EOS Original Data Security System Security Target
Version 1.7, Date May 17, 2007
Copyright (C) 2006-2007, Canon Inc. All rights reserved. i
This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target
written in Japanese
EOS Original Data Security System Security Target
Version 1.7
Date May 17, 2007
Author Camera Development Center, Canon, Inc.
EOS Original Data Security System Security Target
Version 1.7, Date May 17, 2007
Copyright (C) 2006-2007, Canon Inc. All rights reserved. ii
Revision History
Version Date Revision Details
1.0 Oct. 16, 2006 First edition.
1.0.1 Nov. 13, 2006 Covered parts of the specifications that are not yet
determined.
1.1 Nov. 24, 2006 Covered OR (TCE-EOR-001-01, TCE-EOR-0002-01).
1.2 Dec. 08, 2006 Corrected written errors based on an internal review.
1.3 Dec. 15, 2006 Corrected errors based on an internal review.
1.4 Feb. 19, 2007 Covered OR (TCE-EOR-003-01, TCE-EOR-0004-01).
1.5 Feb. 23, 2007 Corrected errors based on an internal review.
1.6 Apr. 09, 2007 Covered OR (TCE-EOR-005-01, TCE-EOR-0006-01).
Corrected errors based on an internal review.
1.7 May 17, 2007 Modified TOE name.
EOS Original Data Security System Security Target
Version 1.7, Date May 17, 2007
Copyright (C) 2006-2007, Canon Inc. All rights reserved. iii
Table of Contents
1 ST introduction ............................................................................................................1
1.1 ST reference ..........................................................................................................1
1.2 TOE reference .......................................................................................................1
1.3 TOE overview........................................................................................................2
1.4 TOE description ....................................................................................................3
2 Conformance claims...................................................................................................14
2.1 CC conformance claim ........................................................................................14
2.2 PP claim, Package claim.....................................................................................14
3 Security problem definition .......................................................................................15
3.1 Threats ................................................................................................................15
3.2 Organisational security policies.........................................................................15
3.3 Assumptions........................................................................................................15
4 Security objectives......................................................................................................17
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE..........................................................................17
4.2 Security objectives for the operational environment.........................................17
4.3 Security objectives rationale ..............................................................................18
5 Extended components definition ...............................................................................22
6 Security requirements ...............................................................................................23
6.1 Security functional requirements.......................................................................23
6.2 Security assurance requirements.......................................................................31
6.3 Security requirements rationale ........................................................................32
7 TOE summary specification ......................................................................................38
7.1 Image File Verification Functions......................................................................38
7.2 Image File Encryption Functions.......................................................................38
7.3 I&A Functions .....................................................................................................39
7.4 PIN Length Inspection Function........................................................................39
7.5 Verification and Connection Functions..............................................................39
7.6 Access Control Function .....................................................................................40
7.7 Administration Functions ..................................................................................41
8 Reference, and Glossary/Abbreviation ......................................................................42
8.1 Reference.............................................................................................................42
8.2 Glossary/Abbreviation ........................................................................................42
EOS Original Data Security System Security Target
Version 1.7, Date May 17, 2007
Copyright (C) 2006-2007, Canon Inc. All rights reserved. 1
1 ST introduction
This chapter covers the ST reference, TOE reference, TOE overview, and TOE
description.
1.1 ST reference
This section describes ST identification information.
ST title EOS Original Data Security System Security Target
ST version 1.7
ST publisher Camera Development Center, Canon, Inc.
ST publishing date May 17, 2007
1.2 TOE reference
This section describes the TOE identification information.
TOE title EOS Original data Security System
TOE version 1.0
TOE developer Camera Development Center, Canon, Inc.
This TOE is comprised of the EOS digital camera, administrator tool, browser tool, and
OS card shown below.
Table 1-1 Component Parts of the EOS Digital Camera
Identifying Name Identifying Information
EOS-1D Mark III hardware EOS-1D Mark III
EOS-1D Mark III firmware 1.0.8
Table 1-2 Component Parts of the Administrator Tool
Identifying Name Identifying Information
Original Data Security Administrator 1.0
EOS Original Data Security System Security Target
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Copyright (C) 2006-2007, Canon Inc. All rights reserved. 2
Table 1-3 Component Parts of the Browser Tool
Identifying Name Identifying Information
Original Data Security Utility 1.0
Table 1-4 Component Parts of the OS Card
Identifying Name Identifying Information
Original Data Security Card hardware OSC-128M
Original Data Security Card applet
(applet name : FF34123456100101)
00000003
1.3 TOE overview
This TOE is a system that is comprised of a digital camera called the EOS-1D Mark III
(referred to as the “EOS digital camera” below), the Original Data Security
Administrator (referred to as the “administrator tool” below), the Original Data
Security Utility (referred to as “the browser tool” below), and the Original Data Security
Card (referred to as “the OS card” below).
This TOE is a system that makes it possible to verify the originality of image files shot
by the EOS digital camera and which keeps image files confidential, by offering the
following security functions.
The EOS digital camera has functions to generate “original image determination
data” (referred to as “verification data” below) for verifying the originality of an
image file that is a shot image, to encrypt or decrypt an image file, to encrypt or
decrypt a key used in the image file encryption process (referred to as the “image
key” below), to verify and connect the OS card, and others.
The browser tool has a function for decrypting image files.
The administrator tool and the browser tool have functions that support the
registration of authentication data related to the function of identifying and
authenticating the users.
The OS card has a function for verifying the originality of image files based on
“verification data,” a function that decrypts encrypted image keys, a function that
both encrypts and decrypts card keys etc., functions for administering and
controlling the access of card keys etc., a function for verifying and connecting the
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EOS digital camera, and functions for identifying and authenticating the users of
the administrator tool and the browser tool.
The EOS digital camera can be used alone, but the administrator tool and browser tool
require either Windows 2000, Windows XP, or Windows Vista running on a
PC/AT-compatible machine. The OS card is used either in the EOS digital camera, or in
an OS card reader/writer (referred to as a “reader/writer” below) that is connected to the
PC/AT-compatible machine. Details regarding these components are given in section 1.4.
Refer to Table 1-5 for the product names and included components.
Table 1-5 Products and Included Components
Product Name Main Included Components
EOS-1D Mark III (complete set) The EOS digital camera
The administrator tool
The browser tool
EOS digital camera accessory
Original Data Security Kit OSK-E3
(referred to as “the OSK kit” below)
The administrator tool
The browser tool
The OS card
The card reader/writer
EOS digital camera accessory
Original Data Security Card OSC-128M
The OS card
1.4 TOE description
This chapter describes the objectives and methods for using the TOE, the physical and
logical scope as the TOE’s configuration, and the users of the TOE.
1.4.1 Objectives and methods for using the TOE
Since the images shot with the digital camera are digital, it is easy to process or modify
them by using a photo retouching tool. Also, it is possible to use a variety of different
media to send digital images, such as different types of flash memory, communication
lines, and so on. Due to these characteristics, the falsification and leakage of shot
images.
The system is designed to protect image files shot with the EOS digital camera from the
perspectives of originality and confidentiality. In other words, this system makes it
possible to use image files while maintaining their originality and confidentiality, with
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its “functions for verifying the originality of image files” and “functions for maintaining
the confidentiality of image files.” The “functions for verifying the originality of image
files” use MAC (Message Authentication Code), and the “functions for maintaining the
confidentiality of image files” are implemented with encryption. The MAC functionality
is comprised of a function that uses a MAC processing key (referred to as the “MAC key”
below) to generate verification data, and a function that verifies the originality of image
files based on the MAC key and verification data. Encryption is comprised of a function
for encrypting image files using image keys, and a function for decrypting encrypted
image files using image keys. Furthermore, this system offers functions to support this
functionality, including functions to generate image keys, functions to control access to
image keys etc., functions to encrypt and decrypt image keys, functions to encrypt and
decrypt card keys etc., functions to connect devices between the EOS digital camera and
OS card, functions to identify and authenticate the administrators and browsers, and so
on.
Next, the image shooting and browsing (viewing) procedures are as described below.
Before an image is shot, the administrator of this system must initilize the OS card
preferences and so on. The OS card’s initializations include the ID and PIN of the OS
card’s administrator and registration of the card key. The browser’s ID and PIN and the
EOS digital camera ID are also registered. The administrator’s ID and PIN, the
browser’s ID and PIN, the EOS digital camera’s ID, and the card key are referred to as
the “OS card data.” Register the EOS digital camera’s ID to register which EOS digital
camera can use that OS card, and register the browser ID to register which browser can
use that OS card. It is possible to register multiple browsers and EOS digital cameras in
a single OS card. The card key is generated inside the OS card and registered. The MAC
key is maintained in advance by the EOS digital camera and the OS card.
A photographer with the EOS digital camera and OS card will insert the OS card into
the EOS digital camera. Once the OS card is inserted into the EOS digital camera, each
device will verify and connect to the other. The EOS digital camera will verify that this
is the OS card, and the OS card will verify that the corresponding EOS digital camera
ID is registered. If either verification fails, then the EOS digital camera will show a
message in its display. After each component verifies the other, the EOS digital camera
will receive the card key from the OS card. When photographs are taken with the EOS
digital camera set to “Add original image verification data,” the EOS digital camera will
generate an image key internally and generate verification data for that image file by
using the MAC key. The image key is used to encrypt the image file, resulting in an
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Copyright (C) 2006-2007, Canon Inc. All rights reserved. 5
encrypted image file. The card key is also used to encrypt the image key, resulting in an
encrypted image key. An encrypted image file is then generated with verification data
that is comprised of verification data, the encrypted image file, and the encrypted image
key. The details of this image file encryption are described later in this document. This
encrypted image file with verification data is recorded on the prescribed medium, as set
by the EOS digital camera. Since the EOS digital camera supports various types of flash
memory and communication lines, the medium is not restricted to any particular
medium. It is possible to save the encrypted image file with verification data on flash
memory installed in the EOS digital camera, or on a PC connected via the USB
(Universal Serial Bus) interface, or on a remote PC via wireless LAN, for instance. Also
note that not all image files taken by the EOS digital camera will have verification
added and be encrypted. Only those image files selected by the photographer will be
handled in this manner. It is possible to set “Add verification data” on or off in the EOS
digital camera menu for “Add original image determination data.” On the other hand,
the image file is automatically encrypted when the OS card is inserted into the EOS
digital camera, after the EOS digital camera and the OS card have verified each other.
In other words, there is no need to set “encrypt the image file” in the EOS digital camera
menu.
The EOS digital camera can decrypt encrypted image files recorded on a specific type of
medium, and show these files on the EOS digital camera display. The EOS digital
camera has no function for outputting image files outside the EOS digital camera,
however.
A browser with a PC and the OS card can use a card reader/writer to connect the OS
card to the PC. When the browser tool is used to attempt to view an encrypted image file
with verification data, the OS card identifies and authenticates the browser with the ID
and PIN. If the identification and the authentification are succeed, the PC and OS card
will decrypt the encrypted image key by using the card key. The image key will then be
used to decrypt the encrypted image file, and the originality of the image file will be
verified based on the MAC key and verification data.
By following these steps, it is possible to maintain the originality and confidentiality of
the image files. The steps for simultaneously achieving both originality and
confidentiality were described above, but there is no need to always maintain both of
these characteristics at the same time. The photographer can set the menu of the EOS
digital camera and attach or remove the OS card from the EOS digital camera to
achieve just originality or confidentiality. Also, since the originality of an image file has
EOS Original Data Security System Security Target
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Copyright (C) 2006-2007, Canon Inc. All rights reserved. 6
no relationship with the photographer or browser, when only the originality needs to be
verified, or in other words, when verifying the originality of an image file with
verification data, there is no need to identify and authenticate the browser (viewer).
The administrator can set the administrator ID and PIN of the OS card and the card
key preferences, can add and delete browser IDs and PINs, can change administrator
PINs and browser PINs, and register or delete the EOS digital camera ID. Multiple
browsers can be registered on a single OS card along with the EOS digital camera.
Furthermore, the administrator can initialize the OS card, as well as take or restore
backups. Backups provide protection against failure of the OS card, and make it
possible to restore on a physically different OS card, thereby resulting in a duplicate
card. A duplicated OS card, which is to say an OS card holding the same OS card data,
can be shared in advance between the photographer and browser in order to realize the
real-time transmission and viewing (browsing) of encrypted image files. A browser can
view (browse) image files and change his own PIN.
1.4.2 TOE configuration
1.4.2.1 Physical scope of the TOE
Figure 1-1 shows a diagram of the entire system. The colored parts represent the
physical scope of the TOE.
PC
OS
Administrator
Tool
Digital Camera
Card
Reader/Writer
Various Types of Media USB Connection
TOE TOE TOE
OS
Card
OS
Card
Browser
Tool
Figure 1-1 Diagram of the Entire EOS Digital Camera System
As shown in Figure 1-1, the entire system is comprised of the EOS digital camera, the
administrator tool, the browser tool, the OS (Operating System), the PC, the OS card,
and the card reader/writer, and the TOE is comprised of the EOS digital camera, the
administrator tool, the browser tool, and the OS card. Figure 1-1 shows multiple OS
EOS Original Data Security System Security Target
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Copyright (C) 2006-2007, Canon Inc. All rights reserved. 7
cards, but these can be physically different OS cards, or the same OS card. The
administrator tool, browser tool, OS card, and card reader/writer can be obtained via
the OSK kit. A description of each element is provided below.
The EOS digital camera
This is the TOE, a device that can shoot images and generate image files. Table 1-6
shows the details of the constituent elements of the EOS digital camera’s hardware
and software. These elements of the physical external interface, which is comprised
of the shutter button, control buttons, dial, remote control port, synchronization
port (for the flash), and other control parts; the LCD monitor, display panel, and
other display parts; the CF (Compact Flash) card, SD (Secure Digital) card, and
other external media parts; and the USB interface and other external connection
device parts. Note that the firmware for the EOS-1D Mark III can be obtained from
Canon’s web site1.
Table 1-6 Constituent Elements of the EOS Digital Camera
Identifying Name Identifying Information
EOS-1D Mark III hardware EOS-1D Mark III
EOS-1D Mark III firmware 1.0.8
Administrator tool
This application, which is a TOE, is used to manage the OS card. Table 1-7 shows
the details of the constituent element of the administrator tool software. This
element has a GUI (Graphical User Interface) as an external physical interface.
Table 1-7 Constituent Element of the Administrator Tool
Identifying Name Identifying Information
Original Data Security Administrator 1.0
Browser tool
This application, which is a TOE, uses image files. Table 1-8 shows the details of
the constituent element of the browser tool software. This element has a GUI
(Graphical User Interface) as an external physical interface.
1 http://canon.jp
EOS Original Data Security System Security Target
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Table 1-8 Constituent Element of the Browser Tool
Identifying Name Identifying Information
Original Data Security Utility 1.0
OS card
This flash memory, which is a TOE, includes smart card functionality. Table 1-9
shows the details of the constituent elements of the OS card hardware and software.
These elements have an external media connection as an external physical
interface. The OS cards each have different individual information (referred to as
the “OSCID” below).
Table 1-9 Constituent Elements of the OS Card
Identifying Name Identifying Information
Original Data Security Card hardware OSC-128M
Original Data Security Card applet
(applet name : FF34123456100101)
00000003
PC
This is the PC/AT-compatible machine on which the administrator tool and browser
tool run. This element uses a human interface comprised of a keyboard, mouse,
display, and other components, and a peripheral device comprised of USB and so on
as the external physical interface.
OS
This is the basic software (operating system) of the PC on which the administrator
tool and browser tool run. The operating systems usable as a TOE are shown in
Table 1-10. This element has a GUI (Graphical User Interface) as an external
physical interface.
Table 1-10 List of Usable Operating Systems
List of Usable Operating Systems
Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional Service Pack 4
Microsoft Windows XP Professional Service Pack 2 (32-bit system)
EOS Original Data Security System Security Target
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Copyright (C) 2006-2007, Canon Inc. All rights reserved. 9
List of Usable Operating Systems
Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition Service Pack 2 (32-bit system)
Microsoft Windows Vista (32-bit system)2
Card reader/writer
This device, which reads and writes the OS card, is connected to the PC via USB.
This element uses a peripheral device interface such as USB and an external media
connection as its external physical interface.
The OS card is flash memory with smart card functionality, and offers physical
tamper-resistance. Also note that the EOS digital camera is dedicated hardware, and its
specifications are unpublished.
1.4.2.2 Logical scope of the TOE
Figure 1-2 shows the functions of this entire system. The functions enclosed within
thick borders are TOE functions, and the colored functions are this TOE’s security
functions.
Digital Camera
Functions
Functions in the Digital Camera
Functions in the PC
Functions in the OS Card
OS Function
Various Types of Media
Functions in the
Administrator
Tool
Functions
in the Browser Tool
Decryption
Function
Encryption
Function
Image Key
Generation Function
Encryption
Function
Decryption
Function
Verification
Data
Generation
Function
Verification and
Connection Function
I&A
Function
Verification
and
Connection
Function
OS Function
Verification
Data
Verification
Function
Information
Management Function
UI Function
PIN Length
Inspection Function
PIN Length
Inspection Function
UI Function
Decryption
Function
Figure 1-2 Block Diagram of EOS Digital Camera System Functions
2 Except the Starter Edition
EOS Original Data Security System Security Target
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Copyright (C) 2006-2007, Canon Inc. All rights reserved. 10
Each function is described below by physical configuration scope.
<The EOS Digital Camera>
Functions in the Digital Camera
By controlling each part of the EOS digital camera based on the input from the
controls and PC connection, this function makes it possible to shoot images,
generate image files, and output image files to the display, external media
connection, and PC connection. It is also possible to decrypt as necessary and show
image files and encrypted image files on the display from some types of media. It is
not possible, however, to use image files and encrypted image files input from
media for any purpose other than displaying.
Verification and Connection Function
This function verifies and connects the OS card.
Encryption Function
This function encrypts image files and image keys.
Image Key Generation Function
This function generates image keys.
Decryption Function
This function decrypts encrypted image files and encrypted image keys.
Verification Data Generation Function
This function generates verification data for verifying the originality of image files
by using MAC keys.
<PC>
OS Function
This is the basic software, or “operating system” for running the TOE.
<administrator tool>
PIN Length Inspection Function
This function inspects the PIN to be registered by a user and ensures that it has
between 8 and 15 characters.
<browser tool>
Decryption Function
This function decrypts encrypted image files.
PIN Length Inspection Function
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This function inspects the PIN to be registered by a user and ensures that it has
between 8 and 15 characters.
<The OS card>
OS Function
This is the basic software, or “operating system” for running the TOE.
I&A Function
This function uses PIN authentication to identify and authenticate administrators
and browsers. This function also manages the IDs and PINs of both administrators
and browsers.
Verification and Connection Function
This function verifies that the EOS digital camera has been registered, and
connects it.
Information Management Function
This function generates and manages card keys, and manages OS card data.
Furthermore, it includes functionality to control the access by users of card keys
and other OS card data. The IDs of EOS digital cameras that can use card keys etc.
are maintained and managed, along with browser IDs. Only the administrator can
set information related to this access control.
Encryption Function
This function encrypts card keys and OS card data, and generates encrypted OS
card data. The encrypted key for the OS card data is generated based on seed
information input from outside.
Decryption Function
This function decrypts encrypted OS card data.
Verification Data Verification Function
This function verifies the originality of image files based on MAC keys and
verification data.
Note that the smart card functions such as the tamper-resistant functionality of the OS
card are not the security functions of this TOE.
Next, the processing steps of image files are shown in Figure 1-3, and the symbols used
in Figure 1-3 are described in Table 1-11. Also, since Figure 1-3 describes the image file
processing steps, it only includes the decryption function, encryption function,
verification data generation function, and verification data verification function, all of
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which are directly involved with image files.
Functions in the Digital Camera Functions in the PC
Functions in the OS Card
I
Image
Decryption
Kx
E(Ki)
E(I)
I
Ki
E(I)
E(Ki)
Verification Data
Generation
V
Verification Data
Verification
R
V
Functions in the OS Card
Image Key
Decryption
Kx
Verification Data
Verificaiton
Image Key
Decryption
Image Key
Encryption
Image
Encryption
Ki
Image Key
Generation
Kx
I’
Figure 1-3 Image File Processing Steps
Table 1-11 Symbol Descriptions
Symbol Description
Ki The image key. This key is used to encrypt and decrypt image files.
Kx The card key. This key is maintained inside the OS card, and is used to
encrypt and decrypt the image key.
I The image file.
V Verification data.
R Verification result. This is the result of verifying the originality of an
image file,based on the verification data.
E(Ki) The encrypted image key.
E(I) The encrypted image file.
I' The encrypted image file with verification data. This is formed from
E(I) , E(Ki) , and V.
As show in Figure 1-3, this system uses the image key to encrypt the image file, and
uses a hierarchical encryption method to encrypt the image key with the card key. The
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card key is generated when the administrator sets the OS card preferences (initial
settings). The image key, on the other hand, is generated each time an image file is
generated, which is to say that the image key is generated automatically inside the EOS
digital camera each time a photograph is taken. The OS card outputs the card key to the
EOS digital camera after the EOS digital camera is verified and connected, and with the
EOS digital camera’s confidentiality maintained. On the other hand, when an encrypted
image file is decrypted, the card key is not output from the OS card to the PC. Also,
although it is not shown in Figure 1-3, the MAC key differs between EOS digital
cameras, and is recorded on the EOS digital camera and the OS card in advance. The
card key and other items of OS data are encrypted with the encryption function inside
the OS card, and are then output to the PC as backup data.
1.4.3 TOE users
The users of this system are as follows:
Photographer The entity who uses the EOS digital camera and the OS card to
generate image files.
Browser The entity who uses the browser tool and the OS card to view or
“browse” image files. This entity can modify his own PIN.
Administrator In addition to the role of browser, the administrator entity uses the
administrator tool and the OS card to initialize, backup, and restore
the OS card data. This entity also manages the EOS digital camera
IDs, administrator IDs and PINs, and browser IDs and PINs capable
of accessing the OS card.
Note that it is expected that there will be situations where the photographer and
administrator are the same person, the browser and administrator are the same person,
or the photographer and browser are the same person.
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2 Conformance claims
2.1 CC conformance claim
The CC conformance claims of this ST and TOE are listed below:
CC versions for which conformance is claimed for the ST and TOE :
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, September 2006, Ver.3.1 Revision 1,
CCMB-2006-09-001
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, September 2006, Ver.3.1 Revision 1,
CCMB-2006-09-002
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, September 2006, Ver.3.1 Revision 1,
CCMB-2006-09-003
Conformance of the ST with respect to CC part 2 : CC Part 2 conformant
Conformance of the ST with respect to CC part 3 : CC Part 3 conformant
The following information was referred to during the creation of this ST :
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Evaluation methodology, September 2006, Ver.3.1 Revision 1,
CCMB-2006-09-004
2.2 PP claim, Package claim
The PP claim and Package claim of this ST and TOE are shown below:
PP claim : This ST conforms with no PP
Package claim : EAL2 Conformant
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3 Security problem definition
This chapter describes the security problem definition.
3.1 Threats
3.1.1 T.MODIFY_IMAGE
A third party with malicious intent and no advanced technical knowledge might use an
IT device to falsify image files shot by the EOS digital camera on a medium between the
EOS digital camera and the browser tool.
3.1.2 T.DISCLOSE_IMAGE
A third party with malicious intent and no advanced technical knowledge might use an
IT device to expose image files shot by the EOS digital camera on a medium between the
EOS digital camera and the browser tool.
3.1.3 T. DISCLOSE_OSC
A third party with malicious intent and no advanced technical knowledge might use a
PC to access the OS card and obtain card keys maintained by that OS card. They might
then be able to use these keys to decrypt any encrypted image files.
3.1.4 T.ILLEGAL_ACCESS
A browser with malicious intent and no advanced technical knowledge might use the
browser tool, the administrator tool, or a combination of the two to access the OS card
and alter the OS card data. This might allow any user to decrypt encrypted image files.
3.1.5 T.BACKUP
A browser with malicious intent and no advanced technical knowledge might obtain OS
card data from the OS card backup data to expose or falsify image files.
3.2 Organisational security policies
No organizational security policy is envisioned based on this ST.
3.3 Assumptions
3.3.1 A.PHOTOGRAPHER
The photographer must manage the OS card he is using in such a way that it is not
switched for another OS card by a third party.
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3.3.2 A.VIEWER
The browser (viewer) must manage the PIN for the OS card he is using in such a way
that it is not leaked to another person. Also, the browser must select and set a PIN that
is difficult for third parties to guess.
3.3.3 A.MANAGER
The administrator (manager) is given the role of correctly registering the EOS digital
camera and browsers that can access the OS card. Also, the administrator must select
and set a PIN that is difficult for third parties to guess.
3.3.4 A.PLATFORM
The PC and OS in which the administrator installs the administrator tool for use must
be managed in such a way that undependable third parties cannot fraudulently use it.
The PC and OS in which the browser installs the browser tool for use must be managed
in such a way that undependable third parties cannot fraudulently use it. Also, these
operating systems must be managed correctly so that no malicious applications are
installed that might monitor or interfere with the operation of the administrator tool or
the browser tool.
3.3.5 A.PERIPHERAL
A card reader/writer connected to a PC on which the browser has installed the browser
tool for use must be managed in such a way that undependable third parties cannot use
it for falsification. Also, this card reader/writer must be connected to the PC in such a
way that eavesdropping does not occur between the two.
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4 Security objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives.
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE
4.1.1 O.VERIFY_IMAGE
When an image file shot by the EOS digital camera is generated, this TOE generates
verification data that can be used to verify the originality of the shot image file, and
records the image file with verification data on the storage medium. The TOE verifies
the originality of the image file based on the verification data when the image file is
viewed.
4.1.2 O.ENC_IMAGE
When an image file shot by the EOS digital camera is generated, this TOE indirectly
uses information stored on the prescribed OS card to encrypt the image file and record
the encrypted image file on the storage medium. When the image file is viewed, the
TOE indirectly uses information stored on the OS card to decrypt the encrypted image
file. The TOE also maintains the confidentiality of the key used for encrypting and
decrypting the image file.
4.1.3 O.I&A
Before accessing the card key stored on the OS card, the TOE identifies and
authenticates of the user.
4.1.4 O.ACCESS_CONTROL
When the OS card is used via the browser tool or administrator tool on the PC, the TOE
controls access by the user.
4.1.5 O.ENC_OSC
The TOE encrypts backup data when the OS card data is backed up, and decrypts this
encrypted backup data when the OS card data is restored.
4.2 Security objectives for the operational environment
4.2.1 OE.PHOTOGRAPHER
The photographer must manage the OS card he is using in such a way that it is not
switched for another OS card by a third party.
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4.2.2 OE.VIEWER
The browser (viewer) must manage the PIN for the OS card he is using in such a way
that it is not leaked to another person. Also, the browser must select and set a PIN that
is difficult for third parties to guess.
4.2.3 OE.MANAGER
The entity given the role of selecting the administrator (manager) must make sure to
assign an administrator who will dutifully carry out permitted actions only. Also, an
administrator must be assigned who will select and set a PIN that is difficult for third
parties to guess.
4.2.4 OE.PLATFORM
The PC and OS in which the administrator installs the administrator tool for use must
be managed in such a way that undependable third parties cannot fraudulently use it.
The PC and OS in which the browser installs the browser tool for use must be managed
in such a way that undependable third parties cannot fraudulently use it. Also, these
operating systems must be managed correctly so that no malicious applications are
installed that might monitor or interfere with the operation of the administrator tool or
the browser tool.
4.2.5 OE.PERIPHERAL
A card reader/writer connected to a PC on which the browser has installed the browser
tool for use must be managed in such a way that undependable third parties cannot use
it for falsification. Also, management must ensure that this card reader/writer will be
connected to the PC in such a way that eavesdropping does not occur between the two.
4.3 Security objectives rationale
This section describes the correspondence relationships between “security objectives”
and “security problem definitions of threats, organizational security policies (OSPs),
and assumptions” from the perspectives of necessity and sufficiency.
4.3.1 The necessity of security countermeasure policies
Table 4-1 maps “security objectives” and “security problem definitions of threats,
organizational security policies (OSPs), and assumptions”. This shows how each
security objective corresponds to at least one threat, organizational security policy
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(OSP), or assumption.
Table 4-1 Correspondence between Security Objectives and Threats, Organizational
Security Policies, and Assumptions
T.MODIFY_IMAGE
T.DISCLOSE_IMAGE
T.DISCLOSE_OSC
T.ILLEGAL_ACCESS
T.BACKUP
A.PHOTOGRAPHER
A.VIEWER
A.MANAGER
A.PLATFORM
A.PERIPHERAL
O.VERIFY_IMAGE ×
O.ENC_IMAGE ×
O.I&A ×
O.ACCESS_CONTROL ×
O.ENC_OSC ×
OE.PHOTOGRAPHER ×
OE.VIEWER ×
OE.MANAGER ×
OE.PLATFORM ×
OE.PERIPHERAL ×
4.3.2 The sufficiency of security countermeasure policies
This section shows the basis for claiming that the security objectives fully satisfy the
security problem definitions.
T.MODIFY_IMAGE is guarded against by O.VERIFY_IMAGE. The reason for this is
that O.VERIFY_IMAGE enables the generation of an image file with verification data
that enables the verification of the image file’s originality when the image file of an
image shot by the EOS digital camera is generated. Also, when an image file with
verification data is viewed, it is possible to verify the originality of the image file based
on the verification data. The makes it possible to detect falsification of an image file
shot with the EOS digital camera, thereby inhibiting the threat in question. Therefore,
O.VERIFY_IMAGE satisfies the demands of T.MODIFY_IMAGE.
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T.DISCLOSE_IMAGE is guarded against by O.ENC_IMAGE. The reason for this is that
O.ENC_IMAGE encrypts image files when they are shot by the EOS digital camera and
generated, and decrypts these encrypted image files for viewing. This makes it possible
to maintain the confidentiality of image files shot with the EOS digital camera, thereby
preventing the threat in question. Therefore, O.ENC_IMAGE satisfies the demands of
T.DISCLOSE_IMAGE.
T.DISCLOSE_OSC is guarded against by O.I&A. The reason for this is that O.I&A
identifies and authenticates the user before allowing access to the card key stored on
the OS card. This prevents the unauthorized access of the OS card by third parties
using the PC, thereby preventing the threat in question. Therefore, O.I&A satisfies the
demands of T.DISCLOSE_OSC.
T.ILLEGAL_ACCESS is guarded against by O.ACCESS_CONTROL. The reason for
this is that O.ACCESS_CONTROL controls access to the OS card by a user of the
browser tool or administrator tool on the PC. This prevents processing that exceeds the
scope of the browser’s privileges, thereby preventing the threat in question. Therefore,
O.ACCESS_CONTROL satisfies the demands of T.ILLEGAL_ACCESS.
T.BACKUP is guarded against by O.ENC_OSC. The reason for this is that O.ENC_OSC
encrypts backup data when a backup is taken, and decrypts the encrypted backup data
during restoration. This makes it possible to maintain the confidentiality of the backup
data, thereby preventing the threat in question. Therefore, O.ENC_OSC satisfies the
demands of T.BACKUP.
It is self-evident that A.PHOTOGRAPHER is guarded against by
OE.PHOTOGRAPHER. The reason for this is that OE.PHOTOGRAPHER roughly
restates the text of A.PHOTOGRAPHER. Therefore, OE.PHOTOGRAPHER satisfies
the demands of A.PHOTOGRAPHER.
It is self-evident that A.VIEWER is guarded against by OE.VIEWER. The reason for
this is that OE.VIEWER roughly restates the text of A.VIEWER. Therefore,
OE.VIEWER satisfies the demands of A.VIEWER.
A.MANAGER is guarded against by OE.MANAGER. OE.MANAGER requires the
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appointment of an administrator who will dutifully carry out only permitted actions,
thereby guaranteeing that no malicious actions will be performed. Therefore,
OE.MANAGER satisfies the demands of A.MANAGER.
It is self-evident that A.PLATFORM is guarded against by OE.PLATFORM. The reason
for this is that OE.PLATFORM roughly restates the text of A.PLATFORM. Therefore,
OE.PLATFORM satisfies the demands of A.PLATFORM.
It is self-evident that A.PERIPHERAL is guarded against by OE.PERIPHERAL. The
reason for this is that OE.PERIPHERAL roughly restates the text of A.PERIPHERAL.
Therefore, OE.PERIPHERAL satisfies the demands of A.PERIPHERAL.
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5 Extended components definition
This chapter describes the extended components. This ST does not define extended
components.
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6 Security requirements
This chapter describes security requirements.
6.1 Security functional requirements
This section describes the security functional requirements. Note that all the security
funcitonal requirements are as stipulated in CC Part 2.
6.1.1 FCS_COP.1a Cryptographic operation (MAC)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: the generation and the
verification of the verification data for the image file] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: The Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication Code] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: fixed value beyond 128 bits] that meet the following:
[assignment: FIPS PUB 198].
6.1.2 FCS_CKM.1b Cryptographic key generation (Image Encryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys (Image Key) in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment:
PRNG based on SHA-1 for general purpose in FIPS 186-2 (+ change
notice 1) Appendix 3.1] and specified cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: 128 bits] that meet the following: [assignment: FIPS PUB
186-2].
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6.1.3 FCS_CKM.4b Cryptographic key destruction (Image Encryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys (Image Key) in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment:
Zeroization] that meets the following: [assignment: none].
6.1.4 FCS_COP.1b Cryptographic operation (Image Encryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: the encryption and the decryption
of the image file] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment: AES] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
128 bits] that meet the following: [assignment: FIPS PUB 197].
6.1.5 FCS_CKM.1c Cryptographic key generation (Image Key
Encryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys (Card Key) in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment:
PRNG based on ANSI X9.31] and specified cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: 128 bits] that meet the following: [assignment: ANSI
X9.31].
6.1.6 FCS_CKM.4c Cryptographic key destruction (Image Key
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Encryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys (Card Key) in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment:
Zeroization] that meets the following: [assignment: none].
6.1.7 FCS_COP.1c Cryptographic operation (Image Key Encryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: the encryption or the decryption of
the Image Key] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[assignment: Triple DES] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 168
bits (3 keys)] that meet the following: [assignment: NIST SP800-67].
6.1.8 FCS_COP.1d Cryptographic operation (OS Card data)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: the encryption and the decryption
of the OS Card data] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment: Triple DES] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: 168 bits (3 keys)] that meet the following: [assignment:
NIST SP800-67].
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6.1.9 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: EOS Digital Camera System
Access Control Policy] on [assignment:
Subject : App process corresponding to the PC tool
Object : Image file (I), OS Card data (C), Seed of the OS Card data
encryption key (S)
Operation : Encrypt (Enc), Decrypt (Dec), Generate (Gen) the
verification data of the object, Verify (Ver) the object based on the
verification data, Export (Exp), Import (Imp)].
6.1.10 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: EOS Digital Camera System
Access Control Policy] to objects based on the following: [assignment:
subjects, objects, and security attributes shown in Table 6-1, Table 6-2,
and Table 6-3].
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
[assignment: rules shown in Table 6-1, Table 6-2, and Table 6-3].
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: [assignment:
The App process can verify (Ver) the image file (I) based on the
verification data].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
[assignment:
The App process with any ID can not encrypt (Enc) the image file (I).
The App process with any ID can not generate (Gen) the verification
data of the image file (I)].
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Table 6-1 EOS Digital Camera System Access Control List 1
Object
Subject Sec. Attributes
Condition
I
App process Viewer ID If Viewer ID is enrolled. Dec
App process Administrator ID If Administrator ID is enrolled. Dec
Table 6-2 EOS Digital Camera System Access Control List 2
Object
Subject Sec. Attributes
Condition
C
App process Administrator ID If Administrator ID is enrolled. Exp/Imp
Table 6-3 EOS Digital Camera System Access Control List 3
Object
Subject Sec. Attributes
Condition
S
App process Administrator ID If Administrator ID is enrolled. Imp
6.1.11 FDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_ETC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: EOS Digital Camera System
Access Control Policy] when exporting user data, controlled under the
SFP(s), outside of the TOE.
FDP_ETC.1.2 The TSF shall export the user data without the user data's associated
security attributes
6.1.12 FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: EOS Digital Camera System
Access Control Policy] when importing user data, controlled under the
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SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user
data when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: [assignment: none].
6.1.13 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: 3]] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: the each
authentication of the administrator and the viewer].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met or surpassed, the TSF shall [assignment: return the
authentication result after waiting 5 seconds in the next
authentication attempt].
Note : When the user is authenticated successfully, the TSF shall clear the unsuccessful
authentication counter for the user.
6.1.14 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
belonging to individual users: [assignment: Administrator ID, Viewer
ID].
6.1.15 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet
[assignment: the Authentication Metric defined below].
Authentication Metric
(1) The length of it between 8 characters and 15 characters.
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6.1.16 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: the actions defined in Table 6-4] on
behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Table 6-4 List of TSF mediated actions #1
TSF mediated actions
To get the OSCID of the OS card
To get the version information of the OS card
To generate the verification data of the image file
To verify the image file based on the verification data
6.1.17 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: the actions defined in Table 6-5] on
behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Table 6-5 List of TSF mediated actions #2
TSF mediated actions
To get the OSCID of the OS card
To get the version information of the OS card
To generate the verification data of the image file
To verify the image file based on the verification data
6.1.18 FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [assignment: Administrator
ID, Viewer ID].
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FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of
user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
[assignment: none].
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the
user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of
users: [assignment: none].
6.1.19 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: modify, delete,
[assignment: run initial-setting, initialize, add]] the [assignment:
Administrator ID, Administrator PIN, Viewer ID, Viewer PIN, Card
Key, EOS Digital Camera ID] to [assignment: the administrator].
6.1.20 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [assignment: management items of column in Table 6-6].
Table 6-6 List of the management functions
management items of the TOE
To add Viewer ID/PIN, and EOS Digital Camera ID
To delete Viewer ID/PIN, and EOS Digital Camera ID
To modify Administrator PIN, Viewer PIN, and EOS Digital Camera ID
To run initial-setting of Administrator ID/PIN and Card Key
To initialize Administrator ID/PIN, Viewer ID/PIN, Card Key, and EOS
Digital Camera ID
6.1.21 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the administrator].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
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6.1.22 FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from [selection: disclosure] when it is
transmitted between separate parts of the TOE (the digital camera and
the OS card).
6.2 Security assurance requirements
This section describes the TOE security assurance requirements. The evaluation
assurance level of this TOE is EAL 2. The security assurance requirements of this TOE
are shown in Table 6-7. Also, all security assurance requirements are as stipulated in
CC Part 3.
Table 6-7 List of TOE Security Assurance Requirement Components
Assurance Class Assurance Requirement Componets
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
Development
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
Life-cycle support
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Security Target evaluation
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Tests
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
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6.3 Security requirements rationale
6.3.1 Sufficiency of the TOE security objectives for covering security
functional requirements
This section describes the correspondence of security functional requirements and TOE
security objectives from the perspectives of necessity and sufficiency.
6.3.1.1 The necessity of security functional requirements
Table 6-8 maps the TOE security objectives and security functional requirements. This
shows how each security functional requirement corresponds to at least one TOE
security objectives.
Table 6-8 Correspondence between Security Functional Requirements and TOE
Security Objectives
O.VERIFY_IMAGE
O.ENC_IMAGE
O.I&A
O.ACCESS_CONTROL
O.ENC_OSC
FCS_COP.1a ×
FCS_CKM.1b ×
FCS_CKM.4b ×
FCS_COP.1b ×
FCS_CKM.1c ×
FCS_CKM.4c ×
FCS_COP.1c ×
FCS_COP.1d ×
FDP_ACC.1 ×
FDP_ACF.1 ×
FDP_ETC.1 × ×
FDP_ITC.1 × ×
FIA_AFL.1 ×
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O.VERIFY_IMAGE
O.ENC_IMAGE
O.I&A
O.ACCESS_CONTROL
O.ENC_OSC
FIA_ATD.1 ×
FIA_SOS.1 ×
FIA_UAU.1 ×
FIA_UID.1 ×
FIA_USB.1 ×
FMT_MTD.1 × ×
FMT_SMF.1 × ×
FMT_SMR.1 × ×
FPT_ITT.1 ×
6.3.1.2 The sufficiency of security functional requirements
This section shows the basis for claiming that the security functional requirements fully
satisfy the TOE security objectives.
O.VERIFY_IMAGE is guarded against by FCS_COP.1a.
TSF generates the Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code based on FCS_COP.1a,
thereby making it possible to verify the originality of the image file based on verification
data. Therefore, FCS_COP.1a satisfies the demands of O.VERIFY_IMAGE.
O.ENC_IMAGE is guarded against by FCS_CKM.1b, FCS_CKM.4b, FCS_COP.1b,
FCS_CKM.1c, FCS_CKM.4c, FCS_COP.1c, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
and FPT_ITT.1.
According to FCS_CKM.1b, FCS_CKM.4b, and FCS_COP.1b, TSF generates the image
key based on “PRNG based on SHA-1 for general purpose in FIPS 186-2 (+ change
notice 1) Appendix 3.1,” implements encryption and decryption of the image file
according to the “encryption algorithm AES,” and destroys the image key by zeroing.
According to FCS_CKM.1c, FCS_CKM.4c, and FCS_COP.1c, TSF generates the card key
based on “PRNG based on ANSI X9.31,” and destroys the card key by zeroing. According
to FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, and FMT_SMR.1, the administrator manages the card
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key. Furthermore, the card key is stored on the OS card with its confidentiality
maintained, and to transfer this card key to the EOS digital camera, TSF implements
the transfer of the card key with its confidentiality intact between the TOEs that are
the OS card and the prescribed EOS digital camera, according to FPT_ITT.1. In order to
determine whether or not the EOS digital camera is the prescribed one, the
administrator manages the ID of the EOS digital camera according to FMT_MTD.1,
FMT_SMF.1, and FMT_SMR.1. Therefore, FCS_CKM.1b, FCS_CKM.4b, FCS_COP.1b,
FCS_CKM.1c, FCS_CKM.4c, FCS_COP.1c, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
and FPT_ITT.1 satisfy the demands of O.ENC_IMAGE.
O.I&A is guarded against by FIA_AFL.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UID.1, FIA_USB.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, and FMT_SMR.1.
TSF authenticates the identities of the administrator and browsers according to
FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1. Also, in order to support identification & authentication,
TSF regulates the operations to be performed when identification & authentication fails
according to FIA_AFL.1, defines the binding of the user subject when identification &
authentication succeeds and defines user attributes according to FIA_ATD.1 and
FIA_USB.1, and regulates the quality of authentication information according to
FIA_SOS.1. Furthermore, TSF implements the management of identification &
authentication by the administrator according to FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, and
FMT_SMR.1. Therefore, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1,
FIA_USB.1, FMT_SMF.1, and FMT_SMR.1 satisfy the demands of O.I&A.
O.ACCESS_CONTROL is guarded against by FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ETC.1,
and FDP_ITC.1.
TSF implements access control according to FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as related to
image files, OS card data, and the seed for the OS card data encryption key. TSF
implements access control according to FDP_ETC.1 and FDP_ITC.1 as related to
exporting and importing OS card data. Furthermore, according to FDP_ITC.1, TSF
implements access control as related to importing the encryption key seed for OS card
data. Therefore, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ETC.1, FDP_ITC.1, and FDP_ITT.1
satisfy the demands of O.ACCESS_CONTROL.
O.ENC_OSC is guarded against by FCS_COP.1d, FDP_ETC.1, and FDP_ITC.1.
According to FCS_COP.1d and FDP_ETC.1, TSF encrypts the OS card data with the
“encryption algorithm Triple DES,” and exports this data as backup data. On the other
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hand, TSF imports encrypted OS card data and decrypts it with the “decryption
algorithm Triple DES.” Also, this encryption key seed is input according to FDP_ITC.1.
Therefore, FCS_COP.1d, FDP_ETC.1, and FDP_ITC.1 satisfy the demands of
O.ENC_OSC.
6.3.2 The rationales for the dependency
Table 6-9 shows the dependencies of TOE security functional requirements. The “SFR”
row shows the IDs of TOE security functional requirements selected by this ST. The “CC
Regulation Dependencies” row shows the dependencies regulated by the CC. Finally, the
“ST Dependencies” row shows IDs that are satisfied by the ST. Note that “-“ in the table
indicates that the dependency component is not designated in CC part 2, or that the
dependency component is not selected by the ST.
Table 6-9 TOE Security Function Requirement Dependencies
SFR CC Regulation Dependencies ST Dependencies
FCS_COP.1a [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2
-
FCS_CKM.1b [FCS_CKM.2, FCS_COP.1],
FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2
FCS_COP.1b,
FCS_CKM.4b
FCS_CKM.4b [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1],
FMT_MSA.2
FCS_CKM.1b
FCS_COP.1b [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2
FCS_CKM.1b,
FCS_CKM.4b
FCS_CKM.1c [FCS_CKM.2, FCS_COP.1],
FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2
FCS_COP.1c,
FCS_CKM.4c
FCS_CKM.4c [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1],
FMT_MSA.2
FCS_CKM.1c
FCS_COP.1c [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2
FCS_CKM.1c,
FCS_CKM.4c
FCS_COP.1d [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2
FDP_ITC.1
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ETC.1 [FDP_ACC.1, FDP_IFC.1] FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ITC.1 [FDP_ACC.1, FDP_IFC.1], FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.1
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
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SFR CC Regulation Dependencies ST Dependencies
FIA_ATD.1 - -
FIA_SOS.1 - -
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 - -
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 - -
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FPT_ITT.1 - -
Since the assurance package EAL 2 was selected for the TOE security assurance
requirement dependencies with no excess or deficiency, these requirement dependencies
are satisfied.
Therefore, the TOE security requirements satisfy the necessary dependencies, other
than the exceptions described below.
FCS_COP.1a does not satisfy any dependencies. Since this TOE uses keys stored in
advance in the OS card with its tamper-resistant characteristics and the EOS digital
camera, the requirements related to generating and inputting keys
(FDP_ITC.1/FDP_ITC.2/FCS_CKM.1) are unnecessary. The OS card and the EOS
digital camera have tamper-resistant properties, and so no threat of unauthorized
reading of the encryption key is envisioned. For this reason, the requirement for
destroying the key (FCS_CKM.4) is unnecessary. Furthermore, this TOE does not have
any security attributes related to keys. For this reason, the requirement regarding
security attributes (FMT_MSA.2) is unnecessary.
Therefore, this ST does not require the FCS_COP.1a dependency.
FCS_CKM.1b, FCS_CKM.4b, FCS_COP.1b, FCS_CKM.1c, FCS_CKM.4c, and
FCS_COP.1c do not satisfy the dependency on FMT_MSA.2. This TOE ford not have
security attributes related to keys.
Therefore, this ST does not require the dependency on FMT_MSA.2.
FCS_COP.1d does not satisfy dependencies on FCS_CKM.4 and FMT_MSA.2. The OS
card and the EOS digital camera have tamper-resistant properties, and so no threat of
unauthorized reading of the encryption key is envisioned. For this reason, the
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requirement for destroying the key (FCS_CKM.4) is unnecessary. Furthermore, this
TOE does not have any security attributes related to keys. For this reason, the
requirement regarding security attributes (FMT_MSA.2) is unnecessary.
Therefore, this ST does not require the dependencies on FCS_CKM.4 and FMT_MSA.2.
FDP_ACF.1 and FDP_ITC.1 do not satisfy the dependency on FMT_MSA.3.
This TOE does not have security attributes related to access control objects. Therefore,
the requirement related to object security attributes (FMT_MSA.3) is not necessary.
Therefore, this ST does not require the dependency on FMT_MSA.3.
6.3.3 The rationale of TOE assurance requirements
This TOE envisions both commercial and private usage. Also, this TOE targets the
originality and confidentiality of image files, and does not directly handle information
with economic value. For this reason, this TOE envisions low-level attackers without
advanced technical knowledge, as described in Chapter 3.
When low-level attackers of this sort are envisioned, EAL 2 is appropriate from both
cost and time investment perspectives.
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7 TOE summary specification
This chapter divides the TOE security functions into categories, which are each then
described.
7.1 Image File Verification Functions
This TOE has a function for generating verification data, and a function for verifying
the originality of image files based on this verification data.
The “verification data generation function” complies with “FIPS PUB 198,” and is
comprised of “The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code” by using “fixed key
lengths of 128 bits or more.” Verification data is generated by the “function for verifying
originality of an image file based on verification data” in the same way as the “function
for generating verification data,” and verification involves the comparison of this
generated verification data and the verification data affixed to the image file (in
compliance with FCS_COP.1a). Also, since the originality of an image is a condition that
is independent from any administrator or browser, this function can be used even if
administrator or browser identification & authentication is not carried out (in
compliance with FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1).
7.2 Image File Encryption Functions
This TOE includes image file encryption functions. These image file encryption
functions include the image file encryption/decryption and image key
encryption/decryption functions shown in Figure 1-3. The image file encryption and
decryption functions are comprised of the following elements:
An AES encryption/decryption function (in compliance with FCS_COP.1b) with a
key length of 128 bits and FIPS PUB 197 compliance
A key generation function compliant with FIPS PUB 186-2, with a PRNG based on
SHA-1 for general purposes in FIPS186-2 (+ change notice 1) Appendix 3.1 (in
compliance with FCS_CKM.1b)
A key zeroization function that zeroes out keys (in compliance with FCS_CKM.4b)
The image key encryption and decryption functions are comprised of the following
elements:
Triple DES encryption and decryption functions with a 168-bit key length and
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compliance with NIST SP800-67 (in compliance with FCS_COP.1c)
A key generation function compliant with ANSI X9.31, with a PRNG based on ANSI
X9.31 (in compliance with FCS_CKM.1c)
A key zeroization function that zeroes out keys (in compliance with FCS_CKM.4c)
7.3 I&A Functions
This TOE has a function that allows the OS card to authenticate the identification of
the user. The identification information and PIN are used to identifies and authenticate
an administrator or browser. This TOE can also perform the following processes without
authenticating a user’s identity (in compliance with FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UID.1, and FIA_USB.1):
Obtain the OS card’s OSCID.
Obtain the OS card’s version information.
Generate verification data for an image file.
Verify an image file based on the verification data.
If the I&A function fails to authenticate the administrator or any browser three times,
then it will return the authentication result after waiting five seconds from the next
authentication attempt. If the identification & authentication is a success, then the I&A
function will bind the user to the subject and define user attributes. Also, when
identification & authentication succeeds, the number of authentication failures of the
corresponding user will be cleared (in compliance with FIA_AFL.1).
7.4 PIN Length Inspection Function
This TOE verifies that a registered PIN is between 8 and 15 characters long (in
compliance with FIA_SOS.1).
7.5 Verification and Connection Functions
The EOS digital camera, which is this TOE, verifies and connects to the OS card. The
OS card, which is also a TOE, verifies that this is the designated EOS digital camera,
and then connects. The camera and OS card verify each other, and after they have
connected, the card key maintained in the OS card is transferred to the EOS digital
camera with its confidentiality maintained by this function (in compliance with
FPT_ITT.1).
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7.6 Access Control Function
This TOE includes a function whereby the OS card controls user access.
This access control function applies the following access rules to image files (I), OS card
data (C), and OS card data encryption key seed information (S) (in compliance with
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ETC.1, and FDP_ITC.1):
Table 7-1 EOS Digital Camera System Access Control List 1
Object
Subject Sec. Attributes
Condition
I
App process Viewer ID If Viewer ID is enrolled. Dec
App process Administrator ID If Administrator ID is enrolled. Dec
Table 7-2 EOS Digital Camera System Access Control List 2
Object
Subject Sec. Attributes
Condition
C
App process Administrator ID If Administrator ID is enrolled. Exp/Imp
Table 7-3 EOS Digital Camera System Access Control List 3
Object
Subject Sec. Attributes
Condition
S
App process Administrator ID If Administrator ID is enrolled. Imp
The symbols in the tables have the following meanings:
「Dec」 : Decrypt.
「Exp」 : Export.
「Imp」 : Import.
Also note that when there is an OS card, the application process will always be able to
verify image files based on verification data. Regardless of the security attribute held,
the application process will not be able to encrypt image files or generate image file
verification data (in compliance with FDP_ACF.1).
Encryption and decryption of OS card data complies with NIST SP800-67, and is
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comprised of Triple DES, using a 168-bit key length (in compliance with FCS_COP.1d).
Also, this encryption key is generated with information inputted from outside as the
seed (in compliance with FDP_ITC.1).
7.7 Administration Functions
Administrators can execute the following operations as administration functions (in
compliance with FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, and FMT_SMR.1):
Add and delete a browser’s ID and PIN as a set.
Change administrator and browser PINs.
Set the initial settings (preferences) of administrator IDs, PINs, and card keys.
Initialize an administrator’s ID and PIN, or a browser’s ID and PIN and card key as
a set.
Add, delete, change, and initialize the EOS digital camera ID so that the OS card
can identify it
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8 Reference, and Glossary/Abbreviation
8.1 Reference
This section provides reference material that was used in the creation of this ST.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, September 2006, Ver.3.1 Revision 1,
CCMB-2006-09-001
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, September 2006, Ver.3.1 Revision 1,
CCMB-2006-09-002
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, September 2006, Ver.3.1 Revision 1,
CCMB-2006-09-003
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Evaluation methodology, September 2006, Ver.3.1 Revision 1,
CCMB-2006-09-004
8.2 Glossary/Abbreviation
This section describes the abbreviations and terms used by this ST.
AES: An encryption algorithm referred to as the “Advanced Encryption Standard”
ANSI: American National Standards Institute
CF: A type of memory card referred to as “Compact Flash”
DES: An encryption algorithm referred to as the “Data Encryption Standard”
FIPS: The Commerce Department’s Federal Information Processing Standards
MAC: Message Authentication Code
NIST: The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS Card (Original Data Security Card): A memory card with smart card functionality
PIN (Personal Identification Number): Password/code number
PRNG: Pseudo-Random Number Generator
SD: A type of memory card referred to as “Secure Digital”
SHA: A hash function referred to as “Secure Hash Algorithm”
USB (Universal Serial Bus): An interface standard for connecting peripheral devices to
a PC