BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019
for
SecDocs Security Komponenten, Version 2.4
from
OpenLimit SignCubes AG
sponsored by
Fujitsu Technology Solutions GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.23
BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019 (*)
SecDocs Security Komponenten, Version 2.4
from OpenLimit SignCubes AG
sponsored by Fujitsu Technology Solutions GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile for an ArchiSafe
Compliant Middleware for Enabling the Long-Term
Preservation of Electronic Documents, Version 1.2,
28 March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0049-2014, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 19 September 2019
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................21
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................22
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................23
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................24
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................24
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................24
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................25
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................27
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................28
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SecDocs Security Komponenten, Version 2.4 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SecDocs Security Komponenten, Version 2.4 was conducted
by T-Systems International GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 12 September 2019.
T-Systems International GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: OpenLimit SignCubes AG.
The sponsor is: Fujitsu Technology Solutions GmbH.
The product was developed by: OpenLimit SignCubes AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 19
September 2019 is valid until 18. September 2024 Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product SecDocs Security Komponenten, Version 2.4 has been included in the BSI list
of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
OpenLimit SignCubes AG
Zuger Straße 76 B
CH 6341 Baar
Switzerland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product SecDocs Security Komponenten, Version
2.4. The TOE is a software product providing amongst others the core of an ArchiSafe
compliant archive middleware and is providing security functionality conformant to the
protection profile for an ArchiSafe compliant middleware [8]. The TOE is part of the
software product “SecDocs Version 3.0” and is delivered together with additional software.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Protection Profile for an ArchiSafe Compliant
Middleware for Enabling the Long-Term Preservation of Electronic Documents, Version
1.2, 28 March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0049-2014, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.2. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
SF 1 Secure Client TOE Access: Preventing the access to the storage systems from
unknown client applications by reliable identification and authentication of these external
entities.
SF 2 Data Object Verification: Preventing the storage of submission information packages
(SIP) which in whole or in part cannot be verified successfully corresponding to the rules
deposited in the TOE in order to guarantee interoperability between client applications
and storage systems.
SF 3 Secure Storage Unit Access: Forwarding of successfully verified SIP’s to the dedicated
storage systems only or another trusted application which in turn forwards the SIP to the
dedicated storage systems only.
SF 4 Invalid Archival Information Package Erasure Prevention: Preventing the deletion of
AIP’s before the expiry of their retention time without a justification.
SF 5 Retrieval and delivery of AIP from the dedicated storage system (to the CS) only.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 77
.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.
7
The security functionality SF3 and SF5 are both addressed in the ST [6] in chapter 7.3 named ‘SF 3’. The
TOE is implemented in such a way, that storing and retrieval to and from the SU use both the same security
mechanisms.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SecDocs Security Komponenten, Version 2.4
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier, SHA256 Hash Value Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Archive file
SecDocs_Security_Components_v.2.4.zip
SHA256:
eef9a24b2c31330624adcd5a8cd83a7a145469f
59e1301302fb4cb22f76271a4
v2.4 Software downloaded from
login-protected servers of
the developer
2 SW Archive file MigSafeOverSign-V2.4.zip
containing the TOE’s JAR files and the
JavaDoc API documentation
SHA256:
639560fe28502429b6dde3d45ffe450c972f392c
992167df48142d09eeca5001
v2.4 Part of the archive file no. 1:
SecDocs_Security_Compon
ents_v.2.4.zip
3 DOC Integrator’s manual
MSOS_Integratorhandbuch_DE.pdf
SHA256:
3ac72f1238a3905a4de9b761e064a8d7a150aa
211b4a389fe66aeaa63bc9cd26
05.06.2019 Part of the archive file no. 1:
SecDocs_Security_Compon
ents_v.2.4.zip
4 DOC Administrator’s manual
MSOS_Admininstratorhandbuch_DE.pdf
SHA256:
0f26f5732266ac8fbd974676e9cd860998aaa87
3097303da5d1e41d77ae6952d
05.06.2019 Part of the archive file no. 1:
SecDocs_Security_Compon
ents_v.2.4.zip
5 DOC TOE’s functional specification ADV_FSP-
MigSafe-OverSign_2.4_2019-08-06.pdf
SHA256:
8b8aa1e4ee9f6ac305da8000d5ec927b773a58
1dbcf1cc5e046942646dd45237
06.08.2019 Part of the archive file no. 1:
SecDocs_Security_Compon
ents_v.2.4.zip
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019 Certification Report
No Type Identifier, SHA256 Hash Value Release Form of Delivery
6 DOC Administrator’s manual of the non-TOE
component OpenLimit Middleware Version 3
Server, Produktversion 1.6
Administratorhandbuch_V3_Server_v.1.35.pdf
SHA256:
02ecf718739c531f75cfb865b3b6ad82a3a21d4
2fb92b1234c39a3cb74596ad8
13.02.2018 Part of the archive file no. 1:
SecDocs_Security_Compon
ents_v.2.4.zip
78
SW Archive file MigSafeOverSign-
V2.4.563_13022_SecureInterfaceTools.zip
containing examples for the TOE integration
v2.4 Part of the archive file no. 1:
SecDocs_Security_Compon
ents_v.2.4.zip
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered to the customer by the OpenLimit SignCubes AG using the following
delivery procedure: The TOE is downloaded from the partner portal under the address
https://partner.openlimit.com/svn/secdocs via an HTTPS secured connection. A login to
this portal is required for downloading the software. The username and the initial password
are transferred to the customer through an encrypted e-mail.
The TOE documentation (items 3 to 6 of table 2) is delivered in electronic form by the
developer as part of the archive file that contains the TOE.
The TOE can be identified using the cryptographic hash value of the archive file
“SecDocs_Security_Components_v.2.4.zip”:
eef9a24b2c31330624adcd5a8cd83a7a145469f59e1301302fb4cb22f76271a4
Note that by this it is ensured that both the TOE software and the TOE documentation are
valid. For additional unique identification, the SHA256 checksum of all files delivered within
the archive file are given in table 2 above.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of SFRs and implemented by
the TOE. The TOE implements logical security functionality in order to enable the long-
term preservation of electronic documents by implementing the ArchiSafe concept
developed by the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB). Hence, the TOE enforces
decoupling and access control storage systems used for the long-term preservation of
(cryptographically signed) electronic documents. The TOE also enforces the provisioning
of a justification, if archived data shall be deleted before its retention time.
Therefore the TOEs policy is to protect the data flow between third party applications (such
as document management systems) and storage solutions. Besides, the TOE prevents
access to storage systems from unknown client applications through identification and
authentication and manages operations that client systems are allowed to execute on
archived data objects. Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies
can be found in Section 6.1 of the Security Target [6].
8
The TOE consists of the artefacts 1 to 6 listed in table 2. They are combined in the single archive file
artefact 1. Artefact 7 contains examples for the TOE integration and is delivered together with the TOE as
part of artefact 1, it is however not part of the evaluated configuration.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.AUTHENT: The client software applications (CS), the storage unit (SU), and any
trustworthy special applications which are authorized by the IT-Environment for using the
TOE or to be used by the TOE, have to be configured in such a way that they identify
and authenticate the TOE before any data transfer.
The integrator has to refer to section 5.4.4 of [10].
● OE.CONFIGURATION: The TOE has to be securely configured and all data required for
the configuration of the TOE must secure and reliable transported to and installed on the
machine which runs the TOE.
The administrator has to refer to section 3.1 of [11].
● OE.EVIDENCEDATA: The generation, storage, management and renewal of evidence
data for proving the unmodified existence of archival information packages at a certain
time shall be provided by trustworthy special applications in a secure non-TOE
environment.
The integrator has to refer to section 5.4.4 of [10].
The administrator has to refer to section 3.1 of [11].
● OE.RULES: Rules defined for operating on archive objects and archive requests by the
TOE must not introduce any security risk.
The integrator has to refer to section 4.1 of [10].
● OE.PHYSPROT: The machine on which the TOE runs must be protected against
unauthorized physical access and modification.
The integrator has to refer to section 4.1 of [10].
The administrator has to refer to section 3.1 of [11].
● OE.COMMUNICATION: The communication inter-connections between the TOE and all
non-TOE components and systems, have to be protected by the environment – by
physical or logical security measures – against disclosure as appropriate regarding the
need for information disclosure of the clients. The communication interconnections
between the TOE and all non-TOE components and systems must be protected by the
environment – by physical or logical security measures – against threats (e. g.
disclosure) which may compromise the security objectives of the ST.
The integrator has to refer to section 4.1 of [10].
The administrator has to refer to section 3.1 of [11].
● OE.NO_BYPASS: The TOE must be integrated in the IT environment in such a way that
all storage access by the CS cannot bypass the TOE, if it is mandated or required by
policies of the organization which uses the TOE.
The integrator has to refer to section 4.1 of [10].
● OE.ADMIN: The administrators of the TOE, of the crypto provider cryptographic or other
trustworthy 3rd party components connected to the TOE, of the storage system, the
underlying systems, and of the communication connections (e.g. the LAN) must not be
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019 Certification Report
careless, wilfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide the instructions provided
by the administrator’s guidance. They shall be well trained to securely and trustworthy
administer all aspects of TOE operation as well as all other involved processes or
operations in accordance with the guidance. The administrators shall protect their
credentials used for authentication. Credentials must not be disclosed to other individual.
The integrator has to refer to section 4.1 of [10].
The administrator has to refer to section 3.1 of [11].
● OE.SERVER: The machine on which the TOE, systems and application run must be free
from malware and viruses. Systems and applications running on the server must be
securely installed. An unauthorized access to functions, processes and data of the TOE
must not be possible.
The administrator has to refer to section 3.1 of [11].
● OE.STORAGE: The dedicated SU must provide a reliable, secure and available storage
of archival information packages (AIP), even for long-terms.
The integrator has to refer to section 5.5 of [10].
● OE.TIMESTAMP: The environment shall be able to provide reliable time-stamps to the
TOE.
The integrator has to refer to section 4.1 of [10].
● OE.TOKEN: The environment, e. g. the SU or another non-TOE part of the middleware,
has to provide a reliably generated unique archive object identifier (AOID) for any
successfully archived submission information package.
The integrator has to refer to section 4.1 of [10].
● OE.TRUSTAPP: The archive requesting CS has to provide sufficient trust to be assumed
as secure and has at least to provide reliable measures regarding the authentication and
access control of its (human) users.
The integrator has to refer to section 4.1 and 4.3 of [10].
● OE.TRUSTCRYPTO: Only trustworthy cryptographic components are allowed to be
used. The cryptographic components must not send any security relevant and
confidential data to any external entity and have to reliably protect all security relevant
and confidential data from disclosure by an external entity.
The integrator has to refer to section 4.1 of [10].
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE mainly decouples the data flow (i.e. the flow of archive objects) between third
party applications, such as document management systems, and the long-term storage
solutions. The architecture of the complete system is shown in Figure 1.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019
Figure 1: Architecture of the TOE
The TOE has three external interfaces:
 IF_CS: This represents the interface between the TOE and an external client
system (CS) which submits and receives the (cryptographically signed) information
to be preserved.
 IF_SU: This represents the interface between the TOE and an external storage unit
(SU) which preserves the (cryptographically signed) information.
 IF_Crypto: This represents the interface between the TOE and an external crypto
provider which is used for cryptographic operations on the (cryptographically
signed) information to be preserved.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019 Certification Report
Internally, the TOE consists of three subsystems as shown in the following table:
Subsystem Description
Common ● Functionalities of accessing an external crypto provider component and an evidence
preservation component (module SecurityProvider)
● Functionalities of accessing an external crypto provider component (module
SecurityProvider)
● Functionalities of accessing an external audit/logging plugin (module Plugin-
Interfaces)
● Functionalities of accessing an external storage plug-in (module Plugin-Interfaces)
● Functionalities of maintaining a volatile user database (module CredentialStore)
● Functionalities of logging of the TOE’s executions (module Logging)
● Generic functionalities like converting data types or usage of certificates (module
Utilities)
MigSafe ● Functionalities of defining the interfaces of the CS to the subsystem MigSafe of the
TOE (module MS-Kern)
● Functionalities of accessing the long-term-storage via the module Plugin-Interfaces of
the subsystem Common (module MS-Kern)
● Functionalities of validating data objects against XML schemes (module Validierung)
● Functionalities of filtering XML documents (module Filter)
OverSign ● Functionalities of requesting and checking of evidence records
● Functionalities of generating hash values
● Functionalities of checking time stamps
Table 3: Subsystems of the TOE
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer Testing
The developer considered the TOE environment as defined in the Security Target [6]. The
developer tests cover all three subsystems Common, MigSafe, and OverSign, as
described in chapter 5.
Moreover, aspects of the security architecture of the TOE are also covered by tests
conducted by the developer. Each test is implemented as an automatic test based on the
JUnit test framework and is executed on the operation systems Red Hat Enterprise Linux
Server (RHEL) 6.5 64 bit, Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server (RHEL) 7.0 64 bit, and SUSE
Linux Enterprise Server 11 SP 3 64 bit, together with the OpenJDK version 8u202, and the
CryptoProvider component “OpenLimit-Middleware-Version-3-Server-
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1.6.2.3.2017062801.x86_64 mit OpenLimit-Middleware-Version-3-Server_AlgCats-
1.6.2.5”. All tests were executed by the JUnit framework without further user action.
The test documentation consists of a test coverage and depth of testing analysis, a test
plan, test specifications for each of the security functionalities (SF1, SF2, SF3, and SF4),
and test result logs. The particular test specifications show:
● Goal of testing
● Testing steps
● Test description
● Test preconditions
● Test conduction
● Expected results
The test result logs show that the tests identified in the test coverage and depth of testing
analysis have been executed as expected by the developer.
7.2. Independent Evaluator Testing
Overview:
The independent testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing
environment, partially using the test environment of the evaluation facility. The developer’s
testing environment implements the external infrastructure required to operate the TOE
with the evaluator’s setup.
Since the TOE has only one configuration, all configurations of the TOE being intended to
be covered by the current evaluation were tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
Independent testing approach:
The TOE was independently tested with respect to three subject areas:
● The usage of TLS connections to external components, which the TOE uses to
exchange archive data for storing or loading, and the usage of random data for crypto
operations,
● the correct usage of XML input data which the TOE uses for submission information
packages and
● the correct authentication of client systems through usage of contexts for calling
operations of credential stores.
TOE test configurations:
No special configuration is made. The TOE has only one single configuration, and the TOE
is always in this default configuration.
The TOE under test is “SecDocs Security Komponenten, Version 2.4” consisting of the
following components:
● CredentialStore.zip, SHA256:
cdf2be3505229716e4305bd01db43e107d2e14cbcf4161ee67baee4a064a724a
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● CredentialStore.jar from CredentialStore.zip, SHA256:
4b1c4271c3d002ba4c11930e2222d2469472fd6b989f3f24ff5f30d4e8f8c888
● MigSafeLibrary.jar, SHA256:
794e232c25735c6666f7a73605cb03f09e12832dfd949c28fcc09012e83a4dcf
● OverSignLibrary.jar, SHA256:
a1568d5ce04535cc27c6e3d355d3345666935f538f201f1b501322a38e731083
● XMLFilter.jar, SHA256:
8009712e6387052d3f9d2b22263b2ab115a22c54b84e0c6e48021150de8b4f11
● bcprov-jdk15on-160.jar, SHA256:
d65bf7e1a3dae9a8ae2ad9cb64ef443ea089b1ad930dca999f70bbab56d9f349
● jsse.jar from CredentialStore.zip, SHA256:
ff0d233737cfb9fd19dc4de16a9c391a789e1256847b64d39347592a6606a9ea
● sunec.jar from CredentialStore.zip, SHA256:
b2231d1f6bccebd58547707361bfc19f783da54df5da263d327eca39e2dd5db6
● sunjce_provider.jar from CredentialStore.zip, SHA256:
1ccb46312b062f16715fe2807a9a0e51478b558b0797d0d6b9e021b0e352f8da
The operation system used was “CentOS 7 64 bit” in combination with the OpenJDK
versions “1.8.0 build 212-b04”9
, “Junit 4.12” and the CryptoProvider component
“OpenLimit-Middleware-Version-3-Server-1.6.2.3.2017062801.x86_64 mit OpenLimit-
Middleware-Version-3-Server_AlgCats-1.6.2.5”.
Independent test subset:
The TSFIs tested by independent evaluator tests are IF_CS, IF_Crypto, and IF_SU (see
chapter 5). This includes all major interface functionalities like communication with the
client software application, the crypto provider, the storage unit and other trustworthy
application (e.g. the Evidence Preservation Component) as well as input data processing.
These interfaces are most critical for the security that the TOE provides.
Developer’s test subset repeated:
The evaluators repeated developer tests for four important subject areas:
● The correct CMAC implementation,
● the repudiation of non-authenticated archive operations,
● the repudiation of invalid certificates, and
● the correct usage of embedded signatures in PDF documents.
All those tests cover critical security functionalities of the TOE and are developer-coded
implementations.
SFRs tested:
The SFRs tested by the subset of the developer tests repeated by the evaluators cover:
FAU_GEN.1, FCS_CKM.1/TLS, FCS_COP.1/TLS, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFC.1,
FDP_IFF.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FMT_MSA.1 (Rules), FMT_MSA.3 (Access),
9
The developer provided a VM that uses OpenJDK 1.8.0 212-b04, instead of version 8u202 as listed in sec.
1.3.3 of the ST [6]. The documented tests were conducted under the provided JDK version 1.8.0 212-b04 but
later were repeated by the evaluators under JDK version 8u202. The evaluators can confirm that for both
JDK versions the test results are the same.
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FMT_MSA.3 (Rules), FMT_SMR.1,FTP_ITC.1 (CRYPTO), FTP_ITC.1 (CS), and
FTP_ITC.1 (TAPP).
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.3. Penetration Testing
Overview:
The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing environment,
partially using the test environment of the evaluation facility.
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential Enhanced-Basic
was actually successful.
Penetration testing approach:
The evaluator examined the developer document [10] to find relevant information about
how to bring the TOE in a proper and known state. He then searched for potential
vulnerabilities through CVE entries based on the design and architecture documentation.
In addition to that the evaluator searched for potential vulnerabilities for the TOE whilst
evaluating the developer contributions for the single evaluation aspects in the context of
the assurance classes ADV, AGD and ATE. The evaluator then derived attack scenarios
which cover all potential vulnerabilities. For these scenarios the evaluator created
penetration tests, so that every attack scenario is tested by at least one relevant
penetration test.
TOE test configurations:
No special configuration is made. The TOE has only one single configuration, and the TOE
is always this default configuration.
The TOE under test is “SecDocs Security Komponenten, Version 2.4” consisting of the
components, as described in chapter 7.2:
The operation system used was “CentOS 7 64 bit” in combination with the OpenJDK
version “1.8.0 build 212-b04”10
, “Junit 4.12” and the CryptoProvider component “Open-
Limit-Middleware-Version-3-Server-1.6.2.3.2017062801.x86_64 mit OpenLimit-
Middleware-Version-3-Server_AlgCats-1.6.2.5”.
Attack scenarios having been tested:
● AS.1: The TOE receives manipulated CMAC values at its interface IF_CS in order to
circumvent the authentication.
● AS.2: The TOE receives malformed certificates values at its interface IF_SU in order to
circumvent the authentication.
10
The developer provided a VM that uses OpenJDK 1.8.0 212-b04, instead of version 8u202 as listed in sec.
1.3.3 of the ST [6]. The documented tests were conducted under the provided JDK version 1.8.0 212-b04 but
later were repeated by the evaluators under JDK version 8u202. The evaluators can confirm that for both
JDK versions the test results are the same.
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● AS.3: The TOE receives malformed XML values to parse input at IF_CS in order to
exploit the XML parser.
SFRs penetration tested:
● FCS_CKM.1/AUTH tested through AS.1,
● FCS_COP.1/AUTH tested through AS.1,
● FDP_ACC.1 tested through AS.1,
● FDP_ACF.1 tested through AS.1,
● FIA_UAU.2 tested through AS.1,
● FIA_UID.2 tested through AS.1,
● FAU_GEN.1 tested through AS.1,
● FCS_COP.1/SIG tested through AS.2,
● FCS_COP.1/HASH tested through AS.2,
● FTP_ITC.1 (STORAGE) tested through AS.2,
● FMT_MSA.1 (Access) tested through AS.3,
● FMT_MSA.1 (Rules) tested through AS.3.
The remaining SFRs were analysed, but not penetration tested due to non-exploitability of
the related attack scenarios in the TOE’s operational environment also including an
attacker with an Enhanced-Basic attack potential.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Enhanced-Basic was
actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the ST [6] provided
that all required measures are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The TOE “SecDocs
Security Komponenten” is only available in one evaluated configuration comprising the
versions of the software components as detailed in table 2. The versions of the software
components can be identified through the instructions given in chapter 3 of
“Administratorhandbuch”, [11].
The TOE offers a legacy mode which does not protect the connection between the TOE
and an external CryptoProvider component with TLS. This legacy mode is not part of the
evaluated configuration and therefore must not be used in order to be compliant to this
evaluation. The user has to follow the guidelines in section 3.1 of “Administratorhandbuch”,
[11] to operate the TOE in its evaluated secure mode.
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9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile for an ArchiSafe Compliant
Middleware for Enabling the Long-Term Preservation of Electronic Documents,
Version 1.2, 28 March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0049-2014, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementati
on
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Authenticity ECDSA TR-03111 256 yes FCS_COP.1/SIG:
identification and
authentication of SU,
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementati
on
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comments
CS, and crypto
provider
2 Integrity SHA256 FIPS 180-4 - - FCS_COP.1/HASH:
protection of
communication with
CS, crypto provider,
and SU against
modification
3 Confidentiality,
Integrity
TLS v.1.2 with
cipher suite
TLS_ECDHE_ECD
SA_WITH_AES_12
8_GCM_SHA256
RFC 5246,
RFC 5289
128 yes FCS_COP.1/TLS
4 Authenticity,
Integrity
AES-CMAC RFC 4493,
NIST SP 800-
38D
128 yes FCS_COP.1/AUTH
5 Key Agreement ECKA-EG with
X9.63 KDF
TR-03116-3,
TR-03111,
FIPS 180-4
128 yes Key Generation for
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
6 Confidentiality,
Integrity
FTP_ITC.1 (CRYPTO): Trusted communication channel between TOE and crypto
provider using FCS_COP.1/TLS
7 Confidentiality,
Integrity
FTP_ITC.1 (CS): Trusted communication channel between TOE and CS using
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
8 Confidentiality,
Integrity
FTP_ITC.1 (STORAGE): Trusted communication channel between TOE and SU
using FCS_COP.1/AUTH
9 Confidentiality,
Integrity
FTP_ITC.1 (TAPP): Trusted communication channel between TOE and TAPP using
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
10 Random
Number
Generator
NPTRNG AIS 20/31 - - FCS_RNG.1: DRG.2
for TOE identity
generation
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
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The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● The TOE offers a legacy mode which is not part of the evaluated configuration – see
chapter 8 – and therefore must not be used in order to be compliant to the certified
configuration.
● For being used, the TOE has to been integrated into an ArchiSafe compliant archive
middleware by the TOE integrator. Therefore, the TOE needs further parts of the
ArchiSafe architecture being supplied by the TOE integrator: an implementation of a
Client Software Application (CS), of the Crypto Provider Component, of the Evidence
Preservation Component and of a so-called Storage Plugin as a trustworthy application
interfacing with the long-term storage system (SU). The TOE can only been run in its
integrated form. The software product “SecDocs v.3.0” offers such an integrated form of
the TOE. For more information see the ST [6] and the Integrator’s Manual [11].
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
ADV CC Evaluation Class: Development
AGD CC Evaluation Class: Guidance Documentation
AIP Archival information package
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
AOID Archive Object Identifier
ATE CC Evaluation Class: Tests
AVA CC Evaluation Class: Vulnerability assessment
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
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CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CS Client Software Application
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
OID Object Identifier
PP Protection Profile
PTB Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Submission Information Package
ST Security Target
SU (Long-Term) Storage Unit
TAPP Trustworthy Application
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
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Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE12
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0994-2019, Version 2.7, 23.08.2019, Security Target
for SecDocs Security Komponenten, Version 2.4, OpenLimit SignCubes GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, 03.09.2019, Evaluation Technical Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0994, T-Systems International GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Common Criteria Protection Profile for an ArchiSafe Compliant Middleware for
Enabling the Long-Term Preservation of Electronic Documents, Version 1.2, 28
March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0049-2014, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 7, 02.09.2019, EVG-CM-Liste (confidential
document)
[10] Integrator’s manual, 05.06.2019, MSOS_Integratorhandbuch_DE.pdf
[11] Administrator’s manual, 05.06.2019, MSOS_Admininstratorhandbuch_DE.pdf
12
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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[12] Administrator’s manual of the non-TOE component OpenLimit Middleware Version 3
Server, Produktversion 1.6, Version 1.35, 13.02.2018,
Administratorhandbuch_V3_Server_v.1.35.pdf
[13] TOE’s functional specification, 06.08.2019, ADV_FSP-MigSafe-OverSign_2.4_2019-
08-06.pdf
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.4
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 11
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 12 to 16
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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