Ärendetyp 5.3 Diarienummer: 23FMV1582-22
Dokument ID CSEC2023002
SEKRETESS
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2024-10-11
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP v17.1.0.1 APM
Issue: 1.0, 2024-okt-11
Authorisation: Jerry Johansson, Lead certifier , CSEC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 3.1 Security Audit 6
3.2 3.2 Cryptographic Support 6
3.3 3.3 Identification and Authentication 6
3.4 3.4 Security Management 6
3.5 3.5 Protection of the TSF 7
3.6 3.6 TOE Access 7
3.7 3.7 Trusted Path / Channels 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
4.1 Assumptions on Usage and Environment 8
4.2 Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 12
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 15
7.1 Evaluator Testing 15
7.2 Penetration Testing 15
8 Evaluated Configuration 16
9 Results of the Evaluation 17
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 18
11 Glossary 19
12 Bibliography 20
Appendix A Scheme Versions 21
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 21
A.2 Scheme Notes 21
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a networking device comprised of hardware and
software. The TOE provides network traffic management functionality, e.g. local traf-
fic management and access policy management. TOE consists of the software version
17.1.0.1 including APM, build 17.1.0.1- 0.61.4, installed on one of the following
hardware appliances:
● i4000 model series, including i4600, and i4800
● i5000 model series, including i5600, i5800, and i5820-DF
● i7000 model series, including i7600, i7800, and i7820-DF
● i10000 model series, including i10600, and i10800
● i11000-DS model series, including i11600-DS, and i11800-DS
● i15000 model series, including i15600, i15800 and i15820-DF
● C2400 with B2250
● C4480 with B4450
● R4000 model series, including R4600 and R4800
● R5000 model series, including R5600, R5800, R5900, and R5920-DF
● R10000 model series, including R10600, R10800, R10900, and R10920-DF
● R12000 model series, including R12600DS, R12800DS, and R12900DS
● CX410 with BX110
TOE is also available for the following hypervisors
● VMWare ESXi 8.0.0.10100
● Hyper-V 10.0.20348.1 on Windows Server 2022 Standard
● KVM qemu-system-x86 v1:6.2+dfsg-2ubuntu6.6 on Ubuntu 22.04.1 LTS
The TOE hardware appliances above are delivered via common carrier from an au-
thorized subcontractor. The TOE software is downloaded from the F5 website.
The Security Target [ST] claims exact conformance to the Collaborative Protection
Profile for Network Devices version 2.2e [NDcPP].
A list of the NIT technical decisions considered during the evaluation is available in
the ST.
There are eleven assumptions being made in the ST regarding the secure usage and the
operational environment of the TOE. The TOE relies on these to counter the nine
threats and comply with the one organisational security policy (OSP) in the ST.
The assumptions, threats, and the OSP are described in chapter 4 Assumptions and
Clarification of Scope.
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB and was com-
pleted in 2024-Sep-23. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the require-
ments of Common Criteria, version 3.1, release 5, and the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1, release 5. The evaluation meets the requirements
of evaluation assurance level EAL 1, augmented by ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem
Definition and the NDcPP Evaluation Activities [SD NDcPP].
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec in-
formation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC
according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria evaluation.
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The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST], and have been reached in
agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodol-
ogy for evaluation assurance level:
EAL 1 + ASE_SPD.1 and in accordance with the Evaluation Activities for Collabora-
tive Protection Profile for Network Devices [SD NDcPP].
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target and the Final
Evaluation Report (FER) produced by atsec information security AB.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2023002
Name and version of the
certified IT product
F5 BIG-IP v17.1.0.1 including APM
build 17.1.0.1-0.61.4
Security Target Identification F5 BIG-IP 17.1.0.1 including APM Security Target,
F5 Inc., 2024-September-09, document version 7.11
EAL EAL 1 + ASE_SPD.1 (NDcPP v2.2e)
Sponsor F5 Inc.
Developer F5 Inc.
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
CEM version 3.1 release 5
QMS version 2.5.2
Scheme Notes Release 22.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, EA/MLA
Certification date 2024-Oct-11
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3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security services:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path / Channels
3.1 3.1 Security Audit
BIG-IP implements syslog capabilities to generate audit records for security-relevant
events. In addition, the BIG-IP protects the audit trail from unauthorized modifications
and loss of audit data due to insufficient space.
3.2 3.2 Cryptographic Support
In BIG-IP, cryptographic functionality is provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic
module. The BIG-IP provides a secure shell (SSH) to allow administrators to connect
over a dedicated network interface. BIG-IP also implements the TLS protocol to allow
administrators to remotely manage the TOE. BIG-IP implements a TLS client for in-
teractions with other TLS servers. These cryptographic implementations utilize the
cryptographic module which provides random number generation, key generation, key
establishment, key storage, key destruction, hash operations, encryption/decryption
operations, and digital signature operations.
3.3 3.3 Identification and Authentication
An internal password-based repository is implemented for authentication of manage-
ment users. BIG-IP enforces a strong password policy and disabling user accounts af-
ter a configured number of failed authentication attempts.
3.4 3.4 Security Management
A command line interface (available via the traffic management shell "tmsh"), web-
based GUI ("Configuration utility" or “TMUI”), a SOAP-based API ("iControl API"),
and a REST-based API (“iControl REST API”) are offered to administrators for all
relevant configuration of security functionality. The TOE manages configuration ob-
jects in a partition which includes users, server pools, etc. This includes the authenti-
cation of administrators by user name and password, as well as access control based
on pre-defined roles and, optionally, groups of objects ("Profiles"). "Profiles" can be
defined for individual servers and classes of servers that the TOE forwards traffic
from clients to, and for traffic that matches certain characteristics, determining the
kind of treatment applicable to that traffic. Management capabilities offered by the
TOE include the definition of templates for certain configuration options. The man-
agement functionality also implements roles for separation of duties.
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3.5 3.5 Protection of the TSF
BIG-IP implements many capabilities to protect the integrity and management of its
own security functionality. These capabilities include the protection of sensitive data,
such as passwords and keys, self-tests, product update verification, and reliable time
stamping.
3.6 3.6 TOE Access
Prior to interactive user authentication, the BIG-IP can display an administrative-
defined banner. BIG-IP terminates interactive sessions after an administrator-defined
period of inactivity and allows users to terminate their own authenticated session.
3.7 3.7 Trusted Path / Channels
The TOE protects remote connections to its management interfaces with TLS and
SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with audit servers using TLS.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Assumptions on Usage and Environment
The Security Target [ST] makes eleven assumptions on the usage and the operational
environment of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environ-
ment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere
with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is
assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the
cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical
attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical ac-
cess to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other con-
trols, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the
physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not
provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing.
For example the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
In the case of vNDs, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one vND instance
for each physical hardware platform. The exception being where components of the
distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. There
are no other guest VMs on the physical platform providing non-Network Device func-
tionality.
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
The standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the
protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the network device to protect da-
ta that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data
and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another
network entity, is not covered by the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of network devices (e.g., fire-
wall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and
to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appro-
priately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Adminis-
trators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy
and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is
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not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that active-
ly works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Adminis-
trator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate
(root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store
(aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g.
offline verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES
The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Adminis-
trator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known
vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are
protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensi-
tive residual information (e.g., cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords,
etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its
operational environment.
A.VS_TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR (applies to vNDs only)
The Security Administrators for the VS are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best
interest of security for the organization. This includes not interfering with the correct
operation of the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defend-
ing against a malicious VS Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise
the security of the device.
A.VS_REGULAR_UPDATES (applies to vNDs only)
The VS software is assumed to be updated by the VS Administrator on a regular basis
in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.VS_ISOLATON (applies to vNDs only)
For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS provides, and is configured to provide sufficient
isolation between software running in VMs on the same physical platform. Further-
more, it is assumed that the VS adequately protects itself from software running inside
VMs on the same physical platform.
A.VS_CORRECT_CONFIGURATION (applies to vNDs only)
For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS and VMs are correctly configured to support ND
functionality implemented in VMs
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4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains nine threats, which have been considered during the
evaluation.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the Network Device by ne-
farious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading
as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety,
or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide
access to the administrative session, or sessions between Network Devices. Success-
fully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the secu-
rity functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic
exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key
sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key
space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or
control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do not use standardized se-
cure tunnelling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take ad-
vantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform
man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of
confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead
to a compromise of the Network Device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to au-
thenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker
could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert
themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The re-
sult is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiali-
ty and integrity, and potentially the Network Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firm-
ware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates
or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firm-
ware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
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T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality
of the Network Device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the at-
tacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise
the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been
compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise
credentials and device data enabling continued access to the Network Device and its
critical data. The compromise of credentials include replacing existing credentials
with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the Admin-
istrator or device credentials for use by the attacker. T.PASSWORD_CRACKING
Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain
privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the at-
tacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may allow them to take advantage
of any trust relationships with other Network Devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE An external, unauthorized entity could
make use of failed or compromised security functionality and might therefore subse-
quently use or abuse security functions without prior authentication to access, change
or modify device data, critical network traffic or security functionality of the device.
The Security Target contains one Organisational Security Policy (OSP), which have
been considered during the evaluation.
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions
of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent
by accessing the TOE.
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE is separated into two (2) distinct planes, the control plane and the data plane.
The control plane validates, stores, and passes configuration data to all necessary sys-
tems. It also provides all administrative access to the TOE. The data plane passes user
traffic through the TOE.
The TOE implements and supports the following network protocols: TLS (client and
server), SSH, HTTPS, FTP. The TOE protects remote connections to its management
interfaces with TLS and SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with
audit servers using TLS (TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2). The cryptographic functionality im-
plemented in the TOE is provided by OpenSSL.
The TOE is divided into the following subsystems:
• F5 Device Hardware,
• F5 platform layer for rSeries and VELOS devices,
• Hardware for hypervisor deployments,
• Hypervisor for hypervisor deployments,
• Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS),
• Traffic Management Micro-kernel (TMM),
• Access Policy Manager (APM), and
• Local Traffic Manager (LTM).
BIG-IP Subsystems for F5 devices (except rSeries and VELOS)
BIG-IP subsystems for F5 rSeries and VELOS devices
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BIG-IP subsystems for virtual deployments with hypervisors
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6 Documentation
The main guide to installing the TOE into the evaluated configuration is:
[ECG] BIG-IP® Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration
Guide BIG-IP® Release 17.1.0.1
The [ST], section 1.6.3.2 provides a full list of the guidance documents that are part of
the TOE.
The TOE documentation is collected in an ISO file that can be downloaded via https
from the F5 website.
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Evaluator Testing
The cryptographic testing was performed within the Cryptographic Algorithm Valida-
tion Program (CAVP). The CAVP certificates covers all TOE hardware appliances,
and the following third party hypervisor configurations:
• VMWare ESXi 8.0.0 on Intel Xeon Gold 6330N processor
• Hyper-V 10.0 on Windows Server 2022 and Intel Xeon Silver 4309Y processor
• KVM on Ubuntu 22.04.1 LTS and Intel Xeon Silver 4309 processor
All other tests were performed on the i7800, r5900, and the r12900 models, on the
VELOS CX410 with BX410, and a virtual deployment on VMWare ESXi 8.0.0,
all with the software build 17.1.0.1-0.61.4.
The evaluator testing was successful and did not reveal any errors.
7.2 Penetration Testing
Portscanning was performed to find open ports that should not be open on the i7800,
r5900, and the r12900 models, on the VELOS CX410 with BX410, and a virtual de-
ployment on VMWare ESXi 8.0.0, all with the software build 17.1.0.1-0.61.4.
No discrepancies were found during the penetration testing
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The following configuration specifics apply to the evaluated configuration of the
TOE:
• Appliance mode is licensed. Appliance mode disables root access to the TOE
operating system and disables bash shell.
• Certificate validation is performed using CRLs.
• Disabled interfaces:
- All command shells other than tmsh are disabled. For example, bash and other
user-serviceable shells are excluded.
- Management of the TOE via SNMP is disabled.
- Management of the TOE via the appliance's LCD display is disabled. (applicable
to F5 devices)
- Remote (i.e., SSH) access to the Lights Out / Always On Management
capabilities of the system is disabled. (applicable to F5 devices)
- SSH client
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The evaluators also applied all assurance activities implied by the collaborative PP
[NDcPP].
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC] and the evaluation ac-
tivities implied by the collaborative PP [NDcPP].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the respective assurance classes and components are summarised in
the following table:
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Guidance Documents AGD PASS
Operational User Guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative Procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-cycle Support ALC PASS
CM Capabilities ALC_CMC.1 PASS
CM Scope ALC_CMS.1 PASS
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security Objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
Extended Components Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security Requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Independent Testing ATE_IND.1 PASS
Vulnerability Assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability Analysis AVA_VAN.1 PASS
Evaluation Activities for NDcPP PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
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11 Glossary
ADC Application Delivery Controller
AFM Advanced Firewall Manager
APM Access Policy Manager
CA Certificate Authority
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CLI Command Line Interface
CRL Certificate Revocation List
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS HTTP Secure
IP Internet Protocol
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
LTM Local Traffic Manager
NDcPP Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
SHA Secure HashAlgorithm
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TMM Traffic Management Microkernel
TMOS Traffic Management Operating System
tmsh Traffic management shell
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
UDP User Datagram Protocol
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12 Bibliography
ST F5 BIG-IP® 17.1.0.1 including APM Security Target, F5 Inc.,
2024-September-09, document version 7.11
ECG BIG-IP® Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide BIG-IP
Release 17.1.0.1, F5 Inc., 03/08/2024, document version 7.7
NDcPP collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, 2020-03-23,
document version 2.2e
SD NDcPP Supporting Document - Evaluation Activities for Network Device
cPP, 2019-12-20, document version 2.2
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
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Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
2.5.2 2024-06-14 None.
2.5.1 2024-02-29 None.
2.5 2024-01-25 None.
2.4.1 2023-09-14 None.
2.4 2023-06-15 None.
2.3.1 2023-04-20 None.
2.3 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
Scheme Note 18 - ST Requirements
Scheme Note 21 - NIAP PP Certifications
Scheme Note 22 - Vulnerability assessment
Scheme Note 23 - Evaluation reports for NIAP PPs and cPPs
Scheme Note 25 - Use of CAVP-tests in CC evaluations
Scheme Note 27 - ST requirements at the time of application for certification
Scheme Note 28 - Updated procedures for application, evaluation ad certification