National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Brocade Communication Systems, Inc
130 Holger Way
San Jose, CA 95134
Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-
Service IronWare R05.9.00
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10657-2016
Dated: January 27, 2016
Version: 0.4
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
Brocade MLXe Family Devices Validation Report Version 0., January 27, 2016
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Stelios Melachrinoudis
Jean Petty
Chris Thorpe
MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Cornelius Haley
Khai Van
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
Brocade MLXe Family Devices Validation Report Version 0., January 27, 2016
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 6
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 6
4.3 User data protection ............................................................................................ 6
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 7
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 7
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 8
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 8
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 8
8 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 8
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 9
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 9
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 10
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 10
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 10
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 10
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 11
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 11
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 11
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 11
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 12
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 12
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 12
Brocade MLXe Family Devices Validation Report Version 0., January 27, 2016
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-
Service IronWare solution provided by Brocade Communication Systems, Inc It presents
the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation
Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S.
government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in January 2016. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-Service
IronWare R05.9.00 internet router and VPN gateway.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Brocade MLXe
Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.9.00 (NDPP11E3/VPNGEP11) Security
Target, Version 0.7, 1/13/16 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through 4 in
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2
accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE: Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.9.00
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 1.1, 8 June 2012 (NDPP)
(including the optional SSH and TLS requirements) with Errata #3
Network Device Protection Profile Extended Package VPN Gateway, Version 1.1,
12 April 2013(VPNGWEP11).
ST: Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.9.00
(NDPP11E3/VPNGEP11) Security Target, Version 0.7, 1/13/16
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-
Service IronWare R05.9.00, Version 0.3, January 22, 2016.
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Brocade Communication Systems, Inc
Developer Brocade Communication Systems, Inc
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Stelios Melachrinoudis, The MITRE Corporation
Jean Petty, The MITRE Corporation
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Item Identifier
Chris Thorpe, The MITRE Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-Service
IronWare R05.9.00 family of products.
The TOE is composed of a hardware appliance with embedded software installed on a
management processor. The embedded software is a version of Brocades' proprietary
Multi-Service IronWare software. The software controls the switching and routing network
frames and packets among the connections available on the hardware appliances. The TOE
includes a card (BR-MLX-10GX4-IPSEC-M) that supports IPsec processing on the
appliances.
All TOE appliances are configured at the factory with default parameters to allow
immediate use of the system’s basic features through its Command Line Interface (CLI).
However, the product should be configured in accordance with the evaluated configuration
(using the Multi-Service IronWare Federal Information Processing Standards and Common
Criteria Guide) prior to being placed into operation. The CLI is a text based interface which
is accessible from a directly connected terminal or via a remote terminal using IPsec. Once
configured following the Common Criteria specific guidance, the TOE also offers an
encrypted Web Management Interface using IPsec. All of the remote management
interfaces are protected using encryption as explained later in this ST.
The hardware platforms that support the TOE have a number of common hardware
characteristics:
 Central processor that supports all system operations, i.e. PowerPC etc.
 Dynamic memory, used by the central processor for all system operations
 Non-volatile flash memory, used to store the operating system image, startup
configuration and other relevant files.
 Multiple physical network interfaces either fixed in configuration or removable as
in a chassis based product.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration consists of the following models …
Brocade Communication Systems, Inc Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-Service
IronWare R05.9.00, including the following series and models
 Brocade NetIron MLXe Series Hardware Platforms with the BR-MLX-10GX4-
IPSEC-M Card
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o BR-MLXe-4-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXe-4-MR2-M-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXe-4-MR2-X-AC, BR-MLXe-4-MR2-X-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXe-8-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXe-8-MR2-M-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXe-8-MR2-X-AC, BR-MLXe-8-MR2-X-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXe-16-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXe-16-MR2-M-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXe-16-MR2-X-AC, BR-MLXe-16-MR2-X-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXE-32-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXE-32-MR2-M-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-32-M, BR-MLX-MR2-32-
X
o BR-MLXE-32-MR2-X-AC, BR-MLXE-32-MR2-X-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-32-M, BR-MLX-MR2-32-
X
3.2 TOE Architecture
The basic architecture of each TOE appliance begins with a hardware appliance with
physical network connections. Within the hardware appliance, the Brocade IronWare OS is
designed to control and enable access to the available hardware functions (e.g., program
execution, device access, facilitate basic routing functions). IronWare OS enforces
applicable security policies on network information flowing through the hardware
appliance.
The basic start-up operation of the TOE is as follows:
1. At system startup the operating system is transferred from flash memory to dynamic
memory using a built-in hardware bootstrap.
2. The operating system reads the configuration parameters from the configuration file
in non-volatile memory and then builds the necessary data structures in dynamic
memory and begins operation.
During normal operation, IP packets are sent to the management IP address or through the
appliance over one or more of its physical network interfaces, which processes them
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according to the system’s configuration and state information dynamically maintained by
the appliance. This processing typically results in the frames or packets being forwarded
out of the device over another interface. The TOE will process other packets destined for
itself (control path packets) based on the requirements of the given protocol (IPsec).
Given that this Security Target conforms to the NDPP11e3 and VPNGWEP11, the security
claims focus on the TOE as a secure network infrastructure device with VPN Gateway
functionality and do not focus on other key functions provided by the TOE. However,
those functions can be freely used without affecting the claimed and evaluated security
functions; they simply have not been evaluated to work correctly themselves.
The TOE protects itself from tampering and bypass by offering only a limited and
controlled set of functions at each of its physical interfaces to its environment.
Communication via those interfaces is either directed at the TOE for the purpose of
administration or is directed through the TOE for communication among network devices.
In both cases the TOE implements a set of policies to control the services available and
those services are designed to protect and ensure the secure operation of the TOE.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
Each TOE appliance runs a version of the Brocades software and has physical network
connections to its environment to facilitate routing and switching of network traffic. The
TOE appliance can also be the destination of network traffic, where it provides interfaces
for its own management.
The TOE may be accessed and managed through a PC or terminal in the environment
which can be remote from or directly connected to the TOE.
The TOE can be configured to forward its audit records to an external syslog server in the
network environment. This is generally advisable given the limited audit log storage space
on the evaluated appliances.
The TOE can be configured to synchronize its internal clock using an external NTP server
in the operational environment.
The TOE can be configured to use external RADIUS and TACACS+ authentication
servers.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security Management
6. Packet Filtering
7. Protection of the TSF
8. TOE access
9. Trusted path/channels
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4.1 Security audit
The TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant
events. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an
administrator and also to send the logs to a designated log server using IPsec to protect the
logs while in transit on the network
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE is a cryptographic module that provides key management, random bit generation,
encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in
support of higher level cryptographic protocols including IPsec.
4.3 User data protection
The TOE performs a wide variety of network switching and routing functions, passing
network traffic among its various network connections. While implementing applicable
network protocols associated with network traffic routing, the TOE is carefully designed to
ensure that it does not inadvertently reuse data found in network traffic. This is
accomplished primarily by controlling the size of all buffers, fully overwriting buffer
contents, and zero-padding of memory structures and buffers when necessary
4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions
mediated by the TOE, with the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its
configured switching/routing rules. It provides the ability to both assign attributes (user
names, passwords and privilege levels) and to authenticate users against these attributes.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands and an HTTPS over IPsec
Graphical User Interface (Web GUI) to access the wide range of security management
functions to manage its security policies. All administrative activity and functions
including security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e.,
administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and
authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through
the use of privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. Among the
available privileges, only the Super User can actually manage the security policies provided
by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective
management since the Super User allows for complete read-and-write access to the system
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4.6 Packet Filtering
The TOE provides extensive packet filtering capabilities for IPv4, IPv6, TCP, and UDP.
The authorized administrator can define packet filtering rules that apply to most every field
within the identified packet types. The authorized administrator can define each rule to
permit, deny, and log each decision.
4.7 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features design to protect itself to ensure the reliability
and integrity of its security features.
It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so
that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing
mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log
accountability).
Note that the TOE is a single appliance, and as such, no intra-TOE communication is
subject to any risks that may require special protection (e.g., cryptographic mechanisms).
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It
also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so
that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce
malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
4.8 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator
establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined
inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be
terminated.
4.9 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using IPsec for CLI
access or for Web graphical user interface access (HTTPS over IPsec). In each case, the
both integrity and disclosure protection is ensured. If the negotiation of an encrypted
session fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration, the
attempted connection will not be established.
The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server, using IPsec
connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
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 Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.1 (with Errata #3), 8 June 2012
(NDPP11e3) with the following two extended packages:
 Network Device Protection Profile Extended Package Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewall, Version 1.0, 19 December 2011 (FW)
 Network Device Protection Profile Extended Package VPN Gateway, Version 1.1,
15 April 2013(VPN)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDPP should be consulted if there
is interest in that material.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Brocade NetIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide Supporting
Multi-Service Ironware R05.9.00a, 53-1003826-01, 22 January 2016.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Detailed Test Report
(NDPP11e3/VPNGWEP11) for Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-Service
IronWare R05.9.00, version 0.3, 1/22/2016.
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDPP11e3 and VPNGWEP11 including the
tests associated with optional requirements.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following series and models
 Brocade NetIron MLXe Series Hardware Platforms with the BR-MLX-10GX4-
IPSEC-M Card
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o BR-MLXe-4-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXe-4-MR2-M-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXe-4-MR2-X-AC, BR-MLXe-4-MR2-X-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXe-8-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXe-8-MR2-M-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXe-8-MR2-X-AC, BR-MLXe-8-MR2-X-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXe-16-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXe-16-MR2-M-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXe-16-MR2-X-AC, BR-MLXe-16-MR2-X-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-M, BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXE-32-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXE-32-MR2-M-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-32-M, BR-MLX-MR2-32-
X
o BR-MLXE-32-MR2-X-AC, BR-MLXE-32-MR2-X-DC
 With management cards BR-MLX-MR2-32-M, BR-MLX-MR2-32-
X
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
work units described in the ND PP and CEM v3.1 rev 4 received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the MLXe Family Devices with Multi-
Service IronWare R05.9.00 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and
product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDPP11e3 and VPNGWEP11 related to
the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and
testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that
the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDPP11e3 and VPNGWEP11 and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a
public search for vulnerabilities and did not discover any public issues with the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay special attention to the evaluated
configuration of the device(s) and the specific functionality defined within the Security
Target. The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. Only the functionality implemented by the
security functional requirements within the Security Target was evaluated. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation.
The product contains more functionality than was covered by the evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
It is important for sponsors and customers to understand that as of the close of this
evaluation, the TOE does not carry an up-to-date FIPS CMVP certificate; as such, all
references to CMVP certification in documentation and prompts generated by the device
itself, including references to a FIPS validated cryptographic module, must be disregarded
until a valid CMVP certificate is issued.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
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12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-Service
IronWare R05.9.00 (NDPP11E3/VPNGEP11) Security Target, Version 0.7, 1/13/16.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
Brocade MLXe Family Devices Validation Report Version 0., January 27, 2016
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[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[4] Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.1 (with Errata #3), 8 June 2012
(NDPP11e3)
[5] Network Device Protection Profile Extended Package VPN Gateway, Version 1.1,
15 April 2013(VPNGWEP11)
[6] Brocade MLXe Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.9.00
(NDPP11E3/VPNGEP11) Security Target, Version 0.7, 1/13/16 (ST)
[7] Assurance Activity Report (NDPP11e3/VPNGWEP11) for Brocade MLXe Family
Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.9.00, Version 0.1, 01/15/2016 (AAR)
[8] Detailed Test Report (NDPP11e3/VPNGWEP11) for Brocade MLXe Family
Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.9.00, version 0.3, 1/22/2016 (DTR)