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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE).
This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common
Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or
any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT
product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report,
and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your organization has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
Contact Centre and Information Services
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security.
A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the
official website of the International Common Criteria Program).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE Description................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................................... 7
2 Security Policy......................................................................................................................................... 8
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................................................................................... 8
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ....................................................................................................... 9
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.............................................................................................................. 9
3.2 Clarification of Scope ........................................................................................................................................ 9
4 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................11
4.1 Documentation.................................................................................................................................................11
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities....................................................................................................................12
5.1 Development....................................................................................................................................................12
5.2 Guidance Documents........................................................................................................................................12
5.3 Life-Cycle Support ............................................................................................................................................12
6 Testing Activities ....................................................................................................................................13
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests.........................................................................................................................13
6.2 Conduct of Testing...........................................................................................................................................13
6.3 Independent Testing.........................................................................................................................................13
6.3.1 Independent Testing Results .........................................................................................................................13
6.4 Vulnerability Analysis .......................................................................................................................................14
6.4.1 Vulnerability Analysis Results........................................................................................................................14
7 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................15
7.1 Recommendations/Comments..........................................................................................................................15
8 Supporting Content..................................................................................................................................16
8.1 List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................16
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8.2 References.......................................................................................................................................................16
LIST OF FIGURES
TOE Architecture..................................................................................................................................................7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification ................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s).........................................................................................................................8
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Fortinet FortiAnalyzer 7.2.9 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Fortinet, Inc. , was the subject
of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this evaluation
demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Section 1.1 for the evaluated security
functionality.
EWA-Canada is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 30 June 2025 and was carried
out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify
that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of
the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Program).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version Fortinet FortiAnalyzer 7.2.9
Developer Fortinet, Inc.
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The TOE claims the following conformance:
EAL4+ with ALC_FLR.3
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE, Fortinet ForiAnalyzer 7.2.9, is a stand-alone appliance that runs FIPS-CC firmware build. The TOE acts as an audit
server that also offers vulnerability management functionality by analyzing logs collected from target hosts for known
issues. In the evaluated configuration the TOE operates as the Analyzer with FIPS-CC mode enabled.
1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path
 Data Collection and Reporting
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following cryptographic implementations are used by the TOE and have been evaluated by the CAVP/CMVP:
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s)
Cryptographic Implementation Certificate Number
Fortinet FortiAnalyzer SSL Cryptographic Library v7.2 A6837
Fortinet FortiAnalyzer RBG Cryptographic Library v7.2 A6839
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 The TOE will be located within controlled access facilities and protected from unauthorized physical modification.
 Authorized administrators are properly trained, not malicious, and follow all administrative guidance. Authorized
administrators are trusted to administer the TOE correctly.
 There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it
contains.
3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
The following features are excluded from this evaluation:
 Automated updates that do not require administrative action were not evaluated. Only manual updates using a Universal
Serial Bus (USB) token are allowed in the evaluated configuration.
 FortiAnalyzer Collector Mode
 The following Representational State Transfer (REST) Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) are not included in the
evaluation:
o JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
o eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
o Software Development Kit (SDK)
 FortiAnalyzer being managed by FortiManager using the FGFM protocol is currently excluded from the evaluation.
 The following protocol/interfaces are excluded from this evaluation:
o SSH Client
o DDNS
o DHCP
o HTTP
o NTP
o SNMP
o SMTP
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o Telnet
o TFTP Client
o LDAP
o RADIUS
o SYSLOG
o High Availability
 The following modules/services are excluded from this evaluation:
o FortiView
o FortiSoC
o Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
o FortiAnalyzer Cloud
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
TOE Software/Firmware Fortinet FortiAnalyzer 7.2.9 Build # 6429
TOE Hardware FAZ-300G
Operational Environment FortiGate v7.2.9
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documentation is provided in Portable Document Format (PDF) format and is available at
https://docs.fortinet.com/product/fortianalyzer/7.2 for download at to assist in the configuration and installation of the
TOE:
a) FortiAnalyzer v7.2.9 Administration Guide, January 14, 2025
FortiAnalyzer-7.2.9-Administration_Guide.pdf
b) FortiAnalyzer v7.2.9 CLI Reference, December 11, 2024
FortiAnalyzer_7.2.9_CLI_Reference.pdf
c) FortiManager & FortiAnalyzer 7.2.9 Log Reference, December 11, 2024
FortiManager_&_FortiAnalyzer_7.2.9_Log_Reference.pdf
d) FortiAnalyzer v7.2.9 Release Notes, February 4, 2025
fortianalyzer-7.2.9-release-notes.pdf
The following Common Criteria Guidance Supplement is also available to customers upon request:
e) FortiAnalyzer 7.2, EAL4 Common Criteria Technote, February 19, 2025
FAZ 7.2 EAL4 CC Technote.pdf
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the security architecture
description depicts the self-protection, domain separation, non-bypassability principles; the functional specification
accurately describes and categorizes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the implementation representation
captures the detailed internal workings of the TSF, and the TOE design description provides appropriate level of
decomposition. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected
against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked, the development security included appropriate security
measures to protect the TOE and its parts, and an effective life-cycle model is in place.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a
vulnerability analysis.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests
identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and
guidance documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developer's tests
b. Cryptographic Implementation Verification: The evaluator confirmed that the claimed cryptographic implementation
was present in the TOE
c. Independent Evaluator Tests: The evaluator examined SSH, HTTPS, and FGT to FAZ protocol implementations.
6.3.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as
specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
The vulnerability analysis focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.
 Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
 Technical community sources (Type 2)
 Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
 Tool Generated (Type 4)
The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and
technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to
discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators
formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their vulnerability analysis.
Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on 3 June 2025 and included the following search terms:
FortiAnalyzer FortiOS Linux Apache
Intel Core i3 OpenSSL PostgreSQL
FOS Linux OpenSSH
Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:
National Vulnerability Database
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln
PSIRT Advisories
https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt
CERT
https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/
CISA KEV
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
6.4.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS
The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating
environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. This certification
report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration.
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Section 1.1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Fortinet FortiAnalyzer 7.2 Security Target v1.4, 25 June 2025
Evaluation Technical Report for Common Criteria Evaluation of Fortinet, Incorporated FortiAnalyzer 7.2 v1.4, 30
June 2025