SolarWinds Orion Software Security Target
Copyright © 2011 SolarWinds Worldwide, LLC.
®
SolarWinds ORION® Software
Security Target
Version 1.8
March 23, 2012
SolarWinds Worldwide, LLC
3711 South MoPac Expressway
Building Two
Austin, Texas 78746
SolarWinds Orion Software Security Target
Copyright © 2011 SolarWinds Worldwide, LLC. 2
DOCUMENT INTRODUCTION
Prepared By:
Common Criteria Consulting LLC
15804 Laughlin Lane
Silver Spring, MD 20906
http://www.consulting-cc.com
Prepared For:
SolarWinds Worldwide, LLC
3711 South MoPac Expressway
Building Two
Austin, Texas 78746
http://www.solarwinds.com
SolarWinds Orion Software Security Target
Copyright © 2011 SolarWinds Worldwide, LLC. 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION................................................................. 7
1.1 Security Target Reference.......................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE Reference............................................................................................................ 7
1.3 Evaluation Assurance Level....................................................................................... 7
1.4 Keywords ..................................................................................................................... 7
1.5 TOE Overview............................................................................................................. 7
1.5.1 Usage and Major Security Features ........................................................................... 7
1.5.2 TOE type.................................................................................................................... 9
1.5.3 Required Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware................................................. 10
1.6 TOE Description ....................................................................................................... 11
1.6.1 Physical Boundary ................................................................................................... 12
1.6.2 Logical Boundary..................................................................................................... 13
1.6.3 TSF Data.................................................................................................................. 14
1.7 Evaluated Configuration.......................................................................................... 19
1.8 Rationale for Non-Bypassability and Separation .................................................. 21
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..................................................................................... 23
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance.............................................................................. 23
2.2 Security Requirement Package Conformance ....................................................... 23
2.3 Protection Profile Conformance.............................................................................. 23
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................... 24
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 24
3.2 Assumptions............................................................................................................... 24
3.3 Threats ....................................................................................................................... 24
3.4 Organisational Security Policies.............................................................................. 24
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES........................................................................................ 26
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................. 26
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.......................................... 26
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ......................................................... 28
5.1 Extended Security Functional Components........................................................... 28
5.1.1 Class FNM: Network Management ......................................................................... 28
5.1.1.1 FNM_MDC Monitor Data Collection................................................................ 28
5.1.1.2 FNM_ANL Monitor Analysis............................................................................ 29
5.1.1.3 FNM_RCT.1 Management React......................................................................... 29
5.1.1.4 FNM_RDR Restricted Data Review.................................................................. 30
5.1.1.5 FNM_STG Monitor Data Storage ........................................................................ 31
5.2 Extended Security Assurance Components............................................................ 32
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS................................................................................ 33
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ................................................................ 33
6.1.1 Identification and Authentication (FIA) .................................................................. 33
6.1.1.1 FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition ................................................................. 33
6.1.1.2 FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication Before any Action........................................... 34
6.1.1.3 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback ................................................. 34
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6.1.1.4 FIA_UID.2 User Identification Before any Action .............................................. 34
6.1.1.5 FIA_USB.1 User-Subject Binding ....................................................................... 34
6.1.2 Security Management (FMT) .................................................................................. 36
6.1.2.1 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data.............................................................. 36
6.1.2.2 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ........................................ 40
6.1.2.3 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles ................................................................................ 41
6.1.3 Network Management (FNM) ................................................................................. 41
6.1.3.1 FNM_MDC.1 Monitor Data Collection ............................................................... 41
6.1.3.2 FNM_ANL.1 Monitor Analysis......................................................................... 41
6.1.3.3 FNM_RCT.1 Management React......................................................................... 41
6.1.3.4 FNM_RDR.1 Restricted Data Review............................................................... 42
6.1.3.5 FNM_STG.1 Guarantee of Monitor Data Availability......................................... 42
6.1.3.6 FNM_STG.2 Prevention of Monitor Data Loss ................................................... 42
6.1.4 TOE Access (FTA) .................................................................................................. 42
6.1.4.1 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-Initiated Termination................................................................ 42
6.1.5 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)................................................................................... 43
6.1.5.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel................................................................ 43
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements ................................................................. 43
6.3 CC Component Hierarchies and Dependencies..................................................... 43
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION....................................................................... 45
7.1 Security Functions .................................................................................................... 45
7.1.1 Identification and Authentication ............................................................................ 45
7.1.2 Management............................................................................................................. 46
7.1.3 Network Monitoring ................................................................................................ 46
7.1.4 Configuration Management ..................................................................................... 48
8. RATIONALE .............................................................................................................. 49
8.1 Rationale for IT Security Objectives....................................................................... 49
8.2 Security Requirements Rationale............................................................................ 51
8.2.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives................ 51
8.2.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale........................................................... 53
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 - EOC Server Minimum Hardware and Software Requirements.................... 10
Table 2 - Orion Server Minimum Software Requirements .......................................... 10
Table 3 - Orion Server Minimum Hardware Requirements......................................... 10
Table 4 - Database Server Minimum Software Requirements..................................... 11
Table 5 - Database Server Minimum Hardware Requirements ................................... 11
Table 6 - TSF Data Descriptions.................................................................................. 14
Table 7 - Assumptions.................................................................................................. 24
Table 8 - Threats........................................................................................................... 24
Table 9 - Organizational Security Policies................................................................... 25
Table 10 - Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................... 26
Table 11 - Security Objectives of the Operational Environment ............................... 26
Table 12 - Orion Server TSF Data Detail................................................................... 37
Table 13 - NCM Server TSF Data Detail................................................................... 39
Table 14 - EOC Server TSF Data Detail.................................................................... 40
Table 15 - EAL2 Assurance Requirements................................................................ 43
Table 16 - TOE SFR Dependency Rationale ............................................................. 43
Table 17 - Threats and Assumptions to Security Objectives Mapping..................... 49
Table 18 - Threats, Assumptions and Policies to Security Objectives Rationale ...... 50
Table 19 - SFRs to Security Objectives Mapping...................................................... 51
Table 20 - Security Objectives to SFR Rationale....................................................... 52
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ACRONYMS LIST
APM ........................................................ ORION Application Performance Monitor™
CC...........................................................................................................Common Criteria
CIDR .........................................................................Classless Internet Domain Routing
DBMS.............................................................................. DataBase Management System
DHCP .................................................................. Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DNS..................................................................................................Domain Name System
EAL .......................................................................................Evaluation Assurance Level
EOC................................................................................. Enterprise Operations Console
FTP................................................................................................. File Transfer Protocol
HTTP..................................................................................HyperText Transfer Protocol
HTTPS ..........................................................................................................HTTP Secure
ICMP.........................................................................Internet Control Message Protocol
IMAP...........................................................................Internet Message Access Protocol
IP..............................................................................................................Internet Protocol
IPAM.............................................................................. ORION IP Address Manager™
IPSLA................................................................................... ORION IP SLA Manager™
IT .................................................................................................Information Technology
MOS ..................................................................................................Mean Opinion Score
NCM..........................................................ORION Network Configuration Manager™
NPM ............................................................. ORION Network Performance Monitor™
NTA........................................................................ORION NetFlow Traffic Analyzer™
POP.....................................................................................................Post Office Protocol
SCP................................................................................................................. Secure CoPy
SFTP................................................................................................................. Secure FTP
SLA.............................................................................................Service Level Agreement
SNMP .................................................................Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH................................................................................................................. Secure SHell
SSL .................................................................................................... Secure Socket Layer
ST................................................................................................................Security Target
TCP.................................................................................. Transmission Control Protocol
TOE...................................................................................................Target of Evaluation
ToS..............................................................................................................Type of Service
TSF ............................................................................................... TOE Security Function
UDP .............................................................................................User Datagram Protocol
URL........................................................................................ Uniform Resource Locator
VoIP............................................................................................................... Voice over IP
WAN...................................................................................................Wide Area Network
WMI .................................................................Windows Management Instrumentation
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1. Security Target Introduction
This Security Target (ST) describes the objectives, requirements and rationale for the
SOLARWINDS® ORION® software TOE. The language used in this Security Target is
consistent with the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1and all international interpretations through March 30, 2011. As such, the spelling of terms is
presented using the internationally accepted English.
1.1 Security Target Reference
SolarWinds Orion Software Security Target, version 1.8, March 23, 2012.
1.2 TOE Reference
SolarWinds Orion Network Performance Monitor (NPM) V10.1.3, Orion Application
Performance Monitor (APM) V4.0.0, Orion Network Configuration Manager (NCM) V6.1.0,
Orion Netflow Traffic Analyzer (NTA) V3.7.0, Orion IP Address Manager (IPAM) V1.7.0,
Orion IP SLA Manager (IPSLA) V3.5.0, and Orion Enterprise Operations Console (EOC)
V1.3.0
1.3 Evaluation Assurance Level
Assurance claims conform to EAL2 (Evaluation Assurance Level 2) from the Common Criteria
for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Release 3.
1.4 Keywords
Performance Monitor, Configuration Manager, Performance Manager, NetFlow Traffic
Analyzer, Address Manager, SLA, Service Level Agreement, SLA Manager
1.5 TOE Overview
1.5.1 Usage and Major Security Features
Orion is a set of applications executing on one or more Windows servers. The applications
monitor a configured set of network devices and applications for status, performance and
configuration settings. Depending on the size of the network, multiple instances of the
applications may be deployed on different servers to provide adequate performance.
The Orion family consists of the following network, application, system, and storage monitoring
and management products:
Orion Network Performance Monitor - Orion Network Performance Monitor (Orion NPM)
provides the ability to detect, diagnose, and resolve performance issues with a dynamic network.
It delivers real-time views and dashboards to visually display network performance. Automated
network discovery features enable network managers to keep up with evolving networks.
Orion Application Performance Monitor - Orion Application Performance Monitor (Orion
APM) brings monitoring, alerting, and reporting capabilities to applications and servers.
Automatically discovers applications and provides visibility into application performance and the
underlying operating systems and servers they run on.
Orion Network Configuration Manager - Orion Network Configuration Manager (Orion
NCM) notifies network managers in real-time when device configurations change, helping
network managers determine which changes could potentially cause network issues. Orion NCM
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also provides nightly configuration backups, bulk configuration changes, user tracking, and
inventory and compliance reporting.
Orion NetFlow Traffic Analyzer - Orion NetFlow Traffic Analyzer (Orion NTA) enables
network managers to quantify exactly how a network is being used, by whom, and for what
purpose. The application mapping feature correlates the traffic arriving from designated ports,
source IPs, destination IPs, and protocols to application names network managers can recognize.
Orion NTA provides a comprehensive view of the network traffic, enabling network managers to
find the bottlenecks or identify the bandwidth hogs.
Orion IP Address Manager - Orion IP Address Manager (Orion IPAM) is an IP address
management module that enables network managers to create, schedule, and share IP address
space reports. With either Orion NPM or Orion APM, Orion IPAM provides IP address
management that is unified with performance monitoring data for a comprehensive view of
network health.
Orion IP SLA Manager - Orion IP SLA Manager delivers a network monitoring solution for
identifying site-specific and WAN-related performance issues from the perspective of each of the
remote sites. With this Orion module, network managers can utilize Cisco IP SLA technology
with automatic IP SLA setup to monitor key WAN performance metrics, including Cisco VoIP
jitter and MOS.
Orion Enterprise Operations Console - Orion Enterprise Operations Console (Orion EOC)
provides a consolidated command center to remotely monitor critical network infrastructure in
multiple different physical locations. Orion EOC provides a consolidated command center to
monitor the entire enterprise network and gives network managers unified visibility into remote
Orion servers running either Orion NPM or Orion APM and Orion modules.
The Orion product suite provides the following capabilities to network managers:
 Schedule network scans to identify new network devices or applications.
 Perform detailed monitoring & analysis of performance data from routers, switches,
servers, and other SNMP-enabled devices to ensure peak network performance.
 Monitor the health of critical applications.
 Remotely monitor WMI performance counters to identify and resolve application issues.
 Monitor the availability and responsiveness of critical DNS, IMAP4, and POP3 network
services.
 Get a comprehensive view of network traffic on a single page, or drill down into any
element’s traffic.
 Break down the display of network traffic information by application.
 Identify network issues across the enterprise.
 Configure alerts for correlated events, sustained conditions, or complex combinations of
device states.
 Generate reports for network performance, application performance and server
availability.
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 Schedule and automatically backup network device configurations on a regular basis for
routers, switches, firewalls, and wireless access points.
 Receive real-time alerts when configurations change on monitored resources.
 Generate a detailed network inventory of all managed devices, including serial numbers,
port details, and IP addresses.
 Perform remote IOS/firmware updates in real time or schedule them to run at a future
time.
 Generate configuration change reports for monitored resources
 Establish unique accounts and specify which types of information are displayed for a
particular user.
 Create a custom poller to monitor any SNMP-enabled device, collect detailed data from
MIB tables, & monitor virtually any statistic available on network devices. This
functionality is not evaluated.
 Install additional polling engines for large networks with a small number of NPM or
APM instances. This functionality is not evaluated.
 Install additional web servers to support a large number of network managers. This
functionality is not evaluated.
Users may interact with the TOE via multiple interfaces. The EOC Web Console provides
access to the EOC, and through it provides visibility to the overall TOE, which is especially
useful when multiple Orion Servers are deployed. The Orion Web Console provides access to
individual Orion Servers. The NCM Web Console provides access to detailed information
provided by Orion NCM. All of these interfaces support connections from remote IT systems
via web browsers.
User access to information via each of these interfaces is controlled by the roles configured for
individual users by administrators. When a connection is established, the user is prompted for a
username and password. User credential validation is performed by the TOE for the Orion Web
Console interface, and by Windows for the EOC Web Console and NCM Web Console
interfaces. In all cases, permitted user accounts must be defined within the TOE so that user-
specific TOE parameters (e.g. role) can be associated with each user.
Orion Servers also provide user interfaces for configuration of specific parameters within the
TOE via Windows application programs. These tasks are performed by invoking applications
via the Windows Start menu. For the applications to configure NCM, users are required to
provide valid credentials before performing any other action. For the other Windows
applications providing TOE access, any user with access to these applications must first
authenticate to Windows and is then assumed to be authorized to perform the configuration
actions.
1.5.2 TOE type
Network Management
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1.5.3 Required Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The TOE consists of applications installed on multiple server types:
1. EOC Server - EOC installed on a dedicated server.
2. Orion Server - NPM and/or APM installed on a dedicated server. Any combination of
NCM and/or Orion modules (NTA, IPAM and/or IPSLA) may also be installed with each
instance. Any combination is generically referred to as an Orion Server.
Table 1 - EOC Server Minimum Hardware and Software Requirements
Item Requirements
Operating System
32-bit or 64-bit Microsoft Windows Server 2003 or Windows Server 2008
(including R2)
Web Server Internet Information Service 6.0 or later
.NET Framework Version 3.5 or later
CPU 3.0 GHz
Memory 2 GB
Available Disk Space 100 MB
DBMS
Microsoft SQL Server 2005 or SQL Server 2008. Express, Standard, or
Enterprise
Table 2 - Orion Server Minimum Software Requirements
Item Requirements
Operating System Windows Server 2003 or 2008, including R2
Web Server Microsoft IIS, version 6.0 and higher, in 32-bit mode
.NET Framework
Version 3.5 SP1 or later
ASP .NET 2.0 Ajax Extension, Version 1 or later
SNMP Trap Services Windows operating system management and monitoring tools
Web Browser
Microsoft Internet Explorer version 6 or higher with Active scripting, or
Firefox 3.0 or higher
The hardware requirements for Orion Servers are dependent on the number of elements to be
monitored and/or managed by the server.
Table 3 - Orion Server Minimum Hardware Requirements
Item Requirements
<500 Elements <2000 Elements 2000+ Elements
CPU 2.0 GHz 2.4 GHz 3.0 GHz
Memory 3 GB 4 GB 4 GB
Available Disk Space 2 GB 5 GB 20 GB
In addition to these platforms, the database used by the TOE is installed on a dedicated server
with the DBMS. Each Orion Server requires its own Database Server.
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Table 4 - Database Server Minimum Software Requirements
Item Requirements
DBMS
SQL Server 2005 SP1 Express, Standard, or Enterprise; or
SQL Server 2008 Standard, or Enterprise
Operating System Any Windows OS satisfying the minimum requirements for the DBMS
Additional Software
SQL Server System Common Language Runtime (CLR) Types
Microsoft SQL Server Native Client
Microsoft SQL Server Management Objects
The hardware requirements for Database Servers are dependent on the number of elements to be
monitored and/or managed by the associated Orion Server.
Table 5 - Database Server Minimum Hardware Requirements
Item Requirements
<500 Elements <2000 Elements 2000+ Elements
CPU 2.0 GHz 2.4 GHz 3.0 GHz
Memory 2 GB 3 GB 4 GB
Available Disk Space 2 GB 5 GB 20 GB
Credential validation for the EOC Web Console and NCM Web Console interfaces is performed
by Windows locally or via Active Directory. The credentials supplied by the user to the TOE are
passed to Windows for validation. If credential validation is successful, the same username is
used to associate attributes with the user session in the TOE. Credential validation for the Orion
Server Web Console is performed entirely by the TOE.
The evaluated configuration requires that IIS is configured to require secure (HTTPS)
connections on all the servers hosting TOE components. This requirement protects any
credentials supplied by remote users from disclosure.
When connecting to network devices, the TOE supports the use of SSH as well as Telnet. Files
transferred from the network devices to the TOE may use SFTP or SCP. The SSL functionality
used for these operations is provided by the operational environment.
1.6 TOE Description
The Orion software acts as a monitoring and management tool for use by network managers. It
maintains a list of the managed elements in the network, monitors their operation, and alerts the
network managers to specified conditions. Managed elements are network devices (e.g. routers
and switches), servers or applications that can be monitored by standard mechanisms such as
SNMP, ICMP, Syslog or WMI. NCM may be used to track configuration changes on the
network devices for products that are able to download a copy of their current configuration
parameters.
Users interact with the TOE via multiple mechanisms. Web Consoles are provided for remote
interaction with the EOC, NPM, APM, and NCM functionality (as well as any modules added to
NPM/APM). Application programs to configure the TOE may also be invoked from the
Windows Start menu by authorized users.
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1.6.1 Physical Boundary
The TOE consists of the SolarWinds Orion software identified in section 1.2 executing on
multiple dedicated Windows servers. The operating systems (including the network protocol
stacks and cryptographic functionality), web servers and DBMS are outside the TOE boundary.
On an Orion Server, the physical boundary of the TOE includes the following Windows services
that are part of the NPM and APM components:
1. SolarWinds Alerting Engine
2. SolarWinds Collector Data Processor
3. SolarWinds Collector Management Agent
4. SolarWinds Collector Polling Controller
5. SolarWinds Information Service
6. SolarWinds Job Engine
7. SolarWinds Job Engine v2
8. SolarWinds Job Scheduler
9. SolarWinds Orion Information Service v1
10. SolarWinds Orion Module Engine
11. SolarWinds Syslog Service
12. SolarWinds Trap Service
If NCM is installed on an Orion Server, the physical boundary of the TOE includes the NCM
Integration Module as well as the following Windows services that are part of the NCM
component:
1. SolarWinds Orion NCM Caching Service
2. SolarWinds Orion NCM Information Service
3. SolarWinds Orion NCM Polling Service
4. SolarWinds SFTP/SCP Server
The SolarWinds ToolSet distributed as part of the Orion product suite is not installed in the
evaluated configuration and is not included in the physical boundary. All other parts of the
Orion product suite distributed with the standard distribution mechanisms are included in the
TOE boundary.
The physical boundary includes the following guidance documentation:
1. SolarWinds® Orion® Common Components Administrator Guide
2. SolarWinds® Orion® Network Performance Monitor Administrator Guide
3. SolarWinds® Orion® Application Performance Monitor Administrator Guide
4. SolarWinds® Orion® Enterprise Operations Console Administrator Guide
5. SolarWinds® Orion® IP SLA Manager Administrator Guide
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6. SolarWinds® Orion® NetFlow Traffic Analyzer Administrator Guide
7. SolarWinds® Orion® IP Address Manager Administrator Guide
8. SolarWinds® Orion® Common Criteria Supplement
1.6.2 Logical Boundary
The TOE provides the following security functionality:
1. Identification and Authentication – When a connection is established to any of the Web
Consoles, the TOE prompts the user for login credentials. The credentials are validated
by the TOE for the Orion Server Web Console. For the EOC and NCM Web Consoles,
the credentials are first passed to Windows for validation. For Windows application
providing configuration capabilities for NCM, the TOE prompts the user for login
credentials. If the credentials are valid, the username is used to retrieve the user’s
security attributes inside the TOE from the TOE database.
2. Management – Management functionality is provided to authorized users. The
functionality provided to individual users is determined by the user’s role, which is one
of the security attributes for users.
3. Network Monitoring – The status and performance of managed elements are monitored.
The results are saved and may be viewed by authorized users. Access to data about the
managed elements may be limited by view limitations. Alerts may be generated in
respond to configured conditions detected about the managed elements.
4. Configuration Management – The configurations of network devices may be downloaded
from the network device, saved in the TOE database, and compared to a reference
configuration. If a configuration change is detected, an upload of a saved configuration
for the network device may be triggered.
The following functionality included in the Orion product suite is not evaluated:
 Create a custom poller to monitor any SNMP-enabled device, collect detailed data from
MIB tables, & monitor virtually any statistic available on network devices.
 Install additional polling engines for large networks with a small number of NPM or
APM instances.
 Install additional web servers to support a large number of network managers.
 External web sites are not added to Orion Server Web Console views.
 The “Check for product updates” function is not used.
 Custom device pollers are not configured. Pollers supplied with the TOE are included in
the evaluation.
 Custom component monitors are not configured. Component monitors supplied with the
TOE are included in the evaluation. Account limitations are tied to custom component
monitors and are also not configured.
 Custom property functionality is not configured. Built-in properties are included in the
evaluation.
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 Advanced Alerts (which use custom properties) are not configured. Basic Alerts are
included in the evaluation.
 Orion Server failover functionality is not configured.
 The functionality to remotely manage interfaces in Network Devices.
 Custom NCM device templates are not configured. The default device templates
supplied with the TOE are included in the evaluation.
 Customized views are not configured on Orion Server Web Consoles; default Views are
used (the Allow Account to Customize Views permission may be set to allow
specification of credentials for the NCM Integration Module).
 View Limitations are not configured.
 Customized page views are not configured on EOC Server Web Consoles; default page
views are used (the Allow User To Personalize Their Pages permission is not set).
1.6.3 TSF Data
The following table describes the TSF data.
Table 6 - TSF Data Descriptions
TSF Data Description
Data Related to Orion Servers or Orion Server Web Console
Alert Configuration Defines the conditions for generating Alerts, which may be
triggered by the occurrence of an event or by the crossing of a
threshold value for a monitored element. Attributes include:
 Name
 Enabled or disabled
 Monitored property
 Monitored objects
 Trigger and reset conditions
 Time of day
 Suppression parameters
 Actions, including notification destinations
Alerts The set of Alerts that have been generated as a result of the Alert
Configurations. Alerts are not shown by default once they have
been acknowledged by an authorized user.
APM Settings Configured information used for monitoring applications. The
information includes:
 Credential sets
 Polling parameters
 Data retention policies
Application Monitor Templates Define a group of component monitors modeling the total
availability and performance level of an application. Attributes
include:
 Polling frequency
 Polling timeout
 Associated Component Monitors
Assigned Application Monitors Define the assigned component monitors that are run at regular
intervals, and then the status results from the component monitors
are used to determine an overall status for an application.
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TSF Data Description
Assigned Component Monitors Define the assignment of application monitor templates to Network
Devices hosting an application to be monitored.
CLI Credential Sets Define credentials used to communicate with Network Devices via
Telnet or SSH to configure IP SLA Operations or obtain
information about DHCP configurations.
Component Monitors Define the mechanisms used to monitor the status and performance
of an aspect of an application. Attributes include:
 Protocol used to poll information concerning the
application
Events The set of Events that have occurred regarding managed elements,
such as an interface status changing to up or down. Events are not
shown by default once they have been cleared by an authorized
user.
Groups Defines groupings of Network Devices, enabling the corresponding
set of Network Devices to be selected for an operation. Groups
may be used to create a hierarchical grouping of the Network
Devices.
IP SLA CallManager Nodes Define the set of Cisco CallManager and CallManager Express
devices to be monitored by the IP SLA functionality.
IP SLA Operations Define test measurements to be performed by the IP SLA
functionality on IP SLA Nodes. Testing may be configured for
DNS, FTP, HTTP, DHCP, TCP Connect, UDP Jitter, VoIP UDP
Jitter, ICMP Echo, UDP Echo, ICMP Path Echo, or ICMP Path
Jitter. Parameters include:
 Measurement type
 Frequency
 Path type
 IP SLA Nodes
 Warning threshold
 Critical threshold
IP SLA Settings Define the operation of IP SLA monitoring. Parameters include:
 VoIP UDP Port
 VoIP Jitter Codec
 Test data collection interval
 Test data retention period
 MOS advantage factor
 Type of Service (ToS) octet
IP SLA VoIP Nodes Define the set of VoIP devices that are monitored by the IP SLA
functionality.
IPAM Addresses and Subnets Define the IP address ranges or subnets that are monitored by the
IPAM functionality. Attributes include:
 Name
 Address range or CIDR prefix
 Scan interval
 Automatic Scanning enabled/disabled
IPAM DHCP Scopes Define the DHCP scopes configured in Cisco IOS and Microsoft
DHCP servers that are monitored by the IPAM functionality.
Parameters include:
 DHCP Server
 Scan parameters
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TSF Data Description
IPAM Settings Define the operation of IPAM monitoring. Parameters include:
 Subnet scan parameters
 Device CLI credentials for Scope scans
 Device SNMP credentials for Scope scans
NCM Integration Module
Configurations
Define the connection parameters for an Orion Server instance to
interact with a co-located NCM Server. Parameters include:
 IP address of the NCM Server
NetFlow Sources Define the interfaces in Network Devices that are monitored by the
NTA functionality.
Network Devices Defines the set of Network Devices monitored by the TOE.
Attributes include:
 Hostname or IP Address
 Dynamic IP Address
 Monitor via ICMP only
 External (applications are monitored, but not the device
itself)
 VMware parameters, including credentials
 SNMP parameters, including credentials
 Polling parameters
 Management State (polled or not polled)
 Interfaces
 Interface Management Parameters (polled or not polled,
what parameters are polled, alert when down, bandwidth)
 Applications
 Whether the Device is monitored by IP SLA
NTA Settings Define the operation of NTA monitoring. Parameters include:
 Enable automatic addition of NetFlow sources
 Enable data retention for traffic on unmonitored ports
 Allow monitoring of flows from unmanaged interfaces
 Application and Service Ports
 Enable/disable each Application and Service Port
 Limit monitoring to selected Destination or Source IP
Address(es)
 Monitored protocols
 NetFlow collector ports
 Types of Services
 Name resolution parameters
 IP address processing period
 Data retention parameters
 Chart parameters
Polling Settings Define the behavior of polling of the managed elements and the
amount of time collected data is retained.
Report Configurations Define the Reports that are generated and made available for
review via the Web Console.
Reports Pre-defined Reports may be viewed via the Web Console.
SNMP Credential Sets Define credentials used to communicate with Network Devices via
SNMP to obtain information.
Syslogs The set of Syslog messages that have been received from Network
Devices. Syslogs are not shown by default once they have been
cleared by an authorized user.
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TSF Data Description
Thresholds Define values for devices that cause warning or error indicators to
be displayed in the Web Console. Threshold values may be set for:
 CPU Load
 Disk Usage
 Percent Memory Used
 Percent Packet Loss
 Response Time
 Availability
 Node Warning Interval
Traps The set of SNMP trap messages that have been received from
Network Devices.
User Accounts Define the user accounts attributes for users authorized to access
Orion Servers via the Web Console. Attributes include:
 Username
 Password
 Enabled
 Expiration Date
 Disable Session Timeout
 Allow Administrator Rights (Role)
 Allow Node Management Rights
 Allow Account to Customize Views
 Allow Account to Clear Events and Acknowledge Alerts
 Alert Sound
 Views (restricts access to Views)
 Report Folder (restricts access to Reports)
 Menu Bar Assignments (limits access to specific GUIs)
 Credentials used to access the NCM server data via the
NCM Integration Module
Views Define the views that may be invoked by users. Attributes include:
 Resources included in the View
Web Console Settings Defines parameters controlling the behavior of a Web Console
session. Settings include:
 Session Timeout
 Page Refresh Time
 Status Rollup Mode
Data Related to NCM or NCM Web Consoles
Config Change Templates Define scripts that can be executed on Nodes to perform common
configuration functions. Attributes include:
 Name
 Description
 Tags
 Parameters for variables used in the script
 Script commands
Default Communication
Parameters
Define the default parameters used when communicating with a
managed Node. Parameters include:
 Community String
 SNMPv3 Settings
 Login Information
 Transfer Protocols
 Transfer Ports
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TSF Data Description
Default NCM Alert Defines the actions performed for the “Default NCM Alert” that is
automatically generated for Alert processing on an Orion Server
when NCM is installed.
Device Configuration Files Contains the configuration information for a Node. This
information may be obtained via download from a Node or by
editing an existing configuration file. Configuration files may be
designated as baseline configurations for a Node.
Groups Define related Nodes.
Ignore List Specifies a set of entities that are not added as Managed Devices
even if they are found during discovery processes.
Inventory Settings Specify the statistics collected from Nodes during Inventory Jobs.
Jobs Define jobs configured to perform periodic operations against
Nodes, such as downloading a configuration file or collecting
inventory information. Parameters include:
 Name
 Type of job
 Starting date/time
 Ending date/time
 Frequency
 Windows credentials for local job execution
 Selected Nodes
 Download configuration file parameters
 Command script
 Results parameters
NCM Settings Define the behavior of NCM with regard to change detection for
Node configurations. Settings include:
 Realtime Change Detection
 Enable Realtime Config Change Notifications
 Configuration Comparison Parameters
 Email Notification Parameters
 Syslog Receiver Parameters
 SNMP Trap Receiver Parameters
Nodes Defines the set of network devices managed by the TOE. The
device types that may be managed include switches, routers,
firewalls, and Windows servers. Attributes for each Node include:
 Hostname or IP Address
 SNMP Version
 SNMP Parameters
 Login Type (Device or User)
 Device Login Credentials
 Management Status (Managed or Unmanaged)
 Communication Protocols and Ports
Reports Define reports available for summarizing information known about
the Nodes. Parameters include:
 Name
 Title
 Description
 Category
 Nodes included
 Information included
 Filters
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TSF Data Description
SNMP Trap Server Settings Configuration for the SNMP Trap receiver. Parameters include:
 Trap retention period
 Filters
 Alerts
Syslog Server Settings Configuration for the Syslog receiver. Parameters include:
 Syslog message retention period
 Filters
 Alerts
User Accounts Define the user account attributes for users authorized to access
NCM. Attributes include:
 Username
 Role (Administrator, Engineer, WebDownloader,
WebUploader, or WebViewer)
 Device Login Credentials
 Device Enable Level and Password
Data Related to EOC or EOC Web Console
EOC User Accounts Define the user account attributes for users authorized to access the
EOC Web Console. Attributes include:
 Username
 Role
 Accessible Orion Servers
 Orion Server Credentials user-supplied or admin-supplied
 Orion Server credentials
Menu Bars Define a set of Views available to a role.
Orion Servers Define the Orion Servers associated with the EOC. Attributes
include:
 Name
 Hostname or IP Address
 URL
 Orion Server credentials
 Polling interval
 Enabled or disabled
Roles Define the Views members assigned the role may access.
Parameters include:
 Name
 Menu Bar
1.7 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following:
1. One instance of the EOC, installed on a dedicated Windows server.
2. One or more instances of the Orion Server, each installed on a dedicated Windows server.
Each Orion Server has one or both of NPM and APM installed. Each Orion Server may
have any combination of NCM, NTA, IPAM and/or IPSLA installed. If NCM is
installed, the Orion Server integration module is also installed.
3. For each instance of the Orion Server, a database (and DBMS) is installed on a separate
dedicated Windows server.
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The following installation and configuration options must be used:
1. IIS on all the dedicated Windows servers hosting TOE components is configured to
accept HTTPS connections only.
2. The SolarWinds Toolset optional component is not installed.
3. For any functions that can be performed both via the Web Consoles (Orion Server or
NCM Server) and via Windows applications (invoked via the Start menu using the
directly attached display/keyboard of the server hosting the Orion Server), guidance
documentation directs the administrator to use the Web Console only to perform those
functions.
4. Access to the Windows applications to invoke the TOE is restricted in Windows to users
authorized to perform those functions, in particular: backup and restore the database,
manage TOE Alerts, manage NCM user account attributes, and manage Report
configuration settings.
5. The Customize option is not configured for any menu bars for the Orion Server Web
Consoles.
6. External web sites are not added to Orion Server Web Console views.
7. The “Check for product updates” function is disabled. Installing product updates may
update the product to a version that has not been evaluated.
8. Custom device pollers are not configured or evaluated. Pollers supplied with the TOE
are included in the evaluation.
9. Custom component monitors are not configured or evaluated. Component monitors
supplied with the TOE are included in the evaluation.
10. Custom property functionality is not configured or evaluated. Built-in properties are
included in the evaluation and may be used to configure View limitations.
11. Advanced Alerts are not configured or evaluated. Basic Alerts are included in the
evaluation.
12. Customized Views are not configured on Orion Server Web Consoles.
13. View Limitations are not configured.
14. Orion Server failover functionality is not configured or evaluated.
15. The functionality to remotely manage interfaces in Network Devices is not evaluated.
16. The IPAM role is configured as Default for all users, allowing the Orion Server role to
determine the user access to IPAM functions.
17. The NTA Database Maintenance option is enabled in order to have the TOE
automatically compress and purge data according to the configured periods.
18. When importing User Accounts into the TOE, only individual accounts are imported.
Windows Group Accounts are not imported.
19. Only Administrators assign passwords for User Accounts defined in the TOE. Non-
Administrators are not permitted to change their own passwords.
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20. The Orion Server Browser Integration parameter is not enabled for User Accounts, since
the operations performed via this integration are outside the control of the TOE.
21. The Allow User To Personalize Their Pages permission is not set for any EOC user
accounts. Therefore, only the default page views are included in the evaluation.
22. Network Devices are imported into NCM from the co-located Orion Server.
23. The NCM “Require a login to use Orion Network Configuration Manager” parameter is
set.
24. Built-in NCM user accounts are used during installation only. In operation, only standard
user accounts are used.
25. Custom NCM device templates are not configured or evaluated. The default device
templates supplied with the TOE are included in the evaluation.
26. Custom Configuration Change Templates are not configured or evaluated. The default
configuration change templates supplied with the TOE are included in the evaluation.
27. The NCM Integration Module provides access to NCM-related information for Orion
Server Web Service users The credentials used must be chosen by administrators to
provide the lowest privileges appropriate for each of the users with access to this
mechanism.
28. Real-time config change notification is not enabled in NCM since it is dependent on
additional software beyond the scope of the evaluated products.
29. Per-device credentials are used rather than per-user device credentials.
30. All users of the NCM Integration Module must be configured to have the Allow Account
to Customize Views permission (in order to enter their credentials for NCM access).
31. Because of inherent security limitations in TFTP, the TFTP server is never enabled on the
Orion Server or EOC Server.
1.8 Rationale for Non-Bypassability and Separation
The responsibility for non-bypassability and non-interference is split between the TOE and the
IT Environment. TOE components are software only products and therefore the non-
bypassability and non-interference claims are dependent upon hardware and OS mechanisms.
The TOE runs on top of the IT Environment supplied OSs.
Non-bypassability
The TOE ensures that the security policy is applied and succeeds before further
processing is permitted whenever a security relevant interface is invoked: the interfaces
are well defined and insure that the access restrictions are enforced. Non-security
relevant interfaces do not interact with the security functionality of the TOE. The TOE
depends upon OS mechanisms to protect TSF data such that it can only be accessed via
the TOE. All systems on which the TOE executes are dedicated systems.
Non-interference
The TOE is implemented with well defined interfaces that can be categorized as security
relevant or non-security relevant. The TOE is implemented such that non-security
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relevant interfaces have no means of impacting the security functionality of the TOE.
Unauthenticated users may not perform any actions within the TOE. The TOE tracks
multiple administrators by sessions and ensures the access privileges of each are
enforced.
The server hardware provides virtual memory and process separation which the server
OS utilizes to ensure that other (non-TOE) processes may not interfere with the TOE; all
interactions are limited to the defined TOE interfaces. The OS and DBMS restrict access
to TOE data in the database to prevent interference with the TOE via that mechanism.
The TOE consists of distributed components. Communication between the components
uses HTTPS to protect the information exchanged. The secure channels rely upon
cryptographic functionality provided by the OS or third party software.
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2. Conformance Claims
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 3, dated July 2009
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant
2.2 Security Requirement Package Conformance
EAL2 conformant.
The TOE does not claim conformance to any security functional requirement packages.
2.3 Protection Profile Conformance
The TOE does not claim conformance to any registered Protection Profile.
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3. Security Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
This chapter defines the nature and scope of the security needs to be addressed by the TOE.
Specifically this chapter identifies:
A) assumptions about the environment,
B) threats to the assets and
C) organisational security policies.
This chapter identifies assumptions as A.assumption, threats as T.threat and policies as P.policy.
3.2 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 7 - Assumptions
A.Type Description
A.ACCESS The TOE has access to all the IT System data it needs to perform its functions.
A.ASCOPE The TOE is appropriately scalable to the IT Systems the TOE monitors.
A.DATABASE Access to the database used by the TOE via mechanisms outside the TOE
boundary is restricted to use by authorized users.
A.ENVIRON The TOE will be located in an environment that provides physical security,
uninterruptible power, and temperature control required for reliable operation.
A.INSTALL The Administrator will install and configure the TOE according to the
administrator guidance.
A.NETWORK There will be a network that supports communication between distributed
components of the TOE. This network functions properly.
A.NOEVILADMIN Administrators are non-hostile and follow the administrator guidance when
using the TOE. Administration is competent and on-going.
3.3 Threats
The threats identified in the following subsections are addressed by the TOE and the Operational
Environment.
Table 8 - Threats
T.Type Description
T.MASQUERAD
E
A user or process may masquerade as another entity in order to gain unauthorized
access to data or TOE resources.
T.TSF_COMPR
OMISE
A user or process may cause, through an unsophisticated attack, TSF data to be
modified.
3.4 Organisational Security Policies
An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an
organization to address its security needs.
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Table 9 - Organizational Security Policies
P.Type Organizational Security Policy
P.ACCESS All data collected and produced by the TOE shall only be used for authorized
purposes.
P.ANALYZ Analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about element or
network problems must be applied to data received from managed elements and
appropriate notification to users generated.
P.DBMONITOR The Administrator shall monitor disk space usage of the databases used by the TOE
and take proactive steps to protect against data loss. The TOE will be configured to
monitor the databases and alert the Administrator to high disk usage levels.
P.DISCLOSURE Credentials passed between distributed TOE components and between the TOE and
remote users will be protected from disclosure.
P.INTGTY Data collected and produced by the TOE shall be protected from modification.
P.MANAGE The TOE shall only be managed by authorized users.
P.PASSWORDS Passwords for User Accounts defined in the TOE are only configured by
Administrators.
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4. Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the TOE’s Operational
Environment. The security objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and the TOE’s
Operational Environment in meeting the security needs. Objectives of the TOE are identified as
O.objective. Objectives that apply to the operational environment are designated as
OE.objective.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The TOE must satisfy the following objectives.
Table 10 - Security Objectives for the TOE
O.Type Description
O.CHANNEL The TOE will use trusted channels when sending credentials to Managed Elements
to protect the credentials from disclosure.
O.CONFIG The TOE will provide functionality to store, upload, and compare configuration
files for administrator-specified network nodes.
O.MANAGE The TOE will provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support the
administrators in their management of the security of the TOE.
O.MONITOR The TOE will monitor the performance and status of the configured Managed
Elements and generate alerts when configured conditions are detected.
O.TOE_ACCESS The TOE will provide mechanisms that control a user’s logical access to the TOE.
O.PASSWORDS The TOE will permit Administrators to configure passwords for User Accounts
defined in the TOE. Users may not configure passwords, even for their own
account.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The TOE’s operational environment must satisfy the following objectives.
Table 11 - Security Objectives of the Operational Environment
OE.Type Description
OE.COMM The Operational Environment will protect communication between
distributed components of the TOE from disclosure.
OE.CRYPTO The Operational Environment will provide cryptographic functionality
needed to provide confidentiality with the protocols used for communication
with remote IT Systems.
OE.DATABASE Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that access to the TOE database
via mechanisms outside the TOE boundary (e.g., DBMS) is restricted to
authorized users only.
OE.DBMONITOR The Administrator shall monitor disk space usage of the databases used by
the TOE and take proactive steps to protect against data loss. The TOE will
be configured to monitor the databases and alert the Administrator to high
disk usage levels.
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OE.Type Description
OE.ENVIRON The Administrator will install the TOE in an environment that provides
physical security, uninterruptible power, and temperature control required for
reliable operation.
OE.INSTALL The Administrator will install and configure the TOE according to the
administrator guidance.
OE.INTROP The TOE is interoperable with the IT Systems it monitors.
OE.NETWORK The Administrator will install and configure a network that supports
communication between the distributed TOE components. The administrator
will ensure that this network functions properly.
OE.NOEVILADMIN Administrators are non-hostile and follow the administrator guidance when
using the TOE. Administration is competent and on-going.
OE.SSL The Operational Environment will require incoming connections to the Web
Services to use SSL/TLS.
OE.WINDOWSACCES
S
Users invoking the Orion Server functionality via Windows application
programs must successfully perform identification and authentication
functions with Windows first, and access to the applications that invoke
ORION Server functionality must be limited to users authorized to invoke
TOE management functionality.
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5. Extended Components Definition
5.1 Extended Security Functional Components
5.1.1 Class FNM: Network Management
All of the components in this section are derived from the U.S. Government Protection Profile
Intrusion Detection System Analyzer For Basic Robustness Environments.
This class of requirements addresses the data collected and analyzed by network management
systems. The audit class of the CC (FAU) was used as a model for creating the IDS class in the
Protection Profile, and the IDS class was used as a model for these requirements. The purpose of
this class of requirements is to address the unique nature of network management data and
provide for requirements about analyzing, reviewing and managing the data.
5.1.1.1 FNM_MDC Monitor Data Collection
Family Behaviour:
This family defines the requirements for the TOE regarding receipt of information related to the
status and performance of managed elements.
Component Levelling:
FNM_MDC.1 Monitor Data Collection provides for the functionality to require TSF controlled
processing of data received from managed elements regarding their status or performance.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Management of the configuration information for real-time feeds.
Audit:
FNM_MDC Monitor Data Collection 1
FNM_MDC Monitor Data Collection 1
FNM_ANL Monitor Analysis 1
FNM_RCT Management React 1
FNM_RDR Restricted Data Review 1
FNM_STG Monitor Data Storage
1
2
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There are no auditable events foreseen.
FNM_MDC.1Monitor Data Collection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: None
FNM_MDC.1.1 The TSF shall be able to store configuration, status and performance information
received via real-time feeds and/or polling.
5.1.1.2 FNM_ANL Monitor Analysis
Family Behaviour:
This family defines the requirements for the TOE regarding analysis of information related to
status and performance received from managed elements.
Component Levelling:
FNM_ANL.1 Monitor Analysis provides for the functionality to require TSF controlled analysis
of data received from managed elements regarding their status or performance.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Configuration of the analysis to be performed.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the ST:
a) Minimal: Enabling and disabling of any of the analysis mechanisms.
FNM_ANL.1 Monitor Analysis
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FNM_MDC.1 Monitor Data Collection
FNM_ANL.1.1 The TSF shall perform the following analysis function(s) on all status and
performance information received from managed elements:
a) Status changes;
b) Threshold values exceeded;
c) Configuration changed; and
d) Configured conditions satisfied.
5.1.1.3 FNM_RCT.1 Management React
Family Behaviour:
This family defines the requirements for the TOE regarding reactions to the analysis of
information related to status and performance received from managed elements.
FNM_ANL Monitor Analysis 1
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Component Levelling:
FNM_RCT.1 Management React provides for the functionality to require TSF controlled
reaction to the analysis of data received from managed elements regarding information related to
status and performance.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) the management (addition, removal, or modification) of actions.
Audit:
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FNM_RCT.1 Management React
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FNM_ANL.1 Monitor Analysis
FNM_RCT.1.1 The TSF shall perform the configured alert action(s) when conditions specified by
an administrator are detected.
5.1.1.4 FNM_RDR Restricted Data Review
Family Behaviour:
This family defines the requirements for the TOE regarding review of the monitor data collected
by the TOE.
Component Levelling:
FNM_RDR.1 Restricted Data Review provides for the functionality to require TSF controlled
review of the monitor data collected by the TOE.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of the group of users with
read access right to the monitor data records.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the ST:
a) Basic: Attempts to read monitor data that are denied.
b) Detailed: Reading of information from the monitor data records.
FNM_RDR.1 Restricted Data Review
FNM_RCT Management React 1
FNM_RDR Restricted Data Review 1
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FNM_MDC.1 Monitor Data Collection
FNM_ANL.1 Monitor Analysis
FNM_RDR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to read
[assignment: list of Monitor data] from the Monitor data.
FNM_RDR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the Monitor data in a manner suitable for the user to
interpret the information.
FNM_RDR.1.3 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the Monitor data, except those
users that have been granted explicit read-access.
5.1.1.5 FNM_STG Monitor Data Storage
Family Behaviour:
This family defines the requirements for the TOE to be able to create and maintain a secure
monitor data trail.
Component Levelling:
FNM_STG.1 Guarantee of Monitor Data Availability requires that the monitor data be protected
from unauthorised deletion and/or modification.
FNM_STG.2 Prevention of Monitor Data Loss defines the actions to be taken if the monitor data
storage capacity has been reached.
Management: FNM_STG.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) maintenance of the parameters that control the monitor data storage
capability.
Management: FNM_STG.2
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of actions to be taken in case
monitor data storage capacity has been reached.
Audit: FNM_STG.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Audit: FNM_STG.2
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the ST:
a) Basic: Actions taken if the storage capacity has been reached.
FNM_STG Monitor Data Storage
1
2
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FNM_STG.1 Guarantee of Monitor Data Availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FNM_MDC.1 Monitor Data Collection
FNM_ANL.1 Monitor Analysis
FNM_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored Monitor data from unauthorised deletion within
the TSC.
FNM_ STG.1.2 The TSF shall protect the stored Monitor data from modification within the TSC.
Application Note: Authorised deletion of data is not considered a modification of Monitor data in this context. This
requirement applies to the actual content of the Monitor data, which should be protected from any
modifications.
FNM_STG.2 Prevention of Monitor data loss
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FNM_MDC.1 Monitor Data Collection
FNM_ANL.1 Monitor Analysis
FNM_STG.2.1 The TSF shall [selection: 'ignore Monitor data', 'prevent Monitor data, except
those taken by the authorised user with special rights', 'overwrite the oldest stored
Monitor data'] if the storage capacity has been reached.
5.2 Extended Security Assurance Components
None
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6. Security Requirements
This section contains the functional requirements that are provided by the TOE. These
requirements consist of functional components from Part 2 of the CC.
The CC defines operations on security requirements. The font conventions listed below state the
conventions used in this ST to identify the operations.
Assignment: indicated in italics
Selection: indicated in underlined text
Assignments within selections: indicated in italics and underlined text
Refinement: indicated with bold text
Iterations of security functional requirements may be included. If so, iterations are specified at
the component level and all elements of the component are repeated. Iterations are identified by
numbers in parentheses following the component or element (e.g., FAU_ARP.1(1)).
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The functional requirements are described in detail in the following subsections. Additionally,
these requirements are derived verbatim from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation with the exception of completed operations.
6.1.1 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
6.1.1.1 FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
Refinement Rationale: The TOE provides multiple access mechanisms for users. The security attributes defined for the users
vary based upon the mechanism, with the exception of Orion Windows Applications where the only attribute
(the role) is implied. Therefore, iterations for this SFR are specified for individual access mechanisms. The
collection of iterations addresses the user attribute definitions for the TOE access mechanisms.
FIA_ATD.1.1(1) The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users of the Orion Server Web Service:
1. Username
2. Password
3. Account expiration date
4. Disable session timeout
5. Allow administrator rights (role)
6. Allow account to customize Views
7. Allow account to clear Events, acknowledge Alerts and Syslogs
8. Alert sound
9. Menu Bar assignments
10. Report folder
11. Credentials used to access the NCM server data via the NCM Integration Module
Application Note: Different security attributes are maintained for different TOE access mechanisms. This iteration applies to
security attributes for users of the Orion Server Web Service.
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FIA_ATD.1.1(2) The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users of the NCM Web Service and NCM Windows applications:
1. Username
2. Role
Application Note: Different security attributes are maintained for different TOE access mechanisms. This iteration applies to
security attributes for users of the NCM Web Service and NCM Windows applications.
FIA_ATD.1.1(3) The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users of the EOC Web Service:
1. Username
2. Role
3. Accessible Orion Servers
4. Orion Server Credentials user-supplied or admin-supplied
5. Orion Server Credentials
Application Note: Different security attributes are maintained for different TOE access mechanisms. This iteration applies to
security attributes for users of the EOC Web Service.
6.1.1.2 FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication Before any Action
Refinement Rationale: This SFR applies to password validation for the Orion Server Web Service. Password validation for the
EOC and NCM Web Services and NCM Windows applications is performed by Windows; Windows is
responsible for the complete I&A process for Windows applications that invoke the TOE.
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each Orion Server Web Service user to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.1.3 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only dots to the user while the authentication is in
progress.
6.1.1.4 FIA_UID.2 User Identification Before any Action
Refinement Rationale: This SFR applies to users accessing the TOE via the Orion Server Web Service, the NCM Web Service,
NCM Windows applications or the EOC Web Service. The TOE does not perform any identification for users
accessing the TOE via Orion Windows applications on servers on which Orion Server components are
installed. Identification must be performed by Windows prior to the users invoking the applications, as
specified in OE.WINDOWSACCESS.
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each Orion Server Web Service, NCM Web Service,
NCM Windows application and EOC Web Service user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.1.5 FIA_USB.1 User-Subject Binding
Refinement Rationale: The TOE provides multiple access mechanisms for users. The security attributes bound to a session for
the users vary based upon the mechanism. Therefore, iterations for this SFR are specified for each access
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mechanism. The collection of iterations addresses the user attribute definition for all TOE access
mechanisms.
FIA_USB.1.1(1) The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects
acting on behalf of that Orion Server Web Service user:
1. Username
2. Disable session timeout
3. Allow administrator rights (role)
4. Allow node management rights
5. Allow account to customize Views
6. Allow account to clear Events, acknowledge Alerts and Syslogs
7. Alert sound
8. Menu Bar assignments
9. Report folder
10. Credentials used to access the NCM server data via the NCM Integration Module
FIA_USB.1.2(1) The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of Orion Server Web Service users:
attributes are bound from the configured parameters for the identified user account.
FIA_USB.1.3(1) The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of Orion Server Web Service
users: User permissions (e.g. Allow administrator rights) are dynamically retrieved and re-
bound as interactions are invoked; Menu Bar assignments are re-bound whenever a Menu Bar
parameter is selected by the user; credentials used to access the NCM server data via the NCM
Integration Module may be modified if the user account has the Allow Account to Customize
Views permission; other subject attributes do not change during a session.
Application Note: Different security attributes are bound for different TOE access mechanisms. This iteration applies to
security attributes for users of the Orion Server Web Service.
FIA_USB.1.1(2) The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects
acting on behalf of that NCM Web Service or NCM Windows application user:
1. Username
2. Role
FIA_USB.1.2(2) The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of NCM Web Service or NCM Windows
application users: attributes are bound from the configured parameters for the identified user
account.
FIA_USB.1.3(2) The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of NCM Web Service or NCM
Windows application users: subject attributes do not change during a session.
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Application Note: Different security attributes are bound for different TOE access mechanisms. This iteration applies to
security attributes for users of the NCM Web Service and NCM Windows applications.
FIA_USB.1.1(3) The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects
acting on behalf of that EOC Web Service user:
1. Username
2. Role
3. Accessible Orion Servers
4. Orion Server Credentials user-supplied or admin-supplied
5. Orion Server credentials
FIA_USB.1.2(3) The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of EOC Web Service users: attributes are
bound from the configured parameters for the identified user account.
FIA_USB.1.3(3) The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of EOC Web Service users:
subject attributes do not change during a session.
Application Note: Different security attributes are bound for different TOE access mechanisms. This iteration applies to
security attributes for users of the EOC Web Service.
FIA_USB.1.1(4) The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects
acting on behalf of that Orion Windows applications user:
1. Role (Windows Application Administrator)
FIA_USB.1.2(4) The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of Orion Windows applications users: the
role is implied by use of the access mechanism.
FIA_USB.1.3(4) The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of Orion Windows applications
users: subject attributes do not change during a session.
Application Note: Different security attributes are bound for different TOE access mechanisms. This iteration applies to
security attributes for users of the Orion Windows applications.
6.1.2 Security Management (FMT)
6.1.2.1 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
Application Note: The TOE provides multiple management access mechanisms for users. The TSF data privileges for the users
vary based upon the mechanism. Therefore, iterations for this SFR are specified for each access mechanism.
The collection of iterations addresses the TSF data privileges for all TOE access mechanisms. If a TSF data
item is not included in the table accompanying the SFR iteration, then no access to that TSF data item is
provided via the TOE access mechanism.
FMT_MTD.1.1(1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to query, modify, delete, clear, create,
acknowledge the Orion Server TSF data specified in the following table to users with the roles
and permissions specified in the following table.
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Application Note: Different TSF data privileges are enforced for different TOE access mechanisms. This iteration applies to
TSF data for Orion Servers.
Application Note: Orion Administrators are authorized Orion Server Web Service user accounts with the Allow Administrator
Rights parameter value set.
Table 12 - Orion Server TSF Data Detail
TSF Data Windows
Application
Administrator
Orion
Administrator
Orion User
Alert Configuration Query, Modify None None
Alerts None Query.
Acknowledge if the
“Allow Account to Clear
Events and Acknowledge
Alerts” account parameter
is set
Query.
Acknowledge if the
“Allow Account to Clear
Events and Acknowledge
Alerts” account parameter
is set
APM Settings None Query and Modify None
Application Monitor
Templates
None Query and Modify None
Assigned Application
Monitors
None Query and Modify None
Assigned Component
Monitors
None Query and Modify None
CLI Credential Sets None Query
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow Node
Management Rights”
account parameter is set
Query
Component Monitors None Query and Modify None
Events None Query.
Acknowledge if the
“Allow Account to Clear
Events and Acknowledge
Alerts” account parameter
is set
Query.
Acknowledge if the
“Allow Account to Clear
Events and Acknowledge
Alerts” account parameter
is set
Groups None Query
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow Node
Management Rights”
account parameter is set
Query
Ignore List None Query
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow Node
Management Rights”
account parameter is set
Query
IP SLA CallManager
Nodes
None Query.
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow
Administrator Rights”
account parameter is set
Query.
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TSF Data Windows
Application
Administrator
Orion
Administrator
Orion User
IP SLA Operations None Query
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow
Administrator Rights”
account parameter is set
Query
IP SLA Settings None Query
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow
Administrator Rights”
account parameter is set
None
IP SLA VoIP Nodes None Query.
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow
Administrator Rights”
account parameter is set
Query.
IPAM Addresses and
Subnets
None Query
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow
Administrator Rights”
account parameter is set
Query
IPAM DHCP Scopes None Query
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow
Administrator Rights”
account parameter is set
Query
IPAM Settings None Query
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow
Administrator Rights”
account parameter is set
None
NCM Integration Module
Configurations
None Query and Modify None
NetFlow Sources None Query, Create, Modify
and Delete
Query
Network Devices None Query.
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow Node
Management Rights”
account parameter is set
Query.
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow Node
Management Rights”
account parameter is set
NTA Settings None Query and Modify None
Polling Settings None Query and Modify None
Report Configurations Query, Create, Modify
and Delete
None None
Reports None Query, limited to Reports
in the folder configured
for the user account
Query, limited to Reports
in the folder configured
for the user account
SNMP Credential Sets None Query
Create, Modify and
Delete if the “Allow Node
Management Rights”
account parameter is set
Query
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TSF Data Windows
Application
Administrator
Orion
Administrator
Orion User
Syslogs None Query.
Acknowledge if the
“Allow Account to Clear
Events and Acknowledge
Alerts” account parameter
is set
Query.
Acknowledge if the
“Allow Account to Clear
Events and Acknowledge
Alerts” account parameter
is set
Thresholds None Query and Modify None
Traps None Query Query
User Accounts None Query, Create, Modify
and Delete
None
Modify their own
credentials used to access
the NCM server data via
the NCM Integration
Module if the “Allow
Account to Customize
Views” account parameter
is set
Views None Query.
Modify if the “Allow
Account to Clear Events
and Acknowledge Alerts”
account parameter is set
Query.
Modify if the “Allow
Account to Clear Events
and Acknowledge Alerts”
account parameter is set
Web Console Settings None Query and Modify None
FMT_MTD.1.1(2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to query, modify, delete, create, execute,
and schedule the NCM Server TSF data specified in the following table to users with the roles
and permissions specified in the following table.
Application Note: Different TSF data privileges are enforced for different TOE access mechanisms. This iteration applies to
TSF data for NCM Servers.
Table 13 - NCM Server TSF Data Detail
TSF Data
Administrator
Engineer
Web
Downloader
Web
Uploader
Web
Viewer
Config Change
Templates
Query, Create,
Modify, Delete,
and Execute
Query, Create,
Modify, Delete,
and Execute
None Query, Create,
Modify, Delete,
and Execute
None
Default
Communication
Parameters
Modify None None None None
Default NCM Alert Modify Modify None None None
Device
Configuration Files
Download,
Upload, Query,
Modify
Download,
Upload, Query,
Modify
Download,
Query
Download,
Upload, Query,
Modify
Query
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TSF Data
Administrator
Engineer
Web
Downloader
Web
Uploader
Web
Viewer
Groups Query, Create,
Modify, and
Delete
Query, Create,
Modify, and
Delete
Query Query Query
Inventory Settings Modify Modify None None None
Jobs Query and
Create
Query and
Create
None None None
NCM Settings Modify Modify None None None
Nodes Modify Modify Query Query Query
Reports Query, Create,
Modify, Delete,
and Schedule
Query, Create,
Modify, Delete,
and Schedule
None None None
SNMP Trap Server
Settings
Modify None None None None
Syslog Server
Settings
Modify None None None None
User Accounts Query, Create,
Modify, and
Delete
None None None None
FMT_MTD.1.1(3) The TSF shall restrict the ability to query, modify, delete, create, access the
EOC Server TSF data specified in the following table to users with the roles and permissions
specified in the following table.
Application Note: Different TSF data privileges are enforced for different TOE access mechanisms. This iteration applies to
TSF data for EOC Servers.
Table 14 - EOC Server TSF Data Detail
TSF Data Administrator Non-Administrator
EOC User Accounts Query, Create, Modify, and Delete None
Menu Bars Query, Create, Modify, Delete, and
Access
Access
Orion Servers Query, Create, Modify, Delete, and
Access
Access
Roles Query, Create, Modify, and Delete None
6.1.2.2 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. User Account management
2. TOE settings management
3. Managed Element management
4. Alert management
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5. Alert, Event, Syslog, and Trap review
6. Device configuration management.
6.1.2.3 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Orion Server Web Services user:
a. Orion Administrator
b. Orion User
2. NCM Web Services or NCM Windows application user:
a. Administrator
b. Engineer
c. Web Downloader
d. Web Uploader
e. Web Viewer
3. EOC Web Services user:
a. Administrator
b. Guest
c. Other roles created by an Administrator
4. Orion Windows application user:
a. Windows Application Administrator.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.1.3 Network Management (FNM)
6.1.3.1 FNM_MDC.1 Monitor Data Collection
FNM_MDC.1.1 The TSF shall be able to store configuration, status and performance
information received via real-time feeds and/or polling.
6.1.3.2 FNM_ANL.1Monitor Analysis
FNM_ANL.1.1 The TSF shall perform the following analysis function(s) on all status and
performance information received from managed elements:
1. Status changes;
2. Threshold values exceeded;
3. Configuration changed; and
4. Configured conditions satisfied.
6.1.3.3 FNM_RCT.1 Management React
FNM_RCT.1.1 The TSF shall perform the specified alert action(s) when conditions specified by
an administrator are detected.
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6.1.3.4 FNM_RDR.1Restricted Data Review
FNM_RDR.1.1(1) The TSF shall provide authorized Orion Web Service users with the
capability to read Monitor data from the Monitor data.
FNM_RDR.1.2(1) The TSF shall provide the Monitor data in a manner suitable for the user to
interpret the information.
FNM_RDR.1.3(1) The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the Monitor data, except those
users that have been granted explicit read-access.
FNM_RDR.1.1(2) The TSF shall provide authorized NCM Web Service users with the capability
to read configuration data from the Monitor data.
FNM_RDR.1.2(2) The TSF shall provide the Monitor data in a manner suitable for the user to
interpret the information.
FNM_RDR.1.3(2) The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the Monitor data, except those
users that have been granted explicit read-access.
FNM_RDR.1.1(3) The TSF shall provide authorized EOC Web Service users with the capability
to read Monitor data from Orion Servers the user is authorized to access from the Monitor data.
FNM_RDR.1.2(3) The TSF shall provide the Monitor data in a manner suitable for the user to
interpret the information.
FNM_RDR.1.3(3) The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the Monitor data, except those
users that have been granted explicit read-access.
6.1.3.5 FNM_STG.1 Guarantee of Monitor Data Availability
FNM_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored Monitor data from unauthorised deletion within
the TSC.
FNM_ STG.1.2 The TSF shall protect the stored Monitor data from modification within the
TSC.
Application Note: Authorised deletion of data is not considered a modification of Monitor data in this context. This requirement
applies to the actual content of the Monitor data, which should be protected from any modifications.
6.1.3.6 FNM_STG.2 Prevention of Monitor Data Loss
FNM_STG.2.1 The TSF shall ignore Monitor data if the storage capacity has been reached.
6.1.4 TOE Access (FTA)
6.1.4.1 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-Initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a configured inactivity time
for Orion Web Service users, unless the inactivity timer functionality is disabled for the user
account.
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6.1.5 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
6.1.5.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted
IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for uploading
configuration files, executing commands and scripts on the Managed Elements, polling managed
elements using WMI.
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The TOE meets the assurance requirements for EAL2. These requirements are summarised in
the following table.
Table 15 - EAL2 Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Component ID Component Title
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional
specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-Cycle Support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
6.3 CC Component Hierarchies and Dependencies
This section of the ST demonstrates that the identified SFRs include the appropriate hierarchy
and dependencies. The following table lists the TOE SFRs and the SFRs each are hierarchical
to, dependent upon and any necessary rationale.
Table 16 - TOE SFR Dependency Rationale
SFR Hierarchical To Dependency Rationale
FIA_ATD.1 No other components. None n/a
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Satisfied by FIA_UID.2
FIA_UAU.7 No other components. FIA_UAU.1 Satisfied by FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UID.2 FIA_UID.1 None n/a
FIA_USB.1 No other components. FIA_ATD.1 Satisfied
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SFR Hierarchical To Dependency Rationale
FMT_MTD.1 No other components. FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
Satisfied,
Satisfied
FMT_SMF.1 No other components. None n/a
FMT_SMR.1 No other components. FIA_UID.1 Satisfied by FIA_UID.2
FNM_MDC.1 No other components. None n/a
FNM_ANL.1 No other components. FNM_MDC.1 Satisfied
FNM_RCT.1 No other components. FNM_ANL.1 Satisfied
FNM_RDR.1 No other components. FNM_MDC.1,
FNM_ANL.1
Satisfied,
Satisfied
FNM_STG.1 No other components. FNM_MDC.1,
FNM_ANL.1
Satisfied,
Satisfied
FNM_STG.2 No other components. FNM_MDC.1,
FNM_ANL.1
Satisfied,
Satisfied
FTA_SSL.3 No other components. None n/a
FTP_ITC.1 No other components. None n/a
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7. TOE Summary Specification
7.1 Security Functions
7.1.1 Identification and Authentication
Relevant SFRs: FIA_ATD.1(*), FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2, FIA_USB.1(*),
FTA_SSL.3, FTP_ITC.1
The TOE provides the following access mechanism for users to interact with the TOE:
1. Orion Server Web Service
2. NCM Web Service
3. EOC Web Service
4. Orion Windows applications invoked on servers hosting TOE components
5. NCM Windows applications
The first three mechanisms are accessed via web browsers from remote IT systems, while the last
two are accessed by users from the local keyboard/display on the servers hosting the TOE
components.
When a connection is established to the Orion Server Web Service, the TOE collects a username
and password from the user. A dot (“•”) is echoed for each character supplied for the password
(FIA_UAU.7). Once the credentials are supplied, they are validated by the TOE (FIA_UID.2,
FIA_UAU.2). If the credentials are not valid, the user account is not enabled, or the user account
has expired, an error message is displayed and the user may try again. If the credentials are
valid, the security attributes configured for the supplied username (FIA_ATD.1) are bound to the
session (FIA_USB.1) and the user is given access to the management functions. The attributes
bound to the session are specified in FIA_USB.1(1). Sessions are automatically terminated after
the configured inactivity time, unless the timeout mechanism is disabled for the user account
(FTA_SSL.3).
When a connection is established to the NCM Web Service or an NCM Windows application is
invoked, the TOE collects a username and password from the user. A dot (“•”) is echoed for
each character supplied for the password (FIA_UAU.7). Once the credentials are supplied, they
are passed to the host operating system (Windows) for validation. If the credentials are not valid,
an error message is displayed and the user may try again. If the credentials are valid, the
supplied username is checked against the user accounts defined for NCM (FIA_UID.2). If the
account is not defined, an error message is displayed and the user may try again. If the user
account is defined, the security attributes configured for the supplied username (FIA_ATD.1) are
bound to the session (FIA_USB.1) and the user is given access to the management functions.
The attributes bound to the session are specified in FIA_USB.1(2).
When a connection is established to the EOC Web Service, the TOE collects a username and
password from the user. A dot (“•”) is echoed for each character supplied for the password
(FIA_UAU.7). Once the credentials are supplied, they are passed to the host operating system
(Windows) for validation. If the credentials are not valid, an error message is displayed and the
user may try again. If the credentials are valid, the supplied username is checked against the user
accounts defined for the web service (FIA_UID.2). If the account is not defined, an error
message is displayed and the user may try again. If the user account is defined, the security
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attributes configured for the supplied username (FIA_ATD.1) are bound to the session
(FIA_USB.1) and the user is given access to the management functions. The attributes bound to
the session are specified in FIA_USB.1(3).
When the Orion Server is invoked via a Windows application, the TOE does not perform any
I&A function. The user is required to have been identified by Windows (per
OE.WINDOWSACCESS). The role bound to all users of this access mechanism is set to the
Windows Application Administrator role (FIA_USB.1).
When a user of the EOC Web Service accesses data from an Orion Server, credentials for the
user are automatically sent to the server on behalf of the user. If the user account is configured
to use the configured credentials, the credentials used are those configured for the user account.
Otherwise, the user is prompted for the credentials to send. A dot (“•”) is echoed for each
character supplied for the password (FIA_UAU.7). Connections from the EOC Server to the
Orion Servers (FTP_ITC.1) use SSL functionality (provided by the operational environment per
OE.SSL) to protect the credentials from disclosure.
When a user of the EOC Web Service or Orion Server Web Service accesses configuration data
(related to NCM) for a Managed Element, the NCM user account credentials configured for the
Orion Server user account are transparently provided to the NCM Server on behalf of the EOC
Web Service or Orion Server Web Service user. If no NCM credentials have been configured,
the TOE collects a username and password from the user if the Orion user account has the Allow
Account to Customize Views permission. A dot (“•”) is echoed for each character supplied for
the password (FIA_UAU.7). Once the credentials are supplied, they are passed to the host
operating system (Windows) for validation. If the credentials are not valid, an error message is
displayed and the user may try again. If the credentials are valid, the supplied username is
checked against the user accounts defined for NCM (FIA_UID.2). If the account is not defined,
an error message is displayed and the user may try again. If the user account is defined, the
security attributes configured for the supplied username (FIA_ATD.1) are bound to the session
(FIA_USB.1) and the user is given access to the management functions. The attributes bound to
the session are specified in FIA_USB.1(2). If the Orion user account does not have the Allow
Account to Customize Views permission, the user may not specify NCM credentials and
therefore may not access NCM via the integration module.
7.1.2 Management
Relevant SFRs: FMT_MTD.1(*), FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
Management functionality is available to authorized users through the Orion Server Web
Service, the NCM Web Service, the EOC Web Service, and Windows applications invoked on
the Orion Servers. The management functionality available to users is specified in FMT_SMF.1.
The functionality made available to individual users is dependent on their roles, which vary
based upon the TOE access mechanism being used. The roles are specified in FMT_SMR.1, and
the functionality available to each role is specified in FMT_MTD.1(*).
7.1.3 Network Monitoring
Relevant SFRs: FNM_ANL.1, FNM_MDC.1, FNM_RCT.1, FNM_RDR.1(*),
FNM_STG.1, FNM_STG.2, FTP_ITC.1
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Network monitoring is performed against Managed Elements by Orion Servers. The types of
monitoring is dependent on the TOE modules installed on the Orion Servers, and may include
nodes, interfaces, servers, applications, IP address space, network flows, and SLAs.
Performance monitoring is performed by sending ICMP and/or SNMP messages to the Managed
Elements to determine configuration information and retrieve status and statistics information
(FNM_MDC.1). Status information may also be determined from Syslog and/or SNMP Trap
messages received from the Managed Elements, or via WMI exchanges to determine information
about servers and applications. Connections from the Orion Servers to the Managed Elements to
upload configuration files, execute scripts or retrieve information via WMI (FTP_ITC.1) use
SSL functionality (provided by the operational environment per OE.SSL) to protect the
information (including credentials) from disclosure, using cryptographic functionality (provided
by the operational environment per OE.CRYPTO). Syslog information sent by the managed
elements to the TOE may be protected via SSL (FTP_ITC.1), using cryptographic functionality
(provided by the operational environment per OE.CRYPTO).
Information collected from the managed elements is analyzed (FNM_ANL.1). The results of the
analysis are available to users of the TOE via Views (FNM_RDR.1). Events are generated to
record status changes or configured threshold values being met concerning the managed
elements (FNM_ANL.1), and Alerts may be generated based upon conditions detected on the
managed elements (FNM_RCT.1). Alerts may cause notifications to be sent to configured
destinations, scripts to be executed on the managed elements, or configuration files to be
uploaded to the managed elements.
The results of the analysis are available to users of the TOE via Views (FNM_RDR.1). Views
may be accessed via the Orion Server Web Service, which provides information concerning
Managed Elements configured in a specific Orion Server instance; the EOC Web Service, which
provides aggregated information from one or more Orion Server instances, depending on the
configuration for individual EOC Web Service users; or the NCM Web Service, which provides
information concerning Managed Elements configured in a specific NCM Server instance.
Access privileges for status and analysis information maintained by the Orion Server is
determined by the user account privileges configured for each authorized Orion Server user
account. Access privileges for status and configuration information maintained by the NCM
Server is determined by the user account privileges configured for each authorized NCM Server
user account. When an Orion Server Web Service user accesses NCM Server information, the
NCM Integration Module acts as a proxy and transparently supplies the configured NCM user
account credentials to the NCM Web Service on behalf of the Orion Server Web Service user.
The information collected from the managed elements, as well as the analysis results, is saved in
the TOE database and may be reviewed by authorized users (FNM_STG.1, FNM_STG.2). The
TOE does not provide any direct database access to Orion Server Web Service, EOC Web
Service, or NCM Web Service users, and the mediated access does not provide any mechanism
to modify the Monitor data. The only mechanism provided to delete Monitor data is via the
configuration of data retention policies by authorized administrators.
In the unlikely event that the storage capacity of the database is exhausted, the existing
information in the database is maintained and new Monitor data is discarded.
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7.1.4 Configuration Management
Relevant SFRs: FMT_MTD.1(2), FNM_ANL.1, FNM_RCT.1, FTP_ITC.1
The TOE downloads configuration files from network nodes either on command by an
authorized NCM user or according to scheduled NCM jobs (FMT_MTD.1). Configuration files
may also be uploaded to network nodes on command by an authorized NCM user or according to
scheduled NCM jobs (FMT_MTD.1). Configuration file uploads are protected (FTP_ITC.1),
using cryptographic functionality (provided by the operational environment per OE.CRYPTO).
When configuration files are downloaded, they may be compared to previously downloaded files
to detect changes (FNM_ANL.1). Syslog messages received from the network nodes may also
be analyzed to detect configuration changes (FNM_ANL.1). Detection of a configuration
change can trigger the upload of a configuration file to a network node (FNM_RCT.1).
Configuration file uploads are protected (FTP_ITC.1), using cryptographic functionality
(provided by the operational environment per OE.CRYPTO).
The TOE provides SFTP and SCP server functionality for configuration file downloads
(FTP_ITC.1), using cryptographic functionality (provided by the operational environment per
OE.CRYPTO).
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8. Rationale
This chapter provides the rationale for the selection of the IT security requirements, objectives,
assumptions and threats. It shows that the IT security requirements are suitable to meet the
security objectives, Security Requirements, and TOE security functional.
8.1 Rationale for IT Security Objectives
This section of the ST demonstrates that the identified security objectives are covering all aspects
of the security needs. This includes showing that each threat and assumption is addressed by a
security objective.
The following table identifies for each threat and assumption, the security objective(s) that
address it.
Table 17 - Threats and Assumptions to Security Objectives Mapping
O.CHANNEL
O.CONFIG
O.MANAGE
O.MONITOR
O.PASSWORDS
O.TOE_ACCESS
OE.COMM
OE.CRYPTO
OE.DATABASE
OE.DBMONITOR
OE.ENVIRON
OE.INSTALL
OE.INTROP
OE.NETWORK
OE.NOEVILADMIN
OE.SSL
OE.WINDOWSACCESS
A.ACCESS X
A.ASCOPE X
A.DATABASE X
A.ENVIRON X
A.INSTALL X
A.NETWORK X
A.NOEVILADMIN X
P.ACCESS X X X
P.ANALYZ X X
P.DBMONITOR X
P.DISCLOSURE X X X X
P.INTGTY X
P.MANAGE X X
P.PASSWORDS X
T.MASQUERADE X X X
T.TSF_COMPROMISE X
The following table describes the rationale for the threats, assumptions and policies to security
objectives mapping.
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Table 18 - Threats, Assumptions and Policies to Security Objectives Rationale
x.TYPE Security Objectives Rationale
A.ACCESS The OE.INTROP objective ensures the TOE has the needed access.
A.ASCOPE The OE.INSTALL objective ensures the TOE is installed per the vendor guidance,
which addresses scalability.
A.DATABASE The OE.DATABASE objective ensures that access to any mechanisms outside the
TOE boundary that may be used to access the database is configured by the
administrators such that only authorized users may utilize the mechanisms.
A.ENVIRON OE.ENVIRON addresses this assumption by restating it as an objective for the
Administrator to satisfy.
A.INSTALL OE.INSTALL addresses this assumption by restating it as an objective for the
Administrator to satisfy.
A.NETWORK OE.NETWORK addresses this assumption by restating it as an objective for the
Administrator to satisfy.
A.NOEVILADM
IN
OE.NOEVILADMIN addresses this assumption by restating it as an objective for
the Administrator to satisfy.
P.ACCESS O.MANAGE defines the access privileges to the data for the supported roles.
O.TOE_ACCESS requires the TOE to control access based upon the user’s role.
OE.WINDOWSACCESS requires Windows to restrict access to Orion Server
functionality via Windows applications to users authorized to invoke TOE
functionality.
P.ANALYZ O.CONFIG requires the TOE to be able to compare configuration files for
managed elements to detect unexpected changes.
O.MONITOR requires the TOE to analyze information collected from the
managed elements to detect conditions specified by administrators.
P.DBMONITOR OE.DBMONITOR addresses this policy by restating it as an objective for the
Administrator to satisfy.
P.DISCLOSURE O.CHANNEL requires the TOE to use a trusted channel when sending credentials
to a managed element.
OE.COMM addresses the policy by requiring the environment to supply
functionality to protect the communication between TOE components.
OE.CRYPTO addresses the policy by requiring the environment to provide
cryptographic functionality in support of data protection protocols such as SSL.
OE.SSL addresses the policy by requiring the environment to provide SSL as a data
protection protocols.
P.INTGTY O.MANAGE requires the TOE to define the required functionality, which also
implicitly defines the lack of functionality for modification of collected data.
P.MANAGE O.TOE_ACCESS requires the TOE to control access based upon the user’s role,
which requires the TOE to bind a role to each user’s session.
OE.WINDOWSACCESS requires Windows to restrict access to Orion Server
functionality via Windows applications to users authorized to invoke TOE
functionality.
P.PASSWORDS O.PASSWORDS addresses this policy by requiring the TOE to provide
functionality for Administrators, but not non-Administrators, to configure
passwords.
T.MASQUERAD
E
O.TOE_ACCESS mitigates this threat by controlling the logical access to the TOE
and its resources. By constraining how and when authorized users can access the
TOE this objective helps mitigate the possibility of a user attempting to login and
masquerade as an authorized user.
OE.COMM mitigates this threat by protecting TSF data from disclosure when it is
transferred between distributed components of the TOE.
OE.WINDOWSACCESS requires Windows to identify and authenticate users
before they access Orion Server functionality via Windows applications.
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x.TYPE Security Objectives Rationale
T.TSF_COMPR
OMISE
O.MANAGE is necessary because an access control policy is not specified to
control access to TSF data. This objective is used to dictate who is able to view and
modify TSF data.
OE.OS_ PROTECTION contributes to countering this threat by ensuring that the
OS can protect itself from users within its control. If the OS could not maintain and
control its domain of execution, it could not be trusted to control access to the
resources under its control, which includes the executable code of the TOE.
8.2 Security Requirements Rationale
8.2.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives
This section provides rationale for the Security Functional Requirements demonstrating that the
SFRs are suitable to address the security objectives.
The following table identifies for each TOE security objective, the SFR(s) that address it.
Table 19 - SFRs to Security Objectives Mapping
O.CHANNEL
O.CONFIG
O.MANAGE
O.MONITOR
O.PASSWORDS
O.TOE_ACCESS
FIA_ATD.1 X X
FIA_UAU.2 X
FIA_UAU.7 X
FIA_UID.2 X
FIA_USB.1 X
FMT_MTD.1 X X X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_SMR.1 X X
FNM_MDC.1 X X
FNM_ANL.1 X X
FNM_RCT.1 X
FNM_RDR.1 X X X
FNM_STG.1 X X
FNM_STG.2 X X
FTA_SSL.3 X
FTP_ITC.1 X
The following table provides the detail of TOE security objective(s).
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Table 20 - Security Objectives to SFR Rationale
Security
Objective
SFR and Rationale
O.CHANNEL FTP_ITC.1 requires the TOE to use protected channels for specific operations that
could otherwise expose sensitive data.
O.CONFIG FMT_MTD.1(*) defines the roles that may perform configuration management
operations with the managed elements.
FNM_ANL.1 requires the TOE be able to compare configuration files for managed
elements.
FNM_MDC.1 requires the TOE be able to upload, download, and compare
configuration files for managed elements.
FNM_RDR.1 requires that configuration file comparisons (analysis results) be able
to be viewed in human readable form.
FNM_STG.1 requires the TOE to protect configuration files from modification or
unauthorized deletion.
FNM_STG.2 defines the behavior of the TOE if space in the database is not
available to save a configuration file.
O.MANAGE FIA_ATD.1(*) define the security attributes that must be able to be managed for
users of the TOE.
FMT_MTD.1(*) define the data access privileges associated with each role.
FMT_SMF.1 defines the specific security management functions to be supported.
FMT_SMR.1 defines the specific security roles to be supported.
FNM_RDR.1 requires the TOE to provide information collected from managed
elements to be displayed in human readable form.
O.MONITOR FNM_MDC.1 requires the TOE be able to collect and save information about the
managed elements
FNM_ANL.1 requires the TOE to be able to analyze the information collected
about the managed elements.
FNM_RCT.1 requires the TOE be able to generate alerts upon detection of
configured conditions concerning the managed elements.
FNM_RDR.1 requires that data collected about the managed elements and analysis
results be able to be viewed in human readable form.
FNM_STG.1 requires the TOE to protect configuration files from modification or
unauthorized deletion.
FNM_STG.2 defines the behavior of the TOE if space in the database is not
available to save a configuration file.
O.PASSWORDS FMT_MTD.1(*) define the access privileges for Administrators and non-
Administrators, explicitly stating that only Administrators may configure passwords
for User Accounts defined in the TOE.
FMT_SMR.1 defines the specific security roles to be supported.
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Security
Objective
SFR and Rationale
O.TOE_ACCESS FIA_ATD.1 defines the attributes of users, including a userid that is used by the
TOE to determine a user’s identity and enforce what type of access the user has to
the TOE (e.g., the TOE associates a userid with a role.
FIA_UID.2 requires that a user be identified to the TOE in order to access TOE
functionality or data.
FIA_UAU.2 requires that a user of the Orion Server Web Service be authenticated
by the TOE before accessing TOE functionality or data.
FIA_UAU.7 provides that the authentication data provided by the user is not
echoed back in plaintext, thus serving to protect that data.
FIA_USB.1(*) defines the attributes that are bound to user sessions for the access
mechanisms provided by the TOE.
FTA_SSL.3 requires the TOE to automatically terminate user sessions that are
inactive, which protects against unauthorized users gaining access via a “forgotten”
session.
8.2.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The TOE stresses assurance through vendor actions that are within the bounds of current best
commercial practice. The TOE provides, primarily via review of vendor-supplied evidence,
independent confirmation that these actions have been competently performed.
The general level of assurance for the TOE is:
A) Consistent with current best commercial practice for IT development and provides
a product that is competitive against non-evaluated products with respect to
functionality, performance, cost, and time-to-market.
B) The TOE assurance also meets current constraints on widespread acceptance, by
expressing its claims against EAL2 from part 3 of the Common Criteria.