Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric
Security Target
Version 1.0
August 13, 2018
Prepared for:
Enveil
8171 Maple Lawn Blvd, Suite 240
Fulton, MD 20759
Prepared by:
Leidos Inc.
https://www.leidos.com/CC-FIPS140
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
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1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................3
1.1 SECURITY TARGET, TOE AND CC IDENTIFICATION........................................................................................3
1.2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS.................................................................................................................................4
1.3 CONVENTIONS ................................................................................................................................................4
2. TOE DESCRIPTION ..........................................................................................................................................8
2.1 TOE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................................8
2.2 TOE ARCHITECTURE......................................................................................................................................9
2.3 TOE DOCUMENTATION ................................................................................................................................11
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..........................................................................................................12
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..............................................................................................................................13
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................13
5. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................................................14
5.1 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS..........................................................................................................................14
5.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................14
5.3 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...............................................................................................20
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION..............................................................................................................22
6.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT ...........................................................................................................................22
6.2 USER DATA PROTECTION ..............................................................................................................................24
6.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION.......................................................................................................24
6.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................................25
6.5 PRIVACY.......................................................................................................................................................27
6.6 PROTECTION OF THE TSF .............................................................................................................................28
6.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS ...........................................................................................................................29
7. PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS...............................................................................................................30
8. RATIONALE.....................................................................................................................................................31
8.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE................................................................................................31
9. APPENDIX: LINUX APIS ...............................................................................................................................33
10. APPENDIX: DEPENDENCIES ...................................................................................................................45
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Evaluation Specific Terminology ..................................................................................................................5
Table 2 - TOE Security Functional Components.........................................................................................................15
Table 3 - Assurance Components ................................................................................................................................20
Table 4 - SFR Protection Profile Sources....................................................................................................................30
Table 5 – Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping ...........................................................................................31
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Target of Evaluation (TOE) along with identification of the Security Target (ST) itself. The
section includes documentation organization, ST conformance claims, and ST conventions.
The TOE is the Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric provided by Enveil.
The Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric enables data to remain encrypted even while being processed, thereby
eliminating the risk of exposure. For example, a search against a dataset can be processed while keeping both the
search and the contents of the dataset encrypted at all times. In addition to securing operations over encrypted data,
the product also secures operations over unencrypted data. In this manner, the product encrypts operations such as
searches or analytics, and processes these encrypted operations over unencrypted data (without ever decrypting the
operation), and produces encrypted results. Thus, a user is able to secure operations in untrusted environments such
as data aggregators and data lakes in which they do not control the data or its encryption. The ZeroReveal Client and
ZeroReveal Server are evaluated as a software application only and the homomorphic encryption techniques used for
the ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server operations are outside the scope of [PP APP SW].
Enveil’s ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric application consists of one ZeroReveal Client Component and one
ZeroReveal Server Component. The ZeroReveal Client Component resides within the enterprise and is responsible
for encrypting ZeroReveal Compute Fabric operations and decrypting results. The ZeroReveal Server Component
resides within the environment of a data repository and is responsible for processing encrypted operations over the
data. The ZeroReveal Compute Fabric encrypted data operations and the decrypting of the results are outside the
scope of the [PP APP SW] and therefore not included in the evaluation.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
 Security Target Introduction (Section 1)
 TOE Description (Section 2)
 Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
 Security Objectives (Section 4)
 IT Security Requirements (Section 5)
 TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
 Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)
 Rationale (Section 8).
 Appendix: Linux APIs (Section 9).
 Appendix: Dependencies (Section 10)
1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification
ST Title – Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric Security Target
ST Version – Version 1.0
ST Date – August 13, 2018
TOE Identification – Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric v1.1.1
ZeroReveal Client v1.1.1
ZeroReveal Server v1.1.1
The evaluated configuration includes one ZeroReveal Client Component and one
ZeroReveal Server Component in standalone mode.
TOE Developer – Enveil
Evaluation Sponsor – Enveil
CC Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
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1.2 Conformance Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:
 This ST is conformant to the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.2, 22 April 2016
[PP APP SW].
The following NIAP Technical Decisions apply to evaluation assurance activities.
 TD0327: Default file permissions for FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2
 TD0326: RSA-based key establishment schemes
 TD0305: Handling of TLS connections with and without mutual authentication
 TD0304: Update to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
 TD0300: Sensitive Data in FDP_DAR_EXT.1
 TD0296: Update to FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3
 TD0283: Cipher Suites for TLS in SWApp v1.2
 TD0268 - FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Clarification
 TD0267 - TLSS testing - Empty Certificate Authorities list
 TD0244 - FCS_TLSC_EXT - TLS Client Curves Allowed
 TD0241- Removal of Test 4.1 in FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1
 TD0238 – User-modifiable files FTP_AEX_EXT.1.4
 TD0221: FMT_SMF.1.1 - Assignments moved to Selections
 TD0217 – Compliance to RFC5759 and RFC5280 for using CRLs
 TD0215: Update to FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2
 TD0192 – Update to FCS_STO_EXT.1 Application Note
 TD0163 – Update to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 Test 5.4 and FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 Test
 TD0131 – Update to FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 Test 4.5
 TD0121: FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1 Configuration Options
 TD0119: FCS_STO_EXT.1.1 in PP_APP_v1.2
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
 Part 2 Extended
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
 Part 3 Extended
1.3 Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
 Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be
applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST,
iteration is indicated by a number in parentheses placed at the end of the component. For example,
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FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1
requirement, (1) and (2).
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using
bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an assignment within a selection
would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [[selected-assignment]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated
using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
o Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and
strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”). Note that ‘cases’
that are not applicable in a given SFR have simply been removed without any explicit identification.
 The [PP APP SW] uses an additional convention – the ‘case’ – which defines parts of an SFR that apply only
when corresponding selections are made or some other identified conditions exist. Only the applicable cases
are identified in this ST and they are identified using bold text.
 Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as
captions.
1.3.1 Evaluation Specific Terminology
Table 1 – Evaluation Specific Terminology
Term Definition
Application The word application used in Sections 4 and 5 refers to the TOE
(e.g. both ZeroReveal Client Component and ZeroReveal Server
Component).
arbitrary-precision arithmetic In computer science, arbitrary-precision arithmetic, also called
bignum arithmetic, multiple-precision arithmetic, or sometimes
infinite-precision arithmetic, indicates that calculations are
performed on numbers whose digits of precision are limited only
by the available memory of the host system. This contrasts with
the faster fixed-precision arithmetic found in most arithmetic
logic unit (ALU) hardware, which typically offers between 8 and
64 bits of precision.
Commodity Hardware Commodity hardware is a term for affordable devices that are
generally compatible with other such devices. In a process called
commodity computing or commodity cluster computing, these
devices are often networked to provide more processing power
when those who own them cannot afford to purchase more
elaborate supercomputers, or want to maximize savings in IT
design. In many cases, commodity hardware setups involve low-
cost desktop computers or workstations that are IBM-compatible
and can run operating systems like Microsoft Windows, Linux
and DOS without additional software or adaptations.
Computational Platform Computational platforms are well integrated software stacks
capable of performing a useful research calculation
Data Aggregation Data aggregation is a type of data and information mining
process where data is searched, gathered and presented in a
report-based, summarized format to achieve specific business
objectives or processes and/or conduct human analysis.
Data Lake A data lake is a storage repository that holds a vast amount of raw
data in its native format until it is needed. While a hierarchical
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Term Definition
data warehouse stores data in files or folders, a data lake uses a
flat architecture to store data.
GNOME Keyring GNOME Keyring is a collection of components in GNOME that
store secrets, passwords, keys, certificates and make them
available to applications. The data is encrypted and stored in a
file in the user's home directory. The default keyring uses the
login password for encryption.
Homomorphic Encryption A form of encryption that allows computation on ciphertexts,
generating an encrypted result which, when decrypted, matches
the result of the operations as if they had been performed on the
plaintext.
JDBC The Java Database Connectivity (JDBC) API provides universal
data access from the Java programming language. Using the
JDBC API, you can access virtually any data source, from
relational databases to spreadsheets and flat files. JDBC
technology also provides a common base on which tools and
alternate interfaces can be built.
Keystore A key store is an encrypted file containing certificates and,
optionally, corresponding private keys. Key stores require a
password in order to decrypt and read the contents.
Enveil components support key stores in two formats: PKCS12
(.p12) and Java Key Store (.jks).
TLS Key Store A TLS key store is a key store containing the certificate and private
key the application will use when communicating over TLS. If the
application is a TLS server, the certificate should be a TLS server
certificate; if it is a TLS client, the certificate should be a TLS
client certificate.
TLS Trust Store A TLS trust store is a key store containing the CA certificates
trusted by the application. When a TLS connection is initiated, the
application will reject its peer’s certificate if it has not been signed
by one of the CA certificates in the trust store.
Truststore The purpose of a truststore is to verify credentials used in the
TLS handshake. A TrustStore stores certificates from a third
party or certificates signed by a CA (certificate authorities like
Verisign, Thawte, Geotrust or GoDaddy) which can be used to
identify a third party.
REST A RESTful API is an application program interface (API) that
uses HTTP requests to GET, PUT, POST and DELETE data.
1.3.2 Abbreviations and Acronyms
This section identifies abbreviations and acronyms used in this ST.
API Application programming interface
ASLR Address space layout randomization
CC Common Criteria
CLI Command line interface
GMP GNU Multiple Precision Library
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GPG GNU Privacy Guard
GUI Graphical user interface
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS HTTP Secure
IP Internet Protocol
JAR Java Archive
JDBC Java Database Connectivity
JRE Java Runtime Environment
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
PII Personally Identifiable Information
REST Representational state transfer
RPM RPM Package Manager
SAR Security assurance requirement
SFR Security functional requirement
TLS Transport Layer Security
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2. TOE Description
This section describes the Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric, which is the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The
description covers TOE architecture, logical boundaries, and physical boundaries.
2.1 TOE Overview
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server communicate via REST over mutually authenticated TLS. The REST
APIs may be used over HTTPS/TLS, and require no additional software to be installed on the system communicating
with the Client. Note, neither the ZeroReveal Client nor the ZeroReveal Server Components provide a graphical user
interface (GUI) or a command line interface (CLI). Users and applications communicate to the ZeroReveal Client
through the REST APIs to retrieve data.1
An administrator communicates with and manages the ZeroReveal Client
Component and ZeroReveal Server Component via configuration files (modifiable by a text editor) on each platform.
Figure 1 shows the ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server in its environment.
Figure 1 – Simplified Network Connection
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server Components store passwords in a GNOME keyring in non-volatile
memory. Both components require their passwords to decrypt keystores and truststores containing TLS certificate and
private keys to be stored by an administrator in a GNOME keyring. The ZeroReveal Client Component also requires
its LDAP user password to be in stored in the GNOME keyring. Both components must be launched manually by an
administrator, who must enter the password to unlock the keyring for the ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server
components. Keyring passwords must be stored with an "enveil_handle" attribute, which the Client and Server
Components use to locate the password in the keyring.
The ZeroReveal Client Component does not provide any functionality until an administrator provides configuration
files. The configuration files contain the ZeroReveal Client LDAP username and LDAP “bind” credentials, paths to
PKI certificates and paths to private keys on the file system and the value of the "enveil_handle" attribute for locating
passwords in the keyring. The components store configuration files in the /etc and home directories.
Users and applications authenticate to a ZeroReveal Client Component in order to request ZeroReveal Compute Fabric
operations. Enveil uses an external LDAP directory to authenticate users and applications. The LDAP credentials can
consist of a username and password, or an X509 certificate trusted by the LDAP root authority.
The ZeroReveal Client Component relays information presented by a user or application to the LDAP directory and
the directory provides the client with decision to either accept or deny, which the client enforces. The ZeroReveal
Client and ZeroReveal Server components rely on certificate validation functions provided by the platform. The
ZeroReveal Server has an explicit list of client certificates that are allowed to connect to it, and what their permissions
are, and will reject any connections not using those certificates.
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components only support OCSP and CRL checking if the peer
certificate includes endpoint (for example, CRL Distribution Points field). The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal
1
Enveil provides for convenience a JDBC Driver library that can be used to communicate with ZeroReveal Client
instead of using the Client’s REST API directly. It is not part of the TOE.
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Server do not permit OCSP stapling. The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components treat a certificate
as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE. The ZeroReveal
Server Component does not provide any functionality until an administrator provides configuration files and verifies
the certificate is valid.
The ZeroReveal Client acts as a TLS client when establishing connection to LDAP directory for authentication and
when establishing connection to ZeroReveal Server Component for operation requests and responses. When acting
as a TLS client, the ZeroReveal Client supports mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates. The ZeroReveal
Client Component requires HTTPS/TLS for connections to the REST interface. The ZeroReveal Client Component
and ZeroReveal Server Component communicate via REST over mutually authenticated TLS.
The ZeroReveal Client Component acts as a TLS server when accepting user connections at its REST interfaces. For
user connections to ZeroReveal Client Component, the client relies on the LDAP directory for the expected identifier.
The ZeroReveal Client verifies that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125
and only establish a trusted channel if the peer certificate is valid. The ZeroReveal Client Component supports
wildcards.
The ZeroReveal Server Component acts as a TLS server. For ZeroReveal Client Component connections to the
ZeroReveal Server Component, the server validates the client’s X.509v3 certificate, extracts the client public key,
maps client public key to user names in a configuration file, and compares the identified user name to DN or SAN.
The ZeroReveal Server will not accept an invalid certificate. The ZeroReveal Server Component also supports
wildcards.
The ZeroReveal Client and the ZeroReveal Server components invoke the platform-provided TLS 1.2 from the
SunJCE cryptographic provider and supports the following ciphersuites:
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components do not check for or apply updates on their own, they rely on
the operating system's package manager to poll the Enveil repository for updates, and to notify the user when updates
are available. An enterprise may mirror the Enveil repository to the client platform when operating in an environment
without network connectivity.
2.2 TOE Architecture
This section describes the TOE architecture including physical and logical boundaries. Figure shows the relationship
of the ZeroReveal Compute Fabric Component to its operational environment along with the TOE boundary. The
security functional requirements identify the libraries included in the ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server
components.
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server rely on the Java Cryptographic Architecture for cryptographic services
and on the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library (GMP) for arbitrary-precision arithmetic. The ZeroReveal
Client and ZeroReveal Server components are packaged with the GMP. The ZeroReveal Client Component and
ZeroReveal Server Component rely on Linux tools (for example, Yum) in support of trusted update. The underlying
operating system is Linux (CentOS 7.4 with SELinux) and the Java Runtime is the Oracle Java 8 JRE with the
Unlimited Strength Jurisdiction Policy installed.
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Figure 2 - Platform for ZeroReveal Compute Fabric Components
GMP is native platform code. Enveil ensures the GMP library is compiled with anti-exploitation capabilities
enabled.
2.2.1 Physical Boundaries
The ZeroReveal Compute Fabric is composed of the ZeroReveal Client Component and the ZeroReveal Server
Component. The client’s representational state transfer (REST) interfaces are within the scope of evaluation. The
configuration files on each platform of the ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server Components are considered part
of the TOE.
2.2.1.1 Software Requirements
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components run on Linux (CentOS 7.4 with SELinux) and the Java
Runtime is the Oracle Java 8 JRE with the Unlimited Strength Jurisdiction Policy installed.
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server rely on the Java Cryptographic Architecture for cryptographic services.
2.2.1.2 Hardware Requirements
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server run on ordinary commodity hardware using general purpose x86_64
CPUs with at least 64 GB of available disk space.
An external LDAP directory is required to authenticate users.
2.2.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:
 Cryptographic support
 User data protection
 Identification and authentication
 Security management
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 Privacy
 Protection of the TSF
 Trusted path/channels
2.2.2.1 Cryptographic support
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components use cryptographic services provided by the platform.
Users communicate with the ZeroReveal Client Component through REST interfaces protected by HTTPS/TLS. The
ZeroReveal Client Component and ZeroReveal Server Component communicate via REST over mutually
authenticated TLS. The ZeroReveal Client Component communicates with a LDAP Server using TLS. The
ZeroReveal Client supports mutual authentication of the user connections at its REST interfaces; and with connections
to the LDAP directory.
Credentials are stored in platform provided GNOME keyrings.
2.2.2.2 User data protection
The ZeroReveal Client network communication is restricted to user-initiated communication for authentication via
LDAP directory, respond to API requests, and initiate communications with the ZeroReveal Server. The ZeroReveal
Server network communication is limited to responding to the ZeroReveal Client requests.
All credentials and sensitive data are stored in GNOME keyrings.
2.2.2.3 Identification and authentication
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components rely on certificate validation functions provided by the
platform to authenticate the X.509 certificate as part of establishing a TLS connection.
2.2.2.4 Security management
An enterprise manages the ZeroReveal Client Component and ZeroReveal Server Component via configuration files
on each platform. There is no management CLI, GUI, or interface to manage a component over a network.
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components do not include any predefined or default credentials, and
utilize the platform recommended storage process for configuration files.
2.2.2.5 Privacy
The ZeroReveal Client Component and ZeroReveal Server Component do not collect or transmit PII over a network.
2.2.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server leverage platform provided package management for secure installation
and updates. The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server package includes only those third-party libraries necessary
for its intended operation. The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server are designed to utilize compiler provided
anti-exploitation capabilities.
2.2.2.7 Trusted path/channels
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components communicate via mutually authenticated TLS over REST.
ZeroReveal Client Components communicate with an authentication server using Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP) secured with TLS. Users communicate with ZeroReveal Client Component through REST.
ZeroReveal Client Component requires HTTPS/TLS for connections to the REST interface.
2.3 TOE Documentation
The TOE includes the following Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric documentation.
 ZeroReveal Compute Fabric Configuration Guide for Common Criteria v3.1, Version 1.1.1, 2018
 ZeroReveal Compute Fabric Manual, Version 1.1.1, 2018
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3. Security Problem Definition
This security target includes by reference the Security Problem Definition from the [PP APP SW]. The Security
Problem Definition consists of threats that a conformant TOE is expected to address and assumptions about the
operational environment of the TOE.
In general, the [PP APP SW] has presented a Security Problem Definition appropriate for application software that
runs on mobile devices, as well as on desktop and server platforms. The Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric TOE
is a Linux application running within an enterprise deployment. As such [PP APP SW] Security Problem Definition
applies to the TOE.
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4. Security Objectives
Like the Security Problem Definition, this security target includes by reference the Security Objectives from the
[PP APP SW]. The [PP APP SW] security objectives for the operational environment are reproduced below, since
these objectives characterize technical and procedural measures each consumer must implement in their operational
environment.
In general, the [PP APP SW] has presented a Security Objectives statement appropriate for application software that
runs on mobile devices, as well as on desktop and server platforms. Consequently, the [PP APP SW] security
objectives are suitable for the Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric TOE.
4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This includes
the underlying operating system and any discrete execution environment provided to the
TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the
software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security
policy.
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5. IT Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that
serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.
The security functional requirements have all been drawn from: Protection Profile for Application Software, Version
1.2, 22 April 2016 [PP APP SW]. As a result, refinements and operations already performed in that PP are not
identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from that PP and any residual operations
have been completed herein. Of particular note, [PP APP SW] made a number of refinements and completed some
of the SFR operations defined in the CC. [PP APP SW] should be consulted to identify those changes if necessary.
The security assurance requirements are the set of SARs specified in [PP APP SW].
5.1 Extended Requirements
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the [PP APP SW]. The [PP APP SW] defines the
following extended SFRs. Since these SFRs are not redefined in this ST, readers should consult [PP APP SW] for
more information in regard to these CC extensions.
 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol
 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol
 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Protocol
 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol
 FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
 FDP_NET_EXT.1(1) Network Communications (ZeroReveal Client Component)
 FDP_NET_EXT.1(2) Network Communications (ZeroReveal Server Component)
 FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
 FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
 FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
 FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
 FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
 FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric TOE.
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Table 2 - TOE Security Functional Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS: Cryptographic
support
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol
FDP: User data protection FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_NET_EXT.1(1) Network Communications (ZeroReveal Client
Component)
FDP_NET_EXT.1(2) Network Communications (ZeroReveal Server
Component)
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FMT: Security management FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FPR: Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable
Information
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FTP: Trusted path/channels FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.2.1.1 Random Bit Generation Services (FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The application shall [use no DRBG functionality] for its cryptographic operations.
5.2.1.2 Storage of Credentials (FCS_STO_EXT.1)
FCS_STO_EXT.1.12
The application shall [invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store
[LDAP password, LDAP X509 Certificate, TLS certificates and private keys, and
credentials for access to TLS certificates and private keys]] to non-volatile memory.
5.2.1.3 HTTPS Protocol (FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1)
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The application ZeroReveal Client Component shall implement the HTTPS protocol
that complies with RFC 2818.
2
Updated per NIAP TD0119
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FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.23
The application ZeroReveal Client Component shall implement HTTPS using TLS in
accordance with [FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1].
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.34
The application ZeroReveal Client Component shall [notify the user and not establish
the connection] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.
5.2.1.4 TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1)
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.15
The application ZeroReveal Client Component shall [invoke platform-provided TLS
1.2] supporting the following ciphersuites:
[
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
]
and no other ciphersuite.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 The application ZeroReveal Client Component shall verify that the presented identifier
matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 The application ZeroReveal Client Component shall establish a trusted channel only if
the peer certificate is valid.
5.2.1.5 TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.2)
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 The application ZeroReveal Client Component shall support mutual authentication
using X.509v3 certificates.
5.2.1.6 TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.4)
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4.16
The application ZeroReveal Client Component shall present the Supported Elliptic
Curves Extension in the Client Hello with the following NIST curves: [secp256r1,
secp384r1] and no other curves.
5.2.1.7 TLS Server Protocol (FCS_TLSS_EXT.1)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.17
The application shall [invoke platform-provided TLS 1.2] supporting the following
cipher suites:
[
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
]
and no other ciphersuite.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2 The application shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0,
TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, and [none].
3
Updated per NIAP TD0215
4
Updated per NIAP TD0296
5
Updated per NIAP TD0283
6
Updated per NIAP TD0244
7
Updated per NIAP TD0283
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FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.38
The application shall generate key establishment parameters using [RSA with key
size [2048 bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits], ECDHE over NIST curves: [secp256r1,
secp384r1] and no other curves].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4 The application shall support mutual authentication of TLS clients using X.509v3
certificates.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.5 The application shall not establish a trusted channel if the peer certificate is invalid.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.6 The application shall not establish a trusted channel if the distinguished name (DN)
or Subject Alternative Name (SAN) contained in a certificate does not match the
expected identifier for the peer.
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.2.2.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (FDP_DAR_EXT.1)
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.19
The application shall [protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1] in
nonvolatile memory.
5.2.2.2 Access to Platform Resources (FDP_DEC_EXT.1)
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict its access to [network connectivity].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2 The application shall restrict its access to [no sensitive information repositories].
5.2.2.3 Network Communications (ZeroReveal Client Component)
(FDP_NET_EXT.1(1))
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1(1) The application ZeroReveal Client Component shall restrict network communication to
[
 user-initiated communication for [authentication via LDAP directory,
initiate communication with server],
 respond to [API requests],
] .
5.2.2.4 Network Communications (ZeroReveal Server Component)
(FDP_NET_EXT.1(2))
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1(2) The application ZeroReveal Server Component shall restrict network communication to
[
 respond to [communication request from client]
] .
8
Updated per NIAP TD0326
9
Updated per NIAP TD0300
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5.2.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.2.3.1 X.509 Certificate Validation (FIA_X509_EXT.1)
FIA_X509_EXT.1.110
The application [invoke platform-provided functionality] to validate certificates in
accordance with the following rules:
 RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
 The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
 The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA
certificates.
 The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [
the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC
2560,
a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section
6.3,
a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759,
] .
 The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the
following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity
verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (idkp 3 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server
Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication
purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall
have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP
Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration
Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in
the extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints
extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.2.3.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication (FIA_X509_EXT.2)
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for [HTTPS, TLS].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a
certificate, the application shall [allow the administrator to choose whether to accept the
certificate in these cases].
10
Updated per NIAP TD0217
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5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)
5.2.4.1 Secure by Default Configuration (FMT_CFG_EXT.1)
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1 The application shall only provide enough functionality to set new credentials when
configured with default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.211
The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the
application's binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged user.
5.2.4.2 Supported Configuration Mechanism (FMT_MEC_EXT.1)
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.112
The TSF shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for
storing and setting configuration options].
5.2.4.3 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.113
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [no other function].
5.2.5 Privacy
5.2.5.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
(FPR_ANO_EXT.1)
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [not transmit PII over a network].
5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.2.6.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities (FPT_AEX_EXT.1)
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1 The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no
exceptions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2 The application shall [
allocate memory regions with write and execute permissions for only [Oracle
Java runtime performing just-in-time compilation]
] .
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform
vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4 The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable
files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5 The application shall be compiled with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.
5.2.6.2 Use of Supported Services and APIs (FPT_API_EXT.1)
FPT_API_EXT.1.1 The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
11
Updated per NIAP TD0327
12
Updated per NIAP TD0121
13
Updated per NIAP TD0221
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5.2.6.3 Use of Third Party Libraries (FPT_LIB_EXT.1)
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1 The application shall be packaged with only [GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic
Library (GMP)].
5.2.6.4 Integrity for Installation and Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and patches to the
application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The application shall be distributed using the format of the platform-supported package
manager.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces
of the application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log
events.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4 The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5 The application shall [leverage the platform] to query the current version of the
application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.6 The application installation package and its updates shall be digitally signed such that its
platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
5.2.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
5.2.7.1 Protection of Data in Transit (FTP_DIT_EXT.1)
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 The application shall [encrypt all transmitted data with [HTTPS, TLS]] between itself
and another trusted IT product.
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements in Table 3 are included in this ST by reference from the [PP APP SW].
Table 3 - Assurance Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
These assurance requirements imply the following requirements from CC class ASE: Security Target Evaluation.
 ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
 ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
 ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
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 ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
 ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
 ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Consequently, the assurance activities specified in [PP APP SW] apply to the TOE evaluation.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
 Cryptographic support
 User data protection
 Identification and authentication
 Security management
 Privacy
 Protection of the TSF
 Trusted path/channels
6.1 Cryptographic support
6.1.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.1
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server Components rely on the platform for cryptographic services.
Consequently, the ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server Components themselves use no DRBG functions.
6.1.2 FCS_STO_EXT.1
Users and applications must authenticate to a ZeroReveal Client Component in order to request ZeroReveal Compute
Fabric operations. Enveil uses an external LDAP directory to authenticate users. The ZeroReveal Client Component
relays information presented by a user to the LDAP directory and the directory provides the client with decision to
either accept or deny, which the client enforces.
The ZeroReveal Client component protects its LDAP access credentials using the platform, as follows:
 ZeroReveal Client may authenticate itself to LDAP with a username and password or with a certificate.
o If authenticating with a username and password, the password is required to be stored in the
GNOME keyring in non-volatile memory.
o If authenticating with a certificate, the certificate and private key must be stored in its TLS Key
Store. The password to the TLS Key Store is required to be stored in the GNOME keyring in non-
volatile memory.
 ZeroReveal Client may optionally use TLS when communicating with LDAP. In this case, ZeroReveal Client
requires a CA certificate to be stored in its TLS Trust Store. The password to the TLS Trust Store is required
to be stored in the GNOME keyring in non-volatile memory.
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server Components store certificates and associated PKI private keys for
communication over TLS in their TLS Key Store and TLS Trust Store, which are encrypted files protected with a
password. The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server Components require the passwords to their TLS Key Store
and TLS Trust Store to be stored in the GNOME keyring in non-volatile memory.
Both components must be launched manually by an administrator, who must enter the password to unlock the keyring
for the application.
For Common Criteria compliance, passwords may not be stored in any of the plain-text configuration files used by
ZeroReveal Client or ZeroReveal Server. Instead, they must be stored in the Enveil user’s default GNOME keyring
(also called the “login” keyring), with attributes that allow ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server to look them up.
The GNOME keyring stores the sensitive data in encrypted format in a keyring file in the user's home directory.
To load passwords into the keyring, use the secret-tool command (which comes with the libsecret library, usually
installed with GNOME). For the password to be loaded by ZeroReveal Client or ZeroReveal Server, it must have two
attributes: enveil_type, which must be set to password, and enveil_handle, which must be set to a unique handle that
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will be stored in ZeroReveal Platform configuration files. Stored passwords must also have a label, which will be
displayed in the keyring UI. Key stores require a password in order to decrypt and read the contents.
Both ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server Components must be launched manually by an administrator, who
must enter the password to unlock the keyring. The Client and Server components then look up passwords in the
keyring by their "enveil handle" attribute, which is stored in the component's configuration file.
6.1.3 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
The ZeroReveal Client Component’s HTTPS protocol complies with RFC 2818 and is implemented using TLS 1.2
(RFC 5246). The ZeroReveal Client Component REST interface does not accept a connection when a peer’s
certificate is invalid and records the failure in the components log.
6.1.4 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.4
The ZeroReveal Client acts as a TLS client when establishing connection to LDAP directory for authentication and
when establishing connection to ZeroReveal Server Component for operation requests and responses. When acting
as a TLS client, the ZeroReveal Client supports mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates. The ZeroReveal
Client certificate must contain the hostname or the IP address of the ZeroReveal Client host machine as a Subject
Alternative Name (SAN). The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components verify that the Common Name
and DN presented identifiers match the reference identifier according to RFC 6125. Both ZeroReveal Client and
ZeroReveal Server Components support wildcards. The ZeroReveal Client does not support certificate pinning. The
ZeroReveal Server has an explicit list of client certificates that are allowed to connect to it, and what their permissions
are, and will reject any connections not using those certificates.
When acting as a TLS client, the ZeroReveal Client component invokes the platform-provided TLS 1.2 from the
SunJCE cryptographic provider and supports the following ciphersuites:
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
The ZeroReveal Client Component supports Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello with the secp256r1, and
secp384r1 NIST curves. The supported curves are hardcoded and there are no configuration options.
The ZeroReveal Server Component does not act as a TLS client.
6.1.5 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
The ZeroReveal Client Component when accepting user connections (acting as a TLS server) supports mutual
authentication of the user connections at its REST interfaces. For user connections to ZeroReveal Client Component,
the client relies on the LDAP directory for the expected identifier. The ZeroReveal Client verifies that the presented
identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125 and only establish a trusted channel if the peer
certificate is valid. Both ZeroReveal Server and ZeroReveal Client Components support wildcards. The ZeroReveal
Client Component and ZeroReveal Server Component communicate via REST over mutually authenticated TLS. The
ZeroReveal Server Component acts as a TLS server. For ZeroReveal Client Component connections to the ZeroReveal
Server Component, the server validates the client’s X.509v3 certificate, extracts the client public key, maps client
public key to user names in a configuration file, and compares the identified user name to DN or SAN. The ZeroReveal
Server will not establish a trusted channel if the distinguished name (DN) or Subject Alternative Name (SAN)
contained in a certificate does not match the expected identifiers for the peer for Client Component connections with
the REST interfaces. The user’s permissions will be looked up in LDAP using the DN and SANs on their certificate
in place of their username. The DN and SANs are extracted from the user’s client certificate and used to retrieve the
user’s entry from the configured LDAP service.
The ZeroReveal Server will not accept an invalid certificate.
When acting as a TLS server, the ZeroReveal Client Component and the ZeroReveal Server Component invoke the
platform-provided TLS 1.2 from the SunJCE cryptographic provider and supports the following ciphersuites:
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
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The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server generate key establishment parameters using RSA with key size 2048
bits, 3072 bits, or 4096 bits and ECDHE over NIST curves: secp256r1 or secp384r1.
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server Components deny SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 connections.
After initial installation, no additional configuration is required for correct TLS operation of the ZeroReveal Client
and ZeroReveal Server components.
6.2 User data protection
6.2.1 FDP_DAR_EXT.1
Sensitive data consists of the LDAP password, LDAP X509 Certificate, TLS certificates and private keys, and
credentials for access to TLS certificates and private keys. The sensitive data is protected in accordance with
FCS_STO_EXT.1 as described above in Section 6.1.2.
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server Components do not contain any other sensitive data on the system that
is not protected by FCS_STO_EXT.1.
6.2.2 FDP_DEC_EXT.1
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server Components access the physical resources for network connectivity.
The guidance documentation identifies when ZeroReveal Client Component and ZeroReveal Server Component
require network connectivity.
6.2.3 FDP_NET_EXT.1(1) (ZeroReveal Client Component),
FDP_NET_EXT.1(2) (ZeroReveal Server Component)
The ZeroReveal Client network communication is restricted to user-initiated communication for authentication via
LDAP directory, respond to API requests, and initiate communications with the ZeroReveal Server. The ZeroReveal
Server network communication is limited to responding to the ZeroReveal Client requests.
6.3 Identification and authentication
6.3.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1 Certificate Validation
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components use X.509v3 certificates to authenticate network endpoints
for TLS and HTTPS communication. The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components comply with
RFC5280 and the certificate path is terminated with a trusted CA certificate. The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal
Server components rely on the certificate validation functions provided by the platform.
Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp
3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field. The JARS are signed by a commercial certificate
authority. The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components do not support email, therefore SMIME
certificates are not used.
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components only support OCSP and CRL checking if the peer
certificate includes endpoint (for example, CRL Distribution Points field). The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal
Server components do not permit OCSP stapling. The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components treat a
certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
Both the ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components use the Java PKIX certificate validation tools. The
notBefore and notAfter dates included in certificates will be checked to be before and after the current time
respectively. Certificates received as part of TLS connections are checked for a valid path up to the certificate authority
roots (which must have the X509v3 Basic Constraint CA: True) provided during configuration by the class
sun.security.provider.certpath.PKIXCertPathValidator and X509TrustManager.
The ZeroReveal Server checks can be found in sun.security.ssl.X509KeyManagerImpl.CheckType#check
http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk8/jdk8/jdk/file/687fd7c7986d/src/share/classes/sun/security/ssl/X509KeyManagerImpl.
Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric Security Target Version 1.0
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java#l568. It ensures certificates presented for server authentication have the digitalSignature keyUsage and TLS
Server extendedKeyUsage.
The ZeroReveal Client checks can be found in sun.security.ssl.X509KeyManagerImpl.CheckType#check
http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk8/jdk8/jdk/file/687fd7c7986d/src/share/classes/sun/security/ssl/X509KeyManagerImpl.
java#l568. It ensures certificates presented for client authentication have the digitalSignature keyUsage and TLS
Client extendedKeyUsage.
Certificates used to sign OCSP responses are checked for the correct OCSP extendedKeyUsage. The OCSP checking
is described at:
http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk8/jdk8/jdk/file/57c26829deb6/src/share/classes/sun/security/provider/certpath/OCSPRe
sponse.java#l502.
OCSP as specified in RFC 2560, CRL checking as specified in RFC 5759, and RFC 5280 Section 6.3 revocation
checking will be attempted on certificates that have listed endpoints. It is a configuration option for administrators to
decide if failure to determine a certificate’s status (if that certificate lists an endpoint and the endpoint is unreachable)
should result in certificate rejection. Enveil enables this platform-provided functionality by adding the
java.security.cert.PKIXRevocationChecker class to the list of X509 TrustManagers associated with TLS contexts used
to form connections.
6.3.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server use X.509v3 client-side certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
mutual authentication for HTTPS and TLS. The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server rely upon the platform for
network communication; it also relies upon the platform for validation of X.509v3 certificates as well as for checking
the revocation status of the certificate. The determination whether or not to establish a connection if the revocation
status of a certificate cannot be established is configured by an administrator in the configuration file.
An administrator sets certificate selection decision in configuration file.
ZeroReveal Client Communications
 enveil.security.tls.truststore.path – identifies the path to the TLS trust store. ZeroReveal.
The Server will only accept connections that contain one of these certificates in their certificate chain.
User Communications
 By default, ZeroReveal Client does not require users of its REST API to present a TLS certificate when
connecting. To require a TLS client certificate for users,
enveil.client.require.mtls.for.users must be set to “true” in client.properties. A key store
will be created and a copy of the CA certificate used when issuing client certificates will be placed in the
directory where ZeroReveal Client can read it. This key store will be used as the ZeroReveal Client’s TLS
trust store.
ZeroReveal Server Communications
 enveil.security.tls.truststore.path – identifies the path to the TLS trust store for incoming connections to
ZeroReveal Client.
ZeroReveal Client LDAP communication
 enveil.client.auth.ldap.ssl.keystore.path (path) - identifies the path to the TLS key
store for the certificate used for the LDAP connection.
6.4 Security management
6.4.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1
The ZeroReveal Client and Server Components are not installed with default credentials.
Before running the installer packages, an Enveil user with sudo privileges must be created on the ZeroReveal Client
and Server Components. Following installation using the package manager, an administrator must log in as the Enveil
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user, then create a Password Keyring named “login” for the Enveil user. Its password must be set to be the Enveil
user’s login password.
Additionally, the ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server installer packages makes sure all configuration and data
directories are configured with appropriate permissions to restrict against modification by unprivileged users.
Passwords may not be stored in any of the plain-text configuration files used by ZeroReveal Client or ZeroReveal
Server. Instead, they must be stored in the Enveil user’s default GNOME keyring (also called the “login” keyring),
with attributes that allow ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server to look them up. All private credentials (such as
key store and LDAP passwords) must be stored in the GNOME keyring for the Enveil user.
Once the ZeroReveal Client has been installed, the following configuration steps must be completed:
 Set up TLS for ZeroReveal Client.
 Configure ZeroReveal Client’s LDAP interaction.
 Assign ZeroReveal Client permissions in LDAP.
 Configure at least one ZeroReveal Server connection
ZeroReveal Server is configured so that all communications from ZeroReveal Clients must use mutually-authenticated
TLS. In order to support this, the following steps must be completed:
 Configure a Certificate Authority.
 Create a ZeroReveal Client TLS key store.
 Create a ZeroReveal Server certificate and a ZeroReveal Server TLS key store.
The ZeroReveal Client Component does not provide any functionality until an administrator provides configuration
files.
The ZeroReveal Server Component does not provide any functionality until an administrator provides configuration
files and identifies which certificate is valid (as determined by the criteria/procedure listed in the FIA_X509_EXT.1
section above).
6.4.2 FMT_MEC_EXT.1
Configuration files (modifiable by a text editor) are used to manage ZeroReveal Client Component and ZeroReveal
Server Component configuration. Non-functional configuration file templates are put in place by the installer package.
The components store configuration files in the /etc and home directories. The values and settings in the configuration
files which are relevant to the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are identified below:
 Configuration changes to Enveil property/configuration files can only be made by editing the configuration
files with a text editor.
 CC Guidance Document Appendix A describes how to store the relevant passwords in the GNOME keyring.
o To store the TLS key store password for ZeroReveal Client, use the command:
bash$ secret -tool store --label ="ZeroReveal Client TLS key store password" enveil_handle
client_tls_key_store_password enveil_type password
After entering this command, a secret prompt for the password that will be stored will be presented.
The handle for this password is client_tls_key_store_password. The following value
in client.properties:
enveil.security.tls.keystore.password=client_tls_key_store_password
o To store the TLS key store password for ZeroReveal Server, use the command:
bash$ secret -tool store --label ="ZeroReveal Server TLS key store password" enveil_handle
server_tls_key_store_password enveil_type password
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After entering this command, a secret prompt for the password that will be stored will be presented.
The handle for this password is server_tls_key_store_password. The following value in
server.properties:
enveil.security.tls.keystore.password=server_tls_key_store_password
 CC Guidance Document Appendix A identifies password attributes stored in the configuration file
o enveil_type, which must be set to password
o enveil_handle, which must be set to a unique handle that will be stored in ZeroReveal Platform
configuration files.
o Stored passwords must also have a label, which will be displayed in the keyring UI.
 The ZeroReveal Server settings that are mandated are enumerated in CC Guidance Document section 2.4.
Make sure that server.properties is configured with the following constraints:
o enveil.common.niap.enforce is set to ”true”.
o enveil.security.passwords.are.keyring.handles is set to ”true”.
o enveil.security.tls.strict is set to ”true”.
o enveil.server.data.source.dir is set to ”/etc/enveil/server/dataSources” if using local storage (if
using cluster storage, any value is valid).
o enveil.server.authFile is set to ”/etc/enveil/server/authorized_clients.json”.
o enveil.security.cert.revocation.check.mode is set to check for certificate revocation using any
provided CRL or OCSP. If NONE, no checks are performed. If SOFT_FAIL, checks do not fail if
the CRL/OCSP cannot be reached. If HARD_FAIL, checks fail if the CRL/OCSP cannot be reached.
 ZeroReveal Server Client component settings that are mandated are enumerated in CC Guidance Document
section 3.4. Make sure that client.properties is configured with the following constraints:
o enveil.common.niap.enforce is set to ”true”.
o enveil.security.passwords.are.keyring.handles is set to ”true”.
o enveil.security.tls.strict is set to ”true”.
o enveil.client.keygen.jce is set to ”true”.
o enveil.client.auth.mechanisms is set to ”ldap”.
o enveil.client.gateway.specification.dir is set to ”/etc/enveil/client/gateways”.
o enveil.client.key.registry.dir is set to ”/etc/enveil/client/keydir”.
o enveil.security.cert.revocation.check.mode is set to check for certificate revocation using any
provided CRL or OCSP. If NONE, no checks are performed. If SOFT_FAIL, checks do not fail if
the CRL/OCSP cannot be reached. If HARD_FAIL, checks fail if the CRL/OCSP cannot be reached.
6.4.3 FMT_SMF.1
An enterprise manages the ZeroReveal Client Component and ZeroReveal Server Component via configuration files
on each platform. There is no management CLI, GUI, or interface to manage a component.
6.5 Privacy
6.5.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1
The ZeroReveal Client Component and ZeroReveal Server Component do not collect or transmit PII over a network.
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6.6 Protection of the TSF
6.6.1 FPT_AEX_EXT.1
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components are written in Java which relies on the JRE for memory
and stack protection, this means the JRE must be compiled correctly. The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server
components link to native code GMP which is compiled using GCC with the required compiler flags for ASLR (GCC
CFLAG –fPIC, “Generate position-independent code”) and stack protection (-fstackprotector-all). The ZeroReveal
Client and ZeroReveal Server components rely on the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) for memory protection. The
memory protections for the GMP native code portion were verified through static analysis. The ZeroReveal Client
and ZeroReveal Server components allocate memory regions with write and execute permissions for Oracle Java
runtime performing just-in-time compilation. The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components install data
and library files to /usr/local/enveil/* and configuration files to /etc/enveil/*. By default, the installed directories
containing user-modifiable files do not have executables in them.
The ZeroReveal Client Component and ZeroReveal Server Component run on a CentOS 7.4 system with SELinux
enabled.
6.6.2 FPT_API_EXT.1
Enveil only uses public APIs in the ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components. The ZeroReveal Client
and ZeroReveal Server components use the Linux APIs listed in section 9 Appendix: Linux APIs.
6.6.3 FPT_LIB_EXT.1
The only dynamically loaded native library that is packaged with the ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server
Components is the GMP library as modified by Enveil. The third-party java dependencies are listed Section 10
Appendix: Dependencies.
6.6.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.1
Enveil will publish Yum repositories for updates and patches to ZeroReveal Client Component and ZeroReveal Server
Component. Each component relies on Yum to periodically poll the repositories for updates and notify the user. The
Components do not check for or apply updates on their own. Each component relies on the platform to secure
communication with the Enveil repositories. If Enveil's repository server is not accessible over the network from the
location of a component (for example, if ZeroReveal Client has been installed on a machine without internet access),
the enterprise will need to mirror the repositories locally. The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components
support packages running on Red Hat and Red Hat derivatives in RPM format. Official Enveil RPMs are signed
using Enveil’s private signing key. When using yum to install Enveil ZeroReveal Platform packages, the GPG
signatures on the RPM files will automatically be checked. If they are missing a signature or signed with the wrong
GPG key then an error indicating that the GPG keys for the repository do not match the package will be displayed and
the install will automatically abort. These checks are also run during the installation of every update.
The ZeroReveal Client Component and ZeroReveal Server Component each records their version in their log files at
startup. An administrator can determine the current version by checking head of the component's log.
The update/install packages include the required information so that the package manager will perform removal and
deletion of all traces of the application when an uninstall command is issued through that package manager.
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components are updated using the platform package manager. When
Enveil developers finish a new version of any component, they sign then upload it to the package repositories, which
make it available to users. Updates are initiated by users via the package manager; ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal
Server components never download, modify, replace or update their own binary code.
Enveil provides a changelog as part of the documentation accompanying every update. This changelog communicates
any changes to security properties or configuration that occurred as part of the update.
Enveil provides a public-facing e-mail address (bugs@enveil.com) that users can use to report security vulnerabilities
involving any ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components . This address is communicated to users in the
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ZeroReveal Platform guide and the Enveil website. A public PGP key is provided on the website at
https://enveil.com/bugs, which can be used to encrypt reports sent to this e-mail.
Enveil uses commercial software to automatically check for active CVEs in any third-party dependencies, as part of
its software development and release process.
The window between public disclosure of a vulnerability and availability of a security update on the package manager
will be 14 - 90 days.
6.7 Trusted path/channels
6.7.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1
The ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server components communicate via REST over mutually authenticated TLS.
ZeroReveal Client Components communicate with an authentication server using Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP) secured with TLS. Users communicate with ZeroReveal Client Component through REST
interfaces via HTTPS/TLS.
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7. Protection Profile Claims
This ST conforms to the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.2, 22 April 2016 [PP APP SW].
As explained in Section 3, Security Problem Definition, the Security Problem Definition of the [PP APP SW] has
been included by reference into this ST.
As explained in Section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of the [PP APP SW] have been included by
reference into this ST.
The following table identifies all the security functional requirements in this ST. Each SFR is reproduced from the
[PP APP SW] and operations completed as appropriate.
Table 4 - SFR Protection Profile Sources
Requirement Class Requirement Component Source
FCS: Cryptographic
support
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services [PP APP SW]
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials [PP APP SW]
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol [PP APP SW]
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol [PP APP SW]
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol [PP APP SW]
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Protocol [PP APP SW]
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol [PP APP SW]
FDP: User data
protection
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data [PP APP SW]
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources [PP APP SW]
FDP_NET_EXT.1(1) Network Communications (ZeroReveal
Client Component)
[PP APP SW]
FDP_NET_EXT.1(2) Network Communications (ZeroReveal
Server Component)
[PP APP SW]
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation [PP APP SW]
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication [PP APP SW]
FMT: Security
management
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration [PP APP SW]
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism [PP APP SW]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions [PP APP SW]
FPR: Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of
Personally Identifiable Information
[PP APP SW]
FPT: Protection of the
TSF
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 AntiExploitation Capabilities [PP APP SW]
FPT_API_EXT.1.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs [PP APP SW]
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries [PP APP SW]
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update [PP APP SW]
FTP: Trusted
path/channels
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit [PP APP SW]
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8. Rationale
This security target includes by reference the [PP APP SW] Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives, and
Security Assurance Requirements. The security target makes no additions to the [PP APP SW] assumptions.
[PP APP SW security functional requirements have been reproduced with the [PP APP SW] operations completed.
Operations on the security requirements follow [PP APP SW] application notes and assurance activities.
Consequently, [PP APP SW] rationale applies but is incomplete. The TOE Summary Specification rationale below
serves to complete the rationale required for the security target.
8.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
Each subsection in Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, describes a security function of the TOE. Each
description is followed with rationale that indicates which requirements are satisfied by aspects of the corresponding
security function. The security functions work together to satisfy all of the security functional requirements.
Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary in order for the TSF to provide the required security
functionality.
This section in conjunction with Section 6 TOE Summary Specification provides evidence that the security functions
are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements. The collection of security functions works together to provide
all of the security requirements. The security functions described in the TOE summary specification are all necessary
for the required security functionality in the TSF. Table 5 demonstrates the relationship between security requirements
and security functions.
Table 5 – Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping
Cryptographic
support
User
data
protection
Identification
and
authentication
Security
management
Privacy
Protection
of
the
TSF
Trusted
path/channels
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 X
FCS_STO_EXT.1 X
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 X
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 X
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 X
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 X
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 X
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 X
FDP_NET_EXT.1(1) X
FDP_NET_EXT.1(2) X
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 X
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 X
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
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Cryptographic
support
User
data
protection
Identification
and
authentication
Security
management
Privacy
Protection
of
the
TSF
Trusted
path/channels
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 X
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 X
FPT_API_EXT.1 X
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 X
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 X
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 X
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9. Appendix: Linux APIs
The Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric components use the following APIs from Java:
1. java.io.BufferedInputStream
2. java.io.BufferedReader
3. java.io.BufferedWriter
4. java.io.ByteArrayInputStream
5. java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
6. java.io.Closeable
7. java.io.DataInput
8. java.io.DataInputStream
9. java.io.DataOutput
10. java.io.DataOutputStream
11. java.io.EOFException
12. java.io.File
13. java.io.FileInputStream
14. java.io.FileNotFoundException
15. java.io.FileOutputStream
16. java.io.FileReader
17. java.io.FileWriter
18. java.io.IOException
19. java.io.InputStream
20. java.io.InputStreamReader
21. java.io.ObjectInputStream
22. java.io.ObjectOutputStream
23. java.io.OutputStream
24. java.io.OutputStreamWriter
25. java.io.PipedInputStream
26. java.io.PipedOutputStream
27. java.io.PrintWriter
28. java.io.Reader
29. java.io.Serializable
30. java.io.StringReader
31. java.io.StringWriter
32. java.io.UnsupportedEncodingException
33. java.io.Writer
34. java.lang.annotation.Annotation
35. java.lang.instrument.UnmodifiableClassException
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36. java.lang.management.ManagementFactory
37. java.lang.management.ThreadMXBean
38. java.lang.reflect.Type
39. java.math.BigDecimal
40. java.math.BigInteger
41. java.math.MathContext
42. java.net.InetAddress
43. java.net.JarURLConnection
44. java.net.MalformedURLException
45. java.net.Socket
46. java.net.SocketException
47. java.net.URI
48. java.net.URISyntaxException
49. java.net.URL
50. java.net.URLConnection
51. java.net.URLEncoder
52. java.nio.ByteBuffer
53. java.nio.channels.FileChannel
54. java.nio.charset.Charset
55. java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets
56. java.nio.file.FileSystem
57. java.nio.file.FileSystems
58. java.nio.file.Files
59. java.nio.file.NoSuchFileException
60. java.nio.file.Path
61. java.nio.file.Paths
62. java.nio.file.StandardOpenOption
63. java.nio.file.attribute.PosixFilePermission
64. java.security.DigestInputStream
65. java.security.DigestOutputStream
66. java.security.GeneralSecurityException
67. java.security.InvalidAlgorithmParameterException
68. java.security.InvalidKeyException
69. java.security.Key
70. java.security.KeyManagementException
71. java.security.KeyPair
72. java.security.KeyPairGenerator
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73. java.security.KeyStore
74. java.security.KeyStoreException
75. java.security.MessageDigest
76. java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException
77. java.security.NoSuchProviderException
78. java.security.Principal
79. java.security.PublicKey
80. java.security.SecureRandom
81. java.security.Security
82. java.security.SignatureException
83. java.security.UnrecoverableKeyException
84. java.security.cert.CertPathBuilder
85. java.security.cert.Certificate
86. java.security.cert.CertificateEncodingException
87. java.security.cert.CertificateException
88. java.security.cert.CertificateExpiredException
89. java.security.cert.CertificateFactory
90. java.security.cert.CertificateNotYetValidException
91. java.security.cert.CertificateParsingException
92. java.security.cert.PKIXBuilderParameters
93. java.security.cert.PKIXRevocationChecker
94. java.security.cert.X509CertSelector
95. java.security.cert.X509Certificate
96. java.security.interfaces.RSAPrivateCrtKey
97. java.security.spec.InvalidKeySpecException
98. java.sql.Array
99. java.sql.Blob
100.java.sql.CallableStatement
101.java.sql.ClientInfoStatus
102.java.sql.Clob
103.java.sql.Connection
104.java.sql.DatabaseMetaData
105.java.sql.Date
106.java.sql.DriverManager
107.java.sql.DriverPropertyInfo
108.java.sql.JDBCType
109.java.sql.NClob
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110.java.sql.ParameterMetaData
111.java.sql.PreparedStatement
112.java.sql.Ref
113.java.sql.ResultSet
114.java.sql.ResultSetMetaData
115.java.sql.RowId
116.java.sql.RowIdLifetime
117.java.sql.SQLClientInfoException
118.java.sql.SQLException
119.java.sql.SQLFeatureNotSupportedException
120.java.sql.SQLWarning
121.java.sql.SQLXML
122.java.sql.Savepoint
123.java.sql.Statement
124.java.sql.Struct
125.java.sql.Time
126.java.sql.Timestamp
127.java.sql.Types
128.java.text.DateFormat
129.java.text.DecimalFormat
130.java.text.NumberFormat
131.java.text.ParseException
132.java.text.SimpleDateFormat
133.java.time.Instant
134.java.util.ArrayList
135.java.util.Arrays
136.java.util.Base64
137.java.util.Calendar
138.java.util.Collection
139.java.util.Collections
140.java.util.Comparator
141.java.util.Date
142.java.util.EnumSet
143.java.util.Enumeration
144.java.util.HashMap
145.java.util.HashSet
146.java.util.Hashtable
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147.java.util.IdentityHashMap
148.java.util.Iterator
149.java.util.LinkedHashMap
150.java.util.LinkedHashSet
151.java.util.LinkedList
152.java.util.List
153.java.util.Locale
154.java.util.Map
155.java.util.Map.Entry
156.java.util.NoSuchElementException
157.java.util.Objects
158.java.util.Optional
159.java.util.PriorityQueue
160.java.util.Properties
161.java.util.Queue
162.java.util.Random
163.java.util.Set
164.java.util.SortedMap
165.java.util.SortedSet
166.java.util.Spliterator
167.java.util.Spliterators
168.java.util.TimeZone
169.java.util.Timer
170.java.util.TimerTask
171.java.util.TreeMap
172.java.util.TreeSet
173.java.util.UUID
174.java.util.concurrent.ArrayBlockingQueue
175.java.util.concurrent.BlockingQueue
176.java.util.concurrent.BrokenBarrierException
177.java.util.concurrent.Callable
178.java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
179.java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentLinkedQueue
180.java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentMap
181.java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentSkipListMap
182.java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentSkipListSet
183.java.util.concurrent.CountDownLatch
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184.java.util.concurrent.CyclicBarrier
185.java.util.concurrent.ExecutionException
186.java.util.concurrent.Executor
187.java.util.concurrent.ExecutorService
188.java.util.concurrent.Executors
189.java.util.concurrent.Future
190.java.util.concurrent.LinkedBlockingQueue
191.java.util.concurrent.RejectedExecutionException
192.java.util.concurrent.ScheduledExecutorService
193.java.util.concurrent.ScheduledFuture
194.java.util.concurrent.ThreadLocalRandom
195.java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit
196.java.util.concurrent.TimeoutException
197.java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean
198.java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger
199.java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong
200.java.util.concurrent.locks.Lock
201.java.util.concurrent.locks.ReadWriteLock
202.java.util.concurrent.locks.ReentrantLock
203.java.util.concurrent.locks.ReentrantReadWriteLock
204.java.util.function.Consumer
205.java.util.function.Function
206.java.util.function.Predicate
207.java.util.function.Supplier
208.java.util.jar.JarFile
209.java.util.logging.Handler
210.java.util.logging.Level
211.java.util.logging.LogManager
212.java.util.logging.Logger
213.java.util.regex.Matcher
214.java.util.regex.Pattern
215.java.util.regex.PatternSyntaxException
216.java.util.stream.Collectors
217.java.util.stream.LongStream
218.java.util.stream.Stream
219.java.util.stream.StreamSupport
220.java.util.zip.GZIPInputStream
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221.java.util.zip.GZIPOutputStream
222.java.util.zip.ZipEntry
223.javax.annotation.Nonnull
224.javax.annotation.Nullable
225.javax.annotation.concurrent.NotThreadSafe
226.javax.crypto.BadPaddingException
227.javax.crypto.Cipher
228.javax.crypto.CipherInputStream
229.javax.crypto.CipherOutputStream
230.javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException
231.javax.crypto.KeyGenerator
232.javax.crypto.NoSuchPaddingException
233.javax.crypto.SecretKey
234.javax.crypto.SecretKeyFactory
235.javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec
236.javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec
237.javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
238.javax.inject.Inject
239.javax.inject.Named
240.javax.inject.Singleton
241.javax.jms.Connection
242.javax.jms.Destination
243.javax.jms.JMSException
244.javax.jms.Message
245.javax.jms.MessageConsumer
246.javax.jms.MessageProducer
247.javax.jms.Session
248.javax.jms.TextMessage
249.javax.management.ServiceNotFoundException
250.javax.naming.NamingEnumeration
251.javax.naming.NamingException
252.javax.naming.OperationNotSupportedException
253.javax.naming.directory.Attribute
254.javax.naming.directory.SearchControls
255.javax.naming.directory.SearchResult
256.javax.naming.ldap.LdapContext
257.javax.net.SocketFactory
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258.javax.net.ssl.CertPathTrustManagerParameters
259.javax.net.ssl.HostnameVerifier
260.javax.net.ssl.KeyManager
261.javax.net.ssl.KeyManagerFactory
262.javax.net.ssl.SSLContext
263.javax.net.ssl.SSLHandshakeException
264.javax.net.ssl.SSLServerSocket
265.javax.net.ssl.SSLSession
266.javax.net.ssl.SSLSocket
267.javax.net.ssl.SSLSocketFactory
268.javax.net.ssl.TrustManager
269.javax.net.ssl.TrustManagerFactory
270.javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager
271.javax.persistence.Access
272.javax.persistence.AccessType
273.javax.persistence.AttributeOverride
274.javax.persistence.AttributeOverrides
275.javax.persistence.CascadeType
276.javax.persistence.Column
277.javax.persistence.ElementCollection
278.javax.persistence.Embeddable
279.javax.persistence.Embedded
280.javax.persistence.Entity
281.javax.persistence.EnumType
282.javax.persistence.Enumerated
283.javax.persistence.GeneratedValue
284.javax.persistence.Id
285.javax.persistence.JoinColumn
286.javax.persistence.JoinTable
287.javax.persistence.Lob
288.javax.persistence.ManyToMany
289.javax.persistence.ManyToOne
290.javax.persistence.OneToMany
291.javax.persistence.OneToOne
292.javax.persistence.Temporal
293.javax.persistence.TemporalType
294.javax.persistence.Transient
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295.javax.persistence.criteria.CriteriaBuilder
296.javax.persistence.criteria.CriteriaQuery
297.javax.persistence.criteria.Join
298.javax.persistence.criteria.Predicate
299.javax.persistence.criteria.Root
300.javax.security.auth.login.Configuration
301.javax.servlet.*
302.javax.servlet.FilterChain
303.javax.servlet.FilterConfig
304.javax.servlet.ServletConfig
305.javax.servlet.ServletContext
306.javax.servlet.ServletException
307.javax.servlet.ServletRequest
308.javax.servlet.ServletResponse
309.javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet
310.javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse
311.javax.sql.DataSource
312.javax.validation.constraints.NotNull
313.javax.validation.constraints.Size
314.javax.ws.rs.*
315.javax.ws.rs.Consumes
316.javax.ws.rs.DELETE
317.javax.ws.rs.DefaultValue
318.javax.ws.rs.GET
319.javax.ws.rs.InternalServerErrorException
320.javax.ws.rs.NotFoundException
321.javax.ws.rs.POST
322.javax.ws.rs.PUT
323.javax.ws.rs.Path
324.javax.ws.rs.PathParam
325.javax.ws.rs.ProcessingException
326.javax.ws.rs.Produces
327.javax.ws.rs.QueryParam
328.javax.ws.rs.WebApplicationException
329.javax.ws.rs.client.Client
330.javax.ws.rs.client.Entity
331.javax.ws.rs.client.WebTarget
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332.javax.ws.rs.container.ContainerRequestContext
333.javax.ws.rs.container.ContainerRequestFilter
334.javax.ws.rs.container.ContainerResponseContext
335.javax.ws.rs.container.ContainerResponseFilter
336.javax.ws.rs.container.PreMatching
337.javax.ws.rs.core.Context
338.javax.ws.rs.core.HttpHeaders
339.javax.ws.rs.core.MediaType
340.javax.ws.rs.core.MultivaluedMap
341.javax.ws.rs.core.Request
342.javax.ws.rs.core.Response
343.javax.ws.rs.core.SecurityContext
344.javax.ws.rs.core.StreamingOutput
345.javax.ws.rs.core.UriBuilder
346.javax.ws.rs.core.UriInfo
347.javax.ws.rs.ext.ExceptionMapper
348.javax.ws.rs.ext.MessageBodyReader
349.javax.ws.rs.ext.MessageBodyWriter
350.javax.ws.rs.ext.Provider
351.javax.xml.XMLConstants
352.javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter
353.javax.xml.bind.annotation.XmlTransient
354.javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder
355.javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory
356.javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException
357.javax.xml.transform.Source
358.javax.xml.transform.dom.DOMSource
359.javax.xml.transform.stream.StreamSource
360.javax.xml.validation.Schema
361.javax.xml.validation.SchemaFactory
362.javax.xml.validation.Validator
The included GMP library imports these C/C++ headers:
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1. algorithm
2. assert.h
3. cfloat
4. cstring
5. ctype.h
6. errno.h
7. fcntl.h
8. float.h
9. gmp.h
10. ia64intrin.h
11. intrinsics.h
12. inttypes.h
13. invent.h
14. iosfwd
15. langinfo.h
16. limits.h
17. limits
18. locale.h
19. machine/builtins.h
20. machine/hal_sysinfo.h
21. math.h
22. nl_types.h
23. obstack.h
24. readline/history.h
25. readline/readline.h
26. setjmp.h
27. signal.h
28. sstream
29. stdarg.h
30. stddef.h
31. stdexcept
32. stdint.h
33. stdio.h
34. stdlib.h
35. string.h
36. string
37. strstream
38. sys/attributes.h
39. sys/ioctl.h
40. sys/iograph.h
41. sys/mman.h
42. sys/param.h
43. sys/processor.h
44. sys/pstat.h
45. sys/resource.h
46. sys/sysctl.h
47. sys/sysinfo.h
48. sys/syssgi.h
49. sys/systemcfg.h
50. sys/time.h
51. sys/times.h
52. sys/types.h
53. time.h
54. type_traits
55. unistd.h
56. utility
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10. Appendix: Dependencies
The Java dependencies are included in the project:
The dependencies are provided in the Maven identifier format of groupId : package name : version.
1. aopalliance:aopalliance:1.0
2. com.google.code.findbugs:jsr305:3.0.2
3. com.google.errorprone:error_prone_annotations:2.1.3
4. com.google.guava:guava:24.0-jre
5. com.google.inject:guice:4.1.0
6. com.google.j2objc:j2objc-annotations:1.1
7. javax.inject:javax.inject:1
8. javax.validation:validation-api:2.0.1.Final
9. log4j:log4j:1.2.17
10. net.java.dev.jna:jna:4.5.1
11. net.revelc.code:gnome-keyring-java:1.0.0-SNAPSHOT
12. org.checkerframework:checker-compat-qual:2.0.0
13. org.codehaus.mojo:animal-sniffer-annotations:1.14
14. com.google.code.gson:gson:2.8.2
15. it.unimi.dsi:fastutil:8.1.1
16. com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-annotations:2.6.7
17. io.swagger:swagger-annotations:1.5.18
18. antlr:antlr:2.7.7
19. asm:asm:3.1
20. com.fasterxml:classmate:1.3.0
21. com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core:2.6.7
22. com.github.cliftonlabs:json-simple:2.3.0
23. com.github.jnr:jffi:1.2.9
24. com.github.jnr:jnr-ffi:2.0.5
25. com.github.jnr:jnr-x86asm:1.0.2
26. com.google.inject.extensions:guice-multibindings:4.1.0
27. com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java:2.5.0
28. com.h2database:h2:1.4.196
29. com.jamesmurty.utils:java-xmlbuilder:0.4
30. com.jcraft:jsch:0.1.54
31. com.lambdaworks:scrypt:1.4.0
32. com.mchange:c3p0:0.9.5.2
33. com.mchange:mchange-commons-java:0.2.11
34. com.microsoft.azure:azure-keyvault-core:1.0.0
35. com.microsoft.azure:azure-storage:7.0.0
36. com.nimbusds:nimbus-jose-jwt:3.9
37. com.squareup.okhttp:okhttp:2.4.0
38. com.squareup.okio:okio:1.4.0
39. com.sun.jersey:jersey-core:1.9
40. com.sun.jersey:jersey-server:1.9
41. com.thoughtworks.paranamer:paranamer:2.3
42. commons-beanutils:commons-beanutils:1.9.3
43. commons-cli:commons-cli:1.2
44. commons-codec:commons-codec:1.11
45. commons-collections:commons-collections:3.2.2
46. commons-configuration:commons-configuration:1.6
47. commons-daemon:commons-daemon:1.0.13
48. commons-digester:commons-digester:1.8
49. commons-io:commons-io:2.6
50. commons-lang:commons-lang:2.6
51. commons-logging:commons-logging:1.2
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52. commons-net:commons-net:3.1
53. dom4j:dom4j:1.6.1
54. io.netty:netty:3.6.2.Final
55. io.netty:netty-all:4.0.56.Final
56. net.java.dev.jets3t:jets3t:0.9.0
57. net.jcip:jcip-annotations:1.0
58. net.jpountz.lz4:lz4:1.3.0
59. net.minidev:json-smart:1.1.1
60. org.abstractj.kalium:kalium:0.7.0
61. org.apache.avro:avro:1.7.4
62. org.apache.commons:commons-compress:1.4.1
63. org.apache.commons:commons-lang3:3.7
64. org.apache.commons:commons-math3:3.1.1
65. org.apache.curator:curator-framework:2.7.1
66. org.apache.curator:curator-recipes:2.7.1
67. org.apache.directory.api:api-asn1-api:1.0.0-M20
68. org.apache.directory.api:api-util:1.0.0-M20
69. org.apache.directory.server:apacheds-i18n:2.0.0-M15
70. org.apache.directory.server:apacheds-kerberos-codec:2.0.0-M15
71. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-annotations:2.8.3
72. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-auth:2.8.3
73. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-azure:2.8.3
74. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-client:2.8.3
75. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-common:2.8.3
76. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-hdfs:2.8.3
77. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-hdfs-client:2.8.3
78. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-mapreduce-client-app:2.8.3
79. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-mapreduce-client-common:2.8.3
80. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-mapreduce-client-jobclient:2.8.3
81. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-mapreduce-client-shuffle:2.8.3
82. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-yarn-api:2.8.3
83. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-yarn-client:2.8.3
84. org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-yarn-server-common:2.8.3
85. org.apache.htrace:htrace-core4:4.0.1-incubating
86. org.apache.httpcomponents:httpclient:4.5.2
87. org.apache.httpcomponents:httpcore:4.4.4
88. org.apache.lucene:lucene-analyzers-common:7.2.1
89. org.apache.lucene:lucene-core:7.2.1
90. org.apache.shiro:shiro-cache:1.4.0
91. org.apache.shiro:shiro-config-core:1.4.0
92. org.apache.shiro:shiro-config-ogdl:1.4.0
93. org.apache.shiro:shiro-core:1.4.0
94. org.apache.shiro:shiro-crypto-cipher:1.4.0
95. org.apache.shiro:shiro-crypto-core:1.4.0
96. org.apache.shiro:shiro-crypto-hash:1.4.0
97. org.apache.shiro:shiro-event:1.4.0
98. org.apache.shiro:shiro-lang:1.4.0
99. org.apache.zookeeper:zookeeper:3.4.6
100.org.codehaus.jackson:jackson-core-asl:1.9.13
101.org.codehaus.jackson:jackson-mapper-asl:1.9.13
102.org.fusesource.leveldbjni:leveldbjni-all:1.8
103.org.glassfish.grizzly:grizzly-framework:2.4.3
104.org.hibernate:hibernate-c3p0:5.2.12.Final
105.org.hibernate:hibernate-core:5.2.12.Final
106.org.hibernate.common:hibernate-commons-annotations:5.0.1.Final
107.org.hibernate.javax.persistence:hibernate-jpa-2.1-api:1.0.2.Final
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108.org.javassist:javassist:3.20.0-GA
109.org.jboss:jandex:2.0.3.Final
110.org.jboss.logging:jboss-logging:3.3.0.Final
111.org.jboss.spec.javax.transaction:jboss-transaction-api_1.2_spec:1.0.1.Final
112.org.mortbay.jetty:jetty:6.1.26
113.org.mortbay.jetty:jetty-sslengine:6.1.26
114.org.mortbay.jetty:jetty-util:6.1.26
115.org.ow2.asm:asm:6.0
116.org.ow2.asm:asm-analysis:6.0
117.org.ow2.asm:asm-commons:6.0
118.org.ow2.asm:asm-tree:5.0.3
119.org.ow2.asm:asm-util:6.0
120.org.scala-lang:scala-library:2.11.12
121.org.slf4j:slf4j-api:1.7.25
122.org.slf4j:slf4j-log4j12:1.7.25
123.org.tukaani:xz:1.0
124.org.xerial.snappy:snappy-java:1.0.4.1
125.xerces:xercesImpl:2.9.1
126.xmlenc:xmlenc:0.52
127.com.101tec:zkclient:0.9
128.com.amazonaws:aws-java-sdk-core:1.11.276
129.com.amazonaws:aws-java-sdk-dynamodb:1.11.276
130.com.amazonaws:aws-java-sdk-kms:1.11.276
131.com.amazonaws:aws-java-sdk-s3:1.11.276
132.com.amazonaws:jmespath-java:1.11.276
133.com.clearspring.analytics:stream:2.7.0
134.com.esotericsoftware:kryo-shaded:4.0.1
135.com.esotericsoftware:minlog:1.3.0
136.com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind:2.6.7.1
137.com.fasterxml.jackson.dataformat:jackson-dataformat-cbor:2.6.7
138.com.fasterxml.jackson.dataformat:jackson-dataformat-yaml:2.9.3
139.com.fasterxml.jackson.module:jackson-module-paranamer:2.6.5
140.com.fasterxml.jackson.module:jackson-module-scala_2.11:2.6.5
141.com.github.traviscrawford:spark-dynamodb:0.0.11
142.com.google.code.findbugs:annotations:3.0.1u2
143.com.intellij:annotations:12.0
144.com.ning:compress-lzf:1.0.3
145.com.sun.jersey:jersey-client:1.9
146.com.twitter:chill-java:0.8.0
147.com.twitter:chill_2.11:0.8.0
148.com.twitter:util-app_2.11:6.43.0
149.com.twitter:util-core_2.11:6.43.0
150.com.twitter:util-function_2.11:6.43.0
151.com.twitter:util-registry_2.11:6.43.0
152.com.univocity:univocity-parsers:2.6.2
153.com.yammer.metrics:metrics-core:2.2.0
154.commons-beanutils:commons-beanutils-core:1.8.0
155.commons-httpclient:commons-httpclient:3.1
156.io.dropwizard.metrics:metrics-core:3.1.2
157.io.dropwizard.metrics:metrics-graphite:3.1.2
158.io.dropwizard.metrics:metrics-json:3.1.2
159.io.dropwizard.metrics:metrics-jvm:3.1.2
160.io.swagger:swagger-core:1.5.18
161.io.swagger:swagger-jaxrs:1.5.18
162.io.swagger:swagger-models:1.5.18
163.javax.activation:activation:1.1
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164.javax.annotation:javax.annotation-api:1.3.1
165.javax.servlet:javax.servlet-api:3.1.0
166.javax.servlet:servlet-api:2.5
167.javax.ws.rs:javax.ws.rs-api:2.1
168.javax.xml.bind:jaxb-api:2.2.2
169.javax.xml.stream:stax-api:1.0-2
170.joda-time:joda-time:2.8.1
171.mx4j:mx4j:3.0.2
172.mysql:mysql-connector-java:6.0.6
173.net.java.dev.jna:jna-platform:4.4.0
174.net.openhft:affinity:3.1.7
175.net.razorvine:pyrolite:4.13
176.net.sf.jopt-simple:jopt-simple:4.9
177.net.sf.py4j:py4j:0.10.4
178.org.antlr:antlr4-runtime:4.5.3
179.org.apache.activemq:activemq-all:5.15.2
180.org.apache.avro:avro-ipc:1.7.7
181.org.apache.avro:avro-mapred:1.7.7
182.org.apache.commons:commons-crypto:1.0.0
183.org.apache.curator:curator-client:4.0.1
184.org.apache.curator:curator-framework:4.0.1
185.org.apache.curator:curator-recipes:4.0.1
186.org.apache.derby:derby:10.14.1.0
187.org.apache.derby:derbyclient:10.14.1.0
188.org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-aws:2.8.3
189.org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-mapreduce-client-core:2.8.3
190.org.apache.hadoop:hadoop-yarn-common:2.8.3
191.org.apache.ivy:ivy:2.4.0
192.org.apache.kafka:kafka-clients:0.10.1.0
193.org.apache.kafka:kafka_2.11:0.10.1.0
194.org.apache.parquet:parquet-column:1.8.2
195.org.apache.parquet:parquet-common:1.8.2
196.org.apache.parquet:parquet-encoding:1.8.2
197.org.apache.parquet:parquet-format:2.3.1
198.org.apache.parquet:parquet-hadoop:1.8.2
199.org.apache.parquet:parquet-jackson:1.8.2
200.org.apache.shiro:shiro-guice:1.4.0
201.org.apache.spark:spark-catalyst_2.11:2.2.1
202.org.apache.spark:spark-core_2.11:2.2.1
203.org.apache.spark:spark-launcher_2.11:2.2.1
204.org.apache.spark:spark-network-common_2.11:2.2.1
205.org.apache.spark:spark-network-shuffle_2.11:2.2.1
206.org.apache.spark:spark-sketch_2.11:2.2.1
207.org.apache.spark:spark-sql_2.11:2.2.1
208.org.apache.spark:spark-streaming_2.11:2.2.1
209.org.apache.spark:spark-tags_2.11:2.2.1
210.org.apache.spark:spark-unsafe_2.11:2.2.1
211.org.apache.xbean:xbean-asm5-shaded:4.4
212.org.apache.zookeeper:zookeeper:3.5.3-beta
213.org.codehaus.jackson:jackson-jaxrs:1.9.13
214.org.codehaus.jackson:jackson-xc:1.9.13
215.org.codehaus.janino:commons-compiler:3.0.0
216.org.codehaus.janino:janino:3.0.0
217.org.elasticsearch:elasticsearch-hadoop:6.2.1
218.org.glassfish.grizzly:grizzly-http:2.4.3
219.org.glassfish.grizzly:grizzly-http-server:2.4.3
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220.org.glassfish.grizzly:grizzly-http-servlet:2.4.3
221.org.glassfish.grizzly:grizzly-websockets:2.4.3
222.org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-api:2.5.0-b61
223.org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-locator:2.5.0-b61
224.org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-utils:2.5.0-b61
225.org.glassfish.hk2:osgi-resource-locator:1.0.1
226.org.glassfish.hk2.external:aopalliance-repackaged:2.5.0-b61
227.org.glassfish.hk2.external:javax.inject:2.5.0-b61
228.org.glassfish.jersey.containers:jersey-container-grizzly2-http:2.26
229.org.glassfish.jersey.containers:jersey-container-servlet:2.22.2
230.org.glassfish.jersey.containers:jersey-container-servlet-core:2.22.2
231.org.glassfish.jersey.core:jersey-client:2.26
232.org.glassfish.jersey.core:jersey-common:2.26
233.org.glassfish.jersey.core:jersey-server:2.26
234.org.glassfish.jersey.inject:jersey-hk2:2.26
235.org.glassfish.jersey.media:jersey-media-jaxb:2.26
236.org.glassfish.jersey.media:jersey-media-multipart:2.26
237.org.javassist:javassist:3.22.0-CR2
238.org.json4s:json4s-ast_2.11:3.2.11
239.org.json4s:json4s-core_2.11:3.2.11
240.org.json4s:json4s-jackson_2.11:3.2.11
241.org.jvnet.mimepull:mimepull:1.9.6
242.org.mongodb:mongo-java-driver:3.4.2
243.org.mongodb.spark:mongo-spark-connector_2.11:2.2.1
244.org.objenesis:objenesis:2.5.1
245.org.ow2.asm:asm-analysis:5.0.3
246.org.ow2.asm:asm-commons:5.0.3
247.org.ow2.asm:asm-util:5.0.3
248.org.postgresql:postgresql:42.2.1
249.org.reflections:reflections:0.9.11
250.org.roaringbitmap:RoaringBitmap:0.5.11
251.org.scala-lang:scala-reflect:2.11.12
252.org.scala-lang.modules:scala-parser-combinators_2.11:1.0.4
253.org.scala-lang.modules:scala-xml_2.11:1.0.6
254.org.slf4j:jcl-over-slf4j:1.7.16
255.org.slf4j:jul-to-slf4j:1.7.16
256.org.spark-project.spark:unused:1.0.0
257.org.xerial.snappy:snappy-java:1.1.2.6
258.org.yaml:snakeyaml:1.18
259.oro:oro:2.0.8
260.software.amazon.ion:ion-java:1.0.2
261.xml-apis:xml-apis:1.4.01
262.com.bettercloud:vault-java-driver:2.0.0
263.com.facebook.presto:presto-parser:0.189
264.com.fasterxml.jackson.jaxrs:jackson-jaxrs-base:2.6.7
265.com.fasterxml.jackson.jaxrs:jackson-jaxrs-json-provider:2.6.7
266.com.fasterxml.jackson.module:jackson-module-jaxb-annotations:2.6.7
267.com.google.inject.extensions:guice-assistedinject:4.1.0
268.com.neovisionaries:nv-websocket-client:2.3
269.com.squareup.okhttp:okhttp:2.7.5
270.com.squareup.okio:okio:1.6.0
271.io.airlift:slice:0.32
272.io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt:0.9.0
273.javax.annotation:javax.annotation-api:1.2
274.javax.servlet:javax.servlet-api:4.0.0
275.javax.xml.bind:jaxb-api:2.3.0
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276.org.antlr:antlr4-runtime:4.6
277.org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-api:2.5.0-b42
278.org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-locator:2.5.0-b42
279.org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-utils:2.5.0-b42
280.org.glassfish.hk2.external:aopalliance-repackaged:2.5.0-b42
281.org.waxeye:waxeye:0.8.1
282.ch.qos.cal10n:cal10n-api:0.8.1
283.com.atlassian.commonmark:commonmark:0.9.0
284.com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-annotations:2.9.3
285.com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core:2.9.3
286.com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind:2.9.3
287.com.github.fge:btf:1.2
288.com.github.fge:jackson-coreutils:1.6
289.com.github.fge:json-patch:1.6
290.com.github.fge:msg-simple:1.1
291.com.github.fge:uri-template:0.9
292.com.github.java-json-tools:json-schema-core:1.2.8
293.com.github.java-json-tools:json-schema-validator:2.2.8
294.com.google.code.findbugs:jsr305:3.0.1
295.com.google.guava:guava:20.0
296.com.googlecode.libphonenumber:libphonenumber:8.0.0
297.com.samskivert:jmustache:1.12
298.com.squareup.okhttp:logging-interceptor:2.7.5
299.com.squareup.okio:okio:1.14.0
300.commons-codec:commons-codec:1.9
301.commons-io:commons-io:2.4
302.io.swagger:swagger-codegen:2.3.1
303.io.swagger:swagger-compat-spec-parser:1.0.33
304.io.swagger:swagger-parser:1.0.33
305.javax.mail:mailapi:1.4.3
306.javax.validation:validation-api:1.1.0.Final
307.joda-time:joda-time:2.9.9
308.junit:junit:4.12
309.net.sf.jopt-simple:jopt-simple:5.0.3
310.org.apache.commons:commons-lang3:3.4
311.org.hamcrest:hamcrest-core:1.3
312.org.mozilla:rhino:1.7R4
313.org.slf4j:slf4j-api:1.7.12
314.org.slf4j:slf4j-ext:1.7.12
315.org.slf4j:slf4j-simple:1.7.12
316.ch.qos.logback:logback-classic:1.2.3
317.ch.qos.logback:logback-core:1.2.3
318.com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-annotations:2.6.0
319.io.swagger:swagger-jersey2-jaxrs:1.5.18
320.org.apache.commons:commons-lang3:3.2.1
321.org.glassfish.grizzly:grizzly-http-servlet:2.4.0
322.org.glassfish.hk2.external:javax.inject:2.5.0-b42
323.org.glassfish.jersey.containers:jersey-container-grizzly2-servlet:2.26
324.org.glassfish.jersey.containers:jersey-container-servlet:2.26
325.org.glassfish.jersey.containers:jersey-container-servlet-core:2.26
326.org.javassist:javassist:3.21.0-GA
327.javax.ws.rs:jsr311-api:1.1.1
328.org.codehaus.plexus:plexus-utils:3.1.0
329.cglib:cglib-nodep:3.2.5
330.com.facebook.presto:presto-base-jdbc:0.189
331.com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-annotations:2.8.1
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332.com.google.inject.extensions:guice-multibindings:4.0
333.com.sun.xml.bind:jaxb-impl:2.2.6
334.io.airlift:bootstrap:0.163
335.io.airlift:concurrent:0.156
336.io.airlift:configuration:0.163
337.io.airlift:log:0.156
338.io.airlift:log-manager:0.163
339.io.airlift:units:1.0
340.javax.xml.bind:jaxb-api:2.2.6
341.org.apache.bval:bval-core:1.1.1
342.org.apache.bval:bval-jsr:1.1.1
343.org.weakref:jmxutils:1.19
344.com.facebook.presto:presto-jdbc:0.189
345.com.google.code.findbugs:jsr305:1.3.9