TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
NL-9351 VT Leek
P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
(KVK), under number 27288788.
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2022-01
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Certification Report
SN220 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library B0.1 C13
and B0.1 C37
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Troplowitzstrasse 20
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility:
Riscure B.V.
Delftechpark 49
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0258298-CR3
Report version: 3
Project number: 0258298_3
Author(s): Wim Ton
Date: 21 October 2022
Number of pages: 16
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.3.1 Assumptions 8
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 9
2.6 IT Product Testing 11
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 11
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 11
2.6.3 Test configuration 12
2.6.4 Test results 12
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 12
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 13
2.9 Evaluation Results 13
2.9.1 Comments/Recommendations 13
3 Security Target 14
4 Definitions 14
5 Bibliography 16
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations..
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the SN220
Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library B0.1 C13 and B0.1 C37. The developer of the SN220
Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library B0.1 C13 and B0.1 C37 is NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and
certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a single chip secure element with a crypto library that can be used as a platform for highly
secure operating systems and applications. Outside of the TOE, the chip also contains an NFC
controller and a power management unit.
The TOE was evaluated initially by Riscure B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was certified on
16 August 2021. The re-evaluation of the TOE (comprising two re-evaluation activities) has also been
conducted by Riscure B.V. and was completed on 21 October 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The
re-certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands
Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of two “recertification with major changes”
activities. The major changes are:
- Hardware:
Adding a second manufacturer “SMIC”
- C37 Software:
Getting more entropy from the TRNG to seed the DRNG, and an improved heath test
Adding the AES-XTS mode
Hardening of the elliptic curve arithmetic
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the SN220 Series - Secure Element with Crypto
Library B0.1 C13 and B0.1 C37, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation
assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of
the SN220 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library B0.1 C13 and B0.1 C37 are advised to verify
that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with, ASE_TSS.2 (TOE summary
specification with architectural design summary), and ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the SN220 Series - Secure Element with Crypto
Library B0.1 C13 and B0.1 C37 from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg,
Germany.
The IC can be manufactured by two factories, GF1 and SMIC. The hardware from each factory has a
unique hardware identifier (HW_ID) as detailed in the tables below.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware SN220_SE B0.1
C13
HW_ID:
0x35 GF1
0x3D SMIC
Software
Specific for
C13
configuration
IC Dedicated Software:
Factory OS
Boot OS (ROM)
Flash driver
9.0.4
9.0.3
9.0.2
Configuration Data:
Factory Page
System Page Common
BootOS patch
21043
21031
9.0.3 PL1v1
Security Software:
Services Library
Crypto Library
9.17.4
2.2.0
Table 1 TOE version C13 components
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware SN220_SE B0.1
C37
HW_ID:
0x33 GF1
0x37 SMIC
Software
Specific for
C37
configuration
IC Dedicated Software:
Factory OS
Boot OS (ROM)
Flash driver
10.0.2
10.0.2
10.0.0
Configuration Data:
Factory Page
System Page Common
BootOS patch
21043
21031
10.0.2 PL1v1
Security Software:
Services Library
Crypto Library
10.17.6
2.3.1
Table 2 TOE version C37 components
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To ensure secure usage, a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the SN220 Series -
Secure Element with Crypto Library B0.1 C13 and B0.1 C37. For details, see section 2.5
“Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.3.3.
2.2 Security Policy
The security functionality of SN220_SE is designed to act as an integral part of a security system
composed of SN220_SE and Security IC Embedded Software to strengthen it as a whole. Several
security mechanisms of SN220_SE are completely implemented in and controlled by SN220_SE.
Other security mechanisms must be treated by Security IC Embedded Software. All security
functionality is targeted for use in a potential insecure environment, in which SN220_SE maintains:
 correct operation of the security functionality
 integrity and confidentiality of data and code stored to its memories and processed in the device
 controlled access to memories and hardware components supporting separation of different
applications.
This is ensured by the construction of SN220_SE and its security functionality.
The SN220_SE provides:
 hardware to perform computations on multi-precision integers, which are suitable for public-key
cryptography
 hardware to calculate the Data Encryption Standard with up to three keys
 hardware to calculate the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with different key lengths
 hardware to support the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feedback
(OFB), and Counter (CTR) modes of operation for symmetric-key cryptographic block ciphers
 hardware to support the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation and the Galois Message
Authentication Code (GMAC) for symmetric-key cryptographic block ciphers
 hardware to calculate Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC)
 hardware to provide True Random Numbers
 hardware and service software to control access to memories and hardware components.
In addition, SN200_SE embeds sensors, which ensure proper operating conditions of the device.
Integrity protection of data and code involves error correction and error detection codes, light sensing
and other security functionality. Encryption and masking mechanisms are implemented to preserve
confidentiality of data and code. The IC hardware is shielded against physical attacks.
Crypto library:
The following symmetric cryptographic primitives are supported and included within the TSF, with the
modes ECB, CBC, CBC-MAC, CTR, CFB, OFB:
 3DES with 112- and 168-bit keys for encryption/decryption and MAC generation/verification
including Retail-MAC
 AES with 128-, 192- and 256-bit keys for encryption/decryption (including GCM and XTS) and
MAC generation and verification including CCM.
The following asymmetric cryptographic primitives are supported and included within the TSF
 RSA and RSA-CRT for encryption/decryption, signature generation/verification with a modulus
length between 512 and 4096 bits and various padding modes.
 ECDSA signature generation/verification with a key length between 128 and 640 bits.
 ECDAA signature generation with a key length between 128 and 640 bits.
 EC point multiplication and addition with a key length between 128 and 640 bits
 EDDSA signature generation/verification using Edward curves with a key length between 128 and
640 bits.
 Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Montgomery curves with a key length between 128 and 640
bits. For example, Curve25519
 Key generation for the above asymmetric algorithms
The following hash operations are supported and included within the TSF in a secure and in a
standard version:
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 SHA-1,
 SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512,
 SHA-3/224, SHA-3/256, SHA-3/384, SHA-3/512,
 SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256
 HMAC generation using the above hash algorithms
Key derivation with an output length between 128 and 256 bits according to ANSI X9.63
eUICC authentication with the following algorithms:
 MILENAGE
 TUAK
 CAVE
A deterministic random number generator, seeded by an on-chip physical random number generator
Secure operations:
 Copy
 Compare
 CRC
 Modular arithmetic
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.3 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The SN220x Single Chip Secure Element and NFC Controller Series combines on a single die an
Embedded Secure Element, an NFC Controller and a shared Power Management Unit (PMU). The
subsystems are called "SN220_SE", "SN220_NFC" and "SN220_PMU", respectively. The NFC
Controller and the PMU are not part of the TOE.
The hardware part of the SN220_SE incorporates a high frequency clocked ARM SC300 processor, a
Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) coprocessor and a Direct Memory Access (DMA) controller, which are
all connected over a Memory Management Unit (MMU) to a bus system. This bus system gives
access to memories, hardware peripherals and communication interfaces.
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Figure 1 SN220x overview
The TOE is an integral part of the SN220x IC.
The IC Dedicated Software consists of IC Dedicated Support Software and Security Software:
 The Security Software, composed of Services Software and a Crypto Library, can be used by the
Security IC Embedded Software.
 The Crypto Library consists of several binary packages for usage by the Security IC Embedded
Software.
 The Services Software consists of Flash Services Software and Services Framework Software.
The Flash Services Software manages technical demands of the Flash memory and provides an
interface for Flash erase and/or programming for the Security IC Embedded Software. The
Services Framework Software represents a collection of different abstractions and utility functions
that provide a runtime environment to the individual Services.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
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Identifier Version
SN220x_SE High-performance secure elements subsystem, Product Data
Sheet v1.2
SN220x_SE – SFR Tables for Coburg Core v0.1
SN220x Wafer and Delivery Specification, Product Data Sheet addendum v1.3
P73 Family SC300 User Manual, Product Data Sheet addendum v1.0
P73 Family DMA Controller PL080 User Manual, Product Data Sheet
addendum DocID 341410
v1.0
P73 Family Chip Health Mode, Application note v1.0
P73 Family Code Signature Watchdog, Application note v1.1
Table 3 SE220x_SE documentation
Identifier Version
SN220x Crypto Library Information on Guidance and Operation 1.1
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual - RNG Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual - RSA Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – RSA Key Generation Library
(RsaKg)
1.0
SN220x Crypto Library Symmetric Cipher Library (SymCfg) Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – ECDAA 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – HASH Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – SHA-3 Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – Secure SHA Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – Secure SHA-3 Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – HMAC Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – Kdf Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual –TwdEdMontGfp Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – eUICC Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – Utils Library 1.0
SN220 Services User Manual API and Operational Guidance 1.1
SN220 Services Addendum Additional API and Operational Guidance 1.1
Table 4 IC Dedicated Software documentation for version B01 C31
Identifier Version
SN220x Crypto Library Information on Guidance and Operation 1.3
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual - RNG Library 1.1
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SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual - RSA Library 1.1
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – RSA Key Generation Library
(RsaKg)
1.0
SN220x Crypto Library Symmetric Cipher Library (SymCfg) Library 1.1
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – ECDAA 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – HASH Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – SHA-3 Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – Secure SHA Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – Secure SHA-3 Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – HMAC Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – Kdf Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual –TwdEdMontGfp Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – eUICC Library 1.0
SN220x Crypto Library: User Manual – Utils Library 1.0
SN220 Services User Manual API and Operational Guidance 1.1
SN220 Services Addendum Additional API and Operational Guidance 1.1
Table 5 IC Dedicated Software documentation for version B01 C37
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and modules
(according to EAL6 requirements). The testing was largely automated using industry standard and
proprietary test suites. Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the
expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators in the baseline evaluation, the developers provided
samples and a test environment. The evaluators reproduced a selection of developer tests as well as
a small number of test cases designed by the evaluator. For the evaluator defined tests the developer
delivered samples (and support in writing scripts). However, Riscure’s test environment was used for
these ATE_IND tests.
As part of the re-evaluation, the evaluator examined the changes to the TOE and the results of the
baseline certification. Some configuration fixes had to be made to the TOE to improve the yield of the
SMIC fab. Therefore, it was concluded that the physical properties of samples from this fab may differ
from the samples manufactured at GF1. Hence, in this re-evaluation, the evaluators performed
verification tests to assess the resistance to side channel attacks of the samples manufactured at the
SMIC fab.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The evaluator independent penetration tests were conducted according to the following testing
approach:
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 During evaluation of the ADV, ATE and ALC classes the evaluators hypothesized possible
vulnerabilities. This resulted in a shortlist of possible vulnerabilities to be further analysed in AVA
using the design knowledge gained in particular from the source code analysis in IMP. This
resulted in a shortlist of potential vulnerabilities to be tested.
 Next, the evaluators analysed the TOE design and implementation for resistance against the JIL
attacks specified in [JIL-AAPS] and [JIL-AM]. This resulted in further potential vulnerabilities to be
tested.
 The evaluators made an analysis of the TOE in its intended environment to check whether the
developer vulnerability analysis in ARC has assessed all information.
 The evaluators concluded that a number of areas could be potentially vulnerable for attackers
possessing a high attack potential. Consequently, practical penetration testing was performed.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators during the baseline evaluation was 24 weeks. During
that test campaign, 60% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 35% on side-channel
testing, and 5% on logical tests.
During the re-evaluation, the evaluator performed further penetration testing resulting from the
updated vulnerability and to consider the update of the IC Dedicated Software and the addition of the
manufacturer “SMIC”:
The test effort expended by the evaluators during the re-evaluation was 55 days. During that test
campaign, 82% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks and 18% on side-channel testing.
2.6.3 Test configuration
Testing was performed on slightly different configurations of the SN220_SE, that allowed the light
sensor to be turned off. Otherwise, the light sensor would interfere with the tests. The differences
between these configurations and the TOE have been analysed. They have no impact on the test
results, Hence the test results apply to the TOE. The tests were executed on the SN220_SE B0.1 C37
with SMIC hardware.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of twenty-eight (28) site certificates and twenty-six (26) Site Technical
Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
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2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number SN220 Series - Secure Element with
Crypto Library B0.1 C13 and B0.1 C37. Chapter 3.1.2 of the [ST] describes how the user can read the
TOE version.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and Site Technical Audit Reports for the sites
[STAR]
2
. To support composite evaluations according to [COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was
provided and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be
considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the SN220 Series - Secure
Element with Crypto Library B0.1 C13 and B0.1 C37, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3
conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 and ASE_TSS.2
This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.9.1 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE.
This TOE is critically dependent on the operational environment to provide countermeasures against
specific attacks as described in sections 2.1, and 4.1 of SN220_SE Information on Guidance and
Operation and sections 6.1.5, 6.2.8 of SN220x Crypto Library Information on Guidance and
Operations (both as referenced in the [ST]). Therefore, it is vital to maintain meticulous adherence to
the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: KoreanSeed (out of scope), OSCCA SM2, OSCCA SM3 and OSCCA SM4 (out
of scope), and FeliCa (out of scope).
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
2
The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
Page: 14/16 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0258298-CR3, dated 21 October 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
3 Security Target
The SN220 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library Security Target, v1.5, 29 September 2022
[ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ARM Advanced Risc Machines
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
DMA Direct Memory Access
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block-cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GF1 Global Foundry Fab 1
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
KDF Key Derivation Function
MAC Message Authentication Code
MMU Memory Management Unit
NFC Near Field Communication
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
OSCCA Office of the State Commercial Cryptography Administration
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RMI Remote Method Invocation
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SMIC Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
Page: 15/16 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0258298-CR3, dated 21 October 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
XTS XEX Tweakable block cipher with ciphertext Stealing
Page: 16/16 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0258298-CR3, dated 21 October 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts
I, II and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart
Cards and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report for SN220 Series - Secure Element with
Crypto Library B0.1 C13/C37, 20210539-D3, Version 1.6, 6 October
2022
[ETRfC] ETR for Composite Evaluation, SN220 Series - Secure Element with
Crypto Library B0.1 C13/C37, 20210539-D4, Version 1.6, 6 October
2022
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June
2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4,
January 2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version
2.5, 28 March 2019
[PP] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages,
registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13
January 2014
[ST] SN220 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library Security Target,
v1.5, 29 September 2022
[ST-lite] SN220 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library Security Target
Lite, v1.5, 29 September 2022
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-
004, April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)