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RICOH IM C530F / IM C530FB version E-1.00-H
Security Target
Version 1.5
October 2021
Document prepared by
www.lightshipsec.com
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Document History
Version Date Description
0.1 17 Feb 2021 Initial draft
0.2 10 Mar 2021 Working draft
0.3 31 Mar 2021 Initial draft for evaluation
0.4 6 April 2021 Updated developer comments
0.5 20 April 2021 Addressed evaluator ORs
0.6 12 May 2021 Addressed evaluator ORs
0.7 9 June 2021 Addressed CB ORs
1.0 7 July 2021 Updated CAVP Cert # and CC Release version to match PP
1.1 13 July 2021 Developer comments
1.2 29 July 2021 Evaluator comments
1.3 20 August 2021 Certifier comments
1.4 31 August 2021 Addressed CB ORs.
1.5 8 October 2021 Addressed NIAP comments.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................ 5
1.2 Identification ................................................................................................................... 5
1.3 Conformance Claims...................................................................................................... 5
1.4 Terminology.................................................................................................................... 6
2 TOE Description.................................................................................................................... 7
2.1 Type ............................................................................................................................... 7
2.2 Usage ............................................................................................................................. 7
2.3 Physical Scope............................................................................................................... 9
2.4 Logical Scope............................................................................................................... 10
3 Security Problem Definition............................................................................................... 13
3.1 Users ............................................................................................................................ 13
3.2 Assets........................................................................................................................... 13
3.3 Threats ......................................................................................................................... 15
3.4 Assumptions................................................................................................................. 15
3.5 Organizational Security Policies................................................................................... 16
4 Security Objectives............................................................................................................. 16
5 Security Requirements....................................................................................................... 18
5.1 Conventions ................................................................................................................. 18
5.2 Extended Components Definition................................................................................. 18
5.3 Functional Requirements ............................................................................................. 18
5.4 Assurance Requirements............................................................................................. 35
6 TOE Summary Specification.............................................................................................. 36
6.1 Security Audit ............................................................................................................... 36
6.2 Identification and Authentication .................................................................................. 37
6.3 Access Control ............................................................................................................. 38
6.4 Cryptographic Operations ............................................................................................ 39
6.5 Protection of the TSF ................................................................................................... 40
6.6 Trusted Communications ............................................................................................. 40
6.7 Administrative Roles .................................................................................................... 41
6.8 Trusted Operation ........................................................................................................ 42
6.9 PSTN Fax-Network Separation.................................................................................... 44
7 Rationale.............................................................................................................................. 45
7.1 Conformance Claim Rationale ..................................................................................... 45
7.2 Security Objectives Rationale ...................................................................................... 45
7.3 Security Assurance Requirements rationale................................................................ 47
Annex A: Extended Components Definition............................................................................. 48
Security Audit (FAU).................................................................................................................. 48
Cryptographic Support (FCS).................................................................................................... 49
User Data Protection (FDP) ...................................................................................................... 61
Identification and Authentication (FIA) ...................................................................................... 62
Protection of the TSF (FPT) ...................................................................................................... 65
Annex B: Security Assurance Requirements ........................................................................... 69
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation ..................................................................................... 69
Class ADV: Development.......................................................................................................... 69
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Class AGD: Guidance Documents............................................................................................ 71
Class ALC: Life-cycle Support .................................................................................................. 73
Class ATE: Tests....................................................................................................................... 74
Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment....................................................................................... 75
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation identifiers ......................................................................................................... 5
Table 2: NIAP Technical Decisions ................................................................................................. 5
Table 3: Terminology....................................................................................................................... 6
Table 4: TOE Models....................................................................................................................... 9
Table 5: CAVP Certificates............................................................................................................ 10
Table 6: User Categories............................................................................................................... 13
Table 7: Asset Categories ............................................................................................................. 13
Table 8: User Data Types.............................................................................................................. 13
Table 9: Document and Job Attributes .......................................................................................... 14
Table 10: TSF Data Types ............................................................................................................ 14
Table 11: Threats........................................................................................................................... 15
Table 12: Assumptions .................................................................................................................. 16
Table 13: Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................... 16
Table 14: Security Objectives for the TOE .................................................................................... 16
Table 15: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ................................................... 17
Table 16: Summary of SFRs ......................................................................................................... 18
Table 17: Audit Events .................................................................................................................. 20
Table 18: D.USER.DOC Access Control SFP............................................................................... 25
Table 19: D.USER.JOB Access Control SFP................................................................................ 27
Table 20: Management of TSF Data ............................................................................................. 31
Table 21: Management Functions ................................................................................................. 32
Table 22: TOE Security Assurance Requirements....................................................................... 35
Table 23: List of Audit Events........................................................................................................ 36
Table 24: Stored Documents Access Control Rules for Normal Users......................................... 39
Table 25: Random Number Sources............................................................................................. 39
Table 26: TLS/HTTPS Cryptographic Functions ........................................................................... 41
Table 27: Start-up Integrity Tests .................................................................................................. 43
Table 28: Signature Verification .................................................................................................... 44
Table 29: Security Objectives Rationale ....................................................................................... 45
Table 30: Security Objectives Rationale ....................................................................................... 46
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
1 This Security Target (ST) defines the RICOH IM C530F / IM C530FB, version E-
1.00-H Target of Evaluation (TOE) for the purposes of Common Criteria (CC)
evaluation.
1.2 Identification
Table 1: Evaluation identifiers
Target of Evaluation RICOH IM C530F / IM C530FB, version E-1.00-H
Security Target RICOH IM C530F / IM C530FB Security Target, v1.5
1.3 Conformance Claims
2 This ST supports the following conformance claims:
a) CC version 3.1 revision 4
b) CC Part 2 extended
c) CC Part 3 conformant
d) Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, v1.0
e) Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, v1.0, Errata #1, June 2017
f) NIAP Technical Decisions per Table 2
Table 2: NIAP Technical Decisions
TD # Name Rationale if n/a
TD0074 FCS_CKM.1(a) Requirement in HCD PP v1.0
TD0157 FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 - Testing SPDs
TD0176 FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2 - SED Testing
TD0219 NIAP Endorsement of Errata for HCD PP v1.0
TD0253 Assurance Activities for Key Transport
TD0261 Destruction of CSPs in flash
TD0299 Update to FCS_CKM.4 Assurance Activities
TD0393 Require FTP_TRP.1(b) only for printing
TD0474 Removal of Mandatory Cipher Suite in
FCS_TLS_EXT.1
TD0494 Removal of Mandatory SSH Ciphersuite for HCD SSH is not claimed.
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TD # Name Rationale if n/a
TD0562 Test activity for Public Key Algorithms SSH is not claimed.
1.4 Terminology
Table 3: Terminology
Term Definition
BEV Border Encryption Value
eMMC embedded MultiMediaCard – A non-field-replaceable non-
volatile memory storage device that the TOE uses to store
documents and user account information.
Firewall A device to protect the LAN from internet threats.
LAN Local Area Network — Network used in the TOE environment
lc key A hardware secure module which provides true random
number generation and protected storage for the TOE.
LDAP Server An external IT entity used by the TOE for network
authentication of users.
MFP Multifunction Printer
NVRAM The NVRAM is a non-field-replaceable non-volatile storage
device where TOE configuration data is stored.
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
PSTN Line A connection to a public switched telephone network for the
TOE to communicate with external fax machines
SMTP Server An external IT entity used by the TOE for e-mail transmission
Syslog Server An external IT entity used by the TOE for audit log storage
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2 TOE Description
2.1 Type
3 The TOE is a Digital Multi-Function Printer (MFP), which is an IT device that inputs,
stores, and outputs electronic and hardcopy documents.
2.2 Usage
4 The expected use cases for the TOE are:
a) Scanning. The TOE scans paper documents and then transmits and deletes
the scanned images, on command from the Operation Panel.
b) Printing. The TOE prints or stores documents received from a printer driver
installed on the client computer, and prints or deletes previously stored
documents from commands from the Operation Panel or the client computer’s
web browser.
c) Copying. The TOE scans paper documents to be printed.
d) Network Communications. The TOE is connected to its operational
environment through a local area network (hereafter "LAN") and the public
switched telephone network (PSTN). It sends and receives documents over
the LAN and the PSTN.
e) Administration. The TOE provides management functions to configure and
manage its operation. The management functions are accessible locally from
the Operation Panel or remotely through the Web Image Monitor (hereafter
“WIM”) accessible using a web browser on a client computer.
f) PSTN Faxing. The TOE provides fax transmission and fax reception
functions; both exchange documents according to the Group 3 standard over
a Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN). The Fax Transmission Function
sends scanned images of paper documents, or images of electronic
documents from a client computer, to external fax devices. The Fax Reception
Function receives documents from external fax devices, and stores them in
the TOE.
g) Internal Audit Log Storage. The MFP stores its audit data internally on the
local device in addition to providing the capability for storing them externally to
a remote syslog server.
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2.2.1 Deployment
5 As shown in Figure 1, the TOE is connected to its operational environment through a
local area network (hereafter "LAN") and the public switched telephone network
(PSTN). Other elements of the TOE’s operational environment are as shown.
Figure 1: Example TOE deployment
2.2.2 Interfaces
6 The TOE interfaces include the following:
a) Operation Panel of the MFP is an LCD touch screen interface that provides
a local user interface where users can perform the following operations:
i. Configuration of the MFP
ii. Copying, faxing, storage, and network transmission of paper
documents
iii. Printing, faxing, network transmission, and deletion of the stored
documents
iv. Receiving fax documents via telephone lines and storing them
b) Web Image Monitor (WIM) this is the remote user interface accessible via
TLS/HTTPS where users can perform the following operations:
i. Limited configuration of the MFP – various settings
ii. Printing of documents
iii. Faxing of documents
c) Client printer driver or fax driver is a remote user interface where
communication is protected using TLS.
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d) TLS interface: The TOE is configured to use TLS to protect communication
with a remote syslog server and remote SMTP server.
e) PSTN Fax Line is used to connect to a remote fax machine.
2.3 Physical Scope
7 The physical boundary of the TOE is comprised of the software and hardware of the
MFP models identified in Table 4 and related guidance documentation. The TOE is
delivered by commercial courier and is installed with the assistance of a RICOH
customer engineer.
8 The TOE model number is indicative of copy speed (higher numbers have higher
copy speeds) and the alphabetic suffix corresponds to fax support (F), regional fonts
and printer languages. The differences between models are not security relevant
and are limited to print engine components (speed) and branding variations (labels,
displays, packaging materials and documentation).
Table 4: TOE Models
Branding Model
RICOH IM C530F
IM C530FB
nashuatec
Rex Rotary
Gestetner
SAVIN IM C530FB
LANIER
9 The TOE includes the following critical components:
a) Main Controller. Provides primary printing, scanning, faxing, and networking
functionality.
i) CPU. Marvell 88PA6270.
ii) OS. Linux 4.2.8.
b) Operation Unit. Provides front panel interface control and device extensibility
capabilities.
i) CPU. ARM Cortex-A9 Quad Core.
ii) OS. Linux 3.18 (customized).
2.3.1 Guidance Documents
10 The TOE guidance documentation includes the following:
a) IM 530 series User Guide, DOCS-7303 (PDF)
b) User Guide Security Reference, D0CS7305 2021.01 (HTML)
c) RICOH IM C530F / IM C530FB Common Criteria Guide, v1.3 (PDF)
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2.4 Logical Scope
11 The logical scope of the TOE comprises the security functions provided by the TOE
to include:
a) Security Audit. The TOE generates audit records of user and administrator
actions. It stores audit records both locally and on a remote syslog server.
b) Cryptographic Support. The TOE includes multiple cryptographic modules
for the cryptographic operations that it performs. The relevant CAVP
certificate numbers are noted in Table 5 below.
c) Access Control. The TOE enforces access control policy to restrict access to
user data. The TOE ensures that documents, document processing job
information, and security-relevant data are accessible only to authenticated
users who have the appropriate access permissions.
d) Identification and Authentication. Except for a defined minimal set of
actions that can be performed by an unauthenticated user, the TOE ensures
that all users must be authenticated before accessing its functions and data.
Users log in to the TOE by entering their credentials on the local operation
panel, through WIM login, through print or fax drivers, or using network
authentication services.
e) Administrative Roles. The TOE provides the capability for managing its
functions and data. Role-based access controls ensure that the ability to
configure the security settings of the TOE is available only to the authorized
administrators. Authenticated users can perform copy, printer, scanner and
fax operations based on the user role and the assigned permissions.
f) Trusted Operations. The TOE performs power-on self-tests to ensure the
integrity of the TSF components. It provides a mechanism for performing
trusted update that verifies the integrity and authenticity of the upgrade
software before applying the updates.
g) TOE Access. Interactive user sessions at the local and remote user interfaces
are automatically terminated by the TOE after a configured period of inactivity.
h) Trusted Communications. The TOE protects communications from its
remote users using TLS/HTTPS. The TOE is configured to use TLS to protect
communication with the Syslog and SMTP servers.
i) PSTN Fax-Network Separation. The TOE restricts information received from
or transmitted to the telephone network to only fax data and fax protocols. It
ensures that the fax modem cannot be used to bridge the LAN.
2.4.1 CAVP Certificates
12 The TOE includes the cryptographic modules with related CAVP certificates shown
Table 5 below.
Table 5: CAVP Certificates
Module Operating
Environment
Algorithms CAVP Usage
RICOH Platform
Validation
Library for Type-
1.5fu (Kernel)
BIOS on Marvell
88PA6270
SHA-1 A1328 Self-test (integrity)
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Platform
Validation
Library for
coreutils, v8.23
Marvell
88PA6270
SHA-1 A1327 Self-test (integrity)
Boot SHA-1
Module, v47.04
ST33TPHF2ESPI SHA-1 C715 Self-test (integrity)
RICOH
Cryptographic
Library for ima-
evm-utils
Marvell
88PA6270
SHA-1 A1566 Self-test (integrity)
RICOH
Cryptographic
Library 2 (Java),
v1.0
Customized Linux
3.18 on ARM
Cortex-A9 Quad
Core
SHA-1
SHA-256
RSA Sig Ver
2048
C582 Trusted Update – SOP
Software (Apps)
libseres, v1.0 Customized Linux
4.2.8 on Marvell
88PA6270
RSA Sig Ver
2048
A1326 Trusted Update - MFP
SHA2-256
RICOH
Cryptographic
Library C, v1.2
Customized Linux
3.18 on ARM
Cortex-A9 Quad
Core
ECDSA Sig
Ver
Curve P-256
C629 Trusted Update – SOP
Software (system)
SHA2-256
wolfCrypt, v4.1.0 Linux 4.2.8 on
Marvell
88PA6270_Rev.
C1 Cortex-A53
RSA Key
Generation
RSA Signature
Generation
(PKCS 1.5)
RSA Signature
Verification
(PKCS 1.5)
C2041 TLS/HTTPS
ECDHE
ECDSA
SHA-1, SHA2-
256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
AES-CBC
AES-GCM
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2.4.2 Excluded Features
13 The following features of the MFP are excluded from the evaluated configuration:
a) USB Port. The MFP has a USB Port that is used to directly connect a client
computer to the MFP for printing. This USB port is disabled during initial
installation and configuration of the TOE.
b) SD Card Slot. The MFP has two SD Card Slots, one for customer engineers
and one for users. The SD Card Slot for customer engineer is used by
customer engineers to install components of the MFP; the SD Card Slot for
users is used by users to print documents. Both are disabled when the TOE is
operational, a cover is placed on the SD Card slot for customer engineer so
cards cannot be inserted or removed and the card slot for users is set to
disabled during installation.
2.4.3 Required non-TOE Components
14 The following non-TOE components are required in the TOE operational
environment:
a) Syslog Server. The TOE uses a remote syslog server for long term storage of
its audit trail.
b) NTP Server. The TOE ensures accurate time by synchronizing with a remote
NTP server.
c) SMTP Server. The TOE uses an SMTP server for email transmission.
Encryption/decr
yption
Key length 128,
256
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
HMAC-SHA2-
384
HMAC-SHA2-
512
Hash DRBG
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3 Security Problem Definition
15 The Security Problem Definition is reproduced from section 2 of the HCDPP.
3.1 Users
16 There are two categories of Users defined in this ST, Normal and Admin.
Table 6: User Categories
Designation Name Definition
U.NORMAL Normal User A User who has been identified and
authenticated and does not have an
administrative role
U.ADMIN Administrator A User who has been identified and
authenticated and has an administrative role
17 A pseudo-user role, Customer Engineer, can be enabled by an Administrator for use
by an authorized service representative. It is normally disabled, as it is in the
evaluated configuration.
3.2 Assets
18 Assets are passive entities in the TOE that contain or receive information. In this PP,
Assets are Objects (as defined by the CC). There are two categories of Assets
defined in this PP:
Table 7: Asset Categories
Designation Asset category Definition
D.USER User Data Data created by and for Users that do not affect the
operation of the TSF
D.TSF TSF Data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the
operation of the TSF
19 There are no additional Asset categories defined in this ST.
3.2.1 User Data
20 User Data are composed of two types:
Table 8: User Data Types
Designation User Data type Definition
D.USER.DOC User Document Data Information contained in a User’s Document, in
electronic or hardcopy form
D.USER.JOB User Job Data Information related to a User’s Document or
Document Processing Job
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21 There are no additional types of User Data defined in this ST. Attributes associate
documents and document processing jobs with the document processing functions
of the TOE:
Table 9: Document and Job Attributes
Document processing function Attribute
Printing +PRT
Copying +CPY
Scanning +SCN
Fax (reception) +FAXIN
Fax (transmission) +FAXOUT
3.2.2 TSF Data
22 TSF Data are composed of two types:
Table 10: TSF Data Types
Designation TSF Data type Definition
D.TSF.PROT Protected TSF Data TSF Data for which alteration by a User who is
neither the data owner nor in an Administrator role
might affect the security of the TOE, but for which
disclosure is acceptable
D.TSF.CONF Confidential TSF Data TSF Data for which either disclosure or alteration by
a User who is neither the data owner nor in an
Administrator role might affect the security of the
TOE
23 There are no additional types of TSF Data defined in this ST.
3.2.2.1 Protected TSF Data
24 D.TSF.PROT is composed of the following data:
a) Username
b) Number of Attempts before Lockout
c) Settings for Lockout Release Timer
d) Lockout time
e) Date settings (year/month/day)
f) Time settings
g) Minimum Character No.
h) Password Complexity Setting
i) Operation Panel auto logout time
j) WIM auto logout time
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k) Stored Reception File User
l) Document user list
m) Available function list
n) User authentication method
o) Device Certificate
p) Network settings
q) Audit transfer settings
r) TOE Software
3.2.2.2 Confidential TSF Data
25 D.TSF.CONF is composed of the following data:
a) Login password
b) Audit log
3.3 Threats
26 The following threats are mitigated by this TOE:
Table 11: Threats
Identifier Description
T.UNAUTHORIZED_
ACCESS
An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete) User Document
Data or change (modify or delete) User Job Data in the TOE through
one of the TOE’s interfaces.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE
An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF Data in the TOE
through one of the TOE’s interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security if the TOE is
permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UP
DATE
An attacker may cause the installation of unauthorized software on
the TOE.
T.NET_
COMPROMISE
An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise compromise the
security of the TOE by monitoring or manipulating network
communication.
3.4 Assumptions
27 The following assumptions must be satisfied in order for the Security Objectives and
Security Functional Requirements to be effective:
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Table 12: Assumptions
Identifier Description
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the
data it stores or processes, is assumed to be provided by the
environment.
A.NETWORK The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the TOE from
direct, public access to its LAN interface.
A.TRUSTED_
ADMIN
TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE according to
site security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to site
security policies.
3.5 Organizational Security Policies
28 The following Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) are enforced by this TOE:
Table 13: Organizational Security Policies
Identifier Description
P.AUTHORIZATION Users must be authorized before performing Document
Processing and administrative functions.
P.AUDIT Security-relevant activities must be audited and the log of such
actions must be protected and transmitted to an External IT
Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION The TOE must be able to identify itself to other devices on the
LAN.
P.FAX_FLOW If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will ensure
separation between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.
4 Security Objectives
29 The following Security Objectives are satisfied by this TOE:
Table 14: Security Objectives for the TOE
Identifier Description
O.USER_I&A The TOE shall perform identification and authentication of
Users for operations that require access control, User
authorization, or Administrator roles.
O.ACCESS_CONTROL The TOE shall enforce access controls to protect User Data
and TSF Data in accordance with security policies.
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Identifier Description
O.USER_AUTHORIZATION The TOE shall perform authorization of Users in accordance
with security policies.
O.ADMIN_ROLES The TOE shall ensure that only authorized Administrators are
permitted to perform administrator functions.
O.UPDATE_VERIFICATION The TOE shall provide mechanisms to verify the authenticity of
software updates.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST The TOE shall test some subset of its security functionality to
help ensure that subset is operating properly.
O.COMMS_PROTECTION The TOE shall generate audit data, and be capable of sending
it to a trusted External IT Entity. Optionally, it may store audit
data in the TOE.
O.AUDIT The TOE shall generate audit data, and be capable of sending
it to a trusted External IT Entity. Optionally, it may store audit
data in the TOE.
O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, then the TOE shall
ensure separation of the PSTN fax telephone line and the LAN,
by system design or active security function.
30 The following Security Objectives must be satisfied by the TOE’s Operational
Environment.
Table 15: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Identifier Description
OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Operational Environment shall provide physical security,
commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it
stores or processes.
OE.NETWORK
PROTECTION
The Operational Environment shall provide network security
to protect the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN
interface.
OE.ADMIN_TRUST The TOE Owner shall establish trust that Administrators will
not use their privileges for malicious purposes.
OE.USER_TRAINING The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of site
security policies and have the competence to follow them.
OE.ADMIN_TRAINING The TOE Owner shall ensure that Administrators are aware
of site security policies and have the competence to use
manufacturer’s guidance to correctly configure the TOE and
protect passwords and keys accordingly.
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5 Security Requirements
5.1 Conventions
31 This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined
by the CC:
c) Assignment. Indicated with italicized text.
d) Refinement. Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs.
e) Selection. Indicated with underlined text.
f) Assignment within a Selection: Indicated with italicized and underlined text.
g) Iteration. Indicated by adding letter in parentheses for iterations completed in
the PP. Iterations completed in the ST are identified by adding a string starting
“/” (e.g. “FCS_CKM.1(b)/DIM”
Note: operations performed within the Security Target are denoted within brackets [].
Operations shown without brackets are reproduced from the HCDPP.
5.2 Extended Components Definition
32 Refer to Annex A: Extended Components Definition.
5.3 Functional Requirements
Table 16: Summary of SFRs
Requirement Title
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic Key Generation (for Symmetric keys)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_CKM.4(a) Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Encryption/Decryption)
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Requirement Title
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1(c)/L1 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1(c)/L2 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected
FCS_RBG EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended Password Management
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
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Requirement Title
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted update
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1(a) Trusted Path (for Administrators)
FTP_TRP.1(b) Trusted Path (for Non-administrators)
5.3.1 Security Audit (FAU)
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit;
c) All auditable events specified in Table 17: Audit Events, [no other
auditable events].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of
the functional components included in the PP/ST, additional
information specified in Table 17, [no other audit relevant
information].
Table 17: Audit Events
Auditable Event Relevant SFR Additional information
Job completion FDP_ACF.1 Type of job
Unsuccessful User
authentication
FIA_UAU.1 None
Unsuccessful User
identification
FIA_UID.1 None
Use of management
functions
FMT_SMF.1 None
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Auditable Event Relevant SFR Additional information
Modification to the group of
Users that are part of a role
FMT_SMR.1 None
Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 None
Failure to establish session FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1(a),
FTP_TRP.1(b)
Reason for failure
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall
be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user
that caused the event.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [U.ADMIN] with the capability to read all records
from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user
to interpret the information.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except
those users that have been granted explicit read-access.
FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage
FAU_STG1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from
unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the
stored audit records in the audit trail.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external
IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FAU_STG.4.1 Refinement The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [no
other actions] if the audit trail is full.
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5.3.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_CKM.1.1(a) Refinement The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used
for key establishment in accordance with [
• NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise
Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography” for finite field-based key establishment schemes;
• NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise
Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography” for elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes
and implementing “NIST curves” P256, P-384 and [P-521] (as
defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”)
]
and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than,
a symmetric key strength of 112 bits.
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric keys)
FCS_CKM.1.1(b)/ Refinement The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a
Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and
specified cryptographic key sizes [128 bit, 256 bit] that meet the
following: No Standard.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 Refinement The TSF shall destroy all plaintext secret and private
cryptographic keys and cryptographic critical security parameters
when no longer needed.
FCS_CKM.4(a) Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1(a) The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [
• For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [removal
of power to the memory];
• For non-volatile memory the destruction shall be executed by a [
[single] overwrite consisting of [a new value of a key of the same
size]];
] that meets the following: No Standard.
Application Note: This SFR is altered by TD0261.
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1(a) Refinement The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES operating in
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[CBC mode, GCM mode] and cryptographic key sizes 128-bits and
256-bits that meets the following:
• FIPS PUB 197, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”
• [NIST SP 800-38A, NIST SP 800-38D]
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for Signature Generation/
Verification)
FCS_COP.1.1(b) Refinement The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in
accordance with a [
• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of
[2048 bits]]
• Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key size of
[256 bits or greater]]
that meets the following: [
Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm:
• FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”
Case: ECDSA Digital Signature Algorithm:
• FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”]
• The TSF shall implement “NIST curves” P-256, P384 and [P521] (as
defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”).]
FCS_COP.1(c)/L1 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1(c) Refinement The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in
accordance with [SHA-1] that meet the following: [ISO/IEC 10118-
3:2004].
FCS_COP.1(c)/L2 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1(c) Refinement The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in
accordance with [SHA-256, SHA-384] that meet the following: [ISO/IEC
10118-3:2004].
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_COP.1.1(g) Refinement The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[SHA-256,
SHA-384], key size [64 (when using SHA-256), 128 (when using SHA-
384)], and message digest sizes [256, 384] bits that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 198-1, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code,
and FIPS PUB 180-3, “Secure Hash Standard.”
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected
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FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC
2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol using TLS as specified in
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with [NIST SP 800-90A] using [Hash_DRBG (any SHA-
256)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source
that accumulates entropy from [[one(1)] hardware-based noise source(s)]
with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest
security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security
Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will
generate.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols [TLS 1.2
(RFC 5246)] supporting the following cipher suites:
[
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384]
Application Note: This SFR is altered by TD0474
5.3.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP on
subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects specified
in Table 2 and Table3 Table 18 and Table 19.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to
objects based on the following: subjects, objects, and attributes specified
in Table 2 and Table3 Table 18 and Table 19.
FDP_ACF.1.2 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules
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governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects
using controlled operations on controlled objects specified in Table
2 and Table3 Table 18 and Table 19.
FDP_ACF.1.3 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: [no additional rules].
FDP_ACF.1.4 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: [no additional rules].
Table 18: D.USER.DOC Access Control SFP
"Create" "Read" "Modify" "Delete"
Print (+PRT)
Operation:
Submit a
document to
be printed
View image
or Release
printed
output
Modify stored
document
Delete stored
document
Job owner
Allowed
(note 1)
View: no
function
Release:
allowed
No function Allowed
U.ADMIN No function
View: no
function
Release: no
function
No function Allowed
U.NORMAL Allowed Denied Denied Denied
Unauthentica
ted
(condition 1) Denied Denied Denied
Scan
(+SCN)
Operation:
Submit a
document for
scanning
View
scanned
image
Modify stored
image
Delete stored
image
Job owner
Allowed
(note 2)
Allowed No function No function
U.ADMIN No function No function No function No function
U.NORMAL Allowed Denied
Denied (No
function)
Denied (No
function)
Unauthentica
ted
Denied Denied
Denied (No
function)
Denied (No
function)
Copy
(+CPY)
Operation:
Submit a
document for
copying
View
scanned
image or
Release
Modify stored
image
Delete stored
image
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"Create" "Read" "Modify" "Delete"
printed copy
output
Job owner
Allowed
(note 2)
View: no
function
Release: no
function
No function No function
U.ADMIN No function
View: no
function
Release: no
function
No function No function
U.NORMAL Allowed Denied
Denied (No
function)
Denied (No
function)
Unauthentica
ted
Denied Denied
Denied (No
function)
Denied (No
function)
Fax send
(+FAXOUT)
Operation:
Submit a
document to
send as a fax
View
scanned
image
Modify stored
image
Delete stored
image
Job owner
Allowed
(note 2)
No function No function No function
U.ADMIN No function No function No function No function
U.NORMAL Allowed Denied
Denied (No
function)
Denied (No
function)
Unauthentica
ted
Denied Denied
Denied (No
function)
Denied (No
function)
Fax receive
(+FAXIN)
Operation:
Receive a
fax and store
it
View fax
image or
Release
printed fax
output
Modify image
of received
fax
Delete image
of received
fax
Fax owner
Allowed
(note 3)
View:
no function
Release:
allowed
No function No function
U.ADMIN
Allowed
(note 4)
View: no
function
Release: no
function
No function No function
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"Create" "Read" "Modify" "Delete"
U.NORMAL
Allowed
(note 4)
Denied Denied Denied
Unauthentica
ted
Allowed Denied Denied Denied
Table 19: D.USER.JOB Access Control SFP
"Create" "Read" "Modify" "Delete"
Print (+PRT)
Operation:
Create print
job
View print
queue / log
Modify print
job
Cancel print
job
Job owner (note 1) Allowed No function Allowed
U.ADMIN No function Allowed No function Allowed
U.NORMAL Allowed Allowed Denied Denied
Unauthentica
ted
Denied Allowed Denied Denied
Scan
(+SCN)
Operation:
Create scan
job
View scan
status / log
Modify scan
job
Cancel scan
job
Job owner (note 2) Allowed No function Allowed
U.ADMIN No function Allowed No function Allowed
U.NORMAL Allowed Allowed Denied Denied
Unauthentica
ted
Denied Denied Denied Denied
Copy
(+CPY)
Operation:
Create copy
job
View copy
status / log
Modify copy
job
Cancel copy
job
Job owner (note 2) Allowed No function Allowed
U.ADMIN No function Allowed No function Denied
U.NORMAL Allowed Allowed Denied Denied
Unauthentica
ted
Denied Denied Denied Denied
Fax send
(+FAXOUT)
Operation:
Create fax
send job
View fax job
queue / log
Modify fax
send job
Cancel fax
send job
Job owner (note 2) Allowed No function No function
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"Create" "Read" "Modify" "Delete"
U.ADMIN No function Allowed No function No function
U.NORMAL Allowed Allowed Denied Denied
Unauthentica
ted
Denied Denied Denied Denied
Fax receive
(+FAXIN)
Operation:
Create fax
receive job
View fax
receive
status / log
Modify fax
receive job
Cancel fax
receive job
Fax owner (note 3) Allowed No function No function
U.ADMIN (note 4) Allowed No function No function
U.NORMAL (note 4) Allowed Denied Denied
Unauthentica
ted
Allowed Denied Denied Denied
Application notes:
Condition 1: Jobs submitted by unauthenticated users must contain a credential that the TOE
can use to identify the Job Owner.
See also the following Notes that are referenced in Table 2 and Table3 Table 18 and Table 19.
Note 1: Job Owner is identified by a credential or assigned to an authorized User as part
of the process of submitting a print or storage Job.
Note 2: Job Owner is assigned to an authorized User as part of the process of initiating a
scan, copy, fax send, or retrieval Job.
Note 3: Job Owner of received faxes is assigned by default or configuration. Minimally,
ownership of received faxes is assigned to a specific user or U.ADMIN role.
Note 4: PSTN faxes are received from outside of the TOE, they are not initiated by Users
of the TOE.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
FDP_FXS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except
transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols.
5.3.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [an administrator configurable positive integer
within [1 to 10]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [
• User authentication using the Operation Panel
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• User authentication using WIM from the client computer
• User authentication when printing from the client computer
• User authentication when using LAN Fax from the client computer].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been [met], the TSF shall [lock the user account for an administrator
configurable time period, or until an administrator unlocks the account.].
Application Note: This SFR applies only to internal identification and authentication.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging
to individual users: [Username, User Role, Available Functions List]
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities
for User passwords:
a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of
upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special
characters: [ “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”, [[“"", “'", “+", “,",
“-", “.", “/", “:", “;", “<", “=", “>", “?", “[", “\", “]", “_", “`", “{", “|", “}", “~"]];
b) Minimum password length shall be settable by an Administrator, and
have the capability to require passwords of 15 characters or greater;
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall allow [the viewing of the list of user jobs, WIM
Help, system status, counter and information of inquiries, and creation of
fax reception and print jobs] on behalf of the user to be performed before
the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [displaying dummy characters as
authentication feedback on the Operation Panel and through WIM] to the
user while the authentication is in progress.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall allow [the viewing of the list of user jobs, WIM
Help, system status, counter and information of inquiries, creation of fax
reception jobs, and creation of print jobs] on behalf of the user to be
performed before the user is identified.
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FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [username, available function
list, and user role].
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [an
Available functions list is associated with the user after the user is
authenticated, and the set of available functions does not change during
the user session.]
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
[none].
5.3.5 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behaviour of,
disable, enable, modify the behaviour of] the functions [listed in Table 20]
to U.ADMIN.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to
restrict the ability to [query, modify] the security attributes [username,
available function list, user role] to [U.ADMIN].
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MSA.3.1 Refinement The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to
provide [permissive] default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 Refinement The TSF shall allow the [U.ADMIN] to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the specified
operations on the specified TSF Data to the roles specified in Table
4 Table 20
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Table 20: Management of TSF Data
Data Operation Interfaces Authorized Role(s)
TSF Data owned by U.NORMAL or associated with documents or jobs owned by U.NORMAL.
Login password for
authenticated user
Modify Operation Panel,
WIM
The Owning
U.NORMAL or
U.ADMIN
TSF Data not owned by a U.NORMAL
Audit Logs Delete, export WIM U.ADMIN
Login passwords of
U.ADMIN user
Modify
Operation Panel,
WIM
U.ADMIN
Username, user role,
available function list
or access permissions
of U.NORMAL Users
Modify
Operation Panel,
WIM
U.ADMIN
Software, firmware, and related configuration data
Audit Transfer Settings Modify Operation Panel,
WIM
U.ADMIN
Date & Time Settings Modify WIM U.ADMIN
Password Length and
Password complexity
settings
Modify Operation Panel,
WIM
U.ADMIN
Operation Panel Auto
logout settings
Modify Operation Panel,
WIM
U.ADMIN
WIM Auto logout
settings
Modify WIM U.ADMIN
PSTN Fax-Line
Separation - Stored
Reception File User
Modify
Operation Panel U.ADMIN
Device Certificate Create, Query,
Modify, Delete
WIM U.ADMIN
TOE Software updates Modify WIM U.ADMIN
Network settings for
trusted communication
Modify Operation Panel,
WIM
U.ADMIN
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FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: [management functions listed in Table 21.
Table 21: Management Functions
Management Functions Operation Interface(s)
Manage user accounts (users, roles,
privileges and available functions list)
Create,
modify, delete
Operation Panel,
WIM
Configure audit transfer settings Modify WIM
Manage audit logs
Delete, export
Operation Panel,
WIM
Manage Audit Functions Enable,
Disable
Operation Panel,
WIM
Manage time and date settings
Modify
Operation Panel,
WIM
Configure minimum password length
Modify
Operation Panel,
WIM
Configure Password complexity settings
Modify
Operation Panel,
WIM
Configure Operation Panel Auto Logout Time
Modify
Operation Panel,
WIM
Configure WIM Auto Logout Time Modify WIM
Configure number of authentication failure
before account lockout
Modify WIM
Configure account release timer settings Modify WIM
Configure PSTN Fax-Line Separation Stored
Reception File User
Modify
Operation Panel,
WIM
Configure network settings for trusted
communications (specify IP addresses and
port to connect to the TOE)
Modify
Operation Panel,
WIM
Manage Device Certificates Create, query,
modify, delete,
upload
Operation Panel,
WIM
Manage TOE Trusted Update Query, Modify WIM
Configure NTP Modify WIM
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Management Functions Operation Interface(s)
Manage user accounts (Ability to login) Unlock WIM
FMT_SMR.1 Restrictions on Security Roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall maintain the roles U.ADMIN, U.NORMAL.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
5.3.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys,
and private keys.
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests during initial start-up
(and power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the
current version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate
updates to TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to
the TOE using a digital signature mechanism and [no other functions]
prior to installing those updates.
5.3.7 TOE Access (FTA)
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate interactive session after a [lapse of Operation
Panel auto logout time, lapse of WIM auto logout time, completion of
document data reception from the printer driver, and completion of
document data reception from the fax driver].
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5.3.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall use [TLS] to provide a trusted
communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities
supporting the following capabilities: [[syslog, SMTP]] that is
logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2 Refinement The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT
entities, to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 Refinement The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted
channel for [communication via the LAN of document data, function
data, protected data, and confidential data].
FTP_TRP.1(a) Trusted Path (for Administrators)
FTP_TRP.1.1(a) Refinement The TSF shall use [TLS/HTTPS] to provide a trusted
communication path between itself and remote administrators that is
logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data
from disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated
data.
FTP_TRP.1.2(a) Refinement The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3(a) Refinement The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for
initial administrator authentication and all remote administration
actions.
FTP_TRP.1(b) Trusted Path (for Non-administrators)
FTP_TRP.1.1(b) Refinement The TSF shall use [TLS/HTTPS] to provide a trusted
communication path between itself and remote users that is logically
distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data
from disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated
data.
FTP_TRP.1.2(b) Refinement The TSF shall permit [the TSF, remote users] to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3(b) Refinement The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for
initial user authentication and all remote actions.
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5.4 Assurance Requirements
33 The TOE security assurance requirements are summarized in Table 22. See Annex
B for Security Assurance Requirements description.
Table 22: TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Components Description
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance Claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended Components Definition
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security Objectives for the operational environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated Security Requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage
Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing - conformance
Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
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6 TOE Summary Specification
34 The following describes how the TOE fulfils each SFR included in section 5.3.
6.1 Security Audit
6.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 & FAU_GEN.2
35 The TOE records an audit log of events listed in Table 23. Audit log entries record
the date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event. Additionally, Job Completion events
record the type of job, and Failure to Establish Session events record the reason for
such failure.
Table 23: List of Audit Events
Auditable event
requirements
Auditable events satisfied
Start-up and shutdown of the
audit functions
Start-up of the Audit Function
Shutdown of the Audit Function
Job completion Printing via networks
LAN Fax via networks
Scanning documents
Copying documents
Receiving incoming faxes
Reading document data (print, fax transmission)
Deleting document data
Unsuccessful User
authentication,
Unsuccessful User
identification
Failure of login operations
Use of management
functions
Use of functions identified in FMT_SMF.1
Modification to the group of
Users that are part of a role
Modification of MFP Administrator roles
Changes to the time Date settings (year/month/day), time settings (hour/minute)
Failure to establish session Failure of communication with the audit server
Failure of communication with print driver
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Auditable event
requirements
Auditable events satisfied
Failure of communication with fax driver
Failure of communication with WIM
6.1.2 FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG_EXT.1, FAU_STG.4, FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SAR.2 and FTP_ITC.1
36 The TOE stores audit log data in a dedicated storage area of the eMMC. Audit
records are buffered in that storage area before transfer to a configured remote
syslog server over a configured TLS trusted channel.
37 Authorized administrators use the WIM to review the audit trail and to initiate transfer
of audit records. The TOE prevents unauthorized access to the audit records by
ensuring that the options to manage the audit function and the audit records are not
included in the lists of available functions visible to the U.NORMAL users.
38 The TOE audit trail comprises three types of audit logs: Job logs, Access logs, and
Ecology logs. By default, the job and ecology logs will each hold a maximum of
4,000 records; the access log can have a maximum of 12,000 records. When a
maximum number of records is reached, the records are overwritten based on the
following criteria:
a) When syslog audit transfers are working, the oldest records which have been
transferred to the syslog server are overwritten first.
b) If none of the logs have been transferred to the audit server, the oldest
records are overwritten first.
6.2 Identification and Authentication
6.2.1 FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_ATD.1 & FIA_USB.1
39 For each individual user, the TOE maintains the user attributes: username,
password, user role and available functions list regardless of the authentication
method for the user account. Users login to the TOE by entering their
username/password credentials on the Operation Panel, the WIM login screen, or
through a client’s print driver or fax driver that has been configured to submit user
credentials.
40 When users enter their passwords on the Operation Panel or the WIM login, the
TOE displays a sequence of dummy characters whose length is the same as that of
the entered password.
41 All users accessing the TOE user interfaces are identified and authenticated before
they are allowed access. Only the following functions are accessible before the user
is authenticated:
a) Viewing user job lists, WIM Help, system status, the counter and information
of inquiries.
b) Creation of fax reception jobs.
c) Creation of print jobs
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42 The TOE authenticates users by checking the entered username/passwords
credentials against the local user database.
43 An available functions list that identifies the basic hardcopy functions a user is
permitted to perform is associated with each Normal User. After successful login,
users are authorized to perform functions according to their assigned user role
(Normal User, MFP Administrator, or MFP Supervisor). If login fails, the user is not
denied access to all functions that require user authentication.
6.2.2 FIA_PMG_EXT.1
44 For authentication within the TOE, login passwords for users can be registered only
if these passwords meet the conditions specified by the selections in
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.
6.2.3 FIA_AFL.1 & FTA_SSL.3
45 The TOE counts consecutive login failures for a given login name and will locks out
that user after an administrator-configured number of authentication failures attempts
have been reached. For the U.NORMAL users, the account lockout is released
when the configured lockout time has elapsed or by direct release operation
performed by the MFP administrator. For the U.ADMIN users, the account lockout is
released when the configured lockout time has elapsed, or by direct release
operation performed by the MFP Administrator or MFP Supervisor, or by elapse of a
given time after the TOE restarts.
46 The TOE can terminate user sessions at the various interfaces as follow:
h) Operation Panel: the user is logged out of the TOE when inactivity reaches
the Operation Panel auto logout time (settable from 10 to 999 seconds).
i) WIM: the user is logged out of the TOE when inactivity reaches the WIM auto
logout time (settable from 3 to 60 minutes).
j) Printer driver: the user is logged out of the TOE immediately after receiving
the print data from the printer driver.
k) Fax driver: the user is logged out of the TOE immediately after receiving the
transmission information from the fax driver.
6.3 Access Control
6.3.1 FDP_ACC.1 & FDP_ACF.1
47 The TOE controls user operations for document data and user jobs as specified in
Table 18 and Table 19.
6.3.1.1 Access control rule on document data
48 The TOE provides users with the ability to perform operations on document data that
are stored in the TOE.
49 Normal Users are permitted to operate on document data if the ID of the user
corresponds to the Document User List for that document (i.e., the user is the "Job
Owner"). A Normal User is not permitted to operate on document data for which it is
not the Job Owner.
50 A Normal User who is a Job Owner may print, send by fax, send by e-mail as
attachments, and delete stored documents, using the Operation Panel or a web
browser.
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51 The TOE allows only the Job Owner to view and delete the document data handled
as a user job while Printer Function is being used.
52 While no interface to change job owners is provided, an interface to cancel user jobs
is provided. If a user job is cancelled, any document the cancelled job operates will
be deleted.
Table 24: Stored Documents Access Control Rules for Normal Users
Function User interface Type of
document
Operations permitted for authorized
users
Printer Operation Panel +PRT Print
Delete
Printer Web browser +PRT Delete
Fax Operation Panel +FAXIN Print
53 MFP Administrators are not permitted to print, download, or send stored documents.
MFP Administrators may delete stored documents, using the Operation Panel, web
browser, or indirectly by cancelling a job.
54 The MFP Supervisor is not permitted to perform any document operations.
6.3.1.2 Access control rule on user jobs
55 The TOE displays on the Operation Panel a menu to cancel a user job only if the
user who logs in from the Operation Panel is a Job Owner or MFP Administrator and
a cancellation of a user job is attempted by the Job Owner or an MFP Administrator.
Other users are not allowed to operate user jobs.
56 When a user job is cancelled, any documents operated by the cancelled job will be
deleted. However, if the document data operated by the cancelled user job is a
stored document, the data will not be deleted and remain stored in the TOE.
6.4 Cryptographic Operations
6.4.1 FCS_CKM.1(a), FCS_CKM.1(b), FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
57 The TOE implements random-bit generation services using a software based-based
DRGB that has been seeded with at least 256-bits of entropy from a third-party
hardware-based TRNG and DRBG.
Table 25: Random Number Sources
RNG Method Standard RNG
Hardware TRNG True RNG +
DRBG
AIS31 Class 2 Hardware TRNG
Software DRBG Hash_DRBG_SH
A256
SP 800-90A Software DRBG
The TOE generates the following cryptographic keys in support of secure
communications:
a) RSA 2048
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b) ECDHE P256, P-384 and P-521.
c) 128-bit and 256-bit symmetric keys
58 Additional details about key creation, the TRNG, and the DRBG, are provided in the
Key Management Description and Entropy Description documents.
6.4.2 FPT_SKP_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.4(a) and FCS_CKM_EXT.4
59 The TOE prevents reading of all symmetric and private keys. It does not make use of
pre-shared keys.
60 The TOE destroys cryptographic keys and key materials when no longer needed.
TLS session keys are no longer needed at the end of a communication session.
Private keys are no longer needed when a new certificate replaces the current
device certificate.
61 Key destruction is further described in the separate proprietary Key Management
Document (KMD).
6.5 Protection of the TSF
6.5.1 FPT_STM.1
62 The date (year/month/day) and time (hour/minute/second) the TOE records for the
audit log are derived from the system clock of the TOE. The system clock is also
used for other time-related functions, including user lockout timing, idle session
timeouts, and SA lifetimes.
63 The system clock may be set locally or configured to use a network time server. Only
an MFP Administrator can configure the system clock.
6.6 Trusted Communications
64 The Trusted Communications Function provides trusted paths for communications
between the TOE and remote users / external IT entities.
6.6.1 FTP_TRP.1 (a), FTP_TRP.1 (b), FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1, FTP_ITC.1,
and FCS_TLS_EXT.1
65 The TOE implements TLS 1.2 to protect communications between the TOE and
remote users' client computers (print drivers, fax drivers, and WIM HTTPS sessions).
TLS client authentication is not supported. The TOE can also be configured at initial
configuration to use TLS to protect communications with a remote Syslog or SMTP
server.
66 The TOE supports these ciphersuites:
a) TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA256
b) TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
c) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
d) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
e) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
f) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
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6.6.2 FCS_COP.1 (a), FCS_COP.1(b), FCS_COP.1(c), and FCS_COP.1(g)
67 The TOE generates a self-signed RSA Device Certificate. Administrators may import
a Device Certificate that is generated outside of the TOE.
68 To establish a session key for TLS communications, the TOE employs a Diffie-
Hellman-based key establishment scheme conforming to NIST SP 800-56A Section
5.6, and a Hash DRBG. The session key is used to encrypt communications with
AES 128 or AES 256 CBC:
Table 26: TLS/HTTPS Cryptographic Functions
Function SFR Algorithm
Authentication n/a RSA KeyGen 186-4
Key establishment FCS_CKM.1(a) DSA KeyGen 186-4
KAS-FFC (DHE)
KAS-ECC (ECDHE)
Random number
generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Hash_DRBG_SHA256
Encryption /
decryption
FCS_COP.1(a) AES 128 CBC
AES 256 CBC
AES 128 GCM
AES 256 GCM
Hashing FCS_COP.1(c)/L2
FCS_COP.1(g)
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
6.7 Administrative Roles
69 The Security Management Function consists of functions to 1) control operations for
TSF data, 2) maintain user roles assigned to Normal Users, MFP Administrator, or
MFP Supervisor to operate the Security Management Function, and 3) set
appropriate default values to security attributes, all of which accord with user role
privileges or user privileges that are assigned to Normal Users, MFP Administrator,
or MFP Supervisor.
6.7.1 FMT_SMR.1
70 The TOE maintains U.NORMAL and U.ADMIN roles as described in Table 6.
U.NORMAL defines the normal or non-admin users of the TOE which are permitted
to use the document processing functions of the MFP and access their own data.
U.ADMIN defines All TOE administrators w which includes the MFP Administrator
and the MFP Supervisor. The MFP Administrator configures the TOE, manages
normal users’ jobs and normal users’ data. The MFP supervisor sets MFP
Administrators’ passwords. Administrators do not initiate document processing jobs.
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6.7.2 FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MOF.1, and FMT_MTD.1
71 The TOE provides and restricts the following management functions which can be
managed over the Operation Panel or the WIM:
a) Manage user accounts including create, modify, delete users, user roles,
privileges, available function lists.
b) Manage the audit functions including enable/disable the audit functions and
modifying the audit transfer settings
c) Query, delete and export the audit logs
d) Configure time and date settings
e) Password Management including configuring password composition,
password length, and password complexity
f) Configure auto logout settings on WIM and the Operation Panel
g) Configure Authentication Failure and Account lockout timer settings
h) Modify PSTN Fax-Line Separation Stored Reception File User
i) Configure network settings for trusted communications (specify IP addresses
and port to connect to the TOE)
j) Manage device certificates including create, query, delete, modify, upload
certificates
k) Manage TOE trusted update
l) Configure NTP
72 The TOE restricts modification of TSF functions and TSF data to the authorized
administrator roles.
6.7.3 FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3
73 Table 18 and Table 19 list the access control rules enforced by the TOE when users
access the document processing functions (print, scan, copy, fax) and individual
user jobs. The default behaviour to access the document data is permissive for all
authenticated normal users, except for the U.ADMIN user which cannot initiate
document processing functions. The TOE maintains username and available
function lists data for individual users, unauthenticated users sending document print
of document fax to the TOE must be identified before the TOE processes the job.
6.8 Trusted Operation
74 The Software Verification Function is to verify the integrity of the executable codes of
the MFP Control Software, FCU Control Software and Operation Panel Control
Software, and confirm that these codes can be trusted.
6.8.1 FPT_TST_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1(b), FCS_COP.1(c)/L1, and
FCS_COP.1(c)/L2
75 During start-up, the TOE performs a series of integrity tests, that check that the hash
on the executable files is correct and that the software has not been changed. The
integrity tests check the hash on the software executable listed below:
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Table 27: Start-up Integrity Tests
Integrity test SFR Algorithm
TPM FCS_COP.1(c)/L1 SHA-1
MFP Control
Software
FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_COP.1(c)/L2
RSA 186-4
SHA-256
Fax Control Unit FCS_COP.1(c)/L1 SHA-1
Operation Panel
Software
FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_COP.1(c)/L1
RSA 186-4
SHA-1
Operation Panel
Applications
FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_COP.1(c)/L1
RSA 186-4
SHA-1
76 If any steps of the integrity tests fail, a Service Call (SC) error code is displayed on
the Operator Panel and the TOE becomes unavailable. In such cases, the
Administrator must contact a Customer Engineer to service the TOE.
77 When all steps succeed, the TOE becomes operational.
78 Testing that the hash on the TOE software image is correct before the TOE can
become operational verifies the integrity and validity of the TOE software; this is
sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF is operating correctly.
6.8.2 FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1(b), FCS_COP.1(c)/L1, and
FCS_COP.1(c)/L2
79 TOE allows only the MFP Administrator to read the version of the MFP Control
Software, Operation Panel Control Software, and FCU Control Software. The MFP
Administrator can read these versions using the Operation Panel or WIM from the
client computer.
80 The MFP Administrator can prepare for installation of updated MFP Control
Software, Operation Panel Software, or FCU Control Software, by uploading an
installation package from the client computer using WIM. The package contains the
TOE Software and a digital signature (DS) that was created using the SERES
private key. Digital signatures for trusted updates are generated outside of the TOE,
by the manufacturer.
81 For MFP Control or FCU Software, the TOE performs the following verifications
before the installing the package:
a) Identifies the type of software (e.g., MFP Control, Operation Panel, FCU);
b) Verifies that the software model name matches the TOE;
c) Creates a SHA256 message digest (MD1) of the software, uses the SERES
public key to decrypt DS (MD2), and then verifies that MD1 = MD2.
82 For Operation Panel software, the TOE performs the following verifications before
the installing the package:
a) Identifies the type of software (e.g., MFP Control, Operation Panel, FCU);
b) Verifies that the software model name matches the TOE;
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c) Creates a SHA256 message digest (MD1) of the index file, uses the SERES
public key to decrypt DS (MD2), and then verifies that MD1 = MD2.
d) Creates a SHA256 message digest (MD3) of the software image, uses an
internal key to decrypt DS (MD4), and then verifies that MD3 = MD4.
83 The TOE performs the signature verification of the software to be updated using the
encryption functions listed below when updating the software.
Table 28: Signature Verification
Integrity test SFR Algorithm
MFP Control
Software
FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_COP.1(c)/L2
RSA 186-4
SHA-256
Operation Panel
Software
FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_COP.1(c)/L2
ECDSA SigVer 186-4
SHA-256
Operation Panel
Applications
FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_COP.1(c)/L2
RSA 186-4
ECDSA SigVer 186-4
SHA-256
6.9 PSTN Fax-Network Separation
84 The Fax Line Separation Function permits only fax transmissions as input
information from telephone lines so that unauthorized intrusion from telephone lines
can be prevented.
6.9.1 FDP_FXS_EXT.1
85 The fax interface use cases are below.
a) Sending faxes
i) The TOE receives documents from client PCs via the LAN, and using
the fax interface, transmits them as fax documents via the PSTN line
using the ITU-T T.30 protocol.
ii) The TOE can transmit stored documents as faxes.
b) Receiving faxes
i) A remote fax machine establishes a connection to the TOE through the
PSTN line using the ITU-T T.30 protocol, through which the TOE
receives fax documents.
c) Fax-Line Separation
i) The fax modem accepts connections through the PSTN only if they
conform to the ITU-T T.30 protocol.
ii) Data that is transmitted or received through the PSTN is fax-format,
image data.
86 Other than the specified use cases, the TOE allows no other data to be transmitted
on the fax line.
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7 Rationale
7.1 Conformance Claim Rationale
87 The following rationale is presented with regard to the PP conformance claims:
a) TOE type. As identified in section 2.1, the TOE is hardcopy device, consistent
with the HCDPP.
b) Security problem definition. As shown in section 3, the threats, OSPs and
assumptions are reproduced directly from the HCDPP.
c) Security objectives. As shown in section 4, the security objectives are
reproduced directly from the HCDPP.
d) Security requirements. As shown in section 5, the security requirements are
reproduced directly from the HCDPP. No additional requirements have been
specified.
7.2 Security Objectives Rationale
88 The following table maps threats, OSPs, and assumptions, to their respective
Security Objectives.
Table 29: Security Objectives Rationale
Threat/Policy/Assumptions Rationale
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS
An attacker may access (read, modify, or
delete) User Document Data or change
(modify or delete) User Job Data in the TOE
through one of the TOE’s interfaces.
O.ACCESS_CONTROL restricts access to User
Data in the TOE to authorized Users.
O.USER_I&A provides the basis for access
control.
O.ADMIN_ROLES restricts the ability to
authorize Users and set access controls to
authorized Administrators.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE
An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access
to TSF Data in the TOE through one of the
TOE’s interfaces.
O.ACCESS_ CONTROL restricts access to TSF
Data in the TOE to authorized Users.
O.USER_I&A provides the basis for access
control.
O.ADMIN_ROLES restricts the ability to
authorize Users and set access controls to
authorized Administrators.
T.TSF_FAILURE
A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of
security if the TOE is permitted to operate.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST prevents the TOE from
operating if a malfunction is detected.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE
An attacker may cause the installation of
unauthorized software on the TOE.
O.UPDATE_VERIFICATION verifies the
authenticity of software updates.
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Threat/Policy/Assumptions Rationale
T.NET_COMPROMISE
An attacker may access data in transit or
otherwise compromise the security of the
TOE by monitoring or manipulating network
communication.
O.COMMS_PROTECTION protects LAN
communications from sniffing, replay, and man-
in-the-middle attacks.
P.AUTHORIZATION
Users must be authorized before performing
Document Processing and administrative
functions.
O.USER_AUTHORIZATION restricts the ability to
perform Document Processing and administrative
functions to authorized Users.
O.USER_I&A provides the basis for
authorization.
O.ADMIN_ROLES restricts the ability to
authorize Users to authorized Administrators.
P.AUDIT
Security-relevant activities must be audited
and the log of such actions must be
protected and transmitted to an External IT
Entity.
O.AUDIT requires the generation of audit data.
O.ACCESS_CONTROL restricts access to audit
data in the TOE to authorized Users.
O.USER_AUTHORIZATION provides the basis
for authorization.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION
The TOE must be able to identify itself to
other devices on the LAN.
O.COMMS_PROTECTION protects LAN
communications from man-in-the-middle attacks.
P.FAX_FLOW (conditionally mandatory)
If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it
will ensure separation between the PSTN
fax line and the LAN.
O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION requires a
separation between the PSTN fax line and the
LAN.
A.PHYSICAL
Physical security, commensurate with the
value of the TOE and the data it stores or
processes, is assumed to be provided by
the environment.
OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION establishes a
protected physical environment for the TOE.
A.NETWORK
The Operational Environment is assumed to
protect the TOE from direct, public access
to its LAN interface.
OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION establishes a
protected LAN environment for the TOE.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN
TOE Administrators are trusted to
administer the TOE according to site
security policies.
OE.ADMIN_TRUST establishes responsibility of
the TOE Owner to have a trusted relationship
with Administrators.
Table 30: Security Objectives Rationale
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7.3 Security Assurance Requirements rationale
The rationale for choosing these security assurance requirements is that they define a minimum
security baseline that is based on the anticipated threat level of the attacker, the security of the
Operational Environment in which the TOE is deployed, and the relative value of the TOE itself.
The assurance activities throughout the PP are used to provide tailored guidance on the specific
expectations for completing the security assurance requirements.
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Annex A: Extended Components Definition
89 This annex reproduces the HCDPP Appendix A.9 extended components definition.
Security Audit (FAU)
External Audit Trail Storage (FAU_STG_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure that secure transmission of audit data
from TOE to an External IT Entity.
Component levelling
FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage requires the TSF to use a trusted channel
implementing a secure protocol.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) The TSF shall have the ability to configure the cryptographic functionality.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included
in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Extended: Protected Audit Trail Storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external
IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.
Rationale:
The TSF is required that the transmission of generated audit data to an External IT Entity which
relies on a non-TOE audit server for storage and review of audit records. The storage of these
audit records and the ability to allow the administrator to review these audit records is provided by
the Operational Environment in that case. The Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR
for the transmission of audit data to an External IT Entity.
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This extended component protects the audit records, and it is therefore placed in the FAU class
with a single component.
Cryptographic Support (FCS)
Cryptographic Key Management (FCS_CKM_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family addresses the management aspects of cryptographic keys. Especially, this extended
component is intended for cryptographic key destruction.
Component levelling
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Material Destruction ensures not only keys but also key
materials that are no longer needed are destroyed by using an approved method.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included
in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys), or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall destroy all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys
and cryptographic critical security parameters when no longer needed.
Rationale:
Cryptographic Key Material Destruction is to ensure the keys and key materials that are no longer
needed are destroyed by using an approved method, and the Common Criteria does not provide
a suitable SFR for the Cryptographic Key Material Destruction.
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This extended component protects the cryptographic key and key materials against exposure,
and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
HTTPS selected (FCS_HTTPS_EXT)
Family Behavior
Components in this family define the requirements for protecting remote management sessions
between the TOE and a Security Administrator. This family describes how HTTPS will be
implemented. This is a new family defined for the FCS Class.
Component levelling
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS selected, requires that HTTPS be implemented according to RFC
2818 and supports TLS.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included
in the PP/ST:
a) Failure of HTTPS session establishment.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC
2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol using TLS as specified in
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.
Rationale:
HTTPS is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide
a suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.
This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it
is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
IPsec selected (FCS_IPSEC_EXT)
Family Behavior
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This family addresses the requirements for protecting communications using IPsec.
Component levelling
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec requires that IPsec be implemented as specified.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
is included in the PP/ST:
b) Failure to establish an IPsec SA.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC
4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement [selection: tunnel mode, transport mode].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches
anything that is otherwise unmatched and discards it.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC
4303 using [selection: the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128 (as
specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-
based HMAC, AES-CBC256 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-GCM-128 as specified
in RFC 4106, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [selection: IKEv1 as defined in
RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [selection: no other RFCs for
extended sequence numbers, RFC 4304 for extended sequence
numbers], and [selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868
for hash functions]; IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996 (with mandatory
support for NAT traversal as specified in section 2.23), 4307, and
[selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash
functions]].
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FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [selection: IKEv1,
IKEv2] protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms [selection: AES-CBC-
128, AES_CBC-192 AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 3602, AES-
GCM-128, AES-GCM-192, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282, no
other algorithm].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main mode.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [selection: IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be
established based on [selection: number of packets/number of bytes;
length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for
Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]; IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be
established based on [selection: number of packets/number of bytes ;
length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for
Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]]
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14
(2048-bit MODP), and [selection: 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS),
19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP, 5 (1536-bit
MODP)), [assignment: other DH groups that are implemented by the
TOE], no other DH groups].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform Peer Authentication
using the [selection: RSA, ECDSA] algorithm and Pre-shared Keys.
Rationale:
IPsec is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a
suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.
This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it
is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 The
TSF shall ensure that IKE protocols implement DH Group(s) [selection: 14 (2048-bit MODP), 19
(256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP), 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS)].
Cryptographic Key Derivation (FCS_KDF_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family specifies the means by which an intermediate key is derived from a specified set of
submasks.
Component levelling
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation requires the TSF to derive intermediate keys
from submasks using the specified hash functions.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen
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Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included
in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Key Derivation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication),
[if selected: FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation
(Random Bit Generation)]
FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall accept [selection: a RNG generated submask as specified
in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, a conditioned password submask, imported
submask] to derive an intermediate key, as defined in [selection: NIST
SP 800-108 [selection: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode,
KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode], NIST SP 800-132], using the
keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1(h), such that the output is
at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.
Cryptographic Operation (FCS_KYC_EXT)
FCS_KYC_EXT Cryptographic Operation (Key Chaining)
Family Behavior
This family provides the specification to be used for using multiple layers of encryption keys to
ultimately secure the protected data encrypted on the storage.
Component levelling
FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining, requires the TSF to maintain a key chain and specifies the
characteristics of that chain.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included
in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
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FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic operation (Key Wrapping),
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining, FCS_COP.1(i)
Cryptographic operation (Key Transport), FCS_KDF_EXT.1
Cryptographic Operation (Key Derivation), and/or FCS_COP.1(f)
Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)].
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [selection: one, using a submask
as the BEVor DEK; intermediate keys originating from one or more
submask(s) to the BEV or DEK using the following method(s): [selection:
key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(e), key combining as specified
in FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(f), key
derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1, key transport as specified in
FCS_COP.1(i)]] while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128
bits, 256 bits].
Rationale:
Key Chaining ensures that the TSF maintains the key chain, and also specifies the characteristics
of that chain. However, the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the
management of multiple layers of encryption key to protect encrypted data.
This extended component protects the TSF data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is
therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
Cryptographic Password Construction and Conditioning (FCS_PCC_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family ensures that passwords used to produce the BEV are robust (in terms of their
composition) and are conditioned to provide an appropriate-length bit string.
Component levelling
FCS_PCC_EXT.1 Cryptographic Password Construction and Conditioning, requires the TSF to
accept passwords of a certain composition and condition them appropriately.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included
in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
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FCS_PCC_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Password Construction and
Conditioning
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_PCC_EXT.1.1 A password used to generate a password authorization factor shall
enable up to [assignment: positive integer of 64 or more] characters in
the set of {upper case characters, lower case characters, numbers, and
[assignment: other supported special characters]} and shall perform
Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-[selection: SHA-256, SHA384,
SHA-512]], with [assignment: positive integer of 1000 or more] iterations,
and output cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128, 256] that meet the
following: [assignment: PBKDF recommendation or specification].
Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
Family Behavior
This family defines requirements for random bit generation to ensure that it is performed in
accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.
Component levelling
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation requires random bit generation to be performed in
accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included
in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
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Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A using
[selection: Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that
accumulates entropy from [selection: [assignment: number of software-
based sources] software-based noise source(s), [assignment: number of
hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source(s)] with a
minimum of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the
greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1
“Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes
that it will generate.
Rationale:
Random bits/number will be used by the SFRs for key generation and destruction, and the
Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the random bit generation.
This extended component ensures the strength of encryption keys, and it is therefore placed in
the FCS class with a single component.
Submask Combining (FCS_SMC_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family defines the means by which submasks are combined, if the TOE supports more than
one submask being used to derive or protect the BEV.
Component levelling
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Submask combining requires the TSF to combine the submasks in a
predictable fashion
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
is included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
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FCS_SMC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method [selection:
exclusive OR (XOR), SHA-256, SHA-512] to generate an intermediary
key or BEV.
Rationale:
Submask Combining is to ensure the TSF combine the submasks in order to derive or protect the
BEV.
This extended component protects the TSF data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is
therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation (FCS_SNI_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family ensures that salts, nonces, and IVs are well formed.
Component levelling
FCS_SNI_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation),
requires the generation of salts, nonces, and IVs to be used by the cryptographic components of
the TOE to be performed in the specified manner.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) No specific management functions are identified
Audit:
The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
is included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_SNI_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and
Initialization Vector Generation)
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall only use salts that are generated by a RNG as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall only use unique nonces with a minimum size of [64] bits.
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner: [ CBC: IVs shall be
non-repeating, CCM: Nonce shall be non-repeating, XTS: No IV. Tweak
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values shall be non-negative integers, assigned consecutively, and
starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer, GCM: IV shall be non-
repeating. The number of invocations of GCM shall not exceed 2^32 for
a given secret key.].
SSH selected (FCS_SSH_EXT)
Family Behavior
The component in this family addresses the ability for a server to offer SSH to protect data
between a client and the server using the SSH protocol.
Component levelling
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH selected, requires the SSH protocol implemented as specified.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
is included in the PP/ST:
a) Failure of SSH session establishment
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFC(s)
[selection: 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, and [selection: 5656, 6668, no other
RFCs].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the
following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-
based, password-based.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater
than [assignment: number of bytes] bytes in an SSH transport
connection are dropped.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the
following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption
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algorithms: [assignment: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, [selection:
AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM, no other algorithms].].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses
[selection: SSH_RSA, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256] and [selection: PGP-SIGN-
RSA, PGP-SIGNDSS, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, no other public key
algorithms,] as its public key algorithm(s).
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.6 6 The TSF shall ensure that data integrity algorithms used in SSH
transport connection is [selection: HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA1-96,
HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-512].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and [selection:
ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521, no other
methods] are the only allowed key exchange method used for the SSH
protocol.
Rationale:
SSH is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a
suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.
This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it
is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
TLS selected (FCS_TLS_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family addresses the ability for a server and/or a client to use TLS to protect data between a
client and the server using the TLS protocol.
Component levelling
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS selected, requires the TLS protocol implemented as specified.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
is included in the PP/ST:
a) Failure of TLS session establishment
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected
Hierarchical to: No other components
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Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols
[selection: TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), TLS 1.2 (RFC
5246)] supporting the following ciphersuites:
Mandatory ciphersuites:
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
Optional ciphersuites:
[selection:
• None
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384].
Rationale:
TLS is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a
suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.
This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it
is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
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User Data Protection (FDP)
Protection of Data on Disk (FDP_DSK_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family is to mandate the encryption of all protected data written to the storage.
Component levelling
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk, requires the TSF to encrypt all the
Confidential TSF and User Data stored on the Field-Replaceable Non-volatile Storage Devices in
order to avoid storing these data in plaintext on the devices.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
is included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [selection: perform encryption in accordance with
FCS_COP.1(d), use a self-encrypting Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage Device that is separately CC certified to conform to the FDE EE
cPP] such that any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device
contains no plaintext User Document Data and no plaintext confidential
TSF Data.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
Rationale:
Extended: Protection of Data on Disk is to specify that encryption of any confidential data without
user intervention, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Protection of
Data on Disk.
This extended component protects the Data on Disk, and it is therefore placed in the FDP class
with a single component.
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Fax Separation (FDP_FXS_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family addresses the requirements for separation between Fax PSTN line and the LAN to
which TOE is connected.
Component levelling
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Fax Separation, requires the fax interface cannot be used to create a network
bridge between a PSTN and a LAN to which TOE is connected.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
is included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_FXS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except
transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols.
Rationale:
Fax Separation is to protect a LAN against attack from PSTN line, and the Common Criteria does
not provide a suitable SFR for the Protection of TSF or User Data.
This extended component protects the TSF Data or User Data, and it is therefore placed in the
FDP class with a single component.
Identification and Authentication (FIA)
Password Management (FIA_PMG_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family defines requirements for the attributes of passwords used by administrative users to
ensure that strong passwords and passphrases can be chosen and maintained.
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Component levelling
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password management requires the TSF to support passwords with varying
composition requirements, minimum lengths, maximum lifetime, and similarity constraints.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
is included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities
for administrative passwords:
c) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of
upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special
characters: [selection: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”,
[assignment: other characters]];
d) Minimum password length shall be settable by an Administrator and
have the capability to require passwords of 15 characters or greater.
Rationale:
Password Management is to ensure the strong authentication between the endpoints of
communication, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Password
Management.
This extended component protects the TOE by means of password management, and it is
therefore placed in the FIA class with a single component.
Pre-Shared Key Composition (FIA_PSK_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure the ability to use pre-shared keys for
IPsec.
Component levelling
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FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition, ensures authenticity and access control for
updates.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
is included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation).
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that are:
• 22 characters in length and [selection: [assignment: other supported
lengths], no other lengths];
• composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters,
numbers, and special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”,
“^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”
).
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using
[selection: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512, [assignment: method of
conditioning text string]] and be able to [selection: use no other pre-
shared keys; accept bit-based pre-shared keys; generate bit-based pre-
shared keys using the random bit generator specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1].
Rationale:
Pre-shared Key Composition is to ensure the strong authentication between the endpoints of
communications, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Pre-shared
Key Composition.
This extended component protects the TOE by means of strong authentication, and it is therefore
placed in the FIA class with a single component.
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Protection of the TSF (FPT)
Protection of Key and Key Material (FPT_KYP_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family addresses the requirements for keys and key materials to be protected if and when
written to nonvolatile storage.
Component levelling
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of key and key material, requires the TSF to ensure that
no plaintext key or key materials are written to nonvolatile storage.
Management: FPT_SKP_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_SKP_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included
in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall not store plaintext keys that are part of the keychain
specified by FCS_KYC_EXT.1 in any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage Device, and not store any such plaintext key on a device that
uses the key for its encryption.
Rationale:
Protection of Key and Key Material is to ensure that no plaintext key or key material are written to
non-volatile storage, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the protection
of key and key material.
This extended component protects the TSF data, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with
a single component.
Protection of TSF Data (FPT_SKP_EXT)
Family Behavior
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This family addresses the requirements for managing and protecting the TSF data, such as
cryptographic keys. This is a new family modelled as the FPT Class.
Component levelling
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading all symmetric keys), requires preventing
symmetric keys from being read by any user or subject. It is the only component of this family.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included
in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No other components.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys,
and private keys.
Rationale:
Protection of TSF Data is to ensure the pre-shared keys, symmetric keys and private keys are
protected securely, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the protection
of such TSF data.
This extended component protects the TOE by means of strong authentication using Preshared
Key, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.
TSF Self-Test (FPT_TST_EXT)
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
Family Behavior
TSF testing requires a suite of self-testing to be run during initial start-up in order to demonstrate
correct operation of the TSF.
Component levelling
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FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Self-Test requires a suite of self-tests to be run during initial start-up in
order to demonstrate correct operation of the TSF.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) No management functions.
Audit:
The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
is included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No other components.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (and power
on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
Rationale:
TSF testing is to ensure the TSF can be operated correctly, and the Common Criteria does not
provide a suitable SFR for the TSF testing. In particular, there is no SFR defined for TSF testing.
This extended component protects the TOE, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a
single component.
Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT)
Family Behavior
This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure that only administrators can update the
TOE firmware and/or software.
Component levelling
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update, ensures authenticity and access control for updates.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management actions foreseen
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Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included
in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature
generation/verification), or FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation
(Hash Algorithm)].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the
current version of the TOE firmware/software
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate
updates to TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates
to the TOE using a [selection: digital signature mechanism, published
hash] prior to installing those updates.
Rationale:
Firmware/software is a form of TSF Data, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable
SFR for the management of firmware/software. In particular, there is no SFR defined for importing
TSF Data.
This extended component protects the TOE, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a
single component.
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Annex B: Security Assurance Requirements
This section describes Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the evaluations performed by
the evaluator based on the CC. These are all common to the Security Functional Requirements
(SFRs) in Section 5. Assurance activities to the individual SFRs are described in their respective
sections.
After the ST has been approved for evaluation, the Common Criteria IT Security Evaluation
Facilities (ITSEF) will obtain the TOE, necessary IT environment, and the TOE guidance
documents. The assurance activities described in the ST (which will be refined by the ITSEF to
be TOE-specific, either within the ST or in a separate document) will be performed by the ITSEF.
Although these activities were performed under the control of the ITSEF, it is allowed to obtain
supports from the developer as well. The results of these activities will be documented and
presented (along with the administrative guidance used) for validation.
For each assurance family, “Developer Notes” are provided on the developer action elements to
clarify what, if any, additional documentation/activity needs to be provided by the developer.
The TOE security assurance requirements specified in Table 22 provides evaluative activities
required to address the threats identified in Section 0 of this PP.
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
The ST is evaluated as per ASE activities defined in the CEM. In addition, there may be
Assurance Activities specified within the PP that call necessary descriptions to be included in the
TSS that are specific to the TOE technology type.
Appendix E of HCD PP v1.0 provides a description of the information expected to be provided
regarding the quality of entropy in the random bit generator.
Given the criticality of the key management scheme, this PP requires the developer to provide a
detailed description of their key management implementation. This information can be submitted
as an appendix to the ST and marked proprietary, as this level of detailed information is not
expected to be made publicly available. See Appendix F of HCD PP v1.0 for details on the
expectation of the developer’s Key Management Description.
Class ADV: Development
For TOEs conforming to this PP, the information about the TOE is contained in the guidance
documentation available to the end user as well as the TOE Summary Specification (TSS) portion
of the ST. While it is not required that the TOE developer write the TSS, the TOE developer must
concur with the description of the product that is contained in the TSS as it relates to the
functional requirements. The Assurance Activities contained in Section 5 should provide the ST
authors with sufficient information to determine the appropriate content for the TSS section.
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
The functional specification describes the TSF Interfaces (TSFIs). At the level of assurance
provided by this PP, it is not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these
interfaces. Additionally, because TOEs conforming to this PP will necessarily have interfaces to
the Operational Environment that are not directly invokable by TOE users (to include
administrative users), at this assurance level there is little point specifying that such interfaces be
described in and of themselves since only indirect testing of such interfaces may be possible. The
activities for this family for this PP should focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the
TSS in response to the functional requirements, and the interfaces presented in the AGD
documentation. No additional “functional specification” document should be necessary to satisfy
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the assurance activities specified. The interfaces that need to be evaluated are characterized
through the information needed to perform the assurance activities listed, rather than as an
independent, abstract list.
Developer action elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to
the SFRs.
Developer Note: The developer shall provide appropriate TSS description and guidance
documents as the functional specification. The TSS description identifies
TSFIs associated with each SFR in order to confirm the validity of
interface design. The developer is required to provide a description at
least at a confirmable level in which TSS description and contents of
guidance documents are consistent with each other. In case of
insufficient information for evaluation in TSS description and contents of
guidance documents, additional documentation can be requested. For
the SFRs that cannot be directly operated/confirmed from external
interfaces, the developer may be requested to provide additional
information.
Content and presentation elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of
use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2C The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with
each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3C The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit
categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the
functional specification.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an
accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
Assurance activity:
TSS:
The evaluator shall confirm identifiable external interfaces from guidance
documents and examine that TSS description identifies all the interfaces required
for realizing SFR.
The evaluator shall confirm identification information of the TSFI associated with
the SFR described in the TSS and confirm the consistency with the description
related to each interface.
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The evaluator shall check to ensure that the SFR defined in the ST is
appropriately realized, based on identification information of the TSFI in the TSS
description as well as on the information of purposes, methods of use, and
parameters for each TSFI in the guidance documents
The assurance activities specific to each SFR are described in Section 5 and the
evaluator shall perform evaluations by adding to this assurance component.
Class AGD: Guidance Documents
The guidance documents will be provided with the developer’s security target. Guidance must
include a description of how the administrator verifies that the Operational Environment can fulfill
its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and
readable by an administrator.
Guidance must be provided for every Operational Environment that the product supports as
claimed in the ST. This guidance includes
• instructions to successfully install the TOE in that environment; and
• instructions to manage the security of the TOE as a product and as a
component of the larger Operational environment.
Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality is also provided; requirements on such
guidance are contained in the assurance activities specified in Section 5.
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Developer action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Developer Note: The developer should review the assurance activities for this component
to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluators will be
checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the
preparation of acceptable guidance.
Content and presentation elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the ser-
accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure
processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to
use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the
available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters
under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present
each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible
functions that need to be performed, including changing the security
characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of
operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational
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error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure
operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the
security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives
for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
Evaluator action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
Assurance activity:
Operational Guidance:
The contents of operational guidance are confirmed by the assurance activities in Section 5 and
the TOE evaluation in accordance with the CEM.
The evaluator shall check to ensure that the following guidance is provided:
Procedures for administrators to confirm that the TOE returns to its evaluation configuration after
the transition from the maintenance mode to the normal Operational Environment.
Application note:
During evaluation, the TOE returns to its evaluation configuration. In the field, the TOE may return
to the configuration that was in force prior to entering maintenance mode.
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative
procedures.
Developer Note: As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the
assurance activities to determine the required content with respect to
preparative procedures.
Content and presentation elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for
secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the
developer’s delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for
secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the
operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for
the operational environment as described in the ST.
Evaluator action elements:
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AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the
TOE can be prepared securely for operation.
Class ALC: Life-cycle Support
At the assurance level provided for TOEs conformant to this PP, life-cycle support is limited to
end-user-visible aspects of the life-cycle, rather than an examination of the TOE vendor’s
development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical
role that a developer’s practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product;
rather, it’s a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this assurance
level.
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
This component is targeted at identifying the TOE such that it can be distinguished from other
products or version from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an
end user.
Developer action elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1C The TOE shall be labeled with its unique reference.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
Assurance activity:
Operational Guidance:
The evaluator shall check the ST to ensure that it contains an identifier (such as a product
name/version number) that specifically identifies the version that meets the requirements of the
ST. The evaluator shall ensure that this identifier is sufficient for an acquisition entity to use in
procuring the TOE (including the appropriate administrative guidance) as specified in the ST.
Further, the evaluator shall check the AGD guidance and TOE samples received for testing to
ensure that the version number is consistent with that in the ST. If the vendor maintains a web
site advertising the TOE, the evaluator shall examine the information on the web site to ensure
that the information in the ST is sufficient to distinguish the product.
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Given the scope of the TOE and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this
component’s assurance activities are covered by the assurance activities listed for ALC_CMC.1.
Developer action elements:
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ALC_CMS.1.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the
evaluation evidence required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
Assurance activity:
Operational Guidance:
The “evaluation evidence required by the SARs” in this PP is limited to the information in the ST
coupled with the guidance provided to administrators and users under the AGD requirements. By
ensuring that the TOE is specifically identified and that this identification is consistent in the ST
and in the AGD guidance (as done in the assurance activity for ALC_CMC.1), the evaluator
implicitly confirms the information required by this component.
Class ATE: Tests
Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage of
design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through ATE_IND family, while the
latter is through the AVA_VAN family. At the assurance level specified in this PP, testing is based
on advertised functionality and interfaces as constrained by the availability of design information
presented in the TSS. One of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as
specified in the following requirements.
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - Conformance
Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the
administrative (including configuration and operation) documentation provided. The focus of the
testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in Section 5 are being met, although some
additional testing is specified for SARs in Section 7. The Assurance Activities identify the
minimum testing activities associated with these components. The evaluator produces a test
report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on
the product models combinations that are claiming conformance to this PP.
Developer action elements:
ATE_IND.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements:
ATE_IND.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements:
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ATE_IND.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF
operates as specified.
Assurance activity:
Test:
The evaluator shall prepare a test plan and report documenting the testing aspects of the system.
The test plan covers all of the testing actions contained in the body of this PP’s Assurance
Activities. While it is not necessary to have one test case per test listed in an Assurance Activity,
the evaluators must document in the test plan that each applicable testing requirement in the ST
is covered.
The Test Plan identifies the product models to be tested, and for those product models not
included in the test plan but included in the ST, the test plan provides a justification for not testing
the models. This justification must address the differences between the tested models and the
untested models, and make an argument that the differences do not affect the testing to be
performed. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the differences have no affect; rationale must
be provided. In case the ST describes multiple models (product names) in particular, the
evaluator shall consider the differences in language specification as well as the influences, in
which functions except security functions such as a printing function, may affect security functions
when creating this justification. If all product models claimed in the ST are tested, then no
rationale is necessary.
The test plan describes the composition of each product model to be tested, and any setup that is
necessary beyond what is contained in the AGD documentation. It should be noted that the
evaluators are expected to follow the AGD documentation for installation and setup of each
model either as part of a test or as a standard pre-test condition. This may include special test
drivers or tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion) is provided that the
driver or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the TOE.
The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to
achieve those objectives. These procedures include the goal of the particular procedure, the test
steps used to achieve the goal, and the expected results. The test report (which could just be an
annotated version of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test procedures
were executed, and includes the actual results of the tests. This shall be a cumulative account, so
if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a fix installed; and then a successful re-run of the
test, the report would show a “fail” and “pass” result (and the supporting details), and not just the
“pass” result.
Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment
For the first generation of this protection profile, the evaluation lab is expected to survey open
sources to discover what vulnerabilities have been discovered in these types of products. In most
cases, these vulnerabilities will require sophistication beyond that of a basic attacker. Until
penetration tools are created and uniformly distributed to the evaluation labs, evaluators will not
be expected to test for these vulnerabilities in the TOE. The labs will be expected to comment on
the likelihood of these vulnerabilities given the documentation provided by the vendor. This
information will be used in the development of penetration testing tools and for the development
of future protection profiles.
Developer action elements:
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AVA_VAN.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified
potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks
performed by an attacker possessing basic attack potential.
Assurance activity:
Test:
As with ATE_IND, the evaluator shall generate a report to document their findings with respect to
this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in
ATE_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to
determine the vulnerabilities that have been found in printing devices and the implemented
communication protocols in general, as well as those that pertain to the particular TOE. The
evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report.
For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-
applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE_IND) to
confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector
needed to take advantage of the vulnerability.
For example, if the vulnerability can be detected by pressing a key combination on boot-up, for
example, a test would be suitable at the assurance level of this PP. If exploiting the vulnerability
requires an electron microscope and liquid nitrogen, for instance, then a test would not be
suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.