Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003
for
Philips Smart Card Controller P8WE6017V1J
from
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Unit Identification
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003
Philips Smart Card Controller
P8WE6017V1J
from
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Unit Identification SOGIS-MRA
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile PP/9806
Functionality: PP/9806 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for
insecure states),
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 08 January 2003
The Vice President of the Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Hange L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate,
and no warranty of the IT product by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik or
any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or
implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4
2
Act setting up the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003
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2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates based on the CC
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002 and Austria in November 2002.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003 Certification Report
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3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Philips Smart Card Controller P8WE6017V1J has undergone the
certification procedure at the BSI.
The evaluation of the product Philips Smart Card Controller P8WE6017V1J was
conducted by T-Systems ISS GmbH. The evaluation facility of T-Systems ISS
GmbH is an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI (ITSEF)6
.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business
Unit Identification.
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 08 January 2003.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18.
The product Philips Smart Card Controller P8WE6017V1J has been included in
the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http://www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline 0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Unit Identification, P.O. Box 54 02 40,
D-22502 Hamburg, Germany
BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003
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Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 8
3 Security Policy 8
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
5 Architectural Information 9
6 Documentation 10
7 IT Product Testing 10
8 Evaluated Configuration 11
9 Results of the Evaluation 11
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations 14
11 Annexes 14
12 Security Target 14
13 Definitions 14
14 Bibliography 17
BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003 Certification Report
B-3
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the "Philips Smart Card Controller
P8WE6017 V1J". It provides a hardware platform for a smart card to run smart
card applications executed by a smart card operating system. The TOE is
composed of a processing unit, security components, I/O ports, cryptographic
co-processor, volatile or non-volatile memories (1280 Bytes RAM, 48 KBytes
ROM, 16 KBytes EEPROM), a Triple-DES Co-processor and a Random
number generator. The TOE also includes Philips proprietary IC Dedicated
Software stored on the chip and used for testing purposes during production
only. It does not provide additional services in the operational phase of the
TOE. The smart card operating system and the application stored in the User-
Mode ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE.
The TOE is embedded in a micro-module or another sealed package. The
micro-modules are embedded into a credit card sized plastic card.
The EEPROM part of the TOE provides a platform for applications requiring
non-volatile data storage, including smart cards and portable data banks.
Several security features independently implemented in hardware or controlled
by software will be provided to ensure proper operations and integrity and
confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for memory
protection and sensors to allow operations only under specified conditions.
The Security Target is written using the Protection Profile PP/9806 [8]. With
reference to this Protection Profile, the smart card product life cycle is described
in seven phases and the development, production and operational user
environment are described and referenced to these phases. The assumptions,
threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile are used.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC Part 2 and are contained in PP/9806:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FAU Audit
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FDP User data protection
FDP-ACC.2 Complete access control
FDP-ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple Security attributes
FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
FIA Identification and Authentification
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003
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Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of secutity functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPR Privacy
FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Table 1: SFRs taken from CC Part 2 and contained in PP/9806
In addition to the SFRs stated in PP/9806, additional SFRs were taken into
account. Table 2 outlines additional SFRs taken from CC Part 2 and can also
be found in chapter 5.1.1.4 of the Security Target. Table 3 outlines additional
extended SFRs.
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Table 2: SFRs token from Part 2 and not contained in PP/9806
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Table 3: additional SFRs CC Part 2 extended
The security functions (SF) of the TOE are applicable to the phases 4 to 7.
Some of the security functions are configured at the end of phase 3 and nearly
all security functions are already active during the delivery from phase 3 to
phase 4. Only the security function F.TEST is only applicable in phase 3.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003 Certification Report
B-5
F.RNG: Random Number Generator
The random number generator continuously produces random numbers
with a length of one byte. Each byte will at least contain a 7 bit entropy.
The TOE implements the F.RNG by means of a physical hardware
random number generator working stable within the limits guaranteed by
F.OPC (operational conditions).
F.DEA: Triple-DES Co-Processor
The TOE provides the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) of the
Data Encryption Standard (DES) [11]. F.DEA is a modular basic
cryptographic function which provides the TDEA algorithm as defined by
FIPS PUB 46-3 [12] by means of a hardware co-processor and supports
the 2-key Triple DEA algorithm according to keying option 2 in FIPS PUB
46-3. The TOE implements functions ensuring that attackers are unable
to observe the keys and plain text by measuring the external behaviour
during the Triple-DES-operation.
F.OPC: Control of Operation Conditions
F.OPC filters the power supply and the frequency of the clock. It also
monitors the power supply, the frequency of the clock, the temperature of
the chip and the high voltage for the write process to the EEPROM by
means of sensors, and it controls the program execution. Before delivery
the mode-switch is set to user mode. In user mode the TOE enables the
sensors automatically when operated. The TOE prevents that the
application program disables the sensors.
F.COMP: Protection of Mode and Configuration and provision of Test Functions
F.COMP provides access control by means of TOE modes of operation
selected by a mode: (i) test mode and (ii) user mode. In the test mode
the TOE allows to execute the test software and prevents to execute the
embedded software. The initial TOE mode is the test mode. The TOE
allows to change the mode-switch from the test mode into the user mode.
The TOE prevents to change the mode-switch from the user mode into
the test mode. In test mode F.COMP also provides the capability to store
identification and/or pre-personalisation data and/or supplements of the
Smart Card Embedded Software into the EEPROM. Before delivery the
TOE is switched to user-mode.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003
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F.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
F.PHY protects against manipulation of (i) the hardware, (ii) the IC
Dedicated Test Software in the ROM, (iii) the Smart Card Embedded
Software in the ROM and the EEPROM, (iv) the application data in the
EEPROM and RAM, (v) the configuration data in the security row of the
EEPROM and (vi) the mode-switch. It also protects secret user data
against the disclosure when stored in EEPROM and RAM or while being
processed by the TOE. The protection comprises different features of the
construction of the TOE.
F.TEST: Providing of test functions
The T.TEST provides test functions to demonstrate the correct operation
of the security functions provided by the TOE. This is performed in the
Test Mode by a suite of self tests at the request of the authorised user.
The test functions also allow to check the integrity of the ROM content
and the functions writing data into the EEPROM check the correctness of
the data written.
The TOE was evaluated against the claims of the Security Target [5] by
T-Systems ISS GmbH. The evaluation was completed on December 4th
, 2002.
The evaluation facility of T-Systems ISS GmbH is an evaluation facility
recognised by BSI (ITSEF)8
.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business
Unit Identification.
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Part C or [1], part 3
for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL5+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 5 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL5 TOE evaluation: Semiformally designed and tested
+: ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing of
insecure states
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 4: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
The level of assurance is chosen in order to allow the confirmation that the TOE
is suitable for use within devices compliant with the German Digital Signature
Law [13].
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003 Certification Report
B-7
1.2 Strength of Function
The TOE‘s strength of functions is rated ‘high’ (SOF-high) for those functions,
identified in the Security Target, chapter 6.1, SOF Claim. The rating of the
strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
1.3 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE are
specified in the PP/9806 [8] and mentioned in the Security Target. There are no
additional high-level security concerns or additional new threats defined in the
Security Target.
1.4 Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode. The
TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process. At this point in time the operating system software is already stored in
the non-volatile memories of the chip and the test mode is disabled. Thus, there
are no special procedures for generation or installation that are important for a
secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery processes, like the
integration into a smart card, personalization and the delivery of the smart card
to an end user, have to be organised in a way that excludes all possibilities of
physical manipulation of the TOE. There are no special security measures for
the start-up of the TOE besides the requirement that the controller has to be
used under the well-defined operating conditions and that the requirements on
the software have to be applied as described in the user documentation [9].
1.5 Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile
PP/9806, the assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are
valid for the Security Target of this TOE.
Additional assumptions are chosen in the Security Target (see [5], chapter 3.3).
1.6 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of
the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to
this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003
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2 Identification of the TOE
The following TOE deliverables are provided for a customer who purchases the
TOE version P8WE6017V1J:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
1 HW Philips P8WE6017V1J
Secure 8-bit Smart Card
Controller
V1J 13.05.2002
GDS2 File)
Wafer (dice
include reference
C009J or P009J)
2 SW Test ROM Software (the
IC dedicated software)
Xk033b 17.01.2002 Test ROM on the
chip
3 DOC Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual of the
P8WE6017V1J [9]
Version 1.0 12.08.2002 Printed document
4 DOC Data Sheet P8WE6017
Secure 8-bit Smart Card
Controller [10]
3.3 Doc.-
No.:
043133,
July, 05th
,
2002
05.07.2002 Printed document
Table 5: Deliverables of the TOE version P8WE6017V1J
The TOE is identified by P8WE6017V1J. A so called nameplate (on-chip
identifier) is coded in a metal mask onto the chip during production and can be
checked by the customer, too. This code is specific for the MOS4YOU
(Nijmegen, The Netherlands) or the PSF (Fishkill, USA) production site as
outlined in the guidance documentation [9]. Additionally, a FabKey according to
the defined FabKey-procedures supports the secure delivery and the
identification of the TOE.
To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery pro-
cedures described in [9] have to be followed.
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus provi-
ding an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of
plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and
it will provide a random number generation of appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed
by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory
of the TOE and
BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003 Certification Report
B-9
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of
security functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC dedicated software) is used by the manufacturer of the
smart card to check the functionality of the chips.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined). At this point in time the operating
system software is already stored in the non-volatile memory of the chip and the
test mode is disabled.
The smart card applications need the security functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system, and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
security functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environ-
mental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Philips Semiconductors is the TOE developer and
manufacturer and responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded
smart card application software in its development and production environment.
For those aspects refer to chapter 9 of this report.
The full evaluation results are applicable for chips from MOS4YOU indicated by
the namplate C0009J and PSF (Fishkill, USA) indicated by the nameplate
P009J.
5 Architectural Information
The Philips P8WE6017V1J smart card controller is an integrated circuit (IC)
providing a hardware platform for a smart card operating system and smart card
application software. A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be
found within the TOE description of the Security Target. The complete hardware
description and the complete instruction set of the Philips P8WE6017V1J smart
card controller is to be found in the Data Sheet P8WE6017, Version 3.3 [10].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
8-bit 80C51 CPU, Special Function Registers, Triple-DES Co-Processor,
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003
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Random Number Generator (RNG), Power Module with Security Sensors and
Security Logic and a Clock Filter are used. Security measures for physical
protection are realised within the layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers provide the interface to the software using the
security functions of the TOE.
6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the consumer:
• The Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual [9],
• The Data Sheet [10] and
• The ETR-lite [7]
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hard-
ware computing platform. The documents [9] and [10] will be used by the
customer to implement the software (operating system / application software)
which will use the TOE.
The ETR-lite is intended to provide the results of the platform evaluation for the
TOE in a way that meets the requirements for a composite evaluation as
defined in AIS 36 [4].
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into four categories: (i) tests
which are performed in a simulation environment, (ii) production tests, which are
done as a last step of the production process for every chip to check its correct
functionality and the integrity of the data stored in the User ROM, (iii)
characterisation tests, which were used to determine the behaviour of the chip
with respect to different operating conditions and (iv) special verification tests
for security functions which were done with samples of the TOE.
The developer tests cover all security functions and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification, the high level design and the low level
design. Chips from both production sites were used for tests.
The evaluators could repeat all tests of the developer either using the library of
programs and tools delivered to the evaluator or at the developers site. They
performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer by sampling. Besides repeating exactly the
developers tests, test parameters were varied and additional analysis was
done. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003 Certification Report
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The evaluators gave evidence that the actual version of the TOE (V1J) provides
the security functions as specified. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functions into considera-
tion. Intensive penetration testing was performed to consider the physical
tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated equipment and expertised
know how.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by P8WE6017V1J with the nameplates C009J and P009J.
There is only one configuration of the TOE [14] (all TSF are active and usable).
All information on how to use the TOE and its security functions by the software
is provided within the user documentation.
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode.
Thus, the evaluation was mainly performed in the user mode. For all evaluation
activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid
for the user mode, too.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 Evaluation of the TOE
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in
coordination with the Certification Body. For smart card IC specific methodology
the guidance documents (i) Joint Interpretation Library - The application of CC
to Integrated Circuits, (ii) Joint Interpretation Library - Integrated Circuit
Hardware Evaluation Methodology and (iii) Functionality classes and evaluation
methodology for physical random number generators and (iv) ETR-lite – for
Composition and ETR-lite – for composition: Annex A Composite smartcard
evaluation: Recommended best practice (see [4]: AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31 and
AIS 36) were used. The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target
were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL5
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Development tools CM coverage ACM_SCP.3 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Semiformal functional specification ADV_FSP.3 PASS
Semiformal high-level design ADV_HLD.3 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Modularity ADV_INT.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.2 PASS
Formal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.3 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Standardised life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 PASS
Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.2 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA.1 PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 6: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function
for the (i) Random Number Generation and (ii) resistance of the Triple-DES co-
processor against Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
For the TOE security function F.DEA, which is Triple-DES encryption and
decryption by the hardware co-processor, the strength was not evaluated as it is
a cryptoalgorithm suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4,
Para. 3, Clause 2).
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The full evaluation results are applicaple for chips from MOS4YOU (Nijmegen,
The Netherlands), indicated by the nameplate C009J and PSF (Fishkill, USA),
indicated by the nameplate P009J.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Philips Smart Card
Controller P8WE6017V1J. The validity can be extended to new versions and
releases of the product or chips from other production and manufacturing sites,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the
modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
9.2 Additional Evaluation Results
• The evaluation confirmed specific results of a previous smart card IC
evaluation regarding assurance aspects for the development and
production environment. This is outlined in part D of this report, annex A.
• To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific
smart card embedded software additional evaluator actions were
performed during the TOE evaluation. Therefore, the interface between
the smart card embedded software developer and the developer of the
TOE was examined in detail. These composition related actions
comprised the following tasks:
- Examination of the integration of the embedded software in the
configuration management system of the IC manufacturer for the
TOE.
This comprises the handling of the ROM-code, the related
acceptance and verification procedures with the customer and the
assignment to a unique commercial type identifier as well as the
handling of different ROM-code masks for the same smart card IC.
- Examination of consistency of delivery and pre-personalisation
procedures.
This comprises the handling of the Fabkey and pre-personalisation
data with respect to the physical, technical and organisational
measures to protect these data as well as the procedures to ensure
the correct configuration of the TOE. In addition, the production test
related to customer specific items including the integrity check of the
customer ROM-code and the personalisation process, were checked.
- Examination of the separation based on the unique commercial type
identifier and the related test and delivery procedures.
- Examination, that Philips Semiconductors has implemented
procedures to provide a customer product related configuration list
based on the general configuration list provided for the evaluation of
the TOE supplemented by the customer specific items including
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ROM-mask labelling, specific development tools for embedded
software development and related customer specific deliveries and
the corresponding verification data generated by Philips to be sent to
customer. In the course of the TOE evaluation a specific customer
product related configuration list was checked [14].
- Examination of aspects relevant for the user guidance documentation
of the TOE to use the TOE for a product composition.
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
1. The operational documentation guidance [9] and Data sheet [10] contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target has to be taken into account.
2. For evaluations of products or systems including the TOE as a part or
using the TOE as a platform (for example smart card operating systems
or complete smart cards), specific information resulting from this
evaluation is of importance and shall be given to the succeeding
evaluation.
3. Frequency limits for operational use are outlined in the Data Sheet [10]
as (Min / Max).
11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment. (see part D of this report)
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [5] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. This document represents the
complete Security Target used for the evaluation. There is no sanitized public
version of the Security Target (ST-lite).
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (see [1])
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DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
OTP One Time Programmable (a certain part of the EEPROM)
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
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Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
UART - Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125, Version 5.1, January
1998)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE, e.g.
AIS 25, for Joint Interpretation Library – The application of CC to
Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July 2002
AIS 26, for: Joint Interpretation Library - Integrated Circuit Hardware
Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.3, April 2000
AIS 31, for: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of
physical random number generators
AIS 36, for: ETR-lite – for Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and ETR-
lilte – for composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation:
Recommended best practice, Version 1.2, March 2002
[5] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0196, Version 1.0, 08.08.2002, Evaluation
of Philips P8WE6017V1J Secure 8-bit Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors
[6] Evaluation Technical Report, Philips P8WE6017V1J Secure 8 bit Smart
Card Controller, Version 1.0, december 4th
, 2002 (confidential document)
[7] ETR-lite for Composition, according AIS 36, Version 1.0, december 4th
,
2002 (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile, Smart Card Integrated Circuit; Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation; Version 2.0, September
1998, registered at the French Certification Body under number PP/9806
[9] Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P8WE6017V1J, Philips
Semiconductors, BSI-DSZ-CC-0195/0196, Version 1.0, 12.08.2002
(confidential document)
[10] Data Sheet, P8WE6017 Secure 8-bit Smart Card Controller, Product
Specification, Philips Semiconductors, Revision 3.3, July 05th
2002, Doc.
No.: 043133 (confidential document)
[11] Data Encryption Standard (DES), FIPS PUB 46, US NBS, 1977,
Washington
[12] FIPS PUB 46-3 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES) Reaffirmed
1999 October 25
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[13] Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische Signaturen und zur
Änderung weiterer Vorschriften vom 16. Mai 2001, BGBl. I, S. 876);
veröffentlicht am 21. Mai 2001
[14] Configuration List of the P8WE6017V1J, BSI-DSZ-CC-0195/0196,
Version 1.0, Philips Semiconductors, december 4th
, 2002 (confidential
document)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4)
The pass result of evaluation shall be a statement that describes the extent to which
the PP or TOE can be trusted to conform to the requirements. The results shall be
caveated with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) or directly to a PP, as listed below.
a) Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are only based upon functional components in Part 2.
b) Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2.
c) Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are in the form of an EAL or assurance package that is
based only upon assurance components in Part 3.
d) Part 3 augmented - A PP or TOE is Part 3 augmented if the assurance
requirements are in the form of an EAL or assurance package, plus other
assurance components in Part 3.
e) Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements are in the form of an EAL associated with additional
assurance requirements not in Part 3 or an assurance package that
includes (or is entirely made up from) assurance requirements not in Part 3.
f) Conformant to PP - A TOE is conformant to a PP only if it is compliant
with all parts of the PP.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modelling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 - Assurance family breakdown and mapping
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered in as much as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
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highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.
Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.
Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003 Certification Report
Annex A D-3
Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0196-2003
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
The IT product, Philips Smart Card Controller P8WE6017V1J (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0,
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4 and smart card
specific guidance, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 08 January 2003, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1),
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below ((a) – (e)):
(a) Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Unit Identification
(BU ID), Georg-Heyken-Strasse 1, 21147 Hamburg, Germany
(b) Philips Semiconductors MOS4YOU, Gerstweg 2, 6534 AE Nijmegen, The Netherlands
(c) Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Philips IC Test Operation
Hamburg (PICTOH), Stresemannallee 101, 22529 Hamburg, Germany
(d) Photronics (UK) Ltd., Trafford Wharf Road, Trafford Park, Manchester,
M17 1PE, United Kingdom.
(e) Philips Semiconductors Fishkill (PSF), Hudson Valley Research Park,
1580 Route 52, P.O. Box 1279, Hopewell Junction, New York 12533, Unites States
The TOE produced at these sites is indicated by the nameplates C009J and P009J.
Additionally, the evaluation confirmed, that the TOE independent aspects of the above
mentioned Common Criteria assurance requirements are fulfilled for the production
environments for a smart card IC type of product listed below (f):
(f) ,,Photronics Brookfield, 15 Sector Road, Brookfield, CT 06804, United States
and
Photronics ATDC , 48820 Kato Rd., Suite 110B, Fremont, CA 94538,
United States
For all sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied for each site
and in accordance with the Security Target [5]. The evaluators verified, that the threats
and the security objective for the life cycle phases 2 and 3 up to delivery at the end of
phase 3 as stated in the TOE Security Target [5] are fulfilled by the procedures of these
sites.
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