BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025
for
SE5000-8.1 Version F
from
Stoneridge Electronics AB
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.49
BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025 (*)
Smart Tachograph: Vehicle Unit
SE5000-8.1 Version F
from Stoneridge Electronics AB
PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version
1.15, 6 June 2021, BSI-CC-PP-0094-V2-2021
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 und AVA_VAN.5
valid until: 6 April 2030
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 7 April 2025
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................17
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................17
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................17
13. Definitions................................................................................................................18
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................19
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................22
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 23
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SE5000-8.1 Version F has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This
is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V7-2023. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V7-2023 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product SE5000-8.1 Version F was conducted by Deutsche Telekom
Security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 28 March 2025. Deutsche Telekom
Security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of
BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Stoneridge Electronics AB.
The product was developed by: Stoneridge Electronics AB.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. According to Tachograph Ordinance 165/2014,
a re-assessment is to be made every two years.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 7 April 2025
is valid until 6 April 2030. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product SE5000-8.1 Version F has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Stoneridge Electronics AB
Gustav III:s Boulevard 26
SE-169 73 Solna
Sweden
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product Digital Tachograph (Vehicle Unit (VU))
SE5000-8.1 Version F.
The TOE is a second generation digital tachograph vehicle unit in the sense of Annex IC
[18] intended to be installed in road transport vehicles. Second generation digital
tachographs, called smart tachographs, include a connection to the global navigation
satellite system (GNSS) facility, a remote early detection communication facility, and an
interface with intelligent transport systems. Its purpose is to record, store, display, print and
output data related to driver activities. It is connected to a motion sensor with which it
exchanges vehicle’s motion data. The TOE is providing security functionality conformant to
the protection profile “Digital Tachograph – Vehicle Unit (VU PP)”, [8].
The Security Target [6] and [9] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.15, 6 June 2021,
BSI-CC-PP-0094-V2-2021 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ATE_DPT.2 und AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 9.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF.ACTIVITIES TSF.ACTIVITIES keeps control of all activity done by the user and ensures
that user data is written to VU and card. It also enables/disables
functionali-ty depending on user (driver, workshop, control and company).
It detects event related to user behaviour.
TSF.BIST TSF.BIST runs test to ensure that tampering of memory is detected. It also
run test to ensure correctness of Composite TOE.
TSF.CARD TSF.CARD controls all secure communication with tachograph card.
Ensures that a secure communication channel exists and is used for
communication. Detect Card related events. Control start-up /shutdown of
card. Ensure that temporary stored cryptographic keys (used for card
communication) is re-moved when not needed.
TSF.CASING TSF.CASING consists of a physical box that gives protection from
tampering and dust/water according to IP class. The enclosure of the VU is
made in such way that it is not possible to open once sealed. It is
considered as a closed box. The case ensures that the VU will not be
physically modified without detection.
TSF.CONFIG TSF.CONFIG enforces calibration function modifying parameters.
TSF.CRYPTO TSF.CRYPTO uses the TOE Platform’s hardware co-processors for basic
DES, AES, RSA, and ECC operations and the TOE Platform’s True
Random Number Generator for generation of random numbers. Access to
RSA and ECC operations uses a TOE Platform Crypto Library.
TSF.DSRC TSF.DSRC controls all communication and creates messages.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF.DOWNLOAD TSF.DOWNLOAD provides services for download of data with
corresponding signatures. When data is downloaded, a validation is also
done to ensure correctness of data within the download.
TSF.ERRORMGR TSF.ERRORMGR ensures that reported Event/faults are stored in a
correct way.
TSF.FRAMEWORK TSF.FRAMEWORK handle start-up of the TOE in a controlled way.
TSF.GNSS TSF.GNSS controls all communication received from GNSS satellites
including supervision of signal loss.
TSF.IPC TSF.IPC manages the internal communication. It acts as a gateway and
only forwards messages approved.
TSF.MMI TSF.MMI controls input and output of user by using buttons, display and a
printer.
TSF.MMU TSF.MMU keeps control of memory allocation/deallocation used to ensure
that no external interfaces are available at the same time as the secret
keys.
TSF.PSI TSF.PSI is the supervisor for external power to TOE. It also ensure that
there is time enough to store relevant data in case of a power loss.
TSF.STORAGE TSF.STORAGE is a supporting all TSF:s in storing data and keep control
of replacement of oldest data.
TSF.SPEED TSF.SPEED controls all secure communication with motion sensor.
Ensures that a secure communication channel exists and is used for
communication. Detect Motion sensor related events. Control initialization
of motion sensor communication. Ensure that events/faults reported by
motion sensor is stored within VU.
TSF.TAM TSF.TAM synchronise the system and keep control of mode of operation to
ensure that all relevant data are stored and functions are enabled/disabled.
TSF.TIME TSF.TIME provides the VU with a correct time.
TSF.UPDATE TSF.UPDATE ensures validation of software package prior of usage.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 10.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 6.1.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.2 to 6.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8 of this
report.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025 Certification Report
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SE5000-8.1 Version F
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
Digital Tachograph (Vehicle Unit) SE5000-8.1
Version F
900773R xxRyy with
software 2322
Please note that the last
five characters shows
the customer specific
revision of the VU,
reflected here by xxRyy.
Separate unit in a
sealed case
2 DOC Workshop Manual SE5000-8 Smart
Tachograph, Version 9000-103767P_01 12,
Stoneridge Electronics AB, 11.2024, note:
includes software update [13]
Version 9000-
103767P_01 12
paper copies
and/or
electronically
adobe pdf
documents
3 DOC Control Manual SE5000-8 Smart Tachograph,
Version 9000-103766P_01 10,
Stoneridge Electronics AB, 11.2024 [12]
Version 9000-
103766P_01 10
paper copies
and/or
electronically
adobe pdf
documents
4 DOC Driver and Company Manual SE5000-8
Smart Tachograph, Version 9000-
103765P_01 07,
Stoneridge Electronics AB [11]
Version 9000-
103765P_01 07
paper copies
and/or
electronically
adobe pdf
documents
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The complete SE5000 digital tachograph (VU) will be transported to the customer after
manufacturing including personalization and approval. The manuals will be sent together
with the VU, separately or be available for download from the Stoneridge Internet
homepage depending on the customer’s demands. Ordinary delivery routines specified
from the logistic department will be used for transport from the manufacturing site in
Örebro to the customer.
Before delivery, the VU is sealed using a tamper label and the required key material is
stored in the VU. The customer is responsible for the transport from the gate at the site in
Örebro and will, maybe through a transporting company, confirm their reception of the
delivery by signing a waybill.
The customer shall check the received tachograph (VU) in accordance to the checklist in
the user documentation (Workshop Manual SE5000-8 Smart Tachograph, Version 9000-
103767P_01 12, Stoneridge Electronics AB, 11.2024) to ensure that the VU is an original
SRE tachograph.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. The TOE implements logical security functionality in order to
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025
enable it to record, store, display, print and output data related to driver activities in
exchange with a motion sensor with which it exchanges vehicle’s motion data.
Hence, the TOE enforces:
● protection of data memory in such a way as to prevent unauthorized access to and
manipulation of the data and the detection of such attempts,
● confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the motion sensor
and the vehicle unit,
● integrity, authenticity and where applicable, confidentiality of data exchanged between
the vehicle unit and the tachograph cards,
● confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data output through the remote early
detection communication for control purposes, and
● integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation of data downloaded.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Section
4.2.3 of the Security Target [6] and [9].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Details can be found in
the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE consists of a hardware box including the following subsystems: GNSS receiver,
Display & Visual warning, Printer, Driver and Co-Driver Card readers, Operator Inputs,
Power supply, Data memory and TSF-Subsystem.
There is one subsystem that is relevant for security, TSF Subsystem, which is fully
represented as modules. The remaining subsystems that make up the TOE are required
for TSF Subsystem’s interactions with the environment (users, tachograph cards, sensor,
GNSS satellites, remote external detection communication facility, external tools etc.) and
have no relevance for security and are not further described. The Data Memory is also
considered not relevant to security because the stored user data’s integrity and
authenticity is upheld by TSF Subsystem.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer tests:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025 Certification Report
All properties/characteristics of the TSFI as described in the functional specification, the
TSF subsystem behaviour and the interaction among TSF subsystems as described in the
design documentation, and all interfaces to the SFR-enforcing modules have been tested
by the developer. The TOE responded to the tests as expected.
Evaluator tests:
The evaluators spent adequate testing effort for the desired resistance of the TOE against
attackers with high attack potential. The evaluators analysed the test specification and
verified based on sampling that the specification has been correctly implemented in the
test scripts. In addition, the used this analysis for:
● creating ideas for independent evaluator tests,
● ensuring that the test environment delivers correct test results, and
● repeating developer tests as well as carrying out independent tests.
Independent tests:
Independent tests were identified based on the developer tests already available. The
developer tests have been compared with the ST, the functional specification and the
design specification in order to determine the fields of further investigation. Furthermore,
the evaluator devised tests based on a systematically analysis of the ST.
The evaluators conducted independent testing at the developer's site.
The evaluator tests have been carried out against the following TOE configurations: The
TOE was brought in every production control state. A simulator or a real motion sensor
was used. Furthermore, every card type (Driver card, workshop card, control card, and
company card) was tested. For the company card also the remote authentication was in
the focus of the tests.
According to EAL4, functional testing is performed down to the depth of SFR-enforcing
module interfaces.
The tests showed that the TOE behaves as expected in all configurations that are
considered as part of the evaluation. The depth of testing is adequate for the evaluation
assurance level chosen (EAL4+). The TOE has successfully passed independent testing.
Penetration tests:
For the penetration testing the TOE was tested in its operative state. Modifications of the
devices were performed before the TOE was brought into its operative state in order to
suppress warnings. The later tests were performed in the operative state of the TOE.
On the basis of the methodical vulnerability analysis some potential vulnerabilities have
been identified by the evaluator. These potential vulnerabilities have been analysed, if they
are exploitable in the planned operational environment. For every potential vulnerability
which was identified to be a candidate to be exploitable in the planned operational
environment the evaluator devised and conducted penetration tests.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration is Digital Tachograph (Vehicle Unit) SE5000-8.1 Version F,
900773E/01R19 with software 2322. 01R19 represents customization variances of the
evaluated TOE and suffix E stands for engineering device instead of R. This is the version
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025
of the TOE as it is stated in the ST ([6] and [9], chap. 4 “Digital Tachograph (Vehicle Unit)
SE5000-8.1 Version F).
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e.
on hardware [14, 15] have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(ii) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(iii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar Devices
(iv) Application of Attack Potential to Hardware Devices with Security Boxes
(v) Terminology and preparation of Smartcard-Evaluations
(vi) Use of Interpretation for Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital Tachographs
(vii) Evaluation methodology for Hardware Devices with Security Boxes
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36, AIS 37, AIS 49).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and 31 were used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ATE_DPT.2 und AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V7-2023, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on developer’s
functional testing and source code and, where relevant for side channel resistance,
assembly code delta review, and dedicated hardware penetration testing of the casing.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.15, 6 June
2021, BSI-CC-PP-0094-V2-2021 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
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● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 und AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The table presented in appendix A of the Security Target [6] and [9] gives an overview of
the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines
the standard of application where its specific appropriateness is stated.
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 [18] the algorithms are
suitable for Digital Tachograph Systems in the sence of Annex 1C [18] of Commission
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 [18]. An explicit validity period is not given.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
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13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SRE Stoneridge Electronics AB
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VU Vehicle Unit
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
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Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025, Version 14, 15 October 2024, SE5000-
8.1 Security Target Vehicle Unit, Stoneridge Electronics AB (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 8.2, 28 March 2025, Evaluation Technical
Report – Summary Digital (Vehicle Unit) SE5000-8.1 Version F, Deutsche Telekom
Security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.15, 6 June 2021, BSI-CC-
PP-0094-V2-2021
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025, Version 06, 27 March 2025, SE5000-
8.1 Security Target Lite, Stoneridge Electronics AB (sanitised public document)
[10] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 32, 26 February 2025, SE5000 Configuration
List, Stoneridge Electronics AB (confidential document)
[11] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Driver and Company Manual SE5000-8
Smart Tachograph, Version 9000-103765P_01 07, Stoneridge Electronics AB
[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE, November 2024, Control Manual SE5000-8
Smart Tachograph, Version 9000-103766P_01 10, Stoneridge Electronics AB
[13] Guidance documentation for the TOE, November 2024, Workshop Manual SE5000-
8 Smart Tachograph, Version 9000-103767P_01 12, Stoneridge Electronics AB
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinwei-se für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 48, Version 1, Anforderungen an die Prüfung von Sicherheitsetiketten
• AIS 49, Version 1, Evaluation methodology for hardware devices with security boxes
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[14] Certificate NSCIB-CC-2200060-02, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. Date of 3rd
issue:
30 August 2024
[15] ETR for Composition of the platform, ETRfC for NSCIB-2200060-02, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Version 3, 22 August 2024
[16] Public Security Target Lite IFX_CCI_00003Fh IFX_CCI_000059h
IFX_CCI_00005Bh IFX_CCI_00003Ch IFX_CCI_00003Dh IFX_CCI_00005Ah G11
and H11 including optional software libraries: Flash Loader according Package1 and
Package2, HCL, RCL, HSL, ACL and SCL, Infineon, Jürgen Noller, Revision 2.6, 16
August 2024
[17] Certification report NSCIB-CC-2200060-02-CR, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. 30
August 2024
[18] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 of 18 March 2016
implementing Regulation (EU) 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council laying down the requirements for the construction, testing, installation,
operation and repair of tachographs and their components, Annex 1 C last amended
by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/980 of 16 May 2023
Annex 1C of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799
Appendix 11 of Annex 1C of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799
[19] Impact Analysis Report, Impact analysis SE5000-8.1, Document no. 2004149, Rev
17, Stoneridge Electronics AB, 03 February 2025
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product SE5000-8.1 Version F (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at
an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 7 April 2025, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1, ALC_COMP.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Stoneridge Electronics AB, Gustav III:s Boulevard 26, 169 73 Solna, Sweden
(HW and SW development, HW and SW tests)
b) Stoneridge Electronics AB, Adolfsbergsvägen 3, 701 14 Örebro, Sweden
(Manufacturing and delivery of the final TOE)
c) Stoneridge Electronics AB, Avenida Alan Tu-ring, 385 – Cidade Universitária,
Campinas - São Paulo, Brazil (SW development and testing)
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6] and [9]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security
objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the
Security Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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