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Reference: 2019-30-INF-4106- v1
Target: Pública
Date: 07.07.2023
Created by: CERT10
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2019-30
TOE Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200
Applicant 440301192W - HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd.
References
[EXT-5169] Solicitud certificación DOPRA
Certification report of the product Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200, as requested in
[EXT-5169] dated 12/07/2019, and evaluated by DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U., as detailed
in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-8470] received on 31/03/2023.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 3
TOE SUMMARY................................................................................................................................ 3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................... 4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................... 5
IDENTIFICATION.................................................................................................................................. 5
SECURITY POLICIES.............................................................................................................................. 5
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................... 5
CLARIFICATIONS ON THREATS......................................................................................................... 6
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ............................................................................. 6
ARCHITECTURE.................................................................................................................................... 6
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................................................. 6
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE................................................................................................................ 7
DOCUMENTS....................................................................................................................................... 8
PRODUCT TESTING.............................................................................................................................. 9
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ............................................................................................................ 9
EVALUATION RESULTS ...................................................................................................................... 10
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM ............................................. 10
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE CERTIFIER............................................................. 10
GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................................... 11
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 11
SECURITY TARGET ............................................................................................................................. 11
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS............................................................................................................ 12
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).................................................... 12
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)................................................................... 12
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product Huawei
DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200.
The TOE is a software library widely used in Huawei products. It can be dynamically linked with a
designated APP.
Developer/manufacturer: HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd.
Sponsor: HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd..
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.1).
Evaluation end date: 01/06/2023
Expiration Date1
: 05/07/2028
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 (augmented with ALC_FLR.1)
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification
S.A.U. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are
satisfied for the EAL4, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM v3.1 R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The TOE is a software library widely used in Huawei products. It can be dynamically linked with a
designated APP and implements these major security feature:
• Auditing
The TOE records audit logs for detected security events.
• Message Protection
The TOE monitors and verifies the incoming and outgoing messages. Generates a security
log with an associated alarm severity level and sends an alarm to the user.
1
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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• Memory monitoring
The TOE monitors the memory. Generates a security log with an associated alarm severity
level and sends an alarm to the user.
• Black Box Protection
The black box monitors the internal memory and the file system of the TOE, transfers logs
from memory to files (dumping mechanism).
• Resource utilization
The TOE detects system resources (memory) overload and message flow control
mechanism. Allocates resources for each APP process.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL4 and the
evidences required by the additional component ALC_FLR.1, according to Common Criteria v3.1 R5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1
ASE.TSS.1
ADV ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.3
AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMS.4
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.1
ALC_FLR.1
ATE ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_VAN.3
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SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5:
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200
Security Target: Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200 Security Target (version 1.3,
29/03/2023).
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.1).
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200 shall implement a set of
security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 3.2 (“Organizational
Security Policies (OSP)”).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties
and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during
the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
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In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 3.3 (“Assumptions”).
CLARIFICATIONS ON THREATS
Generally speaking, the threats, when listed in the security target, do not suppose a risk for the TOE
although the agents implementing attacks have the attack potential according to the Enhanced
Basic attack potential of EAL4 (when fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security
policies satisfaction). For any other threat not included in the security target, the evaluation results
of the product security properties and the associated certificate do not guarantee any resistance.
Nevertheless, in this case, all the security objectives of the security target are derived from
assumptions and Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) only. Therefore, there is no any threat
identified for this TOE.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 4.2 (“Security Objectives
for the operational Environment”).
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
From a logical perspective, the security features of the TOE are:
1. Auditing
• Records log in the TOE internal memory, when a security event is detected by the
TOE.
• Associates timestamp with each security events detected by the TOE.
2. Message Protection:
• Monitoring and Alarm
o When message is damaged, the TOE sends alarm to the APP, and generates
an event log.
• Message transmission verification
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o Inserts CRC (for more details about CRC, please refers to Appendix C) in each
outgoing message.
o Check the CRC for each incoming message. If the verification fails, the
message is discarded, the TOE generates an event log.
3. Memory monitoring
• Monitoring and Alarm
o When memory is damaged, the TOE sends alarm to the APP, and generates
an event log.
4. Black Box Protection
• Supports log dumping2
, when the memory black box area is full.
5. Resource Utilization
• Resource specification restriction and partition
o Creates different message/memory partitions and message token buckets for
each module with their own minimum and maximum size setting.
o Message priority management to ensure that high-priority messages obtain
resources first in each module.
o When each message/memory partition usage is exceeding the threshold, the
TOE sends alarm to APP, and generates an event log.
o Each APP process3
partitions (message and memory) are independent, even if
one partition is damaged or insufficient, partitions from another APP process
will be not affected.
• Running Overload Protection
o The message scheduling supports message priority scheduling control. In
addition, supports the message token bucket mechanism to implement
message flow control.
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
From a physical point of view, the TOE is comprised of a software package and guidance
documents.
2
Dumping: Action to write the content of the memory black box area into a file in the black box file system.
3
APP Process: A consistent and closely related software organization, consisting of program (APP linked to the TOE)
and data structures. One process runs multiple modules.
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DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
• Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200 AGD_OPE v0.73.pdf
o Description: Security management guide.
o Date: February 2023.
o SHA256 checksum:
758bb09cee309c4eaf86bfc1eec2f3debc226e394288b25c6114714d84012477
• Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200 AGD_PRE v0.73.pdf
o Description: Installation Guide.
o Date: March 2023
o SHA256 checksum:
3406a247d916720f1394fc3f577f60bf75cb0eb59c6c9fb053fcfa5be032d34f
• Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200 API and Configuration Reference.chm V3.0
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o Description: Interface guide.
o Date: August 2022
o SHA256 checksum:
9e70462503a99a3ed5cc34a72d4ad5ec0ed5e8c9f57c141d5c1d7bf1c6eea788
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed test for all the security functions. All the tests have been performed by
the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the security
functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate to the
function that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the established
architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the
tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluator has repeated all the developer functional
tests verifying that the obtained results are consistent with the results obtained by the developer.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are indicated below.
Therefore, for the operation of the product Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200 it is
necessary the disposition of the following software components:
Item Item type Comments
libdopra.so (TOE) Software library
libdopra.so is the shared object resulting of compiling the
DOPRASSP SDK
APP Software
an application developed by the evaluator to test the
functionality of the TOE. Each program developed for the
testing that has dopra as dependency can be thought as an
APP
Python version 3.10.0 with
scapy 2.4.5
Software.
Auxiliary testing
component
GCC version 7.3.0
Software.
Auxiliary testing
component
VMWare Environment
16.2.3 build-19376536
Virtual Machine
Host of the SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 x64. All the testing
of the TOE was executed within the SUSE operating system
SUSE Linux Enterprise
Server 12 x64
Operating system Guest OS of the virtual machine
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EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200 has been evaluated against the Security
Target: Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200 Security Target (version 1.3, 29/03/2023).
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 have been assigned a “PASS”
verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U. assigns the “PASS”
VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level
EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM v3.1 R5.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
• It is mandatory to strictly follow the steps indicated in the installation documentation in
order to download and install the correct version of the TOE and the cumulative update in a
proper manner.
• The user guidance must be read and understood in order to operate the TOE in an adequate
manner according to the security target.
• The fulfilment of the assumptions indicated in the security target is a key point as it implies
TOE environment configurations that leave some potential vulnerabilities out of the scope.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE CERTIFIER
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200, a positive resolution is proposed.
• Since the assumption A.OS defined in the section 3.3 Assumptions within the [ST] states that
the applications that can send data to the TOE are not attackers, these applications will not
try to send malformed data that could cause buffer overflow, integer overflow, etc, leading
into the execution of arbitrary code, denial of service, etc.
• Although the TOE has potential public vulnerabilities, according to the evaluator’s
vulnerability analysis, the restrictions described throughout the complete security problem
remove the attack paths that could be used to successfully provoke the behaviour described
in those public vulnerabilities. Moreover, according to the evaluator’s analysis of the [ST],
the TOE is protected against physical access, users and persons in charge of the installation
procedures are trusted, data received from TOE environment should not be constructed in a
form that induces errors in the system, etc. This is why all TOE security objectives are traced
to organizational security policies OSPs.
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GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[ST] Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200 Security Target (version 1.3, 29/03/2023).
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body:
• Huawei DOPRA SSP V300R005C00SPC123B200 Security Target (version 1.3, 29/03/2023).
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
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2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components up to EAL2 and
ALC_FLR.