BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025
for
CONEXA 3.0 Version 1.6
from
Theben Smart Energy GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.48
BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025 (*)
Smart Meter Gateway
CONEXA 3.0, Version 1.6
Software: v3.85.0-cc
Hardware: HW V01.00 & V01.01
from Theben Smart Energy GmbH
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart
Metering System, Version 1.3, 31 March 2014,
BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2, AVA_VAN.5
valid until: 5 February 2033
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and
ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 6 February 2025
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................7
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................19
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................19
12. Definitions................................................................................................................19
13. Bibliography.............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................24
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025 Certification Report
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component AVA_VAN.5 that is
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product CONEXA 3.0, Version 1.6 Software: v3.85.0-cc, Hardware: HW V01.00 &
V01.01 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V6-2024. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-
0918-V6-2024 were re-used.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025
The evaluation of the product CONEXA 3.0, Version 1.6 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 31 January 2025. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Theben Smart Energy GmbH.
The product was developed by: Theben Smart Energy GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 6 February
2025 is valid until 5 February 2033 Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025 Certification Report
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
4. to monitor the resistance of the certified product against new attack methods and to
provide a qualified positive confirmation by applying for a recertification or
reassessment process on a regular basis every two years starting from the
issuance of the certificate.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product CONEXA 3.0, Version 1.6 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Theben Smart Energy GmbH
Schlossfeld 9
72401 Haigerloch
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) presented in this document is called "Smart Meter
Gateway", “SMGW” or “Gateway” and uniquely identified as CONEXA 3.0 (CC), Version
1.6. It is the communication unit used within such an intelligent metering system and
represented by the product CONEXA 3.0 except for the integrated Security Module.
Besides data processing, Smart Meter Gateway offers possibility to generate tariff rates in
order to enable network operators and consumers to control energy consumption in an
intelligent way.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System, Version 1.3, 31 March
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.2, AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1-6.10. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
SF.AU: Audit The TOE maintains three kinds of logs:
• System Log,
• Consumer Log, and
• Calibration Log.
The purpose of the System Log is to inform the Gateway Administrator and the Service
Technician about the system status of Smart Meter Gateway. The Consumer Log informs
authorized consumers about all information flows to the WAN, available Processing
Profiles, billing relevant and other Meter Data. Within the Calibration Log only calibration-
relevant information is stored.
SF.CR:
Cryptography
All connections between the TOE and external entities in WAN, HAN or LMN shall be
cryptographically protected. Hence, the TOE allows only TLS 1.2 protected connections
according to [RFC 5246] between the TOE and entities in the WAN or HAN. For TLS
protected connections to the WAN, according to the requirements from [TR 03116-3] the
elliptical curve BrainpoolP256r1 is useable only. Thus, the TOE supports the following
symmetric cryptographic algorithm: AES-CBC with 128 bit key for encryption and
decryption in accordance with [FIPS 197] and [NIST SP800-38A] and AES-CMAC with
128 bit key for integrity protection in accordance to [RFC 4493]. This method enforces
that the TOE and the corresponding Meter have a common symmetric 128 bit key.
SF.UD: User
Data Protection
The TOE is attached to three separated networks HAN, WAN and LMN. The interfaces to
the different networks are physically separated. This TSF controls the access of all
external entities in WAN, HAN and LMN to any information that is sent to, from or via the
TOE or that is stored within the TOE.
SF.IA:
Identification &
Authentication
Each user, who communicates with the TOE or receives data from the TOE shall be
identified and authenticated before any action on behalf of that user, including receiving
of data sent from the Gateway.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
SF.SM:
Security
Management
The TOE offers a set of functions to manage and configure the TSF. Those security
functions comprise
• Management of devices in LMN and HAN,
• Client management,
• Maintenance of Processing Profiles,
• Key- and Certificate-Management,
• Firmware Update,
• Wake-up configuration,
• Monitoring,
• Resetting of the TOE (restart), and
• Audit Log configuration.
SF.PR: Privacy This TSF assures the privacy of the Consumer by ensuring that authorized External
Entities can only obtain data that is absolutely relevant for billing processes and the
secure operation of the grid.
SF.SP: Self-
protection
The TOE provides a set of self-protection mechanisms that in particular comprises the
self-test of the TOE, detection of replay and physical attacks and the failure with
preservation of a secure state.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.3-3.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
CONEXA 3.0, Version 1.6
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW CONEXA 3.0 HW V01.00
HW V01.01
Secure Delivery
Procedure via transport
service and installation
by a service technician
or personal hand over
2 SW SMGW Software v3.85.0-cc Pre-Installed on the HW
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3 DOC Handbuch CONEXA 3.0
für den Gateway
Administrator [11]
Version 2.13.3, SHA256 Hash:
e3997512641772752d0c600fce2627aa9
d78a525d554d3d15e1e26c825fab715
Download from https
secured website
4 DOC Handbuch CONEXA 3.0
für den Service-Techniker
[12]
Version 2.14.2, SHA256 Hash:
1e11af36c4135d43a1dba81acaa373025
f3f68fa5849a49c2b58add483691b99
Download from https
secured website
5 DOC Handbuch CONEXA 3.0
für den Letztverbraucher
[13]
Version 2.12.1, SHA256 Hash:
c89a8f8f0324a7e145b3895fb82cfe56d7
698bc95a3b3b86236ff41c1d2d4d66
Download from https
secured website
6 DOC Conexa 3.0
Profilbeschreibungen [14]
Version 2.16, SHA256 Hash:
45354f07db962baca72fec33ede98e136
97a07d81fa4c28d498ef1fc3e1f7bdc
Download from https
secured website
7 DOC COSEM HTTP-
Webservice [16]
Version 2.2, SHA256 Hash:
8abbabcaff546dbfc060d0100bd2fd6a5b
99988af99d9b97c759b22626dea8dd
Download from https
secured website
8 DOC Conexa 3.0
Logmeldungen [15]
Version 1.11.0, SHA256 Hash:
88980a569cbfc9d89157248173cdd52be
77fec88942f71f8a58c394c04e0309b
Download from https
secured website
9 DOC Schnittstellenbeschrei-
bung IF_GW_CON [17]
Version 1.4, SHA256 Hash:
26c821592d7245e29ce91fc25c5dacc0c
3310f2885fa9e1baff30d7e97103221
Download from https
secured website
10 DOC Schnittstellenbeschrei-
bung IF_GW_SRV [18]
Version 1.4, SHA256 Hash:
ec094d7ff046c387e921bfdd2d49443308
3030745cc22cdf20824dc5f5feab99
Download from https
secured website
11 DOC Anhang sichere
Auslieferung [19]
Version 0.16, SHA256 Hash:
a71d4484abb51133dca17b902a89e6bd
c4be5c0fe7c97e93e982b0a1845167bc
Download from https
secured website
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
As stated earlier, the TOE itself consists of the hardware, firmware and software parts of
the Smart Meter Gateway accompanied by the different guidance documents. The physical
parts (hardware parts) can be delivered within a special and secure transport box (Pylocx
Box) by a standard transportation service, or within a cardboard tamper-detecting
packaging with technical support (MVTU) for a small amount of gateways (1 gateway in an
individual packaging or an amount of individual packaged gateways packed together in an
outer packaging).
The secure transport box can only be opened by authorized individuals by using a special
key pad and a valid one time PIN. Due to the mandatory instructions of the developer it is
not allowed to remove SMGWs from the secure transport box outside a secure storage
room (e.g. at the premise of the energy company) or at the place of installation at the
consumers premise where it is installed by a service technician. All places where SMGW
will be stored during the delivery need to provide a basic protection against possible
attackers (e.g. concrete walls, doors need to be locked, and a physical inventory needs to
be performed). Thereby it is ensured that no manipulation of the SMGW can take place on
the complete track of delivery (starting with the manufacturer, through the different stages
of storages to the final place of installation).
The cardboard packaging may only be opened when the TOE is installed, it is not allowed
to remove SMGWs from the secure packaging as they are connected in a special
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025
backend. During the whole delivery process the cardboard packaging has to be checked
for integrity and verified via a special frontend every time it is stored in a secure storage,
left unobserved, or opened for installation. All places where SMGW will be stored during
the delivery need to provide basic protection against possible attackers (e.g. concrete
walls, doors need to be locked). Thereby it is ensured that no manipulation of the SMGW
can take place on the complete track of delivery (starting with the manufacturer, through
the different stages of storages to the final place of installation).
All above mentioned delivery variants can be used in order to fulfil the delivery to the MPO.
With the introduction of the MPO delivery chain, the definition of responsibility for SMGW
delivery methods was sharpened as follows:
• The TOE developer is responsible for the secure development, production and
delivery to the MPO.
• Upon acceptance of the TOE from the developer, the respective MPO takes over
responsibility for the subsequent storage, transport and assembly of the TOE.
This definition was announced by the BSI by publishing the possibility of the MPO delivery
chain which was taken over by the developer. As already explained reduces the integration
of the MPO delivery the scope of the certification. Only the delivery of the TOE from the
developer to the MPO is part of this certification.
The TOE thereby consists of the main circuit board of the Smart Meter Gateway, the case
and the seal. The correct hardware of the TOE can be identified by the identifier “HW
V01.00” or “HW V01.01”, which can be found on a laser engraving on the TOE.
The firmware and software are pre-installed on the hardware and therefore also part of the
physical delivery. It can be uniquely identified by all users by connecting to the TOE and
using the commands described in the relevant guidance document.
The guidance documents mentioned in Table 2 can be downloaded by a https secured
developer’s website. The corresponding users can uniquely identify the guidance by
checking the hash sum, which is also included in the Security Target (which will be
published on the website of the BSI).
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
Security audit, communication, cryptographic support, user data protection, identification
and authentication, security management, privacy, protection of the TSF and trusted path/
channels.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
OE.ExternalPrivacy: Authorised and authenticated external entities receiving any kind of
private or billing-relevant data shall be trustworthy and not perform unauthorised analyses
of these data with respect to the corresponding Consumer(s).
OE.TrustedAdmins: The Gateway Administrator and the Service Technician shall be
trustworthy and well-trained.
OE.PhysicalProtection: The TOE shall be installed in a non-public environment within the
premises of the consumer that provides a basic level of physical protection. This protection
shall cover the TOE, the Meters that the TOE communicates with and the communication
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025 Certification Report
channel between the TOE and its Security Module. Only authorised individuals may
physically access the TOE.
OE.Profile: The Processing Profiles that are used when handling data shall be obtained
from a trustworthy and reliable source only.
OE.SM: The environment shall provide the services of a certified Security Module for
• Verification of digital signatures,
• Generation of digital signatures,
• Key agreement,
• Key transport,
• Key storage, and
• Random Number Generation.
The Security Module used shall be certified and shall be used in accordance with its
relevant guidance documentation.
OE.Update: The firmware updates for the Gateway that can be provided by an authorised
external entity shall undergo a certification process according to this Security Target before
they are issued to show that the update is implemented correctly. The external entity that is
authorised to provide the update shall be trustworthy and ensure that no malware is
introduced via a firmware update.
OE.Network: It shall be ensured that
• a WAN network connection with sufficient reliability and bandwidth for the individual
situation is available,
• one or more trustworthy sources for an update of the system time are available in
the WAN,
• the Gateway is the only communication gateway for Meters in the LMN, and
• if devices in the HAN have a separate connection to parties in the WAN (be-side the
Gateway) this connection is appropriately protected.
OE.Keygen: It shall be ensured that the ECC key pair for a Meter (TLS) is generated
securely according to the [24]. It shall also be ensured that the keys are brought into the
Gateway in a secure way by the Gateway Administrator.
OE.Delivery: After the reception of the TOE by the MPO, the MPO is responsible for the
secure delivery of the TOE to the installation and operational environment. The MPO shall
be trustworthy in context of this delivery and well trained and shall take appropriate
security measures to ensure protection against undetected manipulation or undetected
replacement of the TOE during such a delivery to ensure integrity and authenticity of the
TOE. Note that adhering to [21] is sufficient for MPOs to fulfill this security objective.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is subdivided into the following subsystems:
• Hardware: Includes the case of the SMGW, the seals and the electronic parts of the
TOE and provides the physical basis as well as the passive physical protection for
the TOE.
• OS: Includes the underlying operating system and provides the filesystem
encryption, firewall functionality and mandatory access control.
• SMPF: Implements parts of the SMGW software and provides the functionality for
system initialisation after the boot process, authentication of external entities,
management of processing profiles and logging.
• Crypto: Implements parts of the SMGW software and provides the cryptographic
functions of the TOE and the interface to the Security Module.
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• Services: Implements parts of the SMGW software and provides the webserver for
the requests send by the gateway administrator, service technician and consumer
• WAN: Implements parts of the SMGW software and provides the wake-up-service,
the communication channels for the GWA and the external entities.
• HAN: Implements parts of the SMGW software and provides the communication
channels to the external entities at the HAN interface.
• Calibration: Implements parts of the SMGW software and provides the
communication channels to the meters at the LMN interface as well as the
processing of the received meter data.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
There is only one final TOE configuration, which has to be tested. Nevertheless, the
developer also provides an additional modification including SSH access for a minor set of
testing.
7.1. TOE test configuration
All developer tests in the context of the evaluation have been conducted using multiple
TOE samples in two different configurations:
• Final TOE with factory setting.
• Instrumentalised TOE with SSH access for TOE manipulations and for firewall tests
on the TOE
7.2. Developer Testing
The developer’s testing approach was to test the TSFI systematically next to a deeper
consideration of TOE subsystems, internal interactions and concrete SFR tests.
The developer testing covered each TSFI, the case with its seals, the subsystem
behaviour and interactions as well as all SFRs.
The developer’s testing effort has been proven sufficient to demonstrate that the security
functionality / TSFI perform as specified.
7.3. Independent Evaluator Testing
In summary, all independent and penetration tests were deployed by the ITSEF on the
TOE with SW version v3.82.10, which only differs from v3.85.0-cc in minor, not security-
relevant adaptations see [20] and in the build process, used certificates (switch from test
PKI to live system) and the naming itself. This was evaluated by the ITSEF. Furthermore,
all differences between the certified SW version of the TOE during the previous
certification (BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V6) and the actual one under evaluation (BSI-DSZ-CC-
0918-V7) were analysed by a detailed source code analyses discussed, without further
indication of potential vulnerabilities.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
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7.4. Penetration Testing
The evaluation body conducted penetration testing based on functional areas of concern
derived from SFRs and architectural mechanisms. These areas were prioritized with
regard to various factors, e.g. attack surface, estimated flaw likelihood, developer testing
coverage and detectability of flaws during developer testing.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment provided that all measures required by
the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE as identified in table 2 has been evaluated. There is only one configuration as
the different variants of the communication adapters that are outside of the TOE scope run
with the same HW and SW configuration of the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 [4] (AIS 34)
and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 46. AIS 48).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2, AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V6-2024, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on adjustment in
assignment of counter register to measured value list, introduction resettable firmware only
for testing purpose, optimization GWA change process, compression of data at the WAN
interface, documentation adaptions, implementation of the MPO delivery method, further
changes and bugfixes, kernel update, and editorial changes.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System,
Version 1.3, 31 March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2, AVA_VAN.5
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
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security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Validity
Period
TLS cipher
suite (key
establishment,
record layer
encryption and
integrity, peer
authentication)
TLS_ECDHE_EC-
DSA_WITH_AES_128_
CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_EC-
DSA_WITH_AES_256_
CBC_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_EC-
DSA_WITH_AES_128_
GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_EC-
DSA_WITH_AES_256_
GCM_SHA384
Cipher Suite: [RFC 5289],
[RFC 5246] [26]
AES: [FIPS 197] [26]
CBC: [NIST SP800-38A]
[26]
HMAC: [RFC 2104] [26]
GCM: [NIST SP800-38D]
[25]
brainpoolPxxxr1: [RFC
5639] [25]
secpxxxr1: [RFC 5114]
[25]
SHA: [FIPS 180-4] [25]
AES:
128bit,
256bit
EC:
secp256r1,
secp384r1,
brain-
poolP256r1,
brain-
poolP384r1,
brain-
poolP512r1
[TR03109]
[22]
2029+
Key generation
for CMS
containers
Key generation: ECKA-
EG
Key wrap: id-aes128-
wrap
Key wrap:
[RFC 3394] [25]
Key generation:
[TR 03111] [25]
128bit [TR03109]
[22]
2029+
Encryption /
decryption
/integrity of
CMS container
id-aes128-gcm,
id-aes-CBC-CMAC-128
CMAC: [RFC 4493] [25]
GCM: [RFC 5084], [25]
[NIST SP800-38D] [25]
AES: [FIPS 197] [25]
CBC: [NIST SP800-38A]
[25]
128bit [TR03109]
[22]
2029+
Key generation
for meter data
AES-CMAC AES-CMAC: [RFC 4493]
[25]
AES: [FIPS 197] [25]
128bit [TR03109]
[22]
2029+
Encryption/
decryption,
integrity of
meter data
Encryption: AES-CBC
Integrity protection:
AES-CMAC
AES-CMAC: [RFC 4493]
[25]
AES: [FIPS 197] [25]
CBC: [NIST SP800-38A]
[25]
128bit [TR03109]
[22]
2029+
Hashing for
signatures
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
SHA: [FIPS 180-4] [25] - [TR-02102]
[23]
2029+
Encryption /
decryption,
integrity of
TSFI
AES-128-CBC ES-
SIV:SHA256
AES: [FIPS 197] [25]
CBC: [NIST SP800-38A]
[25]
SHA: [FIPS 180-4] [25]
128bit [TR-02102]
[23]
2029+
Remarks Integrity of firmware updates and stored binaries of TSFI are not defined in SFRs per ST
but they are implemented as ARC mechanisms.
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025 Certification Report
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to TR-03109-3 [22] or TR-02102-1 [23] the algorithms are suitable for Smart
Metering Systems.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CLS Controllable Local Systems
CMAC Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code
CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC Elliptic Curve
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GWA Gateway Administrator
HAN Home Area Network
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HMAC Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LMN Local Metrological Network
LTE Long Term Evolution
MAC Message Authentication Code
NTP Network Time Protocol
PP Protection Profile
OS Operation System
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMGW Smart Meter Gateway
SMPF Smart Metering Platform Framework
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TAF Tarifanwendungsfall
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
WAN Wide Area Network
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025 Certification Report
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025, Version 1.97.3, 2024-12-02, Security
Target (ASE) CONEXA 3.0 - Smart Meter Gateway, Theben Smart Energy GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2025-01-29, ETR Summary – CONEXA 1.6,
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System, Version 1.3, 31
March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014
[9] Configuration list for the TOE HW, ALC_CMS.4 Konfigurationsliste Smart Meter
Gateway CONEXA 3.0, Version 1.1, Theben Smart Energy GmbH (confidential
document)
[10] Configuration list for the TOE SW, “ASSURANCE LIFE CYCLE – CONFIGURATION
MANAGEMENT” DER CONEXA 3.0 (ALC_CMS.4), Version 3.85.0-cc, Theben
Smart Energy GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Handbuch CONEXA 3.0 für Gateway Administrator, Version 2.13.3, 2024-11-25,
Theben Smart Energy GmbH
[12] Handbuch CONEXA 3.0 für den Service-Techniker, Version 2.14.2, 2024-11-25,
Theben Smart Energy GmbH
[13] Handbuch CONEXA 3.0 für den Letztverbraucher, 2.12.1, 2024-11-06, Theben
Smart Energy GmbH
[14] Profilbeschreibungen CONEXA 3.0 Smart Meter Gateway, Version 2.16, 2024-08-
02, Theben Smart Energy GmbH
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 48, Version 1.0, Anforderungen an die Prüfung von Sicherheitsetiketten
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025
[15] Logbucheinträge CONEXA 3.0 – Smart Meter Gateway, Version 1.11.0, 2024-08-07,
Theben Smart Energy GmbH
[16] COSEM HTTP-Webservice, Version 2.2, Theben Smart Energy GmbH
[17] Schnittstellenbeschreibung IF_GW_CON, Version 1.4, Theben Smart Energy GmbH
[18] Schnittstellenbeschreibung IF_GW_SRV, Version 1.4, Theben Smart Energy GmbH
[19] Anhang sichere Auslieferung, Version 0.16, 2024-11-29, Theben Smart Energy
GmbH
[20] Impact Analysis Report – Smart Meter Gateway CONEXA, Version 3.01.1, 2025-01-
20, Theben Smart Energy GmbH (confidential document)
[21] BSI. Anforderungskatalog zur MSB-Lieferkette, in der aktuell gültigen Fassung.
URL:
https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Unternehmen-und-Organisationen/Standards-
und-Zertifizierung/Smart-metering/Smart-Meter-Gateway/MSB/MSB_node.html (cit.
on pp. 38, 47). 2024, German Federal Office for Information Security
[22] TR-03109:
Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1, Anlage IV, Feinspezifikation „Drahtlose LMN-
Schnittstelle“, Teil a: „OMS Specification Volume 2, 13.12.2024, Primary
Communication“, Version 2.0, German Federal Office for Information Security
Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1, Anlage IV, Feinspezifikation
„Drahtgebundene LMN-Schnittstelle“, Teil a: „HDLC für LMN“, Version 2.0,
13.12.2024 , German Federal Office for Information Security
Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1, Anlage IV, Feinspezifikation
„Drahtgebundene LMN-Schnittstelle“, Teil b: „SML-Smart Message Language“,
Version 2.0, 13.12.2024, German Federal Office for Information Security
TR-03109-3: Technische Richtlinie BSI-TR-03109-3 Kryptographische Vorgaben für
die Infrastruktur von intelligenten Messsystemen, BSI, Version 1.1, 2014, Federal
Office for Information Security
[23] TR-02102
Technische Richtlinie TR-02102 “Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und
Schlüssellängen”:
Technische Richtlinie TR-02102-1, Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und
Schlüssellängen, Version 2024-01, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
Technische Richtlinie TR-02102-2, Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und
Schlüssellängen, Teil 2 – Verwendung von Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version
2024-01, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
Technische Richtlinie TR-02102-3, Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und
Schlüssellängen, Teil 3 – Verwendung von Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) und
Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2), Version 2024-02, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
[24] TR-03116-3: Technische Richtlinie BSI-TR-03116-3, Kryptographische Vorgaben für
Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 3 - Intelligente Messsysteme, Stand 2025,
German Federal Office for Information Security, 13.12.2024.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025 Certification Report
[25] Standard of Implementation
BSI TR-03111: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Version 2.10, German Federal
Office for Information Security, 01.06.2018
[FIPS 180-4] NIST FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). NIST, August
2015.
[FIPS 197] NIST FIPS PUB 197: Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (AES), 2001-11-2, NIST, 2001.
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods and Techniques. NIST, 2001.
[NIST SP800-38B] NIST SP800-38B: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication. NIST, 2005.
[NIST SP800-38D] NIST SP800-38D: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC. NIST, 2007.
[RFC 2104] Network Working Group RFC 2104, H. Krawczyk et al.: HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication. Network Working Group, Feb. 1997.
[RFC 3394] IETF RFC 3394, J. Schaad, R. Housley: Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm. IETF, 2002.
[RFC 4493] IETF RFC 4493, J. H. Song, J. Lee, T. Iwata: The AES-CMAC
Algorithm. IETF, 2006.
[RFC 5084] IETF RFC 5084, R. Housley: Using AES-CCM amd AES-GCM
Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). IETF, 2007.
[RFC 5114] IETF RFC 5114, M. Lepinski, S. Kent: Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups
for Use with IETFStandards, 2008
[RFC 5246] RFC 5246 - The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.2,
Dierks & Rescorla - Standard Track, August 2008
[RFC 5289] IETF RFC 5289, E. Rescorla: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM). IETF, 2008.
[RFC 5639] IETF RFC 5639, M. Lochter, J. Merkle: Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation. IETF, 2010
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-V7-2025 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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