



**RICOH IM C530F / IM C530FB version E-1.00-H**

# **Security Target**

**Version 1.5**

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**Document prepared by**



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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Overview

- 1 This Security Target (ST) defines the RICOH IM C530F / IM C530FB, version E-1.00-H Target of Evaluation (TOE) for the purposes of Common Criteria (CC) evaluation.

## 1.2 Identification

**Table 1: Evaluation identifiers**

<b>Target of Evaluation</b>	RICOH IM C530F / IM C530FB, version E-1.00-H
<b>Security Target</b>	RICOH IM C530F / IM C530FB Security Target, v1.5

## 1.3 Conformance Claims

- 2 This ST supports the following conformance claims:
- a) CC version 3.1 revision 4
  - b) CC Part 2 extended
  - c) CC Part 3 conformant
  - d) Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, v1.0
  - e) Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, v1.0, Errata #1, June 2017
  - f) NIAP Technical Decisions per Table 2

**Table 2: NIAP Technical Decisions**

TD #	Name	Rationale if n/a
TD0074	FCS_CKM.1(a) Requirement in HCD PP v1.0	
TD0157	FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 - Testing SPDs	
TD0176	FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2 - SED Testing	
TD0219	NIAP Endorsement of Errata for HCD PP v1.0	
TD0253	Assurance Activities for Key Transport	
TD0261	Destruction of CSPs in flash	
TD0299	Update to FCS_CKM.4 Assurance Activities	
TD0393	Require FTP_TRP.1(b) only for printing	
TD0474	Removal of Mandatory Cipher Suite in FCS_TLS_EXT.1	
TD0494	Removal of Mandatory SSH Ciphersuite for HCD	SSH is not claimed.

TD #	Name	Rationale if n/a
TD0562	Test activity for Public Key Algorithms	SSH is not claimed.

## 1.4 Terminology

**Table 3: Terminology**

Term	Definition
BEV	Border Encryption Value
eMMC	embedded MultiMediaCard – A non-field-replaceable non-volatile memory storage device that the TOE uses to store documents and user account information.
Firewall	A device to protect the LAN from internet threats.
LAN	Local Area Network — Network used in the TOE environment
Ic key	A hardware secure module which provides true random number generation and protected storage for the TOE.
LDAP Server	An external IT entity used by the TOE for network authentication of users.
MFP	Multifunction Printer
NVRAM	The NVRAM is a non-field-replaceable non-volatile storage device where TOE configuration data is stored.
PSTN	Public Switched Telephone Network
PSTN Line	A connection to a public switched telephone network for the TOE to communicate with external fax machines
SMTP Server	An external IT entity used by the TOE for e-mail transmission
Syslog Server	An external IT entity used by the TOE for audit log storage

## 2 TOE Description

### 2.1 Type

3 The TOE is a Digital Multi-Function Printer (MFP), which is an IT device that inputs, stores, and outputs electronic and hardcopy documents.

### 2.2 Usage

4 The expected use cases for the TOE are:

- a) **Scanning.** The TOE scans paper documents and then transmits and deletes the scanned images, on command from the Operation Panel.
- b) **Printing.** The TOE prints or stores documents received from a printer driver installed on the client computer, and prints or deletes previously stored documents from commands from the Operation Panel or the client computer's web browser.
- c) **Copying.** The TOE scans paper documents to be printed.
- d) **Network Communications.** The TOE is connected to its operational environment through a local area network (hereafter "LAN") and the public switched telephone network (PSTN). It sends and receives documents over the LAN and the PSTN.
- e) **Administration.** The TOE provides management functions to configure and manage its operation. The management functions are accessible locally from the Operation Panel or remotely through the Web Image Monitor (hereafter "WIM") accessible using a web browser on a client computer.
- f) **PSTN Faxing.** The TOE provides fax transmission and fax reception functions; both exchange documents according to the Group 3 standard over a Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN). The Fax Transmission Function sends scanned images of paper documents, or images of electronic documents from a client computer, to external fax devices. The Fax Reception Function receives documents from external fax devices, and stores them in the TOE.
- g) **Internal Audit Log Storage.** The MFP stores its audit data internally on the local device in addition to providing the capability for storing them externally to a remote syslog server.

## 2.2.1 Deployment

- 5 As shown in Figure 1, the TOE is connected to its operational environment through a local area network (hereafter "LAN") and the public switched telephone network (PSTN). Other elements of the TOE's operational environment are as shown.




Figure 1: Example TOE deployment

## 2.2.2 Interfaces

- 6 The TOE interfaces include the following:
- a) **Operation Panel of the MFP** is an LCD touch screen interface that provides a local user interface where users can perform the following operations:
    - i. Configuration of the MFP
    - ii. Copying, faxing, storage, and network transmission of paper documents
    - iii. Printing, faxing, network transmission, and deletion of the stored documents
    - iv. Receiving fax documents via telephone lines and storing them
  - b) **Web Image Monitor (WIM)** this is the remote user interface accessible via TLS/HTTPS where users can perform the following operations:
    - i. Limited configuration of the MFP – various settings
    - ii. Printing of documents
    - iii. Faxing of documents
  - c) **Client printer driver or fax driver** is a remote user interface where communication is protected using TLS.



- d) **TLS interface:** The TOE is configured to use TLS to protect communication with a remote syslog server and remote SMTP server.
- e) **PSTN Fax Line** is used to connect to a remote fax machine.

### 2.3 Physical Scope

7 The physical boundary of the TOE is comprised of the software and hardware of the MFP models identified in Table 4 and related guidance documentation. The TOE is delivered by commercial courier and is installed with the assistance of a RICOH customer engineer.

8 The TOE model number is indicative of copy speed (higher numbers have higher copy speeds) and the alphabetic suffix corresponds to fax support (F), regional fonts and printer languages. The differences between models are not security relevant and are limited to print engine components (speed) and branding variations (labels, displays, packaging materials and documentation).

**Table 4: TOE Models**

Branding	Model
RICOH	IM C530F
nashuatec	
Rex Rotary	
Gestetner	
SAVIN	IM C530FB
LANIER	

- 9 The TOE includes the following critical components:
- a) **Main Controller.** Provides primary printing, scanning, faxing, and networking functionality.
    - i) **CPU.** Marvell 88PA6270.
    - ii) **OS.** Linux 4.2.8.
  - b) **Operation Unit.** Provides front panel interface control and device extensibility capabilities.
    - i) **CPU.** ARM Cortex-A9 Quad Core.
    - ii) **OS.** Linux 3.18 (customized).

#### 2.3.1 Guidance Documents

- 10 The TOE guidance documentation includes the following:
- a) [IM 530 series User Guide](#), DOCS-7303 (PDF)
  - b) [User Guide Security Reference](#), D0CS7305 2021.01 (HTML)
  - c) RICOH IM C530F / IM C530FB Common Criteria Guide, v1.3 (PDF)

## 2.4 Logical Scope

- 11 The logical scope of the TOE comprises the security functions provided by the TOE to include:
- a) **Security Audit.** The TOE generates audit records of user and administrator actions. It stores audit records both locally and on a remote syslog server.
  - b) **Cryptographic Support.** The TOE includes multiple cryptographic modules for the cryptographic operations that it performs. The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are noted in Table 5 below.
  - c) **Access Control.** The TOE enforces access control policy to restrict access to user data. The TOE ensures that documents, document processing job information, and security-relevant data are accessible only to authenticated users who have the appropriate access permissions.
  - d) **Identification and Authentication.** Except for a defined minimal set of actions that can be performed by an unauthenticated user, the TOE ensures that all users must be authenticated before accessing its functions and data. Users log in to the TOE by entering their credentials on the local operation panel, through WIM login, through print or fax drivers, or using network authentication services.
  - e) **Administrative Roles.** The TOE provides the capability for managing its functions and data. Role-based access controls ensure that the ability to configure the security settings of the TOE is available only to the authorized administrators. Authenticated users can perform copy, printer, scanner and fax operations based on the user role and the assigned permissions.
  - f) **Trusted Operations.** The TOE performs power-on self-tests to ensure the integrity of the TSF components. It provides a mechanism for performing trusted update that verifies the integrity and authenticity of the upgrade software before applying the updates.
  - g) **TOE Access.** Interactive user sessions at the local and remote user interfaces are automatically terminated by the TOE after a configured period of inactivity.
  - h) **Trusted Communications.** The TOE protects communications from its remote users using TLS/HTTPS. The TOE is configured to use TLS to protect communication with the Syslog and SMTP servers.
  - i) **PSTN Fax-Network Separation.** The TOE restricts information received from or transmitted to the telephone network to only fax data and fax protocols. It ensures that the fax modem cannot be used to bridge the LAN.

### 2.4.1 CAVP Certificates

- 12 The TOE includes the cryptographic modules with related CAVP certificates shown Table 5 below.

**Table 5: CAVP Certificates**

Module	Operating Environment	Algorithms	CAVP	Usage
RICOH Platform Validation Library for Type-1.5fu (Kernel)	BIOS on Marvell 88PA6270	SHA-1	A1328	Self-test (integrity)

Platform Validation Library for coreutils, v8.23	Marvell 88PA6270	SHA-1	A1327	Self-test (integrity)
Boot SHA-1 Module, v47.04	ST33TPHF2ESPI	SHA-1	C715	Self-test (integrity)
RICOH Cryptographic Library for ima-evm-utils	Marvell 88PA6270	SHA-1	A1566	Self-test (integrity)
RICOH Cryptographic Library 2 (Java), v1.0	Customized Linux 3.18 on ARM Cortex-A9 Quad Core	SHA-1 SHA-256 RSA Sig Ver 2048	C582	Trusted Update – SOP Software (Apps)
libseres, v1.0	Customized Linux 4.2.8 on Marvell 88PA6270	RSA Sig Ver 2048	A1326	Trusted Update - MFP
		SHA2-256		
RICOH Cryptographic Library C, v1.2	Customized Linux 3.18 on ARM Cortex-A9 Quad Core	ECDSA Sig Ver Curve P-256	C629	Trusted Update – SOP Software (system)
		SHA2-256		
wolfCrypt, v4.1.0	Linux 4.2.8 on Marvell 88PA6270_Rev. C1 Cortex-A53	RSA Key Generation RSA Signature Generation (PKCS 1.5) RSA Signature Verification (PKCS 1.5)	C2041	TLS/HTTPS
		ECDHE		
		ECDSA		
		SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512		
		AES-CBC AES-GCM		

		Encryption/decryption Key length 128, 256		
		HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-384 HMAC-SHA2-512		
		Hash DRBG		

**2.4.2 Excluded Features**

- 13 The following features of the MFP are excluded from the evaluated configuration:
- a) **USB Port.** The MFP has a USB Port that is used to directly connect a client computer to the MFP for printing. This USB port is disabled during initial installation and configuration of the TOE.
  - b) **SD Card Slot.** The MFP has two SD Card Slots, one for customer engineers and one for users. The SD Card Slot for customer engineer is used by customer engineers to install components of the MFP; the SD Card Slot for users is used by users to print documents. Both are disabled when the TOE is operational, a cover is placed on the SD Card slot for customer engineer so cards cannot be inserted or removed and the card slot for users is set to disabled during installation.

**2.4.3 Required non-TOE Components**

- 14 The following non-TOE components are required in the TOE operational environment:
- a) **Syslog Server.** The TOE uses a remote syslog server for long term storage of its audit trail.
  - b) **NTP Server.** The TOE ensures accurate time by synchronizing with a remote NTP server.
  - c) **SMTP Server.** The TOE uses an SMTP server for email transmission.

### 3 Security Problem Definition

15 The Security Problem Definition is reproduced from section 2 of the HCDPP.

#### 3.1 Users

16 There are two categories of Users defined in this ST, Normal and Admin.

**Table 6: User Categories**

Designation	Name	Definition
U.NORMAL	Normal User	A User who has been identified and authenticated and does not have an administrative role
U.ADMIN	Administrator	A User who has been identified and authenticated and has an administrative role

17 A pseudo-user role, Customer Engineer, can be enabled by an Administrator for use by an authorized service representative. It is normally disabled, as it is in the evaluated configuration.

#### 3.2 Assets

18 Assets are passive entities in the TOE that contain or receive information. In this PP, Assets are Objects (as defined by the CC). There are two categories of Assets defined in this PP:

**Table 7: Asset Categories**

Designation	Asset category	Definition
D.USER	User Data	Data created by and for Users that do not affect the operation of the TSF
D.TSF	TSF Data	Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TSF

19 There are no additional Asset categories defined in this ST.

##### 3.2.1 User Data

20 User Data are composed of two types:

**Table 8: User Data Types**

Designation	User Data type	Definition
D.USER.DOC	User Document Data	Information contained in a User's Document, in electronic or hardcopy form
D.USER.JOB	User Job Data	Information related to a User's Document or Document Processing Job

21 There are no additional types of User Data defined in this ST. Attributes associate documents and document processing jobs with the document processing functions of the TOE:

**Table 9: Document and Job Attributes**

Document processing function	Attribute
Printing	+PRT
Copying	+CPY
Scanning	+SCN
Fax (reception)	+FAXIN
Fax (transmission)	+FAXOUT

**3.2.2 TSF Data**

22 TSF Data are composed of two types:

**Table 10: TSF Data Types**

Designation	TSF Data type	Definition
D.TSF.PROT	Protected TSF Data	TSF Data for which alteration by a User who is neither the data owner nor in an Administrator role might affect the security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable
D.TSF.CONF	Confidential TSF Data	TSF Data for which either disclosure or alteration by a User who is neither the data owner nor in an Administrator role might affect the security of the TOE

23 There are no additional types of TSF Data defined in this ST.

**3.2.2.1 Protected TSF Data**

24 D.TSF.PROT is composed of the following data:

- a) Username
- b) Number of Attempts before Lockout
- c) Settings for Lockout Release Timer
- d) Lockout time
- e) Date settings (year/month/day)
- f) Time settings
- g) Minimum Character No.
- h) Password Complexity Setting
- i) Operation Panel auto logout time
- j) WIM auto logout time

- k) Stored Reception File User
- l) Document user list
- m) Available function list
- n) User authentication method
- o) Device Certificate
- p) Network settings
- q) Audit transfer settings
- r) TOE Software

**3.2.2.2 Confidential TSF Data**

25 D.TSF.CONF is composed of the following data:

- a) Login password
- b) Audit log

**3.3 Threats**

26 The following threats are mitigated by this TOE:

**Table 11: Threats**

Identifier	Description
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS	An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete) User Document Data or change (modify or delete) User Job Data in the TOE through one of the TOE's interfaces.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE	An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF Data in the TOE through one of the TOE's interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE	A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security if the TOE is permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UP DATE	An attacker may cause the installation of unauthorized software on the TOE.
T.NET_COMPROMISE	An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise compromise the security of the TOE by monitoring or manipulating network communication.

**3.4 Assumptions**

27 The following assumptions must be satisfied in order for the Security Objectives and Security Functional Requirements to be effective:

**Table 12: Assumptions**

Identifier	Description
A.PHYSICAL	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.NETWORK	The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN	TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE according to site security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS	Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to site security policies.

### 3.5 Organizational Security Policies

28 The following Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) are enforced by this TOE:

**Table 13: Organizational Security Policies**

Identifier	Description
P.AUTHORIZATION	Users must be authorized before performing Document Processing and administrative functions.
P.AUDIT	Security-relevant activities must be audited and the log of such actions must be protected and transmitted to an External IT Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION	The TOE must be able to identify itself to other devices on the LAN.
P.FAX_FLOW	If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will ensure separation between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.

## 4 Security Objectives

29 The following Security Objectives are satisfied by this TOE:

**Table 14: Security Objectives for the TOE**

Identifier	Description
O.USER_I&A	The TOE shall perform identification and authentication of Users for operations that require access control, User authorization, or Administrator roles.
O.ACCESS_CONTROL	The TOE shall enforce access controls to protect User Data and TSF Data in accordance with security policies.



Identifier	Description
O.USER_AUTHORIZATION	The TOE shall perform authorization of Users in accordance with security policies.
O.ADMIN_ROLES	The TOE shall ensure that only authorized Administrators are permitted to perform administrator functions.
O.UPDATE_VERIFICATION	The TOE shall provide mechanisms to verify the authenticity of software updates.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST	The TOE shall test some subset of its security functionality to help ensure that subset is operating properly.
O.COMMS_PROTECTION	The TOE shall generate audit data, and be capable of sending it to a trusted External IT Entity. Optionally, it may store audit data in the TOE.
O.AUDIT	The TOE shall generate audit data, and be capable of sending it to a trusted External IT Entity. Optionally, it may store audit data in the TOE.
O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION	If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, then the TOE shall ensure separation of the PSTN fax telephone line and the LAN, by system design or active security function.

30 The following Security Objectives must be satisfied by the TOE's Operational Environment.

**Table 15: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment**

Identifier	Description
OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION	The Operational Environment shall provide physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it stores or processes.
OE.NETWORK PROTECTION	The Operational Environment shall provide network security to protect the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
OE.ADMIN_TRUST	The TOE Owner shall establish trust that Administrators will not use their privileges for malicious purposes.
OE.USER_TRAINING	The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of site security policies and have the competence to follow them.
OE.ADMIN_TRAINING	The TOE Owner shall ensure that Administrators are aware of site security policies and have the competence to use manufacturer's guidance to correctly configure the TOE and protect passwords and keys accordingly.

## 5 Security Requirements

### 5.1 Conventions

- 31 This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC:
- c) **Assignment**. Indicated with italicized text.
  - d) **Refinement**. Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs.
  - e) **Selection**. Indicated with underlined text.
  - f) **Assignment within a Selection**: Indicated with italicized and underlined text.
  - g) **Iteration**. Indicated by adding letter in parentheses for iterations completed in the PP. Iterations completed in the ST are identified by adding a string starting “/” (e.g. “FCS\_CKM.1(b)/DIM”
- Note:** operations performed within the Security Target are denoted within brackets []. Operations shown without brackets are reproduced from the HCDPP.

### 5.2 Extended Components Definition

32 Refer to Annex A: Extended Components Definition.

### 5.3 Functional Requirements

**Table 16: Summary of SFRs**

Requirement	Title
FAU_GEN.1	Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2	User Identity Association
FAU_SAR.1	Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2	Restricted Audit Review
FAU_STG.1	Protected Audit Trail Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1	Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG.4	Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FCS_CKM.1(a)	Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_CKM.1(b)	Cryptographic Key Generation (for Symmetric keys)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4	Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_CKM.4(a)	Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1(a)	Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Encryption/Decryption)

Requirement	Title
FCS_COP.1(b)	Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1(c)/L1	Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1(c)/L2	Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1(g)	Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	Extended: HTTPS selected
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1	Extended: TLS selected
FDP_ACC.1	Subset Access Control
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control
FDP_FXS_EXT.1	Extended: Fax separation
FIA_AFL.1	Authentication Failure Management
FIA_ATD.1	User attribute definition
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	Extended Password Management
FIA_UAU.1	Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7	Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UID.1	Timing of identification
FIA_USB.1	User-subject binding
FMT_MOF.1	Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MSA.1	Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3	Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1	Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1	Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	Extended: Protection of TSF Data
FPT_STM.1	Reliable Time Stamps

Requirement	Title
FPT_TST_EXT.1	Extended: TSF testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Extended: Trusted update
FTA_SSL.3	TSF-initiated Termination
FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1(a)	Trusted Path (for Administrators)
FTP_TRP.1(b)	Trusted Path (for Non-administrators)

**5.3.1 Security Audit (FAU)**

**FAU\_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation**

FAU\_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit;
- c) All auditable events specified in Table 17: Audit Events, [*no other auditable events*].

FAU\_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, **additional information specified in Table 17**, [*no other audit relevant information*].

**Table 17: Audit Events**

Auditable Event	Relevant SFR	Additional information
Job completion	FDP_ACF.1	Type of job
Unsuccessful User authentication	FIA_UAU.1	None
Unsuccessful User identification	FIA_UID.1	None
Use of management functions	FMT_SMF.1	None

Auditable Event	Relevant SFR	Additional information
Modification to the group of Users that are part of a role	FMT_SMR.1	None
Changes to the time	FPT_STM.1	None
Failure to establish session	FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1(a), FTP_TRP.1(b)	Reason for failure

**FAU\_GEN.2 User Identity Association**

FAU\_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

**FAU\_SAR.1 Audit Review**

FAU\_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [U.ADMIN] with the capability to read **all records** from the audit records.

FAU\_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

**FAU\_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review**

FAU\_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access.

**FAU\_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage**

FAU\_STG1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.

FAU\_STG1.2 The TSF shall be able to **prevent** unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

**FAU\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage**

FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP\_ITC.1.

**FAU\_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss**

FAU\_STG.4.1 Refinement The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and *[no other actions]* if the audit trail is full.

### 5.3.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

#### FCS\_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)

FCS\_CKM.1.1(a) Refinement The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys **used for key establishment** in accordance with [

- NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" for finite field-based key establishment schemes;
- NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" for elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes and implementing "NIST curves" P256, P-384 and [P-521] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard")

]

**and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits.**

#### FCS\_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric keys)

FCS\_CKM.1.1(b)/ Refinement The TSF shall generate **symmetric** cryptographic keys **using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key sizes [128 bit, 256 bit]** that meet the following: **No Standard.**

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction

FCS\_CKM.4.1 Refinement The TSF shall destroy **all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and cryptographic critical security parameters** when no longer needed.

#### FCS\_CKM.4(a) Cryptographic Key Destruction

FCS\_CKM.4.1(a) The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [

- For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [removal of power to the memory];
- For non-volatile memory the destruction shall be executed by a [single] overwrite consisting of [a new value of a key of the same size];

] that meets the following: *No Standard.*

Application Note: This SFR is altered by TD0261.

#### FCS\_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Encryption/Decryption)

FCS\_COP.1.1(a) Refinement The TSF shall perform **encryption and decryption** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **AES operating in**

**[CBC mode, GCM mode]** and cryptographic key sizes **128-bits and 256-bits** that meets the following:

- **FIPS PUB 197, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”**
- **[NIST SP 800-38A, NIST SP 800-38D]**

### **FCS\_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for Signature Generation/ Verification)**

FCS\_COP.1.1(b) Refinement The TSF shall perform **cryptographic signature services** in accordance with a [

- RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [2048 bits]
- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key size of [256 bits or greater]

that meets the following: [

Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm:

- FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”

Case: ECDSA Digital Signature Algorithm:

- FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”]
- The TSF shall implement “NIST curves” P-256, P384 and [P521] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”).]

### **FCS\_COP.1(c)/L1 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)**

FCS\_COP.1.1(c) Refinement The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with **[SHA-1]** that meet the following: **[ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004]**.

### **FCS\_COP.1(c)/L2 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)**

FCS\_COP.1.1(c) Refinement The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with **[SHA-256, SHA-384]** that meet the following: **[ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004]**.

### **FCS\_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)**

FCS\_COP.1.1(g) Refinement The TSF shall perform **keyed-hash message authentication** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **HMAC-[SHA-256, SHA-384]**, key size **[64 (when using SHA-256), 128 (when using SHA-384)]**, and message digest sizes **[256, 384]** bits that meet the following: **FIPS PUB 198-1, “The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, and FIPS PUB 180-3, “Secure Hash Standard.”**

### **FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected**

FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol using TLS as specified in FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1.

### **FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)**

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with [NIST SP 800-90A] using [Hash\_DRBG (**any SHA-256**)].

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [one(1)] hardware-based noise source(s) with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

### **FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected**

FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] supporting the following cipher suites:

- [
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
  - TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256
  - TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
  - TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384
  - TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256
  - TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384]

Application Note: This SFR is altered by TD0474

## **5.3.3 User Data Protection (FDP)**

### **FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control**

FDP\_ACC.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall enforce the **User Data Access Control SFP** on subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects specified in ~~Table 2 and Table 3~~ Table 18 and Table 19.

### **FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control**

FDP\_ACF.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall enforce the **User Data Access Control SFP** to objects based on the following: subjects, objects, and attributes specified in ~~Table 2 and Table 3~~ Table 18 and Table 19.

FDP\_ACF.1.2 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **rules**



**governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects specified in Table 2 and Table 3 Table 18 and Table 19.**

FDP\_ACF.1.3 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [no additional rules].

FDP\_ACF.1.4 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [no additional rules].

**Table 18: D.USER.DOC Access Control SFP**

		"Create"	"Read"	"Modify"	"Delete"
<b>Print (+PRT)</b>	Operation:	Submit a document to be printed	View image or Release printed output	Modify stored document	Delete stored document
	Job owner	Allowed (note 1)	View: no function Release: allowed	No function	Allowed
	U.ADMIN	No function	View: no function Release: no function	No function	Allowed
	U.NORMAL	Allowed	Denied	Denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	(condition 1)	Denied	Denied	Denied
<b>Scan (+SCN)</b>	Operation:	Submit a document for scanning	View scanned image	Modify stored image	Delete stored image
	Job owner	Allowed (note 2)	Allowed	No function	No function
	U.ADMIN	No function	No function	No function	No function
	U.NORMAL	Allowed	Denied	Denied (No function)	Denied (No function)
	Unauthenticated	Denied	Denied	Denied (No function)	Denied (No function)
<b>Copy (+CPY)</b>	Operation:	Submit a document for copying	View scanned image or Release	Modify stored image	Delete stored image

		"Create"	"Read"	"Modify"	"Delete"
			printed copy output		
	Job owner	Allowed (note 2)	View: no function Release: no function	No function	No function
	U.ADMIN	No function	View: no function Release: no function	No function	No function
	U.NORMAL	Allowed	Denied	Denied (No function)	Denied (No function)
	Unauthenticated	Denied	Denied	Denied (No function)	Denied (No function)
<b>Fax send (+FAXOUT)</b>	Operation:	Submit a document to send as a fax	View scanned image	Modify stored image	Delete stored image
	Job owner	Allowed (note 2)	No function	No function	No function
	U.ADMIN	No function	No function	No function	No function
	U.NORMAL	Allowed	Denied	Denied (No function)	Denied (No function)
	Unauthenticated	Denied	Denied	Denied (No function)	Denied (No function)
<b>Fax receive (+FAXIN)</b>	Operation:	Receive a fax and store it	View fax image or Release printed fax output	Modify image of received fax	Delete image of received fax
	Fax owner	Allowed (note 3)	View: no function Release: allowed	No function	No function
	U.ADMIN	Allowed (note 4)	View: no function Release: no function	No function	No function

		"Create"	"Read"	"Modify"	"Delete"
	U.NORMAL	Allowed (note 4)	Denied	Denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	Allowed	Denied	Denied	Denied

**Table 19: D.USER.JOB Access Control SFP**

		"Create"	"Read"	"Modify"	"Delete"
<b>Print (+PRT)</b>	Operation:	Create print job	View print queue / log	Modify print job	Cancel print job
	Job owner	(note 1)	Allowed	No function	Allowed
	U.ADMIN	No function	Allowed	No function	Allowed
	U.NORMAL	Allowed	Allowed	Denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	Denied	Allowed	Denied	Denied
<b>Scan (+SCN)</b>	Operation:	Create scan job	View scan status / log	Modify scan job	Cancel scan job
	Job owner	(note 2)	Allowed	No function	Allowed
	U.ADMIN	No function	Allowed	No function	Allowed
	U.NORMAL	Allowed	Allowed	Denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	Denied	Denied	Denied	Denied
<b>Copy (+CPY)</b>	Operation:	Create copy job	View copy status / log	Modify copy job	Cancel copy job
	Job owner	(note 2)	Allowed	No function	Allowed
	U.ADMIN	No function	Allowed	No function	Denied
	U.NORMAL	Allowed	Allowed	Denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	Denied	Denied	Denied	Denied
<b>Fax send (+FAXOUT)</b>	Operation:	Create fax send job	View fax job queue / log	Modify fax send job	Cancel fax send job
	Job owner	(note 2)	Allowed	No function	No function

		"Create"	"Read"	"Modify"	"Delete"
	U.ADMIN	No function	Allowed	No function	No function
	U.NORMAL	Allowed	Allowed	Denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	Denied	Denied	Denied	Denied
Fax receive (+FAXIN)	Operation:	Create fax receive job	View fax receive status / log	Modify fax receive job	Cancel fax receive job
	Fax owner	(note 3)	Allowed	No function	No function
	U.ADMIN	(note 4)	Allowed	No function	No function
	U.NORMAL	(note 4)	Allowed	Denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	Allowed	Denied	Denied	Denied

Application notes:

Condition 1: Jobs submitted by unauthenticated users must contain a credential that the TOE can use to identify the Job Owner.

See also the following Notes that are referenced in **Table 2 and Table 3** Table 18 and Table 19.

- Note 1: Job Owner is identified by a credential or assigned to an authorized User as part of the process of submitting a print or storage Job.
- Note 2: Job Owner is assigned to an authorized User as part of the process of initiating a scan, copy, fax send, or retrieval Job.
- Note 3: Job Owner of received faxes is assigned by default or configuration. Minimally, ownership of received faxes is assigned to a specific user or U.ADMIN role.
- Note 4: PSTN faxes are received from outside of the TOE, they are not initiated by Users of the TOE.

**FDP\_FXS\_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation**

FDP\_FXS\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols.

**5.3.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)**

**FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management**

FIA\_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [an administrator configurable positive integer within [1 to 10]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [

- User authentication using the Operation Panel



FIA\_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

### **FIA\_USB.1 User-subject binding**

FIA\_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [*username, available function list, and user role*].

FIA\_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [*an Available functions list is associated with the user after the user is authenticated, and the set of available functions does not change during the user session.*]

FIA\_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [*none*].

## **5.3.5 Security Management (FMT)**

### **FMT\_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior**

FMT\_MOF.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of] the functions [listed in Table 20] to **U.ADMIN**.

### **FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes**

FMT\_MSA.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall enforce the **User Data Access Control SFP** to restrict the ability to [query, modify] the security attributes [*username, available function list, user role*] to [*U.ADMIN*].

### **FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization**

FMT\_MSA.3.1 Refinement The TSF shall enforce the **User Data Access Control SFP** to provide [permissive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT\_MSA.3.2 Refinement The TSF shall allow the [**U.ADMIN**] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

### **FMT\_MTD.1 Management of TSF data**

FMT\_MTD.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall restrict the ability to **perform the specified operations on the specified TSF Data to the roles specified in Table 4 Table 20**

**Table 20: Management of TSF Data**

<b>Data</b>	<b>Operation</b>	<b>Interfaces</b>	<b>Authorized Role(s)</b>
<i>TSF Data owned by U.NORMAL or associated with documents or jobs owned by U.NORMAL.</i>			
<i>Login password for authenticated user</i>	<u>Modify</u>	Operation Panel, WIM	The Owing U.NORMAL or U.ADMIN
<i>TSF Data not owned by a U.NORMAL</i>			
<i>Audit Logs</i>	<u>Delete, export</u>	WIM	U.ADMIN
<i>Login passwords of U.ADMIN user</i>	<u>Modify</u>	Operation Panel, WIM	U.ADMIN
<i>Username, user role, available function list or access permissions of U.NORMAL Users</i>	<u>Modify</u>	Operation Panel, WIM	U.ADMIN
<i>Software, firmware, and related configuration data</i>			
<i>Audit Transfer Settings</i>	<u>Modify</u>	Operation Panel, WIM	U.ADMIN
<i>Date &amp; Time Settings</i>	<u>Modify</u>	WIM	U.ADMIN
<i>Password Length and Password complexity settings</i>	<u>Modify</u>	Operation Panel, WIM	U.ADMIN
<i>Operation Panel Auto logout settings</i>	<u>Modify</u>	Operation Panel, WIM	U.ADMIN
<i>WIM Auto logout settings</i>	<u>Modify</u>	WIM	U.ADMIN
<i>PSTN Fax-Line Separation - Stored Reception File User</i>	<u>Modify</u>	Operation Panel	U.ADMIN
<i>Device Certificate</i>	<u>Create, Query, Modify, Delete</u>	WIM	U.ADMIN
<i>TOE Software updates</i>	<u>Modify</u>	WIM	U.ADMIN
<i>Network settings for trusted communication</i>	<u>Modify</u>	Operation Panel, WIM	U.ADMIN

**FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions**

FMT\_SMF.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [*management functions listed in Table 21.*]

**Table 21: Management Functions**

Management Functions	Operation	Interface(s)
Manage user accounts (users, roles, privileges and available functions list)	Create, modify, delete	Operation Panel, WIM
Configure audit transfer settings	Modify	WIM
Manage audit logs	Delete, export	Operation Panel, WIM
Manage Audit Functions	Enable, Disable	Operation Panel, WIM
Manage time and date settings	Modify	Operation Panel, WIM
Configure minimum password length	Modify	Operation Panel, WIM
Configure Password complexity settings	Modify	Operation Panel, WIM
Configure Operation Panel Auto Logout Time	Modify	Operation Panel, WIM
Configure WIM Auto Logout Time	Modify	WIM
Configure number of authentication failure before account lockout	Modify	WIM
Configure account release timer settings	Modify	WIM
Configure PSTN Fax-Line Separation Stored Reception File User	Modify	Operation Panel, WIM
Configure network settings for trusted communications (specify IP addresses and port to connect to the TOE)	Modify	Operation Panel, WIM
Manage Device Certificates	Create, query, modify, delete, upload	Operation Panel, WIM
Manage TOE Trusted Update	Query, Modify	WIM
Configure NTP	Modify	WIM



Management Functions	Operation	Interface(s)
Manage user accounts (Ability to login)	Unlock	WIM

### **FMT\_SMR.1          Restrictions on Security Roles**

FMT\_SMR.1.1 Refinement      The TSF shall maintain the roles **U.ADMIN, U.NORMAL**.

FMT\_SMR.1.2                  The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

### **5.3.6          Protection of the TSF (FPT)**

#### **FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1      Extended: Protection of TSF Data**

FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1.1          The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

#### **FPT\_STM.1          Reliable Time Stamps**

FPT\_STM.1.1                  The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

#### **FPT\_TST\_EXT.1      Extended: TSF testing**

FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1          The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests during initial start-up (and power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.

#### **FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1      Extended: Trusted update**

FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1          The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the current version of the TOE firmware/software.

FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2          The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate updates to TOE firmware/software.

FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.3          The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a digital signature mechanism and [no other functions] prior to installing those updates.

### **5.3.7          TOE Access (FTA)**

#### **FTA\_SSL.3          TSF-initiated Termination**

FTA\_SSL.3.1                  The TSF shall terminate interactive session after a *[lapse of Operation Panel auto logout time, lapse of WIM auto logout time, completion of document data reception from the printer driver, and completion of document data reception from the fax driver]*.

### 5.3.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

#### FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

FTP\_ITC.1.1 Refinement The TSF shall use **[TLS]** to provide a **trusted** communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: [[syslog, SMTP]]** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.

FTP\_ITC.1.2 Refinement The TSF shall permit **the TSF, or the authorized IT entities**, to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP\_ITC.1.3 Refinement The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [**communication via the LAN of document data, function data, protected data, and confidential data**].

#### FTP\_TRP.1(a) Trusted Path (for Administrators)

FTP\_TRP.1.1(a) Refinement The TSF shall use **[TLS/HTTPS]** to provide a **trusted** communication path between itself and remote administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data**.

FTP\_TRP.1.2(a) Refinement The TSF shall permit **remote administrators** to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP\_TRP.1.3(a) Refinement The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for **initial administrator authentication and all remote administration actions**.

#### FTP\_TRP.1(b) Trusted Path (for Non-administrators)

FTP\_TRP.1.1(b) Refinement The TSF shall use **[TLS/HTTPS]** to provide a **trusted** communication path between itself and remote users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data**.

FTP\_TRP.1.2(b) Refinement The TSF shall permit [the TSF, remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP\_TRP.1.3(b) Refinement The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for **initial user authentication and all remote actions**.

## 5.4 Assurance Requirements

33 The TOE security assurance requirements are summarized in Table 22. See Annex B for Security Assurance Requirements description.

**Table 22: TOE Security Assurance Requirements**

Assurance Class	Components	Description
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance Claims
	ASE_ECD.1	Extended Components Definition
	ASE_INT.1	ST Introduction
	ASE_OBJ.1	Security Objectives for the operational environment
	ASE_REQ.1	Stated Security Requirements
	ASE_SPD.1	Security Problem Definition
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE Summary Specification
Development	ADV_FSP.1	Basic Functional Specification
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE.1	Operational User Guidance
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures
Life Cycle Support	ALC_CMC.1	Labelling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1	TOE CM Coverage
Tests	ATE_IND.1	Independent Testing - conformance
Vulnerability Assessment	AVA_VAN.1	Vulnerability survey

## 6 TOE Summary Specification

34 The following describes how the TOE fulfils each SFR included in section 5.3.

### 6.1 Security Audit

#### 6.1.1 FAU\_GEN.1 & FAU\_GEN.2

35 The TOE records an audit log of events listed in Table 23. Audit log entries record the date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event. Additionally, Job Completion events record the type of job, and Failure to Establish Session events record the reason for such failure.

**Table 23: List of Audit Events**

Auditable event requirements	Auditable events satisfied
Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions	Start-up of the Audit Function
	Shutdown of the Audit Function
Job completion	Printing via networks
	LAN Fax via networks
	Scanning documents
	Copying documents
	Receiving incoming faxes
	Reading document data (print, fax transmission)
	Deleting document data
Unsuccessful User authentication, Unsuccessful User identification	Failure of login operations
Use of management functions	Use of functions identified in FMT_SMF.1
Modification to the group of Users that are part of a role	Modification of MFP Administrator roles
Changes to the time	Date settings (year/month/day), time settings (hour/minute)
Failure to establish session	Failure of communication with the audit server
	Failure of communication with print driver

Auditable event requirements	Auditable events satisfied
	Failure of communication with fax driver
	Failure of communication with WIM

**6.1.2 FAU\_STG.1, FAU\_STG\_EXT.1, FAU\_STG.4, FAU\_SAR.1, FAU\_SAR.2 and FTP\_ITC.1**

- 36 The TOE stores audit log data in a dedicated storage area of the eMMC. Audit records are buffered in that storage area before transfer to a configured remote syslog server over a configured TLS trusted channel.
- 37 Authorized administrators use the WIM to review the audit trail and to initiate transfer of audit records. The TOE prevents unauthorized access to the audit records by ensuring that the options to manage the audit function and the audit records are not included in the lists of available functions visible to the U.NORMAL users.
- 38 The TOE audit trail comprises three types of audit logs: Job logs, Access logs, and Ecology logs. By default, the job and ecology logs will each hold a maximum of 4,000 records; the access log can have a maximum of 12,000 records. When a maximum number of records is reached, the records are overwritten based on the following criteria:
  - a) When syslog audit transfers are working, the oldest records which have been transferred to the syslog server are overwritten first.
  - b) If none of the logs have been transferred to the audit server, the oldest records are overwritten first.

**6.2 Identification and Authentication**

**6.2.1 FIA\_UAU.1, FIA\_UID.1, FIA\_UAU.7, FIA\_ATD.1 & FIA\_USB.1**

- 39 For each individual user, the TOE maintains the user attributes: username, password, user role and available functions list regardless of the authentication method for the user account. Users login to the TOE by entering their username/password credentials on the Operation Panel, the WIM login screen, or through a client's print driver or fax driver that has been configured to submit user credentials.
- 40 When users enter their passwords on the Operation Panel or the WIM login, the TOE displays a sequence of dummy characters whose length is the same as that of the entered password.
- 41 All users accessing the TOE user interfaces are identified and authenticated before they are allowed access. Only the following functions are accessible before the user is authenticated:
  - a) Viewing user job lists, WIM Help, system status, the counter and information of inquiries.
  - b) Creation of fax reception jobs.
  - c) Creation of print jobs

42 The TOE authenticates users by checking the entered username/passwords credentials against the local user database.

43 An available functions list that identifies the basic hardcopy functions a user is permitted to perform is associated with each Normal User. After successful login, users are authorized to perform functions according to their assigned user role (Normal User, MFP Administrator, or MFP Supervisor). If login fails, the user is not denied access to all functions that require user authentication.

## 6.2.2 FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1

44 For authentication within the TOE, login passwords for users can be registered only if these passwords meet the conditions specified by the selections in FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1.

## 6.2.3 FIA\_AFL.1 & FTA\_SSL.3

45 The TOE counts consecutive login failures for a given login name and will lock out that user after an administrator-configured number of authentication failures attempts have been reached. For the U.NORMAL users, the account lockout is released when the configured lockout time has elapsed or by direct release operation performed by the MFP administrator. For the U.ADMIN users, the account lockout is released when the configured lockout time has elapsed, or by direct release operation performed by the MFP Administrator or MFP Supervisor, or by elapse of a given time after the TOE restarts.

46 The TOE can terminate user sessions at the various interfaces as follow:

- h) **Operation Panel:** the user is logged out of the TOE when inactivity reaches the Operation Panel auto logout time (settable from 10 to 999 seconds).
- i) **WIM:** the user is logged out of the TOE when inactivity reaches the WIM auto logout time (settable from 3 to 60 minutes).
- j) **Printer driver:** the user is logged out of the TOE immediately after receiving the print data from the printer driver.
- k) **Fax driver:** the user is logged out of the TOE immediately after receiving the transmission information from the fax driver.

## 6.3 Access Control

### 6.3.1 FDP\_ACC.1 & FDP\_ACF.1

47 The TOE controls user operations for document data and user jobs as specified in Table 18 and Table 19.

#### 6.3.1.1 Access control rule on document data

48 The TOE provides users with the ability to perform operations on document data that are stored in the TOE.

49 Normal Users are permitted to operate on document data if the ID of the user corresponds to the Document User List for that document (i.e., the user is the "Job Owner"). A Normal User is not permitted to operate on document data for which it is not the Job Owner.

50 A Normal User who is a Job Owner may print, send by fax, send by e-mail as attachments, and delete stored documents, using the Operation Panel or a web browser.

- 51 The TOE allows only the Job Owner to view and delete the document data handled as a user job while Printer Function is being used.
- 52 While no interface to change job owners is provided, an interface to cancel user jobs is provided. If a user job is cancelled, any document the cancelled job operates will be deleted.

**Table 24: Stored Documents Access Control Rules for Normal Users**

Function	User interface	Type of document	Operations permitted for authorized users
Printer	Operation Panel	+PRT	Print Delete
Printer	Web browser	+PRT	Delete
Fax	Operation Panel	+FAXIN	Print

- 53 MFP Administrators are not permitted to print, download, or send stored documents. MFP Administrators may delete stored documents, using the Operation Panel, web browser, or indirectly by cancelling a job.
- 54 The MFP Supervisor is not permitted to perform any document operations.

**6.3.1.2 Access control rule on user jobs**

- 55 The TOE displays on the Operation Panel a menu to cancel a user job only if the user who logs in from the Operation Panel is a Job Owner or MFP Administrator and a cancellation of a user job is attempted by the Job Owner or an MFP Administrator. Other users are not allowed to operate user jobs.
- 56 When a user job is cancelled, any documents operated by the cancelled job will be deleted. However, if the document data operated by the cancelled user job is a stored document, the data will not be deleted and remain stored in the TOE.

**6.4 Cryptographic Operations**

**6.4.1 FCS\_CKM.1(a), FCS\_CKM.1(b), FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.**

- 57 The TOE implements random-bit generation services using a software based-based DRGB that has been seeded with at least 256-bits of entropy from a third-party hardware-based TRNG and DRBG.

**Table 25: Random Number Sources**

RNG	Method	Standard	RNG
Hardware TRNG	True RNG + DRBG	AIS31 Class 2	Hardware TRNG
Software DRBG	Hash_DRBG_SH A256	SP 800-90A	Software DRBG

The TOE generates the following cryptographic keys in support of secure communications:

- a) RSA 2048

- b) ECDHE P256, P-384 and P-521.
- c) 128-bit and 256-bit symmetric keys

58 Additional details about key creation, the TRNG, and the DRBG, are provided in the Key Management Description and Entropy Description documents.

#### **6.4.2 FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1, FCS\_CKM.4(a) and FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4**

59 The TOE prevents reading of all symmetric and private keys. It does not make use of pre-shared keys.

60 The TOE destroys cryptographic keys and key materials when no longer needed. TLS session keys are no longer needed at the end of a communication session. Private keys are no longer needed when a new certificate replaces the current device certificate.

61 Key destruction is further described in the separate proprietary Key Management Document (KMD).

### **6.5 Protection of the TSF**

#### **6.5.1 FPT\_STM.1**

62 The date (year/month/day) and time (hour/minute/second) the TOE records for the audit log are derived from the system clock of the TOE. The system clock is also used for other time-related functions, including user lockout timing, idle session timeouts, and SA lifetimes.

63 The system clock may be set locally or configured to use a network time server. Only an MFP Administrator can configure the system clock.

### **6.6 Trusted Communications**

64 The Trusted Communications Function provides trusted paths for communications between the TOE and remote users / external IT entities.

#### **6.6.1 FTP\_TRP.1 (a), FTP\_TRP.1 (b), FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1, FTP\_ITC.1, and FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1**

65 The TOE implements TLS 1.2 to protect communications between the TOE and remote users' client computers (print drivers, fax drivers, and WIM HTTPS sessions). TLS client authentication is not supported. The TOE can also be configured at initial configuration to use TLS to protect communications with a remote Syslog or SMTP server.

66 The TOE supports these ciphersuites:

- a) TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
- b) TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256
- c) TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
- d) TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384
- e) TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256
- f) TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384



**6.6.2 FCS\_COP.1 (a), FCS\_COP.1(b), FCS\_COP.1(c), and FCS\_COP.1(g)**

67 The TOE generates a self-signed RSA Device Certificate. Administrators may import a Device Certificate that is generated outside of the TOE.

68 To establish a session key for TLS communications, the TOE employs a Diffie-Hellman-based key establishment scheme conforming to NIST SP 800-56A Section 5.6, and a Hash DRBG. The session key is used to encrypt communications with AES 128 or AES 256 CBC:

**Table 26: TLS/HTTPS Cryptographic Functions**

Function	SFR	Algorithm
Authentication	n/a	RSA KeyGen 186-4
Key establishment	FCS_CKM.1(a)	DSA KeyGen 186-4 KAS-FFC (DHE) KAS-ECC (ECDHE)
Random number generation	FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Hash_DRBG_SHA256
Encryption / decryption	FCS_COP.1(a)	AES 128 CBC AES 256 CBC AES 128 GCM AES 256 GCM
Hashing	FCS_COP.1(c)/L2 FCS_COP.1(g)	HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-384

**6.7 Administrative Roles**

69 The Security Management Function consists of functions to 1) control operations for TSF data, 2) maintain user roles assigned to Normal Users, MFP Administrator, or MFP Supervisor to operate the Security Management Function, and 3) set appropriate default values to security attributes, all of which accord with user role privileges or user privileges that are assigned to Normal Users, MFP Administrator, or MFP Supervisor.

**6.7.1 FMT\_SMR.1**

70 The TOE maintains U.NORMAL and U.ADMIN roles as described in Table 6. U.NORMAL defines the normal or non-admin users of the TOE which are permitted to use the document processing functions of the MFP and access their own data. U.ADMIN defines All TOE administrators w which includes the MFP Administrator and the MFP Supervisor. The MFP Administrator configures the TOE, manages normal users' jobs and normal users' data. The MFP supervisor sets MFP Administrators' passwords. Administrators do not initiate document processing jobs.

### 6.7.2 FMT\_SMF.1, FMT\_MOF.1, and FMT\_MTD.1

- 71 The TOE provides and restricts the following management functions which can be managed over the Operation Panel or the WIM:
- a) Manage user accounts including create, modify, delete users, user roles, privileges, available function lists.
  - b) Manage the audit functions including enable/disable the audit functions and modifying the audit transfer settings
  - c) Query, delete and export the audit logs
  - d) Configure time and date settings
  - e) Password Management including configuring password composition, password length, and password complexity
  - f) Configure auto logout settings on WIM and the Operation Panel
  - g) Configure Authentication Failure and Account lockout timer settings
  - h) Modify PSTN Fax-Line Separation Stored Reception File User
  - i) Configure network settings for trusted communications (specify IP addresses and port to connect to the TOE)
  - j) Manage device certificates including create, query, delete, modify, upload certificates
  - k) Manage TOE trusted update
  - l) Configure NTP

- 72 The TOE restricts modification of TSF functions and TSF data to the authorized administrator roles.

### 6.7.3 FMT\_MSA.1 and FMT\_MSA.3

- 73 Table 18 and Table 19 list the access control rules enforced by the TOE when users access the document processing functions (print, scan, copy, fax) and individual user jobs. The default behaviour to access the document data is permissive for all authenticated normal users, except for the U.ADMIN user which cannot initiate document processing functions. The TOE maintains username and available function lists data for individual users, unauthenticated users sending document print of document fax to the TOE must be identified before the TOE processes the job.

## 6.8 Trusted Operation

- 74 The Software Verification Function is to verify the integrity of the executable codes of the MFP Control Software, FCU Control Software and Operation Panel Control Software, and confirm that these codes can be trusted.

### 6.8.1 FPT\_TST\_EXT.1, FCS\_COP.1(b), FCS\_COP.1(c)/L1, and FCS\_COP.1(c)/L2

- 75 During start-up, the TOE performs a series of integrity tests, that check that the hash on the executable files is correct and that the software has not been changed. The integrity tests check the hash on the software executable listed below:

**Table 27: Start-up Integrity Tests**

Integrity test	SFR	Algorithm
TPM	FCS_COP.1(c)/L1	SHA-1
MFP Control Software	FCS_COP.1(b) FCS_COP.1(c)/L2	RSA 186-4 SHA-256
Fax Control Unit	FCS_COP.1(c)/L1	SHA-1
Operation Panel Software	FCS_COP.1(b) FCS_COP.1(c)/L1	RSA 186-4 SHA-1
Operation Panel Applications	FCS_COP.1(b) FCS_COP.1(c)/L1	RSA 186-4 SHA-1

76 If any steps of the integrity tests fail, a Service Call (SC) error code is displayed on the Operator Panel and the TOE becomes unavailable. In such cases, the Administrator must contact a Customer Engineer to service the TOE.

77 When all steps succeed, the TOE becomes operational.

78 Testing that the hash on the TOE software image is correct before the TOE can become operational verifies the integrity and validity of the TOE software; this is sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF is operating correctly.

### 6.8.2 FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1, FCS\_COP.1(b), FCS\_COP.1(c)/L1, and FCS\_COP.1(c)/L2

79 TOE allows only the MFP Administrator to read the version of the MFP Control Software, Operation Panel Control Software, and FCU Control Software. The MFP Administrator can read these versions using the Operation Panel or WIM from the client computer.

80 The MFP Administrator can prepare for installation of updated MFP Control Software, Operation Panel Software, or FCU Control Software, by uploading an installation package from the client computer using WIM. The package contains the TOE Software and a digital signature (DS) that was created using the SERES private key. Digital signatures for trusted updates are generated outside of the TOE, by the manufacturer.

81 For MFP Control or FCU Software, the TOE performs the following verifications before the installing the package:

- a) Identifies the type of software (e.g., MFP Control, Operation Panel, FCU);
- b) Verifies that the software model name matches the TOE;
- c) Creates a SHA256 message digest (MD1) of the software, uses the SERES public key to decrypt DS (MD2), and then verifies that MD1 = MD2.

82 For Operation Panel software, the TOE performs the following verifications before the installing the package:

- a) Identifies the type of software (e.g., MFP Control, Operation Panel, FCU);
- b) Verifies that the software model name matches the TOE;

- c) Creates a SHA256 message digest (MD1) of the index file, uses the SERES public key to decrypt DS (MD2), and then verifies that MD1 = MD2.
- d) Creates a SHA256 message digest (MD3) of the software image, uses an internal key to decrypt DS (MD4), and then verifies that MD3 = MD4.

83 The TOE performs the signature verification of the software to be updated using the encryption functions listed below when updating the software.

**Table 28: Signature Verification**

Integrity test	SFR	Algorithm
MFP Control Software	FCS_COP.1(b)	RSA 186-4
	FCS_COP.1(c)/L2	SHA-256
Operation Panel Software	FCS_COP.1(b)	ECDSA SigVer 186-4
	FCS_COP.1(c)/L2	SHA-256
Operation Panel Applications	FCS_COP.1(b)	RSA 186-4
	FCS_COP.1(c)/L2	ECDSA SigVer 186-4
		SHA-256

## 6.9 PSTN Fax-Network Separation

84 The Fax Line Separation Function permits only fax transmissions as input information from telephone lines so that unauthorized intrusion from telephone lines can be prevented.

### 6.9.1 FDP\_FXS\_EXT.1

85 The fax interface use cases are below.

- a) Sending faxes
  - i) The TOE receives documents from client PCs via the LAN, and using the fax interface, transmits them as fax documents via the PSTN line using the ITU-T T.30 protocol.
  - ii) The TOE can transmit stored documents as faxes.
- b) Receiving faxes
  - i) A remote fax machine establishes a connection to the TOE through the PSTN line using the ITU-T T.30 protocol, through which the TOE receives fax documents.
- c) Fax-Line Separation
  - i) The fax modem accepts connections through the PSTN only if they conform to the ITU-T T.30 protocol.
  - ii) Data that is transmitted or received through the PSTN is fax-format, image data.

86 Other than the specified use cases, the TOE allows no other data to be transmitted on the fax line.

# 7 Rationale

## 7.1 Conformance Claim Rationale

- 87 The following rationale is presented with regard to the PP conformance claims:
- a) **TOE type.** As identified in section 2.1, the TOE is hardcopy device, consistent with the HCDPP.
  - b) **Security problem definition.** As shown in section 3, the threats, OSPs and assumptions are reproduced directly from the HCDPP.
  - c) **Security objectives.** As shown in section 4, the security objectives are reproduced directly from the HCDPP.
  - d) **Security requirements.** As shown in section 5, the security requirements are reproduced directly from the HCDPP. No additional requirements have been specified.

## 7.2 Security Objectives Rationale

88 The following table maps threats, OSPs, and assumptions, to their respective Security Objectives.

**Table 29: Security Objectives Rationale**

Threat/Policy/Assumptions	Rationale
<p><b>T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS</b></p> <p>An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete) User Document Data or change (modify or delete) User Job Data in the TOE through one of the TOE’s interfaces.</p>	<p>O.ACCESS_CONTROL restricts access to User Data in the TOE to authorized Users.</p> <p>O.USER_I&amp;A provides the basis for access control.</p> <p>O.ADMIN_ROLES restricts the ability to authorize Users and set access controls to authorized Administrators.</p>
<p><b>T.TSF_COMPROMISE</b></p> <p>An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF Data in the TOE through one of the TOE’s interfaces.</p>	<p>O.ACCESS_CONTROL restricts access to TSF Data in the TOE to authorized Users.</p> <p>O.USER_I&amp;A provides the basis for access control.</p> <p>O.ADMIN_ROLES restricts the ability to authorize Users and set access controls to authorized Administrators.</p>
<p><b>T.TSF_FAILURE</b></p> <p>A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security if the TOE is permitted to operate.</p>	<p>O.TSF_SELF_TEST prevents the TOE from operating if a malfunction is detected.</p>
<p><b>T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE</b></p> <p>An attacker may cause the installation of unauthorized software on the TOE.</p>	<p>O.UPDATE_VERIFICATION verifies the authenticity of software updates.</p>

Threat/Policy/Assumptions	Rationale
<p>T.NET_COMPROMISE</p> <p>An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise compromise the security of the TOE by monitoring or manipulating network communication.</p>	<p>O.COMMS_PROTECTION protects LAN communications from sniffing, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks.</p>
<p>P.AUTHORIZATION</p> <p>Users must be authorized before performing Document Processing and administrative functions.</p>	<p>O.USER_AUTHORIZATION restricts the ability to perform Document Processing and administrative functions to authorized Users.</p> <p>O.USER_I&amp;A provides the basis for authorization.</p> <p>O.ADMIN_ROLES restricts the ability to authorize Users to authorized Administrators.</p>
<p>P.AUDIT</p> <p>Security-relevant activities must be audited and the log of such actions must be protected and transmitted to an External IT Entity.</p>	<p>O.AUDIT requires the generation of audit data.</p> <p>O.ACCESS_CONTROL restricts access to audit data in the TOE to authorized Users.</p> <p>O.USER_AUTHORIZATION provides the basis for authorization.</p>
<p>P.COMMS_PROTECTION</p> <p>The TOE must be able to identify itself to other devices on the LAN.</p>	<p>O.COMMS_PROTECTION protects LAN communications from man-in-the-middle attacks.</p>
<p>P.FAX_FLOW (conditionally mandatory)</p> <p>If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will ensure separation between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.</p>	<p>O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION requires a separation between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.</p>
<p>A.PHYSICAL</p> <p>Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be provided by the environment.</p>	<p>OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION establishes a protected physical environment for the TOE.</p>
<p>A.NETWORK</p> <p>The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.</p>	<p>OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION establishes a protected LAN environment for the TOE.</p>
<p>A.TRUSTED_ADMIN</p> <p>TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE according to site security policies.</p>	<p>OE.ADMIN_TRUST establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to have a trusted relationship with Administrators.</p>

**Table 30: Security Objectives Rationale**

### **7.3 Security Assurance Requirements rationale**

The rationale for choosing these security assurance requirements is that they define a minimum security baseline that is based on the anticipated threat level of the attacker, the security of the Operational Environment in which the TOE is deployed, and the relative value of the TOE itself. The assurance activities throughout the PP are used to provide tailored guidance on the specific expectations for completing the security assurance requirements.

# Annex A: Extended Components Definition

89 This annex reproduces the HCDPP Appendix A.9 extended components definition.

## Security Audit (FAU)

### External Audit Trail Storage (FAU\_STG\_EXT)

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure that secure transmission of audit data from TOE to an External IT Entity.

#### Component levelling



FAU\_STG\_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage requires the TSF to use a trusted channel implementing a secure protocol.

**Management:**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) The TSF shall have the ability to configure the cryptographic functionality.

**Audit:**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FAU\_STG\_EXT.1                      Extended: Protected Audit Trail Storage**

Hierarchical to:                      No other components.

Dependencies:                      FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation  
     FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.1                      The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP\_ITC.

**Rationale:**

The TSF is required that the transmission of generated audit data to an External IT Entity which relies on a non-TOE audit server for storage and review of audit records. The storage of these audit records and the ability to allow the administrator to review these audit records is provided by the Operational Environment in that case. The Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the transmission of audit data to an External IT Entity.



This extended component protects the audit records, and it is therefore placed in the FAU class with a single component.


## Cryptographic Support (FCS)

### Cryptographic Key Management (FCS\_CKM\_EXT)

#### Family Behavior

This family addresses the management aspects of cryptographic keys. Especially, this extended component is intended for cryptographic key destruction.

#### Component levelling



FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Material Destruction ensures not only keys but also key materials that are no longer needed are destroyed by using an approved method.

#### Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen

#### Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen

### **FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys), or FCS\_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)], FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall destroy all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and cryptographic critical security parameters when no longer needed.

#### Rationale:

Cryptographic Key Material Destruction is to ensure the keys and key materials that are no longer needed are destroyed by using an approved method, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Cryptographic Key Material Destruction.

This extended component protects the cryptographic key and key materials against exposure, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

## HTTPS selected (FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT)

### Family Behavior

Components in this family define the requirements for protecting remote management sessions between the TOE and a Security Administrator. This family describes how HTTPS will be implemented. This is a new family defined for the FCS Class.

### Component levelling



FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1 HTTPS selected, requires that HTTPS be implemented according to RFC 2818 and supports TLS.

#### Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

#### Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Failure of HTTPS session establishment.

### FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol using TLS as specified in FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1.

#### Rationale:

HTTPS is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.


This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

## IPsec selected (FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT)

### Family Behavior

This family addresses the requirements for protecting communications using IPsec.

### Component levelling



FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1 IPsec requires that IPsec be implemented as specified.

#### Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management actions foreseen.

#### Audit:

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- b) Failure to establish an IPsec SA.

### **FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition  
FCS\_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)

FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.

FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement [selection: tunnel mode, transport mode].

FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is otherwise unmatched and discards it.

FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using [selection: the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-CBC256 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-GCM-128 as specified in RFC 4106, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106].

FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [selection: IKEv1 as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [selection: no other RFCs for extended sequence numbers, RFC 4304 for extended sequence numbers], and [selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]; IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in section 2.23), 4307, and [selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]].

FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [selection: IKEv1, IKEv2] protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms [selection: AES-CBC-128, AES\_CBC-192 AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 3602, AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-192, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282, no other algorithm].

FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main mode.

FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [selection: IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be established based on [selection: number of packets/number of bytes; length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]; IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be established based on [selection: number of packets/number of bytes ; length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]]

FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14 (2048-bit MODP), and [selection: 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP, 5 (1536-bit MODP)), [assignment: other DH groups that are implemented by the TOE], no other DH groups].

FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform Peer Authentication using the [selection: RSA, ECDSA] algorithm and Pre-shared Keys.

Rationale:

IPsec is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.

This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.11 The TSF shall ensure that IKE protocols implement DH Group(s) [selection: 14 (2048-bit MODP), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP), 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS)].

**Cryptographic Key Derivation (FCS\_KDF\_EXT)**

**Family Behavior**

This family specifies the means by which an intermediate key is derived from a specified set of submasks.

**Component levelling**



FCS\_KDF\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation requires the TSF to derive intermediate keys from submasks using the specified hash functions.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen

**Audit:**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen

**FCS\_KDF\_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Key Derivation**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication),

[if selected: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)]

FCS\_KDF\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall accept [selection: a RNG generated submask as specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1, a conditioned password submask, imported submask] to derive an intermediate key, as defined in [selection: NIST SP 800-108 [selection: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode, KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode], NIST SP 800-132], using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS\_COP.1(h), such that the output is at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.


**Cryptographic Operation (FCS\_KYC\_EXT)**

**FCS\_KYC\_EXT Cryptographic Operation (Key Chaining)**

**Family Behavior**

This family provides the specification to be used for using multiple layers of encryption keys to ultimately secure the protected data encrypted on the storage.

**Component levelling**



FCS\_KYC\_EXT Key Chaining, requires the TSF to maintain a key chain and specifies the characteristics of that chain.

**Management:**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen

**Audit:**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FCS\_COP.1(e) Cryptographic operation (Key Wrapping), FCS\_SMC\_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining, FCS\_COP.1(i) Cryptographic operation (Key Transport), FCS\_KDF\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Key Derivation), and/or FCS\_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)].

FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [selection: one, using a submask as the BEV or DEK; intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s) to the BEV or DEK using the following method(s): [selection: key wrapping as specified in FCS\_COP.1(e), key combining as specified in FCS\_SMC\_EXT.1, key encryption as specified in FCS\_COP.1(f), key derivation as specified in FCS\_KDF\_EXT.1, key transport as specified in FCS\_COP.1(i)]] while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits].

Rationale:


Key Chaining ensures that the TSF maintains the key chain, and also specifies the characteristics of that chain. However, the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the management of multiple layers of encryption key to protect encrypted data. This extended component protects the TSF data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

**Cryptographic Password Construction and Conditioning (FCS\_PCC\_EXT)**

**Family Behavior**

This family ensures that passwords used to produce the BEV are robust (in terms of their composition) and are conditioned to provide an appropriate-length bit string.

**Component levelling**



FCS\_PCC\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Password Construction and Conditioning, requires the TSF to accept passwords of a certain composition and condition them appropriately.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FCS\_PCC\_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Password Construction and Conditioning**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)

FCS\_PCC\_EXT.1.1 A password used to generate a password authorization factor shall enable up to [assignment: positive integer of 64 or more] characters in the set of {upper case characters, lower case characters, numbers, and [assignment: other supported special characters]} and shall perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-[selection: SHA-256, SHA384, SHA-512]], with [assignment: positive integer of 1000 or more] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128, 256] that meet the following: [assignment: PBKDF recommendation or specification].

**Random Bit Generation (FCS\_RBG\_EXT)**

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)**

**Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for random bit generation to ensure that it is performed in accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.

**Component levelling**



FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation requires random bit generation to be performed in accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.

**Management:**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen

**Audit:**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A using [selection: Hash\_DRBG (any), HMAC\_DRBG (any), CTR\_DRBG (AES)].

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from [selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source(s), [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source(s)] with a minimum of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

**Rationale:**


Random bits/number will be used by the SFRs for key generation and destruction, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the random bit generation. This extended component ensures the strength of encryption keys, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

## Submask Combining (FCS\_SMC\_EXT)

### Family Behavior

This family defines the means by which submasks are combined, if the TOE supports more than one submask being used to derive or protect the BEV.

### Component levelling



FCS\_SMC\_EXT.1 Submask combining requires the TSF to combine the submasks in a predictable fashion

**Management:**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management actions foreseen.

**Audit:**

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

## FCS\_SMC\_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)



FCS\_SMC\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method [selection: exclusive OR (XOR), SHA-256, SHA-512] to generate an intermediary key or BEV.

Rationale:

Submask Combining is to ensure the TSF combine the submasks in order to derive or protect the BEV.


This extended component protects the TSF data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

**Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation (FCS\_SNI\_EXT)**

**Family Behavior**

This family ensures that salts, nonces, and IVs are well formed.

**Component levelling**



FCS\_SNI\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation), requires the generation of salts, nonces, and IVs to be used by the cryptographic components of the TOE to be performed in the specified manner.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) No specific management functions are identified

Audit:

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FCS\_SNI\_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)

FCS\_SNI\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall only use salts that are generated by a RNG as specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.

FCS\_SNI\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall only use unique nonces with a minimum size of [64] bits.

FCS\_SNI\_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner: [ CBC: IVs shall be non-repeating, CCM: Nonce shall be non-repeating, XTS: No IV. Tweak


values shall be non-negative integers, assigned consecutively, and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer, GCM: IV shall be non-repeating. The number of invocations of GCM shall not exceed  $2^{32}$  for a given secret key.].

## SSH selected (FCS\_SSH\_EXT)

### Family Behavior

The component in this family addresses the ability for a server to offer SSH to protect data between a client and the server using the SSH protocol.

### Component levelling



FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1 SSH selected, requires the SSH protocol implemented as specified.

#### Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

#### Audit:

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Failure of SSH session establishment

### **FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFC(s) [selection: 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, and [selection: 5656, 6668, no other RFCs].

FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, password-based.

FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [assignment: number of bytes] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption

algorithms: [assignment: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, [selection: AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM, AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM, no other algorithms].].

FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [selection: SSH\_RSA, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256] and [selection: PGP-SIGN-RSA, PGP-SIGNDSS, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, no other public key algorithms,] as its public key algorithm(s).

FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.6 6 The TSF shall ensure that data integrity algorithms used in SSH transport connection is [selection: HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA1-96, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-512].

FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and [selection: ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521, no other methods] are the only allowed key exchange method used for the SSH protocol.

Rationale:


SSH is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms. This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

**TLS selected (FCS\_TLS\_EXT)**

**Family Behavior**

This family addresses the ability for a server and/or a client to use TLS to protect data between a client and the server using the TLS protocol.

**Component levelling**



FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1 TLS selected, requires the TLS protocol implemented as specified.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Failure of TLS session establishment

**FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols [selection: TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] supporting the following ciphersuites:

Mandatory ciphersuites:

- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA

Optional ciphersuites:

[selection:

- None
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384].

Rationale:

TLS is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.

This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

## User Data Protection (FDP)

### Protection of Data on Disk (FDP\_DSK\_EXT)

#### Family Behavior

This family is to mandate the encryption of all protected data written to the storage.

#### Component levelling



FDP\_DSK\_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk, requires the TSF to encrypt all the Confidential TSF and User Data stored on the Field-Replaceable Non-volatile Storage Devices in order to avoid storing these data in plaintext on the devices.

#### Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

#### Audit:

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### **FCS\_DSK\_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

FDP\_DSK\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [selection: perform encryption in accordance with FCS\_COP.1(d), use a self-encrypting Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device that is separately CC certified to conform to the FDE EE cPP] such that any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device contains no plaintext User Document Data and no plaintext confidential TSF Data.

FDP\_DSK\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.

#### Rationale:

Extended: Protection of Data on Disk is to specify that encryption of any confidential data without user intervention, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Protection of Data on Disk.


This extended component protects the Data on Disk, and it is therefore placed in the FDP class with a single component.

## Fax Separation (FDP\_FXS\_EXT)

### Family Behavior

This family addresses the requirements for separation between Fax PSTN line and the LAN to which TOE is connected.

### Component levelling



FDP\_FXS\_EXT.1 Fax Separation, requires the fax interface cannot be used to create a network bridge between a PSTN and a LAN to which TOE is connected.

#### Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

#### Audit:

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FCS\_FXS\_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

FDP\_FXS\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols.

#### Rationale:

Fax Separation is to protect a LAN against attack from PSTN line, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Protection of TSF or User Data.

This extended component protects the TSF Data or User Data, and it is therefore placed in the FDP class with a single component.

## Identification and Authentication (FIA)

### Password Management (FIA\_PMG\_EXT)

### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the attributes of passwords used by administrative users to ensure that strong passwords and passphrases can be chosen and maintained.

## Component levelling



FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1 Password management requires the TSF to support passwords with varying composition requirements, minimum lengths, maximum lifetime, and similarity constraints.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:

- c) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [selection: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "\*", "(", ")", [assignment: other characters]];
- d) Minimum password length shall be settable by an Administrator and have the capability to require passwords of 15 characters or greater.

Rationale:

Password Management is to ensure the strong authentication between the endpoints of communication, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Password Management.

This extended component protects the TOE by means of password management, and it is therefore placed in the FIA class with a single component.

## **Pre-Shared Key Composition (FIA\_PSK\_EXT)**

### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure the ability to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.

## Component levelling



FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition, ensures authenticity and access control for updates.

**Management:**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

**Audit:**

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation).

FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.

FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that are:

- 22 characters in length and [selection: [assignment: other supported lengths], no other lengths];
- composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “\$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “\*”, “(”, and “)”).

FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using [selection: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512, [assignment: method of conditioning text string]] and be able to [selection: use no other pre-shared keys; accept bit-based pre-shared keys; generate bit-based pre-shared keys using the random bit generator specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1].

**Rationale:**

Pre-shared Key Composition is to ensure the strong authentication between the endpoints of communications, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Pre-shared Key Composition.

This extended component protects the TOE by means of strong authentication, and it is therefore placed in the FIA class with a single component.




## Protection of the TSF (FPT)

### Protection of Key and Key Material (FPT\_KYP\_EXT)

#### Family Behavior

This family addresses the requirements for keys and key materials to be protected if and when written to nonvolatile storage.

#### Component levelling



FPT\_KYP\_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of key and key material, requires the TSF to ensure that no plaintext key or key materials are written to nonvolatile storage.

Management: FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### **FPT\_KYP\_EXT.1      Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material**

Hierarchical to:      No other components.

Dependencies:      No dependencies.

FPT\_KYP\_EXT.1.1      The TSF shall not store plaintext keys that are part of the keychain specified by FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1 in any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device, and not store any such plaintext key on a device that uses the key for its encryption.

Rationale:

Protection of Key and Key Material is to ensure that no plaintext key or key material are written to non-volatile storage, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the protection of key and key material.


This extended component protects the TSF data, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.

### Protection of TSF Data (FPT\_SKP\_EXT)

#### Family Behavior

This family addresses the requirements for managing and protecting the TSF data, such as cryptographic keys. This is a new family modelled as the FPT Class.

### Component levelling



FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading all symmetric keys), requires preventing symmetric keys from being read by any user or subject. It is the only component of this family.

#### Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management activities foreseen.

#### Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### **FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1      Protection of TSF Data**

Hierarchical to:      No other components.

Dependencies:      No other components.

FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1.1      The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

#### Rationale:

Protection of TSF Data is to ensure the pre-shared keys, symmetric keys and private keys are protected securely, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the protection of such TSF data.

This extended component protects the TOE by means of strong authentication using Preshared Key, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.


### **TSF Self-Test (FPT\_TST\_EXT)**

#### **FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 TSF Testing**

#### **Family Behavior**

TSF testing requires a suite of self-testing to be run during initial start-up in order to demonstrate correct operation of the TSF.

### Component levelling



FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 TSF Self-Test requires a suite of self-tests to be run during initial start-up in order to demonstrate correct operation of the TSF.

**Management:**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) No management functions.

**Audit:**

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No other components.

FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (and power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.

**Rationale:**

TSF testing is to ensure the TSF can be operated correctly, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the TSF testing. In particular, there is no SFR defined for TSF testing. This extended component protects the TOE, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.

**Trusted Update (FPT\_TUD\_EXT)**

**Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure that only administrators can update the TOE firmware and/or software.

**Component levelling**



FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Trusted Update, ensures authenticity and access control for updates.

**Management:**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) There are no management actions foreseen

**Audit:**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) There are no auditable events foreseen

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FCS\_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification), or FCS\_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)].

FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the current version of the TOE firmware/software

FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate updates to TOE firmware/software.

FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [selection: digital signature mechanism, published hash] prior to installing those updates.

**Rationale:**

Firmware/software is a form of TSF Data, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the management of firmware/software. In particular, there is no SFR defined for importing TSF Data.

This extended component protects the TOE, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.

## Annex B: Security Assurance Requirements

This section describes Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the evaluations performed by the evaluator based on the CC. These are all common to the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in Section 5. Assurance activities to the individual SFRs are described in their respective sections.

After the ST has been approved for evaluation, the Common Criteria IT Security Evaluation Facilities (ITSEF) will obtain the TOE, necessary IT environment, and the TOE guidance documents. The assurance activities described in the ST (which will be refined by the ITSEF to be TOE-specific, either within the ST or in a separate document) will be performed by the ITSEF. Although these activities were performed under the control of the ITSEF, it is allowed to obtain supports from the developer as well. The results of these activities will be documented and presented (along with the administrative guidance used) for validation.

For each assurance family, “Developer Notes” are provided on the developer action elements to clarify what, if any, additional documentation/activity needs to be provided by the developer.

The TOE security assurance requirements specified in Table 22 provides evaluative activities required to address the threats identified in Section 0 of this PP.

### Class ASE: Security Target evaluation

The ST is evaluated as per ASE activities defined in the CEM. In addition, there may be Assurance Activities specified within the PP that call necessary descriptions to be included in the TSS that are specific to the TOE technology type.

Appendix E of HCD PP v1.0 provides a description of the information expected to be provided regarding the quality of entropy in the random bit generator.

Given the criticality of the key management scheme, this PP requires the developer to provide a detailed description of their key management implementation. This information can be submitted as an appendix to the ST and marked proprietary, as this level of detailed information is not expected to be made publicly available. See Appendix F of HCD PP v1.0 for details on the expectation of the developer’s Key Management Description.

### Class ADV: Development

For TOEs conforming to this PP, the information about the TOE is contained in the guidance documentation available to the end user as well as the TOE Summary Specification (TSS) portion of the ST. While it is not required that the TOE developer write the TSS, the TOE developer must concur with the description of the product that is contained in the TSS as it relates to the functional requirements. The Assurance Activities contained in Section 5 should provide the ST authors with sufficient information to determine the appropriate content for the TSS section.

#### ADV\_FSP.1 Basic functional specification

The functional specification describes the TSF Interfaces (TSFIs). At the level of assurance provided by this PP, it is not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these interfaces. Additionally, because TOEs conforming to this PP will necessarily have interfaces to the Operational Environment that are not directly invocable by TOE users (to include administrative users), at this assurance level there is little point specifying that such interfaces be described in and of themselves since only indirect testing of such interfaces may be possible. The activities for this family for this PP should focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the TSS in response to the functional requirements, and the interfaces presented in the AGD documentation. No additional “functional specification” document should be necessary to satisfy

the assurance activities specified. The interfaces that need to be evaluated are characterized through the information needed to perform the assurance activities listed, rather than as an independent, abstract list.

**Developer action elements:**

- ADV\_FSP.1.1D            The developer shall provide a functional specification.
- ADV\_FSP.1.2D            The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
- Developer Note:        The developer shall provide appropriate TSS description and guidance documents as the functional specification. The TSS description identifies TSFIs associated with each SFR in order to confirm the validity of interface design. The developer is required to provide a description at least at a confirmable level in which TSS description and contents of guidance documents are consistent with each other. In case of insufficient information for evaluation in TSS description and contents of guidance documents, additional documentation can be requested. For the SFRs that cannot be directly operated/confirmed from external interfaces, the developer may be requested to provide additional information.

**Content and presentation elements:**

- ADV\_FSP.1.1C            The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
- ADV\_FSP.1.2C            The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
- ADV\_FSP.1.3C            The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.
- ADV\_FSP.1.4C            The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.

**Evaluator action elements:**

- ADV\_FSP.1.1E            The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
- ADV\_FSP.1.2E            The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.

**Assurance activity:**

**TSS:**

The evaluator shall confirm identifiable external interfaces from guidance documents and examine that TSS description identifies all the interfaces required for realizing SFR.

The evaluator shall confirm identification information of the TSFI associated with the SFR described in the TSS and confirm the consistency with the description related to each interface.

The evaluator shall check to ensure that the SFR defined in the ST is appropriately realized, based on identification information of the TSFI in the TSS description as well as on the information of purposes, methods of use, and parameters for each TSFI in the guidance documents

The assurance activities specific to each SFR are described in Section 5 and the evaluator shall perform evaluations by adding to this assurance component.

## Class AGD: Guidance Documents

The guidance documents will be provided with the developer's security target. Guidance must include a description of how the administrator verifies that the Operational Environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and readable by an administrator.

Guidance must be provided for every Operational Environment that the product supports as claimed in the ST. This guidance includes

- instructions to successfully install the TOE in that environment; and
- instructions to manage the security of the TOE as a product and as a component of the larger Operational environment.

Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality is also provided; requirements on such guidance are contained in the assurance activities specified in Section 5.

### AGD\_OPE.1 Operational user guidance

#### Developer action elements:

AGD\_OPE.1.1D            The developer shall provide operational user guidance.

Developer Note:            The developer should review the assurance activities for this component to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluators will be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.

#### Content and presentation elements:

AGD\_OPE.1.1C            The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the ser-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.

AGD\_OPE.1.2C            The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.

AGD\_OPE.1.3C            The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.

AGD\_OPE.1.4C            The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.

AGD\_OPE.1.5C            The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational

error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.

AGD\_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

AGD\_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.

**Evaluator action elements:**

AGD\_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**Assurance activity:**

Operational Guidance:

The contents of operational guidance are confirmed by the assurance activities in Section 5 and the TOE evaluation in accordance with the CEM.

The evaluator shall check to ensure that the following guidance is provided:

Procedures for administrators to confirm that the TOE returns to its evaluation configuration after the transition from the maintenance mode to the normal Operational Environment.

**Application note:**

During evaluation, the TOE returns to its evaluation configuration. In the field, the TOE may return to the configuration that was in force prior to entering maintenance mode.

## **AGD\_PRE.1 Preparative procedures**

**Developer action elements:**

AGD\_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative procedures.

Developer Note: As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the assurance activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.

**Content and presentation elements:**

AGD\_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.

AGD\_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

**Evaluator action elements:**



- AGD\_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
- AGD\_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation.

## **Class ALC: Life-cycle Support**

At the assurance level provided for TOEs conformant to this PP, life-cycle support is limited to end-user-visible aspects of the life-cycle, rather than an examination of the TOE vendor's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it's a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this assurance level.

### **ALC\_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE**

This component is targeted at identifying the TOE such that it can be distinguished from other products or version from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user.

#### **Developer action elements:**

- ALC\_CMC.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.

#### **Content and presentation elements:**

- ALC\_CMC.1.1C The TOE shall be labeled with its unique reference.

#### **Evaluator action elements:**

- ALC\_CMC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

#### **Assurance activity:**

##### **Operational Guidance:**

The evaluator shall check the ST to ensure that it contains an identifier (such as a product name/version number) that specifically identifies the version that meets the requirements of the ST. The evaluator shall ensure that this identifier is sufficient for an acquisition entity to use in procuring the TOE (including the appropriate administrative guidance) as specified in the ST. Further, the evaluator shall check the AGD guidance and TOE samples received for testing to ensure that the version number is consistent with that in the ST. If the vendor maintains a web site advertising the TOE, the evaluator shall examine the information on the web site to ensure that the information in the ST is sufficient to distinguish the product.

### **ALC\_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage**

Given the scope of the TOE and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this component's assurance activities are covered by the assurance activities listed for ALC\_CMC.1.

#### **Developer action elements:**

ALC\_CMS.1.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.

**Content and presentation elements:**

ALC\_CMS.1.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.

ALC\_CMS.1.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

**Evaluator action elements:**

ALC\_CMS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**Assurance activity:**

Operational Guidance:

The “evaluation evidence required by the SARs” in this PP is limited to the information in the ST coupled with the guidance provided to administrators and users under the AGD requirements. By ensuring that the TOE is specifically identified and that this identification is consistent in the ST and in the AGD guidance (as done in the assurance activity for ALC\_CMC.1), the evaluator implicitly confirms the information required by this component.

## **Class ATE: Tests**

Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage of design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through ATE\_IND family, while the latter is through the AVA\_VAN family. At the assurance level specified in this PP, testing is based on advertised functionality and interfaces as constrained by the availability of design information presented in the TSS. One of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as specified in the following requirements.

### **ATE\_IND.1 Independent testing - Conformance**

Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the administrative (including configuration and operation) documentation provided. The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in Section 5 are being met, although some additional testing is specified for SARs in Section 7. The Assurance Activities identify the minimum testing activities associated with these components. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the product models combinations that are claiming conformance to this PP.

**Developer action elements:**

ATE\_IND.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

**Content and presentation elements:**

ATE\_IND.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

**Evaluator action elements:**

- ATE\_IND.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
- ATE\_IND.1.2E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.

**Assurance activity:****Test:**

The evaluator shall prepare a test plan and report documenting the testing aspects of the system. The test plan covers all of the testing actions contained in the body of this PP's Assurance Activities. While it is not necessary to have one test case per test listed in an Assurance Activity, the evaluators must document in the test plan that each applicable testing requirement in the ST is covered.

The Test Plan identifies the product models to be tested, and for those product models not included in the test plan but included in the ST, the test plan provides a justification for not testing the models. This justification must address the differences between the tested models and the untested models, and make an argument that the differences do not affect the testing to be performed. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the differences have no affect; rationale must be provided. In case the ST describes multiple models (product names) in particular, the evaluator shall consider the differences in language specification as well as the influences, in which functions except security functions such as a printing function, may affect security functions when creating this justification. If all product models claimed in the ST are tested, then no rationale is necessary.

The test plan describes the composition of each product model to be tested, and any setup that is necessary beyond what is contained in the AGD documentation. It should be noted that the evaluators are expected to follow the AGD documentation for installation and setup of each model either as part of a test or as a standard pre-test condition. This may include special test drivers or tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion) is provided that the driver or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the TOE.

The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to achieve those objectives. These procedures include the goal of the particular procedure, the test steps used to achieve the goal, and the expected results. The test report (which could just be an annotated version of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test procedures were executed, and includes the actual results of the tests. This shall be a cumulative account, so if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a fix installed; and then a successful re-run of the test, the report would show a "fail" and "pass" result (and the supporting details), and not just the "pass" result.

## **Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment**

For the first generation of this protection profile, the evaluation lab is expected to survey open sources to discover what vulnerabilities have been discovered in these types of products. In most cases, these vulnerabilities will require sophistication beyond that of a basic attacker. Until penetration tools are created and uniformly distributed to the evaluation labs, evaluators will not be expected to test for these vulnerabilities in the TOE. The labs will be expected to comment on the likelihood of these vulnerabilities given the documentation provided by the vendor. This information will be used in the development of penetration testing tools and for the development of future protection profiles.

**Developer action elements:**

AVA\_VAN.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

**Content and presentation elements:**

AVA\_VAN.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

**Evaluator action elements:**

AVA\_VAN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AVA\_VAN.1.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.

AVA\_VAN.1.3E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing basic attack potential.

Assurance activity:

Test:

As with ATE\_IND, the evaluator shall generate a report to document their findings with respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE\_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to determine the vulnerabilities that have been found in printing devices and the implemented communication protocols in general, as well as those that pertain to the particular TOE. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report.

For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE\_IND) to confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take advantage of the vulnerability.

For example, if the vulnerability can be detected by pressing a key combination on boot-up, for example, a test would be suitable at the assurance level of this PP. If exploiting the vulnerability requires an electron microscope and liquid nitrogen, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.