Security Target for
Cybertrust UniCERT 5
Common Criteria EAL4 Evaluation
This document may be reproduced or distributed in its entirety, the copying of only part is
strictly forbidden without the express prior written permission of Cybertrust.
Copyright Ó 2006 Cybertrust
All Rights Reserved.
Table of Contents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction........................................................................................................................1
1.1 Security Target Identification ...............................................................................................1
1.2 Security Target Scope .........................................................................................................1
1.3 Security Target Organisation ...............................................................................................2
1.4 CC Conformance Claim.......................................................................................................3
1.5 Glossary...............................................................................................................................4
1.6 References.........................................................................................................................12
2. TOE Description...............................................................................................................13
2.1 Product Type......................................................................................................................13
2.2 Methods of Use..................................................................................................................15
2.3 Product Components .........................................................................................................18
2.4 UniCERT Configurations....................................................................................................34
2.5 UniCERT Evaluated Configuration ....................................................................................37
2.6 CD Content Lists................................................................................................................41
3. TOE Security Environment .............................................................................................57
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................57
3.2 Secure Usage Assumptions ..............................................................................................57
3.3 Threats to Security.............................................................................................................59
3.4 Organisational Security Policies ........................................................................................72
4. Security Objectives..........................................................................................................74
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................74
4.2 Security Objectives for the TOE ........................................................................................74
4.3 Security Objectives for the Environment............................................................................78
5. IT Security Requirements ...............................................................................................82
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................82
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements ............................................................................82
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements..........................................................................108
5.4 Security Requirements for the IT Environment................................................................119
5.5 Minimum Strength of Function Level ...............................................................................120
6. TOE Summary Specification.........................................................................................121
6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................121
6.2 TOE Security Functions...................................................................................................121
6.3 Assurance Measures .......................................................................................................133
7. Protection Profile Claims ..............................................................................................138
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7.1 Protection Profile Reference............................................................................................138
7.2 Protection Profile Refinements ........................................................................................138
7.3 Protection Profile Additions..............................................................................................138
8. Rationale.........................................................................................................................139
8.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................139
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale..........................................................................................139
8.3 Security Requirements Rationale ....................................................................................148
8.4 TOE Summary Specification Rationale ...........................................................................168
8.5 PP Claims Rationale........................................................................................................169
9. Security Policy Model....................................................................................................170
9.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................170
9.2 Definition of Users............................................................................................................173
9.3 Information Flow Control Policy.......................................................................................178
Appendix ADocumentation Contents on TOE CDs........................................................................184
A.1 UniCERT Core v5.2.1 for Windows .................................................................................184
A.2 UniCERT WebRAO Client v5.2.1 for Windows ...............................................................220
A.3 UniCERT Core v5.2.1 for Solaris.....................................................................................227
Introduction
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1. Introduction
1.1 Security Target Identification
1.1.1 This section provides the labelling and descriptive information necessary to
control and identify the Security Target and the TOE to which it refers.
1.1.2 It is assumed that the reader of this document is familiar with the concept
of PKI.
Title: Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5
Authors: George Sarandrea, Judith Furlong, Michael
Linehan, Chris Lowe
TOE Identification Cybertrust UniCERT 5.2.1
Publication Date January 2006
ISO 15408 (CC) Version: 2.1 Final
EAL: 4, augmented with ALC_FLR.2
ST Evaluation: LogicaCMG’s AISEF
Keywords: PKI, Certification Authority
Table 1-1 ST Information
1.1.3 Note that the release of the product that is under evaluation is 5.2.1,
including patch 5.2.1.900. Whenever “UniCERT” or “UniCERT 5” is
referred to in this document or other evaluation deliverables, that is what is
meant.
Also note that as a result of a recent merger, Cybertrust now holds the copyright to
Betrusted products. Where the UniCERT documents or software refer to Betrusted
as the legal entity, read Cybertrust.
1.2 Security Target Scope
1.2.1 Cybertrust’s UniCERT is a PKI/Cryptography standards-compliant server
for generating, issuing and revoking digital certificates in response to
requests received from clients.
1.2.2 UniCERT provides all the functionality needed to implement a PKI system,
essentially a system that provides registration, PKI management and
certification authority functions. This can then be used to manage all the
keys necessary for a system requiring security for end users, such as a
secure messaging system, or security on Web browsers. UniCERT provides
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the ability to set up a centralized or a distributed PKI for organizations of
any size.
1.2.3 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides the core framework for a wide
variety of components, applications, policies and practices to combine and
achieve the four principal security functions for commercial transactions:
1.2.4 Confidentiality to keep information private
1.2.5 Integrity to prove that information has not been manipulated
1.2.6 Authentication to prove the identity of an individual or application
1.2.7 Non-repudiation to ensure that information cannot be disowned
1.2.8 Lack of security is often cited as a major barrier to the growth of e-
commerce, which can only be built on the confidence that comes from
knowing that all transactions are protected by these core functions.
1.3 Security Target Organization
1.3.1 The main sections of the Security Target are its TOE description, TOE
Security Environment, Security Objectives, IT Security Requirements, TOE
Summary Specifications, Protection Profile Claims and Rationale.
1.3.2 The TOE Description provides general information about the TOE, serves as
an aid to understanding its security requirements, and provides context for
the ST evaluation.
1.3.3 The TOE Security Environment describes security aspects of the environment
in which the TOE is to be used and the manner in which it is to be
employed. The TOE security environment includes descriptions of a)
assumptions regarding the TOE intended usage and environment of use, b)
threats relevant to secure TOE operation, and c) organizational security
policies with which the TOE must comply.
1.3.4 The Security Objectives reflect the stated intent of the ST. They pertain to
how the TOE will counter identified threats and it will cover identified
organizational security policies and assumptions. Each security objective is
categorized as being for the TOE, or for the environment.
1.3.5 The IT Security Requirements are subdivided as follows: (a) TOE Security
Functional Requirements, including strength-of-function requirements for
TOE security functions realized by a probabilistic or permutational
mechanism, and (b) TOE security assurance requirements.
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1.3.6 The TOE Summary Specification defines the instantiation of the security
requirements of the TOE. This specification describes the security functions
and assurance measures of the TOE that meet the TOE security
requirements. The TOE Summary Specification section covers the IT
security functions and specifies how these functions satisfy the TOE
security functional requirements. The Functional and Assurance
requirements are derived from the Common Criteria, Part 2 and 3,
respectively, and the TOE must satisfy these. TOE Summary Specification
includes a mapping between functions and requirements that shows which
functions satisfy which requirements and that all requirements are met.
1.3.7 The Protection Profile Claims section contains the Protection Profile
conformance claim statements. Although there are no Protection Profile
conformance claims, this section is provided for completeness.
1.3.8 The Rationale presents evidence that the ST is a complete and cohesive set of
requirements and that a conformant TOE would provide an effective set of
IT security countermeasures within the security environment.
1.3.9 The Rationale is factored into two main parts. First, a Security Objectives
Rationale demonstrates that the stated security objectives are traceable to all
of the aspects identified in the TOE security environment and are suitable to
cover them. Then, a Security Requirements Rationale demonstrates that the
security requirements (TOE and environment) are traceable to the security
objectives and are suitable to meet them.
1.3.10 The Protection Profile Rationale, provides a set of arguments that address
dependency analysis, strength of function issues, and the internal
consistency and mutual supportiveness of the protection profile
requirements. This is not used in this ST as there is no PP dependency.
1.3.11 An acronym list is provided to define frequently used acronyms.
1.3.12 A reference section is provided to identify background material.
1.4 CC Conformance Claim
The TOE conforms to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (ISO/IEC 15408), Version 2.1, Parts 2 and 3 as follows:
a) Part 2 conformant
b) Part 3 conformant
c) EAL 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2
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1.5 Glossary
Term Description
ARL See Authority revocation list
ARM Advanced Registration Module. A separate piece
of software, which may be purchased, installed,
and executed completely separately from UniCERT
so as to interface to UniCERT. May not be used
with the product in its evaluated configuration.
Auditor A special class of administrator that is given
permissions to perform functions on the audit logs.
There are four types of auditor, as described in
Section 9.2.
Audit log Security relevant events occurring during the
operation of the PKI are recorded in audit logs of
either the CA and/or the RA.
Authority revocation list A revocation list containing identification of
public-key certificates issued to Certification
Authorities (CA) that are no longer considered
valid by the certificate issuer. This is essentially a
list of authorities that have been compromised in
some way and can no longer be trusted.
Authorization The process of approving a request against criteria
set forth in a registration policy.
Authorization group An authorization group is a specific set of
authorizers (human or automated processes).
Membership within an authorization group may be
indicated by a specify DN or DN attribute.
Authorization groups are set up using the CAO,
and are used to control which authorizers can
process requests submitted using a particular
registration policy.
Authorizer Human or automated process, which approves a
request against criteria set forth in a registration
policy, whereupon a certificate is generated and
issued upon affirmative approval.
Bootstrap The process of creating a PKI, which involves
creating the CA and CAO.
CA See Certification Authority
CA clone Separate instances of the CA executable, which use
the same key material and the same database.
CA components Combination of CA (Server), CA database, CAO,
Publisher and Certificate Status Server (CSS) that
together provide the certification part of the
system.
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Term Description
CAO See Certification Authority Operator.
CAO user Person who operates the CAO.
CDP See CRL distribution point.
Certificate For the purposes of this document, Certificate
refers to X.509 Certificate - see below.
Certificate extensions Optional fields within an X.509 v3 formatted
certificate that contain information designed to
enhance the certificate verification process and to
convey additional information about the subject
and issuer of the certificate.
Certificate revocation list A signed list of certificates (serial numbers) that
have been revoked and can no longer be trusted
(according to the standard for CRL v2 as defined in
X.509).
Certification Authority The component within the TOE which is
responsible for the creation, distribution, or
revocation of X.509 public key certificates
Certification Authority Operator The interface through which the elements of a
public-key infrastructure (PKI) are defined,
configured and controlled. The CAO is used to
configure the PKI, define registration policies, and
administer certificates. It is the trusted system
management component for a CA.
Certification Practices Statement A detailed document issued by a Certification
Authority that prescribes the operational
procedures on the security and registration policies
under which that authority issues public-key
certificates.
Clone See CA Clone or RA clone.
CPS See Certification Practices Statement.
CRL See Certificate revocation list
CRL distribution point The location from which a CRL or partitioned CRL
can be obtained. Specifically, an X.500 directory
entry or other information source that is named in
an X.509 v3 public-key certificate extension as a
location from which to obtain a certificate
revocation list.
Cross-certification The process whereby a UniCERT CA can certify
another CA. Handled using the normal processes
for signing any certificate, but via a slightly
different message and certificate format.
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Term Description
Crypto module A hardware security module (HSM) or smart card,
which can be used to store keys and perform some
cryptographic operations. Those that can be used
with the TOE are defined in 2.5.1.6.
Directory server A directory server is typically used to store
information, such as a company directory, in a
central repository and to provide quick and easy
access to this information. LDAP is a standard
protocol for accessing directory servers.
Distinguished Name A sequence of attributes that identifies an entity
and traces its path up the directory tree. The DN
provides the necessary information about the
owner of a certificate. The certificate contains both
the DN of the owner (subject) and the DN of the
issuer of the certificate.
DN See Distinguished name.
DN attribute An element of a distinguished name, e.g., C=US or
O=Cybertrust.
EE See End entity.
End entity An entity (e.g., end user) that is the subject of a
public-key certificate and that is using, or is
permitted and able to use, the matching private key
only for some purpose other than signing a
certificate.
Face-to-face registration The process of entering end user details at the
WebRAO directly, without a remote request
coming in through the protocol handler.
Hardware security module A hardware security module is a cryptographic
device, which can generate, store and use
cryptographic keys within a secure hardware
device.
HSM See Hardware security module.
Issuer DN The distinguished name that identifies the CA that
has issued a certificate.
KAS Key Archive Server. A separate piece of software
to the TOE, which may be installed with the TOE.
The TOE provides an evaluated interface to the
KAS.
LDAP See Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.
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Term Description
Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol
A set of open protocols for accessing information
directories. LDAP can make the physical network
topology and protocols transparent so that a
network user can access any resource without
knowing where or how it is physically connected.
Object identifier A string of numbers that is unique worldwide, for
example, 1.2.840.23452323.1.1. An OID represent a
hierarchy of domains and objects within domains,
using numbers instead of names. Each OID starts
from an internationally defined root. For example,
1 at the first level represents the International
Standards Organization (ISO). Each level of the
hierarchy is represented by its own unique number
(ID), which is appended to the OID of the level
above it. For example, 1.2.840 represents the
hierarchy: ISO (1) ISO member-body (2) United
States (840). In a hierarchy like this, each country is
responsible for defining the structure of the rest of
the OID under the third level (country).
OCSP See Online Certificate Status Protocol.
OID See Object identifier.
Online Certificate Status Protocol A protocol that allows applications to verify
whether a certificate is valid or has been revoked.
OCSP can be either a replacement or a supplement
to checking against a CRL. It attempts to overcome
some of the distribution limitations of the CRL.
OCSP specifies a request-response message syntax
between a client application that requires certificate
revocation status information and a server
application that has knowledge of the revocation
status. The OCSP server (or OCSP responder) can
also provide additional status information beyond
that available through a CRL.
Operational policy An operational policy consists of configuration
information for a PKI entity. They set up
operational rules, explicitly defining required tasks
and how each entity performs its functions on a
daily basis. For example, the CA’s operational
policy defines how often the CA generates a CRL
and whether it generates a new CRL each time a
certificate is revoked. The RA’s operational policy
defines the time period during which the RA
processes certificate requests and how often it polls
the database for new requests.
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Term Description
P11 A standard for accessing cryptographic hardware
tokens for example smart cards and HSMs. The
standard is defined in [PKCS11].
P12 A standard for securely storing key material in
software. The standard is defined in [PKCS12].
Personal secure environment Cybertrust supports the concept of a personal
secure environment (PSE). This proprietary format
holds certificate owners’ private keys (or a pointer
to the private keys if the keys are being kept in a
smart card, token or HSM) and other sensitive data
securely. They can only be accessed or altered by
the authorized owner of those keys. UniCERT
supports both disk- and token-based PSE.
PH See Protocol Handler.
PKCS#11 device See Crypto module.
PKI See Public key infrastructure.
PKI entity One of the UniCERT core components (e.g., CA,
CAO, RA, WebRAO, etc.) that are within the PKI
structure.
POP See Proof of possession.
Proof of possession A verification process whereby it is proven that the
owner of a key pair actually possesses the private
key associated with the public key.
Protocol Handler A Protocol Handler (PH) is a UniCERT registration
component though which applications can make
protocol specific request for certificates and other
PKI related services. A Protocol Handler converts
requests from protocol specific formats to the
common request format that is used internal to the
UniCERT system.
PSE See Personal secure environment.
Public-key certificates A set of data that uniquely identifies an entity,
contains the entity’s public key and optionally
other information that is digitally signed by a
trusted party, thereby binding the public key to the
entity. The optional information may provide more
information about the user and how the key should
be used.
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Term Description
Public-key infrastructure A PKI system provides a framework by which
users and entities can communicate securely.
Public-key cryptography uses a combination of
public and private keys, digital signatures, digital
certificates, and Certification Authorities (CAs), to
meet the major requirements of e-security. The
X.509 standard defines a PKI as "The set of
hardware, software, people and procedures needed
to create, manage, store, distribute and revoke
certificates based on public-key cryptography."
Described in RFC3280 as published by the IETF.
RA See Registration Authority.
RA clone Separate instances of the RA executable, which use
the same key material and the same database.
RA components Combination of RA (Server), RA database, RA
exchange, Protocol Handlers and WebRAO that
together provide the registration portal (interface)
to the system.
Registration Authority Operator See WebRAO.
RAO See WebRAO.
Registration The process of collecting information required to
generate and authorize (approve) a certificate
request. Registration may be face-to-face, or may be
via a protocol handler or programmatic interface
(referred to as remote registration).
Registration Authority The RA acts as a router, transferring information to
and from the CA. It receives and verifies certificate
requests from the registering entities, and sends
back the CA’s reply.
Registration policy A registration policy (RP) provides a set of rules
and criteria for certificate requests that must be met
before the CA can issue a certificate. An RP
governs what data must be collected for the
certificate applicant to register, determines the
content of the certificate(s) produced, and controls
the life cycle of the certificate.
Registration Policy Editor The Registration Policy Editor is a portion of the
CAO, which is used to create registration policies.
Remote registration The process of registration being initiated via a
protocol handler or a programmatic interface
rather than face-to-face.
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Term Description
Revocation The process of invalidating a public key certificate.
There are a number of reasons for revocation,
including: unspecified, key compromise, CA
compromise, affiliation changed, superseded and
certificate hold. A certificate hold places a
certificate on hold, referred to as suspension of a
certificate in this document. With the exception of
certificate hold, all other reasons for revocation are
permanent, which means the certificate will no
longer be or become valid.
Revocation Request Revocation requests include requests to revoke,
suspend and unsuspended a certificate.
Revoke To invalidate a certificate.
Root CA The Certification Authority at the top of the PKI
hierarchy.
Root certificate The self-signed public-key certificate at the top of
the PKI hierarchy.
RP See Registration policy.
Schema The structure of a database system, including the
layout of fields in tables, and the relationships (if
any) between different tables.
Smart card A card with an embedded integrated circuit for
storing information, typically used for
authenticating a computer user or banking
services, providing access control, storing value
applications, and/or carrying private keys in a
security system.
“Social engineering” attack An attack whereby a trusted person is either bribed
or threatened to cause them to reveal or change
something that they should not.
Sub CA See Subordinate CA.
Subject DN The distinguished name that identifies the entity to
whom a certificate is issued, for example: cn=John
Doe, ou=Sales, o=Acme, l=Northeast, c=US.
Subordinate CA A Certification Authority that is below the level of
the root CA. A subordinate CA is a special case of a
CA, whereby the CA certificate is registered
(certificate is signed by another CA) as part of
another PKI. UniCERT may be configured either as
a root CA or a subordinate CA.
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Term Description
Suspension The temporary revocation of a certificate. Once a
certificate has been suspended it can be handled in
one of three ways:
· It may remain on the CRL with no further
action, causing users to reject transactions issued
during the hold period.
· It may be replaced by a (final) revocation for the
same certificate, in which case the reason shall
be one of the standard reasons for revocation,
the revocation date shall be the date the
certificate was suspended.
· It may be explicitly released and the entry
removed from the CRL.
System administrator The person responsible for maintaining the systems
necessary for the smooth running of UniCERT,
including the operating system, the Oracle
database, communications lines, etc.
Unsuspension Removing the temporary hold (suspension) of a
certificate and therefore removing it from the CRL.
UPI UniCERT Programmatic Interface. A separate
software toolkit, which provides access to the
authorization and registration functionality within
UniCERT. May not be used with the product in its
evaluated configuration.
Web Registration Authority
Operator
See WebRAO.
WebRAO A Web-based application used to review and
authorize (approve) certificate requests and which
may also be used to submit certificates requests on
behalf of an end entity.
X.509 The ISO/ITU-TX.509 standard defines what
information can be included in a certificate and a
certificate revocation list and describes the data
format of the information.
X.509 certificate The ISO/ITU-T X.509 Standard defines two types
of certificates, the X.509 public key certificate and
the X.509 attribute certificate. In this document the
X.509 certificate refers to a X.509 public key
certificate. (See also Public Key Certificate.)
X.509 public key certificate A block of data containing your public key and
basic identification details rendered unforgeable by
the digital signature of the issuing CA private key,
encoded in the ISO/ITU-T X.509 format.
Table 1-2 Glossary
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1.6 References
1.6.1 The following documents were referenced in the preparation of this
Security Target:
[3DES] FIPS 46-3 (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips46-3/fips46-
3.pdf)
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(ISO/IEC 15408), version 2.1, Parts 1, 2 and 3
[FLR] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (CEM-2001/0015R) Part 2: Evaluation Methodology
Supplement: ALC_FLR – Flaw Remediation, Version 1.1 February
2002
[DER] ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER) ITU-T Rec. X.690 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:1998, available at
http://asn1.elibel.tm.fr/en/standards/ASN1-1997.htm
[DSA] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication 186-2, 27 January 2000
(http://www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-2/fips186-2-
change1.pdf)
[PEM] Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: Key
Certification and Related Services
(http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1424.txt)
[PKCS10] PKCS #10 v1.7: Certification Request Syntax Standard, RSA
Laboratories, May 26 2000
[RFC1321] R. Rivest. RFC1321: The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm, April 1992.
[PKCS11] PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Standard, RSA Laboratories,
v2.01 December 1997
[PKCS12] PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax, RSA Laboratories,
v1.0, June 24, 1999
[PKCS7] PKCS #7 v1.5: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard, RSA
Laboratories, Nov 1 1993
[PPST_G] Guide for production of Protection Profiles and Security Targets,
version 0.8, ISO/IEC WD 15446, M. Donaldson, July 1999
[RSA] PKCS 1 (http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-
1/index.html)
[SCEP] Cisco System’s Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol,
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/pd/sqsw/tech/scep_wp.ht
m
[SHA-1] Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 180-2, 1 August 2002
(http://www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-
2withchangenotice.pdf)
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2. TOE Description
2.1 Product Type
2.1.1 UniCERT provides all the functionality needed to implement a PKI system,
essentially a system that provides registration, PKI management and
certification authority functions. This can then be used to manage all the
keys necessary for a system requiring security for end users, such as a
secure messaging system, or security on Web browsers. UniCERT provides
the ability to set up a centralized or a distributed PKI for organizations of
any size.
2.1.2 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides the core framework for a wide
variety of components, applications, policies and practices to combine and
achieve the four principal security functions for commercial transactions:
2.1.3 Confidentiality – to keep information private
2.1.4 Integrity – to prove that information has not been manipulated
2.1.5 Authentication – to prove the identity of an individual or application
2.1.6 Non-repudiation – to ensure that information cannot be disowned
2.1.7 Lack of security is often cited as a major barrier to the growth of e-
commerce, which can only be built on the confidence that comes from
knowing that all transactions are protected by these core functions.
2.1.8 A Public Key Infrastructure is made up of hardware and software products
combined with the policies and procedures to implement and operate the
system. It provides the basic security required to carry out electronic
business so that users, who do not know each other, or are widely
distributed, can communicate securely through a chain of trust. PKI is
based on digital IDs known as “digital certificates” which act like
“electronic passports”, and bind the user’s public key to his or her private
key.
2.1.9 A PKI should consist of:
2.1.9.1 Security Policy
A security policy sets out and defines an organization’s top-level direction on
information security, as well as the processes and principles for the use of
cryptography. Typically it will include statements on how the organization will
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handle keys and valuable information, and will set the level of control required to
match the levels of risk.
2.1.9.2 Certification Practices Statement (CPS)
Some PKI systems are Commercial CAs, and therefore require a CPS. This is a
detailed document containing the operational procedures on how the Security
Policy will be enforced and supported in practice. It typically includes definitions
on how the CAs are constructed and operated, how certificates are issued,
accepted and revoked, and how keys will be generated, registered and certified,
where they will be stored, and how they will be made available to users.
2.1.9.3 Certification Authority
The CA system is the trust basis of a PKI, as it manages public key certificates for
their whole life cycle. The CA will:
· Issue certificates by binding the identity of a user or system to a public key with
a digital signature;
· Schedule expiry dates for certificates;
· Ensure certificates are revoked when necessary; and
· Informs users about revoked certificate by publishing Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRLs).
2.1.9.4 Registration Authority
An RA provides the interface between the user and the CA. It captures and
authenticates the identity of the users and submits the certificate request to the CA.
The quality of this authentication process determines the level of trust that can be
placed in the certificates.
2.1.9.5 Certificate Distribution System
A certificate distribution system is the mechanism for delivering end-user
certificates and their status to the parties that will need to rely on them. This is
typically an LDAP directory acting as a repository for certificates and/or
revocation lists and also may be an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
responder that delivers certificate status.
2.1.9.6 PKI-enabled applications
A PKI is a means to an end, providing the security framework by which PKI-
enabled applications can be confidently deployed to achieve the end benefits.
Examples of applications are:
2.1.10 Communications between web servers and browsers
2.1.11 Email
2.1.12 Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
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2.1.13 Credit card transactions over the Internet
2.1.14 Virtual Private Networks (VPN)
2.2 Methods of Use
2.2.1 Within a PKI, the policies under which certificates are issued determine the
level of confidence other parties will have in the certificates issued by a CA,
and are normally published in a Certification Practice Statement (CPS). This
states the policies for issuing various levels of certificates and the
registration process that people must go though in order to obtain a
certificate.
2.2.2 UniCERT is designed to accommodate the requirements of a wide variety of
CPSs. In particular, the registration process may involve the acquisition and
verification of a variety of data from users, directly in face-to-face requests
or indirectly in remote requests via the UniCERT Protocol Handler, e.g.,
web browser, email and VPN.
2.2.3 UniCERT’s unique Registration Policy editor enables you to be able to set
up details of:
· How the registration process is to be done
· Information that needs to be checked or recorded
· The number of keys and hence certificates that are to be generated (typically
separate keys are generated for signing and encryption purposes)
· Where and on what media the keys are to be generated, keys can be generated
by the end user or by the WebRAO user, and can be stored on diskette, disk,
smart card or token.
· Format of certificates that are to be produced
· The number of authorizers required to accept a certification request
· Additional business information to be collected during the registration process.
2.2.4 Face-to-Face Registration
2.2.4.1 For some PKI implementations, a direct registration system is the only
secure means to correctly authenticate users and distribute/generate keys
and certificates. In an Intranet environment, an organization may
implement a policy whereby users must visit a security officer personally to
receive a disk or smart card with their keys and certificates. This
registration may involve the candidate showing an employee ID card,
driver’s license, passport or other means of identification.
2.2.4.2 In an Internet environment, organizations with public offices such as banks,
post offices, etc. may require customers to present themselves at a branch or
retail counter. UniCERT includes a face-to-face registration system, which
offers a simple, easy-to-use Windows interfaces.
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2.2.4.3 The person using the WebRAO program enters an end user’s details and
accepts or rejects the candidate’s application. Keys can either be generated
by the WebRAO program and are secured using a passphrase entered by
the applicant, or the applicant can generate their own keys, and provide the
public key to the WebRAO.
2.2.4.4 Once the certificate is processed, the certificate can be saved on a smart card
or disk and given to the user.
2.2.5 Remote Registration
2.2.5.1 In many cases, a method of registration other than face-to-face is required,
where the user is remote from the WebRAO, and wants to submit their
registration request from a browser, email or VPN. In these cases the
registration request is sent via the UniCERT Protocol Handlers, and the
request is stored at the RA. A WebRAO user can then authorize the request
in the same way as when doing face-to-face registration.
2.2.5.2 Alternatively, if allowed by the registration policy, the RA can send
requests received from the UniCERT Protocol Handler automatically to the
CA without being authorized by a WebRAO user. Registration policies that
allow this are not permitted in the evaluated configuration.
2.2.6 Custom Registration
2.2.6.1 Another of the features that make UniCERT flexible is that custom
registration processes can be built, typically using the UniCERT ARM or
Cybertrust KeyTools. This may be done where it is required for the
registration process to interact with another application or database, for
example a human resources database. However, note that the ARM is
outside of the evaluation and cannot be used with the product when it is in
its evaluated configuration.
2.2.7 Certificate Distribution
2.2.7.1 Certificate distribution is one of the primary functions that a PKI must be
able to perform in a flexible manner. There are three separate types of
certificate distribution: Issued certificates need to be delivered to the
requestor, the CA certificate needs to be exportable and published, it may
also be necessary to put end-user certificates in a directory to allow other
end-users access to them. All of this has to be done in a fashion that suits
the end-user and utilizes the organization’s infrastructure.
2.2.7.2 End-user certificates must be provided to the requestor by a method and in
a format that matches the requestor requirements. UniCERT has the
flexibility to issue certificates in a wide variety of formats and to deliver
them by suitable mechanisms, the Registration Policy controls this.
Typically, certificates dealt with in a face-to-face manner are distributed
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either in software or on cryptographic hardware e.g., smart cards and
requests that have come remotely are distributed by the same method in
which they were received: email, HTTP or sockets. However using the
Registration Policy, alternative distribution mechanisms can be used.
2.2.7.3 The CA certificate typically needs to be made as public as possible. End-
users must be able to download the CA certificate and manually trust it
before they can take advantage of the services offered by the PKI. The CA
certificate within UniCERT can be exported in a variety of different formats,
and is included in PKCS#12 and PKCS#7 responses to end-users. If an
X.500 or LDAP directory is being utilized then the certificate can be
published to the directory using the Publisher.
2.2.7.4 The use of a directory in conjunction with UniCERT is optional but adds
considerable functionality. In order to encrypt messages it is necessary to
have the recipient’s certificate. In order to verify a signature one must have
access to the signer’s certificate. For these two reasons it is common to store
certificates and revocation information (CRLs) in a directory. This directory
is made accessible to the user group.
2.2.7.5 The UniCERT Publisher handles all publishing. This is standards based and
can be configured to use the lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP).
This allows the PKI to take advantage of an already existing directory and
gives maximum flexibility if a new one is required. UniCERT has a flexible
schema in order to fit in with a corporate structure.
2.2.7.6 UniCERT also allows certificates and CRLs to be published to disk. This
opens up possibilities for custom publication mechanisms to be
implemented outside of the CA; however, the Publisher provides very
flexible publishing capabilities.
2.2.8 Ease of Use
2.2.8.1 The “cost of ownership” of a CA system should always be considered
before purchasing. Apart from the cost of the hardware and software
components, issues such as training, maintenance, configuration and
management function need to be considered. All modules run on standard
operating systems, i.e., Windows, which are familiar to most computer
users (the server components also run on Solaris). UniCERT is entirely
controlled by graphical user interfaces (GUIs) that allow for a very short
training cycle. Informational and instructional messages can be included
within the policy to inform the user of correct procedure.
2.2.9 Configuration
2.2.9.1 UniCERT CAO offers a GUI based PKI editor, Registration Policy editor
and Operational Policy editor. This eliminates the need for complicated file
configurations and also allows users to quickly verify configuration details.
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These facilities enable centralized (or regional) control with distributed
authority. Cybertrust’s philosophy of securely pushing registration and
operation policies to the other UniCERT modules is in line with network-
centric computing. This minimizes administration costs and reduces the
risk of errors.
2.2.10 Auditing
2.2.10.1 UniCERT maintains a number of different system logs, which detail a
number of system and user actions. These logs can be viewed through
UniCERT screens and complex reports can be done through the use of SQL.
All the database logs are signed by the entity logging the information and
are verifiable via the GUI screens.
2.2.11 Backup and Recovery
2.2.11.1 No form of cryptography can ever protect against data loss. Any business
critical PKI implementation needs to put in place the procedures and
policies necessary to ensure that all data can be restored.
2.2.11.2 In order to restore UniCERT 5, the cryptographic tokens, PSEs, data and
system configurations are required; these should be backed up and kept
secure.
2.2.11.3 UniCERT stores its data, and audit events in a database. UniCERT uses
Oracle as its database. Oracle supports many advanced features for the
backup and restoration of data. These should be used to support the backup
and restoration of the PKI.
2.2.12 Cloning and Continuity
2.2.12.1 UniCERT 5 support cloning this is where a component such as the CA, can
be duplicated, either locally to share the processing load, or remotely to
provide a continuity of service should a site or its host computer fail.
2.2.12.2 A cloned component will share the same tokens, database account and
certificate, but may be on the same machine (on a different port) or different
machine. The database may be put in failsafe mode, replicated, or kept
synchronized using the various Oracle recommended techniques.
2.2.12.3 The use of clones is transparent to the user, since a certificate issued by a
cloned system, or involving cloned components, will be identical.
2.3 Product Components
2.3.1 UniCERT 5 components can be broken down into core components and
utilities that are provided with the basic CA and RA management
installations. In addition a number of Advanced Components can be used
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with UniCERT 5 such as the Key Archive Server and the Advanced
Registration Module, but these modules are not included as part of this
evaluation.
2.3.2 The UniCERT 5 core components can be further sub-divided into
Certification Authority components and Registration Authority
components.
2.3.3 The Certification Authority components are responsible for the generation
and publication of certificates and certificate revocation lists, and for the
overall management of the PKI. The components are as follows:
· Certification Authority (CA) service
· CA Operator (CAO)
· Publisher (not part of the TOE)
· Certificate Status Server (CSS)
The relationship between these components is shown diagrammatically in Figure
2-1.
Figure 2-1 Certification Authority Components and Interface
2.3.4 The Registration Authority components are responsible for gathering
registration information and revocation requests, authorizing requests, and
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handling renewals. The control over what registration authority
components are allowed to do is provided by the Certification Authority
components. The Registration Authority components are as follows:
· Registration Authority (RA) service
· The RA Event Viewer
· RA eXchange
· The protocol handlers: Web Handler, email Handler, SCEP Handler, and CMP
Handler (the CMP Handler is out of scope of the evaluation.)
· Web RA Operator (WebRAO)
The relationship between these components is shown diagrammatically in Figure
2-2.
Figure 2-2 Registration Authority Components and Interface
2.3.5 UniCERT 5 utilities are as follows
· Database Wizard
· Key Generator
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· Token Manager
· Service Manager
2.3.6 Certification Authority (CA)
2.3.6.1 Description of the CA Component of the TOE
The UniCERT CA is the highest hierarchical element in the UniCERT PKI. Its
primary purpose is to sign and issue digital certificates, which provide a means of
exchanging electronic information securely.
The Certification Authority (CA) module is the nucleus of a PKI. All trust within
the infrastructure depends upon the CA’s signature. The CA operates according to
its own flexible operational policy, which is controlled using the Certification
Authority Operator (CAO).
The functionality of the CA is as follows (note that the functions referred to are
further described later in this document, in the TOE Summary Specification):
a) On starting up the CA user must identify themselves by choosing a key and
accessing it by using a PIN or passphrase (IA_Identify).
b) When this is successfully done, the CA retrieves the latest PKI from the CA
database and verifies it against its signature (it is stored with the signature of
the CAO user that updated it) using the function PP_PKIVerify. If the latest
PKI is not verifiable then processing stops with an error message. If no PKI
exists in the database then the CAO user is required to use functionality
described in the CAO section to create the PKI.
c) The CA checks the CRL in its database to ensure that it exists and has not
expired. If either of these conditions is true then it generates a new one and
signs it, updating the database as it does so using the function
CR_Publish_Rev_Cert_Status.
d) The CA uses the retrieved PKI to identify and authenticate both it’s own
user, and all other entities that attempt to communicate to it when such
communications are initiated, using the function IA_Authenticate to ensure
that all of these entities are in the PKI and have valid, current certificates.
e) The CA uses CP_Authenticate to continue to authenticate those connections.
It disconnects any connections made by entities that are not in the PKI or
otherwise cannot be authenticated using the function CP_Disconnect.
f) The CA receives approved certificate requests from Registration Authorities
(RAs) and CAOs, and returns certificates and an indication of success or
error using the function CG_Generate.
g) Using CG_Generate, the CA signs all certificates that it generates and stores
them in the CA database. If requested, CG_Generate can check that all
certificates being generated have a unique DN and/or public key before
producing a certificate – if requested to do this check, and one of these items
is not unique, then it will not produce a certificate but will return an error.
CG_Generate also maintains this information in the CA database so that it
can continue to perform this check when requested to do so.
h) The CA receives approved revocation requests from Registration Authorities
(RAs) and CAOs, and responds to them, using the functions CR_Suspend,
CR_Revoke, or CR_Unsuspend, as appropriate. Note that certificates are
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both suspended and unsuspended using a revocation request from a RA.
These functions will result either in the certificate’s status being changed in
the CA’s database as requested and an indication of success, or an indication
of an error.
i) The CA signs the PKI using the function PP_PKIProtect prior to sending it to
the RA (or KAS) using the PP_PKIExport function.
j) The CA can sign and publish CRLs, partitioned CRLs (CDPs) and ARLs to
either the CA database or disk files using the function
CR_Publish_Rev_Cert_Status. This can be done immediately, or by
scheduling it using records in the CA database via
CR_Publish_Rev_Cert_Status. The information in the disk files can then be
published by UniCERT Publisher (which is not part of the TOE).
k) Message Signing – using the functions CP_Protect and CP_Origin, all
messages sent by the CA are digitally signed with the CA’s private key.
l) Message Verification - the CA verifies all messages it receives to ensure
integrity and authenticity using the function CP_Verify. If any do not verify
correctly they are discarded by that function and the connection is
disconnected using CP_Disconnect.
m) Audit logging – audit records (as listed in Table 5-1) are stored by the CA in
the CA’s database by the functions AL_Logging and AL_Integrity.
AL_Integrity is used to ensure that all audit log information stored is
digitally signed by the CA, and each entry has a unique tracking number.
2.3.6.2 Features
a) Multi-language support (Unicode)
b) Extensive hardware security module (HSM) support.
c) Multiple key pairs – optionally the CA can have individual key pairs for
each of its functions: certificate signing, CRL signing, digital signature and
non-repudiation. Key usage can be grouped and combined as required.
d) Variable CRL publication time.
e) Supports RSA (up to 4096 bits) and DSA key pairs.
2.3.7 Certification Authority Operator (CAO)
2.3.7.1 Description of the CAO Component of the TOE
The Certification Authority Operator (CAO) module provides a GUI that the
administrator of the PKI uses to configure the PKI. The CAO’s purpose is to allow
its user to control all of the administration functions and grant privileges to other
UniCERT modules and users. There can be multiple CAO users each with
diminished rights if distributed control is required.
The functionality of the CAO is as follows (note that the functions referred to are
further described later in this document, in the TOE Summary Specification):
a) On starting up the CAO user is requested to identify themselves by choosing
a key and accessing it by using a PIN or passphrase (IA_Identify). They can
choose to not do so, which allows them to either create a new PKI, or work
on registration policies, saving them to external files, using the functions
described later in this section.
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b) When the user has identified themselves with a private key and chosen a
PKI to work on, the CAO retrieves the PKI from the CA database and
verifies it using PP_PKIVerify. The settings within the PKI for the CAO user
define the CAO user’s permissions within that PKI and describe how the
CAO should communicate to the CA entity.
c) The CAO then checks that it is in the retrieved PKI and has a valid and
current certificate using the function IA_Authenticate.
d) Registration Policies control the information to be collected and processes
used to issue certificates. The CAO provides facilities for working on
Registration Policies as follows:
i) The CAO user can create and maintain these policies using the
function PG_PolicyConfigure to edit them and save them to the
database.
ii) The policies may be exported to disk for backup or to the other PKI
entities using the function PG_PolicyExport: this function puts them
into a format suitable for transmission or storage and writes them to
disk or exports them to the entity that requires them.
iii) Registration Policies may be retired or deleted when no longer
required using the function PG_PolicyRetire and PG_PolicyDelete.
When retired, they are marked as such in the CA’s database but not
deleted, so that they cannot be used for new registration requests but
can still be referenced. They can only be deleted from the database by
PG_PolicyDelete if they have not been published or used to register
certificates at the CAO – if either of these conditions is true they can
only be retired.
iv) Registration Policies may also be configured in various ways, for
example they can be assigned to Authorization Groups (see below)
using PG_PolicyConfigure. Any changes made in this area are stored
as part of the policy in the CA database.
v) PG_PolicyImport is used to import registration policies from files that
they had been exported to using PG_PolicyExport.
e) The CAO can be used to create Authorization Groups with the function
GG_Create. It can then be used to assign WebRAO users to Authorization
Groups (or remove them from those groups) using the function GG_Modify.
Authorization Groups may also be marked as retired in the database, which
stops them from still being used, while allowing reference to them – this is
done by the function GG_Retire. Authorization group information is stored
in the CA database by these functions.
f) The CAO is used to create and modify the PKI, using the functions
PP_PKICreate and PP_PKIModify. When this is done, the PKI is stored in
the CA database, signed with the CAO user’s key using the function
PP_PKIProtect. When the PKI is extracted for any reason it is verified
against this signature using the function PP_PKIVerify.
g) Entities (including TOE administrator accounts and a hierarchy of CAs) can
be created and updated by CAO facilities via the function PP_EntityModify.
Not all of these “PKI entities” will always be part of a PKI – they may be
registered as part of a PKI using PP_EntityRegister. They will all be stored
in the CA database, and may be deleted when no longer required using
PP_EntityDelete. The certificates created by the TOE are never deleted from
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the CA’s database, but information about the entities that own them may be
deleted.
h) The CAO is used to register and submit requests for certificates. This
registration is done using the function CG_Register (for PKI entities) or
CG_Request (for end entities, which may include certificate renewals),
which is then authorized and submitted as a request to the CA (using
CG_Authorize), which will generate the certificate. The generation,
authorization and request all result in updating the CA’s database to reflect
these actions, and the request is sent to the CA using the communication
channel between the CA and CAO. This process may involve the generation
of keys for these entities using the function KG_Generate.
i) As well as generating keys, the CAO provides functionality to split access to
keys via KG_Split, and to export keys in a protected manner via KG_Export.
The CAO will also securely destroy all keys it holds in memory using
KG_Destroy.
j) The CAO can be used to authorize the revocation of any certificate (note that
revocation requests include requests to suspend and unsuspend) using the
function CR_Authorize. Authorized revocation requests are communicated
to the CA (which performs the requested action) using the function
CR_Request.
k) Message Signing – using the functions CP_Protect and CP_Origin, all
messages sent by the CAO are digitally signed with the CAO user’s private
key.
l) Message Verification - the CAO verifies all messages it receives to ensure
integrity and authenticity using the function CP_Verify. If any do not verify
correctly then the messages are discarded.
m) Audit logging – audit records (as listed in Table 5-2) are stored by the CAO
in the CA’s database by the functions AL_Logging and AL_Integrity.
AL_Integrity is used to ensure that all audit log information stored is
digitally signed by the CA, and each entry has a unique tracking number.
n) The CAO can be used to selectively view the audit records stored in the
CA’s database using AL_Selection. CAO users that have been assigned the
correct permissions, can also check the integrity of audit records
(AL_Integrity) and archive those audit records using AL_Archive, while still
preserving the integrity of the audit log.
o) A CAO user can request the CA to publish CRLs, partitioned CRLs (CDPs)
and ARLs to disk files using the function CR_Publish_Rev_Cert_Status.
p) A CAO user with the requisite permissions can use the function
AL_CreateAuditor to assign (or remove assignations of) auditor roles to
administrators. (If assigned the appropriate auditor roles, the administrator
is able to review and/or archive records from either or both of the CA
and/or RA databases as described elsewhere.) A CAO user cannot provide
another CAO user with greater permissions than they have themselves.
2.3.7.2 Features
a) Multi-language support (Unicode)
b) CAO keys can be kept in a range of smart cards/tokens or in software.
c) Publication of CRL can be forced for immediate revocation
d) Easy to use GUI.
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e) Log and certificate tracking interface.
f) Certificate and CRL retrieval.
g) Diminished roles – an individual CAO user can have limited privileges.
2.3.8 Certificate Status Server (CSS)
2.3.8.1 Description of the CSS Component of the TOE
The purpose of the CSS is to provide real-time certificate status information to the
other UniCERT components. The CSS acts as a server listening for network
connections. When a connection is established, the CSS checks for Online
Certificate Status Protocols (OCSP) requests. The CSS responds to OCSP request
message by sending OCSP response messages containing the status of each
certificate listed in the request.
The functionality of the CSS is as follows (note that the functions referred to are
further described later in this document, in the TOE Summary Specification):
a) On starting up the CSS user must identify themselves by choosing a key and
accessing it by using a PIN or passphrase (IA_Identify).
b) When this is successfully done, the CSS retrieves the latest PKI from the CA
database and verifies it against its signature using the function
PP_PKIVerify. If there is no PKI or the latest PKI is not verifiable then
processing stops with an error message.
c) The CSS then checks that it is in the retrieved PKI and has a valid and
current certificate in order to identify and authenticate itself, using the
function IA_Authenticate.
d) The CSS then responds to requests for certificate status and provides real
time information on the status of the certificate using the function
CR_Publish_Rev_Cert_Status
e) Message Signing – using the functions CP_Protect and CP_Origin, all
messages sent by the CSS are digitally signed with the CSS user’s private
key.
2.3.9 UniCERT Publisher (NOT part of the TOE, but can be run with the TOE)
2.3.9.1 Description of UniCERT Publisher
The Publisher handles all the publishing requirements of the CA, including the
ability to publish to a wide range of different directories (including Microsoft’s
Active directory) and OCSP responders, and to be able to publish to multiple
directories. It supports flexible publishing schemas, and has the ability to only
publish certain types of certificates. It takes files that can be output by the CA
component and publishes them if requested to do so by an administrator. The
UniCERT Publisher does not implement core UniCERT security functionality, and
so has not been included as part of the TOE.
The functionality of the UniCERT Publisher is as follows:
a) Publication of CA certificates – the Publisher optionally publishes its CA
certificates to one or more LDAP connected directories.
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b) Publication of CRLs and ARLs – the Publisher optionally publishes CRLs
and ARLs to one or more LDAP connected directories.
c) Publication of End Entity certificates – the Publisher optionally publishes
end entity certificates to one or more LDAP connected directories. Control of
whether end entities certificates are published is done via configurable
filters.
d) Publication of CRLs to OCSP responder – the Publisher optionally publishes
CRLs to Online Certification Status Protocol (OCSP) servers.
2.3.9.2 Features
a) Multi-language support (Unicode)
b) LDAP support
c) Extensive support for different directories
d) When certificates are published, other attributes can also be published
e) Configurable Filters to control which end entity certificates are published
f) Publication of CRLs to OCSP responders
2.3.10 Registration Authority (RA)
2.3.10.1 Description of the RA Component of the TOE
The purpose of the Registration Authority (RA) is to act as a router between RA
Operators (WebRAOs), Protocol handlers and the CA.
The functionality of the RA is as follows (note that the functions referred to are
further described later in this document, in the TOE Summary Specification):
a) On starting up the RA user must identify themselves by choosing a key and
accessing it by using a PIN or passphrase (IA_Identify).
b) Then, using PP_PKIVerify the RA attempts to retrieve the PKI from the RA
database, and also requests it from the CA (the CA sends it using
PP_PKIExport). The RA requests the PKI from the CA so as to ensure that it
has the most up-to-date copy (and updates the RA database with this copy if
not). When the PKI is obtained the RA verifies it.
c) The RA then uses the retrieved PKI to identify and authenticate both it’s
own user and all entities that attempt to communicate to it when such
communications are initiated, using the function IA_Authenticate.
d) It also uses CP_Authenticate to continue to authenticate those connections.
It disconnects any connections made by entities that are not in the PKI or
otherwise cannot be authenticated using the function CP_Disconnect.
e) The RA checks the RA database for processed requests and then
communicates any approved end-user certificate and revocation requests
received from the WebRAO users to the CA. It receives certificates and
confirmation (or error) messages from the CA and makes them available to
the WebRAO users, via the RA eXchange. It updates the database to reflect
the request status of the certificates that it receives from the CA as it
distributes them. The security-enforcing part of this functionality is
performed by CG_Distribute.
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f) If selected in the registration policy, the RA sends end users’ private
encryption keys that are marked to be archived to the Key Archive Server
(KAS). These will have been encrypted by the WebRAO.
g) The RA is responsible for initiating end-user certificate rollover, when an
end-user’s certificate is about to expire and the associated registration policy
dictates that a new certificate is to be issued. This is performed by the
function CG_Request.
h) The RA securely destroys all private keys it holds in memory using the
function KG_Destroy.
i) Message Verification - the RA verifies all messages it receives to ensure
integrity and authenticity using the function CP_Verify. If any do not verify
correctly they are discarded by that function and the connection is
disconnected using CP_Disconnect.
j) Message Signing – using the functions CP_Protect and CP_Origin, all
messages sent by the RA are digitally signed with the RA’s private key.
k) Audit logging – audit records (as listed in Table 5-3) are stored by the RA in
the RA’s database by the functions AL_Logging and AL_Integrity.
AL_Integrity is used to ensure that all audit log information stored is
digitally signed by the RA, and each entry has a unique tracking number.
l) Security-relevant data (i.e., certificate request history) that is stored by the
RA in the RA’s database is protected by the function DP_Store using a
digital signature. It is verified against its signature when retrieved, by the
function DP_Verify.
2.3.10.2 Features
a) Multi-language support (Unicode)
b) Extensive HSM support
2.3.11 RA eXchange (RAX)
2.3.11.1 Description of the RA eXchange Component of the TOE
The purpose of the RA eXchange is to provide a communication link between the
RA and the Protocol Handlers, WebRAOs and Web Handler. The RA eXchange
acts as an entry point into UniCERT’s RA, in particular, the RA’s database. It is the
server that receives requests, retrieves or inserts data into the RA’s database
according to the request, and then returns an appropriate response.
The functionality of the RA eXchange is as follows (note that the functions referred
to are further described later in this document, in the TOE Summary Specification):
a) On starting up the RA eXchange user must identify themselves by choosing
a key and accessing it by using a PIN or passphrase (IA_Identify).
b) The RA eXchange then retrieves the PKI from the RA database and verifies it
using PP_PKIVerify.
c) It checks that it is in the PKI, and has a valid and current certificate, using
IA_Authenticate, and, if not, it shuts down. Otherwise it then uses the
retrieved PKI to identify and authenticate all entities that attempt to
communicate to it when such communications are initiated, using the
function IA_Authenticate respectively. It also uses CP_Authenticate to
continue to authenticate those connections. It disconnects any connections
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made by entities that are not in the PKI or otherwise cannot be authenticated
using the function CP_Disconnect.
d) The RA eXchange receives certificate and revocation requests from the
Protocol Handlers and passes them to WebRAO users for authorization, and
sends certificates and informational messages back to the Protocol Handlers.
This is done using the functions CP_Verify, CG_Distribute and CP_Protect.
e) Message Verification - the RA eXchange verifies all signed messages it
receives to ensure integrity and authenticity using the function CP_Verify. If
any of these do not verify correctly they are discarded by that function and
the connection is disconnected using CP_Disconnect.
f) Security-relevant data (i.e., certificate requests) that is stored by the RA
eXchange in the RA’s database is protected by the function DP_Store using
the RA eXchange user’s digital signature. It is verified against its signature
when retrieved, by the function DP_Verify.
g) Audit logging – audit records (as listed in Table 5-4) are stored by the RA
eXchange in the RA’s database by the functions AL_Logging and
AL_Integrity. AL_Integrity is used to ensure that all audit log information
stored is digitally signed by the RA eXchange user, and each entry has a
unique tracking number.
2.3.11.2 Features
a) Multi-language support (Unicode).
2.3.12 RA Event Viewer (RAE)
2.3.12.1 Description of the RA Event Viewer Component of the TOE
The purpose of the RA Event Viewer is to provide a GUI for retrieving and
performing limited actions on the audit events from the RA database. All
Registration Authority Components provide audit event records that are stored in
the RA database.
The functionality of the RA Event Viewer is as follows (note that the functions
referred to are further described later in this document, in the TOE Summary
Specification):
a) On starting up the RA Event Viewer user must identify themselves by
choosing a key and accessing it by using a PIN or passphrase (IA_Identify).
b) The RA Event Viewer then retrieves the PKI from the RA database and
verifies it using PP_PKIVerify. It checks that its own user is in the PKI and
has a valid and current certificate, using IA_Authenticate, and, if not, it shuts
down. It also obtains the permissions of the current user from the PKI to
determine their ability to use the RA Event Viewer.
c) The RA Event Viewer allows a RA Event Viewer user to review all, or a
selection of audit records in the audit log table or all records in an audit log
archive file using the function AL_Selection. This function selects audit
records from the RA database according to criteria entered by the RA Event
Viewer user and displays them to the RA Event Viewer user, or displays all
the content of an audit log file.
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d) The RA Event Viewer allows the RA Event Viewer user to confirm the
integrity of the audit records using the function AL_Integrity. AL_Integrity
checks the signatures on the audit records to do this.
e) The RA Event Viewer allows a RA Event Viewer user with the required
permissions to archive part of the audit log whilst maintaining its integrity
by using the function AL_Archive. This function moves the selected records
from the standard audit log table in the RA database to an archive log file.
f) Audit logging – audit records are stored by the RA Event Viewer in the RA’s
database by the functions AL_Logging and AL_Integrity. AL_Integrity is
used to ensure that all audit log information stored is digitally signed by the
RA Event Viewer user, and each entry has a unique tracking number.
2.3.12.2 Features
g) Multi-language support (Unicode)
2.3.13 WebRAO
2.3.13.1 Description of the WebRAO Component of the TOE
The purpose of the WebRAO is to enable its users to authorize certification and
revocation requests. These requests will have been sent from the Protocol
Handlers, or from other WebRAO users. WebRAO users can also handle face-to-
face registrations. . The WebRAO users belong to one or a number of
Authorization Groups, and can only process requests associated with specific
registration policies that have been assigned to their Authorization Groups by
CAOs.
In the evaluated configuration of UniCERT v5, the WebRAO component can be
used with SSL turned on to provide another layer of security to your PKI
installation, but UniCERT v5 is not dependent on SSL or any other feature of the
browser or the web server to achieve its security objectives.
The functionality of the WebRAO is as follows (note that the functions referred to
are further described later in this document, in the TOE Summary Specification):
a) On starting up the WebRAO user must identify themselves by choosing a
key and accessing it by using a PIN or passphrase (IA_Identify).
b) The WebRAO can be used to generate and authorize certificate requests
using Registration Policies, which have been defined by the CAO users, for
their Authorization Group. This is done using CG_Request and
CG_Authorize respectively, and results in entries being made in the RA
database (by the RA eXchange) to reflect these actions. The certificate
requests can be made face-to-face, or can be sent to the WebRAO user from
other WebRAO users or from the Protocol Handlers. Using CG_Distribute,
the WebRAO can retrieve the certificates from the RA DB and distribute the
generated certificates to those that should receive them.
c) The WebRAO user can also place a registration request using CG_Register.
This allows the WebRAO user to register another PKI entity (note that the
only other PKI entities that WebRAOs can register are other WebRAOs), and
results in a request going to the CA to issue a certificate for the PKI entity
using the same functionality as for CG_Request and CG_Authorize.
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d) The WebRAO may be used to generate end user keys on a token or in
software as part of this activity, using the function KG_Generate. It may
also be used to export keys via the function KG_Export. The WebRAO will
securely delete all keys that it holds in memory after use, via the function
KG_Destroy. If the registration policy being used to generate the certificate
specifies that the private key will be archived, then the WebRAO encrypts
the private key before sending it with the certificate request
(DP_KeyExport).
e) The WebRAO may also be used to reject a certification request. This is
performed using the function CG_Authorize.
f) Under the control of the Registration Policies, the WebRAO can be used to
provide additional authorization for certification requests received from
other WebRAOs using the function CG_Authorize.
g) The WebRAO can be used to authorize or reject the revocation of a certificate
(note that revocation requests include requests to suspend and unsuspend)
with the function CR_Authorize. Authorized revocation requests are
communicated to the CA (which performs the requested action) using the
function CR_Request.
h) The WebRAO user can obtain certificate status using the function
CR_Publish_Rev_Cert_Status.
i) Message Signing – using the functions CP_Protect and CP_Origin, messages
sent by the WebRAO, which are important to the security objectives of the
TOE, are digitally signed with the WebRAO user’s private key.
2.3.13.2 Features
a) Multi-language support (Unicode)
b) WebRAO keys can be kept in a range of smart cards/tokens or in software.
c) Easy to use GUI.
d) Certificate tracking interface.
e) Extensive smart card support.
2.3.14 Protocol Handlers (PH)
2.3.14.1 Description of the PH Component of the TOE
The PH is an extensible set of request handlers, whose purpose is to handle
certification requests using such protocols as Web, email, Cisco SCEP and PKIX
CMP (although the PKIX CMP handler is not included in the evaluation and
cannot be run in the evaluated configuration).
The Protocol Handlers handle the complexities of the various certificate
management protocols, and pass the registration (or revocation) requests into the
RA using a common internal format. Each request is automatically associated with
a registration policy by the PH (which is then used to control it authorization path
etc.)
If allowed by the registration policy, the Protocol Handlers receive the certificates
back from the RA and communicate them to the end user according to the
methods allowed by the protocol handler.
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The functionality of the PH component is as follows (note that the functions
referred to are further described later in this document, in the TOE Summary
Specification):
a) On starting up the PH (except for the Web Handler) demands that its user
identifies themselves by choosing a key and accessing it by using a PIN or
passphrase (IA_Identify). If this is successful, it retrieves the PKI from the
RA database via the RA eXchange and verifies it using PP_PKIVerify. It
checks that its user is in the PKI, using IA_Authenticate, and, if not, it shuts
down, disconnecting its own communications using CP_Disconnect.
b) The email PH provides the following functionality:
· It retrieves certificate requests in PKCS#10 or PEM format from a POP3 store
and submits them using CG_Request. The email PH sends back certificates
in PKCS#7 (certificate chain), X.509 (binary) or PEM format via a SMTP
server using CG_Distribute.
· The email PH also distributes email notices, where these have been set up in
a registration policy (note that this is not security functionality)
· Email notices can be configured to be sent out for any of the following status
(note that this is not security functionality):
· Pending - certificate request has been received into system,
· Rejection - certificate request has been rejected,
· Pickup - send out a URL where the certificate can be retrieved,
· Expiry Warning Reminder - warns that a certificate is about to
expire,
· Certificate - which includes a certificate in response to a certificate
request (which may have been requested by another registration
method), or from auto renewal via the system.
· Key Archival - successful archive of private key pair at Key
Archive Server (KAS)
c) The Web PH provides the following functionality:
· It provides registration pages, which are dynamically built from the
registration policies. Via these request pages customers may request
certificates via the major browsers (Netscape and Microsoft IE) and via PKI-
aware applications capable of generating PKCS#10 certificate requests (e.g.,
Web servers). This functionality is provided using CG_Request.
· Using the function CG_Distribute, the Web PH is able to distribute
certificates that have been requested via the Web PH, or where web
distribution has been configured in a registration policy.
· Where allowed by the registration policy, the Web PH supports end-user
revocation by providing revocation specific web pages. End users may
revoke or suspend their own certificate and must supply a password in
order to perform this function, which is supplied by the function
CR_Request.
· The Web PH also enables users to query the status of the certificate, and to
down load CRLs via the function CR_Publish_Rev_Cert_Status.
d) The SCEP PH (SCEP - Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol - is the
certificate request and retrieval method used by Cisco and other VPN
vendor devices and software – defined in [SCEP]):
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· receives SCEP requests directly by sockets and generates certificate requests
to the CA using CG_Request
· returns the certificate in the same manner using CG_Distribute.
2.3.14.2 Features
a) Multi-language support (Unicode)
2.3.15 UniCERT Utilities
UniCERT also contains a number of utilities for handling such things as token
management, key generation, database setup, and service management. These are
described below.
2.3.16 Token Manager Utility (TM)
2.3.16.1 Description of the Token Manager Component of the TOE
The purpose of the Token Manager is to allow an administrator to manage the
various personal secure environments (PSEs) used in PKIs. The Token Manger is a
stand-alone module that manages software and hardware (smart cards and HSMs)
PSEs.
The functionality of the Token Manager component is as follows (note that the
functions referred to are further described later in this document, in the TOE
Summary Specification):
a) The Token Manager initializes tokens before they are used. This process
protects the token with a PIN.
b) The Token Manager is responsible for changing the PINs on tokens. This is
done by the function KG_Update.
c) The Token Manager is used to change the passphrase that protects keys
stored in software. This is done by the function KG_Update.
d) PSE files can be written to tokens using this module. These actions are
performed by the DP_Export, KG_Update and KG_Export functions. This
does not apply to when PSEs are copied from one location to another, for
example when copying a PSE from a file to a token.
e) The Token Manager can split access to a key, based on user input, using the
function KG_Split. The KG_Split function is not available on the Solaris
version of the Token Manager.
f) The Token Manager can securely destroy a key with the function
KG_Destroy.
2.3.16.2 Features
a) On Windows the Token Manager runs as a GUI, and on Solaris as a
command line utility.
2.3.17 Service Manager Utility (SM)
2.3.17.1 Description of the Service Manager Component of the TOE
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The purpose of the Service Manager is to provide an interface that allows an
administrator to start and stop all of the server components e.g., the CA, CSS, RA,
RA eXchange and PHs (except the Web Handler).
The functionality of the Service Manager component is as follows (note that the
functions referred to are further described later in this document, in the TOE
Summary Specification):
a) The Service Manager provides an interface that allows an administrator to
start the server components of the TOE. When the administrator attempts to
do so, the Service Manager uses parts of IA_Identify to allow the
administrator to identify themselves to services. The identification action is
performed by allowing the user to choose their key and provide a
passphrase or PIN to open it. The other TOE components provide the
identification and authentication mechanism – the only part of IA_Identify
that the Service Manager provides is an interface to allow the user to choose
the key and enter their PIN or passphrase and request to start the service –
these are passed on to the relevant TOE component. Services may be added
using the Service Manager, by selecting from a list of supported services
b) Multiple instances of each service can be started
c) Services can be configured to be started manually or automatically (but the
automatic start option is not allowed in the evaluated configuration of the
TOE)
d) The Service Manager also allows the user to stop services. The administrator
is not required to re-authenticate before stopping services.
2.3.17.2 Features
a) On Windows the Service Manager runs as a GUI, and on Solaris as a
command line utility
2.3.18 Database Wizard Utility (DBW)
2.3.18.1 Description of the Database Wizard Component of the TOE
The Database Wizard is used to initially create the Oracle tables, and to create
database user accounts for the UniCERT users. . The Database Wizard only works
on database to create or destroy user accounts and database instances for the TOE
components and to configure the database structure. The Database Wizard is
unable to modify the data, or the account privileges. It can be used to change the
account password. The Database Wizard does not contain security functionality,
and does not handle security relevant data, but only exists to assist an
administrator begin working with the TOE.
2.3.19 Key Generator Utility (KGU)
2.3.19.1 Description of the Key Generator Component of the TOE
The main purpose of the Key Generator is to perform key generation for the
UniCERT components such as the CA, RA, and Protocol Handlers, etc. Once the
keys have been generated, a PKCS#10 can be sent to a CAO for certification. The
CAO returns a PKCS#7, which is then imported using this utility. The Key
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Generator supports both hardware based cryptographic devices (HSMs, smart
cards) as well as software.
The functionality of the Key Generator component is as follows (note that the
functions referred to are further described later in this document, in the TOE
Summary Specification):
a) The Key Generator enables the PKI entities to request certificates from the
CAO using the function CG_Register.
b) The Key Generator generates keys in both hardware-based cryptographic
devices and software using the function KG_Generate.
c) The Key Generator securely exports software keys using the KG_Export
function.
d) The Key Generator enables a key to be split into a number of components
when saving a PSE to file or token. The Key Generator uses KG_Split to
provide this functionality. The KG_Split function is not available on the
Solaris version of the Key Generator.
2.3.19.2 Features
a) On Windows the Key Generator runs as a GUI, and on Solaris as a command
line utility
2.4 UniCERT Configurations
2.4.1 The diagrams in this section show various ways that UniCERT can be
configured so as to run with other products. All of these configurations are
possible in the evaluated configuration of the product: the evaluated
configuration includes all configurations running on all supported
platforms, within the limitations described in this document.
2.4.2 Section 2.3 describes which of these items form the TOE. All other items
shown are products that can be used with the TOE – i.e., the CA database,
the Publisher, the smart cards, HSM (hardware security module), OCSP
(Online Certificate Status Protocol) directory, LDAP (Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol) directory, and RA database.
2.4.3 The following sections demonstrate some of the ways that the product can
be installed.
2.4.4 Root CA Configuration
2.4.4.1 Figure 2-3 shows the CA, CAO, database and optionally Publisher on one
system, optionally using an HSM for the CA, and a smart card for the CAO.
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Figure 2-3 Root CA Configuration
2.4.5 Single CA/RA Configuration
2.4.5.1 Figure 2-4 shows all the components resident on one system, using software
cryptography. Note that “Web Handler Servlets” form part of the Web
Handler; “WebRAO Servlets” are part of the WebRAO.
Figure 2-4 All components on one system with software cryptography
2.4.5.2 Figure 2-5 shows the system as in Figure 2-4 but with the databases on a
separate system, and using HSMs and smart cards. As for the previous
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diagram, note that “Web Handler Servlets” form part of the Web Handler;
“WebRAO Servlets” are part of the WebRAO.
Figure 2-5 Single CA – RA with smart cards CA and RA on one system, and databases on
separate system
2.4.6 Separate CA and RAs
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As for Figure 2-5, note that in Figure 2-6 the “Web Handler Servlets” form part of
the Web Handler; “WebRAO Servlets” are part of the WebRAO.
Figure 2-6 CA and RA on separate systems
2.5 UniCERT Evaluated Configuration
This section describes the items that may be used with the TOE in its evaluated
configuration, and a number of configuration options that may not be used in the
evaluated configuration.
2.5.1.1 Hardware
All UniCERT modules will run on the following minimum “customer” hardware
platforms with the exception of the CAO and WebRAO client (applet) that are PC
only:
Component Recommended Configuration
1.8 GHz Pentium IV
256 MB RAM without Oracle; or
512 MB RAM with Oracle
Windows
4 GB for Oracle install
452 MB for Oracle data
390 MB for TOE Components
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Component Recommended Configuration
Single Ultra Sparc 64 bit CPU
1024 MB RAM with out Oracle; or
2048 MB RAM with Oracle
Unix1
4 GB for Oracle Install
452 MB for Oracle data
390 MB for TOE Components
Table 2-1 Platform Configurations
2.5.1.2 Operating Systems
The following operating systems will be supported by all UniCERT 5 modules
except where explicitly stated.
Server
Windows 2000 Server SP4; or
Windows 2003 Enterprise Edition
Windows
Client
Windows 2000 Professional SP4; or
Windows XP Professional SP2
Unix
Except CAO, RA Event
Viewer, and WebRAO
which are Windows
only components
Sun Solaris 8 (Patch Bundle 5/02 (May 2002))
Table 2-2 Supported Operating Systems
2.5.1.3 Web Servers
Table 2-3 indicates the web servers and servlet managers used in conjunction with
UniCERT 5.
Operating System
Web Server Servlet
Manager
Windows Solaris 8
Apache v1.3
or v2.0
Jakarta
Tomcat
UniCERT 5
WebRAO
UniCERT 5
WebRAO
1 Note, in a Unix configuration, the operator GUI’s CAO and RA Event Viewer can only be run and
installed on a Windows operating system.
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v4.1.27 Web Handler Web Handler
IIS v5.0 ServletExec
v4.2 patch 19
UniCERT 5
WebRAO
Web Handler
N/A
Sun Java
System Web
Server v6.0
SP2
None
Required
UniCERT 5
WebRAO
Web Handler
UniCERT 5
WebRAO
Web Handler
Table 2-3 Supported Web Servers and Servlet Managers
2.5.1.4 Browsers
Table 2-4 indicates the browsers used in conjunction with the WebRAO.
Operating System
Browser
Windows Sol8
IE v5.5 SP2 and
v6.0
N/A
Netscape v7.2 v7.2
Table 2-4 Supported Browsers at the WebRAO
Table 2-5 indicates the browsers used in conjunction with the Web Handler.
Operating System
Browser
Windows Sol8
IE v5.5 SP2 and
v6.0
N/A
Netscape v4.7 or v7.x v4.7 or v7.x
Table 2-5 Supported Browsers at the Web Handler
2.5.1.5 Database - Oracle
UniCERT 5 will use Oracle 9i, as follows:
Configuration Supported Version
Oracle v9.2.0.5 (9i) and security
patch
Windows Server
Oracle v8.1.7.4 and security patch
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Configuration Supported Version
Solaris Server Oracle v9.2.0.6(9i)
Windows Client Oracle v9.2.0.1 (9i)
Solaris Client Oracle v9.2.0.6 (9i)
Table 2-6 Supported Oracle Versions
2.5.1.6 Crypto Modules
If a hardware security module is used within the evaluated configuration of
UniCERT, this module must be certified under the Common Criteria to at least
EAL4. This certification must cover the provision of the SFRs listed under
OE.TamperNotify and OE.HardwareFunctions. At the time of writing only the
Luna® CA³, Version 3.97, Software Version 8.1, from SafeNet (formerly Chrysalis-
ITS) has been certified in this way.
If the evaluated version of UniCERT is to be used with a smart card, then that
smart card must be certified under the Common Criteria to at least EAL4. This
certification must cover the provision of the SFRs listed under
OE.HardwareFunctions. At the time of writing only the Oberthur Card Systems
“COSMOPOLIC 2.1 V4 JavaCard Open Platform Embedded Software version 1”
has been certified in this way.
2.5.1.7 Maintenance Agreement
In order to be in the evaluated configuration the owners of UniCERT 5 are
required to participate in a maintenance agreement with Cybertrust. The
maintenance agreement ensures that security flaws and vulnerabilities that have
been discovered by users or by internal analysis are communicated to the user.
The maintenance agreement will also ensure that remedial or corrective actions
will be communicated to the user in a timely manner.
2.5.1.8 Other Software
A number of Cybertrust products can be run with UniCERT 5 to provide extra
functionality. Some of these may be run with the product when it is in its
evaluated configuration, and some may not, as follows:
· Advanced Registration Module (ARM) – MAY NOT be used with the TOE in its
evaluated configuration, unless a separate evaluation of the ARM software
running with the TOE is performed
· UniCERT Programmatic Interface (UPI) – MAY NOT be used with the TOE in
its evaluated configuration, unless a separate evaluation of the UPI software
running with the TOE is performed
· The CMP handler MAY NOT be installed or used with the TOE in the evaluated
configuration, unless a separate evaluation of the CMP handler software
running with the TOE is performed
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· Key Archive Server (KAS)– MAY be run with the TOE in its evaluated
configuration. This product has a defined interface to the TOE and the security
functions of the TOE that form this interface are part of the evaluation
· Publisher– MAY be run with the TOE in its evaluated configuration. This
product only accepts output from an interface of the TOE – this interface is part
of the evaluation.
2.5.1.9 Product Configuration
A number of configuration options of the product must be set as specified by the
administrator for the product to be in its evaluated configuration, as follows:
· Automatic startup of the UniCERT services MAY NOT be used (unless a
separate evaluation of the TOE with this option turned on is performed). All
UniCERT services must be set to Manual startup in the UniCERT Service
Manager so that the passphrases or PINs used to open the PKI keys are not
stored anywhere on the machines running the TOE
· ECDSA key algorithm MAY NOT be used in registration policies – it does not
form part of the evaluated product.
· Registration policies can provide an option to allow No Authorization. In the
evaluated configuration, this MAY NOT be used.
2.6 CD Content Lists
The TOE is distributed on CDs. As of the time of the evaluation, there are CDs for
the 5.2.1 release for Windows and Solaris, as well as 5.2.1.900 patch CDs for
Windows and Solaris. Note that subdirectories that only contain other
subdirectories (no files) are not listed in these subsections.
2.6.1 UniCERT 5.2.1 for Windows
Table 2-7 lists the files on the UniCERT Core v5.2.1 for Windows CD and their
sizes. In the interest of space, the documentation files (those under D:\docs) are
listed separately in Appendix A.
Filename File size
(bytes)
Root directory files (D:\)
UniCERT.ico 766
autorun.inf 50
core_install.exe 18,359,193
Files in D:\MicroSoft\Redist
MSVCP60.DLL 401,462
vcredist.exe 1,809,120
Files in D:\modules
ca_install.exe 18,458,804
cao_install.exe 23,593,973
cmp_install.exe 17,996,098
common_install.exe 78,163,559
coredocs_install.exe 35,803,985
css_install.exe 18,348,200
email_install.exe 18,415,908
publisher_install.exe 21,635,824
ra_install.exe 18,480,554
rax_install.exe 18,074,152
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Filename File size
(bytes)
scep_install.exe 18,420,427
Table 2-7 CD Contents for UniCERT Core v5.2.1 on Windows
Table 2-8 lists the files on the UniCERT Web Components v5.2.1 for Windows CD
and their sizes.
Filename File size
(bytes)
Root directory files (D:\)
UniCERT.ico 766
autorun.inf 50
webcomponents_install.exe 18,309,449
webreadme.html 7,371
Files in D:\modules
webhandler_install.exe 69,927,834
webrao_install.exe 76,286,455
Table 2-8 CD Contents for UniCERT Web Components v5.2.1 on Windows
Table 2-9 lists the files on the UniCERT WebRAO Client v5.2.1 for Windows CD
and their sizes. In the interest of space, the documentation files (those under
D:\docs) are listed separately in Appendix A.
Filename File size (bytes)
Root directory files (D:\)
autorun.inf 52
installer.jar 90,131
Files in D:\Client
IdentrusExtra.dll 81,920
IdentrusPkcs11.dll 208,896
JCryptoki.dll 245,760
KeyToolsProJava5220Signed.jar 993,178
US_export_policy.jar 4,355
local_policy.jar 4,368
ocs_lib.dll 376,832
Files in D:\jre
CHANGES 1,126
COPYRIGHT 4,519
LICENSE 15,549
LICENSE.rtf 25,641
LICENSE_de.rtf 96,318
LICENSE_es.rtf 33,512
LICENSE_fr.rtf 50,533
LICENSE_it.rtf 62,114
LICENSE_ja.rtf 50,115
LICENSE_ko.rtf 305,403
LICENSE_sv.rtf 71,880
LICENSE_zh_CN.rtf 33,149
LICENSE_zh_TW.rtf 32,341
README.txt 10,313
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Filename File size (bytes)
THIRDPARTYLICENSEREADME.txt 10,367
Welcome.html 998
Files in D:\jre\bin
JdbcOdbc.dll 49,278
NPJPI142_03.dll 65,650
NPJava11.dll 65,647
NPJava12.dll 65,647
NPJava13.dll 65,647
NPJava14.dll 65,647
NPJava32.dll 65,647
NPOJI610.dll 65,647
RegUtils.dll 110,707
awt.dll 970,862
axbridge.dll 94,323
cmm.dll 139,374
dcpr.dll 139,375
dt_shmem.dll 24,689
dt_socket.dll 20,595
eula.dll 61,547
fontmanager.dll 327,811
hpi.dll 28,791
hprof.dll 49,258
ioser12.dll 24,715
jaas_nt.dll 20,611
java.dll 102,515
java.exe 24,681
javaw.exe 28,779
jawt.dll 20,592
jcov.dll 61,544
jdwp.dll 102,505
jpeg.dll 122,992
jpicom32.dll 82,035
jpicpl32.cpl 61,555
jpicpl32.exe 16,501
jpiexp32.dll 94,323
jpins4.dll 28,783
jpins6.dll 41,071
jpins7.dll 45,167
jpinsp.dll 86,127
jpishare.dll 77,939
jsound.dll 139,384
jucheck.exe 241,777
jusched.exe 32,881
keytool.exe 28,801
kinit.exe 28,797
klist.exe 28,797
ktab.exe 28,795
msvcrt.dll 266,293
net.dll 57,455
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Filename File size (bytes)
nio.dll 32,880
orbd.exe 28,820
policytool.exe 28,807
rmi.dll 20,590
rmid.exe 28,795
rmiregistry.exe 28,807
servertool.exe 28,832
tnameserv.exe 28,822
verify.dll 57,453
w2k_lsa_auth.dll 20,563
zip.dll 53,364
Files in D:\jre\bin\client
Xusage.txt 1,410
jvm.dll 1,212,546
Files in D:\jre\bin\server
Xusage.txt 1,410
jvm.dll 2,740,354
Files in D:\jre\javaws
JavaCup.ico 25,214
JavaWebStart.dll 139,264
Readme.html 12,382
Readme_de.html 15,799
Readme_es.html 15,028
Readme_fr.html 15,293
Readme_it.html 14,947
Readme_ja.html 14,976
Readme_ko.html 11,878
Readme_sv.html 13,013
Readme_zh_CN.html 9,718
Readme_zh_TW.html 11,881
cacerts 21,653
javalogo52x88.gif 2,841
javaws-l10n.jar 98,420
javaws-license.txt 10,540
javaws.exe 135,168
javaws.jar 1,198,733
javaws.policy 138
javawspl.dll 36,864
sunlogo64x30.gif 980
Files in D:\jre\javaws\resources
copyright.jpg 19,014
messages.properties 1,734
messages_de.properties 2,135
messages_es.properties 2,189
messages_fr.properties 2,171
messages_it.properties 2,026
messages_ja.properties 3,747
messages_ko.properties 3,172
messages_sv.properties 2,172
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Filename File size (bytes)
messages_zh_CN.properties 2,215
messages_zh_TW.properties 2,283
miniSplash.jpg 5,076
splash.jpg 10,008
Files in D:\jre\lib
charsets.jar 5,604,126
content-types.properties 5,778
flavormap.properties 3,904
font.properties 4,520
font.properties.CP1250 4,589
font.properties.CP1251 4,589
font.properties.CP1253 4,589
font.properties.CP1254 4,589
font.properties.CP1256 4,359
font.properties.CP1257 4,589
font.properties.MS950_HKSCS 7,610
font.properties.hi 5,711
font.properties.iw 3,079
font.properties.ja 6,218
font.properties.ko 5,645
font.properties.ru 4,607
font.properties.th 5,575
font.properties.zh 5,524
font.properties.zh.98 5,527
font.properties.zh_CN_GB18030 5,763
font.properties.zh_TW 6,020
font.properties.zh_TW.95 5,678
font.properties.zh_TW_MS950_HKSCS 7,616
jce.jar 69,596
jsse.jar 895,647
jvm.hprof.txt 2,748
jvm.jcov.txt 4,890
logging.properties 2,299
plugin.jar 2,003,473
psfont.properties.ja 3,177
psfontj2d.properties 10,981
rt.jar 26,429,417
sunrsasign.jar 89,343
tzmappings 6,867
Files in D:\jre\lib\audio
soundbank.gm 493,589
Files in D:\jre\lib\cmm
CIEXYZ.pf 51,236
GRAY.pf 632
LINEAR_RGB.pf 1,044
PYCC.pf 274,474
sRGB.pf 150,368
Files in D:\jre\lib\ext
dnsns.jar 8,896
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Filename File size (bytes)
jh.jar 500,623
ldapsec.jar 53,248
localedata.jar 769,335
sunjce_provider.jar 111,374
Files in D:\jre\lib\fonts
LucidaBrightDemiBold.ttf 75,144
LucidaBrightDemiItalic.ttf 75,124
LucidaBrightItalic.ttf 80,856
LucidaBrightRegular.ttf 344,908
LucidaSansDemiBold.ttf 317,896
LucidaSansRegular.ttf 698,236
LucidaTypewriterBold.ttf 234,068
LucidaTypewriterRegular.ttf 242,700
Files in D:\jre\lib\i386
jvm.cfg 695
Files in D:\jre\lib\im
indicim.jar 10,441
thaiim.jar 7,939
Files in D:\jre\lib\images\cursors
cursors.properties 1,359
invalid32x32.gif 153
win32_CopyDrop32x32.gif 165
win32_CopyNoDrop32x32.gif 153
win32_LinkDrop32x32.gif 168
win32_LinkNoDrop32x32.gif 153
win32_MoveDrop32x32.gif 147
win32_MoveNoDrop32x32.gif 153
Files in D:\jre\lib\security
US_export_policy.jar 2,440
cacerts 21,653
java.policy 2,271
java.security 7,059
local_policy.jar 2,921
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi
CET 1,168
EET 1,072
GMT 27
MET 1,168
WET 1,068
ZoneInfoMappings 12,970
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\Africa
Abidjan 65
Accra 181
Addis_Ababa 65
Algiers 333
Asmera 65
Bamako 85
Bangui 65
Banjul 77
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Filename File size (bytes)
Bissau 77
Blantyre 65
Brazzaville 65
Bujumbura 27
Cairo 1,500
Casablanca 213
Ceuta 1,112
Conakry 85
Dakar 77
Dar_es_Salaam 85
Djibouti 65
Douala 65
El_Aaiun 77
Freetown 313
Gaborone 77
Harare 65
Johannesburg 105
Kampala 97
Khartoum 337
Kigali 65
Kinshasa 27
Lagos 65
Libreville 65
Lome 27
Luanda 65
Lubumbashi 27
Lusaka 65
Malabo 77
Maputo 65
Maseru 89
Mbabane 65
Mogadishu 73
Monrovia 77
Nairobi 97
Ndjamena 89
Niamey 89
Nouakchott 85
Ouagadougou 65
Porto-Novo 77
Sao_Tome 65
Timbuktu 65
Tripoli 293
Tunis 265
Windhoek 824
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\America
Adak 1,224
Anchorage 1,224
Anguilla 65
Antigua 77
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Filename File size (bytes)
Araguaina 1,036
Aruba 77
Asuncion 1,116
Barbados 137
Belem 297
Belize 513
Boa_Vista 329
Bogota 89
Boise 1,284
Buenos_Aires 517
Cambridge_Bay 1,096
Cancun 792
Caracas 77
Catamarca 517
Cayenne 77
Cayman 65
Chicago 1,960
Chihuahua 816
Cordoba 517
Costa_Rica 137
Cuiaba 1,116
Curacao 77
Danmarkshavn 341
Dawson 1,108
Dawson_Creek 509
Denver 1,336
Detroit 1,200
Dominica 65
Edmonton 1,316
Eirunepe 313
El_Salvador 105
Fortaleza 377
Glace_Bay 1,204
Godthab 1,036
Goose_Bay 1,792
Grand_Turk 1,044
Grenada 65
Guadeloupe 65
Guatemala 121
Guayaquil 65
Guyana 89
Halifax 1,924
Havana 1,372
Hermosillo 189
Indianapolis 329
Inuvik 1,096
Iqaluit 1,092
Jamaica 233
Jujuy 517
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Filename File size (bytes)
Juneau 1,224
La_Paz 81
Lima 169
Los_Angeles 1,560
Louisville 1,500
Maceio 393
Managua 153
Manaus 313
Martinique 89
Mazatlan 840
Mendoza 517
Menominee 1,216
Merida 788
Mexico_City 880
Miquelon 1,032
Monterrey 788
Montevideo 581
Montreal 1,928
Montserrat 65
Nassau 1,284
New_York 1,960
Nipigon 1,144
Nome 1,228
Noronha 329
Panama 65
Pangnirtung 1,096
Paramaribo 101
Phoenix 141
Port-au-Prince 313
Port_of_Spain 65
Porto_Velho 297
Puerto_Rico 77
Rainy_River 1,144
Rankin_Inlet 1,088
Recife 377
Regina 497
Rio_Branco 297
Santiago 1,360
Santo_Domingo 201
Sao_Paulo 1,116
Scoresbysund 1,040
St_Johns 2,048
St_Kitts 65
St_Lucia 65
St_Thomas 65
St_Vincent 65
Swift_Current 241
Tegucigalpa 105
Thule 852
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Filename File size (bytes)
Thunder_Bay 1,192
Tijuana 1,276
Tortola 65
Vancouver 1,592
Whitehorse 1,108
Winnipeg 1,568
Yakutat 1,220
Yellowknife 1,088
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\America\Indiana
Knox 765
Marengo 361
Vevay 185
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\America\Kentucky
Monticello 1,260
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\America\North_Dakota
Center 1,276
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\Antarctica
Casey 65
Davis 81
DumontDUrville 81
Mawson 65
McMurdo 1,124
Palmer 1,144
Rothera 65
Syowa 65
Vostok 65
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\Asia
Aden 65
Almaty 1,016
Amman 1,052
Anadyr 1,044
Aqtau 1,016
Aqtobe 1,016
Ashgabat 269
Baghdad 1,004
Bahrain 77
Baku 984
Bangkok 65
Beirut 1,208
Bishkek 1,024
Brunei 77
Calcutta 97
Choibalsan 361
Chongqing 181
Colombo 121
Damascus 1,300
Dhaka 97
Dili 93
Dubai 65
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Filename File size (bytes)
Dushanbe 261
Gaza 1,236
Harbin 205
Hong_Kong 617
Hovd 357
Irkutsk 1,040
Jakarta 129
Jayapura 85
Jerusalem 1,236
Kabul 65
Kamchatka 1,040
Karachi 121
Kashgar 193
Katmandu 77
Krasnoyarsk 1,040
Kuala_Lumpur 121
Kuching 217
Kuwait 65
Macau 393
Magadan 1,040
Makassar 85
Manila 125
Muscat 65
Nicosia 1,116
Novosibirsk 1,048
Omsk 1,040
Oral 1,016
Phnom_Penh 97
Pontianak 125
Pyongyang 101
Qatar 77
Qyzylorda 1,028
Rangoon 85
Riyadh 65
Riyadh87 4,661
Riyadh88 4,581
Riyadh89 4,581
Saigon 97
Sakhalin 1,044
Samarkand 281
Seoul 165
Shanghai 201
Singapore 121
Taipei 381
Tashkent 277
Tbilisi 1,008
Tehran 924
Thimphu 77
Tokyo 27
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Filename File size (bytes)
Ulaanbaatar 357
Urumqi 181
Vientiane 97
Vladivostok 1,040
Yakutsk 1,040
Yekaterinburg 1,040
Yerevan 1,016
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\Atlantic
Azores 1,868
Bermuda 1,124
Canary 1,044
Cape_Verde 97
Faeroe 1,016
Madeira 1,864
Reykjavik 577
South_Georgia 27
St_Helena 65
Stanley 1,080
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\Australia
Adelaide 1,224
Brisbane 189
Broken_Hill 1,224
Darwin 125
Hobart 1,288
Lindeman 221
Lord_Howe 1,012
Melbourne 1,224
Perth 157
Sydney 1,224
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\Etc
GMT 27
GMT+1 27
GMT+10 27
GMT+11 27
GMT+12 27
GMT+2 27
GMT+3 27
GMT+4 27
GMT+5 27
GMT+6 27
GMT+7 27
GMT+8 27
GMT+9 27
GMT-1 27
GMT-10 27
GMT-11 27
GMT-12 27
GMT-13 27
GMT-14 27
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Filename File size (bytes)
GMT-2 27
GMT-3 27
GMT-4 27
GMT-5 27
GMT-6 27
GMT-7 27
GMT-8 27
GMT-9 27
UCT 27
UTC 27
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\Europe
Amsterdam 1,544
Andorra 968
Athens 1,196
Belfast 2,032
Belgrade 1,040
Berlin 1,236
Brussels 1,564
Bucharest 1,180
Budapest 1,312
Chisinau 1,212
Copenhagen 1,152
Dublin 1,916
Gibraltar 1,676
Helsinki 1,036
Istanbul 1,464
Kaliningrad 1,140
Kiev 1,048
Lisbon 1,868
London 2,024
Luxembourg 1,568
Madrid 1,416
Malta 1,440
Minsk 1,064
Monaco 1,576
Moscow 1,152
Oslo 1,216
Paris 1,568
Prague 1,216
Riga 1,108
Rome 1,440
Samara 1,040
Simferopol 1,064
Sofia 1,088
Stockholm 1,040
Tallinn 1,080
Tirane 1,164
Uzhgorod 1,052
Vaduz 1,008
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Filename File size (bytes)
Vienna 1,200
Vilnius 1,060
Warsaw 1,400
Zaporozhye 1,072
Zurich 1,056
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\Indian
Antananarivo 89
Chagos 65
Christmas 27
Cocos 27
Comoro 65
Kerguelen 65
Mahe 65
Maldives 65
Mauritius 65
Mayotte 65
Reunion 65
Files in D:\jre\lib\zi\Pacific
Apia 77
Auckland 1,336
Chatham 856
Easter 1,264
Efate 233
Enderbury 89
Fakaofo 65
Fiji 105
Funafuti 65
Galapagos 77
Gambier 65
Guadalcanal 65
Guam 65
Honolulu 117
Johnston 27
Kiritimati 89
Kosrae 85
Kwajalein 89
Majuro 77
Marquesas 65
Midway 65
Nauru 97
Niue 89
Norfolk 77
Noumea 121
Pago_Pago 77
Palau 65
Pitcairn 77
Ponape 65
Port_Moresby 27
Rarotonga 285
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Filename File size (bytes)
Saipan 77
Tahiti 65
Tarawa 65
Tongatapu 133
Truk 65
Wake 65
Wallis 65
Yap 77
Files in D:\vm
j2re-1_4_2_06-windows-i586-p.exe 15,691,488
Table 2-9 CD Contents for UniCERT WebRAO Client v5.2.1 on Windows
2.6.2 UniCERT 5.2.1.900 for Windows
Table 2-10 lists the files on this CD and their sizes.
Filename File size (bytes)
RAGateway521.dll 880,640
RAService.exe 610,304
UniCERT_v5.2.1_Windows_patch_900readme.html 13,723
unicert_5_additional_cc_guidance.pdf 462,798
Table 2-10 CD Contents for UniCERT v5.2.1.900 on Windows
2.6.3 UniCERT Core 5.2.1 for Solaris
Table 2-11 lists the files on the UniCERT Core v5.2.1 CD for Solaris and their sizes.
As there is only a Windows version of the CAO, its Windows installer and
associated files are also included on this CD.
In the interest of space, the documentation files (those under /docs) are listed
separately in Appendix A.
Filename File size (bytes)
Root directory files (/)
UniCERT.ico 766
autorun.inf 52
core_install.bin 33,225,676
Files in /cao
cao_master.exe 18,383,669
Files in /MicroSoft/Redist
MSVCP60.DLL 401,462
vcredist.exe 1,809,120
Files in /cao/modules
cao_install.exe 23,593,973
common_install.exe 78,163,559
coredocs_install.exe 35,803,985
Files in /modules
ca_install.bin 34,274,056
cmp_install.bin 35,126,638
common_install.bin 118,810,163
css_install.bin 33,279,195
email_install.bin 34,297,705
publisher_install.bin 41,618,400
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Filename File size (bytes)
ra_install.bin 34,140,552
rax_install.bin 38,079,509
scep_install.bin 34,352,477
serversdocs_install.bin 49,555,426
Table 2-11 CD Contents for UniCERT Core v5.2.1 on Solaris
Table 2-12 lists the files on the UniCERT Web Components v5.2.1 for Solaris CD
and their sizes.
Filename File size (bytes)
Root directory files (/)
<translation table> 1
webcomponents_install.bin 34,194
webreadme.html 11
Files in /modules
<translation table> 1
webhandler_install.bin 91,776
webrao_install.bin 97,648
Table 2-12 CD Contents for UniCERT Web Components v5.2.1 on Solaris
As there is only a Windows version of the WebRAO Client (which also gets
distributed with UniCERT v5.2.1 for Solaris), see Table 2-9 for a listing of its files.
2.6.4 UniCERT 5.2.1.900 for Solaris
Table 2-13 lists the files on this CD and their sizes.
Filename File size (bytes)
unicert521_900.tar, which includes:
o libRAGateway_521u.so
o RAService
o unicert_5_additional_cc_guidance.pdf
7,742,976
5,609,200
1,667,920
462,798
unicert521solaris900readme.html 15,242
Table 2-13 CD Contents for UniCERT v5.2.1.900 on Solaris
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3. TOE Security Environment
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 This section contains a statement of the TOE Security Environment. It
describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is
intended to be used and the manner in which it is expected to be employed.
3.2 Secure Usage Assumptions
3.2.1 User
3.2.1.1 A.DisposalofAuthenticationData: Proper disposal of authentication data
Authentication data and associated privileges should be properly disposed of
and/or removed as appropriate when no longer required. This includes the
removal from the PKI, the revocation of certificates and the secure deletion of
authentication data for both human and non-human users (i.e., the CAO user or
the CA) when appropriate. For example, if a CAO administrator leaves the
organization that runs a PKI, then their certificate should be revoked, their private
key securely destroyed, and the CAO entity that they managed should be removed
from the PKI. Similarly, if it is suspected that a private key has been
compromised, then the associated certificate should be promptly suspended or
revoked.
3.2.1.2 A.AuditReview: It is assumed that authorized auditor(s) will regularly
review audit records.
The auditor roles are responsible for regularly reviewing audit records for signs of
attempted attacks. They should perform regular audits of the audit records
(including checking the integrity of the audit logs) and respond to any such
attempted attacks as appropriate. They should also ensure that the audit data is
regularly archived to prevent audit data storage exhaustion.
3.2.1.3 A.CPS: It is assumed that the PKI users are familiar with and uphold the CP
and CPS that the PKI operates.
All PKI users, especially the TOE administrators and users, will be familiar with
and trusted to uphold the requirements of their PKI’s Certification Policy and
Certification Practices Statement.
3.2.1.4 A.CompetentPKIUsers: Assume competent PKI users
All PKI users, especially the administrators and users are competent, either by
training or experience, to manage, operate and use the TOE and the security and
privacy of the data it contains. In order to be competent all such persons will read,
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understand and follow the guidance documentation that is relevant to them, and
will have a good understanding of the principles of computer security and Public
Key Infrastructures.
3.2.1.5 A.MaliciousCodeNotExecuted: Assume the TOE trusted users do not
execute malicious code.
It is assumed that the TOE administrators and users do not install and execute
malicious code on the same platform as the TOE.
3.2.1.6 A.SecureInstallation: Ensure that the system is set up and operated
securely.
The Systems administrators are responsible for securely installing, operating and
maintaining the TOE and other IT components used when operating the TOE.
These persons are trusted to do so in a secure fashion. The TOE, and the IT
components that are associated with it (i.e., hardware, operating systems, web
server, RA and CA databases, browsers) should be physically and logically
protected from access by untrusted persons.
3.2.1.7 A.Guidance: Assume the PKI administrators and users read and follow the
guidance material.
The Guidance contains all necessary information to securely install, configure,
operate and maintain the TOE. It is assumed that administrators and users read
the guidance material so they can appropriately perform their duties. This
material provides information on what the TOE is able to do securely. An example
of this is the value of the assets that the TOE is able to protect: as the TOE is
evaluated to an EAL 4+ level, it is only able to provide protection to information
assets of less than a moderate value.
3.2.2 Physical/Logical
3.2.2.1 A.CommunicationsProtection: Protect communications both logically and
physically
The system owners are responsible for providing adequate logical and physical
protection on the communications channels used by the TOE.
This includes the use of firewalls to prevent logical intrusions, and the physical
protection of the communications system, to guard against unauthorized access or
malicious modification and destruction by users.
The protection is to extend to the boundary of the protected network of the TOE
components.
3.2.2.2 A.PhysicalProtection: Protect physical boundary
The system owners are responsible for providing adequate physical protection for
the TOE and the other items it runs with in the evaluated configuration.
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This includes user access controls to restrict access to only authorized, trusted
persons, and monitoring entries, to guard against unauthorized access or
malicious modification and destruction by users.
3.2.3 System
3.2.3.1 A.Timesource: There is a trusted, accurate and reliable time source.
It is assumed that TOE owners will ensure that a time source for timestamping
audit records is available, and that its reliability and accuracy is acceptable to the
TOE owner.
3.3 Threats to Security
3.3.1 This section describes all threats to the assets against which specific
protection within the TOE or its environment is required. Each threat is
described in terms of an identified threat agent, the attack, and the asset
that is the subject of the attack. Threat agents are described by addressing
their required expertise, available resources, and motivation. Attacks are
described by addressing the attack methods, any vulnerability that would
need to be exploited to perform the attack, and opportunity.
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Threat Threat Agent Attack Asset
T.AdminErrCommit:
Administrative errors of
commission
A TOE administrator or
system administrator
commits errors that directly
compromise organizational
security objectives or change
the technical security policy
enforced by the system or
application.
Expertise
N/A - unintentional
Resources
N/A - unintentional
Motivation
N/A - unintentional
Attack Methods
Unintentional Error
Vulnerabilities Exploited
Any poor design of the TOE, which might
increase the possibility of such an error.
The developer has measures in place to
ensure that this does not occur.
Opportunity
Substantial, as the “attacker” is an
administrator.
Certificates
produced by the
TOE, linking an
identity to a
private key.
T.AdminErrOmit:
Administrative errors of
omission
The TOE administrator or
system administrator
unintentionally fails to
perform some function
essential to security.
Expertise
N/A - unintentional
Resources
N/A - unintentional
Motivation
N/A - unintentional
Attack Methods
Unintentional Error
Vulnerabilities Exploited
Any poor design of the TOE, which might
increase the possibility of such an error.
The developer has measures in place to
ensure that this does not occur.
Opportunity
Substantial, as the “attacker” is an
administrator.
Certificates
produced by the
TOE, linking an
identity to a
private key.
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Threat Threat Agent Attack Asset
T.PKIKeyCompromise: A
TOE administrator or user’s
key is compromised.
A TOE administrator or
user’s key is compromised,
by theft, accidental exposure,
modification, or by an
attacker masquerading as an
authorized user. This could
lead to the production of
certificates that cannot be
trusted, as well as
compromise of a key, or the
masquerading as an
administrator/user by the
attacker.
Expertise
To successfully perform cryptanalysis to
discover a private key would require high
levels of expertise. The other attacks would
require less expertise.
Resources
A moderate or high level of resources would
be required to successfully execute this attack.
However, the resources applied to this task
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Motivation
A moderate or high level of motivation would
be required to successfully execute this attack.
However, the motivation level for attackers
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Attack Methods
Cryptanalysis to discover a private key
using the public key or a signature done
using the private key; stealing or copying
of private key in storage and obtaining
PIN or passphrase either by “social
engineering”, accident or cryptanalysis.
Vulnerabilities Exploited
Any weaknesses in the cryptographic
algorithms used to generate the key pair
or to protect the private key. The
developer has measures in place to
ensure that these do not occur.
Opportunity
In the case of PKI Entities, the
opportunity to steal a key would be
reduced due to the greater security
awareness of the administrator, and the
physical protection of the TOE
environment. In the case of the end user,
this would be increased.
Compromise of
administrator or
user’s key.
Compromise of
this could lead to
allowing an
attacker to produce
of compromised
certificates, or to
masquerade as
someone else.
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Threat Threat Agent Attack Asset
T.ExportKeyMaterial The
TOE may export secret or
private keys in a form that
an attacker can interpret and
use the keys for launching
other attacks on the
TOE/PKI.
An administrator or user’s
keys may be compromised
by the TOE exporting the
key in a form that an attacker
can interpret and use. This
could lead to the production
of certificates that cannot be
trusted, as well as
compromise of end user or
other entity or user keys, or
the masquerading as an
administrator or user by the
attacker.
Expertise
Low – if this fault existed, the attacker would
just need to find the material that they could
use.
Resources
Low – this would occur due to either faults in
the TOE, or bad design of the TOE. If this fault
existed, the attacker would just need to find it.
Motivation
Low – this would occur due to either faults in
the TOE, or bad design of the TOE. If this fault
existed, the attacker would just need to find it.
Attack Methods
To examine the output of the TOE to
attempt to discover the private keys of
either an administrator or user in a
format that the attacker can use.
Vulnerabilities Exploited
A faulty or badly designed TOE, which
exports secret material in clear text.
Inadequate design or testing could lead to
this situation. The developer has
measures in place to ensure that this does
not occur.
Opportunity
This would depend on where the private
key material was exported. If it was in
publicly distributed information, such as
certificates, then substantial opportunity
would be presented to execute this attack.
Private keys
protected by the
TOE security
mechanisms.
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Threat Threat Agent Attack Asset
T.Cryptography:
Inappropriate cryptographic
operations or parameters are
used by the TOE.
Inappropriate cryptographic
operations or parameters are
accidentally used, chosen or
specified by the TOE
administrators or users that
may be exploited by
cryptographic analysis
techniques that lead to key
certificate or PKI message
compromises.
Expertise
Low: this threat arises due to administrators or
users using TOE resources wrongly,
accidentally.
Resources
Low: this threat arises due to administrators or
users using TOE resources wrongly,
accidentally.
Motivation
Low: this threat arises due to administrators or
users using TOE resources wrongly,
accidentally.
Attack Methods
Administrators or users using TOE
resources wrongly, accidentally.
Vulnerabilities Exploited
If the guidance documentation did not
give adequate guidance on secure use of
the TOE then this threat may arise. The
developer has measures in place to
ensure that this does not occur.
Opportunity
High, due to the fact that TOE
administrators and users have access to
the TOE.
The privacy or
integrity of private
keys, certificate
integrity, or the
integrity or privacy
of messages
between PKI
components.
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Threat Threat Agent Attack Asset
T.NonRepudiation:
An administrator or user
denies having sent a message
or initiating a TSF that
would violate the TSP.
Expertise
In order to successfully perform this attack, a
high level of expertise would be required due
to the cryptographic protection on messages
and log event records afforded by the TOE.
Resources
A moderate or high level of resources would
be required to successfully execute this attack.
However, the resources applied to this task
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Motivation
A moderate or high level of motivation would
be required to successfully execute this attack.
However, the motivation level for attackers
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Attack Methods
Cryptanalysis in order to modify the log
and/or messages without detection.
Vulnerabilities Exploited
Any weaknesses in the cryptographic
algorithms employed. The developer has
measures in place to ensure that these do
not occur.
Opportunity
The administrator or user has substantial
access to the TOE, as they are able to use
the TOE as they wish. They could,
therefore have substantial opportunity to
access the messages sent between their
TOE component and the others.
However, apart from auditors, the
administrators and users do not have
access to the logs and so has little
opportunity to attack them.
Certificates and
certificate status
records produced
by the TOE.
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Threat Threat Agent Attack Asset
T.DevFlawedCode:
Software containing
security-related flaws
A system or applications
developer delivers code that
does not perform according
to specifications or contains
security flaws, thereby
unintentionally allowing an
attacker to access the assets
that the TOE protects.
Expertise
Potentially Low – if the TOE contained security
faults, an attacker would just need to find the
flaw – this could be easy.
Resources
Potentially Low – as for expertise.
Motivation
Potentially Low – as for expertise.
Attack Methods
To examine the output of the TOE to
discover any security flaws.
Vulnerabilities Exploited
Inadequate design or testing, or
inadequate control over the development
environment could lead to this situation.
However, the developer has measures in
place to ensure that this does not occur.
Opportunity
The opportunity to exploit such a flaw
would depend on the type of flaw it is.
Certificates and
certificate status
information
produced by the
TOE.
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Threat Threat Agent Attack Asset
T.FlawDiscovery: A flaw
is discovered that could
potentially affect the TSF
During the product lifecycle
a flaw may be discovered
that could potentially affect
the TSF. This may occur
during development or post
release. A user may not be
aware of this flaw and
potentially be vulnerable to
an attack.
Expertise
Potentially Low – if the TOE contained security
flaws, an attacker would just need to find it –
this could be easy.
Resources
Potentially Low – as for expertise.
Motivation
Potentially Low – as for expertise.
Attack Methods
To examine the output of the TOE to
discover any security flaws.
Vulnerabilities Exploited
Inadequate design or testing, or
inadequate control over the development
environment could lead to this situation.
However, the developer has measures in
place to ensure that this does not occur.
Opportunity
The opportunity to exploit such a flaw
would depend on the type of flaw it is.
Certificates and
certificate status
information
produced by the
TOE.
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Threat Threat Agent Attack Asset
T.LossOfAuditData:
An attacker gains access to
the audit data and then
deletes or modifies it to mask
an attack on the TOE.
Expertise
In order to successfully perform this attack, a
high level of expertise would be required due
to the cryptographic protection on log event
records afforded by the TOE.
Resources
A moderate or high level of resources would
be required to successfully execute this attack.
However, the resources applied to this task
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Motivation
A moderate or high level of motivation would
be required to successfully execute this attack.
However, the motivation level for attackers
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Attack Methods
Cryptanalysis in order to modify the log
without detection.
Vulnerabilities Exploited
Any weaknesses in the cryptographic
algorithms employed. The developer has
measures in place to ensure that these do
not occur.
Opportunity
Due to the physical and logical protection
afforded to the TOE by
A.PhysicalProtection,
A.CommunicationsProtection, , an
attacker is likely to have little opportunity
to access the TOE directly. The TOE, in
turn affords protection to the audit log.
Therefore there would be little
opportunity to perform this attack.
Certificates and
certificate status
records produced
by the TOE.
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Threat Threat Agent Attack Asset
T.MaliciousCode: An
attacker causes an
administrator or user to
execute malicious code with
the TOE.
An attacker either gains
access to the TOE and
installs malicious code or
causes an administrator or
user to do so such that the
TSP is violated.
Expertise
An attacker would need considerable expertise
to access the machine running the TOE as it is
protected both physically and logically. They
could alternatively trick an administrator or
user to do so, but this would still require some
expertise. Furthermore, most types of
malicious code would be unlikely to work on
the user’s or administrator’s machine because
of the cryptographic controls in place – to
develop code that would do so would require a
moderate to high level of expertise.
Resources
A moderate or high level of resources would
be required to successfully execute this attack
by either means. However, the resources
applied to this task would always be less than
moderate due to the fact that administrators
are instructed to only use the TOE to protect
assets of less than this value.
Motivation
A moderate or high level of motivation would
be required to successfully execute this attack
due to the level of resources required.
However, the motivation level for attackers
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Attack Methods
These are listed under “expertise”.
Vulnerabilities Exploited
Any vulnerabilities in the TOE’s access
controls or its cryptographic mechanisms
that protect certificates could potentially
permit this attack. Also vulnerabilities in
the assumed physical and logical
protection of machines running the TOE.
Opportunity
There may be substantial opportunity to
access the TOE’s administrators and users
to attempt this attack, depending on the
environment the TOE is installed in,
though this is unlikely due to the
assumed trusted nature and competence
of the administrators and users. There
would be little opportunity to access the
machines running the TOE directly either
physically or logically due to the assumed
physical and logical protection of
machines running the TOE.
Certificates and
certificate status
records produced
by the TOE. These
would be attacked
indirectly by
attempting to cause
the TOE to violate
the TSP, whilst still
being able to
execute.
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Threat Threat Agent Attack Asset
T.UnAuthorizedConfigurati
onChange: An attacker
modifies the PKI
configuration.
An attacker modifies the
configuration of the PKI to
allow for the production of
untrustworthy certificates,
replacing authentic
components with
masquerades.
Expertise
An attacker would need considerable expertise
to gain access to the TOE and perform this
action, as they would need to falsely obtain a
certificate that allows them to do so.
Resources
A moderate or high level of resources would
be required to successfully execute this attack.
However, the resources applied to this task
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Motivation
A moderate or high level of motivation would
be required to successfully execute this attack.
However, the motivation level for attackers
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Attack Methods
The attacker would need to create or steal
a certificate that provided them with
access to the TOE, or otherwise bypass
the TOE’s access controls. They would
then need to physically or logically access
the TOE and perform this change, whilst
overcoming the cryptographic controls on
PKI components.
Vulnerabilities Exploited
Any vulnerabilities in the TOE’s access
controls or its cryptographic mechanisms
that protect certificates and the PKI could
potentially permit this attack. The
developer has procedures and
mechanisms in place to ensure that these
do not arise.
Opportunity
There may be substantial opportunity to
access the TOE and attempt this attack,
depending on the environment it is
installed in, though this is unlikely.
Certificates and
certificate status
records produced
by the TOE. These
would be attacked
indirectly by
attempting to
modify the
configuration of
the PKI so as to
allow for the
production of
untrustworthy
certificates.
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Threat Threat Agent Attack Asset
T.MessageModification:
An Intercepted message is
modified and sent on.
An attacker modifies
intercepted messages
between TOE entities, to gain
access, or higher privilege or
to initiate an unauthorized
TSF.
Expertise
An attacker would need considerable expertise
to successfully intercept and modify messages
between the TOE entities, as they would need
overcome the cryptographic protection on
these messages.
Resources
A moderate or high level of resources would
be required to successfully execute this attack.
However, the resources applied to this task
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Motivation
A moderate or high level of motivation would
be required to successfully execute this attack.
However, the motivation level for attackers
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Attack Methods
The attacker would need to obtain access
to the communication channels and
intercept the messages, whilst
overcoming the cryptographic controls on
PKI components.
Vulnerabilities Exploited
Any vulnerabilities in the TOE’s
cryptographic protection of messages
could potentially permit this attack. The
developer has mechanisms in place to
ensure that these do not arise.
Opportunity
There would be little opportunity to
perform this attack due to
A.CommunicationsProtection.
Certificates and
certificate status
records produced
by the TOE. These
would be attacked
by attempting to
modify the
messages between
the TOE
components
without detection.
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Threat Threat Agent Attack Asset
T.UnTrustedEntity: An
untrusted entity is used to
register or create certificates
An untrusted entity
masquerading as the TOE is
used to register or create
certificates bypassing the
process and procedures of
the PKI, and leading to
untrustworthy certificates.
Expertise
An attacker would need considerable expertise
to successfully masquerade as the TOE, as they
would need create or obtain the CA’s private
key to do so.
Resources
A moderate or high level of resources would
be required to successfully execute this attack.
However, the resources applied to this task
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Motivation
A moderate or high level of motivation would
be required to successfully execute this attack.
However, the motivation level for attackers
would always be less than moderate due to the
fact that administrators are instructed to only
use the TOE to protect assets of less than this
value.
Attack Methods
The attacker would need to steal or create
the CA’s private key so as to masquerade
as the TOE. This might be done by
cryptanalysis of the public key or of
something signed by the CA, or it might
be done by stealing a copy of the CA’s
private key.
Vulnerabilities Exploited
Vulnerabilities in the cryptographic
algorithm used to create the CA’s key, or
possibly a “social engineering” attack
used to obtain the private key. The TOE
has mechanisms in place to address these
attacks.
Opportunity
There would be little opportunity to
perform this attack due to the
mechanisms in place to protect the CA’s
private key.
Certificates and
certificate status
records produced
by the TOE. These
would be attacked
by attempting to
masquerade as the
TOE without
detection.
Table 3-1 Threats and Attacks
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3.4 Organizational Security Policies
3.4.1 This section identifies the organizational security policy statements or
rules with which the TOE must comply.
3.4.2 User
3.4.2.1 P.Accountability: Individual accountability
Individuals shall be held accountable for their actions.
3.4.2.2 P.DisposalOfAuthenticationData: Disposal of authentication data and
privileges
The TOE owner will ensure that there are appropriate procedures to ensure
authentication data is destroyed and privileges removed after access has been
removed or redefined. This applies to administrators and users.
3.4.2.3 P.Guidance: Installation and usage guidance
Guidance shall be provided for the secure installation and use of the system. The
guidance shall be unambiguous and contain sufficient information for a secure
set up and operation of the TOE.
3.4.2.4 P.QualifiedTOEUsers: The TOE users should be sufficiently qualified to
perform their duties.
The TOE owner is responsible for ensuring the TOE users (as defined in section
9.2.2) are appropriately qualified by means of training, knowledge, and or
experience.
3.4.2.5 P.RoleSeparation: The TOE owners must ensure that there is
independence in roles.
a) The System administrators cannot assume any other role;
b) The WebRAO users cannot assume any other role (although they may install
their software); and
c) The Audit Log Managers cannot assume any other role.
3.4.3 Cryptography
3.4.3.1 P.Cryptography: Appropriate use of cryptographic functions
The TOE owners are responsible for insuring the TOE uses secure algorithms and
parameters for all cryptographic functions. This extends to ensuring the TOE
administrators and users use only secure algorithms and parameters. The CAO
user enforces this objective through the certificate practice statement and by
defining the certificate registration (policy) requirements.
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3.4.3.2 P.HardwareCryptography: Appropriate selection of cryptographic
devices
The TOE owners are responsible for insuring if the TOE uses external
cryptographic devices, then secure algorithms and parameters for all
cryptographic functions, and that there is sufficient protection of the keys. This
extends to ensuring the TOE administrators and users use only secure algorithms
and parameters and devices.
3.4.4 System
3.4.4.1 P.ApplyFlawRemediation: Maintaining Security of TOE Functions
The TOE owners are responsible for insuring the TOE security functionality is
maintained by applying developer supplied flaw remediation.
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4. Security Objectives
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 This section defines the security objectives to be satisfied by the TOE and
the security objectives to be satisfied by IT and non-IT measures within the
TOE environment. It addresses all of the identified aspects of the security
environment.
4.2 Security Objectives for the TOE
4.2.1 The following security objectives for the TOE trace back to aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and/or organizational
security policies to be met by the TOE.
4.2.2 User
4.2.2.1 O.AuditLogs: Review of Audit Logs.
The auditors are responsible for identifying and monitoring security relevant
events – they are required to review audit logs sufficiently regularly.
This requires both administrator guidance and a policy to ensure that the
auditors fulfill their duties.
4.2.2.2 O.DisposalOfAuthenticationData: Proper disposal of authentication
data
Proper disposal of authentication data and associated privileges is performed
after access has been removed. This would be enforced by the key destruction
function of the TOE and HSMs coupled with removal of PKI entities from the
PKI.
4.2.2.3 O.IndividualAccountability: Ensure adequate information in the audit
data
Provide individual accountability for audited events. This means role separation
should be enforced, based upon user attributes and system roles.
4.2.2.4 O.Installation: Install, operate, and maintain.
The TOE owners are responsible for the TOE being installed, operated and
maintained in a secure manner.
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4.2.2.5 O.CPS: All users familiar with CP and CPS under which TOE operates
To ensure that administrators and users are familiar with the CP and CPS under
which the TOE is operated.
4.2.3 Cryptography
4.2.3.1 O.CryptographicFunctions: To ensure appropriate cryptographic
functions and parameters are used.
The TOE must implement secure cryptographic functions and parameters for:
a) Authentication; Signing and Verification
b) Encryption/Decryption: Symmetric Key Generation, Encryption and
Decryption.
c) Key Management; Key Generation, Key Storage, and Key Destruction.
4.2.3.2 O.NonRepudiation: All users are to be accountable.
To prevent users from avoiding responsibility for their actions, all TOE users are
to provide evidence of origin for messages and TSF initiation.
4.2.4 System
4.2.5 O.Audit:
The TOE will provide the means of recording security related events so as to
assist auditors in the detection of potential attacks or misconfiguration of the
TOE security features that would leave the TOE susceptible to attack. The TOE
will provide the means for generating evidence in each security related event
record of the log and for the whole log that allows the auditor to verify the
integrity of the record.
4.2.5.1 O.DataImportExport: Ensure data integrity and confidentiality when
transferring data to/from the TOE
To protect confidentiality and integrity when transmitting data to/from TOE
either directly or via an intermediate channel.
Confidentiality and Integrity is required for the following data:
· All private, secret key material, all passphrase and PIN information.
Integrity is required for the following data:
· All PKI CMP messages, all user data, all registration data, all revocation
request data, some BRSP messages, all PKI data, all identification and
authentication and authorization material, audit and all archived audit
records.
2 This is specified in SPM_TOE_INTEGRITY and SPM_USER_INTEGRITY.
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4.2.5.2 O.FlawUnknownToUser: If a security flaw is discovered, there needs
to be a way to notify users of the flaw.
In order to maintain the assurance level, after a discovery of a flaw, the user must
be aware of the impact and any corrective action.
4.2.5.3 O.FlawRemediation: If a flaw is discovered in the TOE, a process
will be in place to provide a corrective action and distribute the corrective
action.
In order to maintain the assurance level, after a discovery of a flaw, the developer
should provide remedial or corrective action to the user to protect the TOE from
exploits that were not addressed during the evaluation.
4.2.5.4 O.Guidance: Provide guidance documentation
To minimize user and administrator errors by providing adequate
documentation, covering installation, startup, operating and maintaining a
secure state for the TOE. All user interfaces, and messages shall be explained as
well as any secure parameters so the users will put the system in a secure state.
Guidance should also contain enough information for the users to recognize
whether the TOE is in a secure state and explain any errors, warnings and audit
information to help the users maintain the secure state of the TOE.
4.2.5.5 O.IntegrityTOEData: Provide adequate measures for integrity of TOE
data.
Provide sufficient measures to ensure that TOE data is adequately maintained.
The TOE data that requires its integrity to be maintained is specified in
SPM_TOE_INTEGRITY.
4.2.5.6 O.IntegrityUserData: Provide adequate measures for integrity of user
data
Provide sufficient measures to ensure that user data is adequately maintained.
The user data that requires its integrity to be maintained is specified in
SPM_USER_INTEGRITY.
4.2.5.7 O.ConfidentialityTOEData: Provide adequate measures for
confidentiality of TOE data.
Provide sufficient measures to ensure that secret or private TOE data is kept
confidential. The user data to be kept confidential is specified in
SPM_TOE_CONFIDENTIALITY.
4.2.5.8 O.ConfidentialityUserData: Provide adequate measures for
confidentiality of user data.
Provide sufficient measures to ensure that secret or private user data is kept
confidential. The user data to be kept confidential is specified in
SPM_USER_CONFIDENTIALITY.
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4.2.5.9 O.LifecycleSecurity: Tools and Techniques
Tools and Techniques used during the development phase to ensure security are
designed into the TOE. By defining the techniques used there is greater assurance
that the implementation is appropriate and no obvious flaws have been designed
into the TOE. By specifying the tools used there is greater assurance that the
limitations of the tools have not conspired to create unknown flaws in the TOE.
4.2.5.10 O.MaintainUserAttributes: Maintain user attributes is in addition to
user identities.
Maintain a list of security attributes that may include:
a) The access privileges – i.e., access to CA/CAO/RA/ WebRAO/Audit data;
b) The group membership; and or
c) The level of authority – i.e., CAO/WebRAO.
The PKI entities also have attributes for example which CA/RA/RA eXchange
does the WebRAO connect to, and send/authorize requests to.
4.2.5.11 O.ProtectAuditRecords: This is to detect modification of audit records,
and detect audit record deletion.
The TOE is to provide for mechanism to detect the modification and deletion of
audit records.
4.2.5.12 O.ProtectConfiguration: Protect the PKI configuration from
unauthorized changes.
The TOE will provide for mechanism to preserve the integrity of the PKI
configuration and to ensure only authorized configuration changes can be
accepted.
4.2.5.13 O.ProvideEvidenceOfOrigin: Enforced proof of origin
Ensure that the origin of a message can be established. This is required for all
PKIX-CMP messages between: the PKI trusted entities; the BRSP message
between the RA eXchange and WebRAO components; all CRLs; all OCSP
messages.
4.2.5.14 O.Passphrase: No weak passphrase.
To prevent the use of weak passphrase for PSE and P12’s the TOE enforces the
use of passphrases that achieve a minimum requirement.
4.2.6 Physical
4.2.6.1 O.ControlUnknownOriginComms: To ensure only authorized entities
can connect to the TOE
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To protect the TOE, communications from unknown sources should be
controlled. This also requires that the TOE ignore security attributes on user data
that is imported from external sources.
4.2.6.2 O.MaliciousCodeNotExecuted: To ensure only trusted code is executed
on the TOE platform
To protect the TOE, any installed code should be signed and the TOE users are
only to execute code signed by a trusted entity.
4.3 Security Objectives for the Environment
4.3.1 The following security objectives for the environment trace back to aspects
of identified threats not completely countered by the TOE and/or
organizational security policies or assumptions not completely met by the
TOE.
4.3.1.1 OE.BackupStorageRestoration: Backup, Storage and effective
restoration
There must be sufficient backup storage and effective restoration to ensure the
system can be re-created. There must be a method to ensure data integrity. There
must be a method to ensure confidentiality of secret and or private key material
and other confidential data.
2 As a guide, two roles should be used to recover the system to prevent a
rogue administrator from temporarily creating a masquerading TOE, for
example:
1. System administrator who performs backup and restore duties
2. CAO user who can restore key material.
4.3.1.2 OE.Audit: Manage the audit log to ensure it is regularly reviewed and
checked and to prevent loss of audit data.
The TOE owners must ensure that A.AuditReview is upheld.
4.3.1.3 OE.CPS: PKI users will be familiar with and uphold the CP and CPS
that the PKI operates
The TOE owners must ensure that A.CPS is upheld.
4.3.1.4 OE.CompetentPKIUsers: PKI users will be competent
The TOE owners must ensure that A.CompetentPKIUsers is upheld.
4.3.1.5 OE.MaliciousCodeNotExecuted: TOE users will not execute malicious
code
The TOE owners must ensure that A.MaliciousCodeNotExecuted is upheld.
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4.3.1.6 OE.SecureInstallation: Ensure that the system is set up and operated
securely
The TOE owners must ensure that A.SecureInstallation is upheld.
4.3.1.7 OE.Guidance: Ensure that the administrators and users read and follow
the guidance material
The TOE owners must ensure that A.Guidance is upheld.
4.3.1.8 OE.TamperNotify: The HSM must provide passive detection of
physical tampering.
Any HSMs holding secret, private or signing keys must provide the ability to
allow users to detect physical tampering.
FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical
tampering that might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether
physical tampering with the TSF’s devices or TSF’s elements has occurred.
4.3.1.9 OE.Cryptography: Selection of Appropriate Crypto algorithms
and parameters.
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all cryptographic operations
have been implemented correctly.
4.3.1.10 OE.HardwareFunctions: All hardware crypto modules, if
used, must provide specified security functions.
When any crypto modules are used with the TOE they must be certified to at
least the EAL 4 level to provide the following functions:
FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1
To force all users to be uniquely identified and authenticated as
authorized users before accessing the other functions
FCS_CKM.4
To destroy keys securely
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform
digital signature creation.
a) RSA signature with SHA-1 hashing; or
b) RSA signature with MD5 hashing; or
c) DSA signature with SHA-1 hashing
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
a) RSA and SHA-1; or
b) RSA and MD5; or
c) DSA and SHA-1
and cryptographic key sizes
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a) RSA 1024, 2048 or 4096 bit and SHA-1 160 bit
b) RSA 1024, 2048 or 4096 bit and MD5 128 bit
c) DSA 1024 or 1536 bit and SHA-1 160 bit
that meet the following:
a) [RSA] and [SHA-1]
b) [RSA] and [RFC1321]
c) [DSA] and [SHA-1] FCS_COP.1.1
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
The TSF shall perform
digital signature verification.
a) RSA signature with SHA-1 hashing; or
b) RSA signature with MD5 hashing; or
c) DSA signature with SHA-1 hashing
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
a) RSA and SHA-1; or
b) RSA and MD5; or
c) DSA and SHA-1
and cryptographic key sizes
a) RSA 1024, 2048 or 4096 bit and SHA-1 160 bit
b) RSA 1024, 2048 or 4096 bit and MD5 128 bit
c) DSA 1024 or 1536 bit and SHA-1 160 bit
that meet the following:
a) [RSA] and [SHA-1]
b) [RSA] and [RFC1321]
c) [DSA] and [SHA-1] FCS_COP.1.1_VERIFY
4.3.1.11 OE.TimeSource: Reliable and Accurate Time source
Those responsible for the TOE are responsible for ensuring that a time source for
timestamping is available, and that its reliability and accuracy is acceptable to the
TOE owner.
4.3.1.12 OE.PassphrasePIN: No weak passphrase and PIN.
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that procedures exist for the secure
selection and management of passphrases and PINs.
4.3.1.13 OE.Keys: Secure storage of keys.
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all private keys used in the
operation and administration of the TOE are securely stored to prevent access by
persons other than TOE administrators.
4.3.1.14 OE.Physical: Physical Security.
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that A.PhysicalProtection is upheld.
4.3.1.15 OE.DisposalOfAuthenticationData: Proper disposal of
authentication data and keys.
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Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that A.DisposalofAuthenticationData
is upheld.
4.3.1.16 OE.FlawRemediation: Once obtained the corrective action should
be implemented.
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that any flaw remediation corrective
action provided as part of the TOE should be implemented.
4.3.1.17 OE.Connectivity: External connections.
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that A.CommunicationsProtection is
upheld
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5. IT Security Requirements
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 This section defines the detailed IT security requirements that shall be
satisfied by the TOE or its environment.
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
5.2.1 Security audit (FAU)
5.2.1.1 Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1)
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a) Startup and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) As per the following tables: Audit Data events by component, Table 5-1
to Table 5-5.FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of
the functional components included in the PP/ST, as detailed in the
following tables FAU_GEN.1.2
Dependencies:[
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
]
Audit Events for the CA
LABEL Audit Event Event description Contents
AE_SIG_VERIFY Signature Verification
Failure
Signature Verification
failure
Event type, CAO user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, identifiable
description of what failed
verification and where it came
from.
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LABEL Audit Event Event description Contents
AE_CERT_GENERATED Certificate Generation A Certificate has
been generated,
signed and stored
Event type, CA user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, Reference #, issuer
DN, subject DN, serial No,
certificate
AE_CERT_REVOCATION Certificate Revoked A Revocation
request has been
processed and
revoked (marked in
the database as
revoked,
suspended, released
from suspension)
Event type, CA user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
identification of RA that
revocation request was
received from, time/date,
unique identity of revocation
message including certificate
revoked, suspended or
released from suspension and
the revocation reason, unique
identity of revocation
requester and approver.
AE_CRL_GENERATION CRL Generated A CRL has been
generated, signed
and stored. Including
Success and Failure
Event type, CA user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, unique identity of
CRL.
AE_CA_PKI_PUSH PKI Information sent PKI data is signed
and pushed
Event type, CA user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, unique identity of
PKI and identity of entity it was
pushed to
AE_CONNECT User or System access
initiated
A connection to the
CA has been
established.
Including Success
and Failure
Event type, CA user (e.g.,
Windows user name), Unique
identity of user or system
accessing the CA (e.g.,
identification of CAO user),
time/date
AE_CONNECT_END User or System access
terminated
A connection to the
CA has been
terminated
Event type, CA user (e.g.,
Windows user name), Unique
identity of user or system
disconnected from the CA
(e.g., identification of CAO
user), time/date
AE_PKI_TAMPER PKI Event Tampered PKI
detected
Event type, CA user (e.g.,
Windows user name), Unique
identity of profile that was
tampered, time/date
Table 5-1 Audit Events for the CA
Audit Events for the CAO
LABEL Audit Event Event description Contents
AE_CERT_REVOKE_SUBMIT Certificate
Revoked
A Revocation
request has been
submitted to the
CA. Including if
it’s successfully
sent or not.
Event type, CAO user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, unique identity of
revocation message including
certificate revoked, suspended
or released from suspension
and the revocation reason.
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LABEL Audit Event Event description Contents
AE_CERT_REVOKE_CONFIRM Certificate
Revoked
A Revocation
request has been
submitted to the
CA and the CA
has responded
with success or
fail.
Event type, CAO user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, unique identity of
revocation message including
certificate revoked, suspended
or released from suspension
and the revocation reason.
AE_CERT_REQUEST_SEND Certificate
Request Sent
A Certificate
request has been
signed and sent
to the CA
Event type, CAO user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, Reference #,
Request data, identification of
CA to which the request was
sent
AE_CERT_REQUEST_RECEIVED Received
Certificate
Request
A Certificate
request has been
received
Event type, CAO user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, certificate request
data uniquely identifying the
certificate request, certificate
request receipt method (e.g.,
imported from floppy,)
AE_POLICY_CREATE Policy Created A policy was
created and
saved to the
database
Event type, CAO user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, unique identity of
policy and policy type
AE_POLICY_RETIRED Policy Retired A policy was
retired and saved
to the database
Event type, CAO user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, unique identity of
policy and policy type
AE_POLICY_DELETED Policy Deleted A policy was
deleted.
Event type, CAO user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, unique identity of
policy and policy type
AE_AUTHORISATION_PATH_CREATE Processing
(Authorization)
Path Events
When an
authorization
path is added
Event type, CAO user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, unique identity of
path, group and policy and
identity of entity it is to be
pushed to.
AE_AUTHORISATION_PATH_MODIFY Processing
(Authorization)
Path Events
CAO user uses
the Authorization
group definitions
to define which,
a subset or all, of
an authorization
group is required
to authorize a
request.
This event is
added when a
modification of
path is
committed.
Event type, CAO user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, unique identity of
path, group and policy and
identity of entity it is to be
pushed to.
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LABEL Audit Event Event description Contents
AE_AUTHORISATION_PATH_RETIRE Processing
(Authorization)
Path Events
CAO user uses
the Authorization
group definitions
to define which,
a subset or all, of
an authorization
group is required
to authorize a
request.
This event is
added when a
path is retired
Event type, CAO user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, unique identity of
path, group and policy and
identity of entity it is to be
pushed to.
AE_SESSION_START Session events The CAO
application may
log on to a
number of PKIs,
but only one per
session
Type, CAO user (e.g., Windows
user name), time/date, unique
identity of PKI.
AE_SESSION_END Session events The CAO
application may
log on to a
number of PKIs,
but only one per
session
Type, CAO user (e.g., Windows
user name), time/date, unique
identity of PKI.
AE_AUDIT_ARCHIVE Audit Archive An archive
function has
been performed
on the audit log
within the CA
database and an
audit log archive
file has been
created.
Event type, CAO user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
time/date, identification of
audit log archive file created.
Table 5-2 Audit Events for the CAO
Audit Events for the RA
LABEL Audit Event Event
description
Contents
AE_SIG_VERIFY Signature
Verification
Signature
Verification.
Success or
failure
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name), Unique
identity of issuer of data failing
signature (e.g., RAO user),
time/date, identifiable
description of what failed
verification.
AE_MSG_VERIFY Message
Validation
Received
request
message
validation
success or
failure
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name), Unique
identity of issuer of data failing
validation (e.g., RAO user),
time/date, identifiable
description of the request that
failed validation, a description of
the validation failure (e.g., what
was revoked, why and when it
was revoked)
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LABEL Audit Event Event
description
Contents
AE_CERT_REQUEST_GEN Certificate
Request
Generated
A Certificate
Request has
been
generated
signed and
saved
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name), time/date,
certificate request data uniquely
identifying the certificate request,
indication of the type of request
(e.g., renewed certificate
request)
AE_CERT_REQUEST_SEND Certificate
Request Sent
A Certificate
request has
been signed
and sent to
the CA
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name), time/date,
Reference #, Request data,
identification of CA to which the
request was sent
AE_CERT_RECEIVED Received
signed
certificate
A Signed
Certificate
was received
and stored in
the RA
database
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
identification of CA certificate
was received from, time/date,
Reference #, issuer DN, subject
DN, serial No, certificate
AE_CERT_STORAGE Storage of
received
Certificate
failed
A Signed
Certificate
was received
but storage
of that
certificate
failed
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
identification of CA certificate
was received from, time/date,
Reference #, issuer DN, subject
DN, serial No, certificate, reason
for failure
AE_REVOKE_REQUEST_SEND Revocation
Request Sent
A Revocation
request has
been signed
and sent to
the CA
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name), time/date,
Request data including unique
identity of revocation request
message including certificate
revoked or suspended and the
revocation reason, identification
of entity revocation request was
received from (e.g., RA
eXchange, RAO), identification
of entity that revocation request
was received from and
approved by (e.g., RA
eXchange)
AE_REVOKE_MSG_RECEIVED Received
signed
revocation
A Signed
Revocation
message was
received and
stored in the
RA database
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
identification of CA revocation
was received from, time/date,
Request data including unique
identity of revocation request
message including certificate
revoked or suspended and the
revocation reason, identification
of entity revocation request was
received from and approved by
(e.g., RA eXchange)
AE_REVOKE_MSG_STORAGE Storage of
received
revocation
message
failed
A Signed
revocation
message was
received but
storage of
that message
failed
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
identification of CA revocation
was received from, time/date,
request data, unique identity of
revocation message including
certificate revoked, reason for
failure
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LABEL Audit Event Event
description
Contents
AE_CONNECT_SUCCESS RA has
connected to
a CA
A connection
to the CA has
been
established
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name), Unique
identity of system accessing the
CA (e.g., identification of RA),
time/date
AE_CONNECT_END RA has
disconnected
from the CA
A connection
to the CA has
been
terminated
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name), Unique
identity of system disconnected
from the CA (e.g., identification
of RA), time/date
AE_ANNOUNCE RA is trying to
connect to a
CA
Announce
message sent
to the CA
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name), Identity of
the CA (e.g., identification of CA
inc port machine name),
time/date
AE_PKI_RECEIVED PKI
information is
received.
Event
includes CRL,
Policies, Auth
Groups and
PKI entities
Event type, RA user (e.g.,
Windows user name),
identification of entity the policy
was received from, time/date,
unique identity of policy
Table 5-3 Audit Events for the RA
Audit Events for the RA Event Viewer
LABEL Audit Event Event
description
Contents
AE_AUDIT_ARCHIVE Audit Archive An archive
function has
been
performed
on the audit
log within the
RA database
and an audit
log archive
file has been
created.
Event type, RA Event Viewer user
(e.g., Windows user name),
time/date, identification of audit
log archive file created.
Table 5-4 Audit Events for the RA Event Viewer
Audit Events for the RA eXchange
LABEL Audit Event Event
description
Contents
AE_SIG_VERIFY Signature
Verification
Failure
Signature
verification
failure
Event type, Unique RA
eXchange, or RA eXchange
interface identifier, Unique
identity of issuer of data failing
signature (e.g., end entity cert
requester), time/date,
identifiable description of what
failed verification (e.g., request
data)
AE_CERT_REQUEST_RECD Certificate
Request
Received
Certificate
request is
received
Event type, Unique RA
eXchange or RA eXchange
interface identifier, Cert
Request data, time/date
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LABEL Audit Event Event
description
Contents
AE_CERT_REQUEST_SEND Certificate
Request Sent
for
Authentication
Certificate
request sent
(stored) for
authentication
Event type, Unique RA
eXchange or RA eXchange
interface identifier, auth ID,
issuer DN, subject DN,
time/date
AE_CERT_RECD Received
signed
certificate
A signed
certificate was
received
Event type, Unique RA
eXchange or RA eXchange
interface identifier,
identification of RA certificate
was received from, time/date,
Reference #, issuer DN, subject
DN, serial No, certificate
AE_CERT_MOD Certificate
Identity Data
Modified
A certificate’s
identity data
has been
modified, the
new request is
also logged
Event type, Unique RA
eXchange or RA eXchange
interface identifier,
identification of RA certificate
was received from, time/date,
Reference #, issuer DN, subject
DN, date time.
AE_CERT_NOTICE A notification
message has
been sent
A certificate
rejection notice
has been sent
to the requestor.
Event type, Unique RA
eXchange or RA eXchange
interface identifier, time/date,
description of certificate, and
end user, reason the request
was rejected, distribution
method (e.g., email), and
address (e.g., email address)
Table 5-5 Audit Events for the RA eXchange
5.2.1.2 User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)
The TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the
user that caused the event.FAU_GEN.2.1
Dependencies: [
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
]
5.2.1.3 Audit review (FAU_SAR.1)
The TSF shall provide the auditors with the capability to read all audit records;
or a user defined selection of audit records from the audit records.FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to
interpret the information.FAU_SAR.1.2
Dependencies: [
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
]
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5.2.1.4 Restricted audit review (FAU_SAR.2)
The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those
users that have been granted explicit read-access. FAU_SAR.2.1
Dependencies: [
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
]
5.2.1.5 Selectable audit review (FAU_SAR.3)
The TSF shall provide the ability to perform searches, sorting, ordering of audit
data based on queries as defined in the CAO documentation, or as selected by
auditor.]FAU_SAR.3.1
Dependencies: [
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
]
5.2.1.6 Protected audit trail storage (FAU_STG.1)
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records from unauthorized
deletion.FAU_STG.1.1
The TSF shall be able to detect modifications to the audit records.FAU_STG.1.2
Dependencies: [
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
]
5.2.2 Communication (FCO)
5.2.2.1 Enforced proof of origin (FCO_NRO.2)
The TSF shall enforce the generation of evidence of origin for transmitted
o PKI Certificates;
o PKI Entity interactions;
o P11 Interactions;
o End user Certificates;
o Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL/ARL); and
o Group Lists.
at all times.FCO_NRO.2.1
The TSF shall be able to relate the signature of the originator of the information,
and the all information fields above of the information to which the evidence
applies.FCO_NRO.2.2
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The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of information
to originator and recipient all other users given the originators public key
certificate and access to certificate status2.FCO_NRO.2.3
Dependencies: [
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
]
5.2.3 Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.2.3.1 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm
a) 3DES
b) DSA
c) RSA
and specified cryptographic key sizes
a) 168 (3 key) bits
b) 1024, 1536
c) 1024, 2048, 4096
that meet the following:
a) [3DES]
b) [DSA]
c) [RSA] FCS_CKM.1.1
Dependencies: [
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
]
5.2.3.2 Cryptographic key distribution (FCS_CKM.2_PublicKey)
The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method
a) X.509 public key certificate in PEM format
b) X.509 public key certificate in DER format
c) X.509 public key certificate in P7c format
d) PKCS#10
that meets the following:
a) [PEM]
b) [DER]
c) [PKCS7]
d) [PKCS10] FCS_CKM.2.1
2 SPM_SIGNATURE_VALIDITY
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Dependencies: [
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
]
Application Note:
This SFR applies to the distribution of public keys.
5.2.3.3 Cryptographic key distribution (FCS_CKM.2)
The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method
a) PKCS#11
b) PKCS#12
that meets the following:
a) [PKCS11]
b) [PKCS12] FCS_CKM.2.1
Dependencies: [
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
]
Application Note:
This SFR applies to the distribution of private, secret, or signing keys by the
WebRAO component of the TOE.
5.2.3.4 Cryptographic key access (FCS_CKM.3)
The TSF shall perform provision of ability to use keys from a PKCS#12 file or
PKCS#11 device in accordance with a specified cryptographic key access method
as allowed by standard that meets the following PKCS#12[PKCS12] or
PKCS#11[PCKS11] standards.FCS_CKM.3.1
Dependencies: [
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
]
5.2.3.5 Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method memory overwrite before deallocation
that meets the following none.FCS_CKM.4.1
Dependencies: [
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
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FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
]
Application Note:
This SFR applies to the destruction of private, secret, or signing keys that are held in
memory.
5.2.3.6 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1_SIGN)
The TSF shall perform
digital signature creation.
a) RSA signature with SHA-1 hashing; or
b) RSA signature with MD5 hashing; or
c) DSA signature with SHA-1 hashing
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
a) RSA and SHA-1; or
b) RSA and MD5; or
c) DSA and SHA-1
and cryptographic key sizes
a) RSA 1024, 2048 or 4096 bit and SHA-1 160 bit
b) RSA 1024, 2048 or 4096 bit and MD5 128 bit
c) DSA 1024 or 1536 bit and SHA-1 160 bit
that meet the following:
a) [RSA] and [SHA-1]
b) [RSA] and [RFC1321]
c) [DSA] and [SHA-1] FCS_COP.1.1_SIGN
Dependencies: [
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
]
5.2.3.7 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1_VERIFY)
The TSF shall perform
digital signature verification.
a) RSA signature with SHA-1 hashing; or
b) RSA signature with MD5 hashing; or
c) DSA signature with SHA-1 hashing
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
a) RSA and SHA-1; or
b) RSA and MD5; or
c) DSA and SHA-1
and cryptographic key sizes
a) RSA 1024, 2048 or 4096 bit and SHA-1 160 bit
b) RSA 1024, 2048 or 4096 bit and MD5 128 bit
c) DSA 1024 or 1536 bit and SHA-1 160 bit
that meet the following:
a) [RSA] and [SHA-1]
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b) [RSA] and [RFC1321]
c) [DSA] and [SHA-1] FCS_COP.1.1_VERIFY
Dependencies: [
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data Without Security Attributes
Or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
]
5.2.3.8 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1_HASH)
The TSF shall perform
secure hash.
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
a) SHA-1
b) MD5
and cryptographic key sizes
a) 160 bit
b) 128 bit
that meet the following:
a) [SHA-1]
b) [RFC1321] FCS_COP.1.1_HASH
Dependencies: [
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data Without Security Attributes
Or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FMT_MSA.72 Secure Security Attributes
]
5.2.3.9 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1_ENCRYPT)
The TSF shall perform symmetric encryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Triple DES and cryptographic key sizes 168 (3 key) bits
that meet the following [3DES].FCS_COP.1.1_ENCRYPT
Dependencies: [
FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data Without Security Attributes
Or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
]
5.2.3.10 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1_DECRYPT)
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The TSF shall perform symmetric decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Triple DES and cryptographic key sizes 168 (3 key) bits
that meet the following [3DES].FCS_COP.1.1_DECRYPT
Dependencies: [
FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data Without Security Attributes
Or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
]
5.2.4 User data protection (FDP)
5.2.4.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
The TSF shall enforce the Access_Control_SFP on list of subjects, objects and
operations defined in Table 5-7.FDP_ACC.1.1
Dependencies: [
FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute based access control
]
5.2.4.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
The TSF shall enforce the Access_Control_SFP defined in Table 5-7 to objects
based on security attributes defined in Table 5-7.FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed if the user has been
explicitly granted access to the object as specified in Table 5-7.FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: user having the attributes for the roles as listed in
Table 5-7.FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: user not having the attributes for the roles as listed in Table 5-
7.FDP_ACF.1.4
Dependencies: [
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
]
5.2.4.3 Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)
The TSF shall enforce the Information_Flow_Control_SFP on subjects,
information and operations as described in Section 9.3.FDP_IFC.1.1
Relevant to the following SFR?
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Subjects, as
defined in
section 9.2.2
Information Permitted Operation
The subject can:
FDP_
IFC.1
FDP_
IFF.1
FDP_
ITT.1
FDP_
ITT.3
Other entity
to CA
· Announce
Messages to the CA
The entity may
· Create connection request
The CA will accept a connection
if the entity is a valid member of
the PKI and is one of:
· A CAO GUI connection on
behalf of a valid CAO user,
· A RA that is a current
member of the PKI,
· A KAS that is a current
member of the PKI
The CA will
· Accept
· Reject (and disconnect)
The CA verifies that the
announce message has not
been delayed, has not been
replayed and has been signed
by a valid entity.
Yes Yes No Yes
CAO to the
CA
· Certificate Requests
· Cross Certification
Requests
· Revocation Requests
· CRL generation
messages
· PKI configuration
messages
· Submit Yes Yes Yes Yes
CA to the
CAO
· Certificate response
· Revocation response
· Accept
· Reject
Yes Yes No Yes
CAO Audit
Manager to
other entity
· Audit events The entity may
· Access the audit records to
create a set of archive audit
events for export to file
Yes No No No
RA Audit
Manager to
other entity
· Audit events The entity may
· Access the audit records to
create a set of archive audit
events for export to file
Yes No No No
RA to the RA
eXchange
· Certificate response
· Revocation response
· Accept
· Reject
Yes Yes No No
RA
eXchange
to RA
· Certificate Requests
· Renewal Requests
· Revocation Requests
· Submit Yes Yes No No
CSS to other
entity
· Certificate Status
Information
· Accept
· Reject
Yes Yes No No
Other entity
to CSS
· Certificate Status
Information
· Request
· Accept
Yes Yes No No
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Relevant to the following SFR?
Subjects, as
defined in
section 9.2.2
Information Permitted Operation
The subject can:
FDP_
IFC.1
FDP_
IFF.1
FDP_
ITT.1
FDP_
ITT.3
Other entity
to RA
eXchange
· Announce
Messages to the RA
eXchange
The entity may
· Create connection request
The RA eXchange will accept a
connection if the entity is a valid
member of the PKI and is a
Protocol Handler that is from
a(n):
· WebRAO
· Web Handler
· email Handler
· SCEP Handler
· CMP Handler
The RA eXchange will
· Accept
· Reject (and disconnect)
The RA eXchange verifies that
the announce message has not
been delayed, has not been
replayed and has been signed
by a valid entity.
Yes Yes No Yes
RA
eXchange
to email
Handler
· Certificate response The email Handler will accept
notification requests from the RA
eXchange including the
Certificate message which is
used to deliver certificates to
any end entity,
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other entity
to Web
Handler
· Connection request
· Certificate Request
· Revocation Request
· Status request
The Web Handler will accept any
appropriately formatted request
from any end entity
Yes Yes Yes No
Other entity
to email
Handler
· Certificate Request
·
The email Handler will accept
any appropriately formatted
request from any end entity
Yes Yes Yes No
Other entity
to SCEP
Handler
· Connection request
· Certificate Request
·
The SCEP Handler will accept
any appropriately formatted
request from any end entity
Yes Yes Yes No
Table 5-6 Subjects, Information and Permitted Operations for
Information_Flow_Control_SFP
This table is used in multiple SFRs. The Information Flow Control SFP is relevant
to that SFR only where row is marked “yes” as being relevant to the SFR in the
heading column.
Dependencies: [
FDP_IFF.1 Simple Security Attributes
]
5.2.4.4 Simple security attributes (FDP_IFF.1)
The TSF shall enforce the Information_Flow_Control_SFP (table 5-6) based on
the following types of subject and information security attributes: those defined
for each subject in Section 9.2.2 FDP_IFF.1.1
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The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and
controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold as
described in Section 9.3. FDP_IFF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the no additional requirements.FDP_IFF.1.3
The TSF shall provide the following no additional capabilities.FDP_IFF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following
rules refer to Section 9.3.FDP_IFF.1.5
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules
refer to Section 9.3.FDP_IFF.1.6
Dependencies: [
FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control.
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization.
]
5.2.4.5 Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)
The TSF shall enforce the Information_Flow_Control_SFP (table 5-6) when
importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TSC. FDP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TSC.FDP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled
under the SFP from outside the TSC: no additional controls.FDP_ITC.1.3
Dependencies: [
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control.
FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control.
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization.
]
5.2.4.6 Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1)
The TSF shall enforce the Access_Control_SFP (table 5-7) and
Information_Flow_Control_SFP (table 5-6) to prevent the modification of user
data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the
TOE.FDP_ITT.1.1
Dependencies: [
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control.
]
5.2.4.7 Integrity monitoring (FDP_ITT.3)
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The TSF shall enforce the Access_Control_SFP (table 5-7) and
Information_Flow_Control_SFP (table 5-6) to monitor user data transmitted
between physically separated parts of the TOE for the following errors. If the
signature is not verified, the data is assumed to be corrupt or from an
untrusted source.FDP_ITT.3.1
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall logically disconnect the
entity that sent the message and log the eventFDP_ITT.3.2
Dependencies: [
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control]
FDP_ITT.1 Basic Internal Transfer Protection
]
5.2.4.8 Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource from the following objects:
Secret or Private Key Material held in memory when a
software cryptographic operations (e.g., sign/encrypt) has
occurred; and
Passphrase and PIN used to open PSE/P12 files or P11 devices
].FDP_RIP.1.1
Dependencies: None
5.2.4.9 Data authentication with identity of guarantor (FDP_DAU.2)
The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a
guarantee of the validity of
Certificate Requests and Certificate Response
Certificate Request Authorizations and associated Response
CRL announcement
PKI Confirmation Message
PKI Error Message
Announce Message
Certificates
Certificate Revocation Lists
PKCS#10 Cross Certification Message
Certificate Status Messages
]. FDP_DAU.2.1
The TSF shall provide All PKI Entities and users with the ability to verify
evidence of validity using SPM_SIGNATURE_VALIDITY (section 9.1) of the
indicated information and the identity of the user that generated that evidence.
FDP_DAU.2.2
Dependencies: [
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
]
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5.2.4.10 Data authentication with identity of guarantor – CAO
FDP_DAU.2_CAO
The CAO shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a
guarantee of the validity of:
Certificate Requests
Certificate Request Authorizations
Revocation Requests
Certificate Request Authorizations
PKI Confirmation
PKI Error
Announce
]. FDP_DAU.2.1_CAO
The CAO shall provide CAO users with the ability to verify evidence of validity
using SPM_SIGNATURE_VALIDITY (Section 9.1)
of the indicated information and the identity of the user that generated that
evidence. FDP_DAU.2.2_CAO
Dependencies: [
FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification
]
5.2.4.11 Data authentication with identity of guarantor – WebRAO
(FDP_DAU.2_WebRAO)
The WebRAO applet shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be
used as a guarantee of the validity of
Initialization Request/Response
Certificate Requests
Certificate Request Authorizations
Revocation Requests
Revocation Request Authorizations
PKI Confirmation
PKI Error Message
. FDP_DAU.2.1_WebRAO
The WebRAO applet shall provide WebRAO users (section 9.2.2) with the
ability to verify evidence of validity using SPM_SIGNATURE_VALIDITY
of the indicated information and of the indicated information and the identity of
the user that generated that evidence. FDP_DAU.2.2_WebRAO
Dependencies: [
FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification
]
5.2.5 Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.2.5.1 User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)
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The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users:
(See Section 9.2.2) User’s Identity including:
X500 Distinguished Name.
Authentication Information:
User Role
Group – based on DN, defined by the CAO user
Registered Entity
Authentication Method – Fixed Digital Signature.
Access Information
Audit Data
PKI Entity – e.g., CA/RA
]. FIA_ATD.1.1
Dependencies: [
No dependencies
]
5.2.5.2 Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
The TSF shall allow
Starting of TOE modules
Shutting down of TOE modules
Bootstrapping
Editing CA and CAO policies
Requesting registration
Requesting revocation
Requesting certificate status information
Accessing the Web Handler web pages
Submitting email requests for registration
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.FIA_UAU.1.2
Dependencies: [
FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification
]
5.2.5.3 User Authentication Before any action (FIA_UAU.2_CAO)
The CAO shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other CAO mediated actions on behalf of that user.FIA_UAU.2.1_CAO
Dependencies: [
FIA_UID.1_CAO Timing of Identification
]
5.2.5.4 User Authentication Before any action (FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO)
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The WebRAO shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other WebRAO mediated actions on behalf of that
user.FIA_UAU.2.1_WebRAO
Dependencies: [
FIA_UID.1_WebRAO Timing of Identification
]
5.2.5.5 Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)
The TSF shall allow:
Starting of TOE modules
Shutting down of TOE modules
Bootstrapping
Editing registration policies
Requesting registration
Requesting revocation
Requesting certificate status information
Accessing the Web Handler web pages
Submitting email requests for registration
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.FIA_UID.1.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.FIA_UID.1.2
Dependencies: [
No Dependencies
]
5.2.5.6 User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2_CAO)
The CAO shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other
CAO-mediated actions on behalf of that user.FIA_UID.2.1_CAO
Dependencies: [
No Dependencies
]
5.2.5.7 User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2_WebRAO)
The WebRAO shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other
WebRAO-mediated actions on behalf of that user.FIA_UID.2.1_WebRAO
Dependencies: [
No Dependencies
]
5.2.5.8 User-subject binding (FIA_USB.1)
The TSF shall associate the appropriate user security attributes with subjects
acting on behalf of that user.FIA_USB.1.1
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Dependencies: [
FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
]
Application Note:
The following are valid security attributes (see section 9.2.2)
· X.509 certificate
· X.509 certificate extensions
· X.509 certificate custom extensions such as BLT {used for PKI Entity certificate}
· User role attributes {e.g., CA auditor role}
· Group Membership rules for WebRAO defined by the CAO administrator
5.2.5.9 Verification of Secrets (FIA_SOS.1)
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet
SPM_PASSWORD_METRIC (Section 9.1).FIA_SOS.1.1
Dependencies: [
No Dependencies
]
5.2.6 Security management (FMT)
5.2.6.1 Management of security functions behavior (FMT_MOF.1)
The TSF shall restrict the ability to determine the behavior of the functions in
Table 5-6 to the subjects in Table 5-7.FMT_MOF.1.1
Subjects, as defined in
section 9.2.2
Object Permitted Operation Relevant
to
FMT_MS
A.1?
Relevant
to
FMT_MT
D.1?
CAO Audit Manager CA Audit
Log
Archive
Query
No Yes
CAO Auditor CA Audit
Log
Query No Yes
CAO user
WebRAO user
Certificate Register certificate requests, and
check the status of these requests
Approve or reject a certificate
request
Approve or reject a revocation
request
View certificates and certificate
status
Yes Yes
CAO user with
required permissions
Cryptograp
hic keys
Key Generation
Key Distribution
Key Access
Key Destruction
Determine cryptographic algorithms
Determine cryptographic key sizes
No Yes
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Subjects, as defined in
section 9.2.2
Object Permitted Operation Relevant
to
FMT_MS
A.1?
Relevant
to
FMT_MT
D.1?
CAO user with
required permissions
PKI View and Modify the PKI
Read Access Rights
Manage Other Users’ permissions
Create and Manage Registration
Policies
Authorize CA Certificates
Revoke CA Certificates
Authorize PKI Entity Certificates
Revoke PKI Entity Certificates
Authorize End Entity Certificates
Revoke End Entity Certificates
Create and edit authorization
groups
Yes No
All CAO users, CA CA Audit
Log
Insert signed records as a result of
actions
No Yes
Key owner PSE or P12
file
Access private key accessed from
file as owner and use it to sign data
Use the Token Manager component
functionality to operate on
No No
Owners of certificates
for PKI entities
PKI Entities
(CA, CAO,
RA, RA
eXchange,
Web PH,
email PH,
SCEP PH,
CSS)
Start the relevant TOE component No No
RA Audit Manager RA Audit
Log
Archive
Query
No Yes
RA Auditor RA Audit
Log
Query No Yes
All RA users, RA
eXchange user
RA Audit
Log
Insert signed records as a result of
actions
No Yes
WebRAO user Cryptograp
hic keys
Key Generation
Key Distribution
Key Access
Key Destruction
Determine cryptographic algorithms
Determine cryptographic key sizes
No Yes
Table 5-7 Subjects, Objects and Permitted Operations for Access_Control_SFP
This table is used in multiple SFRs. The Access Control SFP is relevant to that
SFR only where row is marked “yes” as being relevant to the SFR in the heading
column.
Dependencies: [
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
]
5.2.6.2 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
The TSF shall enforce the Access_Control_SFP to restrict the ability to query,
modify, delete the security attributes objects, as listed in Table 5-7 (where row
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is marked as being relevant to FMT_MSA.1) to subjects, as listed in Table 5-7
(where row is marked as being relevant to FMT_MSA.1) .FMT_MSA.1.1
Dependencies: [
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
]
5.2.6.3 Secure security attributes (FMT_MSA.2)
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security
attributes.FMT_MSA.2.1
Dependencies: [
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE Security Policy Model
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
Or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
]
5.2.6.4 Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3)
The TSF shall enforce the SFP in Table 5-7 to provide permissive default values
for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall allow the roles in Table 5-7 to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.FMT_MSA.3.2
Dependencies: [
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
]
5.2.6.5 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
The TSF shall restrict the ability to query, modify, delete or clear according to
Table 5-7 the data listed in Table 5-7 as “objects” (in rows noted as being
relevant to FMT_MTD.1) to subjects listed in Table 5-7 (in rows noted as being
relevant to FMT_MTD.1) FMT_MTD.1.1
Dependencies: [
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
]
5.2.6.6 Management of limits on TSF data (FMT_MTD.2)
The TSF shall restrict the specification of the limits for Certificate Validity to
CAO users, WebRAO users.FMT_MTD.2.1
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The TSF shall take the following actions, if the TSF data are at, or exceed, the
indicated limits Certificate request to be rejected or modified.FMT_MTD.2.2
Dependencies: [
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
]
5.2.6.7 Revocation (FMT_REV.1)
The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke security attributes associated with the
users and PKI entities within the TSC to users and administrators (as defined
in 9.2.2) .FMT_REV.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the rules SPM_REVOKE_CERTIFICATE,
SPM_REMOVE_PKI, SPM_CHANGE_WEBRAO_GROUP,
SPM_CHANGE_CAO_ATTRIBUTE.FMT_REV.1.2
Dependencies: [
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
]
Application notes:
The following are valid security attribute
· X.509 certificate
· X.509 certificate extensions
· X.509 certificate custom extensions such as BTL
· User role attributes, i.e., CAO auditor role
· Group membership rules
The following cannot be controlled by the TSF
· Database access
The following can have their attributes revoked:
· PKI entities
· PKI entity users
· PKI trusted users, e.g., KAS
· PKI entity user attributes – e.g., CAO auditor role
Revocation can occur by:
· The CAO user removing the entity from the PKI.
· Changing the attributes of the entity in the PKI definition
· When the certificate expires
· Trust list is compromised
· Revoking the certificate
5.2.6.8 Time-limited authorization (FMT_SAE.1)
The TSF shall restrict the capability to specify an expiration time for all digital
certificate expiry dates to CAO user and WebRAO users, defined by the
registration policy and CA expiry.FMT_SAE.1.1
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For each of these security attributes, the TSF shall be able to reject all requests
signed with that certificate, reject connection requests, and optionally notify
the user or forward a renewal after the expiration time for the indicated security
attribute has passed.FMT_SAE.1.2
Dependencies: [
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
]
5.2.6.9 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions:
Archive Audit Log and Delete Archived Audit Records. FMT_SMF.1.1
Dependencies: [
No Dependencies
]
5.2.6.10 Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
The TSF shall maintain the roles the “Subjects” defined in Section 9.2.2.
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.FMT_SMR.1.2
Dependencies:
[
FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification
]
5.2.7 Protection of the TOE Security Functions (FPT)
5.2.7.1 Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission (FPT_ITC.1_RA)
The RA shall protect all confidential TSF data transmitted from the TSF to a
remote trusted IT product (the KAS) from unauthorized disclosure during
transmission.FPT_ITC.1.1_RA
2 This applies only to exporting the private key to the KAS.
Dependencies: [
No Dependencies
]
5.2.7.2 Inter-TSF detection of modification (FPT_ITI.1)
The TSF shall provide the capability to detect modification of all TSF data during
transmission between the TSF and a remote trusted IT product within the
following metric: SPM_Signature_Validity.FPT_ITI.1.1
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The TSF shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of all TSF data
transmitted between the TSF and a remote trusted IT product and perform : the
TSF shall logically disconnect the connecting entity, reject the message, and
log the event if modifications are detected.FPT_ITI.1.2
Dependencies: [
No Dependencies
]
5.2.7.3 Basic Internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1_WebRAO)
The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure and modification when it is
transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.FPT_ITT.1.1_WebRAO
Dependencies: [
No Dependencies
]
Application note:
This SFR is intended to refer to the functionality where the WebRAO protects
TSF data from disclosure (when sending private keys via the RA eXchange to the
KAS for archive) and modification (for all messages) between itself and the RA
eXchange.
5.2.7.4 Basic Internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1)
The TSF shall protect TSF data from modification when it is transmitted
between separate parts of the TOE.FPT_ITT.1.1
Dependencies: [
No Dependencies
]
5.2.7.5 Simple trusted acknowledgement (FPT_SSP.1)
The TSF shall acknowledge, when requested by another part of the TSF, the
receipt of an unmodified TSF data transmission. FPT_SSP.1.1
Dependencies: [
FPT_ITT.1 basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection
]
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5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
5.3.1 This section defines the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) of the
TOE as Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2,
specified in terms of assurance components in the Common Criteria (CC)
Part 3. The SARs are summarized in the following table.
Assurance Class Assurance Component
ASE_DES.1 TOE Description
ASE_ENV.1 Security Environment
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security Objectives
ASE_PPC.1 PP Claims
ASE_REQ.1 IT Security Requirements
ASE_SRE.1 Explicitly stated IT
Security Requirements
ASE Security Target
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary
Specification
ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation
ACM_CAP.4 Generation support and
acceptance procedures
ACM Configuration
Management
ACM_SCP.2 Problem tracking CM
coverage
ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification
ADO Delivery and
Operation
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, Generation,
and Startup Procedures
ADV_FSP.2 Fully defined external
interfaces
ADV_HLD.2 Security Enforcing High-
Level Design
ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the
implementation of the TSF
ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level
design
ADV_RCR.1 Informal Correspondence
Demonstration
ADV Development
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security
policy model
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Assurance Class Assurance Component
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator Guidance
AGD Guidance
Documents
AGD_USR.1 User Guidance
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of Security
Measures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-
cycle model
ALC Life Cycle
Support
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development
tools
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: High Level Design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional Testing
ATE Tests
ATE_IND.2 Independent Testing -
Sample
AVA_MSU.2 Validation of analysis
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE Security
Function Evaluation
AVA Vulnerability
Assessment
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability
analysis
Table 5-8 – TOE Security Assurance Requirements
5.3.2 The remainder of this section contains details of the assurance
components, listed above, from Part 3 of the CC.
5.3.3 Configuration management (ACM)
5.3.3.1 Partial CM automation (ACM_AUT.1)
The CM system shall provide an automated means by which only authorized
changes are made to the TOE implementation representation.ACM_AUT.1.1C
The developer shall use a CM system.ACM_AUT.1.1D
The CM system shall provide an automated means to support the generation of
the TOE.ACM_AUT.1.2C
The developer shall provide a CM plan.ACM_AUT.1.2D
The CM plan shall describe the automated tools used in the CM
system.ACM_AUT.1.3C
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The CM plan shall describe how the automated tools are used in the CM
system.ACM_AUT.1.4C
5.3.3.2 Generation support and acceptance procedures (ACM_CAP.4)
The CM system shall provide measures such that only authorized changes are
made to the configuration items.ACM_CAP.4.10C
The CM system shall support the generation of the TOE.ACM_CAP.4.11C
The acceptance plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or
newly created configuration items as part of the TOE.ACM_CAP.4.12C
The reference for the TOE shall be unique to each version of the TOE.ACM_CAP.4.1C
The developer shall provide a reference for the TOE.ACM_CAP.4.1D
The TOE shall be labelled with its reference.ACM_CAP.4.2C
The developer shall use a CM system.ACM_CAP.4.2D
The CM documentation shall include a configuration list, a CM plan, and an
acceptance plan.ACM_CAP.4.3C
The CM list shall identify all configuration items that comprise the TOE.
The developer shall provide CM documentation.ACM_CAP.4.3D
The configuration list shall describe the configuration items that comprise the
TOE.ACM_CAP.4.4C
The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the
configuration items.ACM_CAP.4.5C
The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.ACM_CAP.4.6C
The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used.ACM_CAP.4.7C
The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is operating in accordance
with the CM plan.ACM_CAP.4.8C
The CM documentation shall provide evidence that all configuration items have
been and are being effectively maintained under the CM system.ACM_CAP.4.9C
5.3.3.3 Problem tracking CM coverage (ACM_SCP.2)
The list of configuration items shall include the following: implementation
representation; security flaws; and the evaluation evidence required by the
assurance components in the ST.ACM_SCP.2.1C
The developer shall provide a list of configuration items for the TOE.ACM_SCP.2.1D
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5.3.4 Delivery and operation (ADO)
5.3.4.1 Detection of modification (ADO_DEL.2)
The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to
maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to a user’s
site.ADO_DEL.2.1C
The developer shall document procedures for delivery of the TOE or parts of it to
the user.ADO_DEL.2.1D
The delivery documentation shall describe how the various procedures and
technical measures provide for the detection of modifications, or any discrepancy
between the developer's master copy and the version received at the user
site.ADO_DEL.2.2C
The developer shall use the delivery procedures.ADO_DEL.2.2D
The delivery documentation shall describe how the various procedures allow
detection of attempts to masquerade as the developer, even in cases in which the
developer has sent nothing to the user’s site.ADO_DEL.2.3C
5.3.4.2 Installation, generation, and startup procedures (ADO_IGS.1)
The installation, generation, and startup documentation shall describe the steps
necessary for secure installation, generation, and startup of the TOE.ADO_IGS.1.1C
The developer shall document procedures necessary for the secure installation,
generation, and startup of the TOE.ADO_IGS.1.1D
5.3.5 Development (ADV)
5.3.5.1 Fully defined external interfaces (ADV_FSP.2)
The functional specification shall describe the TSF and its external interfaces
using an informal style.ADV_FSP.2.1C
The developer shall provide a functional specification.ADV_FSP.2.1D
The functional specification shall be internally consistent.ADV_FSP.2.2C
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use of all
external TSF interfaces, providing complete details of all effects, exceptions and
error messages.ADV_FSP.2.3C
The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.ADV_FSP.2.4C
The functional specification shall include rationale that the TSF is completely
represented.ADV_FSP.2.5C
5.3.5.2 Security enforcing high-level design (ADV_HLD.2)
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The presentation of the high-level design shall be informal.ADV_HLD.2.1C
The developer shall provide the high-level design of the TSF.ADV_HLD.2.1D
The high-level design shall be internally consistent.ADV_HLD.2.2C
The high-level design shall describe the structure of the TSF in terms of
subsystems.ADV_HLD.2.3C
The high-level design shall describe the security functionality provided by each
subsystem of the TSF.ADV_HLD.2.4C
The high-level design shall identify any underlying hardware, firmware, and/or
software required by the TSF with a presentation of the functions provided by
the supporting protection mechanisms implemented in that hardware, firmware,
or software.ADV_HLD.2.5C
The high-level design shall identify all interfaces to the subsystems of the
TSF.ADV_HLD.2.6C
The high-level design shall identify which of the interfaces to the subsystems of
the TSF are externally visible.ADV_HLD.2.7C
The high-level design shall describe the purpose and method of use of all
interfaces to the subsystems of the TSF, providing details of effects, exceptions
and error messages, as appropriate.ADV_HLD.2.8C
The high-level design shall describe the separation of the TOE into TSP-enforcing
and other subsystems. ADV_HLD.2.9C
5.3.5.3 Subset of the implementation of the TSF (ADV_IMP.1)
The implementation representation shall unambiguously define the TSF to a level
of detail such that the TSF can be generated without further design
decisions.ADV_IMP.1.1C
The developer shall provide the implementation representation for a selected
subset of the TSF.ADV_IMP.1.1D
The implementation representation shall be internally consistent.ADV_IMP.1.2C
5.3.5.4 Descriptive low-level design (ADV_LLD.1)
The low-level design shall describe the separation of the TOE into TSP-enforcing
and other modules.ADV_LLD.1.10C
The presentation of the low-level design shall be informal.ADV_LLD.1.1C
The developer shall provide the low-level design of the TSF.ADV_LLD.1.1D
The low-level design shall be internally consistent.ADV_LLD.1.2C
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The low-level design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules.ADV_LLD.1.3C
The low-level design shall describe the purpose of each module.ADV_LLD.1.4C
The low-level design shall define the interrelationships between the modules in
terms of provided security functionality and dependencies on other
modules.ADV_LLD.1.5C
The low-level design shall describe how each TSP-enforcing function is
provided.ADV_LLD.1.6C
The low-level design shall identify all interfaces to the modules of the
TSF.ADV_LLD.1.7C
The low-level design shall identify which of the interfaces to the modules of the
TSF are externally visible.ADV_LLD.1.8C
The low-level design shall describe the purpose and method of use of all
interfaces to the modules of the TSF, providing details of effects, exceptions and
error messages, as appropriate.ADV_LLD.1.9C
5.3.5.5 Informal correspondence demonstration (ADV_RCR.1)
For each adjacent pair of provided TSF representations, the analysis shall
demonstrate that all relevant security functionality of the more abstract TSF
representation is correctly and completely refined in the less abstract TSF
representation.ADV_RCR.1.1C
The developer shall provide an analysis of correspondence between all adjacent
pairs of TSF representations that are provided.ADV_RCR.1.1D
5.3.5.6 Informal TOE security policy model (ADV_SPM.1)
The TSP model shall be informal.ADV_SPM.1.1C
The developer shall provide a TSP model.ADV_SPM.1.1D
The TSP model shall describe the rules and characteristics of all policies of the
TSP that can be modeled.ADV_SPM.1.2C
The developer shall demonstrate correspondence between the functional
specification and the TSP model.ADV_SPM.1.2D
The TSP model shall include a rationale that demonstrates that it is consistent
and complete with respect to all policies of the TSP that can be
modeled.ADV_SPM.1.3C
The demonstration of correspondence between the TSP model and the functional
specification shall show that all of the security functions in the functional
specification are consistent and complete with respect to the TSP
model.ADV_SPM.1.4C
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5.3.6 Guidance documents (AGD)
5.3.6.1 Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM.1)
The administrator guidance shall describe the administrative functions and
interfaces available to the administrator of the TOE.AGD_ADM.1.1C
The developer shall provide administrator guidance addressed to system
administrative personnel.AGD_ADM.1.1D
The administrator guidance shall describe how to administer the TOE in a secure
manner.AGD_ADM.1.2C
The administrator guidance shall contain warnings about functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing
environment.AGD_ADM.1.3C
The administrator guidance shall describe all assumptions regarding user
behavior that are relevant to secure operation of the TOE.AGD_ADM.1.4C
The administrator guidance shall describe all security parameters under the
control of the administrator, indicating secure values as appropriate.AGD_ADM.1.5C
The administrator guidance shall describe each type of security-relevant event
relative to the administrative functions that need to be performed, including
changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the
TSF.AGD_ADM.1.6C
The administrator guidance shall be consistent with all other documentation
supplied for evaluation.AGD_ADM.1.7C
The administrator guidance shall describe all security requirements for the IT
environment that are relevant to the administrator.AGD_ADM.1.8C
5.3.6.2 User guidance (AGD_USR.1)
The user guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces available to the
non-administrative users of the TOE. AGD_USR.1.1C
The developer shall provide user guidance.AGD_USR.1.1D
The user guidance shall describe the use of user-accessible security functions
provided by the TOE.AGD_USR.1.2C
The user guidance shall contain warnings about user-accessible functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing
environment.AGD_USR.1.3C
The user guidance shall clearly present all user responsibilities necessary for
secure operation of the TOE, including those related to assumptions regarding
user behavior found in the statement of TOE security environment.AGD_USR.1.4C
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The user guidance shall be consistent with all other documentation supplied for
evaluation.AGD_USR.1.5C
The user guidance shall describe all security requirements for the IT environment
that are relevant to the user.AGD_USR.1.6C
5.3.7 Life cycle support (ALC)
5.3.7.1 Identification of security measures (ALC_DVS.1)
The development security documentation shall describe all the physical,
procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect
the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its
development environment.ALC_DVS.1.1C
The developer shall produce development security documentation.ALC_DVS.1.1D
The development security documentation shall provide evidence that these
security measures are followed during the development and maintenance of the
TOE.ALC_DVS.1.2C
5.3.7.2 Flaw reporting procedures (ALC_FLR.2)3
The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the procedures
used to track all reported security flaws in each release of the TOE.ALC_FLR.2.1C
The developer shall provide flaw remediation procedures addressed to TOE
developers.ALC_FLR.2.1D 4
The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature
and effect of each security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a
correction to that flaw.ALC_FLR.2.2C
The developer shall establish a procedure for accepting and acting upon all
reports of security flaws and requests for corrections to those flaws.ALC_FLR.2.2D
The flaw remediation procedures shall require that corrective actions be
identified for each of the security flaws.ALC_FLR.2.3C
The developer shall provide flaw remediation guidance addressed to TOE
users.ALC_FLR.2.3D
The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used
to provide flaw information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to
TOE users.ALC_FLR.2.4C
3 ALC_FLR is not part of an EAL 4 evaluation. This component is used to augment the EAL4
evaluation to allow flaw remediation and corrective actions, which are security relevant, to be
distributed to end users.
4 This has been affected by [FLR] – the updated text is shown.
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The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe a means by
which the developer receives from TOE users reports and enquiries of suspected
security flaws in the TOE.ALC_FLR.2.5C
The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall ensure that any
reported flaws are corrected and the correction issued to TOE users.ALC_FLR.2.6C
The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall provide safeguards
that any corrections to these security flaws do not introduce any new
flaws.ALC_FLR.2.7C
The flaw remediation guidance shall describe a means by which TOE users
report to the developer any suspected security flaw in the TOE.ALC_FLR.2.8C
5.3.7.3 Developer defined life-cycle model (ALC_LCD.1)
The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop
and maintain the TOE.ALC_LCD.1.1C
The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the development
and maintenance of the TOE.ALC_LCD.1.1D
The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development
and maintenance of the TOE.ALC_LCD.1.2C
The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.ALC_LCD.1.2D
5.3.7.4 Well-defined development tools (ALC_TAT.1)
All development tools used for implementation shall be well-defined.ALC_TAT.1.1C
The developer shall identify the development tools being used for the
TOE.ALC_TAT.1.1D
The documentation of the development tools shall unambiguously define the
meaning of all statements used in the implementation.ALC_TAT.1.2C
The developer shall document the selected implementation-dependent options of
the development tools.ALC_TAT.1.2D
The documentation of the development tools shall unambiguously define the
meaning of all implementation-dependent options.ALC_TAT.1.3C
5.3.8 Tests (ATE)
5.3.8.1 Analysis of coverage (ATE_COV.2)
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The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence between
the tests identified in the test documentation and the TSF as described in the
functional specification.ATE_COV.2.1C
The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.ATE_COV.2.1D
The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that the correspondence
between the TSF as described in the functional specification and the tests
identified in the test documentation is complete. ATE_COV.2.2C
5.3.8.2 Testing: high-level design (ATE_DPT.1)
The depth analysis shall demonstrate that the tests identified in the test
documentation are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF operates in accordance
with its high-level design.ATE_DPT.1.1C
The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.ATE_DPT.1.1D
5.3.8.3 Functional testing (ATE_FUN.1)
The test documentation shall consist of test plans, test procedure descriptions,
expected test results and actual test results.ATE_FUN.1.1C
The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.ATE_FUN.1.1D
The test plans shall identify the security functions to be tested and describe the
goal of the tests to be performed.ATE_FUN.1.2C
The developer shall provide test documentation.ATE_FUN.1.2D
The test procedure descriptions shall identify the tests to be performed and
describe the scenarios for testing each security function. These scenarios shall
include any ordering dependencies on the results of other tests.ATE_FUN.1.3C
The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful
execution of the tests.ATE_FUN.1.4C
The test results from the developer execution of the tests shall demonstrate that
each tested security function behaved as specified.ATE_FUN.1.5C
5.3.8.4 Independent testing - sample (ATE_IND.2)
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.ATE_IND.2.1C
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.ATE_IND.2.1D
The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that were
used in the developer’s functional testing of the TSF. ATE_IND.2.2C
5.3.9 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
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5.3.9.1 Validation of analysis (AVA_MSU.2)
The guidance documentation shall identify all possible modes of operation of the
TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their
consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation.AVA_MSU.2.1C
The developer shall provide guidance documentation. AVA_MSU.2.1D
The guidance documentation shall be complete, clear, consistent and
reasonable.AVA_MSU.2.2C
The developer shall document an analysis of the guidance
documentation.AVA_MSU.2.2D
The guidance documentation shall list all assumptions about the intended
environment.AVA_MSU.2.3C
The guidance documentation shall list all requirements for external security
measures (including external procedural, physical and personnel
controls).AVA_MSU.2.4C
The analysis documentation shall demonstrate that the guidance documentation
is complete.AVA_MSU.2.5C
5.3.9.2 Strength of TOE security function evaluation (AVA_SOF.1)
For each mechanism with a strength of TOE security function claim the strength
of TOE security function analysis shall show that it meets or exceeds the
minimum strength level defined in the PP/ST.AVA_SOF.1.1C
The developer shall perform a strength of TOE security function analysis for each
mechanism identified in the ST as having a strength of TOE security function
claim.AVA_SOF.1.1D
For each mechanism with a specific strength of TOE security function claim the
strength of TOE security function analysis shall show that it meets or exceeds the
specific strength of function metric defined in the PP/ST.AVA_SOF.1.2C
5.3.9.3 Independent vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA.2)
The vulnerability analysis documentation shall describe the analysis of the TOE
deliverables performed to search for ways in which the a user can violate the
TSP.AVA_VLA.2.1C
The developer shall perform a vulnerability analysis.AVA_VLA.2.1D
The vulnerability analysis documentation shall describe the disposition of
identified vulnerabilities.AVA_VLA.2.2C
The developers shall provide vulnerability analysis documentation.AVA_VLA.2.2D
The vulnerability analysis documentation shall show, for all identified
vulnerabilities that the vulnerability cannot be exploited in the intended
environment for the TOE.AVA_VLA.2.3C
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The documentation shall justify that the TOE, with the identified vulnerabilities,
is resistant to obvious penetration attacks.AVA_VLA.2.4C
5.4 Security Requirements for the IT Environment
5.4.1 Each of the environmental security objectives is either met by IT or non-IT
means.
5.4.2 Table 5-7 summarizes the way in which environmental security objectives
are addressed and lists the Security Requirements on the IT Environment.
The actual SFRs to be provided by the IT environment are listed under the
Environmental Security Objectives they relate to, as listed in this table:
Environmental Security
Objective
IT Environment
Security Requirement
Comment and justification
where appropriate
OE.BackupStorageRestoration Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.Audit Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.TamperNotify IT for HSM FPT_PHP.1, which
contributes to achieving this
security objective because it
matches the security objective
exactly.
OE.Cryptography Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.HardwareFunctions IT for HSM, Smart cards FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1,
FCS_COP.1, FCS_CKM.4,
which contribute to achieving
this security objective because
they match the security
objective exactly.
OE.TimeSource Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.PassphrasePIN Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.Keys Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.Physical Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.DisposalOfAuthenticationDate Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.FlawRemediation Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.CPS Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.CompetentPKIUsers Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.MaliciousCodeNotExecuted Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.SecureInstallation Nil addressed by Non-IT means
OE.Guidance Nil addressed by Non-IT means
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Environmental Security
Objective
IT Environment
Security Requirement
Comment and justification
where appropriate
OE.Connectivity Nil addressed by Non-IT means
Table 5-9 – Method for addressing the environmental security objectives
5.5 Minimum Strength of Function Level
Most of the TOE’s Security Functional Requirements that are realized by
probabilistic or permutational mechanisms are cryptographic in nature and
therefore the assessment of their algorithmic strength is out of scope of the
evaluation, being assessed by the National Authority.
However one mechanism does require a strength of function assessment. This is
the mechanism that protects the privacy and integrity of the “.pse” file. This is
implemented by the functions IA_Identify, KG_Generate, KG_Split, KG_Update
and KG_Export, and has a strength of function of SOF-Basic, so the minimum
strength of function for the TOE Security Functional Requirements is SOF-Basic.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
6.1 Introduction
This section defines the instantiation of the security requirements of the TOE.
This specification describes the security functions and assurance measures of the
TOE that meet the TOE security requirements.
6.2 TOE Security Functions
This section covers the IT security functions and specifies how these functions
satisfy the TOE security functional requirements. It includes a mapping between
functions and requirements that shows which functions satisfy which
requirements and that all requirements are met.
6.2.1 IT Security Functions
The IT security functions provided by the TOE are described in Table 6.1. The
SFR(s) that they implement are given in brackets within the description, and so
the descriptions of the SFRs (provided in Chapter 5) that each IT security
function is mapped to in this way also provides part of the description of the IT
security function.
The description of each function in Table 6.1 provides the justification as to why
the function is suitable to meet the SFRs that are mapped to it. Table 6.1 also
shows which security mechanisms are implemented by which IT security
function, by the mapping to the SFR(s).
Finally, Table 6.1 shows which IT security functions are realized by probabilistic
or permutational mechanisms (apart from those requiring a strength-of-function
claim, which are listed in the following section). This is because all such
mechanisms that are implemented by the TSF are implemented using
cryptographic functions (apart from those requiring a strength-of-function claim,
which are listed in the following section). Therefore, all IT security functions
mapped to cryptographic SFRs (i.e., Any SFR whose name begins with “FCS_”)
are realized by probabilistic or permutational mechanisms.
Security Function Description
AL_Archive Archive Audit Records
This function is used to allow an authorized auditor to
archive the audit log and to ensure that the integrity of
the log is maintained (FIA_UAU.2_CAO,
FIA_UID.2_CAO, FDP_IFC.1, FMT_SAE.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1).
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Security Function Description
AL_CreateAuditor Register Auditor
This function is used when assigning the auditor roles to
an administrator (FIA_ATD.1). The following types of
Auditor roles exist in the TOE, the CAO auditor, the
CAO Audit Manager, the RA auditor, the RA Audit
Manager. Only those administrators that are assigned
an appropriate auditor role are able to review these logs
(FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2 and FAU_SAR.3,
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1, FIA_UAU.2_CAO,
FIA_UID.2_CAO, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_MTD.1). These functions cannot be used to
provide greater permissions to a user than the current
user has.
AL_Integrity Protect Audit Log.
This function is used to ensure the integrity of the audit
data and prevent unauthorized deletion and detect
modifications (FAU_STG.1, FPT_ITT.1) using hashing
(FCS_COP.1_HASH) and digital signatures
(FCS_COP.1_SIGN and FCS_COP.1_VERIFY).
AL_Logging Events Logging.
This function is used by various components to add
audit data to the log, which is stored in a database
(FAU_GEN.1). The identity of the user that caused the
event is included in each log record (FAU_GEN.2).
AL_Selection Audit Selection
This function is used to allow an authorized auditor to
select all or portions of the audit record from a database
and perform sorting to facilitate checking of the audit
logs (FAU_SAR.3, FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FMT_SAE.1, FMT_SMR.1).
CG_Authorize Authorize Registration Request
This function is used to authorize a registration request.
The action of authorizing a request involves first
verifying the signature on the request
(FCS_COP.1_VERIFY) then digitally signing an
authorization (FCS_COP.1_SIGN, FDP_DAU.2_CAO,
FDP_DAU.2_WebRAO). These functions can be used by
the CAO and WebRAO users if they are valid and
current users of the TSF (FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.2_CAO,
FIA_UID.2_CAO, FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO,
FIA_UID.2_WebRAO, FIA_UID.1, FMT_SAE.1,
FMT_SMR.1) or may be bypassed if automatic
authorization is enabled. (Note that this ST excludes the
use of automatic authorization.)
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Security Function Description
CG_Distribute Distribute Certificate
This function is used to retrieve a certificate from the
database, update its status to reflect the action, and
return it to the end entity via an assigned return path
(FDP_IFC.1).
CG_Generate Generate Certificate
This function is used to create a certificate on the basis of
an authorized certificate request (FDP_DAU.2_CAO).
This involves querying the status of the certificate in the
database while creating it, and storing the certificate in
the database after creation. This is performed by the
appropriate CA. Certificates will be digitally signed by
the CA (FCS_COP.1_SIGN, FDP_DAU.2). They are also
used to check whether the certificate being generated
has a unique DN and/or public key before producing
the certificate by checking the database. If requested to
do this check, and one of the items is not unique, then it
will not produce a certificate but will return an error.
Otherwise, as well as producing the certificate, it will
update the database to reflect DNs and public keys it
produces so as to perform this check in future.
A CA will not generate a certificate for any PKI entity
except a WebRAO if the request has come from a
WebRAO (i.e., requests for certificates for PKI entities
must come from CAOs to be accepted – all others will be
discarded).
CG_Register Register Entity
This function is used to generate a certificate request for
a PKI entity. This function is performed by the CAO
user or the WebRAO user (when issuing certificates for
other WebRAOs) if they are a valid and current user of
the TSF (FMT_SAE.1, FMT_SMR.1), and may initiate
KG_Generate to generate keys. The certificate request
process may be done as a face-to-face process or it may
involve the export of a PKCS10 certificate request and
import of a PKCS7 certificate chain.
This function covers certificate generation for the CA
and the CAO entities, which occurs during the bootstrap
process (initial creation of the PKI)as well as certificate
generation associated with the addition of any PKI
entity into an existing PKI. The entity may also use the
Key Generator to generate a certificate request to
become part of the PKI.
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Security Function Description
CG_Request Generate Registration Request
This function is used to create a certification request for
an end entity, which may include specifying renewals.
This may involve importing a private key from the end
entity (FDP_ITC.1), or it may involve generating a key
pair by initiating KG_Generate. These requests will be
signed by the originator to prove that they are a valid
and current user of the TSF (FCS_COP.1_SIGN,
FDP_DAU.2_CAO, FDP_DAU.2_WebRAO, FMT_SAE.1,
FMT_SMR.1). These functions can be used by the CAO
user, WebRAO user and end entities (but note that
requests generated by end entities are not considered in
this ST).
CP_Authenticate Authenticate Entity
This function is used to validate the entity trying to
establish a communications channel. This is done by
verifying the signature on those communications
(FCS_COP.1_VERIFY).
CP_Disconnect Disconnect Entity
This function is used to logically disconnect an entity
from a communications channel. This may be because
the entity sent data that could not be successfully
verified – i.e., it had been modified in transit, or was not
from a valid and current member of the PKI (FDP_ITT.3,
FPT_SSP.1).
CP_Origin Embed Origin.
This function is used to embed proof of origin
information in message, when required. This is done by
the hashing (FCS_COP.1_HASH) and then digital
signing by the originator of the message, using the
originator’s private key (FCO_NRO.2,
FCS_COP.1_SIGN, FDP_DAU.2, FDP_DAU.2_CAO,
FIA_USB.1).
CP_Protect Protect Messages
This function is used to ensure messages are protected
from either/both disclosures, modification, replay and
other attacks (FPT_ITC.1_RA, FPT_ITI.1,
FPT_ITT.1_WebRAO, FPT_ITT.1). Integrity will be
protected by signing (FCS_COP.1_SIGN, FDP_ITT.1,
FDP_ITT.3, FDP_DAU.2, FDP_DAU.2_CAO) and
confidentiality will be protected by encryption
(FCS_COP.1_ENCRYPT, FPT_ITC.1_RA, FPT_ITI.1,
FPT_ITT.1_WebRAO).
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Security Function Description
CP_Verify Verify Messages
This function is used to verify the origin, integrity,
validity of messages (FPT_ITC.1_RA, FPT_ITI.1,
FPT_ITT.1_WebRAO). This is done by checking the
digital signature on the message, using the originator’s
public key (FCO_NRO.2, FDP_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.3) and
ensuring that it decrypts correctly
(FCS_COP.1_DECRYPT).
CR_Authorize Authorize Certificate Revocation Request
This function is used to authorize a certificate revocation
request. This can be done by the CAO user or WebRAO
user. This action involves checking the signature on the
certificate revocation request (FCS_COP.1_VERIFY) and
then signing the authorization (FCS_COP.1_SIGN,
FDP_DAU.2_CAO, FDP_DAU.2_WebRAO). These
functions can only be performed by authorized persons
(FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO, FIA_UID.2_WebRAO,
FIA_UID.1, FMT_REV.1).
CR_Publish_Rev_Ce
rt_Status
Publish Revocation and Certificate Status
This function is used to publish or create a list of
suspended and revoked certificates, or the status of
individual certificates. For lists (which may be created in
the database or as a message), this can be done either
periodically, via scheduling using records in the CA
database, or automatically when a revocation or
suspension occurs, or on request. For individual
certificates, the status can be published (in messages) by
this function on request from the CAO, the CSS, Web
Handler or WebRAO. In all cases the indication of status
will be signed by the originator (FCS_COP.1_SIGN,
FDP_DAU.2, FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FDP_IFC.1).
CR_Request Generate Revocation Request
This function is used to create a revocation, suspension
or unsuspension request, which will be signed by the
originator (FCS_COP.1_SIGN, FDP_DAU.2_CAO,
FDP_DAU.2_WebRAO). This does not cover the case
where an end user has generated the request, which is
outside the scope of the ST.
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Security Function Description
CR_Revoke Revoke Certificate
This function is used to revoke a certificate, by updating
the database to show its change in status. This is done
by the CA on receipt of a request from an authorized
person (FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.2_CAO,
FIA_UID.2_CAO, FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO,
FIA_UID.2_WebRAO, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_REV.1). Note that when a PKI entity is revoked all
of its certificates are revoked at the same time.
CR_Suspend Suspend Certificate
This function is used to suspend a certificate, by
updating the database to show its change in status. This
is done by the CA on request from an authorized person
(FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO, FIA_UID.2_WebRAO,
FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_REV.1). Note that
when a PKI entity is suspended all of its certificates are
suspended at the same time.
CR_Unsuspend Unsuspended Certificate
This function is used to unsuspend a suspended
certificate, by updating the database to show its change
in status. A revoked certificate cannot be unrevoked.
This is done by the CA on request from an authorized
person (FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO, FIA_UID.2_WebRAO,
FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1). Note that when a PKI entity
is unsuspended then all of its certificates will be
unsuspended.
DP_Export Protect Data Exported
This function is to ensure that data is protected when
exported (if required) (FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITC.1_RA,
FPT_ITI.1, FPT_ITT.1_WebRAO, FPT_ITT.1) from
modification or disclosure. Integrity will be protected by
signing (FCS_COP.1_SIGN) and confidentiality will be
protected by encryption (FCS_COP.1_ENCRYPT)
DP_KeyExport Export Private Key
These functions are a special case of the above. The Keys
are only exported to authorized end entities and are
protected from disclosure and modification (FDP_IFC.1,
FPT_ITC.1_RA, FPT_ITI.1, FPT_ITT.1_WebRAO,
FPT_ITT.1). Integrity will be protected by signing
(FCS_COP.1_SIGN) and confidentiality will be protected
by encryption (FCS_COP.1_ENCRYPT) with a key
generated for the purpose (FCS_CKM.1).
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Security Function Description
DP_Store Protect Data Storage
These functions are used to protect the data stored by
the TOE in the database. Integrity will be protected by
signing (FCS_COP.1_SIGN, FDP_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.3) and
confidentiality will be protected by encryption
(FCS_COP.1_ENCRYPT).
DP_Verify Verify Data Store.
These functions are to verify the integrity and to ensure
only data that has been stored by authorized users is
used by the TOE (FPT_ITC.1_RA, FPT_ITI.1,
FPT_ITT.1_WebRAO) when retrieved from the
database. This is done by verifying the hash
(FCS_COP.1_HASH) and signature
(FCS_COP.1_VERIFY, FDP_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.3) on the
data and ensuring that it decrypts correctly
(FCS_COP.1_DECRYPT).
GG_Create Create Authorization Group
These functions are used to create a group of PKI
entities associated by a defined criteria based on their
certificate DN or partial DN (FIA_USB.1).
Groups can then be used to assign authorization or
registration paths to policies. Only authorized persons
are able to use the TOE to perform this function
(FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1,
FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO, FIA_UID.2_WebRAO,
FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MTD.1).
Authorization group information is stored in the CA
database.
GG_Modify Modify Group
These functions are used to modify a group of PKI
entities associated by a defined criteria based on their
certificate DN or partial DN. Only authorized persons
are able to use the TOE to perform this function
(FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1,
FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO, FIA_UID.2_WebRAO,
FIA_USB.1, FMT_MTD.1).
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Security Function Description
GG_Retire Retire Group
These functions are used to retire a group of PKI entities
associated by a defined criteria based on their certificate
DN or partial DN. Groups cannot be deleted. Only
authorized persons are able to use the TOE to perform
this function (FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1,
FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO, FIA_UID.2_WebRAO,
FMT_MTD.1, FMT_REV.1), and the function results in
the database being updated.
IA_Authenticate Authenticate Entity
This function is executed after IA_Identify has identified
the user and after PP_PKIVerify retrieved the PKI and
verified its signature, and involves checking the PKI
definition to determine if the entity is a valid and
current member of the PKI community and if so, what
permissions they have. The function is passed a
certificate, and checks that:
· It is associated with a member of the PKI
community, and not retired
· The current date/time falls within the validity
period of the certificate
· The certificate has the correct extensions for the
function it is being used for
If these checks are passed successfully, it obtains a list of
the user’s permissions from the PKI, which it uses to set
the options available on the relevant screens.
The identity, once authenticated, may be used in data
generated by the TOE e.g., audit records (FAU_GEN.2),
or to control access to TOE functionality and data
(FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_SAR.3 and
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO, FIA_UID.2_WebRAO,
FIA_UID.1, FMT_SAE.1, FMT_SMR.1).
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Security Function Description
IA_Identify Identify Entity
This function is used to identify a member of the PKI
community.
This is done by allowing the user to choose a key file
and to enter their passphrase/PIN and then using this to
attempt to open the key file (FCS_CKM.3). If it cannot
be opened then an error is returned to the user. This
function is not relevant to the Key Generator or Token
Manager.
The identity, once identified and authenticated, may be
used in data generated by the TOE e.g., audit records
(FAU_GEN.2), or to control access to TOE functionality
and data (FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_SAR.3 and
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1, FIA_UAU.2_CAO,
FIA_UID.2_CAO, FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO,
FIA_UID.2_WebRAO).
KG_Destroy Destroy Key
These functions are used to securely destroy key
material, so that it cannot be recovered. This is done by
the TOE (FCS_CKM.4, FDP_RIP.1) or via P11 interface
to a Smart card or HSM. The ST requires that the P11
device is trusted and performs the appropriate key
destruction function (FCS_CKM.4) – refer to
OE.HardwareFunctions.
KG_Export Export Key Pair
These functions are used to export a key based on the
current key policy (FDP_IFC.1). If this policy permits it,
this can be done by any PKI entity or by the separate
Key Gen Utility (FCS_CKM.2_PublicKey, FCS_CKM.2)
or via the interface to a Smart card or HSM. The key will
be encrypted using FCS_COP.1_ENCRYPT before being
exported.
KG_Generate Generate Key Pair
These functions are used to specify a passphrase and
generate a key based on the current key policy
(FIA_SOS.1, FCS_CKM.1). Some control is exerted over
the passphrase chosen to ensure that it is secure
(FMT_MSA.2). This can be done using the CAO,
WebRAO or by the Key Gen Utility.
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Security Function Description
KG_Split Split Key
These functions are used to split access to a key based
on the user input. This operation can physically divide
the key between more than one device if the key is in a
PSE file (FCS_CKM.2_PublicKey, FIA_SOS.1). This can
be initiated using the CAO, Token Manager or the Key
Gen Utility.
KG_Update Update Key
These functions are used to update key properties, such
as passphrase, based on user selection. They can also be
used to physically move a key from one device to
another (FCS_CKM.2_PublicKey, FIA_SOS.1). Some
control is exerted over the passphrase chosen to ensure
that it is secure (FMT_MSA.2). This can be done using
the Token Manager.
PG_PolicyConfigure Configure Registration Policy.
These functions are used to create registration policies
and assign registration policies to users, user groups,
PHs and to create an authorization path for that policy.
These functions can only be performed by authorized
persons (FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.2_CAO,
FIA_UID.2_CAO, FIA_UID.1, FMT_MOF.1,
FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SAE.1, FMT_SMR.1),
and some control is exerted over the choices available to
ensure that they are secure (FMT_MSA.2). These
functions allow an administrator to set the limits for
certificate validity for certificates using this policy
(FMT_MTD.2). All of these functions result in updating
the database to save the results.
PG_PolicyDelete Delete Registration Policy.
These functions are used by authorized persons to
delete a registration policy from the database
(FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO).
Policies that have been used, or assigned, cannot be
deleted, only retired (FMT_MSA.2).
PG_PolicyExport Export Registration Policy.
This set of functions is used to either export a policy to
another PKI entity (signed, using FCS_COP.1_SIGN) or
to save it to disk in order to create a backup. These
functions are used to export the registration policy.
(Note that signed policies are verified on receipt by a
PKI entity using the function CP_Verify.)
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Security Function Description
PG_PolicyImport Import Registration Policy.
These functions are used to import a registration policy
from a file. This function ensures that the policy is a
valid policy, but the policy need not be created by an
authorized PKI entity. These functions can only be
performed by authorized persons (FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO).
PG_PolicyRetire Retire Registration Policy.
These functions are used by authorized persons to retire
a registration policy by marking it as such in the
database (FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FMT_MTD.1).
Policies that have been used, or assigned, cannot be
deleted, only retired (FMT_MSA.2).
PP_EntityDelete Delete Entity
This set of functions is used to delete an entity from a
PKI. This will not include end entities. Only authorized
persons are able to use the TOE to perform this function
(FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1,
FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO, FMT_MTD.1,
FMT_REV.1).
PP_EntityModify Modify Entity
This set of functions is used to create and modify an
entity in a PKI, resulting in its definition being stored or
updated in the database. This will not include end
entities. For other entities, it includes specifying
configuration parameters such as key and certificate
attributes and port, machine name, and timeout
specifications and also includes working on the renewal
of certificates and modifying permissions of entities
(FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1). This operation may include
signing communications (FCS_COP.1_SIGN). Only
authorized persons are able to use the TOE to perform
this function (FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1,
FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.2_CAO,
FIA_UID.2_CAO, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1), and some control is exerted
over the configuration choices available to ensure that
they are secure (FIA_SOS.1 and FMT_MSA.2).
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Security Function Description
PP_EntityRegister Register Entity
This set of functions is used to register an entity in a
PKI, which includes creating users and administrators
and storing information about them (FIA_ATD.1), but
will not include registering end entities. Only
authorized persons are able to use the TOE to perform
this function (FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1,
FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FIA_UID.1, FMT_MTD.1), and some control is exerted
over the configuration choices available to ensure that
they are secure (FIA_SOS.1 and FMT_MSA.2). Entities
will be given a default set of permissions on creation –
this default set can be changed by an authorized
administrator (FMT_MSA.3). If an attempt is made to
register an entity with a certificate validity that is
outside of the limits that have been set by an
administrator, then this attempt will be rejected
(FMT_MTD.2).
PP_PKICreate Create PKI
This set of functions is used to create a PKI, which will
be stored in the CA database. The PKI at a minimum
includes a CA and a CAO. Only authorized persons are
able to use the TOE to perform this function
(FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UID.1).
PP_PKIExport Export PKI
This set of functions is used to export the description of
the PKI to another PKI entity (FDP_IFC.1).
PP_PKIModify Modify PKI
This set of functions is used to modify a PKI.
Modifications include adding, deleting or modifying an
entity, specifying renewals and permissions, and editing
or the entities configuration parameters such as port,
machine name and timeouts. Only authorized persons
are able to use the TOE to perform this function
(FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1).
PP_PKIProtect Protect PKI
These functions are used to protect the PKI from
unauthorized modification. Signing the PKI with the CA
key performs this (FCS_COP.1_SIGN, FDP_DAU.2,
FDP_DAU.2_CAO). Only authorized persons are able
to use the TOE to perform this function (FDP_ACC.1,
FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1).
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Security Function Description
PP_PKIVerify Verify PKI
These functions are used to obtain the PKI and verify its
integrity. The PKI will be either retrieved from a
database or received in a communication (or both),
along with its signature. The RA uses the PKI Version
Number in its communication with the CA to ensure
that it has the latest version of the PKI. Checking the
hash (FCS_COP.1_HASH) and signature verification
(FCS_COP.1_VERIFY) are used to verify the integrity of
the PKI. Note that this function also provides the
recipient with the latest CRL, ARL, and CA certificate.
Table 6-1 – IT Security Functions
6.2.2 Strength of Functions
Table 6.1 identifies all IT security functions that are realized by probabilistic or
permutational mechanisms that are cryptographic in nature (i.e., those mapped
to cryptographic SFRs). The assessment of the algorithmic strength used by these
functions is out of scope of the evaluation, being assessed by the National
Authority.
However one mechanism does require a strength of function assessment. This is
the mechanism that protects the privacy and integrity of the “.pse” file. This is
implemented by the functions IA_Identify, KG_Generate, KG_Split, KG_Update
and KG_Export, and has a strength of function of SOF-Basic.
6.3 Assurance Measures
This section specifies the assurance measures of the TOE that are claimed to
satisfy the stated assurance requirements. The assurance measures are traced to
the assurance requirements so that it can be seen which measures contribute to
the satisfaction of which requirements. This is done with reference to the
appropriate documentation.
The assurance measures listed in Table 6.2 are required to be successfully
evaluated in order for the TOE to be successfully certified.
Assurance
Component
Assurance Measure Justification that the assurance measure meets the
TOE security assurance requirement
ASE_DES.1 Security Target
document, i.e., this
document
The security target contains a TOE description
which contains relevant information to aid the
understanding of the purpose of the TOE and its
functionality which is complete and consistent.
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Assurance
Component
Assurance Measure Justification that the assurance measure meets the
TOE security assurance requirement
ASE_ENV.1 Security Target
document, i.e., this
document
The security target contains a statement of the TOE
security environment which provides a clear and
consistent definition of the security problem that the
TOE and its environment is intended to address.
ASE_INT.1 Security Target
document, i.e., this
document
The security target contains an introduction which
is complete and consistent with all other parts of the
document and correctly identifies the ST.
ASE_OBJ.1 Security Target
document, i.e., this
document
The security target describes the security objectives
completely and consistently, and these security
objectives counter the identified threats, achieve the
identified organizational security policies and are
consistent with the stated assumptions.
ASE_PPC.1 Security Target
document, i.e., this
document
The security target makes no claims of protection
profile conformance.
ASE_REQ.1 Security Target
document, i.e., this
document
The security target describes the TOE security
requirements (both the TOE security functional
requirements and the TOE security assurance
requirements). The security requirements for the IT
environment are described completely and
consistently, and these provide an adequate basis
for development of a TOE that will achieve its
security objectives.
ASE_SRE.1 Security Target
document, i.e., this
document
The security target contains no security functional
requirements or security assurance requirements
that are stated without reference to the CC.
ASE_TSS.1 Security Target
document, i.e., this
document
The security target contains a TOE summary
specification, which provides a clear and consistent
high-level definition of the security functions and
assurance measures, and demonstrates that these
satisfy the specified TOE security requirements.
ACM_AUT.
1
Configuration
Management Plan as
supplied to evaluators
As described in the configuration management
plan, changes to the implementation representation
are controlled with the support of the automated
tool “Perforce”, making the CM system less
susceptible to human error or negligence.
ACM_CAP.
4
Configuration
Management Plan as
supplied to evaluators
and Configuration
Item List as supplied
to evaluators
Configuration Management Plan and
Configuration Item List clearly identify the TOE
and its associated configuration items, and
demonstrate that the ability to modify these items is
properly controlled.
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Assurance
Component
Assurance Measure Justification that the assurance measure meets the
TOE security assurance requirement
ACM_SCP.
2
Configuration Item
List as supplied to
evaluators
The Configuration Item List will demonstrate that
the developer performs configuration management
on the TOE implementation representation, design,
tests, user and administrator guidance, the CM
documentation and security flaws.
ADO_DEL.
2
Delivery Procedures
as supplied to
evaluators
The Delivery Procedures describe all procedures
used to maintain security and to detect modification
or substitution of the TOE when distributing the
TOE to the user’s site.
ADO_IGS.1 Guidance Documents
as supplied to
evaluators
The Guidance Documents document the
procedures and steps for the secure installation,
generation, and startup of the TOE and result in a
secure configuration.
ADV_FSP.2 Functional
Specification as
supplied to evaluators
The Functional Specification provides an adequate
description of all security functions of the TOE and
demonstrates that the security functions provided by
the TOE are sufficient to satisfy the security
functional requirements of the ST.
ADV_HLD.
2
High-Level Design as
supplied to evaluators
The High-Level Design provides a description of
the TSF in terms of major structural units (i.e.,
subsystems), provides a description of the interfaces
to these structural units, and is a correct realization
of the functional specification.
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation
Representation
Sample as supplied to
evaluators
The Implementation Representation is sufficient to
satisfy the functional requirements of the ST and is
a correct realization of the low-level design.
ADV_LLD.
1
Low-Level Design as
supplied to evaluators
The Low-Level Design satisfies the functional
requirements of the ST, and is a correct and
effective refinement of the high-level design.
ADV_RCR.
1
Analysis of
Correspondence as
supplied to evaluators
The Analysis of Correspondence demonstrates that
the developer has correctly and completely
implemented the requirements of the ST, functional
specification, high-level design and low-level
design in the implementation representation.
ADV_SPM.
1
Security Target
Document as supplied
to evaluators
The security policy model in the security target
clearly and consistently describes the rules and
characteristics of the security policies. This
description corresponds with the description of
security functions in the functional specification.
AGD_ADM
.1
Guidance Documents
as supplied to
evaluators
The administrator guidance (part of the Guidance
Documents) describes how to administer the TOE
in a secure manner.
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Assurance
Component
Assurance Measure Justification that the assurance measure meets the
TOE security assurance requirement
AGD_USR.
1
Guidance Documents
as supplied to
evaluators
The user guidance (i.e., The WebRAO guidance
document, which forms part of the Guidance
Documents) describes the security functions and
interfaces provided by the TSF and provides
instructions and guidelines for the secure use of the
TOE.
ALC_DVS.1 Development Security
Documentation as
supplied to evaluators
The Development Security Documentation
demonstrates that the developer’s security controls
on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE
design and implementation that is necessary to
ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not
compromised.
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw Remediation
Procedures
Documentation as
supplied to evaluators
The Flaw Remediation Procedures Documentation
describes all flaw remediation procedures
including the procedures for accepting and acting
on all reports of flaws and requests to correct those
flaws, tracking security flaws, describing the flaws,
and recording the status of finding a correction to
that flaw. It describes the means by which reports
and enquires of suspected security flaws are
reported and managed so that any reported flaws are
corrected and the correction issued to TOE users.
ALC_LCD.1 Life-Cycle Definition
Documentation as
supplied to evaluators
The Life-Cycle Definition Documentation
demonstrates that the developer has used a
documented model of the TOE life-cycle.
ALC_TAT.1 Development Tools
and Techniques
Documentation as
supplied to evaluators
The Development Tools and Techniques
Documentation demonstrates that the developer
has used well-defined development tools (e.g.,
programming languages or computer-aided design
(CAD) systems) that yield consistent and
predictable results.
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Test
Coverage (Test
Documentation) as
supplied to evaluators
The Analysis of Test Coverage (Test
Documentation) shows that the testing is sufficient
to establish that the TSF has been systematically
tested against the functional specification.
ATE_DPT.1 Analysis of Depth of
Testing (Test
Documentation) as
supplied to evaluators
The Analysis of Depth of Testing (Test
Documentation) shows that the developer has tested
the TSF against its high-level design.
ATE_FUN.1 Test documentation
as supplied to
evaluators
The test documentation demonstrates that security
functions perform as specified.
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Assurance
Component
Assurance Measure Justification that the assurance measure meets the
TOE security assurance requirement
ATE_IND.2 Evaluator action Evaluator action
AVA_MSU.
2
Misuse Analysis
Document as supplied
to evaluators
The Misuse Analysis Document demonstrates that
the guidance is neither misleading, unreasonable or
conflicting, that secure procedures for all modes of
operation have been addressed, and that use of the
guidance will facilitate prevention and detection of
insecure TOE states.
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of Function
Analysis as supplied
to evaluators
The Strength of Function Analysis will demonstrate
that SOF claims have been made in the ST for all
probabilistic or permutational mechanisms and
that these claims supported by a correct analysis.
AVA_VLA.
2
Vulnerability Analysis
as supplied to
evaluators
The Vulnerability Analysis will show that the TOE,
in its intended environment, has no vulnerabilities
exploitable by attackers possessing low attack
potential.
Table 6-2 – Assurance Measures
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7. Protection Profile Claims
This section contains the Protection Profile conformance claim statements.
7.1 Protection Profile Reference
No Protection Profile conformance claims are made.
7.2 Protection Profile Refinements
No Protection Profile conformance claims are made.
7.3 Protection Profile Additions
No Protection Profile conformance claims are made.
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8. Rationale
8.1 Introduction
8.1.1 This section presents evidence that supports the claims that the Security
Target is a complete and cohesive set of requirements, that a conformant
TOE would provide an effective set of IT security countermeasures within
the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification
addresses the requirements. The rationale also demonstrates that any
protection profile claims are valid.
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale
8.2.1 This section demonstrates that the stated security objectives are traceable
to all of the aspects identified in the TOE security environment and are
suitable to cover them.
8.2.2 Table 8.1 below maps the threats, assumptions and organization security
policies against the TOE security objectives that are intended to address
them. Table 8.2 presents a similar mapping for the Environmental security
objectives identified in Section 4.3. These tables show that each security
objective covers at least one threat, assumption or policy and that each
threat, assumption and policy (identified in Chapter 3) is covered by at
least one security objective. All security objectives are thus shown to be
necessary.
Security Objective Threat/Assumption/Policy
O.AuditLogs T.LossOfAuditData
T.AdminErrCommit
T.AdminErrOmit
P.RoleSeparation
P.Guidance
O.DisposalOfAuthenticationData P.DisposalOfAuthenticationData
T.PKIKeyCompromise
O.IndividualAccountability T.AdminErrCommit
T.AdminErrOmit
T.NonRepudiation
P.Accountability
P.QualifiedTOEUsers
P.RoleSeparation
O.Installation P.Guidance
P.QualifiedTOEUsers
T.MaliciousCode
P.RoleSeparation
O.CPS T.AdminErrOmit
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Security Objective Threat/Assumption/Policy
O.CryptographicFunctions T.Cryptography
T.ExportKeyMaterial
P.Cryptography
O.NonRepudiation T.AdminErrCommit
T.NonRepudiation
T.MaliciousCode
P.Accountability
O.Audit T.LossOfAuditData
T.AdminErrCommit
T.AdminErrOmit
T.NonRepudiation
T.UnauthorizedConfigurationChange
P.RoleSeparation
P.Guidance
O.DataImportExport T.ExportKeyMaterial
T.MessageModification
O.FlawUnknownToUser T.DevFlawedCode
T.FlawDiscovery
O.Guidance P.Guidance
O.IntegrityTOEData T.MessageModification
T.UnAuthorizedConfigurationChange
T.PKIKeyCompromise
T.MaliciousCode
T.LossOfAuditData
O.IntegrityUserData T.MessageModification
O.ConfidentialityTOEData T.PKIKeyCompromise
T.MessageModification
T.ExportKeyMaterial
O.ConfidentialityUserData T.ExportKeyMaterial
T.PKIKeyCompromise
O.LifeCycleSecurity T.DevFlawedCode
T.FlawDiscovery
O.MaintainUserAttributes T.UnAuthorizedConfigurationChange
P.Accountability
P.RoleSeparation
O.ProtectAuditRecords T.PKIKeyCompromise
T.LossOfAuditData
O.ProtectConfiguration T.UnAuthorizedConfigurationChange
T.UnTrustedEntity
O.ProvideEvidenceOfOrigin T.NonRepudiation
O.Passphrase T.NonRepudiation
T.PKIKeyCompromise
P.Guidance
O.ControlUnknownOriginComms T.UnTrustedEntity
O.MaliciousCodeNotExecuted T.MaliciousCode
O.FlawRemediation P.Guidance
T.DevFlawedCode
T.FlawDiscovery
P.ApplyFlawRemediation
Table 8-1 – TOE Security Objectives
Security Objective Threat/Assumption/Policy
OE.BackupStorageRestoration A.DisposalOfAuthenticationData.
T.PKIKeyCompromise
P.Guidance
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Security Objective Threat/Assumption/Policy
OE.Audit T.LossOfAuditData
A.AuditReview
P.Guidance
OE.TamperNotify P.Cryptography
T.PKIKeyCompromise
P.HardwareCryptography
P.Guidance
OE.Cryptography P.HardwareCryptography
T.ExportKeyMaterial
P.Cryptography
T.Cryptography
OE.HardwareFunctions P.HardwareCryptography
T.ExportKeyMaterial
T.Cryptography
P.Cryptography
OE.CPS A.CPS
OE.CompetentPKIUsers A.CompetentPKIUsers
OE.MaliciousCodeNotExecuted A.MaliciousCodeNotExecuted
OE.SecureInstallation A.SecureInstallation
OE.Guidance A.Guidance
OE.FlawRemediation P.ApplyFlawRemediation
T.FlawDiscovery
OE.Timesource A.Timesource
OE.PassphrasePIN T.PKIKeyCompromise
OE.Keys T.PKIKeyCompromise
OE.Physical A.PhysicalProtection
OE.DisposalOfAuthenticationData A.DisposalOfAuthenticationData
P.DisposalOfAuthenticationData
OE.Connectivity A.CommunicationsProtection
T.MessageModification
Table 8-2 – Environmental Security Objectives
8.2.3 The following sections demonstrate that the security objectives are
sufficient to meet the security needs of the TOE. Each threat, assumption
and policy is considered in turn.
8.2.4 Threats
T.AdminErrCommit O.AuditLogs ensures that the audit logs
created by the TOE are reviewed by an
auditor.
O.Audit ensures that the TOE records security
related events, with evidence to allow the
integrity of the audit logs to be verified.
O.IndividualAccountability makes it more
difficult for a user of the TOE to intentionally
or unintentionally undermine the TOE’s
security objectives.
O.NonRepudiation, by embedding the
evidence of origin into TOE messages and/or
other actions performed by users, makes it
hard for someone to falsely argue that they
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did not perform an action.
T.AdminErrOmit O.AuditLogs ensures that the audit logs
created by the TOE are reviewed by an
auditor.
O.Audit ensures that the TOE records security
related events, with evidence to allow the
integrity of the audit logs to be verified.
O.IndividualAccountability makes it more
difficult for a user of the TOE to intentionally
or unintentionally undermine the TOE’s
security objectives.
O.CPS ensures that administrators and users
of the TOE know their responsibilities when
issuing certificates.
T.PKIKeyCompromise O.DisposalOfAuthenticationData ensures
that, when authentication data is no longer
valid or required, the ability to use it can be
withdrawn.
O.ConfidentialityUserData ensures that secret
user data such as secret keys will remain
secret.
O.Passphrase ensures that passphrases chosen
meet specified complexity and length
requirements and which makes them more
difficult to break.
O.IntegrityTOEData ensures that the data that
is relevant to the secure operation of the TOE
can only be changed by authorized persons.
OE.BackupStorageRestoration ensures that
procedures and facilities exist outside the TOE
that allow the TOE owners to recover the TOE
from any disaster while ensuring system
integrity and the confidentiality private key
material.
OE.Keys secure storage of all keys used to
operate or administer the TOE helps to
prevent their compromise.
OE.TamperNotify ensures that, if an HSM is
used to store key material, that it will provide
notification if someone attempts to tamper
with it.
O.ConfidentialityTOEData ensures that secret
TOE data such as secret keys will remain
secret.
O.ProtectAuditRecords assists by ensuring
that the TOE’s audit trail is reliable.
OE.PassphrasePIN ensures that secure choices
will be made when specifying both
passphrases and PINs, making them harder
for an attacker to guess.
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T.ExportKeyMaterial O.ConfidentialityUserData ensures that secret
user data such as secret keys will remain
secret.
O.ConfidentialityTOEData ensures that secret
TOE data such as secret keys will remain
secret.
O.CryptographicFunctions ensures that
correct algorithms are used, so as to provide
reliable protection when required.
OE.Cryptography ensures that correct
algorithms are used, so as to provide reliable
protection when required.
OE.HardwareFunctions ensures that any
HSMs used are able to perform the functions
required reliably.
O.DataImportExport ensures that keys are
cryptographically protected when exported.
T.Cryptography O.CryptographicFunctions ensures that
correct algorithms are used, so as to provide
reliable protection when required.
OE.Cryptography ensures that correct
algorithms are used, so as to provide reliable
protection when required.
OE.HardwareFunctions ensures that any
HSMs used are able to perform the functions
required reliably.
T.NonRepudiation O.IndividualAccountability makes it more
difficult for a user of the TOE to intentionally
or unintentionally undermine the TOE’s
security objectives.
O.NonRepudiation, by embedding the
evidence of origin into TOE messages or and
other actions performed by users makes it
hard for someone to falsely argue that they
did not perform an action.
O.ProvideEvidenceOfOrigin ensures that the
originator of messages can be established
from the message itself.
O.Passphrase ensures that passphrases chosen
meet specified complexity and length
requirements and which makes them more
difficult to break.
O.Audit ensures that the TOE records security
related events, with evidence to allow the
integrity of the audit logs to be verified.
T.DevFlawedCode O.FlawUnknownToUser ensures that, if a
security flaw is discovered, users can be made
aware of the impact and any corrective action
that they should undertake.
O.LifecycleSecurity assists in preventing code
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with security flaws from being developed by
using defined tools and techniques that are
designed to prevent this.
O.FlawRemediation ensures that there is a
way to effectively address any flaws found.
T.FlawDiscovery O.FlawUnknownToUser ensures that, if a
security flaw is discovered, users can be made
aware of the impact and any corrective action
that they should undertake.
O.FlawRemediation ensures that there is a
way to effectively address any flaws found.
O.LifeCycleSecurity assists in preventing code
with security flaws from being developed by
using defined tools and techniques that are
designed to prevent this.
OE.FlawRemediation ensures that any flaw
remediation corrective action will be
implemented by those responsible for the
TOE.
T.LossOfAuditData O.AuditLogs ensures that the audit logs
created by the TOE are reviewed by an
auditor.
O.Audit ensures that the TOE records security
related events, with evidence to allow the
integrity of the audit logs to be verified.
O.IntegrityTOEData ensures that the data that
is relevant to the secure operation of the TOE
can only be changed by authorized persons.
O.ProtectAuditRecords assists by ensuring
that the TOE’s audit trail is reliable.
OE.Audit ensures that no audit log records
are lost due to lack of space.
T.MaliciousCode O.IntegrityTOEData ensures that the data that
is relevant to the secure operation of the TOE
can only be changed by authorized persons.
O.Installation ensures that the correct
procedures will be followed at the time of
installation to provide a secure TOE.
O.NonRepudiation, by embedding the
evidence of origin into TOE messages and/or
other actions performed by users, makes it
hard for someone to falsely argue that they
did not perform an action.
O.MaliciousCodeNotExecuted ensures that
TOE users will not execute malicious code on
the same platform as the TOE.
T.UnAuthorizedConfigurationChange O.Audit ensures that the TOE records security
related events, with evidence to allow the
integrity of the audit logs to be verified.
O.IntegrityTOEData ensures that the data that
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is relevant to the secure operation of the TOE
can only be changed by authorized persons.
O.MaintainUserAttributes ensures that the
TOE correctly maintains user attributes
associated with user identities.
O.ProtectConfiguration provides a
mechanism to protect the PKI configuration
from unauthorized changes.
T.MessageModification O.DataImportExport ensures that messages
are cryptographically protected.
O.IntegrityTOEData ensures that the data that
is relevant to the secure operation of the TOE
can only be changed by authorized persons.
O.IntegrityUserData provides cryptographic
measures to ensure the integrity of user data.
O.ConfidentialityTOEData ensures that secret
TOE data such as secret keys will remain
secret.
OE.Connectivity ensures that communications
channels are logically and physically
protected from unauthorized access.
T.UnTrustedEntity O.ProtectConfiguration provides a
mechanism to protect the PKI configuration
from unauthorized changes.
O.ControlUnknownOriginComms ensures
that the TOE components only accept
communications from known sources.
Table 8-3 – Threats
8.2.5 Assumptions
A.DisposalOfAuthenticationData OE.BackupStorageRestoration ensures that
procedures and facilities exist outside the TOE
that allow the TOE owners to recover the TOE
from any disaster while ensuring system
integrity and the confidentiality private key
material.
OE.DisposalOfAuthenticationData makes the
TOE owners responsible to ensure that this
assumption is upheld.
A.AuditReview OE.Audit ensures that the TOE owners are
responsible to uphold the assumption.
A.CPS OE.CPS ensures that the TOE owners are
responsible to uphold the assumption.
A.CompetentPKIUsers OE.CompetentPKIUsers ensures that the TOE
owners are responsible to uphold the
assumption.
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A.MaliciousCodeNotExecuted OE.MaliciousCodeNotExecuted ensures that the
TOE owners are responsible to uphold the
assumption.
A.SecureInstallation OE.SecureInstallation ensures that the TOE
owners are responsible to uphold the
assumption.
A.Guidance OE.Guidance ensures that the TOE owners are
responsible to uphold the assumption.
A.CommunicationsProtection OE.Connectivity ensures that the TOE owners
are responsible to uphold the assumption.
A.Timesource OE.Timesource ensures that the TOE owners are
responsible to uphold the assumption.
A.PhysicalProtection OE.Physical ensures that the TOE owners are
responsible to uphold the assumption.
Table 8-4 – Assumptions
8.2.6 Organization Security Policies
P.Accountability O.IndividualAccountability makes it more
difficult for a user of the TOE to intentionally or
unintentionally undermine the TOE’s security
objectives.
O.MaintainUserAttributes ensures that the TOE
correctly maintains user attributes associated
with user identities.
O.NonRepudiation, by embedding the evidence
of origin into TOE messages and/or other
actions performed by users, makes it hard for
someone to falsely argue that they did not
perform an action.
P.DisposalOfAuthenticationData O.DisposalOfAuthenticationData ensures that,
when authentication data is no longer valid or
required, the ability to use it can be withdrawn.
OE.DisposalOfAuthenticationData makes the
TOE owners responsible to ensure that this
assumption is upheld.
P.Guidance O.AuditLogs ensures that the audit logs created
by the TOE are reviewed by an auditor.
O.Installation ensures that the correct
procedures will be followed at the time of
installation to provide a secure TOE.
O.Audit ensures that the TOE records security
related events, with evidence to allow the
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integrity of the audit logs to be verified.
O.Guidance provides enough information so
that users and administrators can use the TOE
securely.
O.FlawRemediation ensures that there is a way
to effectively address any flaws found.
OE.BackupStorageRestoration ensures that
procedures and facilities exist outside the TOE
that allow the TOE owners to recover the TOE
from any disaster while ensuring system
integrity and the confidentiality private key
material.
OE.Audit ensures that the TOE records security
related events, with evidence to allow the
integrity of the audit logs to be verified.
O.Passphrase ensures that passphrases chosen
meet specified complexity and length
requirements and which makes them more
difficult to break.
OE.TamperNotify ensures that, if an HSM is
used to store key material, that it will provide
notification if someone attempts to tamper with
it.
P.QualifiedTOEUsers O.IndividualAccountability makes it more
difficult for a user of the TOE to intentionally or
unintentionally undermine the TOE’s security
objectives.
O.Installation ensures that the correct
procedures will be followed at the time of
installation to provide a secure TOE.
P.RoleSeparation O.AuditLogs ensures that the audit logs created
by the TOE are reviewed by an auditor.
O.IndividualAccountability makes it more
difficult for a user of the TOE to intentionally or
unintentionally undermine the TOE’s security
objectives.
O.Installation ensures that the correct
procedures will be followed at the time of
installation to provide a secure TOE.
O.Audit ensures that the TOE records security
related events, with evidence to allow the
integrity of the audit logs to be verified.
O.MaintainUserAttributes ensures that the TOE
correctly maintains user attributes associated
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with user identities.
P.ApplyFlawRemediation O.FlawRemediation ensures that there is a way
to effectively address any flaws found.
OE.FlawRemediation ensures that any flaw
remediation corrective action will be
implemented by those responsible for the TOE.
P.Cryptography O.CryptographicFunctions ensures that correct
algorithms are used, so as to provide reliable
protection when required.
OE.Cryptography ensures that correct
algorithms are used, so as to provide reliable
protection when required.
OE.HardwareFunctions ensures that any HSMs
used are able to perform the functions required
reliably.
OE.TamperNotify ensures that, if an HSM is
used to store key material, that it will provide
notification if someone attempts to tamper with
it.
P.HardwareCryptography OE.TamperNotify ensures that, if an HSM is
used to store key material, that it will provide
notification if someone attempts to tamper with
it.
OE.Cryptography ensures that correct
algorithms are used, so as to provide reliable
protection when required.
OE.HardwareFunctions ensures that any HSMs
used are able to perform the functions required
reliably.
Table 8-5 – Organization Security Policies
8.3 Security Requirements Rationale
8.3.1 This section demonstrates that the set of security requirements for the TOE
is suitable to meet and is traceable to the security objectives. Section 5.4 of
the ST provides a tracing of security objectives for the IT environment to
security requirements for the IT environment, with a justification for each
one that the security requirements for the IT environment are suitable to
meet that security objective for the IT environment.
8.3.2 It demonstrates the following:
a) That the combination of the individual functional and assurance
requirements components for the TOE and its IT environment together
meet the stated security objectives
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b) That the set of security requirements together form a mutually supportive
and internally consistent whole
c) That the choice of security requirements is justified (including non-
satisfaction of dependencies)
d) That the selected strength of function level for the Security Target, together
with any explicit strength of function claim, is consistent with the security
objectives for the TOE.
8.3.3 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
8.3.3.1 The following table maps each TOE security objective against the
corresponding security functional components. It demonstrates that each
security objective for the TOE is addressed by at least one SFR and that
each SFR addresses at least one security objective.
8.3.3.2 For each security objective, informal arguments are provided as to why
the identified SFRs are sufficient to satisfy the objective.
O.AuditLogs FAU_GEN.1 Identifies Auditable events for which the
audit records should be generates and specifies the
information to be provided in the audit records
FAU_GEN.2 Associates each auditable event with the
users that caused the event
FAU_SAR.1 Provides that Authorized user the
capability to read all or a selection of audit records
from the audit trail in a manner that the user can
interpret.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricts the reading of the audit record
to an Authorized user.
FAU_SAR.3 Provides an authorized user the ability to
sort, query and filter the audit records before
displaying the log.
FMT_MOF.1 This function supports this objective by
ensuring that security functions can only be
performed by authorized persons.
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 describe the access
control policy that is enforced by the TOE to control
who can perform controlled operations on specified
objects such as the audit records.
FAU_STG.1 Allows only an authorized user the
ability to archive audit records, and provides a
mechanism to detect modification to the audit record.
FCS_COP.1_SIGN This function is used to sign the
audit record and a representation of the entire log in
order to allow for the detection of deletion and
modification from the audit trail.
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FCS_COP.1_VERIFY This function is used to monitor
the integrity of each audit record and the whole by
verifying the signature.
FCS_CKM.3 This specifies the mechanism used in
acing the private key used for the protection of the
audit records.
FIA_UAU.1 This prevents the accessing of audit
records without first ensuring that the user has the
rights to access those audit records.
FIA_UAU.2_CAO This prevents the accessing of audit
records without first ensuring that the user has the
rights to access the audit records.
FMT_SAE.1 This function is used to ensure that the
credentials of the auditor have not expired.
FMT_SMR.1 This function is used to ensure that the
TOE maintains the list of users associated with the
TOE audit manager roles.
O.DisposalOfAuthenticationData FCS_CKM.4 This function ensures that any private,
secret or signing key that is used (in combination with
a digital certificate) to identify and authenticate a user
that is held in memory for the duration of the
cryptographic operation is destroyed so that it cannot
be re-used.
FMT_REV.1 This function enables authorized users to
revoke user privileges (by revoking or suspending
their certificates or removing their attributes) for users
who are no longer permitted to have those privileges.
FMT_SAE.1 This function automatically revokes user
privileges by invalidating authentication data (user
certificates) when they have expired. FMT_MTD.2
limits the validity of certificates to reasonable
amounts of time.
FDP_RIP.1 This function ensures that authentication
data that may reside in memory is securely deleted
once used. This applies to passphrase, PINs and key
material.
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O.IndividualAccountability FAU_GEN.1 This function ensures that all security
relevant events are recorded in the audit log.
FAU_GEN.2 This function supports this objective by
ensuring, where possible, the user associated is
identified with the event that is recorded in the audit
log.
FMT_MOF.1 This function supports this objective by
ensuring that security functions can only be
performed by authorized persons.
FMT_MSA.1 This function ensures that only
authorized persons are able to change security
attributes, and, if they have been found to do so
wrongly, that authorization can be withdrawn from
them.
FMT_MSA.2 and FIA_SOS.1 ensure that secure
passphrases are used, so as to reduce the risk of
private keys being discovered by someone other than
the owner.
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 describe the access
control policy that is enforced by the TOE to control
who can perform controlled operations on specified
objects such as the audit records.
FCO_NRO.2 This function supports this objective by
ensuring the user cannot deny their actions by using
the digital signature of the user, which is
cryptographically bound to the identity of the user.
FIA_UID.1 This function ensures that any security
relevant operation requires the user to be identified
before initiating the function.
FIA_UID.2_CAO This function ensures that any PKI
Administration function cannot be initiated without
the user being identified beforehand.
FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO, FIA_UID.2_WebRAO ensure
that only authenticated and identified persons can
perform the WebRAO functions. Because of this, their
actions can be linked to them via log records.
FIA_USB.1 This function binds security attributes to
the user associated with that attribute. This ensures
that all operations involving a subject with attributes
can be traced to an individual user.
FMT_SMR.1 Ensures that all security roles can be
associated to a user.
O.Installation AGD_ADM.1 Ensures that the TOE Owners have
sufficient information to install, maintain and operate
the TOE in a secure manner.
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ADO_IGS.1 Ensures that the TOE is installed in a
secure manner by providing guidance.
ADO_DEL.2 Ensures that the TOE owner can
distinguish between a genuine delivered TOE or a
product masquerading as the TOE. This also ensures
that the delivered product is the item identified in this
security target as the TOE.
O.CPS AGD_ADM.1 This ensures that the PKI
administrators have sufficient information to allow
them to operate the TOE in compliance to a defined
Certificate Policy(ies) and Certification Practices
Statement(s).
AGD_USR.1 This ensures that TOE users have
sufficient information to allow them to use the TOE in
accordance with a defined Certificate Policy(ies) and
Certification Practices Statement(s).
O.CryptographicFunctions FCS_CKM.1 This functions ensures that cryptographic
keys that are generated comply with the appropriate
algorithm, key length and standards.
FCS_CKM.2_PublicKey This function ensures that the
public keys are distributed according the relevant
standards and formats.
FCS_CKM.2 This function ensures that when
generated by the TSF the secret, private or signing
keys are distributed securely according to the relevant
standard and formats.
FCS_CKM.3 Ensures that key load occurs according
the relevant method and standards.
FCS_CKM.4 This function ensures that key
destruction is done correctly.
FCS_COP.1_Sign This function ensures that signing
functions use appropriate algorithms and hash
functions according to the relevant standards.
FCS_COP.1_Verify This function ensures that
verification of a digital signature is in accordance to
the relevant standards.
FCS_COP.1_Hash This function ensures that
cryptographic hash are generated with the
appropriate algorithm and parameters.
FCS_COP.1_Encrypt This function ensures that
encryption operations are performed with the
appropriate algorithm, key size and parameters.
FCS_COP.1_Decrypt This function ensures that
decryption operations are performed with the
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appropriate algorithms and parameters.
O.NonRepudiation FCS_COP.1_Sign Contributes to meeting the objective
by requiring that the TOE conforms to recognized
digital signature standards. This function also
contributes to meeting the objectives by associating
and binding the signature with the user that produced
it. The binding and association is performed by the
contents of the message or data, which is protected by
the digital signature.
FCS_COP.1_Verify Contributes to this objective by
ensuring that signatures on data can be checked.
FAU_GEN.1 This function ensures that all security
relevant events are recorded in the audit log, with the
identity of the user that caused them and the
date/time of the event.
FCO_NRO.2 Contributes to satisfying this objective
by ensuring that the user associated with a subject,
message, or data cannot deny producing it by binding
the user identity with the evidence in the form of a
digital signature.
FCS_CKM.3 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the key loading for the signature operation
conforms to the defined standards.
FMT_SMR.1 Ensures that the TOE maintains the list
that identifies the users associated with security
relevant roles.
FIA_UAU.2_CAO, FIA_UID.2_CAO ensure that only
authenticated and identified persons can perform the
CAO functions. Because of this, their actions can be
linked to them via log records.
FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO, FIA_UID.2_WebRAO ensure
that only authenticated and identified persons can
perform the WebRAO functions. Because of this, their
actions can be linked to them via log records.
FPT_SSP.1 Ensures that receipts can be generated to
ensure that TSF data has not been modified when
being passed to another part of the TSF. This
contributes to this objective by guaranteeing the
integrity of the evidence associated with the non-
repudiation.
O.Audit FAU_GEN.1 identifies the auditable events for which
audit records should be generated and specifies the
information to be provided in the audit records.
FCS_CKM.3 specifies the mechanism(s) used in
loading private keys used in the administration of the
TOE.
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FAU_STG.1 Ensures that if evidence stored in the
audit log is archived by an unauthorized person or
modified then this can be detected.
FCS_COP.1_Sign contributes to meeting the objective
by requiring that the TOE conforms to recognized
digital signature and hashing standards.
FCS_COP.1_Verify contributes to meeting the
objective by allowing auditors to verify the integrity
of the audit logs
FIA_USB.1 Ensures that the auditor role is bound to
an authorized user.
FMT_MOF.1 This function supports this objective by
ensuring that security functions can only be
performed by authorized persons.
O.DataImportExport FCS_CKM.2_PublicKey Contributes to this objective
by ensuring that public keys that are distributed are
done so in compliance with standards and formats
that ensure integrity by being transported inside X.509
digital certificates that are digitally signed using
FCS_COP.1_Sign.
FCS_CKM.2 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
secret, private or signing key confidentiality is
protected by FCS_COP.1_Encrypt that encrypts the
keys and confidentiality by using FCS_COP.1_Sign
that adds a signature to security relevant data that is
transferred to the other parts of the TOE.
FDP_IFC.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that information flow is controlled by specific SFPs,
which ensure that confidential data is protected before
being transmitted.
FTP_ITC.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that information flow is controlled by specific SFPs,
when importing user data.
FCO_NRO.2 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the list of security relevant transmitted
information is generated with evidence of origin.
Because of this, the originator can be checked by the
TOE to be sure that they are allowed to communicate
with the TOE – if not, the communications are not
accepted.
FDP_IFF.1 ensures that the TOE components only
communicate with known entities.
FDP_ITT.1 ensures that data that is received by TOE
components is checked before
FPT_ITI.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1 and FDP_ITT.3
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Contributes to this objective by ensuring that TOE
data integrity can be verified on receipt by TOE
components, and discarded if modified.
O.FlawUnknownToUser ALC_FLR.2 Enforces this objective by ensuring that
the users and TOE owners are notified of any known
flaw.
O.FlawRemediation ALC_FLR.2 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the users and TOE owners are notified of any
known flaw and any remediation.
ACM_SCP.2 Contributes to this object by ensuring
that any reported flaws can be tracked to the point
where the user and owner receive remediation
information.
AGD_USR.1 and AGD_ADM.1 ensures that the
guidance documentation covers the correct way to
respond to any flaws that have been found.
ATE_COV.2 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that test coverage is sufficient to detect any potential
security flaws.
ATE_DPT.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that depth of testing is sufficient to detect any
potential security flaws.
ATE_FUN.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the security functional design is adequately
documented to prevent any inadvertent or deliberate
potential security flaw being introduced into the TOE.
ATE_IND.2 Contributes to this objective by
introducing independent testing to verify that known
security flaws are not part of the TOE.
O.Guidance AGD_ADM.1 Contributes to this objective by
ensuring that there is sufficient information for the
owners, and administrators to operate and configure
the TOE securely.
ADO_IGS.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that there is sufficient information for the owners, and
administrators to install the TOE securely.
AGD_USR.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that there is sufficient information for the TOE users
to operate the TOE and interact with the TOE
securely.
O.IntegrityTOEData FCS_COP.1_SIGN Contributes to this objective by
ensuring that the data integrity can be verified by
signing TOE data using standard algorithms and
parameters.
FCS_COP.1_VERIFY Contributes to this objective by
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using verification to check for data modification prior
to using the data.
FDP_ITT.3 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that TOE data integrity can be verified after
transmitting between TOE components.
FPT_ITI.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that TOE data integrity can be verified after
transmitting between TOE components.
FPT_ITT.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that TOE data integrity can be verified after
transmitting between TOE components.
FCS_CKM.3 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the key loading for the signature operation
conforms to the defined standards.
FCS_CKM.2 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that TOE certificate integrity is assured by using
FCS_COP.1_Sign and FCS_COP.1_Verify.
O.IntegrityUserData FCS_COP.1_SIGN Contributes to this objective by
ensuring that the data integrity can be verified by
signing user data using standard algorithms and
parameters.
FCS_COP.1_VERIFY Contributes to this objective by
using verification to check for data modification prior
to using the data.
FPT_SSP.1Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that when requested by another part of the TSF, shall
acknowledge the receipt of an unmodified TSF data.
This occurs during the initial handshake between TOE
modules and the CA/RA.
FDP_ITT.3 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that user data integrity can be verified after
transmitting between TOE components.
FPT_ITT.1_WebRAO Contributes to this objective by
ensuring that user data (certificates) integrity can be
verified after transmitting between TOE components.
FCS_CKM.3 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the key loading for the signature operation
conforms to the defined standards.
FCS_CKM.2 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that TOE certificate integrity is assured by using
FCS_COP.1_Sign and FCS_COP.1_Verify.
FMT_MOF.1 and FMT_MTD.1 ensure that only
authorized persons can perform specified operations
on user data.
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O.ConfidentialityTOEData FCS_COP.1_ENCRYPT Contributes to this objective
by ensuring that confidentiality is provided by secure
cryptographic algorithms and parameters.
FCS_COP.1_DECRYPT Contributes to this objective
by ensuring that encrypted data is decrypted securely.
FCS_CKM.3 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the key loading for the signature operation
conforms to the defined standards.
O.ConfidentialityUserData FCS_COP.1_ENCRYPT Contributes to this objective
by ensuring that confidentiality is provided by secure
cryptographic algorithms and parameters.
FCS_COP.1_DECRYPT Contributes to this objective
by ensuring that encrypted data is decrypted securely.
FCS_CKM.3 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the key loading for the signature operation
conforms to the defined standards.
FPT_ITC.1_RA Contributes to this objective by
ensuring that if the user private key needs to be
exported outside the TSC the confidentiality is
maintained by encryption as per FCS_COP.1_Encrypt
FPT_ITT.1 ensures that key material handled by the
TOE is protected from modification.
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 describe the access
control policy that is enforced by the TOE to control
who can perform controlled operations on specified
objects such as user data.
FCS_CKM.4 This function ensures that key
destruction is done securely, to assist private keys to
remain private.
O.LifeCycleSecurity ACM_AUT.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that only authorized changes can be made to the TOE
during development.
ACM_CAP.4 Contributes to this objective along with
ACM_AUT.1 by providing an automatic method to
ensure that the TOE is generated from configuration
items, and that any changes to configuration items are
authorized.
ACM_SCP.2 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that any flaws discovered during development can be
tracked and reduces the likelihood of the flaws
remaining in the TOE.
ALC_DVS.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the integrity and confidentiality of the TOE is
maintained during development.
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ALC_LCD.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that there is a defined product development and
maintenance lifecycle that will reduce the likelihood
of deliberate or accidental flaws being introduced into
the product, and ensures that remedial actions will be
performed to eliminate flaws discovered during
development.
ALC_TAT.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that all tool options used in development are
unambiguously defined to prevent the introduction of
flaws.
ADO_DEL.2 Ensures that the TOE is delivered
securely.
ADO_IGS.1 Ensures that the TOE is installed and
started up securely.
O.MaintainUserAttributes FMT_MOF.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that security functions can only be performed by
authorized persons.
FMT_MSA.1 Contributes to this objective by enforcing
an access control SFP to prevent unauthorized
changes to the user attributes.
FMT_MSA.2 and FIA_SOS.1 Contributes to this
objective by ensuring that only secure values for
passphrases will be accepted.
FMT_MSA.3 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that secure initial values are initialized for user
attributes.
FIA_ATD.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the TOE maintains attributes belonging to
individual users.
FAU_STG.1 Allows only an Authorized user the
ability to archive audit records, and provides a
mechanism to detect modification to the audit record.
Audit records will show who changed a user’s
attributes.
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 describe the access
control policy that is enforced by the TOE to control
who can perform controlled operations on specified
objects such as user attributes.
FIA_USB.1 ensures that the appropriate user security
attributes are associated with the user, and not
someone else’s.
FCS_COP.1_SIGN ensures that user attributes are
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signed when held by the TOE.
O.ProtectConfiguration FAU_GEN.1 Contributes to this objective by deterring
administrators from making unauthorized changes by
recording all security relevant events, including
changing the TOE configuration.
FAU_GEN.2 Contributes to this objective by deterring
administrators from making unauthorized changes by
ensuring that users are accountable for their actions.
FCS_COP.1_SIGN Contributes to this objective by
protecting the PKI configuration by using
cryptographic techniques that signing functions use
appropriate algorithms and hash functions according
to the relevant standards.
FCS_COP.1_VERIFY Contributes to this objective by
using verification to check for data modification prior
to using the data.
FIA_UAU.2_CAO Contributes to this objective by
ensuring that users are successfully authenticated
before being allowed to perform CAO mediated
actions including changing the PKI configuration.
FMT_SMR.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the TOE associates users with roles.
FDP_IFF.1 ensures that the TOE components only
communicate with known entities.
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 describe the access
control policy that is enforced by the TOE to control
who can perform controlled operations on specified
objects such as the TOE configuration.
FMT_MOF.1 and FMT_MTD.1 ensure that only
authorized persons can perform specified operations
on configuration data.
FMT_SMF.1 Contributes to this objective by providing
a mechanism that will ensure that TOE administrators
who can modify the PKI cannot delete the audit
records. This is contingent on the policy
P.RoleSeparation being enforced by the TOE owners.
O.ProtectAuditRecords FAU_GEN.1 Contributes to this objective by deterring
administrators from making unauthorized changes by
recording all security relevant events, including
deleting and archiving the audit records.
FAU_GEN.2 Contributes to this objective by deterring
administrators from making unauthorized changes by
ensuring that users are accountable for their actions.
The audit log records audit data archive events.
FCS_COP.1_SIGN Contributes to this objective by
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protecting the audit record by using cryptographic
techniques that signing functions use appropriate
algorithms and hash functions according to the
relevant standards.
FCS_COP.1_VERIFY Contributes to this objective by
using verification to check for audit date modification
when initiated by the Audit Reviewer.
FIA_UAU.2_CAO Contributes to this objective by
ensuring that users are successfully authenticated
before being allowed to perform CAO mediated
actions including reviewing and deleting and
archiving the audit records.
FMT_SMR.1 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the TOE associates users with roles.
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 describe the access
control policy that is enforced by the TOE to control
who can perform controlled operations on specified
objects such as the audit records.
FMT_SMF.1 Contributes to this objective by providing
a mechanism that will ensure that TOE administrators
who can modify the PKI cannot delete the audit
records. This is contingent on the policy
P.RoleSeparation being enforced by the TOE owners.
FMT_MOF.1 and FMT_MTD.1 ensure that only
authorized persons can perform specified operations
on log data.
O.ProvideEvidenceOfOrigin FCO_NRO.2 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that the list of security relevant transmitted
information is generated with evidence of origin.
FCS_COP.1_Sign Supports FCO_NRO.2 by using
standard cryptographic techniques to add evidence of
origin to the transmitted information.
FDP_IFF.1 ensures that the TOE components only
communicate with known entities.
FCS_COP.1_Verify Supports FDP_DAU.2,
FDP_DAU.2_CAO and FDP_DAU.2_WebRAO by
using standard cryptographic techniques to verify the
evidence of origin attached to the transmitted
information.
FDP_DAU.2 Contributes to this objective by ensuring
the TSF has the capability to generate evidence of
origin for transmitted security relevant information,
and also ensures that the evidence of origin can be
verified by using secure cryptographic algorithms and
parameters in FCS_COP.1_Sign. The TSF can verify
the evidence of origin by using FCS_COP.1_Verify.
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FDP_DAU.2_CAO contributes to this objective by
ensuring the CAO has the capability to generate
evidence of origin for transmitted security relevant
information, and also ensures that the evidence of
origin can be verified by using secure cryptographic
algorithms and parameters in FCS_COP.1_Sign. The
TSF can verify the evidence of origin by using
FCS_COP.1_Verify. FDP_DAU.2_WebRAO
contributes to this objective by ensuring the TSF has
the capability to generate evidence of origin for
transmitted security relevant information, and also
ensures that the evidence of origin can be verified by
using secure cryptographic algorithms and
parameters in FCS_COP.1_Sign. The TSF can verify
the evidence of origin by usingFCS_COP.1_Verify.
O.Passphrase FMT_MSA.2 and FIA_SOS.1 ensure that passphrases
conform to minimum length and complexity
requirements.
O.ControlUnknownOriginComms FCS_COP.1_VERIFY Contributes to this objective by
using standard cryptographic algorithms and
parameters for signature verification to check for
subject identification before establishing a session
with the subject.
FDP_IFF.1 ensures that the TOE components only
communicate with known entities.
FDP_ITC.1 contributes to this objective by allowing
the import of user data, but limiting the import to user
data without security attributes when importing data
from outside the TOE scope of control (TSC).
FPT_SSP.1Contributes to this objective by ensuring
that when requested by another part of the TSF, shall
acknowledge the receipt of an unmodified TSF data.
This occurs during the initial handshake between TOE
modules and the CA/RA.
O.MaliciousCodeNotExecuted AGD_USR.1 and AGD_AGD.1 Contributes to this
objective by providing information to the user and
administrator to identify valid and trusted
downloadable code, to ensure that the user does not
download and install malicious mobile code that is
not signed or signed by an untrusted third party.
Table 8-6 – Security Objectives
8.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The target evaluation level of CC EAL 4 is sufficiently high given the identified
threats and security objectives. In particular, it considers the vulnerabilities that
may be exploited by external threat agents in the vulnerability analyses that are
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not included in lower assurance levels. The TOE has been developed in a
manner to ensure that CC EAL 4 is attainable.
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices that, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOE and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.
These are the circumstances applicable to UniCERT 5, and so, for these reasons,
EAL4 is suitable.
8.3.5 Strength of Function Level Rationale
8.3.5.1 The Minimum Strength of Function Level of SOF-Basic is consistent with
the security objectives of the TOE because of the Evaluation Assurance
Level that is sought, and the likely expertise, resources, and motivation of
attackers as described in the statement of TOE security environment.
8.3.5.2 As described in paragraph 511 of the CC part 2, in the description of
AVA_VLA.2, it is necessary for the TOE to be resistant to penetration
attacks by attackers of low attack potential only, in order to satisfy
AVA_VLA.2. Furthermore, as described in the descriptions of threat
sources in chapter 3 of this ST, the expertise, resources and motivation of
attackers will never be high, due to the fact that the TOE will not be used
to protect assets of any greater than low value. The minimum strength
level for this TOE of SOF-Basic is therefore consistent with both of these
because, according to Table B.2 in Annex B to the CEM, SOF-Basic
provides adequate protection against attackers of low attack potential.
8.3.6 Dependency Rationale
8.3.6.1 The following table summarizes how the dependencies among SFRs are
satisfied. The first column is used to identify individual rows. The second
column lists all SFRs that contribute to the TOE security objectives. The
next column contains the dependencies on each SFR. The last column
references the row that refers to the dependency or states that it is not
satisfied. For each unsatisfied dependency there is an explanation below
the table, which shows why the dependency does not need to be satisfied.
ID SFR Dependency Satisfied by
1 FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 Not satisfied
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ID SFR Dependency Satisfied by
2 FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 1
FIA_UID.1 34
3 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 1
4 FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 3
5 FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 3
6 FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 1
7 FCO_NRO.2 FIA_UID.1 34
8 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1 13,14,15,16 & 17
FCS_CKM.4 12
FMT_MSA.2 44
9 FCS_CKM.2_PublicKey FCS_CKM.1 8
FCS_CKM.4 12
FMT_MSA.2 44
10 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.1 8
FCS_CKM.4 12
FMT_MSA.2 44
11 FCS_CKM.3 FCS_CKM.1 8
FCS_CKM.4 12
FMT_MSA.2 44
12 FCS_CKM.4 FDP_ITC.1 22
FCS_CKM.1 8
FMT_MSA.2 44
13 FCS_COP.1_SIGN FCS_CKM.1 8
FCS_CKM.4 12
FMT_MSA.2 44
14 FCS_COP.1_VERIFY FCS_CKM.1 8
FCS_CKM.4 12
FMT_MSA.2 44
15 FCS_COP.1_HASH FCS_CKM.1 8
FCS_CKM.4 12
FMT_MSA.2 44
16 FCS_COP.1_ENCRYPT FCS_CKM.1 8
FCS_CKM.4 12
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ID SFR Dependency Satisfied by
FMT_MSA.2 44
17 FCS_COP.1_DECRYPT FCS_CKM.1 8
FCS_CKM.4 12
FMT_MSA.2 44
18 FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 19
19 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 18
FMT_MSA.3 45
20 FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 21
21 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1 20
FMT_MSA.3 45
22 FDP_ITC.1 FDP_ACC.1 18
FDP_IFC.1 20
FMT_MSA.3 45
23 (deleted) (deleted) (deleted)
24 FDP_ITT.1 FDP_ACC.1 18
FDP_IFC.1 20
25 FDP_ITT.3 FDP_ACC.1 18
FDP_IFC.1 20
FDP_ITT.1 24
26 FDP_RIP.1 NONE
27 FDP_DAU.2 FIA_UID.1 34
28 FDP_DAU.2_CAO FIA_UID.1 34
29 FDP_DAU.2_WebRAO FIA_UID.1 34
30 FIA_ATD.1 NONE
31 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 34
32 FIA_UAU.2_CAO FIA_UID.2_CAO 35
33 FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO FIA_UID.2_WebRAO 36
34 FIA_UID.1 NONE
35 FIA_UID.2_CAO NONE
36 FIA_UID.2_WebRAO NONE
37 FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 30
38 FIA_SOS.1 NONE
39 (deleted) (deleted)
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ID SFR Dependency Satisfied by
40 (deleted) (deleted)
41 FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1 50
FMT_SMF.1 49
42 (deleted) (deleted)
43 FMT_MSA.1 FDP_ACC.1 18
FDP_IFC.1 20
FMT_SMF.1 49
FMT_SMR.1 50
44 FMT_MSA.2 ADV_SPM.1 Assurance Measure
FDP_ACC.1 18
FDP_IFC.1 20
FMT_MSA.1 43
FMT_SMR.1 50
45 FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1 43
FMT_SMR.1 50
46 FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1 50
FMT_SMF.1 49
47 FMT_REV.1 FMT_SMR.1 50
48 FMT_SAE.1 FMT_SMR.1 50
FPT_STM.1 Not satisfied
49 FMT_SMF.1 NONE
50 FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 34
51 FPT_ITC.1_RA NONE
52 FPT_ITI.1 NONE
53 FPT_ITT.1_WebRAO NONE
54 FPT_ITT.1 NONE
55 FPT_SSP.1 FPT_ITT.1 54
56 FMT_MTD.2 FMT_MTD.1 46
FMT_SMR.1 50
Table 8-7 – SFR Dependency Analysis
8.3.6.2 The dependencies are not directly satisfied:
a) That of FAU_GEN.1 and FPT_SAE on FPT_STM.1
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FAU_GEN.1 refers to the requirement of the TOE to have reliable
timestamps for its own use, in order to put timing information in its audit
logs. FMT_SAE has a similar requirement, in order to enforce time-limited
authorization. In both cases the dependency is not required as the
environmental security objective OE.TimeSource ensures that the
administrator provides a reliable time source for both purposes.
8.3.7 Mutually Supportive Security Requirements Rationale
8.3.7.1 The security requirements are mutually supporting as all requirements are
based purely on the CC part 2 and all dependencies have been addressed
in some way. The set of SFRs are internally consistent and include SFRs
that defend other SFRs against attacks such as bypassing or tampering.
8.3.7.2 The internal consistency of the security requirements is demonstrated by
considering how they fall under the following categories:
a) Security Audit (FAU). All of the audit SFRs relate to the same set of data,
namely the auditable events. These events are recorded in an events log,
associated with the identity of the entity that caused the event and time it
occurred. Facilities are provided to review the events for selected users.
The audit events are protected using cryptographic functions, with
facilities provided to detect modifications to the audit records
b) Communication (FCO). The TSF enforces the generation of evidence of origin
for its communications using its cryptographic functions, and provides
facilities to check this evidence
c) Cryptographic Support (FCS). The cryptographic support SFRs
(FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.3, FCS_CKM.4 and FCS_COP.1)
specify the requirements for generating, distributing, destroying, loading
and using the cryptographic keys. These SFRs support the signing,
encryption and decryption of communications and data. The
cryptographic support SFRs support the other functions as shown under
those functions elsewhere in this section. There are no potential conflicts
with these SFRs.
d) User Data Protection (FDP). The user data protection SFRs (FDP_ACC.1,
FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1, FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.3,
FDP_RIP.1 and FDP_DAU.2) describe how the privacy and integrity of
user data held by the TOE is preserved by access control to user data.
FDP_ACC.1 defines the subjects, objects and operations allowed by the
SFPs of the TOE. FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1, FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITT.1,
FDP_ITT.3 and FDP_IFC.1 define the SFPs and they way that the SFPs will
be used. FDP_RIP.1 describes the protection applied to user data when it is
no longer required. FDP_DAU.2, FDP_DAU.2_CAO,
FDP_DAU.2_WebRAO define the evidence to be provided to guarantee the
validity and origin of specified data. There are no potential conflicts with
any other TOE SFR.
e) Identification and Authentication (FIA). The identification and
authentication SFRs (FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.2_CAO,
FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FIA_UID.2_WebRAO, FIA_USB.1 and FIA_SOS.1) describe a number of
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rules for the identification and authentication of users by the TOE. These
rules are specified in FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.2_CAO,
FIA_UAU.2_WebRAO, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UID.2_CAO,
FIA_UID.2_WebRAO. FIA_ATD.1 and FIA_USB.1 describe the attributes
of users who are managed by the TSF, and FIA_SOS.1 describes the rules
on password choice. There are no instances where one of these
identification and authentication SFRs applies to other SFRs in a way
where potential conflicts may arise.
f) Security Management (FMT). The Security Management SFRs (FMT_MOF.1,
FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_MTD.2,
FMT_REV.1, FMT_SAE.1, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1) specify the
security management functions, describe how the security attributes are
managed, and specifies the security roles that can carry out this function.
These SFRs depend on the Identification and Authentication SFRs to
determine the identity and role of a user before allowing them to perform
security management functions. There are no potential conflicts with any
other TOE SFR.
g) Protection of the TSF (FPT). These SFRs (FPT_ITC.1_RA,FPT_ITI.1,
FPT_ITT.1_WebRAO, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_SSP.1) describe how the TSF protects
itself. It does this by using the cryptographic functions to ensure that data
is protected during transmission between the parts of the TOE. There are
no potential conflicts with any other TOE SFR.
8.3.7.3 Mutual support by SFRs that prevent bypassing of other SFRs is
implemented by the identification and authentication (FIA) SFRs which
identify and authenticate users and work to prevent the impersonation of
a user. They require all users to be identified and authenticated before
allowing them to perform any security-relevant actions on the TOE. As
noted earlier, the Cryptographic Support and Protection of the TSF (FCS)
SFRs assist the communication (FCO) SFRs and Protection of the TSF
(FPT) SFRs in providing secure communications within the TOE, and in
turn those secure communications assist the other SFRs by ensuring the
integrity and privacy of communications. The remaining SFRs are always
invoked when necessary and hence cannot be bypassed if the SFRs are
satisfied by the TSF.
8.3.7.4 Mutual support by SFRs that prevent anyone tampering with other SFRs
is, again, implemented by the identification and authentication (FIA) SFRs
that ensure that only authorized users have access to the TOE functions, in
conjunction with the cryptographic (FCS) SFRs which ensure that it is not
possible for unauthorized persons to disrupt the functions of other SFRs.
The FCS SFRs support the Security Management (FMT) SFRs and the
Protection of the TSF (FPT) SFRs in managing the TOE functions and
ensuring that TOE communications are not tampered with.
8.3.7.5 Mutual support by SFRs that prevent deactivation of other SFRs or of
attack aimed at defeating another SFR is implemented by the same means
as specified above for mutual support by SFRs that prevent anyone
tampering with other SFRs.
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8.3.7.6 Mutual support by SFRs that enable the detection of the misconfiguration
of another SFR is implemented by the Security Management (FMT) SFRs
that give authorized users access to the security functions of the TSF,
enabling them to detect the configuration of the TOE, and therefore any
misconfiguration of the TOE. The Security Audit (FAU) SFRs also assist in
detecting misconfiguration of the TOE – these, again, are supported by the
cryptographic (FCS) SFRs.
8.4 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
8.4.1 This section demonstrates that the TOE security functions and assurance
measures are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements.
8.4.2 It demonstrates the following:
a) That the combination of specified TOE IT security functions work together
so as to satisfy the TOE security functional requirements;
b) That the strength of TOE function claims made are valid, or that assertions
that such claims are unnecessary are valid
c) That the claim is justified that the stated assurance measures are compliant
with the assurance requirements.
8.4.3 IT Security Functions Rationale
A mapping of IT Security Functions onto SFRs is provided in Table 6.1. It
demonstrates that each SFR is mapped onto at least one IT Security Function and
that each IT Security Function is mapped onto at least one SFR. For a justification
for each of these mappings, the reader is directed to the textual description of
each function that is also provided in Table 6.1.
8.4.4 Strength of Function Claim Rationale
The strength of function claims for the IT security functions are consistent with
the strength of functions for the TOE SFRs because they are the same: both are
SOF-Low. The claims for the minimum strength of TOE SFRs and the minimum
strength of the IT Security Functions are both made in the section on “Minimum
Strength of Function Level” in Chapter 5.
8.4.5 Mutually Supportive IT Security Functions Rationale
The TOE Summary Specification does not introduce any changes to the
dependency and mutual support argument presented for SFRs.
8.4.6 Security Assurance Measures Rationale
The security assurance requirements of EAL 4 are achievable for the following
reasons:
d) All documentation and other resources required by this assurance level as
shown in Table 6.2 will be made available
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e) The documents have been produced to fulfill the criteria of this assurance
level
f) The TOE has been developed to achieve a high degree of security
g) The TOE was developed in a secure manner.
8.5 PP Claims Rationale
No Protection Profile conformance claims have been made.
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9. Security Policy Model
9.1 Introduction
9.1.1 This section details the security policy model that is enforced by the TOE
security functions (TSP).
9.1.1.1 Security policy models
SPM_TOE_CONFIDENTIALITY Private key material is encrypted for the receiver by
using key exchange using the receiver’s public key
certificate.
This applies to all end entity private/secret keys
when being archived or recovered.
The private key material is encrypted using the
encrypt operations as specified in
FCS_COP.1_ENCRYPT and can be decrypted using
the decrypt operation as specified in
FCS_COP.1_DECRYPT.
SPM_USER_CONFIDENTIALITY Private key material is encrypted for the receiver by
using key exchange using the receiver’s public key
certificate.
This applies to all end entity private/secret keys
when being archived or recovered.
The private key material is encrypted using the
encrypt operations as specified in
FCS_COP.1_ENCRYPT and can be decrypted using
the decrypt operation as specified in
FCS_COP.1_DECRYPT.
SPM_TOE_INTEGRITY Security relevant TOE data is protected from
modification by use of digital signatures. The
security relevant TOE data is stored in the database,
signed by a valid PKI entity and when accessed the
signature is checked according to
SPM_SIGNATURE_VALIDITY.
When transferred by TCP/IP communications the
entity transferring the data will use digital signatures
and the receiving entity will use
SPM_MESSAGE_VALIDITY.
The signing operation is as defined in
FCS_COP.1_SIGN.
SPM_USER_INTEGRITY Security relevant user data is protected from
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modification by use of digital signatures. The
security relevant user data is stored in the database,
signed by a valid PKI entity and when accessed the
signature is checked according to
SPM_SIGNATURE_VALIDITY.
When transferred by TCP/IP communications the
entity transferring the user data will use digital
signatures the receiving entity will use
SPM_MESSAGE_VALIDITY.
The signing operation is as defined in
FCS_COP.1_SIGN.
SPM_SIGNATURE_VALIDITY In relation to authenticating signed data against a
given identity (as described in FDP_DAU.2,
FDP_DAU.2_CAO and FDP_DAU.2_WebRAO), as
well detecting Inter TSF modification of data (as
described in FPT_ITI.1), the signature is determined
to be valid if:
1. The entity certificate is in the PKI (for PKI
entities)
2. The signature is verified
(FCS_COP.1_VERIFY)
3. Optionally checking for an appropriate
extension
4. The certificate has not expired nor has been
revoked or suspended.
2 TOE users and certificate attributes are
defined in section 9.2.2
SPM_SECURE_HASH Security relevant messages and data are hashed, and
signed, for integrity checking. The receiver can verify
that the message or data is unmodified by checking
the hash of the message with the hash encrypted in
the signature.
The Hash operation is as defined in
FCS_COP.1_HASH.
SPM_PASSWORD_METRIC Enforced when PSE, P12s are generated by TOE
components – the passphrase must be at least 8
characters with at least one alpha, one numeric, one
upper, one lower, and one non alphanumeric
character (FIA_SOS.1).
SPM_REVOKE_CERTIFICATE An entity can request a revocation of their certificate,
but only an authorized entity can Authorize the
revocation (FMT_REV.1).
SPM_REMOVE_PKI The CAO with PKI management attributes can
remove an entity from the PKI directly
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(FMT_REV.1).
A PKI entity can be untrusted (by other PKI entities)
when their certificate has expired or has been
revoked.
SPM_CHANGE_WEBRAO_GROUP A WebRAO user may only authorize requests for
certificates which have been requested using a
registration policy to which they have been granted
access.
Likewise, a WebRAO user may only authorize
requests to revoke certificates, where those
certificates have been issued using a registration
policy to which the WebRAO has been granted
access for the purpose of revocation.
Access to registration policies is controlled by a CAO
user with the appropriate privileges. Refer to 9.2.2.10
and FMT_MOF.1.
SPM_CHANGE_CAO_ATTRIBUTE The operations that a CAO can perform are
controlled by their privileges.
Only a CAO with appropriate privileges may change
the privileges of another CAO. Refer to 9.2.2.2 and
FMT_MOF.1.
Table 9-1 – Security Model
9.1.1.2 Security function policy
SFP_SIGNED_MESSAGES As described through section 2.3 several of the
components sign messages to other components within
the TOE. Also, signed messages may be sent to users
externally to the TOE (e.g., messages over the SCEP
protocol and OCSP protocols).
SPM_USER_INTEGRITY and SPM_TOE_INTEGRITY
refer to the mechanism for signing and validating these
messages.
In addition to checks undertaken in
SPM_SIGNATURE_VALIDITY, the following checks
are also carried out:
· Checking for Delayed Messages
· Checking Replay Attacks
SFP_SIGNED_DATA Certain TOE data and certain USER data is signed
when being saved to the database.
SPM_TOE_INTEGRITY and SPM_USER_INTEGRITY
refer to the mechanisms for signing and validating the
data.
SFP_AUDITOR The Audit functions (FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2,
FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.1) can only be accessed by the
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roles with Auditor attributes (CAO Auditor, RA
Auditor, CAO Audit Manager, RA Audit Manager)
In addition, the archive functions of CA audit records is
restricted to the CAO Audit Manager, the RA Audit
Manager can archive RA audit records.
Table 9-2 – Security Function Policy
9.2 Definition of Users
This section lists the users, their required attributes and their roles as used in the
document.
9.2.1 Users that are of relevance to the TOE, but do not act on it directly, and
having attributes not controlled by the TOE.
CC Label Common Label Role Identified Authenticated By OSP
Administrators
System
Administrator
Network
Admin No No Yes
OS Admin No No Yes
Database
Admin No No Yes
Operators Backup Operator
Backup
Operator No No Yes
Restore
Operator No No Yes
Table 9-3 – Users Relevant to the TOE
9.2.1.1 Administrators (Attributes not maintained by the TOE)
The following are IT administrator roles used to maintain the TOE environment
that are created by the organizational security policies and not enforced or
maintained by the TOE:
· Network administrator
· Operating system administrator
· Database administrator
9.2.1.2 Users (Attributes not maintained by the TOE)
The following are IT user roles that are used to maintain the TOE. These are
created by the organization security policies, and not enforced by the TOE:
· Backup/restoration user
9.2.2 Subjects
The following subjects are defined for both Access_Control_SFP and
Information_Flow_Control_SFP.
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Common
Label
Has
Private
Key
Has
Certificate Full DN
Partial
DN
Has Cybertrust
Defined OID=
1.2.372.980001.3.1
CA a a a r r
CAO user,
CAO Audit
Manager,
CAO
Auditor a a a a .2
RA user a a a r .1
RA Audit
Manager
RA Auditor a a a r .22
CSS a a a r r
RA
eXchange a a a r .11
email PH a a a r r
Web PH r r a r r
WebRAO a a a r .3 or .21
SCEP PH a a a r r
Table 9-4 – Summary of Subjects, and the Ways They Are Identified
A tick represents "yes", the entity possesses one, and a cross represents "No",
the entity does not possess one.
9.2.2.1 CA
The CA is created on bootstrap, has an X.509 certificate with the following
attributes:
· X.509 Basic Constraint: IsCA = TRUE.
· The CA key(s) usages should include: digital signature, non-repudiation,
certificate signing and CRL signing. These may be part of the usage of one or
more keys, but the CA requires key(s) that cover all these uses.
· The CA certificate is registered in the PKI, and must be valid and not expired.
· The CA is identified by its X.509 certificate DN, binding to its identity is by its
private key.
9.2.2.2 CAO Users (including CAO Audit Manager and CAO Auditor)
The CAO users may have the ability to configure the PKI, add, modify policies,
create certificates and manage PKI entity certificates when permitted.
The CAO user has an X.509 certificate with the following attributes:
· BTL Entity extension with OID=1.2.372.980001.3.1.2
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· The CAO certificate is registered in the PKI, and must be valid and not
expired.
· The CAO key(s) usages should include: digital signature and non-repudiation.
· The CAO is identified by its X.509 certificate DN, binding to its identity is by
its private key.
The CAO users use the CAO GUI. They may have one or more of the following
permissions (which are assigned by attributes within the PKI rather than in their
certificate):
· View and Modify the PKI
· Manage Other Users
· Create and Manage Registration Policies
· Authorize CA Certificates
· Revoke CA Certificates
· Authorize PKI Entity Certificates
· Revoke PKI Entity Certificates
· Authorize End Entity Certificates
· Revoke End Entity Certificates
· Create and edit authorization groups
· Query the CA audit data (i.e., be a CAO Auditor)
· Archive the CA audit data (i.e., be a CAO Audit Manager).
CAO users are not able to edit their own permissions. Each CAO user (with
permissions to manage other users) is able to create and assign permissions to
other CAOs up to and including their own set of permissions. The CAO created
at bootstrap has all permissions - this can later be changed by another authorized
CAO.
CAO users who have been given CAO Audit Manager or CAO Auditor
permissions (which are assigned by attributes within the PKI rather then in their
certificates) may also act as RA Audit Managers or an RA Auditors, respectively.
They will use the RA Event Viewer to perform the following tasks:
· Query the RA audit data (RA Auditor).
· Archive the RA audit data (RA Audit Manager).
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9.2.2.3 RA
The RA is created by the CAO user with appropriate attributes after bootstrap.
The RA has an X.509 certificate with the following attributes:
· X.509 BLT Entity extension with OID=1.2.372.980001.3.1.1
· The RA key usages should include: digital signature.
· The RA certificate is registered in the PKI, and must be valid and not expired.
· The RA is identified by its X.509 certificate’s DN; binding to its identity is by its
private key.
· The RA is identified by its X.509 DN, and authenticated by having its
certificate registered in the PKI by the CAO user.
RA users have the following permission (which are assigned via attributes within the
PKI rather than in their certificate).
· Query the RA audit data (i.e., be a RA Auditor) using the RA Event Viewer.
9.2.2.4 RA Auditor (including RA Audit Manager)
The RA Auditor is created by the CAO user with appropriate attributes after
bootstrap. This entity has an X.509 certificate with the following attributes:
· X.509 BLT Entity extension with OID=1.2.372.980001.3.1.22
· The RA Auditor key usages should include: digital signature and non-
repudiation
· The RA Auditor certificate is registered in the PKI, and must be valid and not
expired.
· The RA Auditor is identified by its X.509 certificate’s DN; binding to its
identity is by its private key.
· The RA Auditor is identified by its X.509 DN, and authenticated by having its
certificate registered in the PKI by the CAO user.
The RA Auditor has the following permissions (which are assigned via attributes
within the PKI rather than in their certificate):
· Query the RA audit data (i.e., be a RA Auditor)
· Delete and archive the RA audit data (i.e., be a RA Audit Manager).
9.2.2.5 The CSS
The CSS is created by the CAO user with appropriate attributes after bootstrap.
The CSS has an X.509 certificate with the following attributes:
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· Extended key usage with X.509 OID= 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9, equivalent to an OCSP
certificate.
· The CSS key usages should include: digital signature.
· The CSS certificate is registered in the PKI, and must be valid and not expired.
· The CSS is identified by its X.509 certificate’s DN, binding to its identity is by
its private key.
· The CSS is identified by its X.509 DN, and authenticated by having its
certificate registered in the PKI by the CAO user.
9.2.2.6 The RA eXchange
The RA eXchange is created by the CAO user with appropriate attributes after
bootstrap. The RA eXchange has an X.509 certificate with the following
attributes:
· BTL Entity extension with OID=1.2.372.980001.3.1.11
· The RA eXchange key(s) usages should include: digital signature.
· The RA eXchange certificate is registered in the PKI, and must be valid and not
expired.
· The RA eXchange is identified by its X.509 certificate’s DN, binding to its
identity is by its private key.
· The RA eXchange is identified by its X.509 DN, and authenticated by having
its certificate registered in the PKI by the CAO user.
9.2.2.7 The email PH
The email Handler is created by the CAO user with appropriate attributes after
bootstrap. The email Handler has an X.509 certificate with the following
attributes:
· The email Handler certificate is registered in the PKI, and must be valid and
not expired.
· The email Handler is identified by its X 509 certificate’s DN, binding to its
identity is by its private key.
· The email Handler is identified by its X.509 DN, and authenticated by having
its certificate registered in the PKI by the CAO user.
9.2.2.8 The Web Handler
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The Web Handler is created by the CAO user with appropriate attributes after
bootstrap. The Web Handler does not have X.509 certificate or a private key. The
Web Handler is identified by a partial DN.
9.2.2.9 The SCEP PH
The SCEP Handler is created by the CAO user with appropriate attributes after
bootstrap. The SCEP Handler has an X.509 certificate and a private key – these
things are used to identify it.
Each SCEP PH must be associated with a certificate that is currently registered in
the PKI for it to function.
9.2.2.10 WebRAO users
The WebRAO user grouping is based on DN or partial DN, and is configured by
the CAO with permission to change the PKI. The CAO user has the ability to
restrict the access to policy forms to a group or groups of WebRAO users.
WebRAO users, which are created by either the CAO user or by a WebRAO user
with access to a WebRAO policy, have an X.509 certificate with the following
attributes:
· BTL Entity extension with OID=1.2.372.980001.3.1.3 or
OID=1.2.372.980001.3.1.21
· The WebRAO key(s) usages should include: digital signature.
· The WebRAO Certificate is not registered in the PKI, but must be valid and not
expired.
· The WebRAO is identified by its X.509 certificate’s DN, binding to its identity
is by its private key.
9.2.3 End Entities
End entities are PKI users who have no role in the PKI, but have certificates
issued by the PKI. Their activities are out of scope of the evaluation.
9.3 Information Flow Control Policy
This ST contains one information flow control policy
(Information_Flow_Control_SFP), and one access control policy
(Access_Control_SFP). This section contains the rules used to derive these
policies.
For both policies:
· The subjects are defined in Section 9.2.2, which also describes how they are
identified.
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· The information and operations, and the rules regarding those operations,
are as described in this section.
· The access control based on subject, object and permitted operations are as
described in this section.
9.3.1 Access to CA
The CA will permit communications with an entity connecting to it if the entity
(which will be an RA, CAO or KAS) is registered in the PKI and has a valid
certificate.
If the connection receives messages that have been duplicated then the CA
protects itself from replay attacks, delayed message attacks.
If the entity connecting to the CA is invalid, the CA will disconnect the entity.
9.3.1.1 Information passed from CA to CAO
The CA communicates with the CAO via the database. The CA does not respond
to the CAO announce message. The following are valid communications:
· The CAO sends certificate request, cross certification request and revocation
request messages by writing the request in the database. The CA verifies that
the CAO user is a valid CAO user and has the attributes associated with
certificate manager.
· The CAO sends CRL generation messages to the CA via the database. The CA
verifies the CAO user is a valid CAO user with permission to change the PKI.
· The CAO sends PKI configuration information to the CA via the database. The
CA verifies the CAO user is a valid CAO user with permission to change the
PKI.
· The CA sends certificate response, and revocation response to the CAO via the
database. The CAO verifies the signature on the responses against the CA
certificate in the PKI data.
9.3.1.2 Information passed from the CA to the RA and from the RA to the CA.
The RA communicates with the CA via CMP over TCP. The RA needs to connect
to the CA, the CA replies to the RA announce message with the PKI data. The
following are valid communications:
· The RA sends an announce message to the CA. The CA verifies that the
announce message has not been delayed, has not been replayed and has been
signed by a valid RA;
· CA reads the PKI information from DB, packages up information, signs
information and sends to RA in response to an Announce message, the RA
verifies that the signature on the announce message is valid;
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· The RA sends certificate request, renewal request and revocation request
messages by writing the request in the database. The CA verifies that the RA is
a valid RA in the PKI;
· The CA sends request responses, revocation response and renewal responses
to the RA. The RA verifies the CA signature.
9.3.1.3 KAS to CA
The KAS communicates with the CA via CMP over TCP. The KAS needs to
connect to the CA, the CA replies to the KAS announce message with the PKI
data.
The announce message is the only valid communication between the KAS and
the CA.
9.3.2 Access to CAO GUI
The CAO will permit a session with an entity connecting to it if:
· The user has a valid CAO certificate.
The CAO will enforce additional security roles as defined in the CAO user roles
in section 9.2.2 to limit the CAO user’s available functions.
9.3.2.1 Information exported from the CAO
The user logged into the CAO has the ability to delete audit events. The deletion
of audit events is only permitted under the following conditions:
· The CAO user has the attributes associated with audit manager; and
· The CAO user has exported the archive data using the audit archive
function.
The user logged into the CAO has the ability to archive audit events. The archive
of audit events is only permitted under the following conditions:
· The CAO user and has the attributes associated with an audit manager.
The archived log integrity is protected by using a digital signature of the audit
manager; however there is no restriction on accessing the archived data as it is
exported out of the TOE scope of control.
9.3.3 Access to RA
The RA will permit a session with an entity connecting to it if:
· The entity, a CA, CSS or KAS, if the entity is registered in the PKI and has a
valid certificate.
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If the connection has been duplicated, the RA protects itself from replay attacks,
delayed message attacks by disconnecting the entity.
If the entity connecting to the RA is invalid, the RA will disconnect the entity.
9.3.3.1 RA eXchange to RA
Communication between RA and RA eXchange takes place only through
database as both share a common database.
The digital signature certificates of RA and RA eXchange (and other PKI entities)
lie in the common database.
Message verification includes checking for:
· Delayed messages
· Anti-replay attack
· Signature verification and that the entity is part of the PKI.
The following are valid messages between the RA eXchange and RA:
· Certificate registration request, certificate revocation request, certificate
renewal request.
The following are valid messages between the RA and RA eXchange:
· PKI data is sent by the CA to the RA, this data is a signed CMP message
from the CA, the RA stores the PKI data in the database. The RA eXchange
verifies the CA signature against the trust point in its PSE;
· The RA stores policy and authorization path data in the database, the RA
eXchange obtains these from the database;
· The RA stores notification messages from the CA in to the database. The
RA eXchange converts this information to a message that the protocol
handler can obtain form the database and transmit the message.
9.3.3.2 CSS to RA
Communication between CSS and RA uses CMP over TCP. The RA uses the
OCSP protocol to communicate to the CSS. The RA will connect to the CSS when
it requires status information, on receiving status responses the RA will
disconnect from the CSS. The RA verifies the signature on the CSS response. The
CSS certificate is contained in the PKI data.
9.3.4 Access to RA Event Viewer
An RA user that is either an RA Auditor or an RA Audit Manager (section 9.2.2)
may connect to the RA Event Viewer GUI to perform the tasks.
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9.3.4.1 Information exported from the RA Event Viewer
The user logged into the RA Event Viewer has the ability to delete audit events.
The deletion of audit events is only permitted under the following conditions:
· The RA Event Viewer user has the attributes associated with audit
manager; and
· The RA Event Viewer user has exported the archive data using the audit
archive function.
The user logged into the RA Event Viewer has the ability to archive audit events.
The archive of audit events is only permitted under the following conditions:
· The RA Event Viewer user and has the attributes associated with an audit
manager.
The archived log integrity is protected by using a digital signature of the audit
manager; however there is no restriction on accessing the archived data as it is
exported out of the TOE scope of control.
9.3.5 Access to the RA eXchange
The protocol handlers connect to the RA eXchange via BRSP messages. The
protocol handler will indicate to the RA eXchange what type of protocol handler
it is. The RA eXchange verifies the connection and responds with security
irrelevant configuration information.
9.3.5.1 Access to the WebRAO
The WebRAO GUI can be accessed with a valid WebRAO certificate (refer to
section 9.2.2). However any request signed by the WebRAO will be verified by
the RA to ensure that WebRAO user is part of the authorization group and has
access to the policy the certificate request was based on.
The WebRAO does not verify the data sent by the RA eXchange.
9.3.5.2 Access to the CSS
Communication between CSS and RA eXchange uses CMP over TCP. The RA
eXchange uses the OCSP protocol to communicate to the CSS. The RA eXchange
will connect to the CSS when it requires status information, on receiving status
responses the RA eXchange will disconnect from the CSS. The RA eXchange
verifies the signature on the CSS response. The CSS certificate is contained in the
PKI data.
9.3.5.3 Access to the Web Handler
The Web Handler can be accessed by any end user. The CAO user will define the
policies the Web Handler can access. The WebRAO user will authorize requests
from the Web Handler.
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9.3.5.4 Access to the email Handler
The email Handler can be accessed by any end user. The CAO user will define
the policies the email Handler can access. The WebRAO user will authorize
requests from the email Handler.
9.3.5.5 Access to the SCEP Handler
The SCEP Handler can be accessed by any end user. The CAO user will define
the policies the SCEP Handler can access. The WebRAO user will authorize
requests from the SCEP Handler.
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Appendix A Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
A.1 UniCERT Core v5.2.1 for Windows
Filename File size
(bytes)
Files in D:\docs
index.htm 955
readme.html 29,364
thirdpartylicense.txt 9,803
wwhelp3.cab 120,586
wwhelp3.jar 192,132
Files in D:\docs\admin
admin.pdf 1,466,347
adminIX.xml 28,002
adminTOC.xml 5,358
catalog.css 16,757
dbw.html 3,366
dbw2.html 4,373
dbw3.html 11,766
dbw4.html 5,163
dbw5.html 10,270
dbw6.html 9,152
dbw7.html 10,874
dbw8.html 5,662
dbw9.html 5,469
document.css 561
introducing.html 3,663
introducing2.html 12,466
introducing3.html 15,009
keymgr.html 3,644
keymgr2.html 5,446
keymgr3.html 4,762
keymgr4.html 5,773
keymgr5.html 3,962
ralog.html 5,473
ralog10.html 7,580
ralog11.html 4,166
ralog12.html 4,105
ralog13.html 3,321
ralog14.html 3,728
ralog15.html 4,361
ralog2.html 6,216
ralog3.html 3,158
ralog4.html 2,883
ralog5.html 17,164
ralog6.html 3,315
ralog7.html 3,382
ralog8.html 3,344
ralog9.html 5,233
servicestr.html 5,551
servicestr2.html 8,360
servicestr3.html 6,105
servicestr4.html 6,475
servicestr5.html 5,159
servicestr6.html 6,625
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Filename File size
(bytes)
servicestr7.html 4,416
servicestr8.html 4,412
servicestr9.html 3,133
tokenmgr.html 5,005
tokenmgr10.html 3,931
tokenmgr11.html 4,794
tokenmgr12.html 3,667
tokenmgr13.html 4,071
tokenmgr14.html 8,944
tokenmgr15.html 3,619
tokenmgr16.html 4,315
tokenmgr17.html 4,030
tokenmgr18.html 3,369
tokenmgr19.html 5,029
tokenmgr2.html 5,565
tokenmgr20.html 7,170
tokenmgr21.html 6,470
tokenmgr22.html 3,406
tokenmgr23.html 3,534
tokenmgr24.html 4,733
tokenmgr25.html 3,985
tokenmgr26.html 3,624
tokenmgr27.html 3,649
tokenmgr28.html 3,524
tokenmgr3.html 5,050
tokenmgr4.html 3,470
tokenmgr5.html 5,428
tokenmgr6.html 3,796
tokenmgr7.html 9,422
tokenmgr8.html 6,719
tokenmgr9.html 4,951
Files in D:\docs\admin\images
ab.gif 881
auditarchive.gif 7,201
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
dbw_1Logon.gif 8,097
dbw_2dbw.gif 11,087
dbw_APM1.gif 7,210
dbw_APM2.gif 13,373
dbw_APM3.gif 14,661
dbw_CA2.gif 13,104
dbw_CAO2.gif 13,751
dbw_UpPass1.gif 13,265
dbw_button_RefreshList.gif 1,567
dbw_button_create.gif 1,614
dbw_button_delete.gif 1,627
dbw_button_lock.gif 1,662
dbw_ca1.gif 6,976
dbw_ca3.gif 14,075
dbw_cao1.gif 7,270
delete.gif 862
filteringlog.gif 3,805
filteringlog2.gif 4,062
iconconfigure.gif 910
info.gif 1,155
keygen_01.gif 37,653
keygen_05.gif 34,323
keygen_06.gif 35,763
keygen_07.gif 7,785
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Filename File size
(bytes)
logo.gif 2,524
new.gif 877
newquery2.gif 2,583
querylog.gif 5,189
querylog2.gif 13,626
querylogeg.gif 4,649
querylogview.gif 11,038
rev_dblogon.gif 11,230
rev_logresult.gif 14,726
rev_mainscr.gif 10,196
rev_open.gif 13,528
rev_pseopen.gif 4,227
servicestra5.gif 815
ss_01.gif 4,573
ss_03.gif 4,613
ss_04.gif 5,582
ss_05.gif 11,235
tm_01.gif 7,422
tm_02.gif 9,448
tm_03.gif 9,879
tm_04.gif 11,045
tm_05.gif 9,933
tm_06.gif 10,240
tm_08.gif 2,387
tm_09.gif 7,541
tm_10.gif 2,831
tm_11.gif 5,785
tm_12.gif 3,034
tm_13.gif 5,021
tm_14.gif 2,600
tm_17.gif 4,885
warn.gif 1,171
Files in D:\docs\admin\wwhdata\common
context.js 74
files.js 4,195
popups.js 38
title.js 72
topics.js 67
towwhdir.js 54
wwhpagef.js 4,505
Files in D:\docs\admin\wwhdata\java
files.xml 10,530
ix.xml 28,002
search.xml 49,308
toc.xml 5,358
Files in D:\docs\admin\wwhdata\js
index.js 20,326
search.js 1,687
toc.js 4,231
Files in D:\docs\admin\wwhdata\js\search
search0.js 16,013
search1.js 16,097
search2.js 16,150
search3.js 6,982
Files in D:\docs\config
CRLs.html 3,750
CRLs2.html 3,937
CRLs3.html 5,229
app_whcustom.html 3,783
app_whcustom10.html 4,723
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Filename File size
(bytes)
app_whcustom11.html 4,312
app_whcustom12.html 2,917
app_whcustom13.html 4,461
app_whcustom14.html 8,180
app_whcustom15.html 4,715
app_whcustom2.html 4,217
app_whcustom3.html 4,725
app_whcustom4.html 7,262
app_whcustom5.html 5,544
app_whcustom6.html 5,663
app_whcustom7.html 7,353
app_whcustom8.html 9,937
app_whcustom9.html 11,462
appendixa.html 28,613
arm.html 3,813
arm10.html 3,556
arm11.html 4,119
arm12.html 5,157
arm13.html 3,424
arm2.html 4,396
arm3.html 3,222
arm4.html 3,258
arm5.html 3,544
arm6.html 3,737
arm7.html 3,311
arm8.html 3,535
arm9.html 3,916
ca.html 7,871
ca10.html 3,931
ca11.html 4,890
ca12.html 3,375
ca13.html 9,556
ca14.html 2,954
ca15.html 3,806
ca16.html 3,788
ca17.html 3,383
ca18.html 3,753
ca19.html 3,653
ca2.html 4,479
ca20.html 5,986
ca21.html 3,953
ca22.html 3,530
ca23.html 4,311
ca24.html 3,064
ca25.html 3,686
ca3.html 3,994
ca4.html 4,420
ca5.html 4,485
ca6.html 5,794
ca7.html 4,513
ca8.html 4,850
ca9.html 3,777
cao.html 3,334
cao.pdf 4,674,222
cao2.html 7,492
cao3.html 3,242
cao4.html 3,932
cao5.html 3,008
cao6.html 3,332
caoIX.xml 91,133
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Filename File size
(bytes)
caoTOC.xml 23,912
catalog.css 16,757
certificates.html 4,676
certificates10.html 4,348
certificates11.html 3,394
certificates12.html 4,158
certificates13.html 4,713
certificates14.html 6,317
certificates15.html 5,024
certificates16.html 7,905
certificates2.html 4,436
certificates3.html 14,454
certificates4.html 5,757
certificates5.html 3,095
certificates6.html 2,962
certificates7.html 3,702
certificates8.html 4,092
certificates9.html 4,530
clone.html 5,163
clone2.html 2,865
clone3.html 4,177
clone4.html 3,450
clone5.html 3,827
crosscert.html 6,227
crosscert2.html 4,247
crosscert3.html 4,384
css.html 4,640
css2.html 4,465
css3.html 3,471
definingrps.html 4,138
definingrps10.html 5,258
definingrps11.html 4,816
definingrps12.html 4,888
definingrps13.html 6,374
definingrps14.html 6,465
definingrps15.html 4,586
definingrps16.html 5,563
definingrps17.html 4,446
definingrps18.html 3,806
definingrps19.html 6,649
definingrps2.html 3,597
definingrps20.html 9,679
definingrps21.html 4,211
definingrps22.html 5,312
definingrps23.html 5,749
definingrps24.html 4,455
definingrps25.html 15,622
definingrps26.html 5,234
definingrps27.html 4,208
definingrps28.html 4,527
definingrps29.html 4,327
definingrps3.html 5,892
definingrps30.html 4,887
definingrps31.html 3,992
definingrps32.html 3,097
definingrps33.html 3,767
definingrps34.html 5,695
definingrps35.html 3,333
definingrps36.html 3,541
definingrps37.html 2,932
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Filename File size
(bytes)
definingrps38.html 6,846
definingrps39.html 4,489
definingrps4.html 3,045
definingrps40.html 4,076
definingrps41.html 2,999
definingrps42.html 5,280
definingrps43.html 3,755
definingrps44.html 4,032
definingrps45.html 3,244
definingrps46.html 3,710
definingrps47.html 4,011
definingrps48.html 3,256
definingrps49.html 4,760
definingrps5.html 6,265
definingrps50.html 4,267
definingrps51.html 3,224
definingrps6.html 3,881
definingrps7.html 4,693
definingrps8.html 4,547
definingrps9.html 3,428
document.css 561
introduction.html 5,560
introduction2.html 6,761
introduction3.html 6,557
introduction4.html 3,841
kao.html 5,053
kao2.html 5,143
kao3.html 4,715
kao4.html 3,346
kao5.html 3,855
kas.html 5,986
kas2.html 3,996
kas3.html 10,220
kas4.html 5,294
kas5.html 4,277
kas6.html 3,575
kas7.html 4,253
logs.html 5,857
logs10.html 2,741
logs11.html 3,383
logs12.html 3,473
logs2.html 17,899
logs3.html 3,156
logs4.html 3,415
logs5.html 3,050
logs6.html 5,097
logs7.html 9,372
logs8.html 4,605
logs9.html 3,424
ph.html 7,522
ph10.html 5,253
ph11.html 7,824
ph12.html 3,994
ph13.html 4,696
ph14.html 3,837
ph15.html 4,720
ph16.html 4,429
ph17.html 3,684
ph18.html 3,953
ph19.html 5,546
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Filename File size
(bytes)
ph2.html 3,513
ph20.html 5,901
ph21.html 6,293
ph22.html 5,630
ph23.html 6,849
ph24.html 5,896
ph3.html 2,892
ph4.html 2,787
ph5.html 8,346
ph6.html 4,302
ph7.html 4,380
ph8.html 3,681
ph9.html 10,162
pki.html 6,029
pki2.html 4,874
pki210.html 7,934
pki211.html 3,504
pki22.html 5,558
pki23.html 9,799
pki24.html 7,813
pki25.html 12,610
pki26.html 7,495
pki27.html 5,809
pki28.html 7,132
pki29.html 3,714
pki2a.html 3,722
pki3.html 9,228
pki4.html 6,752
pki5.html 9,272
pki6.html 9,203
pki7.html 12,405
pki8.html 3,592
pki9.html 6,256
ra.html 6,745
ra2.html 4,117
ra3.html 4,828
ra4.html 5,818
ra5.html 4,179
ra6.html 3,848
ra7.html 3,591
raa.html 5,759
raa2.html 5,170
raa3.html 2,773
rax.html 3,393
rax2.html 6,214
rax3.html 3,224
rax4.html 3,480
rax5.html 4,222
rax6.html 5,419
rax7.html 6,516
renew.html 6,499
renew10.html 8,321
renew11.html 10,121
renew12.html 6,005
renew13.html 8,967
renew14.html 9,776
renew15.html 6,034
renew16.html 9,077
renew17.html 10,679
renew18.html 10,514
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Filename File size
(bytes)
renew19.html 13,090
renew2.html 3,751
renew20.html 7,943
renew21.html 4,018
renew22.html 6,957
renew23.html 18,409
renew24.html 4,959
renew25.html 3,968
renew26.html 3,574
renew27.html 3,991
renew28.html 9,776
renew29.html 7,437
renew3.html 5,249
renew30.html 11,661
renew31.html 4,546
renew4.html 4,805
renew5.html 4,548
renew6.html 6,840
renew7.html 5,876
renew8.html 4,382
renew9.html 3,317
rp.html 5,081
rp10.html 4,851
rp11.html 4,519
rp12.html 3,650
rp13.html 4,050
rp14.html 4,606
rp15.html 3,421
rp16.html 4,254
rp17.html 5,050
rp18.html 4,605
rp2.html 3,564
rp3.html 4,914
rp4.html 6,441
rp5.html 4,432
rp6.html 3,945
rp7.html 10,824
rp8.html 7,206
rp9.html 5,087
subCA.html 3,920
subCA2.html 3,897
subCA3.html 7,419
subCA4.html 4,331
subCA5.html 5,430
tasks.html 8,670
tasks2.html 4,013
tasks3.html 3,693
tasks4.html 3,183
tasks5.html 3,354
tasks6.html 3,212
tasks7.html 4,028
troubleshoot.html 3,846
troubleshoot2.html 2,829
troubleshoot3.html 3,309
troubleshoot4.html 3,506
troubleshoot5.html 2,888
troubleshoot6.html 4,223
troubleshoot7.html 3,686
troubleshoot8.html 3,476
troubleshoot9.html 3,207
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
webrao.html 4,056
webrao2.html 4,414
webrao3.html 5,143
webrao4.html 4,028
webrao5.html 3,764
webrao6.html 3,285
webrao7.html 3,403
webrao8.html 3,205
wh.html 5,478
wh10.html 3,080
wh11.html 6,207
wh12.html 12,560
wh13.html 6,415
wh14.html 4,493
wh15.html 4,822
wh16.html 6,280
wh2.html 5,038
wh3.html 4,942
wh4.html 3,427
wh5.html 4,935
wh6.html 4,399
wh7.html 3,481
wh8.html 7,650
wh9.html 3,022
Files in D:\docs\config\images
ab.gif 881
addcdp.gif 5,981
addedcdp.gif 16,098
addentity.gif 5,420
alignspace.gif 6,850
apptype.gif 6,644
armlog.gif 8,853
armsda.gif 8,165
armtuning.gif 6,280
auditarchive.gif 7,201
auditdeletion.gif 35,700
authgroup.gif 3,652
authgrouptab.gif 3,701
bullet.gif 822
cacerts.gif 12,566
cacommunicate.gif 3,975
cacrl.gif 14,582
cadb.gif 2,891
caentityname.gif 12,725
cajob.gif 5,899
camiscellaneous.gif 7,690
caoaccess.gif 13,730
caotune.gif 23,511
caserverparam.gif 10,852
catune.gif 8,675
caution.gif 1,533
cert_request_ee.gif 18,108
certificate.gif 6,791
certificate_request_page.gif 8,991
certificateinstall.gif 9,081
certificatesa15.gif 1,117
certquery.gif 5,272
certtype.gif 2,305
choose.gif 37,081
choosepol.gif 34,026
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
choosepolicy.gif 26,030
cmpmode.gif 7,981
cmpreg.gif 16,551
cmprp.gif 12,762
cmptrust.gif 3,212
cmptune.gif 9,253
collection.gif 5,845
color.gif 2,834
columns.gif 6,086
combobox.gif 4,612
combobox2.gif 1,402
composequery.gif 13,335
connected.gif 1,166
cq_icon1.gif 157
cq_icon2.gif 166
crlgentime.gif 5,014
crosscerta.gif 8,150
cryptoprofile2.gif 11,045
csstune.gif 22,962
database.gif 3,758
delete.gif 862
deletiondetect.gif 4,819
dnelements.gif 24,623
dnorder.gif 4,034
dnvalue.gif 4,396
dnwindow.gif 4,523
dsapara.gif 4,893
editbox.gif 1,523
email.gif 13,648
emailadd.gif 9,606
emailnotification.gif 13,611
emailpemtags.gif 14,209
emailreg.gif 12,238
emailrp.gif 5,737
emailtemplate.gif 13,769
emailtemplate1.gif 11,187
emailtune.gif 15,086
entitiespki.gif 16,375
entityreq.gif 28,714
exportcrl.gif 7,987
exportcrl2.gif 8,550
filtering.gif 3,722
filtering2.gif 4,019
filteringlog.gif 3,805
filteringlog2.gif 4,062
fingeprint.gif 1,505
fingerprintalg.gif 4,574
form.gif 26,888
generateca.gif 28,249
genkeys.gif 38,427
grouptab.gif 5,348
iconcert.gif 928
iconconfigure.gif 910
iconerror.gif 890
iconrevoke.gif 935
icontask.gif 914
icontask2.gif 882
iddata.gif 13,847
importext.gif 12,420
info.gif 1,155
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 194
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
kaoaccess.gif 9,642
kaotuning.gif 6,092
kastuning.gif 10,891
keystore.gif 12,215
ldapuri.gif 3,364
ldapuriadv.gif 6,860
lisktuning.gif 4,903
lock.gif 940
logcolumns.gif 3,876
logo.gif 2,524
logoptions.gif 6,891
logresult.gif 12,520
logsa.gif 5,947
mainscreen.gif 10,939
mapped.gif 2,220
multkeys.gif 2,980
nested.gif 33,018
new.gif 877
newpolicy.gif 22,704
newquery.gif 5,775
newquery2.gif 2,583
newtemplate.gif 2,990
openpki.gif 4,571
openpki1.gif 5,650
pkia.gif 4,143
policyinfo.gif 21,255
policylife.gif 18,180
policymap.gif 14,351
policyscope.gif 3,987
policytab.gif 12,986
policytab1.gif 5,388
pselocate.gif 9,448
publication.gif 10,509
querylog.gif 5,189
querylog2.gif 13,626
querylogeg.gif 4,649
querylogview.gif 11,038
queryresult.gif 9,091
raaaccess.gif 7,961
ratasks.gif 22,092
ratune.gif 23,802
rax2eh.gif 8,853
rax2scepcmp.gif 11,440
rax2webrao.gif 20,911
rax2wh.gif 8,220
raxaccess.gif 18,259
raxaccess2.gif 18,597
raxtune.gif 13,216
received.gif 35,763
remote.gif 5,595
remove.gif 5,381
renewalrules.gif 5,323
renewcomplete.gif 10,922
renewcomplete2.gif 33,136
renewcomplete3.gif 11,105
renewcompletekeygen.gif 53,365
renewdecisions.gif 59,816
reneweditpolicy.gif 31,245
reneweditpolicya.gif 31,245
renewencrypt.gif 32,916
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 195
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
renewexport.gif 32,694
renewmulticert.gif 46,059
renewpkientity.gif 33,735
renewpolicy.gif 33,050
renewpse.gif 11,000
renewrootca1.gif 33,397
renewrootreuse.gif 33,121
renewsubCAdetails.gif 33,397
renewsubatroot1.gif 32,280
renewsubcaexport.gif 32,910
renewsubcaexport2.gif 32,753
renewsubcagrayout.gif 32,974
renewsubcaimport.gif 31,614
renewsubcapolicy.gif 33,555
renewsubcomplete.gif 10,978
renewsubkeygen.gif 5,900
renewsubmit.gif 33,097
renewsubp10.gif 9,415
renewsubreuse.gif 45,499
renewsubreuse2.gif 46,807
request.gif 21,847
requestnotify.gif 3,978
requestsum.gif 21,824
retire.gif 891
retire_unpub.gif 117
retirecdp.gif 3,531
retiregroup.gif 4,544
revoke.gif 5,715
revokentity.gif 5,546
rootcert.gif 7,177
rpproperties1.gif 9,313
rpproperties2.gif 12,204
rpproperties3.gif 10,472
rpproperties4.gif 9,500
rpproperties6.gif 10,782
rpproperties7.gif 11,437
ruleeg.gif 4,884
scep.gif 7,984
scepreg.gif 9,867
sceprp.gif 13,176
sceptune.gif 25,194
search_criteria_ee.gif 2,843
staticlist.gif 7,162
subca2.gif 34,309
subca3.gif 34,039
subca4.gif 28,052
submit.gif 35,171
suspend.gif 5,668
taborder.gif 3,592
tasksa.gif 17,832
tick.gif 882
titleurl.gif 1,201
unassigned.gif 915
unassigned2.gif 930
unsuspend.gif 5,838
viewevent.gif 5,749
warn.gif 1,171
Files in D:\docs\config\wwhdata\common
context.js 72
files.js 18,571
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 196
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
popups.js 38
title.js 70
topics.js 67
towwhdir.js 54
wwhpagef.js 4,505
Files in D:\docs\config\wwhdata\java
files.xml 30,257
ix.xml 91,133
search.xml 194,881
toc.xml 23,912
Files in D:\docs\config\wwhdata\js
index.js 66,571
search.js 1,688
toc.js 19,305
Files in D:\docs\config\wwhdata\js\search
search0.js 16,154
search1.js 16,125
search10.js 16,152
search11.js 15,839
search12.js 16,128
search13.js 1,137
search2.js 16,160
search3.js 16,139
search4.js 16,001
search5.js 16,141
search6.js 16,153
search7.js 16,145
search8.js 16,036
search9.js 15,710
Files in D:\docs\dbadmin
catalog.css 16,757
dba_1b_changes.html 4,462
dba_1b_changes2.html 3,947
dba_1b_changes3.html 4,336
dba_1b_changes4.html 2,975
dba_1b_changes5.html 3,810
dba_1intro.html 2,891
dba_1intro2.html 6,384
dba_1intro3.html 4,618
dba_2ainstalloraclewindows.html 3,342
dba_2ainstalloraclewindows2.html 4,385
dba_2ainstalloraclewindows3.html 3,276
dba_2ainstalloraclewindows4.html 10,959
dba_2ainstalloraclewindows5.html 3,803
dba_2ainstalloraclewindows6.html 7,351
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris.html 3,341
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris2.html 4,394
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris3.html 3,422
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris4.html 9,108
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris5.html 10,350
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris6.html 3,803
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris7.html 7,418
dba_3acreate_dbwindows.html 3,828
dba_3acreate_dbwindows2.html 4,537
dba_3acreate_dbwindows3.html 18,907
dba_3acreate_dbwindows4.html 4,331
dba_3acreate_dbwindows5.html 6,363
dba_3bcreate_dbsolaris.html 3,549
dba_3bcreate_dbsolaris2.html 4,383
dba_3bcreate_dbsolaris3.html 18,896
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 197
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
dba_3bcreate_dbsolaris4.html 4,274
dba_4arunningoracle_windows.html 3,293
dba_4arunningoracle_windows2.html 6,207
dba_4arunningoracle_windows3.html 3,613
dba_4arunningoracle_windows4.html 4,270
dba_4arunningoracle_windows5.html 8,715
dba_4arunningoracle_windows6.html 5,347
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris.html 3,294
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris2.html 4,422
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris3.html 7,065
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris4.html 5,756
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris5.html 4,755
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris6.html 5,872
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris7.html 3,141
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris8.html 3,137
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris9.html 4,371
dba_5amorelisteners_windows.html 2,795
dba_5amorelisteners_windows2.html 7,781
dba_5bmorelisteners_solaris.html 2,797
dba_5bmorelisteners_solaris2.html 8,063
dba_6amorealiases_windows.html 3,275
dba_6amorealiases_windows2.html 9,137
dba_6bmorealiases_solaris.html 3,276
dba_6bmorealiases_solaris2.html 9,071
dba_7ahomeselector_windows.html 4,976
dba_8adbtranstion_windows.html 2,997
dba_8adbtranstion_windows2.html 4,452
dba_8adbtranstion_windows3.html 8,539
dba_8adbtranstion_windows4.html 8,191
dba_8bdbtranstion_solaris.html 2,984
dba_8bdbtranstion_solaris2.html 4,254
dba_8bdbtranstion_solaris3.html 8,967
dba_8bdbtranstion_solaris4.html 7,990
dba_appauto.html 3,025
dba_appauto2.html 2,557
dba_appauto3.html 3,797
dba_appauto4.html 7,431
dba_appbackup.html 3,419
dba_appbackup2.html 3,412
dba_appbackup3.html 3,569
dba_appbackup4.html 3,341
dba_appbackup5.html 3,286
dba_appbackup6.html 6,837
dba_appbackup7.html 4,983
dba_appbackup8.html 3,436
dba_appdbastudio_solaris.html 4,572
dba_appdbastudio_solaris2.html 3,513
dba_appdbastudio_solaris3.html 5,727
dba_appdbastudio_solaris4.html 3,526
dba_appdbastudio_windows.html 4,268
dba_appdbastudio_windows2.html 3,517
dba_appdbastudio_windows3.html 5,605
dba_appdbastudio_windows4.html 3,532
dba_appdelete.html 3,499
dba_appdelete2.html 4,216
dba_appdelete3.html 8,258
dba_apporadir.html 3,615
dba_apporadir2.html 3,084
dba_apporadir3.html 3,673
dba_apporadir4.html 4,489
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 198
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
dba_apporadir5.html 3,592
dba_apporadir6.html 3,347
dbadminguide.pdf 2,277,340
dbadminguideIX.xml 24,632
dbadminguideTOC.xml 8,366
document.css 561
Files in D:\docs\dbadmin\images
099.summary.gif 33,520
099.summary_sol.gif 29,055
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
db_config_ora_services.gif 15,241
db_upgrade_backup6_solaris.gif 39,047
db_upgrade_backup6_windows.gif 39,029
db_upgrade_database2.gif 42,242
db_upgrade_database2_sol.gif 42,266
db_upgrade_export_summary7_sol.gif 15,253
db_upgrade_export_summary7_wind.gif 15,060
db_upgrade_progress8.gif 42,122
db_upgrade_results9_sol.gif 21,658
db_upgrade_results9_win.gif 21,498
db_upgrade_rollback_issue4.gif 7,465
db_upgrade_temp.gif 5,579
db_upgrade_welcome1.gif 48,954
dbconfig92_archive_all_init_param.gif 11,201
dbconfig92_create_options.gif 7,315
dbconfig92_create_options_sol.gif 7,322
dbconfig92_db_storage_logs_gen.gif 13,815
dbconfig92_db_storage_logs_gen_sol.gif 13,828
dbconfig92_dbfeatures6.gif 6,212
dbconfig92_dbident4.gif 4,162
dbconfig92_dbtemplates3.gif 5,403
dbconfig92_init_param_archive.gif 9,428
dbconfig92_init_param_archive_sol.gif 9,486
dbconfig92_init_param_charset.gif 6,631
dbconfig92_init_param_dbsize.gif 5,549
dbconfig92_init_param_fileloc.gif 10,269
dbconfig92_init_param_fileloc_sol.gif 11,361
dbconfig92_initparam_mem9.gif 9,301
dbconfig92_messagefeatures7.gif 4,532
dbconfig92db_conoptions8.gif 5,830
dbconfig_passwords.gif 9,319
dbconfig_passwords_sol.gif 9,371
dbconfig_progress.gif 30,703
dbconfig_summary_92.gif 17,116
dbconfig_summary_92_sol.gif 17,121
delete_user.gif 28,698
home_selector1.gif 20,583
home_selector2.gif 20,594
home_selector3.gif 11,653
home_selector4.gif 7,978
info.gif 1,155
install92_avail_prod4.gif 79,097
install92_db_config7.gif 77,824
install92_file_loc3_sol.gif 78,552
install92_file_loc3_win.gif 77,135
install92_install_types4.gif 80,408
install92_install_types4_sol.gif 41,920
install92_mts8.gif 75,523
install92_progress10.gif 93,207
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 199
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
install92_rootsh_command_sol.gif 5,622
install92_rootsh_sol.gif 3,538
install_name.gif 2,059
logo.gif 2,524
lstnrctl.gif 9,549
net8asst_tns0008.gif 2,742
net8asst_tns0009.gif 6,212
netmgr_add_list_name.gif 2,216
netmgr_alias_protocol3.gif 8,723
netmgr_alias_protocol_settings4.gif 9,269
netmgr_alias_start1a.gif 15,727
netmgr_alias_test6.gif 10,388
netmgr_alias_test6a.gif 7,863
netmgr_alias_welcome2a.gif 7,739
netmgr_list_loc.gif 10,840
netmgr_lsnr_add_address3.gif 12,355
netmgr_lsnr_add_address3a.gif 8,070
netmgr_lsnr_add_database4.gif 9,492
netmgr_lsnr_add_database4_solaris.gif 9,479
netmgr_lsnr_start1.gif 13,141
oem_add_to_tree5.gif 6,043
oem_adding_uni6.gif 25,153
oem_check_db2.gif 17,055
oem_logged_in4_cropped.gif 21,670
oem_login1.gif 20,154
oem_password_login3.gif 21,010
ora_running.gif 8,150
oracledirectories.gif 4,501
regedit_04_nls_lang.gif 3,038
service_manager.gif 6,998
warn.gif 1,171
Files in D:\docs\dbadmin\wwhdata\common
context.js 83
files.js 7,083
popups.js 38
title.js 81
topics.js 67
towwhdir.js 54
wwhpagef.js 4,505
Files in D:\docs\dbadmin\wwhdata\java
files.xml 13,898
ix.xml 24,632
search.xml 62,572
toc.xml 8,366
Files in D:\docs\dbadmin\wwhdata\js
index.js 14,425
search.js 1,687
toc.js 5,599
Files in D:\docs\dbadmin\wwhdata\js\search
search0.js 16,125
search1.js 16,107
search2.js 16,144
search3.js 16,137
search4.js 5,320
Files in D:\docs\exts
app_certext.html 24,236
app_crlext.html 8,386
app_dn.html 17,344
app_profiles.html 4,046
app_profiles2.html 4,251
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 200
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
app_profiles3.html 5,406
app_profiles4.html 3,824
app_profiles5.html 4,494
app_profiles6.html 5,511
app_profiles7.html 4,890
app_profiles8.html 3,905
catalog.css 16,757
document.css 561
extensions.pdf 1,165,967
extensionsIX.xml 28,932
extensionsTOC.html 4,737
extensionsTOC.xml 4,737
introx509.html 4,136
introx50910.html 9,826
introx50911.html 6,484
introx5092.html 4,471
introx5093.html 5,731
introx5094.html 6,879
introx5095.html 14,239
introx5096.html 6,305
introx5097.html 4,396
introx5098.html 5,496
introx5099.html 6,536
profile_rp.html 3,569
profile_rp10.html 10,248
profile_rp11.html 26,959
profile_rp2.html 4,550
profile_rp3.html 5,056
profile_rp4.html 4,674
profile_rp5.html 13,734
profile_rp6.html 3,062
profile_rp7.html 3,779
profile_rp8.html 4,350
profile_rp9.html 10,676
set_exts.html 3,007
set_exts10.html 4,646
set_exts11.html 5,644
set_exts12.html 5,634
set_exts13.html 5,709
set_exts14.html 5,109
set_exts15.html 5,231
set_exts16.html 5,357
set_exts17.html 4,097
set_exts18.html 5,165
set_exts19.html 5,019
set_exts2.html 8,079
set_exts20.html 4,366
set_exts21.html 4,627
set_exts22.html 4,364
set_exts23.html 4,469
set_exts24.html 2,546
set_exts25.html 3,806
set_exts26.html 10,601
set_exts27.html 9,923
set_exts28.html 4,197
set_exts29.html 3,506
set_exts3.html 5,208
set_exts30.html 4,416
set_exts31.html 3,875
set_exts32.html 4,116
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
set_exts33.html 3,387
set_exts4.html 8,459
set_exts5.html 4,210
set_exts6.html 5,357
set_exts7.html 5,236
set_exts8.html 4,308
set_exts9.html 4,470
Files in D:\docs\exts\images
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
certv3a.gif 54,197
info.gif 1,155
logo.gif 2,524
v2crl.gif 45,830
warn.gif 1,171
Files in D:\docs\exts\wwhdata\common
context.js 69
files.js 3,648
popups.js 38
title.js 67
topics.js 67
towwhdir.js 54
wwhpagef.js 4,505
Files in D:\docs\exts\wwhdata\java
files.xml 9,910
ix.xml 28,932
search.xml 55,882
toc.xml 4,737
Files in D:\docs\exts\wwhdata\js
index.js 19,760
search.js 1,687
toc.js 3,516
Files in D:\docs\exts\wwhdata\js\search
search0.js 16,164
search1.js 16,140
search2.js 16,138
search3.js 14,689
Files in D:\docs\index_topics
arrow1.gif 1,022
arrow2.gif 1,282
arrow2big.gif 1,415
arrow3.gif 1,550
catalog.css 16,757
document.css 561
install.html 2,764
managing.html 3,127
planning.html 2,691
remarks.htm 699,714
running.html 3,274
search.html 688
testing.html 3,542
unicert1st.html 3,599
Files in D:\docs\install
aboutdocs.html 4,231
aboutdocs10.html 3,187
aboutdocs11.html 3,106
aboutdocs12.html 7,207
aboutdocs13.html 3,922
aboutdocs14.html 3,560
aboutdocs15.html 8,642
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
aboutdocs2.html 4,583
aboutdocs3.html 6,571
aboutdocs4.html 3,007
aboutdocs5.html 3,031
aboutdocs6.html 8,478
aboutdocs7.html 3,014
aboutdocs8.html 2,994
aboutdocs9.html 3,191
catalog.css 16,757
document.css 561
install.pdf 1,332,178
installIX.xml 27,025
installTOC.xml 8,377
instructions.html 4,905
instructions10.html 2,977
instructions11.html 3,719
instructions12.html 3,591
instructions13.html 3,981
instructions14.html 8,269
instructions15.html 3,524
instructions16.html 4,568
instructions17.html 5,034
instructions18.html 3,843
instructions19.html 4,359
instructions2.html 4,579
instructions20.html 4,812
instructions3.html 3,824
instructions4.html 5,355
instructions5.html 4,116
instructions6.html 5,510
instructions7.html 3,964
instructions8.html 4,914
instructions9.html 8,291
plandeploy.html 5,204
plandeploy2.html 5,098
plandeploy3.html 6,371
plandeploy4.html 5,830
plandeploy5.html 4,123
plandeploy6.html 3,769
plandeploy7.html 3,603
plandeploy8.html 3,818
plandeploy9.html 3,744
prereqs.html 3,544
prereqs10.html 3,195
prereqs11.html 2,643
prereqs12.html 2,667
prereqs13.html 3,501
prereqs14.html 6,605
prereqs15.html 3,160
prereqs16.html 2,918
prereqs17.html 3,864
prereqs18.html 2,878
prereqs19.html 3,051
prereqs2.html 4,700
prereqs20.html 2,761
prereqs21.html 2,808
prereqs3.html 10,546
prereqs4.html 5,085
prereqs5.html 3,863
prereqs6.html 7,710
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
prereqs7.html 14,541
prereqs8.html 3,344
prereqs9.html 2,871
securepki.html 3,874
securepki10.html 3,852
securepki11.html 5,660
securepki12.html 6,720
securepki13.html 4,874
securepki14.html 3,258
securepki15.html 3,610
securepki16.html 4,350
securepki17.html 3,778
securepki18.html 4,150
securepki19.html 2,624
securepki2.html 6,172
securepki20.html 3,004
securepki21.html 6,957
securepki22.html 2,934
securepki23.html 4,848
securepki24.html 5,436
securepki25.html 5,630
securepki26.html 9,603
securepki3.html 3,606
securepki4.html 3,302
securepki5.html 2,664
securepki6.html 2,738
securepki7.html 3,178
securepki8.html 2,817
securepki9.html 3,701
webinstructions.html 4,373
webinstructions10.html 5,517
webinstructions11.html 5,613
webinstructions12.html 3,908
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webinstructions14.html 7,531
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webinstructions2.html 5,654
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webinstructions4.html 5,226
webinstructions5.html 7,387
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webinstructions8.html 5,945
webinstructions9.html 3,748
Files in D:\docs\install\images
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
deployVPN2.gif 51,482
deploydemo.gif 11,473
docdiagram.gif 69,449
hostarchitect.gif 41,038
hostca.gif 47,288
info.gif 1,155
init_install.gif 80,923
installxp.gif 31,684
logo.gif 2,524
securepkia.gif 58,820
warn.gif 1,171
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
webinstructionsa.gif 110,567
Files in D:\docs\install\wwhdata\common
context.js 71
files.js 6,510
popups.js 38
title.js 69
topics.js 67
towwhdir.js 54
wwhpagef.js 4,505
Files in D:\docs\install\wwhdata\java
files.xml 13,658
ix.xml 27,025
search.xml 72,951
toc.xml 8,377
Files in D:\docs\install\wwhdata\js
index.js 18,802
search.js 1,687
toc.js 6,245
Files in D:\docs\install\wwhdata\js\search
search0.js 16,145
search1.js 16,158
search2.js 16,152
search3.js 16,127
search4.js 16,150
search5.js 1,277
Files in D:\docs\overview
beginners.html 3,453
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beginners6.html 3,917
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beginners9.html 5,005
catalog.css 16,757
certificates.html 3,077
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certificates5.html 4,622
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certreq.html 3,692
certreq2.html 6,140
certreq3.html 5,708
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certreq5.html 5,652
certreq6.html 6,280
document.css 561
glossary.html 69,536
introduction.html 5,324
introduction10.html 5,776
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
introduction11.html 4,390
introduction12.html 4,103
introduction13.html 6,342
introduction14.html 4,227
introduction15.html 5,636
introduction16.html 7,064
introduction17.html 7,720
introduction18.html 4,480
introduction19.html 4,022
introduction2.html 3,828
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introduction3.html 6,366
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introduction5.html 3,623
introduction6.html 3,344
introduction7.html 4,023
introduction8.html 3,667
introduction9.html 4,122
overview.pdf 1,057,928
overviewIX.xml 23,697
overviewTOC.xml 5,722
pki_entities.html 3,689
pki_entities10.html 3,392
pki_entities11.html 3,419
pki_entities12.html 3,220
pki_entities13.html 3,277
pki_entities14.html 3,486
pki_entities15.html 4,097
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pki_entities17.html 5,158
pki_entities18.html 3,585
pki_entities19.html 3,042
pki_entities2.html 6,528
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pki_entities25.html 6,045
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pki_entities3.html 3,679
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pki_entities5.html 4,263
pki_entities6.html 3,590
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pki_entities8.html 3,322
pki_entities9.html 3,919
Files in D:\docs\overview\images
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
certprocess.gif 37,958
certtemplate.gif 21,953
gui_ex.gif 23,231
info.gif 1,155
laddertrust.gif 14,373
logo.gif 2,524
meetinmiddle.gif 15,845
pkiarch.gif 27,431
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
warn.gif 1,171
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhdata\common
context.js 69
files.js 4,378
popups.js 38
title.js 67
topics.js 67
towwhdir.js 54
wwhpagef.js 4,505
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhdata\java
files.xml 10,892
ix.xml 23,697
search.xml 84,226
toc.xml 5,722
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhdata\js
index.js 16,395
search.js 1,687
toc.js 4,125
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhdata\js\search
search0.js 16,072
search1.js 16,137
search2.js 16,138
search3.js 16,136
search4.js 16,156
search5.js 14,915
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp
books.xml 218
messages.xml 31,996
settings.xml 3,918
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\images
altclose.gif 156
altopen.gif 173
caution.gif 1,533
info.gif 1,155
warn.gif 1,171
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\wwhimpl
version.htm 868
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\wwhimpl\common\html
blank.htm 336
bookmark.htm 339
content.htm 1,258
controll.htm 1,413
controlr.htm 1,454
default.css 553
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default10.htm 6,138
default11.htm 6,210
default2.htm 5,544
default3.htm 5,754
default4.htm 7,113
default5.htm 5,882
default6.htm 6,170
default7.htm 6,170
default8.htm 6,738
default9.htm 6,098
document.css 561
document.htm 1,056
init0.htm 935
init1.htm 1,400
init2.htm 1,098
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
init3.htm 935
pagenav.htm 1,338
switch.htm 1,379
title.htm 1,138
wwhelp.htm 3,620
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\wwhimpl\common\images
bkmark.gif 250
bkmarkx.gif 99
close.gif 214
divider.gif 46
divider2.gif 46
doc.gif 150
email.gif 289
emailx.gif 93
fc.gif 235
fo.gif 174
frameset.gif 234
home.gif 287
logo.jpg 4,851
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nextx.gif 76
prev.gif 252
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print.gif 313
printx.gif 94
related.gif 440
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spacer4.gif 51
spc1w2h.gif 43
spc1w7h.gif 44
spc2w1h.gif 43
spc5w1h.gif 43
sync.gif 270
syncx.gif 86
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\wwhimpl\common\private
books.js 315
locale.js 12,224
options.js 1,594
popupf.js 3,024
title.js 133
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\wwhimpl\common\scripts
bklist1s.js 422
bookgrps.js 5,006
booklist.js 7,909
browseri.js 3,482
controls.js 12,842
documt1s.js 190
filelist.js 1,710
handler.js 774
help.js 19,082
highlt.js 5,677
pophash.js 1,456
popup.js 12,897
related.js 13,393
strutils.js 12,383
switch.js 5,187
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\wwhimpl\java\html
ie60win.htm 2,721
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
iemac.htm 1,820
iewindow.htm 2,296
netscape.htm 2,238
nosecie.htm 2,097
nosecie6.htm 2,522
nosecns.htm 2,237
wwhelp.htm 4,198
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\wwhimpl\java\private
books.xml 230
locale.js 2,690
locale.xml 22,045
options.js 146
options.xml 1,086
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\wwhimpl\java\scripts
handler.js 905
java.js 5,431
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\wwhimpl\js\html
indexsel.htm 1,167
navigate.htm 1,353
panel.htm 1,568
panelini.htm 1,127
tabs.htm 1,149
wwhelp.htm 4,599
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\wwhimpl\js\images
tabsbg.gif 45
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\wwhimpl\js\private
locale.js 13,715
options.js 2,696
Files in D:\docs\overview\wwhelp\wwhimpl\js\scripts
handler.js 475
index.js 44,486
index1s.js 171
javascpt.js 4,355
outlfast.js 6,502
outlin1s.js 167
outline.js 23,298
outlsafe.js 5,483
panels.js 6,663
search.js 33,500
search1s.js 341
search2s.js 147
search3s.js 142
search4s.js 142
tabs.js 3,713
Files in D:\docs\pubadmin
addprofile.html 3,425
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Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
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Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
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appx_ocsp.html 3,612
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Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
ix.xml 43,350
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toc.xml 12,338
Files in D:\docs\pubadmin\images
apm_cainfo.gif 9,317
apm_casourcepubretries.gif 12,030
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apm_upcertfile.gif 5,850
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
connconfigmgr.gif 12,376
dbconnconfig.gif 8,847
dbconnconfig_full.gif 9,308
info.gif 1,155
ldapserverconfigdsam.gif 9,221
logo.gif 2,524
ocspconfigmgr.gif 30,614
ocspsvrconfig.gif 26,634
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
pubconfigselect.gif 8,823
pubinstanceunicert.gif 5,075
pubnoticesrecordsdcc.gif 16,932
tsconfigmgr.gif 13,656
tssvrconfig.gif 15,634
warn.gif 1,171
Files in D:\docs\pubadmin\wwhdata\common
context.js 84
files.js 9,618
popups.js 38
title.js 82
topics.js 1,401
towwhdir.js 54
wwhpagef.js 4,505
Files in D:\docs\pubadmin\wwhdata\java
files.xml 20,157
ix.xml 43,350
search.xml 89,826
toc.xml 12,338
Files in D:\docs\pubadmin\wwhdata\js
index.js 30,684
search.js 1,687
toc.js 9,413
Files in D:\docs\pubadmin\wwhdata\js\search
search0.js 16,160
search1.js 16,153
search2.js 16,143
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Files in D:\docs\relnotes
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Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
issuesresolved28.html 2,424
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relnotes.pdf 342,191
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Files in D:\docs\relnotes\images
bullet.gif 822
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size
(bytes)
caution.gif 1,533
info.gif 1,155
logo.gif 2,524
warn.gif 1,171
Files in D:\docs\relnotes\wwhdata\common
context.js 66
files.js 4,880
popups.js 38
title.js 64
topics.js 67
towwhdir.js 54
wwhpagef.js 4,505
Files in D:\docs\relnotes\wwhdata\java
files.xml 11,409
ix.xml 4,889
search.xml 25,336
toc.xml 6,349
Files in D:\docs\relnotes\wwhdata\js
index.js 3,392
search.js 1,687
toc.js 4,460
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collecting2.html 3,338
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
collecting3.html 5,733
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document.css 561
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facetoface14.html 4,202
facetoface15.html 3,547
facetoface16.html 4,097
facetoface17.html 3,875
facetoface18.html 8,449
facetoface19.html 4,945
facetoface2.html 3,402
facetoface20.html 5,045
facetoface21.html 4,264
facetoface22.html 4,318
facetoface23.html 7,874
facetoface24.html 4,106
facetoface25.html 4,259
facetoface26.html 7,244
facetoface27.html 4,607
facetoface28.html 5,296
facetoface29.html 3,922
facetoface3.html 7,832
facetoface30.html 3,889
facetoface31.html 8,703
facetoface32.html 5,301
facetoface33.html 4,717
facetoface34.html 4,640
facetoface35.html 5,285
facetoface36.html 4,123
facetoface37.html 3,860
facetoface38.html 4,237
facetoface39.html 6,054
facetoface4.html 3,717
facetoface5.html 5,060
facetoface6.html 5,270
facetoface7.html 4,269
facetoface8.html 4,000
facetoface9.html 4,266
gettingstarted.html 3,700
gettingstarted2.html 4,260
gettingstarted3.html 12,313
gettingstarted4.html 11,240
gettingstarted5.html 3,639
gettingstarted6.html 3,992
installing.html 4,675
installing10.html 4,243
installing11.html 6,820
installing12.html 3,486
installing13.html 4,996
installing14.html 6,201
installing15.html 5,203
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
installing2.html 4,708
installing3.html 3,790
installing4.html 3,972
installing5.html 5,822
installing6.html 3,115
installing7.html 5,180
installing8.html 6,018
installing9.html 3,795
introduction.html 3,324
introduction2.html 3,659
introduction3.html 4,253
introduction4.html 5,155
introduction5.html 6,394
introduction6.html 3,489
introduction7.html 3,097
introduction8.html 3,138
introduction9.html 4,143
keepingyoursystemsecure.html 3,932
keepingyoursystemsecure2.html 4,386
keepingyoursystemsecure3.html 4,022
keepingyoursystemsecure4.html 3,090
keepingyoursystemsecure5.html 4,889
keepingyoursystemsecure6.html 3,485
recover.html 2,944
recover2.html 3,268
recover3.html 10,521
recover4.html 3,201
suspendingandrevoking.html 3,895
suspendingandrevoking2.html 8,438
suspendingandrevoking3.html 6,358
suspendingandrevoking4.html 3,412
suspendingandrevoking5.html 9,254
suspendingandrevoking6.html 6,520
suspendingandrevoking7.html 5,733
troubleshooting.html 3,817
troubleshooting2.html 3,430
troubleshooting3.html 4,642
troubleshooting4.html 11,919
troubleshooting5.html 3,818
troubleshooting6.html 5,018
troubleshooting7.html 4,195
troubleshooting8.html 3,788
troubleshooting9.html 3,231
webraoguide.pdf 1,786,892
webraoguideIX.xml 36,204
webraoguideTOC.xml 11,499
Files in D:\docs\webrao\images
appendix_identrusa.gif 46,643
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
cert_req_dual_ke_PKCS11.gif 11,409
cert_req_dual_key.gif 11,132
cert_request_sub_authorize.gif 2,466
cert_request_sub_authorize2.gif 2,047
cert_status.gif 5,601
certificate_request_page.gif 8,140
certificate_request_page_PKCS11.gif 8,680
certificate_request_page_import.gif 8,709
certificate_request_recover.gif 5,529
certificate_request_submitted_page.gif 7,457
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
certificate_request_submitted_page_PKCS11.gif 2,485
certificate_request_submitted_page_authorize.gif 8,683
certificate_request_submitted_page_import.gif 2,523
collect_rro.gif 6,165
export_certificate_screen2.gif 10,022
export_certificate_screen_key1.gif 10,063
facetofacea26.gif 11,888
friendly_name2.gif 7,864
import_certificate_request_page.gif 2,339
import_certificate_request_screen.gif 10,298
info.gif 1,155
install.gif 64,385
key_recov_submitted.gif 2,477
key_recov_submitted_auth.gif 2,537
login_page.gif 6,084
logo.gif 2,524
menu_krowrao.gif 4,446
multi_cert_friendly.gif 9,877
pkcs12_options.gif 15,729
random_data_screen.gif 9,204
recov_key.gif 8,441
recov_key_auth.gif 8,550
recov_request2.gif 6,862
recovery_reasons.gif 2,262
registration_officer_logon_screen.gif 8,347
registration_officer_logon_screen_pkcs11.gif 8,080
request_details.gif 6,017
revocation_dropdown.gif 2,477
revoke_cert_revoke.gif 9,142
revoke_certificate_page.gif 9,504
revoke_certificate_page_suspend.gif 8,825
revoke_certificate_page_unsuspend.gif 10,072
save_cert_p12_drop-down.gif 3,629
save_certificate_page_import.gif 5,811
save_certificate_page_multiple.gif 10,305
save_certificate_page_multiple_PKCS11.gif 15,606
save_certificate_page_p12.gif 11,978
save_certificate_page_pem.gif 12,137
save_certificate_page_smartcard3.gif 8,402
save_key_cert.gif 5,900
saving_keys_and_certificates_screen.gif 13,379
saving_keys_and_certificates_screen_multiple_certificates
.gif
8,985
saving_keys_and_certificates_screen_p7c_file.gif 10,049
saving_keys_and_certs_collect.gif 5,866
saving_keys_and_certs_key1.gif 13,655
saving_keys_and_certs_key2.gif 13,794
saving_keys_and_certs_key2_diff_file.gif 13,750
saving_keys_and_certs_recover.gif 13,538
search_criteria_page_authorize.gif 10,585
search_criteria_page_ch_cert_status.gif 10,768
search_criteria_page_collect.gif 9,888
search_criteria_page_collect_keys.gif 9,865
search_criteria_page_recover.gif 9,394
search_criteria_page_revoke.gif 3,743
search_criteria_page_status.gif 3,781
select_certificate_screen_collect.gif 10,793
select_certificate_screen_collect_key.gif 5,324
select_certificate_screen_recover.gif 7,800
select_certificate_screen_status.gif 9,233
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
select_registration_policy_page.gif 9,686
select_request_page2.gif 7,335
select_request_page3.gif 5,474
select_request_page4.gif 5,456
select_request_status.gif 5,436
smartcard2_ro_screen.gif 7,460
smartcard2_screen.gif 10,225
smartcard3_ro_screen.gif 6,783
smartcard3_screen.gif 6,973
smartcard4_ro_screen.gif 7,305
smartcard4_screen.gif 7,391
status.gif 6,738
warn.gif 1,171
welcome_rro.gif 9,985
Files in D:\docs\webrao\wwhdata\common
context.js 72
files.js 9,395
popups.js 38
title.js 70
topics.js 67
towwhdir.js 54
wwhpagef.js 4,505
Files in D:\docs\webrao\wwhdata\java
files.xml 17,133
ix.xml 36,204
search.xml 84,686
toc.xml 11,499
Files in D:\docs\webrao\wwhdata\js
index.js 23,203
search.js 1,687
toc.js 8,618
Files in D:\docs\webrao\wwhdata\js\search
search0.js 16,155
search1.js 16,162
search2.js 16,131
search3.js 16,112
search4.js 16,146
search5.js 12,308
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp
books.xml 698
messages.xml 31,996
settings.xml 3,918
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\images
altclose.gif 156
altopen.gif 173
caution.gif 1,533
info.gif 1,155
warn.gif 1,171
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl
version.htm 868
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\common\html
blank.htm 336
bookmark.htm 339
catalog.css 16,757
content.htm 1,258
controll.htm 1,413
controlr.htm 1,454
default.htm 4,539
document.css 561
document.htm 1,056
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
init0.htm 935
init1.htm 1,400
init2.htm 1,098
init3.htm 935
pagenav.htm 1,338
switch.htm 1,379
title.htm 1,138
wwhelp.htm 3,620
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\common\images
bkmark.gif 250
bkmarkx.gif 99
close.gif 214
divider.gif 46
divider2.gif 46
doc.gif 150
email.gif 289
emailx.gif 93
fc.gif 235
fo.gif 174
frameset.gif 234
home.gif 287
logo.jpg 4,851
logocolor.gif 58
next.gif 248
nextx.gif 76
prev.gif 252
prevx.gif 76
print.gif 313
printx.gif 94
related.gif 440
relatedi.gif 95
relatedx.gif 95
spacer4.gif 51
spc1w2h.gif 43
spc1w7h.gif 44
spc2w1h.gif 43
spc5w1h.gif 43
sync.gif 270
syncx.gif 86
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\common\private
books.js 812
locale.js 12,224
options.js 1,594
popupf.js 3,024
title.js 162
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\common\scripts
bklist1s.js 422
bookgrps.js 5,006
booklist.js 7,909
browseri.js 3,482
controls.js 12,842
documt1s.js 190
filelist.js 1,710
handler.js 774
help.js 19,082
highlt.js 5,677
pophash.js 1,456
popup.js 12,897
related.js 13,393
strutils.js 12,383
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size
(bytes)
switch.js 5,187
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\java\html
ie60win.htm 2,721
iemac.htm 1,820
iewindow.htm 2,296
netscape.htm 2,238
nosecie.htm 2,097
nosecie6.htm 2,522
nosecns.htm 2,237
wwhelp.htm 4,198
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\java\private
books.xml 776
locale.js 2,690
locale.xml 22,045
options.js 146
options.xml 1,085
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\java\scripts
handler.js 905
java.js 5,431
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\js\html
indexsel.htm 1,167
navigate.htm 1,353
panel.htm 1,568
panelini.htm 1,127
tabs.htm 1,149
wwhelp.htm 4,599
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\js\images
tabsbg.gif 45
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\js\private
locale.js 13,715
options.js 2,696
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\js\scripts
handler.js 475
index.js 44,486
index1s.js 171
javascpt.js 4,355
outlfast.js 6,502
outlin1s.js 167
outline.js 23,298
outlsafe.js 5,483
panels.js 6,663
search.js 33,500
search1s.js 341
search2s.js 147
search3s.js 142
search4s.js 142
tabs.js 3,713
Table A-1 – UniCERT Core v5.2.1 Documentation Files for Windows
A.2 UniCERT WebRAO Client v5.2.1 for Windows
Filename File size (bytes)
Files in D:\docs
webraoindex.htm 955
webraoreadme.html 6,913
wwhelp3.cab 120,586
wwhelp3.jar 192,132
Files in D:\docs\users
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size (bytes)
about.html 3,392
about10.html 7,146
about11.html 3,492
about12.html 3,437
about2.html 3,287
about3.html 3,809
about4.html 4,186
about5.html 3,949
about6.html 3,636
about7.html 4,148
about8.html 3,192
about9.html 4,236
appendix_identrus.html 2,864
appendix_identrus10.html 5,765
appendix_identrus2.html 3,033
appendix_identrus3.html 6,745
appendix_identrus4.html 7,642
appendix_identrus5.html 3,375
appendix_identrus6.html 5,396
appendix_identrus7.html 5,025
appendix_identrus8.html 4,931
appendix_identrus9.html 10,632
appendix_passphrase.html 3,125
appendixb.html 3,075
appendixb2.html 5,067
appendixb3.html 4,160
appendixc.html 6,682
authorizingrequests.html 3,948
authorizingrequests2.html 12,326
authorizingrequests3.html 10,790
authorizingrequests4.html 10,388
catalog.css 16,757
collecting.html 3,340
collecting10.html 8,648
collecting2.html 3,338
collecting3.html 5,733
collecting4.html 5,702
collecting5.html 6,882
collecting6.html 10,322
collecting7.html 5,730
collecting8.html 5,898
collecting9.html 5,259
copyright.html 5,363
document.css 561
facetoface.html 4,480
facetoface10.html 7,829
facetoface11.html 3,586
facetoface12.html 4,086
facetoface13.html 8,862
facetoface14.html 4,202
facetoface15.html 3,547
facetoface16.html 4,097
facetoface17.html 3,875
facetoface18.html 8,449
facetoface19.html 4,945
facetoface2.html 3,402
facetoface20.html 5,045
facetoface21.html 4,264
facetoface22.html 4,318
facetoface23.html 7,874
facetoface24.html 4,106
facetoface25.html 4,259
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size (bytes)
facetoface26.html 7,244
facetoface27.html 4,607
facetoface28.html 5,296
facetoface29.html 3,922
facetoface3.html 7,832
facetoface30.html 3,889
facetoface31.html 8,703
facetoface32.html 5,301
facetoface33.html 4,717
facetoface34.html 4,640
facetoface35.html 5,285
facetoface36.html 4,123
facetoface37.html 3,860
facetoface38.html 4,237
facetoface39.html 6,054
facetoface4.html 3,717
facetoface5.html 5,060
facetoface6.html 5,270
facetoface7.html 4,269
facetoface8.html 4,000
facetoface9.html 4,266
gettingstarted.html 3,700
gettingstarted2.html 4,260
gettingstarted3.html 12,313
gettingstarted4.html 11,240
gettingstarted5.html 3,639
gettingstarted6.html 3,992
installing.html 4,675
installing10.html 4,243
installing11.html 6,820
installing12.html 3,486
installing13.html 4,996
installing14.html 6,201
installing15.html 5,203
installing2.html 4,200
installing3.html 3,790
installing4.html 3,729
installing5.html 5,580
installing6.html 3,115
installing7.html 5,180
installing8.html 6,018
installing9.html 3,795
introduction.html 3,324
introduction2.html 3,659
introduction3.html 4,252
introduction4.html 5,155
introduction5.html 6,394
introduction6.html 3,489
introduction7.html 3,097
introduction8.html 3,138
introduction9.html 4,143
keepingyoursystemsecure.html 3,932
keepingyoursystemsecure2.html 4,386
keepingyoursystemsecure3.html 4,022
keepingyoursystemsecure4.html 3,090
keepingyoursystemsecure5.html 4,889
keepingyoursystemsecure6.html 3,485
recover.html 2,944
recover2.html 3,268
recover3.html 10,521
recover4.html 3,201
suspendingandrevoking.html 3,895
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size (bytes)
suspendingandrevoking2.html 8,438
suspendingandrevoking3.html 6,358
suspendingandrevoking4.html 3,412
suspendingandrevoking5.html 9,254
suspendingandrevoking6.html 6,520
suspendingandrevoking7.html 5,733
troubleshooting.html 3,817
troubleshooting2.html 3,430
troubleshooting3.html 4,642
troubleshooting4.html 11,919
troubleshooting5.html 3,818
troubleshooting6.html 5,018
troubleshooting7.html 4,195
troubleshooting8.html 3,788
troubleshooting9.html 3,231
webraoguide.pdf 1,811,916
webraoguideIX.xml 36,204
webraoguideTOC.xml 11,499
Files in D:\docs\users\images
appendix_identrusa.gif 46,643
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
cert_req_dual_ke_PKCS11.gif 11,409
cert_req_dual_key.gif 11,132
cert_request_sub_authorize.gif 2,466
cert_request_sub_authorize2.gif 2,047
cert_status.gif 5,601
certificate_request_page.gif 8,140
certificate_request_page_PKCS11.gif 8,680
certificate_request_page_import.gif 8,709
certificate_request_recover.gif 5,529
certificate_request_submitted_page.gif 7,457
certificate_request_submitted_page_PKCS11.gif 2,485
certificate_request_submitted_page_authorize.gif 8,683
certificate_request_submitted_page_import.gif 2,523
collect_rro.gif 6,165
export_certificate_screen2.gif 10,022
export_certificate_screen_key1.gif 10,063
facetofacea26.gif 11,888
friendly_name2.gif 7,864
import_certificate_request_page.gif 2,339
import_certificate_request_screen.gif 10,298
info.gif 1,155
install.gif 64,385
key_recov_submitted.gif 2,477
key_recov_submitted_auth.gif 2,537
login_page.gif 6,084
logo.gif 2,524
menu_krowrao.gif 4,446
multi_cert_friendly.gif 9,877
pkcs12_options.gif 15,729
random_data_screen.gif 9,204
recov_key.gif 8,441
recov_key_auth.gif 8,550
recov_request2.gif 6,862
recovery_reasons.gif 2,262
registration_officer_logon_screen.gif 8,347
registration_officer_logon_screen_pkcs11.gif 8,080
request_details.gif 6,017
revocation_dropdown.gif 2,477
revoke_cert_revoke.gif 9,142
revoke_certificate_page.gif 9,504
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
revoke_certificate_page_suspend.gif 8,825
revoke_certificate_page_unsuspend.gif 10,072
save_cert_p12_drop-down.gif 3,629
save_certificate_page_import.gif 5,811
save_certificate_page_multiple.gif 10,305
save_certificate_page_multiple_PKCS11.gif 15,606
save_certificate_page_p12.gif 11,978
save_certificate_page_pem.gif 12,137
save_certificate_page_smartcard3.gif 8,402
save_key_cert.gif 5,900
saving_keys_and_certificates_screen.gif 13,379
saving_keys_and_certificates_screen_multiple_certificates.gif 8,985
saving_keys_and_certificates_screen_p7c_file.gif 10,049
saving_keys_and_certs_collect.gif 5,866
saving_keys_and_certs_key1.gif 13,655
saving_keys_and_certs_key2.gif 13,794
saving_keys_and_certs_key2_diff_file.gif 13,750
saving_keys_and_certs_recover.gif 13,538
search_criteria_page_authorize.gif 10,585
search_criteria_page_ch_cert_status.gif 10,768
search_criteria_page_collect.gif 9,888
search_criteria_page_collect_keys.gif 9,865
search_criteria_page_recover.gif 9,394
search_criteria_page_revoke.gif 3,743
search_criteria_page_status.gif 3,781
select_certificate_screen_collect.gif 10,793
select_certificate_screen_collect_key.gif 5,324
select_certificate_screen_recover.gif 7,800
select_certificate_screen_status.gif 9,233
select_registration_policy_page.gif 9,686
select_request_page2.gif 7,335
select_request_page3.gif 5,474
select_request_page4.gif 5,456
select_request_status.gif 5,436
smartcard2_ro_screen.gif 7,460
smartcard2_screen.gif 10,225
smartcard3_ro_screen.gif 6,783
smartcard3_screen.gif 6,973
smartcard4_ro_screen.gif 7,305
smartcard4_screen.gif 7,391
status.gif 6,738
warn.gif 1,171
welcome_rro.gif 9,985
Files in D:\docs\users\wwhdata\common
context.js 72
files.js 9,328
popups.js 38
title.js 70
topics.js 67
towwhdir.js 54
wwhpagef.js 4,505
Files in D:\docs\users\wwhdata\java
files.xml 17,045
ix.xml 36,204
search.xml 84,207
toc.xml 11,499
Files in D:\docs\users\wwhdata\js
index.js 23,203
search.js 1,687
toc.js 8,618
Files in D:\docs\users\wwhdata\js\search
search0.js 16,142
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size (bytes)
search1.js 16,152
search2.js 16,151
search3.js 16,125
search4.js 16,149
search5.js 11,781
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp
books.xml 246
messages.xml 31,996
settings.xml 3,918
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\images
altclose.gif 156
altopen.gif 173
caution.gif 1,533
info.gif 1,155
warn.gif 1,171
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl
version.htm 868
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\common\html
blank.htm 336
bookmark.htm 339
catalog.css 16,757
content.htm 1,258
controll.htm 1,413
controlr.htm 1,454
default.htm 4,602
document.css 561
document.htm 1,056
init0.htm 935
init1.htm 1,400
init2.htm 1,098
init3.htm 935
pagenav.htm 1,338
switch.htm 1,379
title.htm 1,138
wwhelp.htm 3,620
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\common\images
bkmark.gif 250
bkmarkx.gif 99
close.gif 214
divider.gif 46
divider2.gif 46
doc.gif 150
email.gif 289
emailx.gif 93
fc.gif 235
fo.gif 174
frameset.gif 234
home.gif 287
logo.jpg 4,851
next.gif 248
nextx.gif 76
prev.gif 252
prevx.gif 76
print.gif 313
printx.gif 94
related.gif 440
relatedi.gif 95
relatedx.gif 95
spacer4.gif 51
spc1w2h.gif 43
spc1w7h.gif 44
spc2w1h.gif 43
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
spc5w1h.gif 43
sync.gif 270
syncx.gif 86
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\common\private
books.js 318
locale.js 12,224
options.js 1,589
popupf.js 3,024
title.js 158
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\common\scripts
bklist1s.js 422
bookgrps.js 5,006
booklist.js 7,909
browseri.js 3,482
controls.js 12,842
documt1s.js 190
filelist.js 1,710
handler.js 774
help.js 19,082
highlt.js 5,677
pophash.js 1,456
popup.js 12,897
related.js 13,393
strutils.js 12,383
switch.js 5,187
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\java\html
ie60win.htm 2,721
iemac.htm 1,820
iewindow.htm 2,296
netscape.htm 2,238
nosecie.htm 2,097
nosecie6.htm 2,522
nosecns.htm 2,237
wwhelp.htm 4,198
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\java\private
books.xml 234
locale.js 2,690
locale.xml 22,045
options.js 146
options.xml 1,085
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\java\scripts
handler.js 905
java.js 5,431
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\js\html
indexsel.htm 1,167
navigate.htm 1,353
panel.htm 1,568
panelini.htm 1,127
tabs.htm 1,149
wwhelp.htm 4,599
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\js\images
tabsbg.gif 45
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\js\private
locale.js 13,715
options.js 2,696
Files in D:\docs\wwhelp\wwhimpl\js\scripts
handler.js 475
index.js 44,486
index1s.js 171
javascpt.js 4,355
outlfast.js 6,502
outlin1s.js 167
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 227
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
outline.js 23,298
outlsafe.js 5,483
panels.js 6,663
search.js 33,500
search1s.js 341
search2s.js 147
search3s.js 142
search4s.js 142
tabs.js 3,713
Table A-2 – UniCERT WebRAO Client v5.2.1 Documentation Files for
Windows
A.3 UniCERT Core v5.2.1 for Solaris
Filename File size (bytes)
Files in /docs
index.htm 920
readme.html 38,513
thirdpartylicense.txt 9,615
wwhelp3.cab 120,586
wwhelp3.jar 192,132
Files in /docs/admin
admin.pdf 1,297,569
adminIX.xml 25,120
adminTOC.xml 5,398
catalog.css 15,962
dbw.html 3,298
dbw2.html 4,271
dbw3.html 10,784
dbw4.html 5,058
dbw5.html 8,859
dbw6.html 8,249
dbw7.html 9,276
dbw8.html 5,555
dbw9.html 5,361
document.css 534
introducing.html 3,533
introducing2.html 3,422
introducing3.html 14,658
keymgr.html 3,566
keymgr2.html 5,356
keymgr3.html 4,013
keymgr4.html 5,661
keymgr5.html 4,057
ralog.html 5,827
ralog10.html 7,418
ralog11.html 4,064
ralog12.html 4,009
ralog13.html 3,296
ralog14.html 3,650
ralog15.html 4,256
ralog2.html 6,025
ralog3.html 3,083
ralog4.html 2,810
ralog5.html 16,730
ralog6.html 3,240
ralog7.html 3,306
ralog8.html 3,263
ralog9.html 5,092
servicestr.html 5,315
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
servicestr10.html 3,833
servicestr11.html 2,952
servicestr2.html 4,614
servicestr3.html 10,512
servicestr4.html 4,258
servicestr5.html 3,270
servicestr6.html 2,380
servicestr7.html 4,377
servicestr8.html 4,807
servicestr9.html 4,320
tokenmgr.html 4,527
tokenmgr10.html 4,704
tokenmgr11.html 5,529
tokenmgr12.html 3,855
tokenmgr13.html 3,953
tokenmgr14.html 6,230
tokenmgr15.html 4,193
tokenmgr16.html 4,713
tokenmgr17.html 4,205
tokenmgr18.html 3,745
tokenmgr19.html 4,471
tokenmgr2.html 5,384
tokenmgr20.html 4,275
tokenmgr21.html 3,577
tokenmgr22.html 3,034
tokenmgr23.html 3,949
tokenmgr24.html 3,019
tokenmgr25.html 2,809
tokenmgr26.html 2,918
tokenmgr27.html 3,754
tokenmgr28.html 2,980
tokenmgr3.html 4,811
tokenmgr4.html 3,930
tokenmgr5.html 4,526
tokenmgr6.html 3,999
tokenmgr7.html 8,760
tokenmgr8.html 6,448
tokenmgr9.html 5,480
Files in /docs/admin/images
ab.gif 881
auditarchive.gif 7,201
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
dbw_1Logon.gif 8,097
dbw_2dbw.gif 11,087
dbw_APM1.gif 7,210
dbw_APM2.gif 13,373
dbw_APM3.gif 14,661
dbw_CA2.gif 13,104
dbw_CAO2.gif 13,751
dbw_UpPass1.gif 13,265
dbw_button_RefreshList.gif 1,567
dbw_button_create.gif 1,614
dbw_button_delete.gif 1,627
dbw_button_lock.gif 1,662
dbw_ca1.gif 6,976
dbw_ca3.gif 14,075
dbw_cao1.gif 7,270
delete.gif 862
filteringlog.gif 3,805
filteringlog2.gif 4,062
iconconfigure.gif 910
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
info.gif 1,155
keygen_01.gif 37,653
keygen_05.gif 34,323
keygen_06.gif 35,763
keygen_07.gif 7,785
logo.gif 2,524
new.gif 877
newquery2.gif 2,583
querylog.gif 5,189
querylog2.gif 13,626
querylogeg.gif 4,649
querylogview.gif 11,038
rev_dblogon.gif 11,230
rev_logresult.gif 14,726
rev_mainscr.gif 10,196
rev_open.gif 13,528
rev_pseopen.gif 4,227
warn.gif 1,171
Files in /docs/admin/wwhdata/common
context.js 70
files.js 4,212
popups.js 35
title.js 68
topics.js 62
towwhdir.js 50
wwhpagef.js 4,299
Files in /docs/admin/wwhdata/java
files.xml 10,458
ix.xml 25,120
search.xml 46,367
toc.xml 5,398
Files in /docs/admin/wwhdata/js
index.js 18,719
search.js 1,575
toc.js 4,243
Files in /docs/admin/wwhdata/js/search
search0.js 15,797
search1.js 15,799
search2.js 15,830
search3.js 4,725
Files in /docs/config
CRLs.html 3,656
CRLs2.html 3,839
CRLs3.html 5,106
app_whcustom.html 3,703
app_whcustom10.html 4,630
app_whcustom11.html 4,230
app_whcustom12.html 2,844
app_whcustom13.html 4,363
app_whcustom14.html 8,016
app_whcustom15.html 4,615
app_whcustom2.html 4,033
app_whcustom3.html 4,622
app_whcustom4.html 7,103
app_whcustom5.html 5,435
app_whcustom6.html 5,532
app_whcustom7.html 7,237
app_whcustom8.html 9,690
app_whcustom9.html 11,712
appendixa.html 27,583
arm.html 3,736
arm10.html 3,470
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 230
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
arm11.html 4,038
arm12.html 5,057
arm13.html 3,342
arm2.html 4,304
arm3.html 3,145
arm4.html 3,181
arm5.html 3,467
arm6.html 3,660
arm7.html 3,234
arm8.html 3,458
arm9.html 3,827
ca.html 7,733
ca10.html 3,838
ca11.html 4,787
ca12.html 3,298
ca13.html 8,716
ca14.html 2,879
ca15.html 3,716
ca16.html 3,705
ca17.html 3,306
ca18.html 3,675
ca19.html 3,569
ca2.html 4,391
ca20.html 5,867
ca21.html 3,863
ca22.html 3,444
ca23.html 4,207
ca24.html 2,988
ca25.html 3,597
ca3.html 3,908
ca4.html 3,765
ca5.html 4,382
ca6.html 5,674
ca7.html 4,408
ca8.html 4,754
ca9.html 3,692
cao.html 3,258
cao.pdf 4,622,060
cao2.html 7,359
cao3.html 3,160
cao4.html 3,836
cao5.html 2,934
cao6.html 3,251
caoIX.xml 86,248
caoTOC.xml 23,509
catalog.css 15,962
certificates.html 4,571
certificates10.html 4,263
certificates11.html 3,315
certificates12.html 4,071
certificates13.html 4,611
certificates14.html 6,179
certificates15.html 4,912
certificates16.html 7,742
certificates2.html 3,965
certificates3.html 14,091
certificates4.html 5,624
certificates5.html 3,021
certificates6.html 2,888
certificates7.html 3,615
certificates8.html 4,006
certificates9.html 4,434
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
clone.html 5,048
clone2.html 2,791
clone3.html 4,096
clone4.html 3,373
clone5.html 3,731
crosscert.html 6,093
crosscert2.html 4,142
crosscert3.html 4,297
css.html 4,543
css2.html 4,370
css3.html 3,385
definingrps.html 4,058
definingrps10.html 5,163
definingrps11.html 4,713
definingrps12.html 4,804
definingrps13.html 6,264
definingrps14.html 6,339
definingrps15.html 4,492
definingrps16.html 5,459
definingrps17.html 4,345
definingrps18.html 3,726
definingrps19.html 5,955
definingrps2.html 3,519
definingrps20.html 9,448
definingrps21.html 4,124
definingrps22.html 5,041
definingrps23.html 5,645
definingrps24.html 4,364
definingrps25.html 15,320
definingrps26.html 5,119
definingrps27.html 4,122
definingrps28.html 4,434
definingrps29.html 4,233
definingrps3.html 5,782
definingrps30.html 4,765
definingrps31.html 3,907
definingrps32.html 3,020
definingrps33.html 3,682
definingrps34.html 5,452
definingrps35.html 3,256
definingrps36.html 3,462
definingrps37.html 2,859
definingrps38.html 6,712
definingrps39.html 4,392
definingrps4.html 2,972
definingrps40.html 3,973
definingrps41.html 2,924
definingrps42.html 5,045
definingrps43.html 3,670
definingrps44.html 3,929
definingrps45.html 3,167
definingrps46.html 3,629
definingrps47.html 3,926
definingrps48.html 3,179
definingrps49.html 4,657
definingrps5.html 5,767
definingrps50.html 4,168
definingrps51.html 3,144
definingrps6.html 3,803
definingrps7.html 4,595
definingrps8.html 4,452
definingrps9.html 3,350
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
document.css 534
introduction.html 5,467
introduction2.html 6,675
introduction3.html 6,275
introduction4.html 3,635
kao.html 4,957
kao2.html 5,031
kao3.html 4,610
kao4.html 3,267
kao5.html 3,772
kas.html 5,872
kas2.html 3,898
kas3.html 10,017
kas4.html 5,186
kas5.html 4,195
kas6.html 3,494
kas7.html 4,161
logs.html 5,730
logs10.html 2,679
logs11.html 3,310
logs12.html 3,380
logs2.html 17,082
logs3.html 3,082
logs4.html 3,330
logs5.html 2,977
logs6.html 4,987
logs7.html 9,173
logs8.html 4,499
logs9.html 3,341
ph.html 7,388
ph10.html 5,148
ph11.html 7,690
ph12.html 3,907
ph13.html 4,605
ph14.html 3,741
ph15.html 4,623
ph16.html 4,342
ph17.html 3,606
ph18.html 3,856
ph19.html 5,432
ph2.html 3,436
ph20.html 5,762
ph21.html 6,177
ph22.html 5,497
ph23.html 6,675
ph24.html 5,744
ph3.html 2,823
ph4.html 2,718
ph5.html 8,170
ph6.html 4,202
ph7.html 4,290
ph8.html 3,598
ph9.html 10,000
pki.html 5,915
pki2.html 4,780
pki210.html 7,767
pki211.html 3,423
pki22.html 5,451
pki23.html 9,618
pki24.html 7,360
pki25.html 11,062
pki26.html 7,376
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
pki27.html 5,689
pki28.html 7,013
pki29.html 3,636
pki2a.html 3,640
pki3.html 9,087
pki4.html 5,947
pki5.html 8,764
pki6.html 8,886
pki7.html 12,167
pki8.html 3,507
pki9.html 6,147
ra.html 6,633
ra2.html 4,026
ra3.html 4,721
ra4.html 5,722
ra5.html 4,097
ra6.html 3,765
ra7.html 3,507
raa.html 6,464
raa2.html 5,059
raa3.html 2,698
rax.html 3,316
rax2.html 6,102
rax3.html 3,148
rax4.html 3,404
rax5.html 4,141
rax6.html 5,300
rax7.html 6,400
renew.html 6,369
renew10.html 7,999
renew11.html 9,766
renew12.html 4,873
renew13.html 8,827
renew14.html 9,439
renew15.html 4,902
renew16.html 8,937
renew17.html 10,322
renew18.html 9,246
renew19.html 12,463
renew2.html 3,670
renew20.html 7,824
renew21.html 3,923
renew22.html 6,851
renew23.html 16,830
renew24.html 4,876
renew25.html 3,872
renew26.html 3,495
renew27.html 3,911
renew28.html 9,629
renew29.html 6,296
renew3.html 5,142
renew30.html 11,183
renew31.html 4,464
renew4.html 4,692
renew5.html 4,453
renew6.html 6,708
renew7.html 5,778
renew8.html 4,284
renew9.html 3,236
rp.html 4,973
rp10.html 4,744
rp11.html 4,431
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 234
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
rp12.html 3,577
rp13.html 3,957
rp14.html 4,520
rp15.html 3,342
rp16.html 4,166
rp17.html 4,953
rp18.html 4,499
rp2.html 3,486
rp3.html 4,790
rp4.html 6,319
rp5.html 4,325
rp6.html 3,856
rp7.html 10,556
rp8.html 7,077
rp9.html 4,976
subCA.html 3,836
subCA2.html 3,801
subCA3.html 7,287
subCA4.html 4,246
subCA5.html 5,338
tasks.html 8,448
tasks2.html 3,923
tasks3.html 3,613
tasks4.html 3,106
tasks5.html 3,282
tasks6.html 3,135
tasks7.html 3,945
troubleshoot.html 3,814
troubleshoot2.html 2,755
troubleshoot3.html 3,236
troubleshoot4.html 3,428
troubleshoot5.html 2,814
troubleshoot6.html 4,145
troubleshoot7.html 3,612
troubleshoot8.html 3,394
troubleshoot9.html 3,131
webrao.html 3,972
webrao2.html 4,328
webrao3.html 5,035
webrao4.html 3,945
webrao5.html 3,686
webrao6.html 3,210
webrao7.html 3,328
webrao8.html 3,127
wh.html 5,358
wh10.html 3,004
wh11.html 5,875
wh12.html 12,368
wh13.html 6,276
wh14.html 4,391
wh15.html 4,719
wh16.html 6,163
wh2.html 4,954
wh3.html 4,801
wh4.html 3,350
wh5.html 4,836
wh6.html 4,296
wh7.html 3,396
wh8.html 7,505
wh9.html 2,946
Files in /docs/config/images
ab.gif 881
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 235
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
addcdp.gif 5,981
addedcdp.gif 16,098
addentity.gif 5,420
alignspace.gif 6,850
apptype.gif 6,644
armlog.gif 8,853
armsda.gif 8,165
armtuning.gif 6,280
auditarchive.gif 7,201
auditdeletion.gif 35,700
authgroup.gif 3,652
authgrouptab.gif 3,701
bullet.gif 822
cacerts.gif 12,566
cacommunicate.gif 3,975
cacrl.gif 14,582
cadb.gif 2,891
caentityname.gif 12,725
cajob.gif 5,899
camiscellaneous.gif 7,690
caoaccess.gif 13,730
caotune.gif 23,511
caserverparam.gif 10,852
catune.gif 8,675
caution.gif 1,533
cert_request_ee.gif 18,108
certificate.gif 6,791
certificate_request_page.gif 8,991
certificateinstall.gif 9,081
certificatesa15.gif 1,115
certquery.gif 5,272
certtype.gif 2,305
choose.gif 37,081
choosepol.gif 34,026
choosepolicy.gif 26,030
cmpmode.gif 7,981
cmpreg.gif 16,551
cmprp.gif 12,762
cmptrust.gif 3,212
cmptune.gif 9,253
collection.gif 5,845
color.gif 2,834
columns.gif 6,086
combobox.gif 4,612
combobox2.gif 1,402
composequery.gif 13,335
connected.gif 1,166
cq_icon1.gif 157
cq_icon2.gif 166
crlgentime.gif 5,014
crosscerta.gif 8,150
cryptoprofile2.gif 11,045
csstune.gif 22,962
database.gif 3,758
delete.gif 862
deletiondetect.gif 4,819
dnelements.gif 24,623
dnorder.gif 4,034
dnvalue.gif 4,396
dnwindow.gif 4,523
dsapara.gif 4,893
editbox.gif 1,523
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 236
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
email.gif 13,648
emailadd.gif 9,606
emailnotification.gif 13,611
emailpemtags.gif 14,209
emailreg.gif 12,238
emailrp.gif 5,737
emailtemplate.gif 13,769
emailtemplate1.gif 11,187
emailtune.gif 15,086
entitiespki.gif 16,375
entityreq.gif 28,719
exportcrl.gif 7,987
exportcrl2.gif 8,550
filtering.gif 3,722
filtering2.gif 4,019
filteringlog.gif 3,805
filteringlog2.gif 4,062
fingeprint.gif 1,505
fingerprintalg.gif 4,574
form.gif 26,888
generateca.gif 28,249
genkeys.gif 38,427
grouptab.gif 5,348
iconcert.gif 928
iconconfigure.gif 910
iconerror.gif 890
iconrevoke.gif 935
icontask.gif 914
icontask2.gif 882
iddata.gif 13,847
importext.gif 12,420
info.gif 1,155
kaoaccess.gif 9,642
kaotuning.gif 6,092
kastuning.gif 10,891
keystore.gif 12,215
ldapuri.gif 3,364
ldapuriadv.gif 6,860
lisktuning.gif 4,903
lock.gif 940
logcolumns.gif 3,876
logo.gif 2,524
logoptions.gif 6,891
logresult.gif 12,520
logsa.gif 5,947
mainscreen.gif 10,939
mapped.gif 2,220
multkeys.gif 2,980
nested.gif 33,159
new.gif 877
newpolicy.gif 22,704
newquery.gif 5,775
newquery2.gif 2,583
newtemplate.gif 2,990
openpki.gif 4,571
openpki1.gif 5,650
pkia.gif 4,143
policyinfo.gif 21,255
policylife.gif 18,149
policymap.gif 14,351
policyscope.gif 3,987
policytab.gif 12,986
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 237
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
policytab1.gif 5,388
pselocate.gif 9,448
publication.gif 10,509
querylog.gif 5,189
querylog2.gif 13,626
querylogeg.gif 4,649
querylogview.gif 11,038
queryresult.gif 9,091
raaaccess.gif 7,961
ratasks.gif 22,092
ratune.gif 23,802
rax2eh.gif 8,853
rax2scepcmp.gif 11,440
rax2webrao.gif 21,115
rax2wh.gif 8,220
raxaccess.gif 18,259
raxaccess2.gif 18,597
raxtune.gif 13,216
received.gif 35,763
remote.gif 5,595
remove.gif 5,381
renewalrules.gif 5,323
renewcomplete.gif 10,922
renewcomplete2.gif 33,136
renewcomplete3.gif 11,105
renewcompletekeygen.gif 53,365
renewdecisions.gif 59,915
reneweditpolicy.gif 31,245
renewencrypt.gif 32,916
renewexport.gif 32,694
renewmulticert.gif 46,059
renewpkientity.gif 33,735
renewpolicy.gif 33,050
renewpse.gif 11,000
renewrootca1.gif 33,397
renewrootreuse.gif 33,121
renewsubCAdetails.gif 33,397
renewsubatroot1.gif 32,280
renewsubcaexport.gif 32,910
renewsubcaexport2.gif 32,753
renewsubcagrayout.gif 32,974
renewsubcaimport.gif 31,614
renewsubcapolicy.gif 33,555
renewsubcomplete.gif 10,978
renewsubkeygen.gif 5,900
renewsubmit.gif 33,097
renewsubp10.gif 9,415
renewsubreuse.gif 45,499
renewsubreuse2.gif 46,807
request.gif 21,847
requestnotify.gif 3,978
requestsum.gif 21,824
retire.gif 891
retire_unpub.gif 117
retirecdp.gif 3,531
retiregroup.gif 4,544
revoke.gif 5,715
revokentity.gif 5,546
rootcert.gif 7,177
rpproperties1.gif 9,313
rpproperties2.gif 12,204
rpproperties3.gif 10,472
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 238
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
rpproperties4.gif 9,500
rpproperties6.gif 10,782
rpproperties7.gif 11,437
ruleeg.gif 4,884
scep.gif 7,997
scepreg.gif 9,867
sceprp.gif 13,176
sceptune.gif 25,194
search_criteria_ee.gif 2,843
staticlist.gif 7,162
subca2.gif 34,309
subca3.gif 34,039
subca4.gif 28,052
submit.gif 35,171
suspend.gif 5,668
taborder.gif 3,592
tasksa.gif 17,832
tick.gif 882
titleurl.gif 1,201
unassigned.gif 915
unassigned2.gif 930
unsuspend.gif 5,838
viewevent.gif 5,749
warn.gif 1,171
Files in /docs/config/wwhdata/common
context.js 68
files.js 18,244
popups.js 35
title.js 66
topics.js 62
towwhdir.js 50
wwhpagef.js 4,299
Files in /docs/config/wwhdata/java
files.xml 29,799
ix.xml 86,248
search.xml 191,535
toc.xml 23,509
Files in /docs/config/wwhdata/js
index.js 64,630
search.js 1,576
toc.js 18,978
Files in /docs/config/wwhdata/js/search
search0.js 15,879
search1.js 15,900
search10.js 15,953
search11.js 15,504
search12.js 15,949
search13.js 1,055
search2.js 15,913
search3.js 15,900
search4.js 15,856
search5.js 15,938
search6.js 15,950
search7.js 15,857
search8.js 15,759
search9.js 15,216
Files in /docs/dbadmin
catalog.css 15,962
dba_1b_changes.html 4,207
dba_1b_changes2.html 3,565
dba_1b_changes3.html 3,952
dba_1b_changes4.html 2,901
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 239
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
dba_1b_changes5.html 3,727
dba_1intro.html 2,818
dba_1intro2.html 6,089
dba_1intro3.html 4,536
dba_2ainstalloraclewindows.html 3,267
dba_2ainstalloraclewindows2.html 4,619
dba_2ainstalloraclewindows3.html 3,624
dba_2ainstalloraclewindows4.html 10,595
dba_2ainstalloraclewindows5.html 3,718
dba_2ainstalloraclewindows6.html 7,227
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris.html 3,266
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris2.html 4,619
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris3.html 3,399
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris4.html 8,983
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris5.html 9,981
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris6.html 3,718
dba_2binstalloraclesolaris7.html 7,297
dba_3acreate_dbwindows.html 3,747
dba_3acreate_dbwindows2.html 4,448
dba_3acreate_dbwindows3.html 18,627
dba_3acreate_dbwindows4.html 4,244
dba_3acreate_dbwindows5.html 6,227
dba_3bcreate_dbsolaris.html 3,470
dba_3bcreate_dbsolaris2.html 4,295
dba_3bcreate_dbsolaris3.html 18,617
dba_3bcreate_dbsolaris4.html 4,177
dba_4arunningoracle_windows.html 3,220
dba_4arunningoracle_windows2.html 6,087
dba_4arunningoracle_windows3.html 3,538
dba_4arunningoracle_windows4.html 4,178
dba_4arunningoracle_windows5.html 8,568
dba_4arunningoracle_windows6.html 5,249
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris.html 3,221
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris2.html 4,331
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris3.html 6,636
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris4.html 5,351
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris5.html 4,059
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris6.html 5,466
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris7.html 3,067
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris8.html 3,061
dba_4brunningoracle_solaris9.html 4,280
dba_5amorelisteners_windows.html 2,723
dba_5amorelisteners_windows2.html 7,660
dba_5bmorelisteners_solaris.html 2,725
dba_5bmorelisteners_solaris2.html 7,932
dba_6amorealiases_windows.html 3,200
dba_6amorealiases_windows2.html 8,997
dba_6bmorealiases_solaris.html 3,201
dba_6bmorealiases_solaris2.html 8,926
dba_7ahomeselector_windows.html 4,873
dba_8adbtranstion_windows.html 2,907
dba_8adbtranstion_windows2.html 4,180
dba_8adbtranstion_windows3.html 8,358
dba_8adbtranstion_windows4.html 8,031
dba_8bdbtranstion_solaris.html 2,904
dba_8bdbtranstion_solaris2.html 3,983
dba_8bdbtranstion_solaris3.html 8,782
dba_8bdbtranstion_solaris4.html 7,845
dba_appauto.html 2,952
dba_appauto2.html 2,485
dba_appauto3.html 3,721
dba_appauto4.html 7,299
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 240
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
dba_appbackup.html 3,158
dba_appbackup2.html 3,335
dba_appbackup3.html 3,492
dba_appbackup4.html 3,264
dba_appbackup5.html 3,212
dba_appbackup6.html 6,651
dba_appbackup7.html 4,877
dba_appbackup8.html 3,354
dba_appdbastudio_solaris.html 4,187
dba_appdbastudio_solaris2.html 3,430
dba_appdbastudio_solaris3.html 5,683
dba_appdbastudio_solaris4.html 3,444
dba_appdbastudio_windows.html 4,187
dba_appdbastudio_windows2.html 3,434
dba_appdbastudio_windows3.html 5,567
dba_appdbastudio_windows4.html 3,450
dba_appdelete.html 3,404
dba_appdelete2.html 4,124
dba_appdelete3.html 8,115
dba_apporadir.html 3,536
dba_apporadir2.html 3,009
dba_apporadir3.html 3,598
dba_apporadir4.html 4,380
dba_apporadir5.html 3,517
dba_apporadir6.html 3,262
dbadminguide.pdf 2,338,682
dbadminguideIX.xml 24,243
dbadminguideTOC.xml 8,235
document.css 534
Files in /docs/dbadmin/images
099.summary.gif 33,520
099.summary_sol.gif 29,055
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
db_config_ora_services.gif 15,241
db_upgrade_backup6_solaris.gif 39,047
db_upgrade_backup6_windows.gif 39,029
db_upgrade_database2.gif 42,242
db_upgrade_database2_sol.gif 42,266
db_upgrade_export_summary7_sol.gif 15,253
db_upgrade_export_summary7_wind.gif 15,060
db_upgrade_progress8.gif 42,122
db_upgrade_results9_sol.gif 21,658
db_upgrade_results9_win.gif 21,498
db_upgrade_rollback_issue4.gif 7,465
db_upgrade_temp.gif 5,579
db_upgrade_welcome1.gif 48,954
dbconfig92_archive_all_init_param.gif 11,201
dbconfig92_create_options.gif 7,315
dbconfig92_create_options_sol.gif 7,322
dbconfig92_db_storage_logs_gen.gif 13,815
dbconfig92_db_storage_logs_gen_sol.gif 13,828
dbconfig92_dbfeatures6.gif 6,212
dbconfig92_dbident4.gif 4,162
dbconfig92_dbtemplates3.gif 5,403
dbconfig92_init_param_archive.gif 9,428
dbconfig92_init_param_archive_sol.gif 9,486
dbconfig92_init_param_charset.gif 6,631
dbconfig92_init_param_dbsize.gif 5,549
dbconfig92_init_param_fileloc.gif 10,269
dbconfig92_init_param_fileloc_sol.gif 11,361
dbconfig92_initparam_mem9.gif 9,301
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 241
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
dbconfig92_messagefeatures7.gif 4,532
dbconfig92db_conoptions8.gif 5,830
dbconfig_passwords.gif 9,319
dbconfig_passwords_sol.gif 9,371
dbconfig_progress.gif 30,703
dbconfig_summary_92.gif 17,116
dbconfig_summary_92_sol.gif 17,121
delete_user.gif 28,698
home_selector1.gif 20,583
home_selector2.gif 20,594
home_selector3.gif 11,653
home_selector4.gif 7,978
info.gif 1,155
install92_avail_prod4.gif 79,097
install92_db_config7.gif 77,824
install92_file_loc3_sol.gif 78,552
install92_file_loc3_win.gif 77,135
install92_install_types4.gif 80,408
install92_install_types4_sol.gif 41,920
install92_mts8.gif 75,523
install92_progress10.gif 93,207
install92_rootsh_command_sol.gif 5,622
install92_rootsh_sol.gif 3,538
install_name.gif 2,059
logo.gif 2,524
lstnrctl.gif 9,549
net8asst_tns0008.gif 2,742
net8asst_tns0009.gif 6,212
netmgr_add_list_name.gif 2,216
netmgr_alias_protocol3.gif 8,723
netmgr_alias_protocol_settings4.gif 9,269
netmgr_alias_start1a.gif 15,727
netmgr_alias_test6.gif 10,388
netmgr_alias_test6a.gif 7,863
netmgr_alias_welcome2a.gif 7,739
netmgr_list_loc.gif 10,840
netmgr_lsnr_add_address3.gif 12,355
netmgr_lsnr_add_address3a.gif 8,070
netmgr_lsnr_add_database4.gif 9,492
netmgr_lsnr_add_database4_solaris.gif 9,479
netmgr_lsnr_start1.gif 13,141
oem_add_to_tree5.gif 6,043
oem_adding_uni6.gif 25,153
oem_check_db2.gif 17,055
oem_logged_in4_cropped.gif 21,670
oem_login1.gif 20,154
oem_password_login3.gif 21,010
ora_running.gif 8,150
oracledirectories.gif 4,501
regedit_04_nls_lang.gif 3,038
service_manager.gif 6,998
warn.gif 1,171
Files in D:/docs/dbadmin/wwhdata/common
context.js 79
files.js 6,984
popups.js 35
title.js 77
topics.js 62
towwhdir.js 50
wwhpagef.js 4,299
Files in /docs/dbadmin/wwhdata/java
files.xml 13,668
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 242
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
ix.xml 24,243
search.xml 61,358
toc.xml 8,235
Files in /docs/dbadmin/wwhdata/js
index.js 14,211
search.js 1,575
toc.js 5,500
Files in /docs/dbadmin/wwhdata/js/search
search0.js 15,817
search1.js 15,798
search2.js 15,817
search3.js 15,843
search4.js 5,361
Files in /docs/exts
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app_crlext.html 8,102
app_dn.html 16,806
app_profiles.html 3,956
app_profiles2.html 4,130
app_profiles3.html 5,280
app_profiles4.html 3,721
app_profiles5.html 4,373
app_profiles6.html 5,365
app_profiles7.html 4,751
app_profiles8.html 3,799
catalog.css 15,962
document.css 534
extensions.pdf 1,134,998
extensionsIX.xml 27,777
extensionsTOC.xml 4,659
introx509.html 4,048
introx50910.html 9,578
introx50911.html 6,318
introx5092.html 4,393
introx5093.html 5,622
introx5094.html 6,698
introx5095.html 13,902
introx5096.html 6,136
introx5097.html 4,318
introx5098.html 5,390
introx5099.html 6,186
profile_rp.html 3,491
profile_rp10.html 9,952
profile_rp11.html 26,239
profile_rp2.html 4,470
profile_rp3.html 4,968
profile_rp4.html 4,576
profile_rp5.html 13,463
profile_rp6.html 2,988
profile_rp7.html 3,687
profile_rp8.html 4,263
profile_rp9.html 10,407
set_exts.html 2,933
set_exts10.html 4,552
set_exts11.html 5,544
set_exts12.html 5,535
set_exts13.html 5,624
set_exts14.html 4,631
set_exts15.html 5,120
set_exts16.html 5,250
set_exts17.html 4,014
set_exts18.html 4,690
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 243
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
set_exts19.html 4,928
set_exts2.html 7,742
set_exts20.html 4,266
set_exts21.html 4,524
set_exts22.html 4,275
set_exts23.html 4,379
set_exts24.html 2,484
set_exts25.html 3,712
set_exts26.html 10,321
set_exts27.html 9,433
set_exts28.html 4,101
set_exts29.html 3,427
set_exts3.html 5,113
set_exts30.html 4,317
set_exts31.html 3,781
set_exts32.html 4,022
set_exts33.html 3,308
set_exts4.html 7,805
set_exts5.html 4,109
set_exts6.html 5,244
set_exts7.html 4,756
set_exts8.html 4,209
set_exts9.html 4,370
Files in /docs/exts/images
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
certv3a.gif 54,672
info.gif 1,155
logo.gif 2,524
v2crl.gif 45,662
warn.gif 1,171
Files in /docs/exts/wwhdata/common
context.js 65
files.js 3,579
popups.js 35
title.js 63
topics.js 62
towwhdir.js 50
wwhpagef.js 4,299
Files in /docs/exts/wwhdata/java
files.xml 9,710
ix.xml 27,777
search.xml 54,418
toc.xml 4,659
Files in /docs/exts/wwhdata/js
index.js 19,378
search.js 1,575
toc.js 3,449
Files in /docs/exts/wwhdata/js/search
search0.js 15,754
search1.js 15,766
search2.js 15,788
search3.js 14,339
Files in /docs/index_topics
arrow1.gif 1,022
arrow2.gif 1,282
arrow2big.gif 1,415
arrow3.gif 1,550
catalog.css 15,962
document.css 534
install.html 2,688
managing.html 3,054
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 244
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
planning.html 2,621
remarks.htm 686,920
running.html 3,201
search.html 1,613
testing.html 3,388
unicert1st.html 3,514
Files in /docs/install
aboutdocs.html 4,149
aboutdocs10.html 3,221
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aboutdocs15.html 3,482
aboutdocs16.html 8,390
aboutdocs2.html 4,515
aboutdocs3.html 6,581
aboutdocs4.html 2,918
aboutdocs5.html 2,965
aboutdocs6.html 9,675
aboutdocs7.html 2,941
aboutdocs8.html 2,921
aboutdocs9.html 3,229
catalog.css 15,962
document.css 534
install.pdf 1,364,781
installIX.xml 27,181
installTOC.xml 8,875
instructions.html 5,058
instructions10.html 3,330
instructions11.html 5,039
instructions12.html 4,759
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instructions14.html 3,922
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plandeploy.html 5,082
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plandeploy8.html 3,779
plandeploy9.html 3,225
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 245
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
prereqs.html 3,466
prereqs10.html 3,116
prereqs11.html 2,571
prereqs12.html 2,595
prereqs13.html 3,420
prereqs14.html 6,850
prereqs15.html 3,065
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prereqs2.html 4,608
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prereqs5.html 3,781
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prereqs8.html 3,296
prereqs9.html 2,798
securepki.html 4,744
securepki10.html 5,570
securepki11.html 6,204
securepki12.html 4,787
securepki13.html 3,180
securepki14.html 3,517
securepki15.html 4,251
securepki16.html 3,688
securepki17.html 4,049
securepki18.html 2,552
securepki19.html 2,929
securepki2.html 6,081
securepki20.html 6,860
securepki21.html 2,871
securepki22.html 4,788
securepki23.html 5,332
securepki24.html 5,520
securepki25.html 9,477
securepki3.html 3,418
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securepki5.html 3,210
securepki6.html 2,666
securepki7.html 3,106
securepki8.html 2,745
securepki9.html 3,773
webinstructions.html 4,302
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webinstructions11.html 5,879
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webinstructions15.html 3,812
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webinstructions3.html 3,878
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webinstructions5.html 3,563
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
webinstructions6.html 4,981
webinstructions7.html 3,967
webinstructions8.html 5,986
webinstructions9.html 5,027
Files in /docs/install/images
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
deployVPN2.gif 55,428
deploydemo_unix.gif 13,354
docdiagram.gif 69,368
hostarchitect.gif 41,193
hostca.gif 47,556
info.gif 1,155
init_install.gif 80,923
installxp.gif 31,684
logo.gif 2,524
securepkia.gif 59,063
warn.gif 1,171
webcomps.gif 17,576
Files in /docs/install/wwhdata/common
context.js 67
files.js 6,885
popups.js 35
title.js 65
topics.js 62
towwhdir.js 50
wwhpagef.js 4,299
Files in /docs/install/wwhdata/java
files.xml 14,070
ix.xml 27,181
search.xml 75,128
toc.xml 8,875
Files in /docs/install/wwhdata/js
index.js 19,342
search.js 1,575
toc.js 6,587
Files in /docs/install/wwhdata/js/search
search0.js 15,793
search1.js 15,780
search2.js 15,793
search3.js 15,804
search4.js 15,817
search5.js 5,448
Files in /docs/overview
beginners.html 3,376
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beginners4.html 3,467
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beginners6.html 3,646
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beginners9.html 4,523
catalog.css 15,962
certificates.html 3,002
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 247
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
certificates2.html 3,783
certificates3.html 5,960
certificates4.html 5,461
certificates5.html 4,529
certificates6.html 4,249
certificates7.html 4,002
certreq.html 3,609
certreq2.html 5,999
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certreq4.html 5,092
certreq5.html 5,541
certreq6.html 6,165
document.css 534
glossary.html 64,904
introduction.html 5,222
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introduction9.html 4,043
overview.pdf 1,025,625
overviewIX.xml 22,719
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pki_entities.html 3,598
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pki_entities13.html 3,198
pki_entities14.html 3,408
pki_entities15.html 4,003
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pki_entities17.html 5,053
pki_entities18.html 3,504
pki_entities19.html 2,969
pki_entities2.html 6,402
pki_entities20.html 3,505
pki_entities21.html 5,387
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pki_entities24.html 3,668
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pki_entities28.html 3,734
pki_entities3.html 3,596
pki_entities4.html 3,386
pki_entities5.html 4,180
pki_entities6.html 3,510
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
pki_entities7.html 4,263
pki_entities8.html 3,242
pki_entities9.html 3,837
Files in /docs/overview/images
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
certprocess.gif 37,841
certtemplate.gif 21,953
gui_ex.gif 23,231
info.gif 1,155
laddertrust.gif 14,553
logo.gif 2,524
meetinmiddle.gif 16,070
pkiarch.gif 27,456
warn.gif 1,171
Files in /docs/overview/wwhdata/common
context.js 65
files.js 4,297
popups.js 35
title.js 63
topics.js 62
towwhdir.js 50
wwhpagef.js 4,299
Files in /docs/overview/wwhdata/java
files.xml 10,680
ix.xml 22,719
search.xml 82,119
toc.xml 5,627
Files in /docs/overview/wwhdata/js
index.js 16,058
search.js 1,575
toc.js 4,044
Files in /docs/overview/wwhdata/js/search
search0.js 15,746
search1.js 15,757
search2.js 15,740
search3.js 15,755
search4.js 15,779
search5.js 14,674
Files in /docs/pubadmin
addprofile.html 3,351
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addprofile25.html 3,589
addprofile26.html 3,831
addprofile27.html 8,766
addprofile28.html 3,222
addprofile29.html 6,336
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Filename File size (bytes)
addprofile3.html 3,892
addprofile30.html 3,739
addprofile31.html 2,865
addprofile32.html 2,873
addprofile33.html 9,353
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addprofile37.html 3,156
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addprofile39.html 3,453
addprofile4.html 3,794
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addprofile41.html 3,012
addprofile42.html 3,722
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addprofile51.html 5,203
addprofile52.html 3,749
addprofile53.html 4,742
addprofile54.html 8,214
addprofile55.html 5,061
addprofile56.html 4,389
addprofile57.html 3,628
addprofile58.html 3,245
addprofile59.html 3,253
addprofile6.html 3,780
addprofile60.html 3,774
addprofile61.html 4,164
addprofile62.html 3,637
addprofile63.html 4,388
addprofile64.html 3,858
addprofile65.html 3,041
addprofile66.html 2,771
addprofile67.html 3,324
addprofile68.html 3,306
addprofile69.html 4,200
addprofile7.html 5,487
addprofile70.html 4,277
addprofile71.html 4,515
addprofile8.html 3,817
addprofile9.html 4,549
appx_aipa.html 5,544
appx_ldap.html 3,540
appx_ldap10.html 3,474
appx_ldap11.html 10,452
appx_ldap12.html 6,135
appx_ldap13.html 8,850
appx_ldap14.html 3,561
appx_ldap15.html 4,564
appx_ldap16.html 8,217
appx_ldap17.html 3,461
appx_ldap18.html 3,597
appx_ldap19.html 9,005
appx_ldap2.html 4,919
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Filename File size (bytes)
appx_ldap20.html 3,294
appx_ldap21.html 4,781
appx_ldap22.html 5,610
appx_ldap3.html 3,581
appx_ldap4.html 6,059
appx_ldap5.html 3,507
appx_ldap6.html 7,266
appx_ldap7.html 10,303
appx_ldap8.html 7,023
appx_ldap9.html 3,524
appx_ocsp.html 3,518
appx_ocsp2.html 6,112
appx_ocsp3.html 6,391
appx_trouble.html 3,587
appx_trouble2.html 2,679
appx_trouble3.html 4,040
appx_trouble4.html 13,372
catalog.css 15,962
crosscerts.html 3,424
crosscerts2.html 3,374
crosscerts3.html 5,801
document.css 534
emailtemplates.html 4,021
emailtemplates2.html 5,687
emailtemplates3.html 5,584
intro.html 4,098
intro10.html 3,338
intro11.html 4,390
intro12.html 3,651
intro13.html 3,260
intro14.html 3,209
intro15.html 3,468
intro16.html 3,066
intro17.html 3,280
intro18.html 4,860
intro19.html 5,532
intro2.html 3,913
intro20.html 4,511
intro21.html 4,248
intro22.html 5,332
intro23.html 3,690
intro24.html 6,801
intro25.html 3,512
intro3.html 5,754
intro4.html 6,247
intro5.html 3,868
intro6.html 3,241
intro7.html 3,334
intro8.html 3,436
intro9.html 3,319
ix.xml 41,294
modify.html 3,873
modify2.html 5,327
modify3.html 4,582
modify4.html 4,315
modify5.html 4,737
modify6.html 5,618
modify7.html 4,205
modify8.html 5,353
modify9.html 3,829
preconfig.html 3,775
preconfig2.html 8,191
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size (bytes)
preconfig3.html 4,061
preconfig4.html 5,578
preconfig5.html 7,023
preconfig6.html 6,450
preconfig7.html 4,236
pubad.pdf 1,961,650
sysconfig.html 3,176
sysconfig2.html 4,426
sysconfig3.html 5,121
sysconfig4.html 3,868
sysconfig5.html 3,288
sysconfig6.html 5,459
sysconfig7.html 5,106
sysconfig8.html 3,582
sysconfig9.html 3,573
testing.html 3,379
testing2.html 3,749
testing3.html 3,540
testing4.html 3,479
toc.xml 12,060
Files in /docs/pubadmin/images
apm_cainfo.gif 9,317
apm_casourcepubretries.gif 12,030
apm_config_main.gif 32,385
apm_config_main_completed.gif 19,561
apm_directories.gif 3,475
apm_directoryentryattr.gif 15,350
apm_eecertadd.gif 15,049
apm_eecertmodify.gif 15,118
apm_flowchart.gif 49,937
apm_leafnode.gif 11,634
apm_postingpreferences.gif 14,986
apm_pubfilterconfig.gif 11,556
apm_pubfiltercrls_rip.gif 6,076
apm_pubinstance.gif 5,093
apm_pubnoticesrecords.gif 13,954
apm_sysconfigtab.gif 14,541
apm_upcertfile.gif 5,850
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
connconfigmgr.gif 12,376
dbconnconfig.gif 8,847
dbconnconfig_full.gif 9,308
info.gif 1,155
ldapserverconfigdsam.gif 9,221
logo.gif 2,524
mainmenu.gif 7,644
ocspconfigmgr.gif 30,614
ocspsvrconfig.gif 26,634
pubconfigselect.gif 8,823
pubinstanceunicert.gif 5,075
pubnoticesrecordsdcc.gif 16,932
tsconfigmgr.gif 13,656
tssvrconfig.gif 15,634
warn.gif 1,171
Files in /docs/pubadmin/wwhdata/common
context.js 80
files.js 9,393
popups.js 35
title.js 78
topics.js 1,374
towwhdir.js 50
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Filename File size (bytes)
wwhpagef.js 4,299
Files in /docs/pubadmin/wwhdata/java
files.xml 19,758
ix.xml 41,294
search.xml 87,610
toc.xml 12,060
Files in /docs/pubadmin/wwhdata/js
index.js 30,021
search.js 1,575
toc.js 9,190
Files in /docs/pubadmin/wwhdata/js/search
search0.js 15,842
search1.js 15,831
search2.js 15,837
search3.js 15,850
search4.js 15,864
search5.js 15,895
search6.js 1,252
Files in /docs/relnotes
catalog.css 15,962
copyright.html 5,289
document.css 534
introduction.html 3,670
introduction2.html 2,804
introduction3.html 2,790
introduction4.html 3,264
introduction5.html 3,177
issuesresolved.html 3,236
issuesresolved10.html 2,559
issuesresolved11.html 2,410
issuesresolved12.html 2,127
issuesresolved13.html 2,415
issuesresolved14.html 2,344
issuesresolved15.html 2,498
issuesresolved16.html 2,582
issuesresolved17.html 2,130
issuesresolved18.html 2,353
issuesresolved19.html 2,917
issuesresolved2.html 2,181
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issuesresolved22.html 2,489
issuesresolved23.html 2,295
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issuesresolved27.html 2,443
issuesresolved28.html 2,575
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issuesresolved3.html 2,547
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issuesresolved31.html 2,350
issuesresolved32.html 2,154
issuesresolved33.html 2,517
issuesresolved34.html 2,472
issuesresolved35.html 2,355
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issuesresolved37.html 2,305
issuesresolved38.html 2,360
issuesresolved39.html 2,406
issuesresolved4.html 2,430
issuesresolved40.html 2,821
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size (bytes)
issuesresolved41.html 2,307
issuesresolved42.html 2,491
issuesresolved43.html 2,351
issuesresolved44.html 2,363
issuesresolved45.html 2,626
issuesresolved46.html 2,350
issuesresolved47.html 2,500
issuesresolved48.html 2,148
issuesresolved49.html 2,373
issuesresolved5.html 2,807
issuesresolved50.html 2,366
issuesresolved51.html 2,531
issuesresolved52.html 2,417
issuesresolved53.html 2,377
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issuesresolved55.html 2,546
issuesresolved56.html 2,499
issuesresolved57.html 2,298
issuesresolved58.html 2,774
issuesresolved59.html 2,466
issuesresolved6.html 2,331
issuesresolved60.html 2,338
issuesresolved61.html 2,414
issuesresolved62.html 2,166
issuesresolved63.html 2,363
issuesresolved64.html 2,154
issuesresolved65.html 2,406
issuesresolved66.html 2,157
issuesresolved67.html 2,377
issuesresolved68.html 2,408
issuesresolved69.html 2,365
issuesresolved7.html 2,317
issuesresolved70.html 2,838
issuesresolved8.html 2,598
issuesresolved9.html 2,510
newfeatures.html 3,134
newfeatures2.html 3,693
newfeatures3.html 2,244
newfeatures4.html 2,634
newfeatures5.html 2,620
newfeatures6.html 2,497
newfeatures7.html 2,549
newfeatures8.html 2,362
newfeatures9.html 2,468
relnotes.pdf 313,019
relnotesIX.xml 4,677
relnotesTOC.xml 6,582
Files in /docs/relnotes/images
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
info.gif 1,155
logo.gif 2,524
warn.gif 1,171
Files in /docs/relnotes/wwhdata/common
context.js 62
files.js 5,116
popups.js 35
title.js 60
topics.js 62
towwhdir.js 50
wwhpagef.js 4,299
Files in /docs/relnotes/wwhdata/java
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Filename File size (bytes)
files.xml 11,619
ix.xml 4,677
search.xml 26,350
toc.xml 6,582
Files in /docs/relnotes/wwhdata/js
index.js 3,311
search.js 1,575
toc.js 4,621
Files in /docs/relnotes/wwhdata/js/search
search0.js 15,535
search1.js 14,796
Files in /docs/webrao
about.html 3,314
about10.html 6,917
about11.html 3,426
about12.html 3,357
about2.html 3,210
about3.html 3,727
about4.html 4,106
about5.html 3,865
about6.html 3,557
about7.html 4,068
about8.html 3,116
about9.html 4,153
appendix_identrus.html 2,791
appendix_identrus10.html 4,905
appendix_identrus2.html 2,959
appendix_identrus3.html 6,557
appendix_identrus4.html 7,497
appendix_identrus5.html 3,298
appendix_identrus6.html 5,290
appendix_identrus7.html 4,938
appendix_identrus8.html 4,834
appendix_identrus9.html 10,237
appendix_passphrase.html 3,055
appendixb.html 3,006
appendixb2.html 4,979
appendixb3.html 4,079
appendixc.html 6,538
authorizingrequests.html 3,868
authorizingrequests2.html 12,131
authorizingrequests3.html 10,626
authorizingrequests4.html 10,218
catalog.css 15,962
collecting.html 3,264
collecting10.html 8,513
collecting2.html 3,260
collecting3.html 5,631
collecting4.html 5,604
collecting5.html 6,773
collecting6.html 10,127
collecting7.html 5,614
collecting8.html 5,782
collecting9.html 5,130
document.css 534
facetoface.html 4,395
facetoface10.html 7,700
facetoface11.html 3,503
facetoface12.html 4,007
facetoface13.html 8,707
facetoface14.html 4,122
facetoface15.html 3,469
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Filename File size (bytes)
facetoface16.html 4,017
facetoface17.html 3,791
facetoface18.html 8,326
facetoface19.html 4,856
facetoface2.html 3,327
facetoface20.html 4,929
facetoface21.html 4,176
facetoface22.html 4,214
facetoface23.html 7,728
facetoface24.html 4,019
facetoface25.html 4,179
facetoface26.html 7,110
facetoface27.html 4,517
facetoface28.html 5,200
facetoface29.html 3,843
facetoface3.html 7,713
facetoface30.html 3,805
facetoface31.html 8,549
facetoface32.html 5,206
facetoface33.html 4,245
facetoface34.html 4,544
facetoface35.html 5,178
facetoface36.html 4,035
facetoface37.html 3,776
facetoface38.html 4,156
facetoface39.html 5,950
facetoface4.html 3,638
facetoface5.html 4,973
facetoface6.html 5,149
facetoface7.html 4,171
facetoface8.html 3,914
facetoface9.html 4,162
gettingstarted.html 3,617
gettingstarted2.html 4,174
gettingstarted3.html 11,705
gettingstarted4.html 10,676
gettingstarted5.html 3,561
gettingstarted6.html 3,889
installing.html 4,574
installing10.html 4,144
installing11.html 6,495
installing12.html 3,410
installing13.html 4,891
installing14.html 6,102
installing15.html 5,109
installing2.html 4,623
installing3.html 3,716
installing4.html 3,894
installing5.html 5,694
installing6.html 3,028
installing7.html 5,078
installing8.html 5,919
installing9.html 3,700
introduction.html 3,248
introduction2.html 3,584
introduction3.html 4,170
introduction4.html 5,069
introduction5.html 6,090
introduction6.html 3,409
introduction7.html 3,024
introduction8.html 3,065
introduction9.html 4,054
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Filename File size (bytes)
keepingyoursystemsecure.html 3,850
keepingyoursystemsecure2.html 4,300
keepingyoursystemsecure3.html 3,943
keepingyoursystemsecure4.html 3,018
keepingyoursystemsecure5.html 4,790
keepingyoursystemsecure6.html 3,406
recover.html 2,871
recover2.html 3,193
recover3.html 10,335
recover4.html 3,136
suspendingandrevoking.html 3,810
suspendingandrevoking2.html 8,299
suspendingandrevoking3.html 6,238
suspendingandrevoking4.html 3,336
suspendingandrevoking5.html 9,078
suspendingandrevoking6.html 6,402
suspendingandrevoking7.html 5,620
troubleshooting.html 3,740
troubleshooting2.html 3,352
troubleshooting3.html 4,550
troubleshooting4.html 11,380
troubleshooting5.html 3,732
troubleshooting6.html 4,920
troubleshooting7.html 4,103
troubleshooting8.html 3,708
troubleshooting9.html 3,157
webraoguide.pdf 1,769,920
webraoguideIX.xml 35,201
webraoguideTOC.xml 11,326
Files in /docs/webrao/images
appendix_identrusa.gif 46,643
bullet.gif 822
caution.gif 1,533
cert_req_dual_ke_PKCS11.gif 11,409
cert_req_dual_key.gif 11,132
cert_request_sub_authorize.gif 2,466
cert_request_sub_authorize2.gif 2,047
cert_status.gif 5,601
certificate_request_page.gif 8,140
certificate_request_page_PKCS11.gif 8,680
certificate_request_page_import.gif 8,709
certificate_request_recover.gif 5,529
certificate_request_submitted_page.gif 7,457
certificate_request_submitted_page_PKCS11.gif 2,485
certificate_request_submitted_page_authorize.gif 8,683
certificate_request_submitted_page_import.gif 2,523
collect_rro.gif 6,165
export_certificate_screen2.gif 10,022
export_certificate_screen_key1.gif 10,063
facetofacea26.gif 11,301
friendly_name2.gif 7,864
import_certificate_request_page.gif 2,339
import_certificate_request_screen.gif 10,298
info.gif 1,155
install.gif 64,385
key_recov_submitted.gif 2,477
key_recov_submitted_auth.gif 2,537
login_page.gif 6,084
logo.gif 2,524
menu_krowrao.gif 4,446
multi_cert_friendly.gif 9,877
pkcs12_options.gif 15,729
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
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Filename File size (bytes)
random_data_screen.gif 9,204
recov_key.gif 8,441
recov_key_auth.gif 8,550
recov_request2.gif 6,862
recovery_reasons.gif 2,262
registration_officer_logon_screen.gif 8,347
registration_officer_logon_screen_pkcs11.gif 8,080
request_details.gif 6,017
revocation_dropdown.gif 2,477
revoke_cert_revoke.gif 9,142
revoke_certificate_page.gif 9,504
revoke_certificate_page_suspend.gif 8,825
revoke_certificate_page_unsuspend.gif 10,072
save_cert_p12_drop-down.gif 3,629
save_certificate_page_import.gif 5,811
save_certificate_page_multiple.gif 10,305
save_certificate_page_multiple_PKCS11.gif 15,606
save_certificate_page_p12.gif 11,978
save_certificate_page_pem.gif 12,137
save_certificate_page_smartcard3.gif 8,402
save_key_cert.gif 5,900
saving_keys_and_certificates_screen.gif 13,379
saving_keys_and_certificates_screen_multiple_certificates
.gif
8,985
saving_keys_and_certificates_screen_p7c_file.gif 10,049
saving_keys_and_certs_collect.gif 5,866
saving_keys_and_certs_key1.gif 13,655
saving_keys_and_certs_key2.gif 13,794
saving_keys_and_certs_key2_diff_file.gif 13,750
saving_keys_and_certs_recover.gif 13,538
search_criteria_page_authorize.gif 10,585
search_criteria_page_ch_cert_status.gif 10,768
search_criteria_page_collect.gif 9,888
search_criteria_page_collect_keys.gif 9,865
search_criteria_page_recover.gif 9,394
search_criteria_page_revoke.gif 3,743
search_criteria_page_status.gif 3,781
select_certificate_screen_collect.gif 10,793
select_certificate_screen_collect_key.gif 5,324
select_certificate_screen_recover.gif 7,800
select_certificate_screen_status.gif 9,233
select_registration_policy_page.gif 9,686
select_request_page2.gif 7,335
select_request_page3.gif 5,474
select_request_page4.gif 5,456
select_request_status.gif 5,436
smartcard2_ro_screen.gif 7,460
smartcard2_screen.gif 10,225
smartcard3_ro_screen.gif 6,783
smartcard3_screen.gif 6,973
smartcard4_ro_screen.gif 7,305
smartcard4_screen.gif 7,391
status.gif 6,738
warn.gif 1,171
welcome_rro.gif 9,985
Files in /docs/webrao/wwhdata/common
context.js 68
files.js 9,256
popups.js 35
title.js 66
topics.js 62
towwhdir.js 50
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Filename File size (bytes)
wwhpagef.js 4,299
Files in /docs/webrao/wwhdata/java
files.xml 16,863
ix.xml 35,201
search.xml 83,025
toc.xml 11,326
Files in /docs/webrao/wwhdata/js
index.js 23,010
search.js 1,575
toc.js 8,479
Files in /docs/webrao/wwhdata/js/search
search0.js 15,817
search1.js 15,837
search2.js 15,818
search3.js 15,875
search4.js 15,872
search5.js 12,113
Files in /docs/wwhelp
books.xml 685
messages.xml 31,554
settings.xml 3,792
Files in /docs/wwhelp/images
altclose.gif 156
altopen.gif 173
caution.gif 1,533
info.gif 1,155
warn.gif 1,171
Files in /docs/wwhelp/wwhimpl
version.htm 838
Files in /docs/wwhelp/wwhimpl/common/html
blank.htm 323
bookmark.htm 326
content.htm 1,217
controll.htm 1,365
controlr.htm 1,404
default.htm 4,401
document.css 534
document.htm 1,017
init0.htm 901
init1.htm 1,354
init2.htm 1,059
init3.htm 901
pagenav.htm 1,295
switch.htm 1,341
title.htm 1,098
wwhelp.htm 3,532
Files in /docs/wwhelp/wwhimpl/common/images
bkmark.gif 250
bkmarkx.gif 99
close.gif 214
divider.gif 46
divider2.gif 46
doc.gif 150
email.gif 289
emailx.gif 93
fc.gif 235
fo.gif 174
frameset.gif 234
home.gif 287
logo.jpg 4,851
next.gif 248
nextx.gif 76
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Filename File size (bytes)
prev.gif 252
prevx.gif 76
print.gif 313
printx.gif 94
related.gif 440
relatedi.gif 95
relatedx.gif 95
spacer4.gif 51
spc1w2h.gif 43
spc1w7h.gif 44
spc2w1h.gif 43
spc5w1h.gif 43
sync.gif 270
syncx.gif 86
Files in /docs/wwhelp/wwhimpl/common/private
books.js 785
locale.js 11,978
options.js 1,541
popupf.js 2,955
title.js 158
Files in /docs/wwhelp/wwhimpl/common/scripts
bklist1s.js 409
bookgrps.js 4,810
booklist.js 7,619
browseri.js 3,351
controls.js 12,394
documt1s.js 184
filelist.js 1,633
handler.js 742
help.js 18,388
highlt.js 5,499
pophash.js 1,397
popup.js 12,447
related.js 13,055
strutils.js 11,920
switch.js 4,949
Files in /docs/wwhelp/wwhimpl/java/html
ie60win.htm 2,634
iemac.htm 1,756
iewindow.htm 2,215
netscape.htm 2,156
nosecie.htm 2,020
nosecie6.htm 2,439
nosecns.htm 2,155
wwhelp.htm 4,104
Files in /docs/wwhelp/wwhimpl/java/private
books.xml 762
locale.js 2,576
locale.xml 21,679
options.js 139
options.xml 1,062
Files in /docs/wwhelp/wwhimpl/java/scripts
handler.js 867
java.js 5,241
Files in /docs/wwhelp/wwhimpl/js/html
indexsel.htm 1,122
navigate.htm 1,315
panel.htm 1,510
panelini.htm 1,087
tabs.htm 1,112
wwhelp.htm 4,501
Files in /docs/wwhelp/wwhimpl/js/images
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Filename File size (bytes)
tabsbg.gif 45
Files in /docs/wwhelp/wwhimpl/js/private
locale.js 13,315
options.js 2,602
Files in /docs/wwhelp/wwhimpl/js/scripts
handler.js 450
index.js 42,949
index1s.js 165
javascpt.js 4,179
outlfast.js 6,285
outlin1s.js 161
outline.js 22,438
outlsafe.js 5,294
panels.js 6,473
search.js 32,343
search1s.js 333
search2s.js 141
search3s.js 136
search4s.js 136
tabs.js 3,593
Table A-3 – UniCERT Core v5.2.1 Documentation Files for Solaris
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Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Version History
Version No. Details Date of change Author
5.0.a Draft Apr 2002 GeorgeS
5.0.b Draft June 2002 GeorgeS
5.0.c Draft July 2002 GeorgeS
5.0.d Draft Sep 2002 GeorgeS
5.0.e Draft Jan 2003 GS,JAF,ML.
5.0.f Draft Mar 2003 GS,JAF,ML
5.0.g First Release for CC Pre-eval Mar 2003 GS,JAF,ML
5.0.h Release for entry into ASIEP April 2003 CL,GS,JAF,ML
5.0.i Various May 2003 CL
5.0.j Addressed comments by DSD and
Betrusted, for review and release to
evaluators for evaluation.
June 2003 CL
5.0.k Minor updates while working on other
docs
July 2003 CL,GS,JAF,ML
5.0.l More updates while working on other
docs and to address EORs
July 2003 CL,GS,JAF,ML
5.0.m Second Release to Evaluators (almost!) July 2003 CL,GS,JAF,ML
5.0.n Second Release to Evaluators (almost!) July 2003 CL,GS,JAF,ML
5.0.o As above July 2003 CL,GS,JAF,ML
5.0.p Third Release to Evaluators
Reflects updates related to FS and
other documents.
Addresses EOR14&15.
October 2003 CL,GS,JAF,ML
5.0.q Incorporate updates from completion
of HLD and LLD.
Fourth Release to Evaluators
November 2003 CL, GS, JAF, ML
5.0.r Update to Betrusted and update to
synchronise with FS.
Jan 2004 GS
5.0.s Disassociated unused template so file
can open; minor reformatting and
changed company refs/logo to
Cybertrust (per Mick);
April 2005 NOD
5.0.t Deleted IA_Identify from the Token
Manager description. Deleted
IA_Identify and KG_Destroy from the
KGU description. Clarified differences
between the TM and KGU on Win and
Solaris. Updated descriptions of
CG_Register and IA_Identify based on
other changes described above.
Renumbered Nancy’s 5.0.2 version to
5.0.s to be consistent with earlier
version numbering scheme.
Updated version to 5.0.t.
Accepted earlier changes, but left
latest changes marked for Judy’s
review.
May 24 2005 GS, ML
Documentation Contents on TOE CDs
Security Target for Cybertrust UniCERT 5 Security Target-5.0.ab 262
Copyright ã 2006 Cybertrust
Version No. Details Date of change Author
5.0.u Accepted changes that George and
Michael added in last version.
Removed DP_Export from RA
description.
Added KG_Export to KGU description.
Updated Web Server, Web Browser
and Crypto Module section to reflect
current version.
Minor editorial changes
Updated version to 5.0.u
Updated month to June 2005
June 3, 2005 JAF
5.0.v Updated Luna CA3 information to
reflect version used with UniCERT 5.2.1
and what is evaluated.
Accepted changes and updated
version and date.
July 1, 2005 JAF
5.0.w Updated description of IA_Identify.
Updated version, date and TOC.
July 4, 2005 ML
5.0.x Updated reference to FIPS 180 and FIPS
186
Updated version and date
July 5, 2005 JAF
5.0.y Updated reference to PKCS11.
Updated definition of PP_PKIVerify to
remove verification of the PKI Version
number. Updated document version
and TOC.
July 29, 2005 ML
5.0.z Clean up of EORs 19, 23, 32
See change-note 89053 Dublin-1.
Minor editorial changes
Added note about relationship of
Cybertrust and Betrusted
Updated month to September 2005
September 2005 GS, JAF,ML
5.0.aa Updated wording in section 2.5.1.6 per
discussion with SafeNet.
Updated section 2.3.13.1 to address
RFC 13.
Minor editorial changes, terminology
consistency with user docs.
Updated date and version.
Added 5.2.1.900 to release version
being evaluated and CD file contents
(2.6, App A)
Accepted changes
December 2005 NOD, JAF
5.0.ab Removed incorrect references to
Windows NT
Updated version, publication date and
year of copyright.
January 2006 JAF