BİLİŞİM TEKNOLOJİLERİ TEST VE BELGELENDİRME DAİRESİ BAŞKANLIĞI
CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
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Certification Report
EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2) Evaluation of
UDEA ELEKTRONİK SAN. TİC. A.Ş
SSR_Core v1.0
issued by
Turkish Standards Institution
Common Criteria Certification Scheme
Certificate Number: 21.0.03/TSE-CCCS-64
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CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................................................................................2
DOCUMENT INFORMATION...............................................................................................................................................3
DOCUMENT CHANGE LOG .................................................................................................................................................3
DISCLAIMER ...........................................................................................................................................................................3
FOREWORD .............................................................................................................................................................................4
RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE............................................................................................................................5
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................................6
2 CERTIFICATION RESULTS.............................................................................................................................................12
2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION ................................................................................................12
2.2 SECURITY POLICY ........................................................................................................................................................13
2.3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE ................................................................................................15
2.4 ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION ...........................................................................................................................16
2.5 DOCUMENTATION ........................................................................................................................................................17
2.6 IT PRODUCT TESTING..................................................................................................................................................17
2.7 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION.................................................................................................................................18
2.8 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION ...............................................................................................................................19
2.9 EVALUATOR COMMENTS / RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................20
3 SECURITY TARGET..........................................................................................................................................................21
4 GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................................................................................................22
5 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................................................................25
6 ANNEXES .............................................................................................................................................................................25
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Document Information
Date of Issue 30.01.2020
Approval Date 31.01.2020
Certification Report Number 21.0.03/20-001
Sponsor and Developer UDEA ELEKTRONİK SAN. TİC. A.Ş
Evaluation Facility BEAM Teknoloji A.Ş
TOE SSR_Core v1.0
Pages 25
Prepared by
Halime Eda BİTLİSLİ ERDİVAN
Reviewed by
İbrahim Halil KIRMIZI
This report has been prepared by the Certification Expert and reviewed by the Technical Responsible of
which signatures are above.
Document Change Log
Release Date Pages Affected Remarks/Change Reference
1.0 30.01.2020 All First Release
DISCLAIMER
This certification report and the IT product defined in the associated Common Criteria document has been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility conformant to Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 5, using Common Methodology for IT Products Evaluation, version 3.1,
revision 5. This certification report and the associated Common Criteria document apply only to the
identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. Evaluation has been conducted
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in accordance with the provisions of the CCCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
FOREWORD
The Certification Report is drawn up to submit the Certification Commission the results and evaluation
information upon the completion of a Common Criteria evaluation service performed under the Common
Criteria Certification Scheme. Certification Report covers all non-confidential security and technical
information related with a Common Criteria evaluation which is made under the ITCD Common Criteria
Certification Scheme. This report is issued publicly to and made available to all relevant parties for
reference and use.
The Common Criteria Certification Scheme (CCCS) provides an evaluation and certification service to
ensure the reliability of Information Security products. Evaluation and tests are conducted by a public or
commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCTL = Common Criteria Testing Laboratory) under
CCCS’ supervision.
CCTL is a facility, licensed as a result of inspections carried out by CCCS for performing tests and
evaluations which will be the basis for Common Criteria certification. As a prerequisite for such
certification, the CCTL has to fulfill the requirements of the standard ISO/IEC 17025 and should be
accredited by accreditation bodies. The evaluation and tests related with the concerned product have been
performed by, BEAM Teknoloji A.Ş which is a commercial CCTL.
A Common Criteria Certificate given to a product means that such product meets the security requirements
defined in its security target document that has been approved by the CCCS. The Security Target
document is where requirements defining the scope of evaluation and test activities are set forth. Along
with this certification report, the user of the IT product should also review the security target document in
order to understand any assumptions made in the course of evaluations, the environment where the IT
product will run, security requirements of the IT product and the level of assurance provided by the
product.
This certification report is associated with the Common Criteria Certificate issued by the CCCS for
SSR_Core v1.0 whose evaluation was completed on 16.01.2020 and whose evaluation technical report
was drawn up by 16.01.2020 (as CCTL), and with the Security Target document with version no 2.10 of
the relevant product.
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The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target document are posted on the
ITCD Certified Products List at bilisim.tse.org.tr portal and the Common Criteria Portal (the official web
site of the Common Criteria Project).
RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo is printed on the certificate to indicate that this
certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA.
The CCRA has been signed by the Turkey in 2003 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based
on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL2. The current list of signatory nations and
approved certification schemes can be found on:
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report constitutes the certification results by the certification body on the evaluation results applied
with requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation.
Evaluated IT product name: SSR_Core
IT Product version: 1.0
Developer’s Name: UDEA ELEKTRONİK SAN. TİC. A.Ş
Name of CCTL: BEAM Teknoloji A.Ş
Assurance Package: EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2)
Completion date of evaluation: 16.01.2020
1.1. Brief Description
The TOE is the Secure Smartcard Reader (SSR) Application Firmware running on SSR Device. The SSR
is the identity verification terminal for the National eID Verification System (eIT.DVS).
As the application firmware which is run on microcontroller of the SSR, the TOE performs identity
verification of Service Requester and Service Attendee according to the eIDVS, securely communicating
with the other system components and as a result of the identity verification, produces an Identity
Verification Assertion (IVA) signed by the Secure Access Module (SAM) inside the SRR. The root
certificates used for the identification & authentication purposes are also covered by the TOE.
The TOE covers type I and II(with SAS/without SAS) secure smart card reader.
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1.2. Major Security Features
The TOE provides the following security services;
 Security Audit
 Identification, Authentication and Authorization
 User Data Protection
 Protection of the TSF
 Security Management
 Communication
 Cryptographic Support
 Trusted Path/Channels
1.3. Threats
The related threats are:
T.Counterfeit_eIDC An attacker (Identity Faker) may present a counterfeit eID Card
(form of illegitimate eID Card) to the TOE for faking his or her
identity. This action is also regarded as damaging the correct
operation of the Identification and Authentication of the Service
Requester and the Service Attendee.
T.Revoked_eIDC An attacker (Identity Faker) may present a revoked eID Card
(form of illegitimate eID Card) to the TOE for faking his or her
identity. This action is also regarded as damaging the correct
operation of the Identification and Authentication of the Service
Requester and the Service Attendee.
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T.Stolen_eIDC An attacker (Identity Faker) may present a stolen (not an
illegitimate eID Card) to the TOE for faking his or her identity.
This action is also regarded as damaging the correct operation
of the Identification and Authentication of the Service
Requester and the Service Attendee.
T.IVA_Fraud An attacker may create a fraudulent Identity Verification
Assertion IVA (totally fake, build from scratch, or modified
from a legitimate IVA).
T.IVA_Eavesdropping
(valid for Type II TOE)
The attacker may obtain Identity Verification Assertion by
monitoring the communication line between SAS and type II
TOE.
T.Repudiation The Service Requester (or the Service Attendee) may
repudiate the Identification Verification Assertion.
T.Fake_TOE_to_SR An attacker may prepare a fake SSR Hardware and introduce it
to the Service Requesters (and/or Service Attendee). This way,
the attacker may collect the Identity Verification Card-PIN and
Biometric Information.
T.Fake_TOE_to_External_Entiti
es
An attacker may introduce himself/herself as legitimate TOE to
the external entities: eID Card, External Biometric Sensor,
External PIN Pad. Thus obtain the PIN and biometric
information of the Service Requester (or the Service Attendee)
and gain access to eID Card on behalf of the Role Holder.
T.SA_Masquerader An attacker may act as if he/she is a legitimate service attendee
and perform the photo verification and thus damage the
Identification and Authentication Service of the Service
Requester.
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T.SA_Abuse_of_Session An attacker may abuse the service attendee’s authentication
session. Thus the attacker can validate the photo and/or accept
negative result of biometric verification in an unauthorized way.
This action therefore is regarded as damaging the correct
operation of the Identification and Authentication of the Service
Requester and the Service Attendee.
T.Fake_Policy An attacker may send a fraudulent policy to manage the
authentication process in an unauthorized manner. This action
is also regarded as damaging the correct operation of the
Identification and Authentication of the SA and the SR.
T.Fake_OCSP_Response An attacker may mimic a legitimate Online Certificate Status
Protocol Server (OCSPS) or manipulate the TSF Data
transmitted by OCSPS. This action is also regarded as
damaging the correct operation of the Identification and
Authentication of the SA and the SR.
T.RH_Comm An attacker may access or modify the eID Card contents
through eavesdropping and manipulating the communication
between the Role Holder and eID Card.
T.RH_Session_Hijack An attacker may access or modify the eID Card contents
through hijacking the authentication session between the eID
Card and the Role Holder.
T.Illegitimate_EBS An attacker may change the outcome of biometric verification1
or steal or modify the transmitted biometric template, thus
collect biometric information from the Cardholders or damage
the correct operation of the Identification and Authentication of
Service Requester or Service Attendee by using an illegitimate
biometric sensor.
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T.EBS_Comm An attacker may change the outcome of biometric verification;
steal or modify the transmitted biometric template, thus collect
biometric information from the Cardholders or damage the
correct operation of the Identification and Authentication of
Service Requester or Service Attendee through (1)
eavesdropping and modifying the communication; (2) hijacking
or replaying the authentication session between the TOE and
the EBB.
T.Illegitimate_EPP An attacker may steal or modify the transmitted PIN, thus
collect PIN information from the Cardholders or damage the
correct operation of the Identification and Authentication or
Service Requester of Service Attendee by using an illegitimate
external PIN-PAD.
T.EPP_Comm An attacker may steal or modify the transmitted PIN, thus
collect PIN information from the Cardholders or damage the
correct operation of the Identification and Authentication of
Service Requester or Service Attendee through (1)
eavesdropping and modifying the communication; (2) hijacking
or replaying the authentication session between SSR and EPP.
T.eIDC_Comm An attacker may access or modify the eID Card contents, steal
the PIN and biometric information, block the PIN and biometric
verification through (1) eavesdropping and modifying the
communication; (2) hijacking or replaying the authentication
session between the TOE and eID Card.
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T.Illegitimate_SAS An attacker may use illegitimate SSR Access Server (SAS) to
undermine security policies. This action is also regarded as
damaging the correct operation of the Identification and
Authentication of third party IT Components for TOE on SSR
Type II.
T.DTN_Change An attacker may change the Device Tracking Number of the
TOE through physically gaining access to the memories. This
also damage the correctness of the IVA generated by the TOE.
T.SAM-PIN_Theft An attacker may read or change the SAM-PIN of the TOE
during normal operation by physically accessing the SAM PIN
memory area or while TOE is entering the SAM PIN, i.e.
sending the SAM PIN to the SAM.
T.Audit_Data_Compromise An attacker may read, change or delete the audit data.
T.TOE_Manipulation An attacker may manipulate the operation or probe the internals
of the SSR. SAM PIN could be obtained by probing the
internals of the SSR, or DTN or Audit data could be
manipulated. In addition, a counterfeit Identity Verification
Assertion could be created.
T.Fake_SAM An attacker may issue a fake SAM to obtain the SAM-PIN.
T.Stolen_SAM An attacker may steal a SAM and use it to build an illegitimate
SSR.
T.Revoked_SAM An attacker may use a Revoked SAM to build an illegitimate
SSR.
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2. CERTIFICATION RESULTS
2.1. Identification of Target of Evaluation
Certificate Number 21.0.03/TSE-CCCS-64
TOE Name and Version SSR_Core v1.0
Security Target Title
Security Target for SSR_Core v1.0
Security Target Version 2.10
Security Target Date 15.01.2020
Assurance Level EAL 4+( ALC_DVS.2)
Criteria  Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
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Criteria  Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Components; CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
 Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Components; CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
Methodology Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2017-04-004,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
Protection Profile Conformance Protection Profile for Application Firmware of Secure
Smartcard Reader (SSR) for National Electronic Identity
Verification System, SSR_PP_2.8
Sponsor and Developer UDEA ELEKTRONİK SAN. TİC. A.Ş
Evaluation Facility BEAM Teknoloji A.Ş
Certification Scheme TSE CCCS
2.2. Security Policy
Organizational Security Policies are listed below;
P.IVM_Management The TOE shall apply the identity verification methods defined by the
IVPS. Otherwise if IVPS is not present, identity verification methods
defined by the SPCA shall be applied. In absence of those, the TOE shall
apply the default policy which has the highest security level.
P.TOE_Upgrade The TOE will have mechanisms for secure field and remote upgrade.
P.Re-Authentication Authentication of third party IT components will be renewed after 24
hours.
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P.Revocation_Control In case SSR Device cannot reach to OCSP Server, downloading the
Revocation List onto the SSR Device and checking the certificate
revocation status of the Service Requester (and the Service Attendee if
applicable) from this list is allowed. The revocation list shall be up to
date. When the certificate revocation check is carried out without OCSP
Server, the information regarding that OCSP check could not be realized
shall be put in the IVA. If the OCSP Server is not reached and there is no
downloaded revocation list, then the information that OCSP check and
revocation list control could not be realized shall be put in the IVA. In
this case, only the certificate status control is performed offline, other
identity verification steps shall be performed online. Unless IVA is
validated at IVS and revocation check is completed, Identity Verification
is not regarded as completed.
P.Tamper_Response The SSR platform will be able to detect any tampering attempts and will
notify the TOE. The TOE will respond to this notification by securely
deleting the SAM-PIN and getting into Initialization & Configuration
phase.
P.Terminal_Cert_Update Terminal Certificate will be renewed within a period defined in TS 13584
[3]. Client application (for TOE on SSR type I or II), SSR Access Server
(for TOE on Type II with SAS) or Application Server (for TOE on SSR
Type
III) shall update the Secure Messaging and Role Card Verifiable
Certificates of SAM one day before the expiration day.
P.Time_Update The time shall be updated using the real time that is received only from
trusted entities.
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P.DPM The TOE shall support Initialization & Configuration and Operation
lifecycle phases. The phase change shall be from Initialization &
Configuration Phase to Operation Phase except tamper event detection
case. If a tamper event is detected, TOE shall be out of service and require
re-initialization. This shall be the only condition to go back to
Initialization & Configuration Phase.
DTN and SAM PIN shall be written to the SSR Device during
Initialization & Configuration Phase.
2.3. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Assumptions for the operational environment of the TOE are;
A.SPCA It is assumed that Service Provider Client Application is a trusted third party
and its communication with SSR occurs in a secure environment via USB
interface. However, for SSR Type II with SAS, there is no direct connection
between the SSR and the SPCA, SPCA communicates to the SAS through
Ethernet interface.
When the Service Provider Client Application determines the identity
verification method, it is assumed that the Service Provider Client Application
selects the appropriate method.
In addition, integrity and the confidentiality of the private data transferred from
SSR Device to the Client Application is preserved by the foundation sustaining
the Client Application
A.IVPS It is assumed that the IVPS prepares and sends the policy correctly.
A.EBS-EPP It is assumed that legitimate External Biometric Sensor (EBS) and legitimate
External Pin Pad (EPP) work correctly.
A.PC It is assumed that the PC executing the Client Application is malicious code
free and located in secure environment. In addition, the confidentiality of the
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private data that might be written into the IVA by the Application Owner as
Application Specific Data is preserved by the Application Owner.
A.APS-IVPS It is assumed that the Application Server and the Identity Verification Policy
Server are malicious code free and located in secure environment.
A.Management_Environ
ment
It is assumed that the environments, where initialization and configuration are
performed, are secure. And the personal that hold initialization and
configuration roles act responsively.
A.SAM_
PIN_Environment
It is assumed that the PIN value of the SAM in the SSR is defined in the SSR
in secure environment.
A.SSR_Platform The SSR platform supports the security functionality of the TOE and does not
undermine the security properties of it. The SSR platform does not provide any
opportunities to the attacker to manipulate or bypass the security functionality
of the TOE. The TSF architecture is resistant against attacks that can be
performed by attackers possessing Enhanced-Basic attack potential
(AVA_VAN.3), it is assumed that SSR Platform does not offer any attack
interface to the attacker with enhanced basic attack potential to break the TSF
architecture. SSR Platform will store TOE encrypted during nonoperation
times. SSR Platform will decrypt and authenticate the TOE during starting up
the TOE.
2.4. Architectural Information
The TOE is stored in a non-volatile memory location in the SSR Hardware as an encrypted binary file.
During power-up, the encrypted TOE is decrypted before its execution.
The TOE runs at the top of an embedded Linux operating system and 528 MHz , ARM Cortex-A7 NXP
Freescale imx6ul-2 microprocessor.
The physical scope of TOE is given below. TOE operates on memory while running in Operation Phase
and cryptographic operations of TOE are performed on memory. Memory and CPU are combined in a
single module. There are 3 card readers on the device, one for Service Requester, one for Service Attendee
and one for SAM. There is an SD Card for extending memory on device. There is one fingerprint sensor
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used for biometric validation and there are several sensors for detecting tamper event. There are two
interfaces for communicating with Application Software, one is via Usb Otg and the other is via Ethernet.
There are 2 Usb Hosts for external devices. There is a touch screen on the device for user interface and
there are 16 keys on a 4x4 keypad. There exists a Real Time Clock for synchronizing time on device.
2.5. Documentation
Documents below are provided to the customer by the developer alongside the TOE;
Name of Document Version Number Date
Security Target for SSR_Core v1.0 2.10 15.01.2020
Operational User Manual 1.6 13.01.2020
Preparation Procedures 1.2 22.01.2019
2.6. IT Product Testing
During the evaluation, all evaluation evidences of TOE were delivered and transferred completely to
CCTL by the developer. All the delivered evaluation evidences which include software, documents, etc.
are mapped to the assurance families Common Criteria and Common Methodology; so the connections
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between the assurance families and the evaluation evidences has been established. The evaluation results
are available in the final Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) of SSR_Core v1.0.
IT Product Testing is composed of two parts:
2.6.1.Developer Testing
Developer has prepared TOE Test Document according to the TOE Functional Specification
documentation, TOE Design documentation which includes TSF subsystems and its interactions.
Developer has conducted 24 functional tests in total.
2.6.2.Evaluator Testing
 Independent Testing: Evaluator has conducted all 24 tests of developer and also has prepared 33
independent tests. TOE has passed all functional tests to demonstrate that its security functions
work as it is defined in the ST.
 Penetration Testing: Evaluator has conducted 20 penetration tests to find out TOE’s
vulnerabilities that can be used for malicious purposes.
2.7. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated TOE configuration is composed of;
 SSR_Core v1.0
 Guidance Documents
Also minimum Hardware/Software/OS requirements for the TOE are;
 Processor: Cortex-A7 @ 528MHz
 Flash Memory: 256 MB SLC NAND(Up to 2 GB NAND flash (SLC))
 RAM: 256 MB DDR3 (Up to 1 GB DDR3)
 Ethernet: 10/100 Mbit Ethernet MAC + IEEE 1588
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 USB Connection: 2 Port USB 2.0 host, 1 Port USB 2.0 device
 LCD: 3.5" TFT LCD Capacitive Touch Screen, Resolution 320 x 240
2.8. Results of the Evaluation
Table below provides a complete listing of the Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE. These
requirements consists of the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL 4) components as specified in Part 3 of
the Common Criteria, augmented with ALC_DVS.2
Assurance Class Component Component Title
Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic Modular Design
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
Life-Cycle Support
ALC_CMC.4 Production Support, Acceptance Procedures and
automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem Tracking CM Coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of Security Measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer Defined Life-Cycle Model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-Defined Development Tools
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance Claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended Components Definition
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
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Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_OBJ.2 Security Objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived Security Requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
Tests
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional Testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent Testing
Vulnerability
Analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused Vulnerability analysis
The Evaluation Team assigned a Pass, Fail, or Inconclusive verdict to each work unit of each EAL 4+
(ALC_DVS.2) assurance component. For Fail or Inconclusive work unit verdicts, the Evaluation Team
advised the developer about the issues requiring resolution or clarification within the evaluation evidence.
In this way, the Evaluation Team assigned an overall Pass verdict to the assurance component only when
all of the work units for that component had been assigned a Pass verdict. So for TOE “SSR_Core v1.0”,
the results of the assessment of all evaluation tasks are “Pass”.
2.9. Evaluator Comments / Recommendations
No recommendations have been communicated to CCCS by the evaluators related to the evaluation
process of “ SSR_Core v1.0” product, result of the evaluation, or the ETR.
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3. SECURITY TARGET
The Security Target associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following terminology:
Title: Security Target for SSR_Core v1.0
Version: 2.10
Date of Document: 15.01.2020
A public version has been created and verified according to ST-Santizing:
Title: Security Target for SSR_Core v1.0
Version: Lite
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4. GLOSSARY
ADV : Assurance of Development
AES : Advanced Encryption Standard
APS : Application Server
AGD : Assurance of Guidance Documents
ALC : Assurance of Life Cycle
APS : Application Server
ASE : Assurance of Security Target Evaluation
ATE : Assurance of Tests Evaluation
AVA : Assurance of Vulnerability Analysis
CC : Common Criteria (Ortak Kriterler)
CCCS : Common Criteria Certification Scheme (TSE)
CCRA : Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CCTL : Common Criteria Test Laboratory
CEM :Common Evaluation Methodology
CMC : Configuration Management Capability
CMS : Configuration Management Scope
CRL : Certificate Revocation List
CVC : Card Verifiable Certificate
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DA : Device Authentication
DEL : Delivery
DES : Data Encryption Standard
DTN : Device Tracking Number
DVS : Development Security
EAL : Evaluation Assurance Level
EBS : External Biometric Sensor
eID : Electronic Identity
EPP : External Pin Pad
eIDMS : Electronic Identity Management System
eID Card : Electronic Identity Card
eIDVS : Electronic Identity Verification System
eSIGN : Electronic Signature
IV : Identity Verification
IVA : Identity Verification Assertion
IVC : Identity Verification Certificate
IVP : Identity Verification Policy
IVPS : Identity Verification Policy Server
IVR : Identity Verification Request
IVS : Identity Verification Server
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IVSP : Identity Verification Specification
OCSPS : Online Certificate Status Protocol Server
OPE : Opretaional User Guidance
OSP : Organisational Security Policy
PP : Protection Profile
PRE : Preperative Procedures
SAM : Security Access Module
SAR : Security Assurance Requirements
SAS : SSR Access Server
SFR : Security Functional Requirements
SPCA : Service Provider Client Application
SPSA : Service Provider Server Application
SSR : Card Acceptance Device
ST : Security Target
TOE : Target of Evaluation
TSF : TOE Secırity Functionality
TSFI : TSF Interface
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5. BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April
2017,
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017
[3] BTBD-03-01-TL-01 Certification Report Preparation Instructions, Rel.Date: February 8th
2016
[4] Common Criteria Protection Profile for Application Firmware of Secure Smartcard Reader for
National Identity Verification System TSE-CCCS/PP-012, version 2.8, August 10th 2017
[5] TS 13584 - Elektronik Kimlik Kartları İçin Güvenli Kart Erişim Cihazları Standardı - Bölüm-3:
Güvenlik Özellikleri (Secure Smart Card Reader Standard - Part-3: Security Properties), 2017, Türk
Standartları Enstitüsü
6. ANNEXES
There is no additional information which is inappropriate for reference in other sections