BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
for
KoCoBox MED+ Konnektor, Version 5.5.12
from
KoCo Connector GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5400
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.48
BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 (*)
Gesundheitswesen: Konnektoren
KoCoBox MED+ Konnektor
Version 5.5.12
from KoCo Connector GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile),
Schutzprofil 2: Anforderungen an den Konnektor,
BSI-CC-PP-0098-V3-2021-MA-02, Version 1.6.1,
15.03.2023, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by AVA_VAN.3, ADV_FSP.4,
ADV_TDS.3, ADV_IMP.1, ALC_TAT.1, ALC_FLR.2
valid until: 18 December 2029
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 19 December 2024
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5400
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................28
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................29
12. Definitions................................................................................................................29
13. Bibliography.............................................................................................................32
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................38
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 39
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product KoCoBox MED+ Konnektor, Version 5.5.12 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V4-2023. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V4-2023 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product KoCoBox MED+ Konnektor, 5.5.12 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 27 November 2024. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: KoCo Connector GmbH.
The product was developed by: KoCo Connector GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 19
December 2024 is valid until 18 December 2029. Validity can be renewed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product KoCoBox MED+ Konnektor, Version 5.5.12 has been included in the BSI list
of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
KoCo Connector GmbH
Dessauer Str. 28/29
10963 Berlin
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The target of evaluation (TOE) is KoCoBox MED+ Konnektor, Version 5.5.12. The TOE is
the base software part of the product KoCoBox MED+. This product is a decentral
component, called “e-Health Konnektor” in the context of the German health care
telematics infrastructure. The TOE consists of three parts, the network connector (NK)
(German: “Netzkonnektor”), the application connector (AK) (German:
“Anwendungskonnektor”) and a healthcare specific module (VSDM) (German: “Fachmodul
VSDM”).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile), Schutzprofil 2:
Anforderungen an den Konnektor, BSI-CC-PP-0098-V3-2021-MA-02, Version 1.6.1,
15.03.2023, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented by AVA_VAN.3, ADV_FSP.4, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_IMP.1, ALC_TAT.1,
ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapters 6.2 and 6.3. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Description
SF.VPN VPN Client
SF.DynamicPacketFilter Firewall with stateful packet inspection
SF.NetworkServices DHCP, DNS and NTP networking services
SF.SelfProtection/NK Mechanisms of self-protection of the TOE:
 Key destruction and residual information protection
for NK,
 Self-tests of TSF and TSF data for NK, and
 Mitigation of attacks
SF.Audit/NK Secure audit service for NK
SF.Administration/NK Secure administration channels and update mechanism
SF.CryptographicServices/NK Cryptographic services required by other security
functionality of the TOE
SF.CryptographicServices/AK Cryptographic services for AK
SF.TLS TLS service for secure communication channel
SF.Authentication Identification and authentication service
SF.AccessControl Access control service for connect requests
SF.CardTerminalMgmt eHealth card terminal management
SF.SmartCardMgmt Smart card management
SF.SignatureService Signature Creation and Validation Application (SCaVA)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
SF.EncryptionService Document encryption service
SF.SecureStorage Secure data storage service
SF.VSDM Versichertenstammdaten (VSD) management service
SF.Administration/AK Administration management service for AK
SF.SelfProtection/AK Mechanisms of self-protection of the TOE:
 Verification management of TSL, CRL etc.,
 Secure state upon failure,
 Self-tests of TSF and TSF data for AK, and
 Key destruction and residual information protection
for AK
SF.Audit/AK Secure audit service for AK
SF.VAU VAU protocol functionality
SF.SGD SGD protocol functionality
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapters 7.1 and 7.2.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
KoCoBox MED+ Konnektor, Version 5.5.12
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No. Type Item / Identifier Release / Version Form of Delivery
1. FW KoCo MED+ 5.5.12 Initially delivery as firmware included
Firmware within the KoCo MED+ hardware.
Downloadable as firmware image from
developer URL or via KSR process as
a software update package.
2. PDF Administratorhand 5 Download via an internet URL from
buch KoCoBox (2024-07-17) developer.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
MED+
SHA-256: 99e3fe717e67af25e6e48e0b54fa619fa84112cea08b57559e4d286ee9102d5a
3. PDF Ergänzungen zum
Administratorhand
buch
1.3.4
(2024-07-17)
Download via an internet URL from
developer.
SHA-256: 6f66420fac43c2ce0466c92b127c172bfd51d9228c27a1f87027aa8486a782a7
4. Booklet Allgemeine
Gebrauchsanleitu
ng KoCoBox
MED+
1.3.8
(2018-05-01)
Delivered with the delivery package of
the TOE.
SHA-256: 2912d4d5eaa5113edd856e2a53e25f0f14dc820a0d4fce81ebb903ab67d20a7a
5. Booklet Allgemeine
Gebrauchsanleitu
ng KoCoBox
MED+
2.1
(2022-03-01)
Delivered with the delivery package of
the TOE.
SHA-256: 7c89ada88b58aff3629ab5253bd93fcb7fbc1ecda7cf3ce4675aac06ed145890
6. PDF JSON-
Managementschni
ttstelle der
KoCoBox Med+
3.22
(2024-02-19)
Delivered on demand by email.
SHA-256: ddda22af9bcd665f389daf64e26ef39f1bd77b361570ad6ff0c578ea149d229f
7. PDF Konnektor
Security Guidance
Fachmodule
NFDM, AMTS und
ePA
4.3
(2024-06-20)
Delivered on demand by email.
SHA-256: af0a8ee1b030470f1c1de284d591155495a26606c1f5fa84b2aac399dff15b74
8. HTML Konnektor API für
Fachmodule
Javadoc (File
Konnektor-FM-
API-VERSION-
javadoc.tar.gz)
7.15.1
(2024-01-30)
Delivered on demand by email.
SHA-256: 09c2172ee95f215c916c538919b984f8fcb09d5af397cf05912705e2065ea93f
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
2.1. TOE Delivery Process
The TOE is delivered by an authorized service technician to the end user. The service
technician installs the TOE within the premises of the end user. Prior to installation, the
service technician must be identified via a photo ID by the end user. The service technician
is trained, instructs the end user and provides security advice.
2.2. TOE Identification
The TOE can be identified as follows:
● Display:
OK to enter the Menu,

Select 4 for Version.

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
Identification:
o G3 variant:
 Firmwareversion: 5.5.12,
 Hardwareversion: 2.0.0.
o G4 variant:
 Firmwareversion: 5.5.12,
 Hardwareversion: 4.0.0.
● Web Administration Interface:
Check the entry Firmware on the status page of the Web Administration

Interface.
Identification:
o G3 variant:
Produktversion: 5.5.12:2.0.0.
o G4 variant:
Produktversion: 5.5.12:4.0.0.
The hardware is not part of the TOE and therefore not relevant for the TOE identification.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Security Audit,
● Cryptographic Support,
● User Data Protection,
● Identification and Authentication,
● Security Management,
● Protection of the TSF,
● Trusted Path/Channels, and
● TOE Access.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in chapters
6.2 and 6.3 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.NK.phys_Schutz: The TOE shall be physically protected against unauthorized
access.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
● OE.NK.Admin_EVG: The TOE shall be configured by a trustworthy and well trained
administrator who operates the TOE according to the guidance.
● OE.NK.PKI: If the administrator manually uploads TSLs and CRLs in the admin web
GUI. Such files shall only be taken from a trustworthy source.
● When the TOE is stolen or no longer under the control of the owner, the owner shall
initiate the blocking of the TOE and its gSMC-Ks.
● OE.NK.Betrieb_CS: The client systems shall be secured by the CS administrators. The
owner of the CS shall only operate CS software that follows the developer specific CS
implementation guide “Ergänzungen zum Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+”.
● OE.AK.Admin_EVG: The administrators shall keep passwords and secrets confidential.
● OE.AK.Admin_Konsole: The admin shall use a secure web browser and not store
password.
● OE.AK.Kartenterminal: For the security of the TOE only certified eHealth card terminals
shall be used for communication with the TOE.
● OE.AK.SecAuthData, OE.AK.Clientsystem, OE.AK.ClientsystemKorrekt: The owner of
the CS shall only operate CS software that follows the developer specific CS
implementation guide “Ergänzungen zum Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+” [10].
● OE.AK.phys_Schutz: The TOE must be physically protected against unauthorized
access.
● OE.AK.Personal: Only qualified and trustworthy personnel are allowed to use and
maintain the TOE.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapters 4.3 and 4.4.
5. Architectural Information
A high level description of the IT product and its major components can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.6.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
TOE test configurations
The Security Target [6] has identified two different TOE variants:
● G3 TOE variant with G3 hardware (i.MX 6 CPU), and
● G4 TOE variant with G4 hardware (i.MX 8 CPU).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
For both TOE variants, the developer uses two firmware variants for blackbox and for
whitebox testing. For test configuration, the developer used one preparative and four test
configurations. Environment simulation is also used. Only the released firmware for both
TOE variants is referenced.
TOE test environment configurations
The assumptions and objectives for the operational environment stated in the Security
Target [6] are not applicable for testing. Nevertheless, the developer uses seven test
environment configurations which cover a large amount of the real environment.
Testing approach
● Coverage and depth tests are done together.
● The test specifications give mappings to the tested TSFI(s), SFR(s), subsystem(s), and
module(s).
● Different testing approaches are used:
• Code analysis,
• Blackbox tests:
• Manual, and
• Automatic,
• Whitebox tests:
• Manual, and
• Automatic.
● The test descriptions comprise (inter alia)
• Pre conditions: preparative steps,
• Test steps: core test steps with expected results, and
• Post conditions: clearance steps to tidy up before the next test.
Testing results
The developer’s testing efforts have been proven sufficient to demonstrate that the TSFIs
and subsystems perform as expected.
All test cases in each test scenario were run successfully on the TOE and they all
PASSED according to their expected result.
7.2. Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
TOE variants and test configurations
The evaluation body used the same TOE variants, test configurations and test envi-
ronment as the developer during functional testing.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
Test subset chosen
The evaluation body chose to repeat and inspect a broad set of developer tests.
Interface selection criteria
The evaluation body chose to broadly cover the existing interfaces without specific
restrictions.
Interfaces tested
Services at the LAN and the WAN ports were considered during testing.
Developer tests performed
The evaluation body chose to perform a random sampling with the intent to broadly cover
the existing interfaces and the implemented security functionality.
Verdict for the sub-activity
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.3. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Overview
The configuration defined in the ST was tested. Furthermore, different TOE variants were
used during penetration testing to verify different mechanisms.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful.
Penetration testing approach
The evaluation body conducted penetration testing based on Functional Areas of Concern
derived from SFRs and architectural mechanisms. The areas were prioritized with regard
to various factors, e.g. attack surface, estimated flaw likelihood, developer testing
coverage, and detectability of flaws during developer testing.
Medium and high areas were guaranteed to be penetration tested, with a stronger
emphasis on high priorities. Low priorities were also considered during penetration, but
could be less emphasized, if developer tests were found to be sufficient.
The penetration testing activities were performed as tests and as analytical tasks.
Whenever an analysis was estimated to yield better results, the evaluators chose the
analytical approach. Analytical activities were especially applied in the areas Update,
Random Number Generation and Hardening Mechanisms. Combined approaches were
also applied.
TOE test configurations
The TOE was delivered by the developer in two different variants based on their hardware
generation (G3 (i.MX 6 CPU) and G4 (i.MX 8 CPU)). For each hardware generation a
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
release TOE and a special ATE variant were delivered for testing. The ATE variant is an
enhanced variant of the software running on the same hardware and using the same smart
cards (gSMC-K). The ATE variant is used to enable tests that are not possible due to
security mechanisms applied in the release TOE. The differences between release TOE
and the ATE variant are clearly defined. Therefore, two goals can be achieved:
(1) Perform detailed testing using the target hardware and smart card,
(2) Ensure that the tests results of the ATE variant are also valid for the TOE.
During the evaluation process, the TOE was updated. Penetration tests were performed
with the final version and prior versions. The developer provided a change analysis which
documents the differences between the versions. The evaluation body did not identify
changes that would render the previous test results invalid for the final version. The most
important tests were conducted with the final version.
Attack scenarios having been tested
The evaluation body considered security analysis and penetration testing in the following
areas:
● VPN Connections,
● Administration Connections,
● Random Number Generation,
● Update,
● Hardening Mechanisms,
● Filtering and Routing,
● Self-Protection,
● TOE Services and Network Services, and
● Audit.
Tested security functionality
The evaluator ensured that all areas listed above are tested. Actually, the evaluation body
used a more detailed list during analysis and testing. The penetration testing was then
conducted based on priorities as described above. Therefore, a complete coverage of
security functional testing based on technical areas of concern is performed.
Verdict for the sub-activity
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential defined by the protection
profile was actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
7.4. Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis
The TOE testing did not reveal vulnerabilities exploitable by an attacker with the attack
potential as defined by the protection profile.
18 / 39
BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is delivered in two different variants. The two variants are associated with the two
hardware platforms G3 and G4. Both of these TOE variants are evaluated configurations
of the TOE. The evaluation results are only valid for the configurations defined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.8.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components AVA_VAN.3, ADV_FSP.4, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_IMP.1, ALC_TAT.1,
ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V4-2023, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on:
● LZV – update of the gSMC-K certificates in case of anticipated expiration,
● End of support for HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm in IKE/IPSec protocol (PRF & integrity),
● End of support of TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_*_CBC_SHA in TLS protocol,
● LDAP authentication mode can be configured, and
● Hardening of XML parser.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile), Schutzprofil
2: Anforderungen an den Konnektor, BSI-CC-PP-0098-V3-2021-MA-02, Version
1.6.1, 15.03.2023, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by AVA_VAN.3, ADV_FSP.4, ADV_TDS.3,
ADV_IMP.1, ALC_TAT.1, ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
19 / 39
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following tables give an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the
following tables with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 120 Bits (in general
context) only. Note that the column “Security Level” given in tables 3 and 4 refers to the
pure cryptographic (mathematical) strength only, and does not take into account whatever
exploitable weaknesses induced by side-channel leakage, physical attacks, or
implementation flaws of any kind.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Implementation
Standard
Key
Size in
Bits
Securit
y Level
above
120
Bits
Comments
1. Authenticit
y
Firmware update
file signature
verification using
RSASSA-PSS
with SHA-512
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
2048 No FDP_ACC.1/
AK.Update,
FDP_ACF.1/
AK.Update,
FDP_UIT.1/
AK.Update,
FCS_COP.1/
NK.SigVer
2. Authenticit
y
FW update X.509
certificate
verification using
RSASSA-PSS
with SHA-256
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
4096 Yes FDP_ACC.1/
AK.Update,
FDP_ACF.1/
AK.Update,
FDP_UIT.1/
AK.Update,
FCS_COP.1/
NK.SigVer
Table 3: Additional TOE cryptographic functionality (NK)
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Implementation
Standard
Key
Size in
Bits
Securit
y Level
above
120
Bits
Comments
1. Key
Generation
Config Data
Backup
Encryption: Key
generation for
PBKDF2
[SP800-132]
(PBKDF2)
ca. 124 Yes FMT_MTD.1/
AK.eHKT_Abf
2. Authenticat Config Data [FIPS197] (AES), ca. 124, Yes FMT_MTD.1/
20 / 39
BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
ed
Encryption
Backup
Encryption: AES-
GCM (AES256-
GCM) encryption
and decryption
using PBKDF2
[SP800-38D]
(GCM),
[RFC5084] (AES-
GCM in CMS),
[SP800-132]
(PBKDF2)
AES-
GCM-
ENC:
256,
AES-
GCM-
DEC:
256,
Authenti
cation
tag: 128
AK.eHKT_Abf,
FMT_MTD.1/
AK.eHKT_Mod
3. Authenticit
y
Config Data
Backup
Signature:
Signature
generation with
SHA-256 and
support of SMC-
B, and RSA
signature
verification with
signature
scheme
RSASSA-PSS
with SHA-256
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA),
[RFC5652] (CMS)
1900 –
8192
Yes (for
keys >=
2800)
FMT_MTD.1/
AK.eHKT_Abf,
FMT_MTD.1/
AK.eHKT_Mod
4. Key
Generation
Generation and
hashing of user
passwords using
PBKDF2WithHm
acSHA512
[SP800-132]
(PBKDF2),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
-- Yes FIA_SOS.1/
AK.Passwörter,
FIA_SOS.1/
AK.CS.Passwörter
Table 4: Additional TOE cryptographic functionality (AK)
The following tables give an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Implementation
Standard
Key
Size in
Bits
Comments
1. Authenticity RSA signature
verification using
signature scheme
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5 with SHA-
256
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
2048 FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert,
FPT_TDC.1/NK.TLS.Zert,
FCS_COP.1/NK.SigVer
2. Authenticity RSA signature
verification of CRL
and OCSP
responses using
signature scheme
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5 with SHA-
{256, 384, 512}
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
2048 –
8192
FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert,
FCS_COP.1/NK.SigVer
3. Authenticity RSA signature
verification of TSL
using signature
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
2048 FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert,
FCS_COP.1/NK.SigVer,
21 / 39
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
scheme RSASSA-
PSS with SHA-
256
[XMLSig2] FPT_TDC.1/NK.TLS.Zert
4. Authenticity RSA signature
verification of CRL
and OCSP
responses using
signature scheme
RSASSA-PSS
with SHA-{256,
384, 512}
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
2048 –
8192
FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert,
FCS_COP.1/NK.SigVer,
FPT_TDC.1/NK.TLS.Zert
5. Authenticity ECDSA signature
verification of TSL
using signature
scheme ECDSA
with SHA-256
[FIPS186-4]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC5639]
(brainpool)
brainpo
olP256r
1
FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert,
FCS_COP.1/NK.SigVer,
FPT_TDC.1/NK.TLS.Zert
6. Authenticity ECDSA signature
verification of CRL
and OCSP
responses using
signature scheme
ECDSA with SHA-
{256, 384, 512}
[FIPS186-4]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC5639]
(brainpool)
brainpo
olP{256,
384,
512}r1
FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert,
FCS_COP.1/NK.SigVer,
FPT_TDC.1/NK.TLS.Zert
7. Authenticati
on
RSA and ECDSA
signature creation
with support of
gSMC-K using
signature scheme
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5 and ECDSA
with SHA-256 and
signature
verification with
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5 and ECDSA
with SHA-256
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC5639]
(brainpool),
[FIPS186-4]
(ECDSA)
RSA:
2048
and
ECC:
brainpo
olP256r
1
FCS_COP.1/NK.Auth
8. Authenticati
on
RSA and ECDSA
signature creation
for TLS with
support of gSMC-
K or SMC-B or
imported or self-
created signing
keys using
signature scheme
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5 and ECDSA
with SHA-{256,
384} and
signature
verification with
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5 and ECDSA
with SHA-{256,
384}
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[FIPS186-4]
(ECDSA, P-256, P-
384),
[RFC7027] (ECC
TLS)
RSA:
2048 –
8192
and
ECC:
P{256,
384},
brainpo
olP{256,
384}r1
FCS_COP.1/NK.TLS.Auth
9. Key
Agreement
Diffie-Hellman
(IKEv2) with key
[RFC2631] (DH), 2048
(DH-
FCS_CKM.2/NK.IKE,
22 / 39
BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
derivation function
PRF-HMAC-SHA-
256
[RFC3526] (dh-
group),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[TR-02102-
3_2022] /
[RFC7296] (IKEv2,
PRF_HMAC_SHA-
256)
group
14) with
DH
expone
nt
length ≥
384 bits,
Derived
Session
Key
Length:
256
FCS_CKM.1/NK
10. Key
Agreement
Diffie-Hellman
with TLS key
derivation function
[RFC2631] (DH),
[RFC3526] (dh-
group),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC3268]
(DHE_RSA),
[RFC5246]
(TLSv1.2)
2048
(DH-
group
14) with
DH
expone
nt
length ≥
384 bits
FCS_CKM.1/NK.TLS
11. Key
Agreement
EC Diffie-Hellman
with TLS key
derivation function
[SEC1-2009]
(ECDH),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC4492]
(ECDHE_RSA),
[RFC5246]
(TLSv1.2),
[FIPS186-4] (P-256,
P-384),
[RFC7027]
(Brainpool)
P{256,
384},
brainpo
olP{256,
384}r1
FCS_CKM.1/NK.TLS
12. Key
Generation
Key generation for
RSA and ECC key
in X.509 and
PKCS#12 (RSA)
or PEM (ECC)
format using
FCS_RNG.1/Hash
_DRBG for usage
in client system
authentication
[RFC5280] (X.509),
[RFC7292]
(PKCS#12),
[RFC4055]
(supporting
[RFC5280]),
[FIPS186-4, Method
B.3.3] (Key-Gen),
[RFC7027] (ECC
Brainpool),
[TR-03111] (ECC
key generation)
RSA:
2048,
3072
and
ECC:
brainpo
olP256r
1,
secp256
r1
FCS_CKM.1/NK.Zert
13. Confidentiali
ty
Symmetric
encryption and
decryption for
VPN: AES in CBC
[FIPS197] (AES),
[RFC3602] (AES-
CBC),
[RFC4303] (ESP),
[RFC4301] (IPsec)
256 FCS_COP.1/NK.ESP,
FCS_COP.1/NK.IPsec,
FCS_CKM.2/NK.IKE
14. Confidentiali
ty
Symmetric
encryption and
decryption for
[FIPS197] (AES),
[RFC3602] (AES-
128,
256
FCS_COP.1/NK.TLS.AES
23 / 39
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
TLS: AES in CBC CBC),
[RFC3268] (AES-
TLS with DH),
[RFC4492] (AES-
TLS with ECDH)
15. Confidentiali
ty
Symmetric
encryption and
decryption AES in
CBC with ESSIV
[FIPS197] (AES),
[SP800-38A] (CBC),
[ESSIV]
256 FCS_COP.1/Storage.AES
16. Integrity HMAC value
generation and
verification with
SHA-{1, 256}
(IKE, IPsec)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC4868] (HMAC-
SHA256),
[RFC7296] (IKEv2)
256 FCS_COP.1/NK.HMAC
17. Integrity HMAC value
generation and
verification with
SHA-{1, 256, 384}
(TLS)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC5246] (TLS
v1.2)
160,
256,
384
FCS_COP.1/
NK.TLS.HMAC
18. Authenticate
d Encryption
AES-128 and
AES-256 in GCM
mode for TLS 1.2
[FIPS197] (AES),
[RFC3268] (AES-
TLS),
[SP800-38D]
(GCM),
[RFC5289] (AES-
GCM-TLS),
[RFC5116] (AEAD)
128,
256
FCS_COP.1/NK.TLS.AES
19. Trusted
Channel
IKEv2, IPsec [RFC7296] (IKEv2),
[RFC4301] (IPsec),
[RFC4303] (ESP)
-- FTP_ITC.1/NK.VPN_TI,
FTP_ITC.1/NK.VPN_SIS
20. Trusted
Channel
TLS v1.2 [RFC5246]
(TLSv1.2)
-- FTP_TRP.1/NK.Admin,
FDP_ITC.2/NK.TLS
21. Key
Generation
Key generation for
RSA and ECC key
in X.509 and PEM
format using
FCS_RNG.1/Hash
_DRBG for usage
in Konnektor
authentication
[RFC5280] (X.509),
[RFC4055]
(supporting
[RFC5280]),
[FIPS186-4, Method
B.3.3] (Key-Gen),
[RFC7027] (ECC
Brainpool),
[FIPS186-4] (P-
256),
[TR-03111] (ECC
key generation)
RSA:
2048,
3072
and
ECC:
P256,
brainpo
olP256r
1
FCS_CKM.1/NK.Auth
22. Key
Agreement
Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(IKEv2) with key
derivation function
PRF-HMAC-SHA-
256
[SEC1-2009]
(ECDH),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[TR-02102-
3_2022] /
[RFC7296] (IKEv2,
PRF_HMAC_SHA-
brainpo
olP256r
1,
Derived
Session
Key
Length:
128,
FCS_CKM.2/NK.IKE,
FCS_CKM.1/NK
24 / 39
BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
256) 256
23. Authenticate
d Encryption
AES-128 and
AES-256 in GCM
mode for VPN
[FIPS197] (AES),
[SP800-38D]
(GCM),
[RFC4106] (AES-
GCM in IPSec),
[RFC5282] (AEAD
in IKEv2),
[RFC4303] (ESP),
[RFC4301] (IPsec)
128,
256
FCS_COP.1/NK.ESP,
FCS_COP.1/NK.IPsec,
FCS_CKM.2/NK.IKE
24. Authenticity RSA signature
verification of TSL
using signature
scheme RSASSA-
PSS with SHA-
256
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
2048 -
8192
FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert,
FCS_COP.1/NK.SigVer,
FPT_TDC.1/NK.TLS.Zert
25. Authenticity RSA and ECDSA
signature
verification of
O_Zertifikat_gSM
C-K certificates
using signature
scheme RSASSA-
PSS with SHA-
256 and ECDSA
with SHA-{256,
384, 512}
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[FIPS186-4]
(ECDSA),
[RFC7027] (ECC
Brainpool)
RSA:
2048
and
ECC:
brainpo
olP{256,
384,
512}r1
FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert,
FCS_COP.1/NK.SigVer,
FPT_TDC.1/NK.TLS.Zert
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality (NK)
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Implementation
Standard
Key
Size in
Bits
Comments
1. Authenticity PadES based
signature
generation with
SHA-256 and
support of HBA,
SMC-B, and RSA
signature
verification using
signature
schemes
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5 and
RSASSA-PSS
with SHA-{256,
384, 512}, and
ECDSA signature
verification with
SHA-256 for QES
and nonQES
[PAdES],
[PAdES-BL],
[ISO_32000-1]
(PDF),
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[RFC7027] (ECC
Brainpool),
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS186-4] (P-
256),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
RSA:
1900 –
8192
(QES),
2048 –
8192
(nonQE
S) and
ECDSA:
brainpo
olP256r
1,
brainpo
olP384r
1,
brainpo
olP512r
1
FDP_DAU.2/AK.QES,
FDP_DAU.2/AK.Sig,
FCS_COP.1/AK.PDF.Sign,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.PDF.SigPr,
FCS_COP.1/AK.SHA,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.SigVer.SSA,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.SigVer.PSS,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.SigVer.ECDSA
2. Authenticity XadES based
signature
generation
including XML
[XMLSig2],
[XAdES],
[XAdES-BL],
RSA:
1900 –
8192
and
FDP_DAU.2/AK.QES,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.XML.Sign,
FCS_COP.1/
25 / 39
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
signed SAML2
assertions with
SHA-256 and
support of HBA,
SMC-B, and RSA
signature
verification using
signature scheme
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5 with SHA-
{256, 384, 512},
and RSA
signature
verification using
signature scheme
RSASSA-PSSwith
SHA-{256, 384,
512}, and ECDSA
signature
verification with
SHA-{256, 384,
512} for QES
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[RFC5639] (ECC
Brainpool),
[FIPS186-4] (P-
256),
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[SAML2]
ECDSA:
brainpo
olP256r
1,
brainpo
olP384r
1,
brainpo
olP512r
1
AK.XML.SigPr,
FCS_COP.1/AK.SHA,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.SigVer.SSA,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.SigVer.PSS,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.SigVer.ECDSA
3. Authenticity CadES based
signature
generation with
SHA-256 and
support of HBA,
SMC-B, and RSA
signature
verification using
signature
schemes
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5 and
RSASSA-PSS
with SHA-{256,
384, 512}, and
ECDSA signature
verification with
SHA-{256, 384,
512} for QES and
nonQES
[RFC5652] (CMS),
[CAdES],
[CAdES-BL],
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[RFC5639] (ECC
Brainpool),
[FIPS186-4] (P-
256),
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
RSA:
1900 –
8192
(QES),
2048 –
8192
(nonQE
S), and
ECDSA:
brainpo
olP256r
1,
brainpo
olP384r
1,
brainpo
olP512r
1
FDP_DAU.2/AK.QES,
FDP_DAU.2/AK.Sig,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.CMS.Sign,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.CMS.SigPr,
FCS_COP.1/AK.SHA,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.SigVer.SSA,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.SigVer.PSS,
FCS_COP.1/
AK.SigVer.ECDSA
4. Authenticity ECDSA signature
verification with
SHA-256 (ecdsa-
with-Sha256)
[gemSpec_Krypt]
(VAU protocol),
[gemSpec_SGD_eP
A] (SGD protocol),
[FIPS186-4]
(ECDSA),
[RFC5639]
(brainpool),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
brainpo
olP256r
1
FCS_COP.1/VAU.ECDSA,
FCS_COP.1/SGD.ECDSA
5. Authenticity Hash functionality
SHA-1 (OCSP)
and SHA-256
(other hash use
cases in VAU and
SGD protocols)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA) -- FCS_COP.1/VAU.Hash,
FCS_COP.1/SGD.Hash,
FIA_SOS.1/
AK.Passwörter,
FIA_SOS.1/
AK.CS.Passwörter
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
6. Key
Agreement
ECDH with key
derivation function
HKDF with SHA-
256
[gemSpec_Krypt]
(VAU protocol),
[SP800-56A]
(ECDSA),
[RFC5639]
(brainpool),
[RFC5869] (HKDF),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
brainpo
olP256r
1
FCS_CKM.1/VAU
7. Key
Generation
Key generation for
hybrid encryption
[SP800-133, Kp.
6.1] (Direct Key-
Gen)
256 FCS_CKM.1/AK.AES
8. Authenticate
d Encryption
CMS document
hybrid encryption
and decryption7
using encryption
schemes
(RSAESOAEP or
ECIES) with AES-
GCM, and XML
document hybrid
encryption and
decryption8
using
encryption
scheme
RSAESOAEP with
AES-GCM
[XMLEnc] (XML),
[RFC5652] (CMS),
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS197] (AES),
[SP800-38D]
(GCM),
[RFC5084] (AES-
GCM in CMS),
[SEC1-2009]
(ECIES),
[TR-03111] (ECKA
(for ECIES)),
[TR-03110-3] (KDF
(for ECIES)),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA-
256 (for ECIES)),
[SP800-38A] (CBC
(for ECIES)),
[SP800-38B]
(CMAC (for ECIES))
RSA-
ENC:
2048 –
8192
and
RSA-
DEC:
dependi
ng on
cards
and
ECIES:
brainpo
olP256r
1 and
AES-
GCM-
ENC:
256 and
AES-
GCM-
DEC:
128,
192,
256 and
Authenti
cation
tag:
128,
AES-
CBC-
256 and
8 byte
CMAC
FCS_COP.1/AK.XML.Ver,
FCS_COP.1/AK.CMS.Ver,
FCS_COP.1/AK.XML.Ent,
FCS_COP.1/AK.CMS.Ent,
FCS_CKM.4/AK,
FCS_COP.1/AK.AES,
FCS_COP.1/AK.ECIES
9. Authenticate
d Encryption
AES-256 in GCM
mode
[FIPS197] (AES),
[SP800-38D] (GCM)
256 and
Authenti
cation
tag: 128
FCS_COP.1/VAU.AES
10. Authenticate
d Encryption
ECIES based
authenticated
hybrid encryption
and decryption for
SGD protocol
[gemSpec_SGD_eP
A] (SGD protocol),
[SEC1-2009]
(ECIES),
ECC:
brainpo
olP256r
1 and
AES-
FCS_COP.1/SGD.ECIES
7
The asymmetric decryption is performed within the smart cards, e.g. HBA.
8
The asymmetric decryption is performed within the smart cards, e.g. HBA.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
[SP800-56A]
(ECDH),
[RFC5869] (HKDF),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[FIPS197] (AES),
[SP800-38D] (GCM)
GCM:
256 bit
key, 128
bit tag
11. Trusted
Channel
VAU protocol [gemSpec_Krypt] -- FTP_ITC.1/VAU
12. Trusted
Channel
SGD protocol [gemSpec_SGD_eP
A]
-- FTP_ITC.1/SGD
13. Authenticity RSA signature
verification of
BNetzA-VL using
signature scheme
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5 with SHA-
{256, 384, 512}
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
1900 –
8192
FCS_COP.1/
AK.SigVer.BNetzA-VL
14. Authenticity RSA signature
verification of
BNetzA-VL using
signature scheme
RSASSA-PSS
with SHA-{256,
384, 512}
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
1900 –
8192
FCS_COP.1/
AK.SigVer.BNetzA-VL
15. Authenticity ECDSA signature
verification of
BNetzA-VL using
signature scheme
ECDSA with SHA-
{256, 384, 512}
[FIPS186-4]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC5639]
(brainpool)
brainpo
olP{256,
384,
512}r1
FCS_COP.1/
AK.SigVer.BNetzA-VL
Table 6: TOE cryptographic functionality (AK)
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to [12] the algorithms are suitable for the corresponding purpose. An explicit
validity period is not given.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
28 / 39
BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● The administrator shall only configure the TOE by using the functionality of the web
administration interface as presented in the recommended web browser.
● The TOE is only able to provide its security services under the following conditions:
• The TOE is configured with mandatory TLS and mandatory client system
authentication.
• The connected client systems verify the authenticity of the Konnektor when using
services and receiving events.
• The user is able to identify whether a client system connection is secure.
• The user operates technical peers of the TOE, which use AES-GCM cipher suites for
TLS connection and avoids AES-CBC cipher suites for any connections.
● The TOE user shall only operate the TOE under the conditions above. A violation of
these conditions is considered a vulnerability of the TOE in the operational environment.
In this case, the TOE user is responsible to counter the vulnerability.
● The TOE supports different setups. The main setups are “Parallel” Mode, “InReihe”
Mode and Offline Mode. The “InReihe” Mode is recommended since it provides a higher
protection of the connected LAN, refer to Chapter 5 of [10].
● "The TOE user may use the button “Zufallspasswort generieren” to generate secure
passwords for the client systems."
● Implementers of client systems shall oblige to the requirements for client systems as
stated in [10].
● For the active VPN connections using IPsec no countermeasures against statistic traffic
analysis are implemented.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
AK Application connector
AMTS Arzneimitteltherapiesicherheit
API Application Programming Interface
29 / 39
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
BNetzA-VL Vertrauensliste der Bundesnetzagentur
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CadES CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DH Diffie-Hellman
DOC Documentation
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECIES Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
eGK Elektronische Gesundheitskarte
ePA Elektronische Patientenakte
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FW Firmware
gSMC-K Secure module for the connector
GUI Graphical User Interface
HBA Heilberufsausweis
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HW Hardware
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
30 / 39
BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
KSR Konfigurations- und Software-Repository
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LE Leistungserbringer
LZV Laufzeitverlängerung
NK Network connector
NTP Network Time Protocol
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
SAK Signaturanwendungskomponente
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SIS Secure Internet Service
SMC-B Secure Module Card – Type B: Praxisausweis / Institutionsausweis
ST Security Target
SW Software
TI Telematikinfrastruktur
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSL Trust-Service Status List
VAU Vertrauenswürdige Ausführungsumgebung
VPN Virtual Private Network
VSDM Versichertenstammdatenmanagement
WAN Wide Area Network
XadES XML Advanced Electronic Signatures
XML Extensible Markup Language
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
9
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
32 / 39
BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024, Version 4.10, 02.09.2024, Security
Target Konnektor, KoCoBox MED+ Konnektor Version 5.5.12, KoCo Connector
GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, 15.11.2024, Evaluation Technical Report
Summary (ETR Summary), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential
document)
[8] Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile), Schutzprofil 2: Anforderungen an
den Konnektor, BSI-CC-PP-0098-V3-2021-MA-02, Version 1.6.1, 15.03.2023,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[9] Configuration lists for the TOE (confidential documents)
Configuration Items os-cillation for G3 HW Generation, v5.5.12, KoCo Connector
GmbH. SHA-1: 348c28e91786a8a68d7452278a516fdb79eb4987
Configuration Items n-design, v7.15.1, KoCo Connector GmbH. SHA-1:
9eb0802d0745941e1517430ed809436266f1a67c
Configuration Items KoCo Hamburg for G4 HW Generation, v5.5.12, KoCo
Connector GmbH. SHA-1: db4346cc849d31018e4db0388055733a3d5adcf8
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE:
Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+, KoCo Connector GmbH, Version 5,
17.07.2024
Ergänzungen zum Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+, KoCo Connector
GmbH, Version 1.3.4, 17.07.2024
Allgemeine Gebrauchsanleitung KoCoBox MED+ (G3), KoCo Connector GmbH,
Version 1.3.8, 01.05.2018
Allgemeine Gebrauchsanleitung KoCoBox MED+ (G4), KoCo Connector GmbH,
Version 2.1, 01.03.2022
JSON-Managementschnittstelle der KoCo-Box MED+, KoCo Connector GmbH,
Version 3.22, 19.02.2024
Konnektor Security Guidance Fachmodule NFDM, AMTS und ePA, KoCo Connector
GmbH, Version 4.3, 20.06.2024
Konnektor API für Fachmodule Javadoc, KoCo Connector GmbH, Version 7.15.1,
30.01.2024
[11] Implementation standards:
[CAdES] Electronic Signature Formats, Electronic Signatures and
Infrastructures (ESI) – Technical Specification, ETSI TS 101 733, V1.7.4, 2008-07,
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
[CAdES-BL] Electronic Signatures and Infrastructure (ESI) - CAdES Baseline
Profile - ETSI Technical Specification TS 103 173, V2.1.1, 2012-03, European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
33 / 39
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
[ESSIV] New Methods in Hard Disk Encryption, Clemens Fruhwith.
[FIPS180-4] FIPS PUB 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication Secure Hash Standard (SHS), 2015-08, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST).
[FIPS186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB
186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), 2013-07, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST).
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication PUB 197,
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Updated Version, 2023-05-09, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[ISO_32000-1] Document management — Portable document format — Part 1:
PDF 1.7, Version 2008-7-1, 2008, Adobe Systems Incorporated.
[PAdES] Advanced Electronic Signature Profiles, Part 3: PAdES Enhanced –
PAdES-BES and PAdES-EPES Profiles, ETSI Technical Specification, V1.2.1, 2010-
07, European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Electronic Signatures and
Infrastructures (ESI).
[PAdES-BL] PAdES Baseline Profile, ETSI Technical Specification, V2.2.2, 2013-
04, European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Electronic Signatures and
Infrastructures (ESI).
[RFC2104] RFC 2104 - HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, 1997-
02, Network Working Group, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt.
[RFC2631] RFC 2631 - Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method, 1999-06, The
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2631.txt.
[RFC3268] RFC 3268 - Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS), 2002-06, The Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3268.txt.
[RFC3526] RFC 3526 - More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups
for Internet Key Exchange (IKE), 2003-05, Network Working Group, The Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3526.txt.
[RFC3602] RFC 3602 - The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec,
2003-09, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3602.txt.
[RFC4055] RFC 4055 - Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography
for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile, 2005-06, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4055.txt.
[RFC4106] RFC 4106 - The Use of Galois/Counter Mode(GCM) in IPsec
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), 2005-06, J. Viega and D. McGrew, The
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4106.txt.
[RFC4301] RFC 4301 - Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (IPsec),
2005-12, S. Kent, K. Seo, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4301.txt.
34 / 39
BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
[RFC4303] RFC 4303 - IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), 2005-12, S.
Kent, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4303.txt.
[RFC4492] RFC 4492 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS), 2006-05, The Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4492.txt.
[RFC4868] RFC 4868 - Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-
SHA-512 with IPsec, 2007-05, S. Kelly, S. Frankel, The Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4868.txt.
[RFC5084] RFC 5084 - Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption
in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), 2007-11, Housley, The Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5084.txt.
[RFC5116] RFC 5116 - An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption,
2008-01, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5116.txt.
[RFC5246] RFC 5246 - The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,
2008-08, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt.
[RFC5280] RFC 5280 - Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile (ProposedStandard), 2008-05, 2008-05,
Cooper, et al., The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt.
[RFC5282] RFC 5282 - Using Authenticated Encryption Algorithms with the
Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol.
RFC5282 (Proposed Standard), 2008-08, D. Black and D. McGrew, The Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5282.txt.
[RFC5289] RFC 5289 - TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and
AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM), 2008-08, Network Working Group, The Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5289.txt.
[RFC5639] RFC 5639 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard
Curves and Curve Generation, 2010-03, M. Lochter (BSI), J. Merkle (secunet
Security Networks), The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt.
[RFC5652] RFC 5652 - Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), IETF Trust and
the persons identified as the document authors, 2009-09, The Inter-net Engineering
Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5652.txt.
[RFC5869] RFC 5869 - HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation
Function (HKDF), 2010-05, H. Krawczyk and P. Eronen, The Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5869.txt.
[RFC7027] RFC 7027 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Curves for
Transport Layer Security (TLS), 2010-06, J. Merkle (secunet Securi-ty Networks), M.
Lochter (BSI), The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7027.txt.
[RFC7292] RFC 7292 - PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax v1.1
(Informational), 2014-07, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7292.txt.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
[RFC7296] RFC 7296 - Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), 2014-
10, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7296.txt.
[RFC8017] RFC 8017 - PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications, Version 2.2,
2016-11, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8017.txt.
[SAML2] Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) V2.0 – Errata Composite, 2015-09-08, OASIS Security Services
Technical Committee.
[SEC1-2009] SEC1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Standards for Efficient
Cryptography, Version 2.0, 2009-05-21, Daniel Brown, Hrsg (Certicom Corp).
[SP800-132] NIST Special Publication 800-132 – Recommendation for Password-
Based Key Derivation, 2010-12, National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST).
[SP800-133] NIST Special Publication 800-133 – Recommendation for
Cryptographic Key Generation, 2012-12, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
[SP800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A – Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation – Methods and Techniques, 2001-12, National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[SP800-38B] NIST Special Publication 800-38B – Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation – The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Updated Version,
2016-10-06, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[SP800-38D] NIST Special Publication 800-38D – Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, 2007-11,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[SP800-56A] NIST Special Publication 800-56A – Recommendation for Pair-Wise
Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptog-raphy, 2018-04,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[TR-02102-3_2022] BSI - Technische Richtlinie TR-02102-3, Kryptographische
Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen, Teil 3 – Verwendung von Internet
Protocol Security (IPsec) und Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2), Version 2022-01,
2022-01-24, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[TR-03110-3] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents and eIDAS Token. Part 3: Common Specification. Technische Richtlinie
BSI TR-03110-3, Version 2.21, 2016-12-21, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI).
[TR-03111] Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03111,
Version 2.10, 2018-06-01, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI).
[XAdES] XML Advanced Electronic Signatures (XAdES): Technical Specication
XML Advanced Electronic Signatures (XAdES); ETSI Technical Specication TS 101
903, Version 1.4.2, 2010, European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
[XAdES-BL] Electronic Signatures and Infrastructure (ESI); XAdES Baseline Pro-
file; ETSI Technical Specification TS 103 171, Version 1.4.2, 2010, European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
[XMLEnc] XML Encryption Syntax and Processing, Version 1.1, 2013-04, W3C
Recommendation.
[XMLSig2] XML Signature Syntax and Processing (Second Edition), 2008-06-10,
IETF/W3C XML Signature Working Group, https://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-
xmldsig-core-20080610/.
[12] Further documents:
[gemSpec_Kon] Spezifikation Konnektor, Version 5.18.0, 28.11.2022, gematik.
[gemSpec_Krypt] Übergreifende Spezifikation Verwendung kryptographischer
Algorithmen in der Telematikinfrastruktur, Version 2.26.0, 09.03.2023, gematik.
[gemSpec_SGD_ePA] Spezifikation Schlüsselgenerierungsdienst ePA, Version
1.5.0, 31.01.2022, gematik.
[TR03116-1] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-1, Kryptographische Vorgaben für
Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 1: Telematikinfrastruktur, Technische
Arbeitsgruppe TR-03116, Version 3.20, 21.09.2018
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-V5-2024 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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