Certification Report
EAL 4+ Evaluation of Entrust Authority Security
Manager and Security Manager Administration v8.1 SP1
Issued by:
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Certification Body
Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
© Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada, 2012
Document number: 383-4-127-CR
Version: 1.0
Date: 06 February 2012
Pagination: i to iii, 1 to 12
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DISCLAIMER
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its
associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established
under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) – using
the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3. This certification report, and its associated certificate,
apply only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the
IT product by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization
that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed
or implied.
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FOREWORD
The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a
third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology
(IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria
Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is
managed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the
Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the
Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the
Standards Council of Canada.
The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is CGI IT Security Evaluation & Test Facility
located in Ottawa, Canada.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the
product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A
security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the
evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target,
in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions
made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements,
and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the
security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated
February 06, 2012, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the
CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of
the Common Criteria Project).
This certification report makes reference to the following trademarks or registered
trademarks:
 Entrust Authority is trademark Entrust, Inc.;
 Entrust Entellegence is a trademark of Entrust, Inc.;
 Critical Path Directory Server is a trademark of Entrust, Inc;
 Windows is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corp.;
 PostgreSQL is a trademark of the PostgreSQL foundation.; and
 Luna CA is a trademark of SafeNet, Inc.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Disclaimer....................................................................................................................................... i
Foreword........................................................................................................................................ ii
Executive Summary...................................................................................................................... 1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ................................................................................ 2
2 TOE Description ................................................................................................................... 2
3 Evaluated Security Functionality........................................................................................ 2
4 Security Target...................................................................................................................... 3
5 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................... 3
6 Security Policy....................................................................................................................... 4
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................................. 5
7.1 SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................... 5
7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................... 5
7.3 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.......................................................................................... 6
8 Evaluated Configuration...................................................................................................... 6
9 Documentation ...................................................................................................................... 7
10 Evaluation Analysis Activities ............................................................................................. 7
11 ITS Product Testing.............................................................................................................. 8
11.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS .......................................................................... 9
11.2 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING ........................................................................ 9
11.3 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING..................................................................... 10
11.4 CONDUCT OF TESTING ............................................................................................. 10
11.5 TESTING RESULTS.................................................................................................... 10
12 Results of the Evaluation.................................................................................................... 11
13 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations................................................................... 11
14 References............................................................................................................................ 12
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Executive Summary
Entrust Authority Security Manager and Security Manager Administration v8.1 SP1
(hereafter referred to as EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1), from Entrust, is the Target of Evaluation
for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 augmented evaluation.
EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 is a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that creates and manages
public key certificates. EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 supports traditional PKI based on the
[X.509] standard, as well as PKI based on the [ISO 7816] standard for a specific application
for Extended Access Control (EAC) for electronic passports. EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1
incorporates FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography.
CGI IT Security Evaluation & Test Facility is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This
evaluation was completed on 19 January 2012 and was carried out in accordance with the
rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions
made during the evaluation, the intended environment for EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1, the
security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the
product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that
their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give
due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)1
for this product provide
sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 4 augmented assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 3. The following augmentation is claimed: ALC_FLR.2 – Flaw
reporting procedures.
EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 is conformant with the Certificate Issuing and Management
Components Protection Profile, Version 1.1, December 27, 2010.
Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body, declares
that the EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on
the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
CCS Certified Products List (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of
the Common Criteria Project).
1
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 augmented
evaluation is Entrust Authority Security Manager and Security Manager Administration v8.1
SP1 (hereafter referred to as EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1), from Entrust Limited.
2 TOE Description
EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 is a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that creates and manages
public key certificates. EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 supports traditional PKI based on the
[X.509] standard, as well as PKI based on the [ISO 7816] standard for a specific application
for Extended Access Control (EAC) for electronic passports. EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1
incorporates FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography.
3 Evaluated Security Functionality
The complete list of evaluated security functionality for EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 is
identified in Section 6 of the ST.
The following cryptographic modules were evaluated to the FIPS 140-2 standard:
Cryptographic Module Certificate #
Entrust Base Security Kernel CM version 8.0 Pending 2
Luna CA4 with DOCK-2 USB reader, firmware 4.6.1 and
client 2.4 HSM3
(3rd
Party HSM)
1178
The following Government of Canada approved cryptographic algorithms were evaluated for
correct implementation in EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1:
Cryptographic Algorithm Standard Certificate #
Triple-DES (3DES) FIPS 186-2
APPENDIX 3
#1253
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) FIPS 186-2
APPENDIX 3,
#1923
2
The cryptographic module is in the process of FIPS 140-2 validation under the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program (CMVP). Information regarding the status of the module validation can be found on the
NIST website.
3
Hardware Security Module
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Cryptographic Algorithm Standard Certificate #
PUB 197
Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) FIPS 186-2 #992
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) FIPS 180-2 #1689
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC)
FIPS 198 #1158
RSA-PSS FIPS 186-3 #992
DSA FIPS 186-2 #610
ECDSA FIPS 186-3 #275
ECDH SP800-56A #15
4 Security Target
The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following nomenclature:
Title: Entrust Authority Security Manager and Security Manager Administration
Version: 5.5
Date: 17 January 2012
5 Common Criteria Conformance
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3.
EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 is:
a. Common Criteria Part 2 extended, with functional requirements based upon functional
components in Part 2, except for the following explicitly stated requirements defined in
the ST:
 FCO_NRO_CIMC.3: Enforced proof of origin and verification of origin;
 FCO_NRO_CIMC.4: Advanced verification of origin;
 FCS_CKM_CIMC.5: CIMC private and secret key zeroization;
 FCS_SOF_CIMC.1: CIMC Strength of Functions;
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 FDP_ACF_CIMC.2: User private key confidentiality protection;
 FDP_ACF_CIMC.3: User secret key confidentiality protection;
 FDP_CIMC_CER.1: Certificate Generation;
 FDP_CIMC_CRL.1: Certificate revocation list validation;
 FDP_CIMC_CSE.1: Certificate status export;
 FDP_ETC_CIMC.5: Extended user private and secret key export;
 FDP_SDI_CIMC.3: Stored public key integrity monitoring and action;
 FMT_MOF_CIMC.3: Extended certificate profile management;
 FMT_MOF_CIMC.5: Extended certificate revocation list profile management;
 FMT_MTD_CIMC.4: TSF private key confidentiality protection;
 FMT_MTD_CIMC.5: TSF secret key confidentiality protection;
 FMT_MTD_CIMC.7: Extended TSF private and secret key export; and
 FPT_CIMC_TSP.1: Audit log signing event.
b. Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, with security assurance requirements based only
upon assurance components in Part 3; and
c. Common Criteria EAL 4 augmented, containing all security assurance requirements in
the EAL 4 package, as well as the following: ALC_FLR.2 –Flaw reporting procedures.
d. EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 is conformant with the Certificate Issuing and Management
Components Protection Profile, Version 1.1, December 27, 2010.
6 Security Policy
EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 implements the CIMC TOE Access Control Policy, a role-based
access control policy to control user access to the system; details of this security policy can
be found in Section 6.1 of the ST.
In addition, EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 implements policies pertaining to security audit, user
data protection, identification and authentication, and security management. Further details
on these security policies may be found in Section 6 of the ST.
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7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Consumers of EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 should consider assumptions about usage and
environmental settings as requirements for the product’s installation and its operating
environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following Secure Usage Assumptions are listed in the ST:
 Audit logs are required for security-relevant events and must be reviewed by the
Auditors;
 An authentication data management policy is enforced to ensure that users change
their authentication data at appropriate intervals and to appropriate values (e.g.,
proper lengths, histories, variations, etc.) (Note: this assumption is not applicable to
biometric authentication data.);
 Users need to accomplish some task or group of tasks that require a secure IT
environment. The users require access to at least some of the information managed by
the TOE and are expected to act in a cooperative manner;
 All Administrators, Officers, and Auditors are familiar with the certificate policy
(CP) and certification practices statement (CPS) under which the TOE is operated;
 Proper disposal of authentication data and associated privileges is performed after
access has been removed (e.g., job termination, change in responsibility);
 Malicious code destined for the TOE is not signed by a trusted entity;
 Administrators, Officers, Auditors, and other users notify proper authorities of any
security issues that impact their systems to minimize the potential for the loss or
compromise of data;
 General users, Administrators, Officers and Auditors are trained in techniques to
thwart social engineering attacks; and
 Competent Administrators, Officers and Auditors will be assigned to manage the
TOE and the security of the information it contains.
7.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following Environmental Assumptions are listed in the ST:
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 The operating system has been selected to provide the functions required by this
CIMC to counter the perceived threats for the CIMC PP, as identified in this ST.
 The TOE is physically protected against loss of communications i.e., availability of
communications.
 The TOE hardware, software, and firmware critical to security policy enforcement
will be protected from unauthorized physical modification.
7.3 Clarification of Scope
EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 offers protection against inadvertent or casual attempts to breach
system security by unsophisticated attackers possessing enhanced-basic attack potential. EA
SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 is not intended for situations which involve determined attempts by
hostile or well-funded attackers using sophisticated attack techniques.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration for EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1comprises:
 Entrust Authority Security Manager v8.1 SP1 (build number 8.1.350.240); and
 Entrust Authority Security Manager Administration v8.1 SP1 (build number 8.1.350.175).
Additional Software Requirements:
 Database - Postgresql 8.3.7;
 Directory - Critical Path Inc., Directory Server (DS) 5.01; and
 End User Client Systems - Entrust Entelligence Security Provider (ESP) 9.2 on
Microsoft Windows 7.
Additional Hardware Requirements:
 HSM - Luna CA4 with DOCK-2 USB reader, firmware 4.6.1 and client 2.4.
The documents required to put the TOE into its evaluated configuration are:
 Entrust Authority Security Manager 8.1 Guidance Documents (AGD_OPE.1) version
1.4 is a high-level document detailing references from existing operational guidance
for the secure configuration of the TOE in it’s evaluated configuration and
environment;
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 Entrust Authority Security Manager Administration 8.1 SP1 Installation Guide Issue
1.0 is the commercially available user guidance that provides a comprehensive
reference on setting up and using the TOE;
 Entrust Authority Security Manager Administration 8.1 SP1 Operations Guide Issue
1.0 is the commercially available user guidance that provides a comprehensive
reference on operating the TOE; and
 Entrust Authority Security Manager 8.1 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1) v1.3
provides supplemental information specific to the configuration of the TOE in the
Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration.
9 Documentation
The Entrust documents provided to the consumer are as follows:
 Entrust Authority Security Manager 8.1 Guidance Documents (AGD_OPE.1) version
1.4;
 Entrust Authority Security Manager Administration 8.1 SP1 Installation Guide 1.0;
 Entrust Authority Security Manager Administration 8.1 SP1 Operations Guide Issue
1.0; and
 Entrust Authority Security Manager 8.1 SP1 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
v1.3.
10 Evaluation Analysis Activities
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of EA SM & SMA v8.1
SP1, including the following areas:
Development: The evaluators analyzed the EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 functional
specification, design documentation, and a subset of the implementation representation; they
determined that the design accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF)
interfaces and the TSF subsystems and modules, and how the TSF implements the security
functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1
security architectural description and determined that the initialization process is secure and
that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains
are maintained. The evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings
between the design documents are correct.
Guidance Documents: The evaluators examined the EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 preparative
user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and
unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration
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and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the
preparative and operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently
detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Life-cycle support: An analysis of the EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 configuration management
system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the EA SM
& SMA v8.1 SP1 configuration items were clearly marked and could be modified and
controlled by automated tools. The developer’s configuration management system was
observed during a site visit, and it was found to be mature and well-developed and operated
in accordance with the CM plan. The evaluators confirmed that the access control measures
as described in the CM plan are effective in preventing unauthorized access to the
configuration items.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of
the procedures required to maintain the integrity of EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 during
distribution to the consumer.
The evaluators examined the development security procedures during a site visit and
determined that they detailed sufficient security measures for the development environment
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 design and
implementation. The evaluators determined that the developer has used a documented model
of the TOE life-cycle and well-defined development tools that yield consistent and
predictable results.
The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by Entrust for EA SM &
SMA v8.1 SP1. During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence generated by
adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to
track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to
consumers of the product include if ALC_FLR.2 is claimed.
Vulnerability Assessment: The evaluators conducted an independent vulnerability analysis
of EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1. Additionally, the evaluators conducted a review of public
domain vulnerability databases and a focused search of all evaluation deliverables. The
evaluators identified potential vulnerabilities for testing applicable to the EA SM & SMA
v8.1 SP1 in its operational environment.
All these evaluation activities resulted in PASS verdicts.
11 ITS Product Testing
Testing at EAL 4 consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing
independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.
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11.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining
their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR4
.
The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage and depth analysis and found them to
be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s
test documentation and the functional specification, TOE design and security architecture
description was complete.
11.2 Independent Functional Testing
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining
design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation,
executing a sample of the developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the
developer tests.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability
of the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test coverage approach is the
following list of CGI IT Security Evaluation & Test Facility test goals:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developer tests to
gain a deeper understanding of the TOE and the TOE interfaces. All security
functions and interfaces were exercised;
b. Security Audit: The objective of this test goal is to determine the TOE’s ability to
audit the activity of users;
c. Identification and Authentication: The objective of these tests is to ensure that access
to the TOE is restricted to authorized users only and that password rules are followed;
d. Access Control: The objective of this test is to demonstrate that access rules are in
place;
e. User Data Protection: The objective of this test goal is to determine the TOE's ability
to protect user data by verifying for digital signatures;
f. Key Management: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate the protection of
public keys as well as the user export/import function and the user archive/retrieval
function;
4
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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g. Certificate management and revocation: The objective of this test goal is to verify the
management of certificate profiles; and
h. Remote Data Entry and Export: The objective of these tests is to demonstrate that
data exchanged via PKIX-CMP is protected for confidentiality and integrity.
11.3 Independent Penetration Testing
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and a
focused review of all evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration
testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:
a. Port Scan: The purpose of this test case is to identify all open ports on the TOE;
b. Traffic Interception: The purpose of this test is to demonstrates that data exchanged
via SEP, PKIX-CMP, or GUI is protected for confidentiality and integrity;
c. Tampering – Log Files: This test demonstrates that modifying log file results in log
file no longer being valid;
d. Memory Scanning: The purpose of this test is to demonstrate that passwords cannot
be found in memory after use; and
e. Tampering – SQL Injection: The purpose of this test case is to try and bypass the
normal authentication mechanism by injecting parameters.
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the
intended operating environment.
11.4 Conduct of Testing
EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented,
independent functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the Entrust
development site at 1000 Innovation Drive, Kanata, Ottawa. The CCS Certification Body
witnessed a portion of the independent testing. The detailed testing activities, including
configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented
in a separate Test Results document.
11.5 Testing Results
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results,
giving assurance that EA SM & SMA v8.1 SP1 behaves as specified in its ST, functional
specification, TOE design and security architecture description.
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12 Results of the Evaluation
This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL 4+ level of assurance. The overall verdict
for the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
13 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations
Acronym/Abbreviation/
Initialization
Description
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and
Certification Scheme
CP Certificate Policy
CPL Certified Products list
CPS Certification Practices Statement
CIMC Certificate Issuing and Management
Component
CM Configuration Management
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HSM Hardware Security Module
IT Information Technology
ITSET Information Technology Security Evaluation
and Testing
PALCAN Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories
- Canada
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RSA Rivet Shamir Adleman
SFR Security Functional Requirements
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TFS TOE Security Functions
Triple DES Triple Data Encryption Algoritm
SHA-1 Secure Hash Algoritm
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14 References
This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:
a. CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October 2010.
b. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, July 2009.
c. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM,
Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
d. Certificate Issuing and Management Components Protection Profile, Version 1.1,
December 27, 2010.
e. Entrust Authority Security Manager and Security Manager Administration Version
5.5 January 17, 2012.
f. Entrust Authority Security Manager and Security Manager Administration v8.1 SP1
Evaluation Technical Report, version 1.2, January 19, 2012.
g. [X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2005 | ISO/IEC 9594-8: 2005, Information
technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and
attribute certificate frameworks.
h. [ISO 7816] ISO/IEC 7816: Identification Cards – Integrated Circuit Cards (Parts 10,
11 & 12).