user (with local
authentication only) is limited to system administrator and the general user (when it is his/her
own).
(9) FMT_SMR.1 Security role
The TOE maintains the roles of system administrator and general user and associates these
roles to the authorized users.
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(10) FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
With the user authentication function, the TOE permits the authenticated user to operate
Faxbox and Store Print as shown in Table 28.
Table 28: Access Control
Faxbox Store Print
Creation of box - -
Deletion of box - -
Print of document
data
Available for
System
Administrator
Available for general
user, System
Administrator
Deletion of
document data
- Available for general
user, System
Administrator
User authentication is performed before accessing Faxbox or Store Print.
a) Store Print Function
A user sends a print request from the printer driver in which the Store Print is preset, the print
data are decomposed into bitmap data, classified according to the user ID, and temporarily
stored in the eMMC memory.
To refer to the stored print data, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the
control panel . When the user is authenticated, the data on the waiting list corresponding to
the user ID are displayed. The user can request printing or deletion of the data on the list.
b) Faxbox Function
The scanned data and received fax data can be stored into Faxbox from Public Telephone
Line (Fax card) which is not shown in Figure 3.
To store the received fax data into Faxbox, user authentication is not required. Among the
received fax data transmitted over public telephone line.
To print or delete the stored data in the Faxbox user authentication is required; the MFD
compares the user ID and password preset in the MFD against those entered by a System
Administrator from the control panel.
•Faxbox Operation by a General User
As for a general user, it is not permitted to operate the Faxbox.
•Faxbox Operation by a System Administrator
As for a system administrator, printing of the document data stored in the Faxbox is allowed.
There is no function for deleting the document data stored in the Faxbox.
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• Store Print Operation by a General User / System Administrator
When the general user identifier / SA identifier matches the owner identifier of Store Print
area, print and deletion of the document data inside are allowed.
When the document data are deleted, the corresponding Store Print area is also deleted.
7.1.3. System Administrator’s Security Management (TSF_FMT)
To grant a privilege to a specific user, this function allows only the authorized system
administrator to access the system administrator mode which enables him/her to refer to and
configure the settings of the following TOE security functions from the control panel or system
administrator client.
(1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
The TOE provides a user interface which allows only the authenticated system administrator
to refer to / change the TOE setting data related to the following TOE security functions and
to make setting whether to enable/disable each function.
With these functions, the required security management functions are provided.
The settings of the following TOE security functions can be referred to and changed from the
control panel.
・ Refer to the setting of TLS communication of Internal Network Data Protection,
enable/disable it, and configure the details;
・ Refer to and set date and time;
With Embedded Web Server, the settings of the following TOE security functions can be
referred to and changed from a system administrator client via Web browser.
・ Setting of the key operator password (only a key operator is privileged);
・ Refer to the setting of ID of SA and general user and change the ID and password (with
local authentication only);
・ Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication failures of system administrator,
enable/disable it, and set the allowable number of the failures before access denial;
・ Refer to and set date and time;
・ Refer to and set Self Test;
・ Refer to and set the minimum password length (with local authentication only);
・ Refer to the setting of Security Audit Log and enable/disable it,
(When Security Audit Log data are enabled, security audit log data can be downloaded in
the form of tab-delimited text to a system administrator client.);
・ Refer to the setting of TLS communication of Internal Network Data Protection,
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enable/disable it, and configure the details;
・ Refer to the setting of IPSec communication of Internal Network Data Protection,
enable/disable it, and configure the details;
・ Refer to the setting of S/MIME communication of Internal Network Data Protection,
enable/disable it, and configure the details;
・ Download/upload and create an X.509 certificate;
・ Refer to the setting of User Authentication and select disable/Local
Authentication/Remote Authentication, and configure the details;
・ Refer to and set general user permission;
・ Refer to and set Customer Engineer Operation Restriction;
(2) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
The TOE restricts the handling of the general user identifier only to a system administrator.
(3) FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Regarding Store Print, the TOE sets the user identifier created as owner identifier and the
available user identifier, and set them as default values of security attributes.
Regarding Faxbox, the TOE sets the System Administrator default values of security attributes.
(4) FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The system administrator's role is maintained and the role is associated with a system
administrator.
7.1.4. Customer Engineer Operation Restriction (TSF_CE_LIMIT)
A system administrator can restrict CE’s operation in the system administrator mode to inhibit CE
from referring to / changing the settings related to System Administrator’s Security Management
(TSF_FMT). This function can prevent setting change by an attacker who is impersonating CE.
(1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
The TOE provides a user interface which allows only the authenticated system administrator
to refer to / change (enable/disable) the TOE settings related to Customer Engineer Operation
Restriction from the Embedded Web Server.
With these functions, the required security management functions are provided.
(2) FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The system administrator's role is maintained and the role is associated with a system
administrator.
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7.1.5. Security Audit Log (TSF_FAU)
According to Security Audit Log setting which is configured by a system administrator using the
system administrator mode, the important events of the TOE such as device failure, configuration
change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who operated what
function. All the TOE users are the targets of this audit log.
(1) FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
It is assured that the defined auditable event is recorded in the audit log.
Table 29 shows the details of the audit log data.
Table 29: Details of Security Audit Log Data
Logged Events Description Status
Change in Device Status
System Status
Started normally (cold boot)
-
Started normally (warm boot)
Shutdown requested
User operation (Local) Start/End
Self Test Successful/Failed
User Authentication
Login/Logout
Login Successful, Failed (Invalid
UserID), Failed (Invalid
Password), Failed
Logout
Locked System Administrator
Authentication
-
(Number of
authentication failures
recorded)
Detected continuous Authentication
Fail
Change in Audit Policy
Audit Policy Audit Log Enable/Disable
Job Status
The auditable events are recorded with the following fixed size entries:
- Log ID: consecutive numbers as an audit log identifier (1 - 60000)
- Date: date data (yyyy/mm/dd, mm/dd/yyyy, or dd/mm/yyyy)
- Time: time data (hh:mm:ss)
- Logged Events: event name (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits)
- User Name: user name (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits)
- Description: description on events
(arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits, see below for details)
- Status: status or result of event processing
(arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits, see below for details)
- Optionally Logged Items: additional information recorded to audit log
(except common record items)
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Logged Events Description Status
Job Status
Print Completed, Completed
with Warnings, Canceled
by User, Canceled by
Shutdown, Aborted,
Unknown
Copy
Scan
Fax
Print Reports
Change in Device Settings
Device Settings
Adjust Time Successful/Failed
Switch Authentication Mode Successful
(Setting items recorded)
Change Security Setting
Access to Data Stored in Device
Device Data
Import Certificate
Successful/Failed
Delete Certificate
Add Address Entry
Delete Address Entry
Edit Address Entry
Export Audit Log
Communication Result
Communication Trusted Communication
Failed
(Protocol and
communication
destination stored)
(2) FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
It is assured that all the information recorded in the audit log can be retrieved.
Security audit log data can be downloaded in the form of tab-delimited text by pressing the
button “store as a text file.” To download security audit log data, TLS communication needs to
be enabled before using Web browser.
(3) FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
The person who retrieves the security audit log data is limited to the authenticated system
administrator. A system administrator can access the security audit log data only via Web
browser and the access from the control panel is inhibited. Therefore, a system administrator
needs to log in from Web browser to access the security audit log data.
(4) FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
There is no function to delete the security audit log data, and the security audit log data are
protected from untrusted alteration and modification.
(5) FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
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When security audit log data are full, the oldest stored audit record is overwritten with the
new data so that the new data is not lost but surely recorded.
Auditable events are stored with time stamps into NVRAM. When the number of stored events
reaches 50, the 50 logs on NVRAM is stored into one file (“audit log file”) within the eMMC
memory. Up to 15,000 events can be stored. When the number of recorded events exceeds
15,000, the oldest audit log file is overwritten and a new audit event is stored.
(6) FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
The time stamp of TOE’s clock function is issued when the defined auditable event is recorded
in the audit log file.
By TSF_FMT, only a system administrator is enabled to change the clock setting.
7.1.6. Internal Network Data Protection (TSF_NET_PROT)
Internal Network Data Protection is provided by the following four protocols which are configured
by a system administrator using the system administrator mode:
(1) FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
The document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data are protected by the
encryption communication protocol that ensures secure data communication between the
TOE and the IT products. This trusted channel is logically distinct from other communication
channel and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the
communication data from modification or disclosure.
The followings are the encryption algorithms for network communication provided by the TOE.
Protocol Target Products. Encryption Algorithms
TLS Client PC
（Web Browser, Printer Driver）
LDAP Server
AES/128 bits
AES/256 bits
IPSec Client PC
（Web Browser, Printer Driver）
LDAP Server
Kerberos Server
SMTP Server
FTP Server
DNS Server
AES/128 bits
Triple-DES/168 bits
S/MIME SMTP Server Triple-DES/168 bits
AES/128 bits
AES/192 bits AES/256 bits
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a) TLS
According to the TLS communication which is configured by a system administrator using the
system administrator mode, TLS ensuring secure data transmission is supported. This protects
the security of document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal
network.
By supporting TLS, the TOE can act as TLS server or TLS client. Moreover, TLS can protect data
transmission between the TOE and the remote from interception and alteration. Protection
from interception is realized by encrypting transmission data with the following cryptographic
keys. A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting a session and lost at the time of
ending the session or powering off the MFD main unit.
Cryptographic key generated as TLSv1.0/TLSv1.1/TLSv1.2 upon every session
Specifically, one of the cryptographic suites below is adopted:
Cryptographic Suites of TLS Cryptographic Method and
Size of Secret Key
Hash
Method
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA AES / 128 bits SHA-1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA AES / 256 bits SHA-1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 AES / 128 bits SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 AES / 256 bits SHA256
Protection from the alteration is realized by HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code -
IETF RFC 2104) of TLS.
When TLS communication is enabled on the Web client, requests from the client must be
received via HTTPS. The TLS communication needs to be enabled before IPSec or S/MIME is
enabled or before security audit log data are downloaded by a system administrator.
b) IPSec
According to the IPSec communication which is configured by a system administrator using
the system administrator mode, IPSec ensuring secure data transmission is supported. This
protects the security of document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the
internal network.
IPSec establishes the security association to determine the parameters (e.g. private key and
cryptographic algorithm) to be used in the IPSec communication between the TOE and the
remote. After the association is established, all transmission data among the specified IP
addresses are encrypted by the transport mode of IPSec until the TOE is powered off or reset.
A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting a session and lost at the time of
ending the session or powering off the MFD main unit.
Cryptographic key generated as IPSec (ESP: Encapsulating Security Payload) at every session
Specifically, one of the following combinations between secret-key cryptographic method and
hash method is adopted:
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Cryptographic Method and Size
of Secret Key
Hash Method
AES / 128 bits SHA-1、SHA256、SHA384、SHA512
3-Key Triple-DES / 168 bits SHA-1、SHA256、SHA384、SHA512
c) S/MIME
According to the S/MIME communication which is configured by a system administrator using
the system administrator mode, S/MIME ensuring secure mail communication is supported.
This protects the security of document data on the internal and external networks.
By S/MIME encrypting mail function, the document data being transmitted to the outside by
E-mail are protected from interception.
A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting mail encryption and lost at the time
of completion of the encryption or powering off the MFD main unit.
Secret-key cryptographic method generated as S/MIME for every mail
Cryptographic Method and Size
of Secret Key
3Key Triple-DES/168 bits
AES / 128 bits
AES / 192 bits
AES / 256 bits
7.1.7. Fax Flow Security (TSF_FAX_FLOW)
This function inhibits unauthorized access to the TOE via Fax card in the controller board, at any
case. The data on public telephone line are not delivered to the internal network.
(1) FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
The data on public telephone line are not delivered to the internal network.
7.1.8. Self Test (TSF_S_TEST)
The TOE can execute a self test function to verify the integrity of TSF executable code and
TSF data.
(1) FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
TOE verifies the area of NVRAM and SEEPROM including TSF data upon initiation, and
displays an error on the control panel if an error occurs.
However, an error is not detected for the data on audit logs and time and date as these are
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not included in the target. Also, when Self Test function is set to be executed upon initiation,
TOE calculates the checksum of Controller ROM to confirm if it matches the specified value,
and displays an error on the control panel if an error occurs.
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8. ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY
8.1. Acronyms
The following acronyms are used in this ST:
Acronym Definition
ADF Auto Document Feeder
CC Common Criteria
CE Customer Engineer / Customer Service Engineer
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
eMMC Embedded Multi Media Card
FIPS PUB Federal Information Processing Standard publication
IIT Image Input Terminal
IOT Image Output Terminal
IT Information Technology
IP Internet Protocol
MFD Multi-Function Device
NVRAM Non Volatile Random Access Memory
PDL Page Description Language
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SEEPROM Serial Electronically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
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8.2. Terminology
The following terms are used in this ST:
Term Definition
User
Any entity outside the TOE who interacts with the TOE: i.e. general user,
system administrator.
System
Administrator
Privilege (SA)
A user authorized by key operator to manage MFD maintenance and
configure TOE security functions.
System
Administrator
An authorized user who manages MFD maintenance and configures
TOE security functions. This term covers both key operator and SA.
Customer Engineer
(CE)
Customer service engineer, an engineer who maintains and repairs
MFD.
Attacker A malicious user of TOE
Control Panel
A panel of MFD on which buttons, lamps, and a touch screen panel are
mounted to operate the MFD
General User Client A client for general user.
System
Administrator Client
A client for system administrator. An administrator can refer to and
rewrite TOE setting data of MFD via Web browser.
Embedded Web
Server
Embedded Web Server is a service on a Web server in the TOE to
confirm the status of the TOE, change settings, job deletion of the TOE
via the Web browser of the user client.
Embedded Web Server can be used with the Windows standard Web
browser.
System
Administrator Mode
An operation mode that enables a system administrator to refer to and
rewrite TOE setting for device operation and that for security functions
according to the operational environment. This mode is distinguished
from the operation mode that enables a general user to use the MFD
functions.
Printer driver
Software to convert the data on a general user client into print data
written in page description language (PDL), a readable format for MFD.
Used on the user client.
Print Data
The data written in PDL, a readable format for MFD, which are to be
converted into bitmap data by the TOE decompose function.
Control Data
The data that are transmitted by command and response interactions.
This is one the type of the data transmitted between MFD hardware
units.
Bitmap Data
The decomposed data of the data read by the copy function and the
print data transmitted from a user client to MFD by the print function.
Bitmap data are stored into the eMMC memory after being compressed
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Term Definition
in the unique process.
Decompose Function
A function to analyze and convert the print data written in PDL into
bitmap data.
Decompose
To analyze and convert the data written in PDL into bitmap data by the
decompose function.
Original Texts, images and photos to be read from IIT in the copy function.
Document Data
Document data means all the data, including images, transmitted
across the MFD when any of copy, print, network scan or fax functions is
used by a general user. The document data includes:
- Bitmap data read from IIT and printed out from IOT (copy function),
- Print data sent by general user client and its decomposed bitmap data
(print function),
- Bitmap data read from IIT and sent to the fax destination and the
bitmap data faxed from the sender’s machine and printed out from the
recipient’s IOT (fax function).
Used Document
Data
The remaining data in the MFD eMMC memory even after deletion. The
document data are first stored into the eMMC memory, used, and then
only their files are deleted.
Security Audit Log
Data
The chronologically recorded data of important events of the TOE. The
events such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation
are recorded based on when and who caused what event and its result.
Internally Stored
Data
The data which are stored in a general user client or in the general
client and server, but do not include data regarding TOE functions.
General Data
The data on the internal network. The general data do not include data
regarding TOE functions.
TOE Setting Data
The data which are created by the TOE or for the TOE and may affect
the TOE security functions. Included in the TSF data, specifically they
include the information regarding the functions of System
Administrator’s Security Management, Customer Engineer Operation
Restriction, ID and password of users, access denial due to
authentication failure of system administrator, Internal Network Data
Protection, Security Audit Log, User Authentication, User permission,
Report Print, Auto Clear, Data/Time, and Self Test.
General Client and
Server
Client and server which do not directly engage in TOE operations
Cryptographic Key
The 256-bit data which is automatically generated. Before the data are
stored into the eMMC memory, they are encrypted with the
cryptographic key.
Network A general term to indicate both external and internal networks.
External Network The network which cannot be managed by the organization that
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Term Definition
manages the TOE. This does not include the internal network.
Internal Network
Channels between MFD and highly reliable remote server / client PC.
The channels are located in the network of the organization, the owner
of the TOE, and are protected from the security risks coming from the
external network.
User Authentication
A function to limit the accessible TOE functions by identifying the user
before he/she uses each TOE function.
There are two modes, Local Authentication and Remote Authentication,
and either mode is used for operation.
Local Authentication
A mode to manage user authentication of the TOE using the user
information registered in the MFD.
Remote
Authentication
A mode to manage user authentication of the TOE using the user
information registered in the remote authentication server.
Faxbox
A location to store the fax document in the TOE.
It enables to print the document stored in Faxbox.
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9. REFERENCES
The following documentation was used to prepare this ST.
Short Name Document Title
［CC Part 1］
Part 1: Introduction and general model (September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4)
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1
Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-001
(Japanese version 1.0, dated November 2012,
translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
［CC Part 2］
Part 2: Security functional components (September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4)
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1
Part 2: Security functional components, dated September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-002
(Japanese version 1.0, dated November 2012,
translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
［CC Part 3］
Part 3: Security assurance components (September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4)
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1
Part 3: Security assurance components, dated September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-003
(Japanese version1.0, dated November 2012,
translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
［CEM］
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version
3.1
Evaluation Methodology, dated September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-004
(Japanese version 1.0, dated November,
translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)