National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11353-2023
Dated: September 29, 2023
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
James Donndelinger
Jerome Myers, PhD
Marybeth Panock
Mike Quintos
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Shehan Dissanayake
Shivani Birwadkar
Minal Wankhede
Yogesh Pawar
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary..............................................................................................................................5
2 Identification ........................................................................................................................................6
3 Assumptions, and Clarification of Scope.............................................................................................7
3.1 Assumptions...........................................................................................................................7
3.2 Threats...................................................................................................................................7
3.3 Clarification of Scope ..............................................................................................................8
4 Architectural Information ..................................................................................................................10
4.1 TOE Description ....................................................................................................................10
4.2 Physical Boundary.................................................................................................................13
5 Security Policy..........................................................................................................................14
5.1 Security Audit .............................................................................................................................14
5.2 Cryptographic Support...............................................................................................................14
5.3 Identification and Authentication .............................................................................................16
5.4 Security Management................................................................................................................16
5.5 TOE Access..................................................................................................................................16
5.6 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................................16
5.7 Trusted Path/Channels..........................................................................................................17
6 Documentation ........................................................................................................................18
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration.....................................................................................................19
7.1 Evaluated Configuration........................................................................................................19
7.2 Excluded Functionality ..........................................................................................................19
8 IT Product Testing.....................................................................................................................20
8.1 Developer Testing.................................................................................................................20
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing...................................................................................20
9 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................21
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target.................................................................................................21
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation ..........................................................................21
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents .......................................................................................21
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities .............................................................................22
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity ........................................................22
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity..........................................................................................22
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results .............................................................................................23
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations................................................................................24
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1 Annexes ...................................................................................................................................25
2 Security Target .........................................................................................................................26
3 Glossary ...................................................................................................................................27
4 Bibliography.............................................................................................................................28
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
assessment of the evaluation of the Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5 Target of Evaluation
(TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not
an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either
expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as
evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in September 2023. The information in this report is
largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all written by
Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in the U.S. Government
Protection Profile for Security Requirements for collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices,
Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020 [NDcPP].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the collaborative Protection
Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020 [NDcPP]. This Validation Report applies only
to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with
the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of
the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and reviewed the
individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation
team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and
assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on these findings, the validation team
concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the
conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March
2020 [NDcPP]
Security Target Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5 Security Target
Evaluation Technical Report Evaluation Technical Report for Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Nokia Corporation
Developer Nokia Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Lab
(CCTL)
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd, Suite 395,
Rockville, MD 20850.
CCEVS Validators James Donndelinger, The Aerospace Corporation
Jerome Myers, PhD, The Aerospace Corporation
Marybeth Panock, The Aerospace Corporation
Mike Quintos, The Aerospace Corporation
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3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
3.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions about the operational environment are made regarding its ability to
provide security functionality.
• It is assumed that the TOE is deployed in a physically secured operational environment and
not subjected to any physical attacks.
• It is assumed that there are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user
applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation,
administration, and support of the TOE.
• The TOE is not responsible for protecting network traffic that is transmitted across its
interfaces that is not related to any TOE management functionality or generated data.
• TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted
manner.
• It is assumed that regular software and firmware updates will be applied by a TOE
Administrator when made available by the product vendor.
• Administrator credentials are assumed to be secured from unauthorized disclosure.
• It is assumed that the availability of all TOE components is checked as appropriate to reduce
the risk of an undetected attack against a TOE component and that auditing is functioning on
all TOE components.
• TOE Administrators are trusted to ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for
sensitive residual information on the TOE when it is removed from its operational
environment.
3.2 Threats
The following lists the threats addressed by the TOE.
• T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS – Threat agents may attempt to gain
Administrator access to the Network Device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an
Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an Administrator, replaying an
administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle
attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions between
Network Devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that
compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.
• T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY – Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or
perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms,
modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force
exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate
and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
• T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS – Threat agents may exploit weak
cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly
chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the
algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing
them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
• T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS – Threat agents may take advantage of secure
protocols that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints, e.g. a shared password that
8
is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed
protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the
attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle
attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of
confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the Network Device itself could be compromised.
• T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE – Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of
the software or firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-
validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the
update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
• T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY – Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the
security functionality of the Network Device without Administrator awareness. This could
result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to
compromise the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has
been compromised.
• T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE – Threat agents may compromise credentials
and device data enabling continued access to the Network Device and its critical data. The
compromise of credentials includes replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s
credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device
credentials for use by the attacker.
• T.PASSWORD_CRACKING – Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to
the device provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and may allow them
to take advantage of any trust relationships with other Network Devices.
• T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE – An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or
compromised security functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions
without prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or security
functionality of the device.
3.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that might benefit
from additional clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of
this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation
is defined within the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e (NDcPP),
March 23, 2020, including all relevant NIAP Technical Decisions. A subset of the “optional” and
“selection-based” security requirements defined in the NDcPP are claimed by the TOE and
documented in the ST.
• Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not specifically
search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or
vulnerabilities to security functionality not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious”
vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication, and resources.
9
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified
in the Security Target. Any additional security functional capability included in the product were
not covered by this evaluation. Further information of excluded functionality can be found in
Section 1.8 of the Security Target and Section 7.2 of this Validation Report. All other functionality
provided by other devices in the operational environment needs to be assessed separately and
no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
10
4 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security
Target.
4.1 TOE Description
The TOE is a network device that is composed of hardware and software and offers a scalable solution to
the end users. It satisfies all of the criterion to meet the collaborative Protection Profile for Network
Devices, Version 2.2e [NDcPP v2.2e].
The TOE is a physical, non-distributed network device implementing networking functions essential for
service adaptation, aggregation and routing over Ethernet and Internet Protocol routing infrastructure.
The primary scenario of deployment is for mobile backhaul, fixed to mobile convergence, mission-critical
applications and enterprise applications.
Each variant of the TOE is fully contained in a single chassis. The TOE may interact with external servers
to implement the functions and services, and may be administered from a local or remote management
station, but neither the servers nor the management stations are parts of the TOE.
The TOE implements a set of security functions and security mechanisms consistent with the
requirements set in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP) Version 2.2e.
These include security audit, cryptographic algorithms and protocols, authentication of users and peer
entities and assigning the users to roles, security management, Protection of the TOE and the TSF,
controlling access to the TOE, and trusted channels and paths between the TOE and peer entities and
between the TOE and users.
The TOE consists of hardware, software and security guidance documentation. TOE Hardware is
contained in the TOE chassis. Variants of the TOE chassis differ in the physical size, precise hardware
configuration, the number of network card slots and network interfaces, and throughput capacity. Some
variants include network card slots which may be used for configuring the network ports of the product
to precisely match the needs of a specific application.
Each variant of the TOE executes identical software, namely, the Nokia Service Aggregation Router
Operating System (SAR OS) Release 21.10R5, and is to be used in accordance with a common security
guidance. The TOE models are summarized in Table 2.
The TOE is the Nokia 7705 Service Aggregation Router (SAR) series with SAR OS 21.10R5 consisting of
the following versions:
− Nokia 7705 SAR-18,
− Nokia 7705 SAR-8,
− Nokia 7705 SAR-X,
− Nokia 7705 SAR-H,
− Nokia 7705 SAR-W,
− Nokia 7705 SAR-Wx,
− Nokia 7705 SAR-Hc, and
− Nokia 7705 SAR-Ax
Versions of the TOE differ in form factor, networking capacity, and processing capacity.
11
Table 2: TOE Models
Platform Description Processors
7705 SAR-18
# of Cores: 8
Frequency: 600 MHz on SAR-18 CSM module
OS: Nokia SAR OS
Image Version: 21.10R5
Cavium OCTEON Plus
CN5640
7705 SAR-8
# of Cores: 6
Frequency: 800 MHz, on CSMv2 module
OS: Nokia SAR OS
Image Version: 21.10R5
Cavium OCTEON II CN6335
7705 SAR-X
# of Cores: 8
Frequency: 800 MHz on chassis
OS: Nokia SAR OS
Image Version: 21.10R5
Cavium OCTEON II CN6640
7705 SAR-H
# of Cores: 2
Frequency: 600 MHz on chassis
OS: Nokia SAR OS
Image Version: 21.10R5
Cavium OCTEON Plus
CN5020
7705 SAR-Hc Cavium OCTEON II CN6020
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Platform Description Processors
# of Cores: 2
Frequency: 600 MHz on chassis
OS: Nokia SAR OS
Image Version: 21.10R5
7705 SAR-W
# of Cores: 1
Frequency: 500 MHz on chassis
OS: Nokia SAR OS
Image Version: 21.10R5
Cavium OCTEON Plus
CN5010
7705 SAR-Wx
# of Cores: 2
Frequency: 600 MHz on chassis
OS: Nokia SAR OS
Image Version: 21.10R5
Cavium OCTEON II CN6020
7705 SAR-Ax
# of Cores: 2
Frequency: 600 MHz on chassis
OS: Nokia SAR OS
Image Version: 21.10R5
Cavium OCTEON II CN6020
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4.2 Physical Boundary
The TOE is deployed inside a secure data center or other premises where physical access is effectively
controlled. This ensures that only authorized personnel gain physical access to the TOE. Logical access
may be through the management station or through the network interfaces. A management station may
be local or remote. In addition to the management stations, a CA/CRL Server, AAA Server, Syslog Server
and Update Server may be deployed in the same network with the TOE. Access methods to the different
management stations and servers are different as are the protocols for protecting network traffic
between them and the TOE. The deployment scenario of the TOE is as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1 – Representative TOE Deployment
The TOE may be administered locally or remotely. In both methods, the administrative interface is the
Command Line Interface (CLI) the TOE software implements for all management functions. If
administering the TOE locally, the administrator connects the local management station to the console
port of the TOE and operates the TOE in the immediate proximity inside the same data center in which
the TOE is deployed. If administering the TOE from a Remote Management Station, the administrator
first establishes a Secure Shell (SSH) connection between the Remote Management Station and the TOE,
and then proceeds to administer the TOE using the same CLI available to the local administrators from
the Local Management Station.
The TOE supports manual upgrading of the TOE software. The administrators load the updates from the
developer's web site to a local Update Server or use the developer's update server, then connect the
TOE to the Update Server using FTP or SFTP. The software upgrade contains a hash value computed
from the image. The hash value shall be verified prior to accepting the upgrade. Therefore, the
likelihood of tampering with the TOE software upgrade without detection is very low and there is no
need for protection of the connection between the TOE and the Update Server.
To support X.509 certificates with IPsec, the TOE implements a CA/CRL Server used for verifying the
certificates and checking their revocation status. As certificates and revocation lists are digitally signed,
it is sufficient to connect to them with HTTP. The TOE also may connect to a remote Syslog server for
storing audit logs and to an AAA Server storing authentication credentials remotely. Both connections
are protected with IPsec.
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5 Security Policy
The TOE implements the following security functional requirements:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• TOE Access
• Protection of the TSF
• Trusted Path/Channels
Each of these security functionalities are listed in more detail in the sections below.
5.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit events for all start-up and shut-down functions and all auditable events as
specified in Table 15. Audit events are also generated for management actions specified in FAU_GEN.1.
The TOE is capable of storing audit events locally and exporting them to an external audit server over
IPsec protocol. Each audit record contains the date and time of event, type of event, subject identity,
and the relevant data of the event. The audit server supports the following severity levels:
indeterminate (info), major, and minor.
5.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of SSH and IPSEC trusted communications. The following
table identifies the cryptographic services per cryptographic library.
Table 3: TOE Cryptography Implementation
SFR Algorithm in ST Implementation
name
CAVP Alg. CAVP Cert #
FCS_CKM.1 RSA schemes using
cryptographic key sizes of
2048-bit or greater that meet
the following: FIPS PUB 186-4,
“Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)”, Appendix B.3
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
C2023
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
C2024
FFC Schemes using ‘safe-
prime’ groups that meet the
following: “NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision
3, Recommendation for Pair-
Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography” and
[RFC 3526]
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
Safe Primes
Key
Generation
Safe Primes
Key
Verification
A3133
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
Safe Primes
Key
Generation
A3134
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SFR Algorithm in ST Implementation
name
CAVP Alg. CAVP Cert #
Safe Primes
Key
Verification
FCS_CKM.2 RSA-based key establishment
schemes that meet the
following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5
as specified in Section 7.2 of
RFC 3447, “Public-Key
Cryptography Standards
(PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1”
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
None CCTL tested
as per the
PP/SD
Evaluation
Activities
FFC Schemes using “safe-
prime” groups that meet the
following: ‘NIST Special
Publication 800- 56A Revision
3, “Recommendation for Pair-
Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography” and
[RFC 3526]
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A3133
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A3134
FCS_COP.1/
DataEncryption
AES used in [CBC, CTR] mode
and cryptographic key sizes
[128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
AES-CBC
AES-CTR
C2023
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
C2024
FCS_COP.1/
SigGen
For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB
186-4, “Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5,
using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature
Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or
RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC
9796-2, Digital signature
scheme 2 or Digital Signature
scheme 3
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
C2023
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
C2024
FCS_COP.1/
Hash
[SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512] and message digest
sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
SHS C2023
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
C2024
FCS_COP.1/
KeyedHash
[HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-
256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-
SHA-512] and cryptographic
key sizes [160-bits, 256-bits,
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-
256
C2023
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SFR Algorithm in ST Implementation
name
CAVP Alg. CAVP Cert #
384-bits, 512-bits] and
message digest sizes [160,
256, 384, 512] bits
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
HMAC-SHA-
384
HMAC-SHA-
512
C2024
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR_DRBG (AES) Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
Counter DRBG C2023
Nokia 7705 SAR OS
Cryptographic library
C2024
5.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE supports Role Based Access Control. All users must be authenticated to the TOE prior to
carrying out any management actions. The TOE supports password-based authentication and public key-
based authentication. Based on the assigned role, a user is granted a set of privileges to access the
system.
5.4 Security Management
The TOE supports local and remote management of its security functions including:
• Local console CLI administration
• Remote CLI administration via SSHv2
• Timed user lockout after multiple failed authentication attempts
• Password configurations
• Role Based Access Control
• Configurable banners to be displayed at login
• Timeouts to terminate administrative sessions after a set period of inactivity
• Protection of secret keys and passwords
5.5 TOE Access
Prior to establishing an administration session with the TOE, a banner is displayed to the user. The
banner messaging is customizable. The TOE will terminate an interactive session after configurable
number of minutes of session inactivity. A user can terminate their local CLI session and remote CLI
session by entering the appropriate command at the prompt.
5.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects all passwords, pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys from unauthorized
disclosure. Pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys are stored in encrypted format. Passwords
are stored as a non-reversible hash value as per standard Linux approach. The TOE executes self-tests
during initial start-up to ensure correct operation and enforcement of its security functions. An
administrator can install software updates to the TOE. The TOE internally maintains the date and time.
17
5.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE supports IPsec for secure communication to the audit server and with the authentication
server. The termination points of the IPsec are the TOE and another IPsec implementation. The TOE
supports local CLI and uses SSH v2 for secure remote administration.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R5 Common Criteria Admin
Guide 1.0, May 15, 2023
• NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R1 Basic System Configuration
Guide, Edition 01, October 2021
• NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R1 Interface Configuration
Guide, Edition 01, October 2021
• NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R1 Log Events Guide, Edition
01, October 2021
• NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R1 Router Configuration
Guide, Edition 01, October 2021
• NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R1 Services Guide, Edition 01,
October 2021
• NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R1 System Management
Guide, Edition 01, October 2021
The documentation listed above are the only documentation that should be trusted to install,
administer, or use the TOE in its evaluated configuration. Any additional customer documentation
provided with the product, or that which may be available online, was not included in the scope of
the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon to configure or operate the device as
evaluated. To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the guidance documentation listed above.
Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure
the device is configured as evaluated.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
In the evaluated configuration, the TOE consists of the platform as stated in Section 4.1. The TOE
supports secure connectivity with another IT environment device as stated in the Security Target.
Table 4: Required Environmental Components
Components Required (Y/N) Usage
Local Management Station Yes A management station connected to the TOE from the
console used for administering the TOE locally.
Remote Management Station Yes A management station connected to the TOE over a
network connection, used for administering the TOE
remotely over SSH.
SSH Client Yes The Remote Management Station must run an SSH client
which the remote administrator may use for establishing
a secure connection between the Remote Management
Station and the TOE.
CA/CRL Server Yes A server with a certification authority and certificate
revocation list used by the TOE for validating the X.509
certificates used for IKE and IPsec connection
establishment.
AAA Server Yes A server implementing RADIUS and TACACS+ which the
TOE may be configured to use for external authentication
of users.
Syslog Server Yes A Server to which the TOE may be configured to forward
audit log files.
Update Server Yes A Server hosting the TOE Software Upgrades. The
Administrator may connect to the server and download
upgrades for the TOE Software.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The following product functionality is not included in the CC evaluation:
• FTP and Telnet and are disabled.
• NTP is not used.
• TACACS+ cryptographic protection of the sessions is not covered by the
evaluation but the security of TACACS+ relies on IPsec between the TOE
and the AAA Server.
• MPLS and SNMP are not included in the scope of the evaluation.
• MACsec functionality is not supported.
20
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in Evaluation Test Reports for Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5, which are
not publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the
prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the vendor-provided guidance documentation and ran the tests specified
in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020 [NDcPP]. The
Independent Testing activity is documented in the Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly
available, and is not duplicated here.
21
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in
detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev
5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5
to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed
the Assurance Activities specified in the NDPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5 that are consistent
with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020 [NDcPP].
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security
Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities
specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020
[NDcPP] related to the examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy
of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE.
The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were
complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020 [NDcPP] related to the examination
22
of the information contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version
2.2e, 27 March 2020 [NDcPP] and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the Evaluation
Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities in
the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020 [NDcPP], and that
the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. In compliance with AVA_VAN.1, the
evaluator examined sources of publicly available information to identify potential vulnerabilities in the
TOE. The sources of examined are as follows:
• https://nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln.search
• https://www.nokia.com/
• https://www.suse.com/
• https://www.nokia.com/about-us/security-and-privacy/product-security-advisory/
• https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html
The evaluator examined public domain vulnerability searches by performing a keyword search. The
terms used for this search were based on the vendor name, product name, and key platform features
leveraged by the product. As a result, the evaluator performed a search using the following keywords:
• Nokia 7705 SAR
• Nokia Service Aggregation Router
• Nokia OS 21.10R5
• OpenSSL 1.1.1g
23
• OpenSSH 3.5p1
• Cavium OCTEON Plus
• Cavium OCTEON II
• Winpath 3
• Winpath
• strongSwan 5.5.0
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices,
Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020 [NDcPP], and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified. The vulnerability assessment was completed on September 15, 2023.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020 [NDcPP], and correctly verified that
the product meets the claims in the ST.
24
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured
per the evaluated configuration instructions in the NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER |
RELEASE 21.10R5 Common Criteria Admin Guide 1.0, May 15, 2023. No other versions of the TOE and
software, either earlier or later were evaluated.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances specified in the Security
Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. The
excluded functionality is specified in section 7.2 of this report.
Additional functionality provided by other devices in the operational environment need to be assessed
separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All other items and scope issues have been sufficiently addressed elsewhere in this document.
25
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
26
12 Security Target
Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5 Security Target, Version 1.4, September 28, 2023
27
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited by
the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
28
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5.
5. Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5 Security Target, Version 1.4, September 28, 2023
(ST)
6. NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R5 Common Criteria Admin Guide
1.0, May 15, 2023 (AGD)
a. NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R1 Basic System
Configuration Guide, Edition 01, October 2021
b. NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R1 Interface
Configuration Guide, Edition 01, October 2021
c. NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R1 Log Events Guide,
Edition 01, October 2021
d. NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R1 Router Configuration
Guide, Edition 01, October 2021
e. NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R1 Services Guide, Edition
01, October 2021
f. NOKIA 7705 SERVICE AGGREGATION ROUTER | RELEASE 21.10R1 System Management
Guide, Edition 01, October 2021
7. Assurance Activity Report for Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5, Version 1.3,
September 28, 2023 (AAR)
8. Evaluation Technical Report for Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5, Version 1.3,
September 28, 2023 (ETR)
9. Vulnerability Assessment for Nokia Corporation, Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 7705 SAR
Series with SAR OS 21.10R5, Version 1.2, September 15, 2023 (AVA)
10. Equivalency Analysis for Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5, Version 1.1, 11 August
2023
11. Test Report for Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5, Test Evidence for Nokia 7705 SAR-
W, Version 1.1, August 11, 2023
12. Test Report for Nokia 7705 SAR Series with SAR OS 21.10R5, Test Evidence for Nokia 7705 SAR-
X, Version 1.1, August 11, 2023