National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cog Systems
Level 1, 277 King Street
Newton NSW 2042 Australia
D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9
Secured by Cog Systems
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10855-2017
Dated: November 16, 2017
Version: 0.3
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9 Validation Report Version 0.3, November 16, 2017
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Stelios Melachrinoudis
John Butterworth
Joanne Fitzpatrick
The MITRE Corporation
Ken Stutterheim
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 5
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 5
4.6 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 5
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 6
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 6
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 6
8 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 7
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 7
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 7
8.3 Test Configuration .............................................................................................. 7
9 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 8
10 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 8
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 8
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 8
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 8
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ..................................... 9
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 9
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)......................................................... 9
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 10
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 10
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 10
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 10
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 10
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 12
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9 solution
secured by Cog Systems. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the
conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or
implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in November 2017. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21 October
2013.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9 secured by
Cog Systems.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the D4 Secure VPN
Client for the HTC A9 Secured by Cog Systems (IVPNCPP14) Security Target, version 0.7,
October 31, 2017 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
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laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9 secured by Cog Systems
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4,
21 October 2013
ST D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9 secured by Cog Systems (IVPNCPP14)
Security Target, version 0.7, October 31, 2017
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9, version 0.3,
November 15, 2017
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Cog Systems
Developer Cog Systems
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Stelios Melachrinoudis, The MITRE Corporation
John Butterworth, The MITRE Corporation
Joanne Fitzpatrick, The MITRE Corporation
Ken Stutterheim, The Aerospace Corporation
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the D4 Secure VPN Client that is the HTC A9 Secured
by Cog Systems D4 Secure Mobile device's built-in Outer Data-In-Transit (DIT) VPN client.
The Outer DIT VPN runs only on the evaluated HTC A9 Secured by Cog Systems D4 Secure
Mobile device.
The D4 Secure is a smartphone based upon an HTC A9 hardware which uses Qualcomm
SoCs (Snapdragon 617, MSM8952) and runs custom Cog Systems D4 Secure images. This
is a custom built smartphone intended to support military and civil service users. The D4
Secure Mobile Device is the TOE Platform for the Outer DIT VPN client. Since the Outer
DIT VPN is built-into the evaluated D4 Secure Mobile device, it is considered to have the
same version as the D4 Secure Mobile device.
The TOE provides always on secure remote network connectivity for the D4 Secure and
Android 6.0.1 operating system, by providing an IPsec VPN that once configured, protects
all data communication. The Outer DIT VPN client sends all network communication to the
connected VPN gateway through an IPsec protected communication channel.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration consists of the D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE is a built-in VPN client (referred to as the Outer DIT). The cell providing the
TOE’s built-in VPN client is referred to as the Outer DIT cell. The TOE also includes a “C2
Agent” cell and an “HSM proxy” cell. These cells cooperate with the Outer DIT cell to
facilitate interaction with the TOE Platform1
. All IPSec protocol functions are provided by
the TOE. All network traffic from the Android Cell is passed through the Outer DIT cell by
the platform, thus ensuring that the Outer DIT VPN can protect all traffic.
The VPN Client relies upon its platform for the random numbers with which it seeds its own
DRBG. All cryptography supporting the IPsec protocol stack is provided by the TOE. Data
stored by the TOE utilize functions offered by the platform.
The following figure depicts the “Cells” in the D4 Secure Mobile Device. The figure shows
the Outer DIT VPN client (i.e., Outer DIT cell, C2 Agent cell and HSM proxy cell), as well
as the D4 Secure Mobile cells supporting the Outer DIT VPN Client. The D4 Secure Mobile
Device is packaged to include all of the pieces shown in Figure 3-1. The “blue”, “yellow”
and “black” boxes in Figure 3-1 represent software that is part of the TOE Platform. The
TOE is composed of only the cells shown in orange. The Outer DIT cell and C2 agent cell
are running a Linux kernel that provides an environment for the cell’s functionality. The
HSM proxy cell is a cell running customized C language code.
1
Refer to the Platform Security Target, VID 10776 for a description of platform cells.
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Figure 3-1 D4 Secure Mobile Architecture
The TOE platform ensures that all network traffic from the Android cell passes through the
Outer DIT cell which encapsulates the traffic in an IPsec tunnel. The outer DIT cell is a
Linux 3.10.84 kernel with StrongSwan version 5.5.1 IPsec, OpenSSL 2.0.14 cryptographic
library, and other non-cryptographic supporting libraries. The Outer DIT cell interacts with
other cells (specifically the Android cell) via virtualized Ethernet. This ensures that the
communication from the Android cell must pass through the Outer DIT cell (irrespective of
whether the phone is connected via Wi-Fi or Mobile) and thus through the D4 Secure VPN
Client.
The administrator configures the D4 Secure VPN client using a physically connected
provisioning workstation. The provisioning workstation directly writes to the phone's
internal, non-volatile memory after the user has unlocked the mobile device. The user cannot
change the configuration once the device has been provisioned.
The TOE protects itself from tampering and bypass by offering only a limited and controlled
set of functions at each of its physical interfaces to its environment. Communication via those
interfaces is either directed at the TOE for the purpose of administration or is directed through
the TOE for communication among network devices. In both cases the TOE implements a
set of policies to control the services available and those services are designed to protect and
ensure the secure operation of the TOE.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The D4 Secure Outer DIT VPN Client runs entirely within the outer DIT cell of the D4
Secure mobile device. From a cryptographic perspective, all cryptography is performed
using TOE software running in the Outer DIT VPN cell. The Outer DIT VPN cell (the TOE)
relies upon the TOE platform for the random numbers with which the Outer DIT VPN cell
seeds its own DRBG. All subsequent requirements for random values by Outer DIT VPN
cell software obtain those values from the Outer DIT VPN cell’s own DRBG. The Outer
DIT VPN cell relies upon the TOE platform to verify the validity of updates.
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4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The IPsec implementation is the primary function of the TOE. IPsec is used by the TOE to
protect communication between itself and a VPN Gateway over an unprotected network. The
TOE also includes cryptographic services to support the IPsec VPN, and the self-testing
functionality specified in this Security Target.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE ensures that residual information is protected from potential reuse in accessible
objects such as network packets.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE provides the ability to use pre-shared keys and X.509 certificates that are used for
IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections. The TOE utilizes TOE Platform
functions to store and protect X.509 certificates.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified
throughout this report to the administrator at provisioning. This includes interfaces to the
VPN gateway. The IPsec VPN is fully configurable through a provisioning process that is
performed prior to the first use of the D4 Secure Mobile Device. The TOE platform provides
the functions necessary to securely update the TOE.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE utilizes its own cryptographic functions to perform self-tests that cover the TOE
cryptographic operations. The TOE relies upon its underlying platform to perform self-tests
that cover the TOE and the functions necessary to securely update the TOE.
4.6 Trusted path/channels
The TOE acts as a VPN client using IPsec to establish secure channels to corresponding VPN
gateways.
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5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21
October 2013
That information has not been reproduced here and the IVPNCPP14 should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
IVPNCPP14 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included
in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Clients and performed by the evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device model and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the IVPNCPP14 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 D4 Secure VPN Client Guide Documentation, Version 1.1, October 31, 2017
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Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that which may be
available online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be
relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report (IVPNCPP14) for D4
Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9, Version 0.3, November 15, 2017 (AAR).
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the IVPNCPP14 including the tests associated with
optional requirements.
8.3 Test Configuration
The evaluation team exercised the independent tests specified in the IPsec Virtual Private
Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21 October 2013 (IVPNCPP14) against the evaluated
configuration of the TOE. The following diagram indicates the test environment.
Test Configuration
Linux
Windows
Network – Putty
Connection
USB Connection
USB Connection
TOE Device
TOE Device
Evaluator Sniffing Configuration
Evaluator Direct Connect
Configuration
Access Point
Linux
RADIU
S
Backtrack
Wireshark
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9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9 on the
evaluated platform, HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4 mobile device.
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the D4 Secure VPN
Client for the HTC A9 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
IVPNCPP14.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9
secured by Cog Systems products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product
security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the IVPNCPP14 related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
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the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the IVPNCPP14 and recorded the results in a
Test Report, as summarized in the Assurance Activity Report.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover
any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: "strongswan", "charon",
"libcharon'libstrongswan", "libhydra".
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The product in its evaluated configuration relies upon a specific NIAP evaluated mobile
device platform. That platform was evaluated under NIAP VID 10776.
The TOE security functionality that was evaluated was scoped exclusively to the security
functional requirements as specified in the TOE Security Target, as instantiated upon the
evaluated platform; the HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4. All other functionality
provided by the devices, to include software that was not part of the evaluated configuration,
needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
The validators encourage the consumers of these products to understand the relationship
between the products and any functionality that may be provided via Mobile Device
Management solutions. This evaluation neither covers, nor endorses, the use of any particular
MDM solution and only the MDM interfaces of the products were exercised as part of the
evaluation.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9 secured by Cog
Systems (IVPNCPP14) Security Target, Version 0.7, October 31, 2017.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
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 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[4] Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21
October 2013
[5] D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9 secured by Cog Systems (IVPNCPP14)
Security Target, Version 0.7, October 31, 2017 (ST)
[6] Assurance Activity Report (IVPNCPP14) for D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9,
Version 0.3, November 15, 2017 (AAR)
[7] Detailed Test Report (IVPNCPP14) for D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9,
Version 0.2, October 30, 2017 (DTR) <Evaluation Sensitive>
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for D4 Secure VPN Client for the HTC A9, Version
0.3, November 15, 2017 (ETR) <Evaluation Sensitive>
[9] D4 Secure VPN Client Guide Documentation, Version 1.1, October 31, 2017