TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-06
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Certification Report
SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document eIDAS
QSCD Application, version 4
Sponsor and developer: HID Global S.p.A.
Viale Remo De Feo 1
80022 Arzano (NA)
Italy
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2200047-01
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 10 November 2023
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 2/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR, dated 10 November 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
Page: 3/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR, dated 10 November 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 4/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR, dated 10 November 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
Page: 5/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR, dated 10 November 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the SOMA-
c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document eIDAS QSCD Application, version 4. The developer of
the SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document eIDAS QSCD Application, version 4 is HID
Global S.p.A. located in Naples, Italy and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and
certification A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The Target Of Evaluation (TOE) is the integrated circuit chip NXP N7121 with IC Dedicated Software
and Crypto Library, the operating system SOMA-c016 and with an eIDAS Qualified Signature Creation
Device (QSCD) application providing signature features and encrypted data decipherment feature.
The signature features are compliant with the eIDAS Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and the according
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/650, repealing the European Parliament Directive
1999/93/EC. The eIDAS QSCD application can optionally be configured as a PKCS #15 application.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 10 November 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic
Document eIDAS QSCD Application, version 4, the security requirements, and the level of confidence
(evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements.
Consumers of the SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document eIDAS QSCD Application,
version 4 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to
give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
Page: 6/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR, dated 10 November 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic
Document eIDAS QSCD Application, version 4 from HID Global S.p.A. located in Naples, Italy.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
NXP secure Smart Card controller N7121
with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto
Library registered under BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-
V3-2022
Release B1
Software
IC Dedicated Test Software (included in the
scope of the HW certification BSI-DSZ-CC-
1136-V3-2022)
Release 9.2.3
IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library
(included in the scope of the HW
certification BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V3-2022)
Release 9.2.3 including:
• Flashloader OS Release 1.2.5
• Communication Library Release
6.0.0
• CRC Library 1.1.8
• Memory Library 1.2.3
• Flash Loader Library 3.6.0
• System Mode OS Release
13.2.3
• Crypto Library Release 0.7.6
Native OS SOMA-c016, including eIDAS
QSCD Application
Version 4
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the SOMA-c016
Machine Readable Electronic Document eIDAS QSCD Application, version 4. For details, see section
2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 2.3.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a combination of hardware and software configured to securely create, use, and manage
Signature Creation Data (SCD). The QSCD protects the SCD during its whole life cycle as to be used
in a signature creation process solely by its Signatory.
The TOE comprises all IT security functionality necessary to ensure the secrecy of the SCD and the
security of the electronic signature and deciphered data.
The TOE provides the following functions:
• generate Signature Creation Data (SCD) and the corresponding Signature Verification Data
(SVD),
• export the SVD for certification to the CGA over a trusted channel,
• prove the identity as QSCD to external entities,
• optionally, receive and store certificate info,
• switch the QSCD from a non-operational state to an operational state, and
• if in an operational state, to create digital signatures for data with the following steps:
o select an SCD if multiple are present in the QSCD,
Page: 7/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR, dated 10 November 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
o authenticate the Signatory and determine its intent to sign,
o receive data to be signed or a unique representation thereof (DTBS/R) from the SCA
over a trusted channel,
o apply an appropriate cryptographic signature creation function to the DTBS/R using
the selected SCD.
• if in an operational state, to decipher encrypted data with the following steps:
o select an SCD if multiple are present in the QSCD,
o authenticate the Signatory and determine its intent to decipher,
o receive data to be deciphered (DTBD) from the DDA over a trusted channel,
o apply an appropriate cryptographic decipher function to the DTBD using the selected
SCD. (cf. ST eIDAS QSCD section 1.5.1)
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as
follows (the red box depicts shows the Composite TOE while the green box shows the portion of the
TOE under evaluation):
The TOE is composed of:
• the circuitry of the dual-interface e-Document’s chip NXP N7121
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software, IC Dedicated Support
Software, and Crypto Library
• the smart card operating system SOMA-c016
• the eIDAS QSCD application
• the associated guidance documentation
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Page: 8/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR, dated 10 November 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Identifier Version
SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Initialization
Guidance, TCAE180013, Dated 01 December 2022
2.0
SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Pre-Personalization
Guidance eIDAS QSCD application, TCAE180015, Dated 04 April 2023
2.1
SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Personalization
Guidance eIDAS QSCD application, TCAE180017, Dated 04 April 2023
2.1
SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Operational User
Guidance ICAO application, TCAE 180019, Dated 04 April 2023
2.1
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level.
All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested
explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing
was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used
extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack, oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the
knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of
(additional) potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack
methods in [JIL-AM]. An important source for assurance in this step is the technical report
[ETRfC-HW] of the underlying platform.
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 6 weeks. During that test campaign, 30% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 70% on side-channel testing.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The developer tested the TOE in the following configuration:
• TOE Identification Data:
Page: 9/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR, dated 10 November 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
SOMA-c016_4 (ASCII codes 53h 4Fh 4Dh 41h 2Dh 63h 30h 31h 36h 5Fh 34h)
• Product Identification Data:
SOMA-c016_4_0 (ASCII codes 53h 4Fh 4Dh 41h 2Dh 63h 30h 31h 36h 5Fh 34h 5Fh 30h)
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused
by composition.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number SOMA-c016 Machine Readable
Electronic Document eIDAS QSCD Application, version 4.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the SOMA-c016 Machine
Readable Electronic Document eIDAS QSCD Application, version 4, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC
Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security
Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [EN419211-2], [EN 419211-4]
and [EN419211-5].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Page: 10/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR, dated 10 November 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
Page: 11/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR, dated 10 November 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
3 Security Target
The SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Security Target eIDAS QSCD Application,
TCAE180021, Version 2.4, 06 April 2023 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
[DCAP] Dutch Conformity Assessment Process
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
Page: 12/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR, dated 10 November 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts
I, II and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart
Cards and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[EU-REG] REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and
trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and
repealing Directive 1999/93/EC
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “SOMA-c016 Machine Readable
Electronic Document eIDAS QSCD Application, version 4” – EAL5+",
23-RPT-339, Version 3.0, 20 October 2023
[HW-CERT] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software
and Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4), 7 September 2022 registered under
the reference BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V3-2022
[HW-ETRfC] TÜV Informationstechnik Gmbh, Evaluation Technical Report for
Composite Evaluation of NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121
with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4) B1,
2022-08-25, v2.0
[HW-ST] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software
and Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4), Security Target Lite Rev. 2.6 – 13
June 2022
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2,
November 2022
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4,
January 2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version
2.6, 02 August 2022
[EN419211-2] EN 419 211-2:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation
device - Part 2: Device with key generation, V2.0.1, registered under the
reference BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02
[EN 419211-4] EN 419 211-4 Protection Profiles for secure signature creation device –
Part 4: Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to
certificate generation application, version 1.0.1, 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0071-
2012-MA-01
[EN419211-5] EN 419 211-5:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation
device - Part 5: Extension for device with key generation and trusted
communication with signature creation application, V1.0.1, registered
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-01
[ST] SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Security Target
eIDAS QSCD Application, TCAE180021, Version 2.4, 06 April 2023
Page: 13/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2200047-01-CR, dated 10 November 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
[ST-lite] SOMA-c016 Machine Readable Electronic Document Security Target
eIDAS QSCD Application, TCLE180024, Version 2.0, Dated 19 June 2023
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)