Security Target for Symantec Enterprise Firewall Version 8.0 Reference: T462\ST July 2004 Issue: 1.0 Symantec Corporation 266 Second Avenue Waltham, MA 02451 USA . Issue 1.0 Page 2 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST Copyright notice Copyright © 1998-2004 Symantec Corporation. All Rights Reserved. Any technical documentation that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyright work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation. No part of this publication may be copied without the express written permission of Symantec Corporation, 20330 Stevens Creek Blvd., Cupertino, CA 95014. Issue 1.0 Page 3 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST DOCUMENT AUTHORISATION Document Title Security Target for Symantec Enterprise Firewall Version 8.0 Reference Issue Date Description T462\ST 1.0 July 2004 Issued Page 4 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 Contents 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITY TARGET ....................................................................................... 9 1.1 SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION............................................................................................................. 9 1.2 SECURITY TARGET OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................... 9 1.3 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM .......................................................................................................................... 9 2 TOE DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................................... 10 2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE FIREWALL............................................................................. 10 2.2 SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES OF THE EVALUATED CONFIGURATION................................................................ 13 2.2.1 Physical Scope...................................................................................................................................... 13 2.2.2 Hardware and Software for the TOE ................................................................................................... 13 2.2.3 Hardware and Software Requirements for the SGMI........................................................................... 15 2.2.4 Hardware and Software for the Authentication Server........................................................................ 15 2.2.5 Outside of the Scope............................................................................................................................. 16 3 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT........................................................................................................................ 17 3.1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 17 3.2 THREATS.................................................................................................................................................... 17 3.2.1 Threats countered by the TOE.............................................................................................................. 17 3.2.2 Threats countered by the Operating Environment ............................................................................... 20 3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ...................................................................................................... 20 3.4 ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................................................................................ 20 4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.............................................................................................................................. 22 4.1 TOE SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................... 22 4.1.1 IT Security Objectives .......................................................................................................................... 22 4.2 ENVIRONMENT SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................... 25 4.2.1 IT Security Objectives .......................................................................................................................... 25 4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives................................................................................................................... 25 5 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS................................................................................................................. 27 5.1 TOE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................................ 27 5.1.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements............................................................................................... 27 5.2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE IT ENVIRONMENT .............................................................................. 39 5.3 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................ 42 5.4 STRENGTH OF FUNCTION CLAIM ................................................................................................................ 44 6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION............................................................................................................. 45 6.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS ....................................................................................................................... 45 6.1.1 Identification and Authentication Function ......................................................................................... 45 6.1.2 Management and Security Function..................................................................................................... 45 6.1.3 Audit Function...................................................................................................................................... 46 6.1.4 Protection of TOE security Functions.................................................................................................. 47 6.1.5 User Data Protection Function............................................................................................................ 47 6.2 IDENTIFICATION AND STRENGTH OF FUNCTION CLAIM FOR IT SECURITY FUNCTIONS................................ 51 6.3 ASSURANCE MEASURES............................................................................................................................. 52 7 PROTECTION PROFILES CLAIMS............................................................................................................ 53 8 RATIONALE.................................................................................................................................................... 54 8.1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 54 Issue 1.0 Page 5 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 8.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE RATIONALE ..................................................................................... 54 8.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE...................................................................................................... 61 8.3.1 Security Requirements are appropriate................................................................................................ 61 8.3.2 Environmental Security Requirements are appropriate....................................................................... 65 8.3.3 Security Requirement dependencies are satisfied................................................................................. 68 8.3.4 IT security functions satisfy SFRs......................................................................................................... 70 8.3.5 IT security functions mutually supportive ............................................................................................ 73 8.3.6 Justification of Explicit Requirements.................................................................................................. 73 8.3.7 Strength of Function claims are appropriate ....................................................................................... 73 8.3.8 Justification of Assurance Requirements.............................................................................................. 74 8.3.9 Assurance measures satisfy assurance requirements ........................................................................... 74 Page 6 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 REFERENCES [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.2, January 2004 (aligned with ISO 15408). Issue 1.0 Page 7 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST GLOSSARY AND TERMS Authentication data Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user. Authorised User A user, who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation. Authorised External IT entity Any IT product or system, outside the scope of the TOE that may administer the security parameters of the TOE. Such entities are not subject to any access control requirements once authenticated to the TOE and are therefore trusted to not compromise the security policy enforced by the TOE. BGE Broadcom Gigabit Ethernet CC Common Criteria External IT entity Any IT product or system, untrusted or trusted, outside of the TOE that interacts with the TOE. FSB Front Side Bus FTP File Transfer Protocol Human User Any person who interacts with the TOE IKE Internet Key Exchange IP Internet Protocol IT Information Technology Windows / Solaris Operating System The operating system used by the firewall. MAC Media Access Control NAT Network Address Translation PP Protection Profile RFC Request for Comments SEF Symantec Enterprise Firewall SESA Symantec Enterprise Security Architecure SFP Security Function Policy Page 8 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 SOF Strength of Function SGMI Symantec Gateway Management Interface SGMI client operating system The operating system on the workstation used by the SGMI to access the TOE. ST Security Target TCP Transmission Control Protocol TOE Target of Evaluation TSAP Transport Service Application Protocol TSC TSF Scope of Control TSF TOE Security Functions TSP TOE Security Policy TSS TOE Summary Specification User Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE. User data Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF. VPN Virtual Private Network Issue 1.0 Page 9 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 1 Introduction to the Security Target 1.1 Security Target Identification 1 Title: Security Target for Symantec Enterprise Firewall version 8.0, issue 1.0. 2 Assurance Level: EAL4, augmented with ALC_FLR.1. 1.2 Security Target Overview 3 The Symantec Enterprise Firewall is a Internet Protocol application and packet- filtering firewall. The application proxy provides connection services to the global Internet on behalf of hosts within a secured network; thus ensuring there is no direct connection between Internet and private networked hosts. The packet filtering allows the acceptance/refusal of data based on the attributes of the data packets. This assists the prevention of unauthorised services being accessed by Internet hosts. 1.3 CC Conformance Claim 4 This TOE has been developed using the functional components as defined in the Common Criteria version 2.2 [CC] part 2, with the assurance level of EAL4, augmented with ALC_FLR.1 as identified in part 3 of [CC]. 5 The TOE conforms to [CC] Part 2 extended and [CC] Part 3 conformant with the assurance level of EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.1. Page 10 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 2 TOE Description 2.1 Overview of the Symantec Enterprise Firewall 6 This section presents an overview of the Symantec Enterprise Firewall Version 8.0 to assist potential users in determining whether it meets their needs. 7 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Symantec Enterprise Firewall, and the Symantec Gateway Management Interface (SGMI) that is used to manage the firewall. The Symantec Enterprise Firewall Network Configuration is shown in Diagram 2-1. 8 The Symantec Enterprise Firewall is an application level firewall. The TOE uses a set of application-specific security proxies to validate each attempt to pass data in or out of the network it secures. This is substantially different from stateful packet filter firewalls that do not filter data at the application level. 9 The packets enter the TCP/IP stack of the Symantec Enterprise Firewall. Various scanning techniques are then applied and completed via the TCP/IP protocol stack. After all tests are completed, if there are no problems, the packets are allowed to flow out of the Symantec Enterprise Firewall to the next network segment. Issue 1.0 Page 11 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST Diagram 2-1: The Symantec Enterprise Firewall Network Configuration 10 The SGMI component provides administrative services to the SEF including policy, location, system-monitoring, settings and report generation. SGMI services can be accessed by supplying an administrator’s user name and password via a java based web browser connected to a dedicated NIC on the firewall and physically contained in the same room. There is no separate software to install. 11 The TOE’s security proxies perform the following functions: Page 12 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 Examine the contents of packets Allow or deny connection based on IP address, user, time, type of service, and the interface the connection came in on. Control direction and type of operations for applications. Log all session data. 12 In addition Symantec Enterprise firewall provides the following functions: Syn flooding attack protection; Denial of Service protection; Port scanning detection. 13 The TOE can be configured not to disclose IP addresses and for users to be unable to identify listening services. 14 For the evaluation four network interface cards will be used on the machine hosting the firewall. It is possible to identify each network interface as either ‘internal’ or ‘external’. If an interface is identified as external then the network to which it attaches is classed as being outside of the firewall. If an interface is identified as an internal interface then the network to which it attaches is classed as being inside (or behind) the firewall. 15 All traffic between each network attached to the TOE must flow through the Symantec Enterprise Firewall to maintain security. The protocols that are within the scope of the evaluation are: HTTPi UDP FTP Ping DNS TELNET SMTP NTP RTSP IP NNTP POP3 RealAudio TCP 16 The application proxies through the TOE that are within the scope of the evaluation are: HTTP FTP NNTP RealAudio DNS NTP TELNET SMTP i HTTP proxy supports WebDAV (Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning) Issue 1.0 Page 13 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 2.2 Scope and Boundaries of the Evaluated Configuration 17 The TOE configuration consists of: • The firewall itself; • The Symantec Gateway Management Interface (SGMI), which is used for local administration by the administrator; 2.2.1 Physical Scope 18 The physical scope of the TOE is identified in Table 2-1. Software Symantec Enterprise Firewall 8.0 with Symantec Gateway Management Interface Table 2-1: TOE Component Identification 2.2.2 Hardware and Software for the TOE 19 The required IT environment for the TOE is identified in Table 2-2. Issue 1.0 Page 14 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST Operating System Microsoft Windows Advanced Server 2000 with Service Pack 4. Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition Sun Solaris version 8 (64 bit) with all patches installed up to 3rd September 2003 Sun Solaris version 9 (64 bit) with all patches installed up to 3rd September 2003 Network Interface cards a) Intel PRO/1000MT Dual Port Server Adaptor b) Intel PRO/1000MT Dual Port Server Adaptor c) Intel PRO/1000MT Dual Port Server Adaptor d) Intel PRO/1000MT Dual Port Server Adaptor a) Intel PRO/1000MT Dual Port Server Adaptor b) Intel PRO/1000MT Dual Port Server Adaptor c) Intel PRO/1000MT Dual Port Server Adaptor d) Intel PRO/1000MT Dual Port Server Adaptor 4 port SUN 10/100 PCI (qfe0, qfe1, qfe2 and qfe3) 4 x BGE card on Motherboard CPU P4 – 3066 MHz P4 – 3066 MHz 4 x SUNW UltraSparc III+ – 1 GHz SUNW UltraSparc IIIi – 1 GHz Memory 512 MB 512 MB 8 GB 1 GB Disk space 30 GB (ST340014A) 30 GB (ST340014A) 72 GB SUN 36 GB SUN Table 2-2: Tested Underlying Hardware of the TOE Issue 1.0 Page 15 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 2.2.3 Hardware and Software Requirements for the SGMI 20 The SGMI is the administration interface to the SEF and is part of the software on the firewall. It is accessible via an SGMI client workstation running a web browser. The SGMI client provides access to local administration of the TOE. Table 2-3 identifies the explicitly tested IT environment for the SGMI client. Software Microsoft Internet Explorer 6 (SP1) Java Plug in version 1.4.2_02 No TOE specific software has to be loaded onto the workstation in order for the workstation to run SGMI. Operating System Either Windows Advanced Server 2000 Service Pack 4 or Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition The choice of operating system for the SGMI Client is not dependant on the operating system hosting the TOE. Memory 512 MB Memory of RAM Table 2-3: IT Environment for the SGMI Client 21 If the Java Plug-in is not already installed in the browser, it can also be downloaded from the firewall. The SGMI applet is automatically downloaded directly from the firewall when an administrator connects the browser to the firewall for the first time. No TOE specific software is loaded onto the browser workstation. 22 The SGMI client hardware will be co-located with the Symantec Enterprise Firewall and have a direct link to it via a dedicated NIC. No other applications will be loaded onto it. 2.2.4 Hardware and Software for the Authentication Server 23 An authentication server is required for single-use authentication. A commercially available authentication server that is compatible with the Symantec Enterprise Firewall should be used. Page 16 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 2.2.5 Outside of the Scope 24 Software and hardware features outside the scope of the defined TOE Security Functions (TSF) and thus not evaluated are: Virtual Private Networking (VPN) functionality; Symantec Enterprise VPN Client; High availability/load balancing; User Authentication by one-time passwordii ; Wizards; H.323 Connections; Remote Administration; Content Filtering; Forward Filtering; Anti-spam; Secure Remote Login (SRL); Tomcat Web server; Live update support; Policy Configuration Manager; Anti-virus; SESA; Global IKE Policy; Event Manager. ii One time password authentication for Telnet/Ftp connections is provided by SecurID and Defender as part of the environment of the TOE. Issue 1.0 Page 17 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 3 Security Environment 3.1 Introduction 25 This section provides the statement of the TOE security environment, which identifies and explains all: 1. known and presumed threats countered by either the TOE or by the security environment; 2. organisational security policies the TOE must comply with; 3. assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE, including physical, personnel and connectivity aspects. 26 Within the evaluation references are made to two operating systems, the firewall operating system and the operating system used by the SGMI client. In order to distinguish between the two operating systems, the firewall operating system is referred to as the "Windows / Solaris Operating System", while the operating system on the workstation used by the SGMI client is referred to as the "SGMI client operating system". 3.2 Threats 27 This section identifies the threats to the IT assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by the security environment. 3.2.1 Threats countered by the TOE 28 The IT assets requiring protection are the services provided by, and data accessible via, hosts on the internal network (or networks if there are multiple network interfaces on the TOE configured as being behind the firewall). 29 The general threats to be countered are: • attackers outside of the protection of the TOE who may gain unauthorised access to resources within the internal network; • users on the internal network who may inappropriately expose data or resources to the external network. 30 If the TOE is configured to provide separation between different internal networks then the following general threats will also need to be countered: Page 18 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 • a user on one of the internal networks who may gain unauthorised access to resources on another of the internal networks; • a user on one of the internal networks who may expose data or resources to users on other internal networks. 31 The threats that must be countered by the TOE are listed below. T.NOAUTH An unauthorised person may attempt to bypass the security of the TOE so as to access and use security function and/or non-security functions provided by the TOE. T.REPEAT An unauthorised person may repeatedly try to guess authentication data in order to use this information to launch attacks on the TOE. T.REPLAY An unauthorised person may use valid identification and authentication data obtained to access functions provided by the TOE. T.ASPOOF An unauthorised person on an external network may attempt to by-pass the information flow control policy by disguising authentication data (e.g. spoofing the source address) and masquerading as a legitimate user or entity on an internal network. T.MEDIAT An unauthorised person may send impermissible information through the TOE that results in the exploitation of resources on the internal network. T.OLDINF Because of a flaw in the TOE functioning, an unauthorised person may gather residual information from a previous information flow or internal TOE data by monitoring the padding of the information flows from the TOE. T.AUDACC Persons may not be accountable for the actions that they conduct because the audit records are not reviewed, thus allowing an attacker to escape detection. T.SELPRO An unauthorised person may read, modify, or destroy security critical TOE configuration data. T.AUDFUL An unauthorised person may cause audit records to be lost or prevent future records from being recorded by taking actions to exhaust audit storage capacity, thus masking an attacker actions. Issue 1.0 Page 19 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST T.LOWEXP The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable vulnerabilities is considered low. 32 The following table identifies the threats that are partially met by the TOE. Threats Partially met by the TOE Reasons T.NOAUTH Part of the security for the TOE is performed by the SGMI client operating system, and the authentication server. This threat is partially met by the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server. T.SELPRO The Windows / Solaris operating system protects certain TOE sensitive data, for example the audit data. This threat is partially met by the Windows / Solaris Operating System. T.AUDFUL The Windows / Solaris operating system provides part of the auditing for the TOE. This threat is partially met by the Windows / Solaris Operating System. T.AUDACC The Windows / Solaris Operating System provides part of the auditing for the TOE. This threat is partially met by the Windows / Solaris Operating System. T.REPEAT This threat is partially met by the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server, as authentication is performed by the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server T.REPLAY This threat is partially met by the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server, as authentication is performed by the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server. T.LOWEXP As part of the security for the TOE is performed by the Windows / Solaris Operating System, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server this threat is partially met by the Windows / Solaris Operating System, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server. Table 3-1 Threats partially met by the TOE and IT Environment Page 20 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 3.2.2 Threats countered by the Operating Environment 33 The threats that must be countered by technical and/or non-technical measures in the IT environment, or must be accepted as potential security risks are listed below. TE.USAGE The TOE may be inadvertently configured, used and administered in an insecure manner by either authorised or unauthorised persons. 34 Table 3-1 identifies the threats that are partially met by the operating environment. 3.3 Organizational Security Policies 35 There are no organizational security policies or rules with which the TOE must comply. 3.4 Assumptions 36 The following assumptions are assumed to exist. A.PHYSEC The TOE, SGMI client operating system and authentication server are physically protected to prevent unauthorised users. Only authorised administrators have physical access to the TOE, SGMI client operating system and the authentication server. A.LOWEXP The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable vulnerabilities is considered low. A.GENPUR There are no general-purpose computing (e.g. the ability to execute arbitrary code or application) and storage repository capabilities on the TOE, SGMI client operating system or authentication server. A.PUBLIC The TOE, SGMI client operating system and authentication server do not host public data. A.NOEVIL Authorised administrators for the TOE, SGMI client operating system and authentication server are non- hostile and follow all administrator guidance; however, they are capable of error. A.SINGEN Information can not flow among the internal and external networks unless it passes through the TOE. Issue 1.0 Page 21 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST A.DIRECT Human users within the physically secure boundary protecting the TOE may attempt to access the TOE from some direct connection (e.g. a console port) if the connection is part of the TOE. A.NOREMO Human users who are not authorised administrators can not access the TOE, the SGMI client operating system or the authentication server remotely from the internal or external networks. A.REMOS The SGMI client operating system and the authentication server are delivered to the user’s site, installed and administered in a secure manner. A.COMMS The communication links between the TOE, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server are physically protected. Page 22 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 4 Security Objectives 4.1 TOE Security Objectives 4.1.1 IT Security Objectives 37 The principal IT security objective of the TOE is to reduce the vulnerabilities of an internal network exposed to an external network (or another internal network should there be multiple internal networks) by limiting the hosts and services available. Additionally, the TOE has the objective of providing the ability to monitor established connections and attempted connections between networks. 38 The IT security objectives are listed below. O.IDAUTH The TOE must uniquely authenticate all users, before granting a user access to certain specified services (FTP / Telnet), to a connected network. O.SINUSE The TOE must prevent the reuse of authentication data for users attempting to authenticate to the TOE from a connected network. O.MEDIAT The TOE must mediate the flow of all information between clients and servers located on internal and external networks governed by the TOE, and must ensure that residual information from a previous information flow is not transmitted in any way. O.SECSTA Upon initial start-up of the TOE or recovery from an interruption in TOE service, the TOE must not compromise its resources or those of any connected network. O.SELPRO The TOE must protect itself against attempts by unauthorised users to bypass, deactivate, or tamper with TOE security functions. O.AUDREC The TOE must provide a means to record a readable audit trail of security-related events, with accurate dates and times, and a means to search and sort the audit trail based on relevant attributes. O.ACCOUN The TOE must provide user accountability for information flows through the TOE and for authorised administrator use of security functions related to audit. Issue 1.0 Page 23 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST O.SECFUN The TOE must provide functionality that enables an authorised administrator to use the TOE security functions and must ensure that only authorised administrators are able to access such functionality. O.LIMEXT The TOE must provide the means for an authorised administrator to control and limit access to TOE security functions by an authorised external IT entity. O.EAL The TOE must be structurally tested and shown to be resistant to obvious vulnerabilities. 39 The following table identifies the IT Security objectives listed that are partially met by the IT environment. Partially met by IT Environment Reasons O.IDAUTH Part of the security of the TOE is provided by the authentication server using a Single-use authentication mechanism. O.SINUSE Part of the security of the TOE is provided by the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server using a Single-use authentication mechanism. O.SECSTA Part of the security of the TOE is provided by the Windows / Solaris Operating System, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server using a Single-use authentication mechanism. O.SELPRO Part of the security of the TOE is provided by the Windows / Solaris Operating System and the SGMI client operating system. O.AUDREC Part of the security of the TOE is provided by the Windows / Solaris Operating System. O.ACCOUN Part of the security of the TOE is provided by the Windows / Solaris Operating System. Page 24 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 O.SECFUN Part of the security of the TOE is provided by the Windows / Solaris Operating System, the SGMI client operating system, and the authentication server. O.LIMEXT Part of the security of the TOE is provided by the Windows / Solaris Operating System, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server. O.EAL Part of the security of the TOE is provided by the Windows / Solaris Operating System, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server Table 4-1 IT Security Objective partially met by IT Environment and TOE Issue 1.0 Page 25 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 4.2 Environment Security Objectives 4.2.1 IT Security Objectives 40 The following IT security objectives are met by the environment. OE.LOWEXP The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable vulnerabilities is considered low. OE.GENPUR There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g. the ability to execute arbitrary code or applications) and storage repository capabilities on the TOE, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server. OE.PUBLIC The TOE, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server do not host public data. OE.SINGEN Information can not flow among the internal and external networks unless it passes through the TOE. OE.NOREMO Human users who are not authorised administrators can not access the TOE, the SGMI client operating system or the authentication server remotely from the internal or external networks. 41 Table 4-1 identifies the IT security objectives that are partially met by the IT environment. 4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives 42 The non-IT environment security objectives are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative measures. OE.PHYSEC The TOE, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server must be physically protected so only authorised administrators have access. (The TOE must only be administered locally). OE.COMMS The communication links between the TOE, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server must be physically protected. Page 26 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 OE.NOEVIL Authorised administrators of the TOE, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server must be non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance; however, they may be capable of error. OE.DIRECT Human users within the physically secure boundary protecting the TOE may attempt to access the TOE from some direct connection (e.g. a console port) if the connection is part of the TOE. OE.GUIDAN The TOE must be delivered to the user's site, installed, administered, and operated in a manner that maintains security. OE.ADMTRA Authorised administrators must be trained as to establishment and maintenance of security policies and practices. OE.REMOS The SGMI client operating system and the authentication server must be delivered to the user's site, installed and administered in a secure manner. Issue 1.0 Page 27 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 5 IT Security Requirements 5.1 TOE Security Requirements 5.1.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements 43 The TOE security functional requirements consist of components from Part 2 of the CC and one explicitly stated requirement (FIA_UAU_SERV.1). They are listed in the following table, along with an indication of the requirements that are either fully or partially met by the TOE. Functional Components Partially / Fully met by the TOE FIA_UAU_SERV.1 Single-use authentication server Fully FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control (1) Fully FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control (2) Fully FDP_IFF.1 Simple Security Attributes (1) Fully FDP_IFF.1 Simple Security Attributes (2) Fully FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (1) Fully FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (2) Fully FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (3) Fully FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (4) Fully FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialisation Fully FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (1) Fully FPT_RVM.1 Non-Bypassability of the TSP Fully FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation Partially FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation Partially FAU_SAR.1 Audit review Fully Page 28 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 Functional Components Partially / Fully met by the TOE FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review Fully FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss Fully FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour (1) Fully FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour (2) Fully Table 5-1: Functional Requirements Identification and Authentication 44 This section addresses the requirements for functions to establish and verify a claimed user identity. This includes identification of any actions that the TOE may complete on the user’s behalf prior to identification or authentication. 45 Only an authorised administrator is able to interact directly with the Symantec Enterprise Firewall through the SGMI The authorised administrator is the only user who can log onto the Symantec Enterprise Firewall via the SGMI and access TSF data. The Symantec Enterprise Firewall provides a basic form of access control mechanisms for identification and authentication. 46 Unauthenticated users use services provided by the TOE but do not visibly interact with the TOE. In order to control service requests from unauthenticated users, basic identification of the request through source address of request identification is performed. Issue 1.0 Page 29 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 47 FIA_UAU_SERV.1 Single-use authentication serveriii FIA_UAU_SERV.1.1 The TSF shall invoke an authentication server to authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [following single authentication mechanism rule: a. single-use authentication mechanism shall be used for human users sending or receiving information through the TOE using FTP or Telnet such that successful authentication must be achieved before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that human user]. User Data Protection 48 This section specifies requirements for the TOE security functions and TOE security function policies relating to protecting user data. 49 Requirements Overview: This Security Target consists of multiple information flow control Security Function Policies (SFPs). The CC allows multiple policies to exist, each having a unique name. This is accomplished by iterating FDP_IFC.1 for each of the two named information flow control policies. The first policy identified is called the UNAUTHENTICATED SFP. The subjects under control of this policy are external IT entities on an internal or external network sending information through the TOE to other external IT entities. The second policy identified is called the AUTHENTICATED SFP. The subjects under control of this policy are human users on an internal or external network who must be authenticated at the TOE. The information flowing between subjects in both policies is traffic with attributes, defined in FDP_IFF.1.1, including source and destination addresses. The rules that define each information flow control SFP are found in FDP_IFF.1.2. Component FDP_IFF.1 is iterated twice to correspond to each of the two iterations of FDP_IFC.1. iii FIA_UAU_SERV.1 is an explicitly stated requirement. Page 30 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 50 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control (1) FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [UNAUTHENTICATED SFP] on: a) [subjects: unauthenticated external IT entities that send and receive information through the TOE to one another; b) information: traffic sent through the TOE from one subject to another; c) operation: pass information]. 51 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control (2) FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [AUTHENTICATED SFP] on: a) [subjects: a human user or external IT entity that sends and receives FTP and Telnet information through the TOE to one another, only after the human user initiating the information flow has authenticated via the mechanisms invoked by FIA_UAU_SERV.1; b) information: FTP and Telnet traffic sent through the TOE from one subject to another; c) operation: initiate service and pass information]. 52 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes (1)iv FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [UNAUTHENTICATED SFP] based on at least the following types of subject and information security attributes: a) [subject security attributes: • presumed address; • Port iv The complete set of functional elements of a component must be selected for inclusion in a ST. However, since the following functional elements from the FDP_IFF.1 (1) component do not add anything significant to the ST, they have been moved here to allow for a clearer, smoother flowing presentation of FDP_IFF.1(1). FDP_IFF.1.3 - The TSF shall enforce the [none]. FDP_IFF.1.4 - The TSF shall provide the following [none]. FDP_IFF.1.5 - The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [none]. Issue 1.0 Page 31 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST b) information security attributes: • presumed address of source subject; • presumed address of destination subject; • transport layer protocol; • TOE interface on which traffic arrives and departs; • service; •Time; •Address Transformation; •Service redirection; •Viability of application data; •URL blocking]. FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and another controlled subject via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: a) [Subjects on an internal network can cause information to flow through the TOE to another connected network if: • all the information security attribute values are unambiguously permitted by the information flow security policy rules, where such rules may be composed from all possible combinations of the values of the information flow security attributes, created by the authorised administrator; • the presumed address of the source subject, in the information, translates to an internal network address; • and the presumed address of the destination subject, in the information, translates to an address on the other connected network. b) Subjects on the external network can cause information to flow through the TOE to another connected network if: • all the information security attribute values are unambiguously permitted by the information flow security policy rules, where such rules may be composed from all possible combinations of the values of the information flow security attributes, created by the authorised administrator; • the presumed address of the source subject, in the information, translates to an external network Page 32 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 address; • and the presumed address of the destination subject, in the information, translates to an address on the other connected network.] FDP_IFF.1.6 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: a) [The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on an external TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on an internal network; b) The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on an internal TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on the external network; c) The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on either an internal or external TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on a broadcast network; d) The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on either an internal or external TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on the loopback network e) The TOE shall reject requests in which the subject specifies the route in which information shall flow en route to the receiving subject; and f) For application protocols supported by the TOE (e.g. DNS, HTTP, SMTP), the TOE shall deny any access or service requests that do not conform to its associated published protocol specification (e.g., RFC). This shall be accomplished through protocol filtering proxies that are designed for that purpose.] Issue 1.0 Page 33 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 53 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes (2)v FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [AUTHENTICATED SFP] based on at least the following types of subject and information security attributes: a) [subject security attributes: • presumed address; • Port b) information security attributes: • user identity; • presumed address of source subject; • presumed address of destination subject; • transport layer protocol; • TOE interface on which traffic arrives and departs; • service (i.e., FTP and Telnet); • security-relevant service command; • Time; • Address Transformation; • Service redirection; • Viability of application data; • Extended authentication methods; • URL blocking]. FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and another controlled subject via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: a) [Subjects on an internal network can cause information to flow through the TOE to another connected network if: • the human user initiating the information flow authenticates according to the mechanisms invoked by FIA_UAU_SERV.1; • all the information security attribute values are unambiguously permitted by the information flow security policy rules, where such rules may be v The complete set of functional elements of a component must be selected for inclusion in a ST. However, since the following functional elements from the FDP_IFF.1 (2) component do not add anything significant to the ST, they have been moved here to allow for a clearer, smoother flowing presentation of FDP_IFF.1 (2). FDP_IFF.1.3 - The TSF shall enforce the [none]. FDP_IFF.1.4 - The TSF shall provide the following [none]. FDP_IFF.1.5 - The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [none. Page 34 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 composed from all possible combinations of the values of the information flow security attributes, created by the authorised administrator; • the presumed address of the source subject, in the information, translates to an internal network address; • and the presumed address of the destination subject, in the information, translates to an address on the other connected network. b) Subjects on the external network can cause information to flow through the TOE to another connected network if: • the human user initiating the information flow authenticates according to the mechanisms invoked by FIA_UAU_SERV.1; • all the information security attribute values are unambiguously permitted by the information flow security policy rules, where such rules may be composed from all possible combinations of the values of the information flow security attributes, created by the authorised administrator; • the presumed address of the source subject, in the information, translates to an external network address; and • the presumed address of the destination subject, in the information, translates to an address on the other connected network.] FDP_IFF.1.6 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: a) [The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on an external TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on an internal network; b) The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on an internal TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on the external network; c) The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on either an internal or external TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on a broadcast network; Issue 1.0 Page 35 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST d) The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on either an internal or external TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on the loopback network e) The TOE shall reject requests in which the subject specifies the route in which information shall flow en route to the receiving subject; and f) The TOE shall reject Telnet or FTP command requests that do not conform to generally accepted published protocol definitions (e.g. RFCs). This must be accompanied through protocol filtering proxies designed for that purpose.] Security Management 54 This section defines requirements for the management of security attributes that are used to enforce the TSF. 55 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior (1) FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable, disable, the functions: a) [ operation of the TOE; b) single use authentication functions described in FIA_UAU.SERV.1] to [an authorised administrator]. 56 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior (2) FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the behaviour of the functions: a) [audit trail management ; b) backup and restore for TSF data, information flow rules, and audit trail data; and c) communication of authorised external IT entities with the TOE] to [an authorised administrator]. Page 36 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 57 FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes (1) FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [UNAUTHENTICATED SFP ] to restrict the ability to [delete attributes from a rule, modify attributes in a rule, add attributes to a rule] the security attributes [ listed in section FDP_IFF1.1(1)] to [the authorised administrator]. 58 FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes (2) FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [AUTHENTICATED SFP ] to restrict the ability to [delete attributes from a rule, modify attributes in a rule, add attributes to a rule] the security attributes [listed in section FDP_IFF1.1(2)] to [the authorised administrator]. 59 FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes (3) FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [UNAUTHENTICATED SFP ] to restrict the ability to delete and [create] the security attributes [ information flow rules described in FDP_IFF1.1(1)] to [the authorised administrator]. 60 FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes (4) FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [AUTHENTICATED SFP ] to restrict the ability to delete and [create] the security attributes [ information flow rules described in FDP_IFF1.1(2)] to [the authorised administrator]. 61 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [UNAUTHENTICATED SFP and AUTHENTICATED SFP,] to provide restrictive default values for information flow security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow [an authorised administrator] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. Issue 1.0 Page 37 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 62 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (1) FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: [those for which FMT_MSA.1 (1),(2),(3),&(4) and FMT_MOF.1 (1) & (2) restrict use to the authorised administrator]. Protection of the TOE Security Functions 63 This section specifies functional requirements that relate to the integrity and management of the mechanisms providing the TSF and TSF data. 64 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPT_RVM.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed. 65 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation FPT_SEP.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects. FPT_SEP.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC Security Audit 66 This section involves recognising, recording and storing information related to security relevant activities. 67 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; Page 38 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and c) [the events in Table 5.2]. FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the ST, [information specified in column three of Table 5.2]. Functional Component Auditable Event Additional Audit Record Contents FDP_IFF.1 All decisions on requests for information flow The presumed addresses of the source and destination subject. FMT_MOF.1 Use of the functions listed in this requirement pertaining to audit. The identity of the authorised administrator performing the operation FMT_SMF.1 Use of the management functions. The identity of the authorised administrator performing the operation FIA_UAU.SERV.1 Any use of the authentication mechanism. The user identities provided to the TOE Table 5-2: Auditable Event 68 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [an authorised administrator] with the capability to read [all audit trail data] from the audit records. FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. Issue 1.0 Page 39 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 69 FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to perform searches and sorting of audit data based on: a) [user identity; b) presumed subject address; c) ranges of dates; d) ranges of times; e) ranges of addresses]. 70 FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall prevent auditable events, except those taken by the authorised administrator and [shall limit the number of audit records lost] if the audit trail is full. 5.2 Security requirements for the IT Environment 71 This section details the IT security requirements that are met by the IT environment of the TOE. Table 5-3 lists the IT security requirements to be provided by the IT environment: Functional Components Partially / Fully met by the IT environment FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action Fully FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms Fully FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action Fully FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation Partially FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps Fully Page 40 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 Functional Components Partially / Fully met by the IT environment FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation Partially FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage Fully FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior (3) Fully FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (2) Fully Table 5-3: IT Security Requirements of the Environment 72 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any actionvi FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. 73 FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanismsvii FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [human users sending or receiving information through the TOE using FTP or Telnet such that successful authentication must be achieved before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that human user]. 74 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any actionviii FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. vi FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2 are fully met by the SGMI client operating system. vii FIA_UAU.4 is fully met by the authentication server using a Single-use authentication mechanism. viii FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2 are fully met by the SGMI client operating system. Issue 1.0 Page 41 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 75 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separationix FPT_SEP.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects. FPT_SEP.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC 76 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stampsx FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use. 77 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generationxixii FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and c) [the events in Table 5.4]. FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the ST, [information specified in column three of Table 5.4]. ix FPT_SEP.1 is partially met by the Windows / Solaris Operating System. x FPT_STM.1 is fully met by the Windows / Solaris Operating System. xi FAU_GEN.1 is partially met by the Windows / Solaris Operating System. xii The management of the audit trail is performed by the following TOE SFRs: FMT_MOF.1(2), FMT_SMF.1(1), FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3 and FAU_STG.4. Page 42 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 Functional Component Auditable Event Additional Audit Record Contents FPT_STM.1 Changes to the time. The identity of the authorised administrator performing the operation. Table 5-4: Auditable Event 78 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storagexiii FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records from unauthorised deletion. FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the audit records in the audit trail. 79 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior (3)xiv FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable, disable the functions: a) [single use authentication functions described in FIA_UAU.4 on the authentication server] to [an authorised administrator]. 80 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (2)xv FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: [those for which FMT_MOF.1 (3) restrict use to the authorised administrator]. 5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements 81 The assurance requirements for this Security Target, taken from Part 3 of the CC, comprise the EAL4 level of assurance, augmented with ALC_FLR.1. The assurance components are summarized in the following table. xiii FAU_STG.1 is fully met by the Windows / Solaris Operating System. xiv FMT_MOF.1(3) is fully met by the authentication server only allowing modification by authorized administrators. xv FMT_SMF.1(2) is fully met by the authentication server using a Single-use authentication mechanism. Issue 1.0 Page 43 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST Assurance Class Assurance Components ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation Configuration management ACM_CAP.4 Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_SCP.2 Problem tracking CM coverage Delivery and operation ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation and start-up procedures ADV_FSP.2 Fully defined external interfaces ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design Development ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model Guidance documents AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance AGD_USR.1 User guidance ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_FLR.1 Basic Flaw Remediation Life cycle support ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools Page 44 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 Assurance Class Assurance Components ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_DPT.1 Testing: high-level design Tests ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample AVA_MSU.2 Validation of analysis Vulnerability assessment AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis Table 5-5: Assurance Requirements: EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 82 Further information on these assurance components can be found in [CC] Part 3. 5.4 Strength of Function Claim 83 A Strength of Function (SOF) claim of SOF-Medium is made for the TOE. No TOE Security functions contain a probabilistic or permutational mechanism. 84 For a justification of the Strength of Function claim see Section 8.3.7. Issue 1.0 Page 45 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 6 TOE Summary Specification 6.1 TOE Security Functions 85 This section describes the security functions provided by the TOE to meet the security functional requirements specified for the TOE in Section 5.1. 6.1.1 Identification and Authentication Function 86 Upon receipt of a request to send or receive Telnet / FTP through the TOE, a request for authentication must be issued to an external authentication server. The response from the external authentication server must be received prior to any further processing of the request. 6.1.2 Management and Security Function 87 The authorised administrator can delete, modify, and add to a rule in the unauthenticated SFP. 88 The authorised administrator can delete, modify, and add to a rule in the authenticated SFP. 89 The authorised administrator can delete and create information flow rules in the unauthenticated SFP, as described by SFR FDP_IFF.1 (1). 90 The authorised administrator can delete and create information flow rules in the authenticated SFP, as described by SFR FDP_IFF.1 (2). 91 The TSF shall provide restrictive default values for the information flow security attributes for Unauthenticated and authenticated SFPs. 92 The authorised administrator has the ability to enable and disable the following functions: a) Operation of the TOE. The operation refers to the ability to control all information flows; b) Single use authentication functions. 93 The authorised administrator has the ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the behavior of the following functions: a) Audit management; b) Backup and restore for TSF data, information flow rules, and audit trail data; and c) Communication of authorised external IT entities with the TOE. Page 46 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 94 The authorised administrator shall be able to specify initial values to override the default values for security attributes when an object or information is created. 6.1.3 Audit Function 95 The accounting mechanisms cannot be disabled. The start-up and shutdown of audit functions is synonymous with the start-up and shutdown of the TOE. Start- up and shut-down of the TOE specific components can be configured to be recorded in the audit trail. 96 It is possible to generate audit records for the following auditable events: • Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; • All level of challenge response (single use authentication); • User identities for single use authentication and audit trail management; • Every successful inbound and outbound connection; • Every unsuccessful inbound and outbound connection; • Creating, deleting, and modifying of rules and associated attributes; • Creating, deleting, and emptying of the audit trail. 97 For each event the Audit Function will record the following: • Date and time of the event; • User identity (for single use authentication and audit trail management ); • System name; • Component name; • Process id; • Type of event or service; • Success or failure of the event; • Message number; • Message description which includes: • Source and destination IP address (for connections only); • Prototype Port number. 98 The authorised administrator has read access only to all audit trail data through the controlled interface SGMI logfile window. 99 The authorised administrator via the SGMI is able through the use of filters to perform searches and sorting of audit data based on: • Date and time ranges; • Event Type • System name; • Component name; • Process identification number; • Message number; • Pattern matching via regular expression implementation. The user identification, source address and a range of addresses can be searched and Issue 1.0 Page 47 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST sorted using this facility as required by the SFR FAU_SAR.3. 100 Archiving is a manual process that is performed on the log files. The files are retained as long as there is space available. The authorised administrator is informed when the space limit is nearly reached. Once the audit trail becomes full, the TSF drops all connections through the TOE. 6.1.4 Protection of TOE security Functions 101 The TOE provides self-protection from external modification or interference of the TSF code or data structures by untrusted subjects via the vulture daemon. Untrusted subjects cannot bypass checks, which always must be invoked. 102 The functions that enforce the TOE Security Policy (TSP) are always invoked and completed, before any function within the TSF Scope of Control (those interactions within the TOE that are subject to the rules of the TSP) is allowed to proceed. 103 The TSF protects itself, by denying all processes unless a process is specifically stated by the TSF. 6.1.5 User Data Protection Function 104 The Time range template function of the TOE provides the facility of allowing an administrator to specify the time that a specific user may have access. This function can only be accessed from the Rules icon within the Symantec Gateway Management Interface (SGMI). 105 The TOE provides a flow control mechanism in the form of security policy rules for all connections through the TOE for either inbound traffic (external to internal) or outbound traffic (internal to external). 106 The TSF permits or denies authenticated connections depending on the security policy rules created by the administrator. 107 The TSF evaluates packets on a “best fit” method, to ensure that the most constructive and specific security policy rule for each connection attempt is applied. 108 The security policy rules are non-order dependent. 109 All Connections are denied unless a specific rule has been set-up to allow information to flow. Page 48 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 110 The Service used can be one of the following protocols: HTTP UDP FTP Ping DNS TELNET SMTP NTP RTSP IP NNTP POP3 RealAudio TCP 111 The application proxies through the TOE that are within the scope of the evaluation are: HTTP RealAudio NNTP NTP DNS TELNET SMTP FTP 112 There are two main types of information flow that the TOE enforces: • Unauthenticated – An external IT entity on an internal or external network sending information through the TOE to other external IT entities. • Authenticated – users on an internal or external network who must be authenticated at the TOE before using any protocol services. Unauthenticated 113 The TSF shall enforce unauthenticated information flow based on the following attributes: a) Subject security attributes: • Presumed address, • Port. b) Information security attributes: • Presumed address of source subject; • Presumed address of destination subject; • Transport layer protocol; • TOE interface on which traffic arrives and departs; • Service; • Time; • Address Transformation; • Service redirection; • Viability of application data; • URL blocking. 114 Unauthenticated information flow shall be permitted: • For unauthenticated external IT entities that send and receive information through the TOE to one another; • For traffic sent through the TOE from one subject to another; • To Pass information. Issue 1.0 Page 49 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 115 Rules in the Security policy are defined by the TOE authorised Administrator, and allow the parameters stated in paragraph 113 to be set for unauthenticated traffic flow. 116 Traffic flows from the configured internal network to another connected network shall only be permitted if all the information security attribute values created by the authorised administrator are permitted. 117 Traffic flows from the configured internal network to another connected network shall only be permitted if the presumed address of the source subject translates to an internal network address. 118 Traffic flows from the configured internal network to another connected network shall only be permitted if the presumed address of the destination subject translates to an address on another connected network. 119 Traffic flows from the external network to another connected network shall only be permitted if all the information security attribute values created by the administrator are permitted. 120 Traffic flows from the external network to another connected network shall only be permitted if the presumed address of the source subject translates to an external network address. 121 Traffic flows from the external network to another connected network shall only be permitted if the presumed address of the destination subject translates to an address on another connected network. 122 Access or services requests shall be denied from an external TOE interface if the presumed address of the source for the traffic flow is an external IT entity on an internal network. 123 Access or services requests shall be denied from an internal TOE interface if the presumed address of the source for the traffic flow is an external IT entity on an external network. 124 Access or services requests shall be denied from an internal or external TOE interface with the presumed address of the source for the traffic flow is an external IT entity on a broadcast network. 125 Access or services requests shall be denied from an internal or external TOE interface with the presumed address of the source for the traffic flow is an external IT entity on a loopback network. 126 Traffic flows in which the subject specifies the route the information flow shall flow to its destination shall be denied. Page 50 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 127 Protocol filtering proxies shall deny access or request services to protocols that do not conform to the associated published protocol specification. Authenticated 128 The TSF shall enforce authenticated information flow based on the following attributes: a) Subject security attributes: • Presumed address; • Port. b) Information security attributes: • User identity; • Presumed address of source subject; • Presumed address of destination subject; • Transport layer protocol; • TOE interface on which traffic arrives and departs; • Service (i.e. FTP and Telnet); • Security-relevant service command; • Time; • Address Transformation; • Service redirection; • Viability of application data; • Extended authentication methods; • URL blocking. 129 Authenticated information flow shall be permitted for human users and external IT entities that send or receive FTP and Telnet information through the Firewall, only after the human user initiating the information flow has been successfully authenticated using an authentication server. 130 Rules in the Security policy are defined by the TOE authorised Administrator, and allow the parameters stated in paragraph 128 to be set for each authenticated traffic flow. 131 Traffic flows from the configured internal network to the another connected network shall only be permitted if the human user initiating the traffic flow authenticates using authentication server for FTP and Telnet. 132 Traffic flows from an internal network to another connected network shall only be permitted if all the information security attribute values created by the authorised administrator are permitted. 133 Traffic flows from a controlled subject and another controlled subject via a controlled operation shall only be permitted if the presumed address of the source subject in the traffic flow, translates to an address on the internal network Issue 1.0 Page 51 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 134 Traffic flows from an internal network to another connected network shall only be permitted if the presumed address of the destination subject translates to an address on the other connected network. 135 Traffic flows from an external network to the another connected network shall only be permitted if the human user initiating the traffic flow authenticates using an authentication server for FTP and Telnet. 136 Traffic flows from an external network to another connected network shall only be permitted if all the information security attribute values created by the administrator are permitted. 137 Traffic flows from the external network to another connected network shall only be permitted if the source address of the packet translate to an address on the external network. 138 Traffic flows from the external network to another connected network shall only be permitted if the destination address of the packet translate to an address on the other connected network. 139 Access or services requests shall be denied from an external TOE interface if the presumed address of the source for the traffic flow is an external IT entity on an internal network. 140 Access or services requests shall be denied from an internal TOE interface if the presumed address of the source for the traffic flow is an external IT entity on an external network. 141 Access or services requests shall be denied from an internal or external TOE interface if the presumed address of the source for the traffic flow is an external IT entity on a broadcast network. 142 Access or services requests shall be denied from an internal or external TOE interface if the presumed address of the source for the traffic flow is an external IT entity on a loopback network. 143 Traffic flows in which the subject specifies the route the information flow shall flow to its destination shall be denied. 144 Protocol filtering proxies shall deny access or services to the following protocols that do not conform to the associated published protocol specification: FTP and Telnet. 6.2 Identification and Strength of Function Claim for IT security Functions 145 This Security Target claims that the general strength of the security functions provided by the TOE is SOF-Medium. Page 52 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 146 No specific strength of function metric is defined. 6.3 Assurance Measures 147 Assurance measures will be produced to comply with the Common Criteria Assurance Requirements for EAL4, augmented with ALC_FLR.1. Table 8-6 maps the deliverables to the assurance requirements. Issue 1.0 Page 53 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 7 Protection Profiles Claims No claims against a protection profile are made. Page 54 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 8 Rationale 8.1 Introduction 148 This section demonstrates that the TOE provides an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements. 8.2 Security Objectives for the TOE Rationale 149 Table 8-1 demonstrates how the IT security objectives and environment objectives of the TOE counter the IT threats and environment threats identified in Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Issue 1.0 Page 55 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST Threats/ Assumptions Objectives T.NOAUTH T.REPEAT T.REPLAY T.ASPOOF T.MEDIATE T.OLDINF T.AUDACC T.SELPRO T.AUDFUL T.LOWEXP TE.USAGE A.PHYSEC A.LOWEXP A.GENPUR A.PUBLIC A.NOEVIL A.SINGEN A.DIRECT A.NOREMO A.REMOS A.COMMS O.IDAUTH O.SINUSE O.MEDIAT O.SECSTA O.SELPRO O.AUDREC O.ACCOUN O.SECFUN O.LIMEXT O.EAL OE.PHYSEC OE.LOWEXP OE.GENPUR OE.PUBLIC OE.NOEVIL OE.SINGEN OE.DIRECT OE.NOREMO OE.GUIDAN OE.ADMTRA OE.REMOS OE.COMMS Table 8-1 Mapping of Objectives to Threats and Assumptions Issue 1.0 Page 56 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 150 The following are justifications for Objectives that are met by the TOE. 151 O.MEDIAT 152 This security objective is necessary to counter the threats: T.ASPOOF, T.MEDIAT and T.OLDINF which have to do with getting impermissible information to flow through the TOE. This security objective requires that all information that passes through the networks is mediated by the TOE and that no residual information is transmitted. 153 The following are justifications for Objectives that are partially met by the TOE and partially by the IT Environment 154 O.IDAUTH 155 This security objective is necessary to counter the threat: T.NOAUTH because it requires that users be uniquely identified before accessing the TOE. 156 The authentication server authenticates users using a single-use authentication mechanism. 157 O.SINUSE 158 This security objective is necessary to counter the threats: T.REPEAT and T.REPLAY because it requires that the TOE prevent the reuse of authentication data so that even if valid authentication data is obtained, it will not be used to mount an attack. 159 The authentication server authenticates users using a single-use authentication mechanism. 160 O.SECSTA 161 This security objective is necessary to counter the threats: T.NOAUTH and T.SELPRO because it requires that no information is compromised by the TOE upon start-up or recovery. 162 The Windows / Solaris Operating System performs part of the resistance to penetration attacks. 163 O.SELPRO 164 This security objective is necessary to counter the threats: T.SELPRO, T.AUDFUL and T.NOAUTH because it requires that the TOE protect itself from attempts to bypass, deactivate, or tamper with TOE security functions. Issue 1.0 Page 57 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 165 The Windows / Solaris Operating System provides part of the protection for the TOE. 166 O.AUDREC 167 This security objective is necessary to counter the threat: T.AUDACC by requiring a readable audit trail and a means to search and sort the information contained in the audit trail. 168 The audit trail is stored on the Windows / Solaris Operating System. 169 O.ACCOUN 170 This security objective is necessary to counter the threat: T.AUDACC because it requires that users are accountable for information flows through the TOE and that authorised administrators are accountable for the use of security functions related to audit. 171 The Windows / Solaris Operating System performs part of the audit functions. 172 O.SECFUN 173 This security objective is necessary to counter the threats: T.NOAUTH, T.REPLAY and T.AUDFUL by requiring that the TOE provide functionality that ensures that only the authorised administrator has access to the TOE security functions. 174 The configuration of the SGMI client operating system, Windows / Solaris operating system and the authentication server support this objective. 175 O.LIMEXT 176 This security objective is necessary to counter the threat: T.NOAUTH because it requires that the TOE provide the means for an authorised administrator to control and limit access to TOE security functions. 177 The configuration of the SGMI client operating system, Windows / Solaris operating system and the authentication server support this objective.. 178 O.EAL 179 This security objective is necessary to counter the threat: T.LOWEXP because it requires that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing minimal attack potential. 180 The Windows / Solaris Operating System, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server perform part of the resistance to penetration attacks. Page 58 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 181 The following are justifications for Objectives that are met by the IT Environment. 182 OE.PHYSEC 183 This environmental security objective is necessary to support the assumption: A.PHYSEC because it requires that the TOE, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server are physically protected. 184 OE.LOWEXP 185 This environmental security objective is necessary to support the assumption: A.LOWEXP because it requires that the threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable vulnerabilities is considered low. 186 OE.GENPUR 187 This environmental security objective is necessary to support the assumption: A.GENPUR because it requires that the TOE, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server do not provide general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the ability to execute arbitrary code or applications) or storage repository capabilities. 188 OE.PUBLIC 189 This environmental security objective is necessary to support the assumption: A.PUBLIC because it requires that the TOE, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server do not host public data. 190 OE.NOEVIL 191 This environmental security objective is necessary to support the assumption: A.NOEVIL because it requires that Authorised administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance; however, they are capable of error. 192 OE.SINGEN 193 This environmental security objective is necessary to support the assumption: A.SINGEN because it requires that information cannot flow among the internal and external networks unless it passes through the TOE. 194 OE.DIRECT 195 This environmental security objective is necessary to support the assumption: A.DIRECT because it requires that human users within the physically secure boundary protecting the TOE may attempt to access the TOE from some direct connection (e.g., a console port) if the connection is part of the TOE. Issue 1.0 Page 59 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 196 OE.NOREMO 197 This environmental security objective is necessary to support the assumption: A.NOREMO because it requires that human users who are not authorised administrators can not access the TOE, the SGMI client operating system or the authentication server remotely from the internal or external networks. 198 OE.GUIDAN 199 This environmental security objective is necessary to counter the threat: TE.USAGE and T.AUDACC because it requires that those responsible for the TOE ensure that it is delivered to the user's site, installed, administered, and operated in a secure manner. 200 OE.ADMTRA 201 This environmental security objective is necessary to counter the threat: TE.USAGE and T.AUDACC because it ensures that authorised administrators receive the proper training. 202 OE.REMOS 203 This environmental security objective is necessary to support the assumption: A.REMOS because it requires that the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server are delivered to the user's site, installed and administered in a secure manner. 204 OE.COMMS 205 This environmental security objective is necessary to support the assumption: A.COMMS because it requires that the communication links between the TOE, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server are physically protected. 206 The following are justifications for IT security threats that are partially met by the TOE and partially by the IT Environment. 207 T.NOAUTH 208 The TOE ensures all FTP and Telnet attempts from an internal or external network are authenticated using an authentication server. Only authenticated connections are allowed between the networks. 209 The SGMI client operating system identifies and authenticates users before allowing access to the TOE. Page 60 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 210 T.SELPRO 211 Access to the internal data of the TOE is only possible through the machine that the TOE is installed on. The TOE relies on the physical environment to ensure that only the authorised user has physical access to the TOE. 212 The Windows / Solaris operating system relies on the physical environment to ensure that only the authorised user has physical access to the Windows / Solaris operating system. 213 T.AUDFUL 214 The TOE provides the administrator with Read Only access to the TOE audit data through the SGMI. The TOE informs the administrator when the space is reaching its limit. Once the audit trail is full, all connections to the TOE are dropped. 215 The Windows / Solaris operating system informs the administrator when the audit storage space is reaching its limit. 216 The authorised user of the machine must ensure that the data is archived and that the storage space does not become exhausted. 217 T.AUDACC 218 The TOE through the SGMI provides the administrator with the means to configure the security-related functions and the information flows to be audited. The TOE will audit all attempts by hosts, connected through one network interface, to access hosts or services, connected on another interface, that are not explicitly allowed by the information flow policy. The administrator must ensure that the audit facilities are used and managed correctly including inspecting the logs on a regular basis. 219 The Windows / Solaris Operating System through the administrative tools allows the administrator to configure the security-related functions to be recorded in the audit trail. The administrator must ensure that the audit facilities are used and managed correctly including inspecting the logs on a regular basis. 220 T.LOWEXP 221 The TOE minimizes the threat of malicious attacks by setting the initial settings to deny. The authorised administrator is required to enable the required settings. 222 The Windows / Solaris Operating System, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server provide part of the security to ensure that the threat of malicious attack is low, in particular no other applications should be loaded onto Issue 1.0 Page 61 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST the Windows / Solaris Operating System, the SGMI client operating system and the authentication server. 223 T.REPEAT 224 The TOE invokes the authentication server for single use authentication. All attempts are audited. 225 The authentication server ensures that users using FTP or Telnet are authenticated by means of an authentication server that generates a one-time password. 226 The SGMI client operating system authenticates authorised administrators prior to allowing an administrator access to TOE. 227 T.REPLAY 228 The TOE invokes the authentication server for single use authentication. All attempts are audited 229 The authentication server ensures that users using FTP or Telnet are authenticated by means of an authentication server that generates a one-time password. 230 The SGMI client operating system authenticates authorised administrators prior to allowing an administrator access to TOE. 8.3 Security Requirements Rationale 8.3.1 Security Requirements are appropriate 231 Table 8-2 identifies which SFRs satisfy the Objectives as defined in Section 4.1.1. Objective Security Functional Requirement(s) O.IDAUTH FIA_UAU_SERV.1 O.SINUSE FIA_UAU_SERV.1 O.MEDIAT FDP_IFC.1(1), FDP_IFC.1(2), FDP_IFF.1(1), FDP_IFF.1(2), FMT_MSA.1(1), FMT_MSA.1(2), FMT_MSA.1(3), FMT_MSA.1(4), FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1(1) Page 62 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 Objective Security Functional Requirement(s) O.SECSTA FMT_MSA.1(1), FMT_MSA.1(2), FMT_MSA.1(3), FMT_MSA.1(4), FMT_MSA.3, FPT_RVM.1, FPT_SEP.1, FAU_STG.4, FMT_MOF.1(1), FMT_MOF.1(2), FMT_SMF.1(1) O.SELPRO FPT_RVM.1, FPT_SEP.1, FAU_STG.4 O.AUDREC FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3 O.ACCOUN FAU_GEN.1 O.SECFUN FMT_MSA.1(1), FMT_MSA.1(2), FMT_MSA.1(3), FMT_MSA.1(4), FAU_STG.4, FMT_MOF.1(1), FMT_MOF.1(2), FMT_SMF.1(1) O.LIMEXT FMT_MOF.1(1), FMT_MOF.1(2), FMT_SMF.1(1) O.EAL FIA_UAU_SERV.1, FDP_IFC.1(1), FDP_IFC.1(2), FDP_IFF.1(1), FDP_IFF.1(2), FMT_MSA.1(1), FMT_MSA.1(2), FMT_MSA.1(3), FMT_MSA.1(4), FMT_MSA.3, FPT_RVM.1, FPT_SEP.1, FAU_STG.4, FMT_MOF.1(1), FMT_MOF.1(2), FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3, FMT_SMF.1(1) Table 8-2 Mapping of Objectives to SFRs 232 O.EAL 233 O.EAL is concerned with the TOE being resistant to obvious vulnerabilities. By default O.EAL maps to all the Security Function Requirements. 234 FIA_UAU_SERV.1 Single-use authentication server 235 This component ensures that an authentication server is appropriately used for Single-use authentication in all attempts to authenticate at the TOE from an internal or external network. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.SINUSE and O.IDAUTH. 236 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control (1) 237 This component identifies the entities involved in the UNAUTHENTICATED information flow control SFP (i.e., users sending information to other users and vice versa). This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.MEDIAT. Issue 1.0 Page 63 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 238 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control (2) 239 This component identifies the entities involved in the AUTHENTICATED information flow control SFP (i.e., users of the services FTP or Telnet sending information to servers and vice versa). The users of these services must be authenticated at the TOE. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.MEDIAT. 240 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes (1) 241 This component identifies the attributes of the users sending and receiving the information in the UNAUTHENTICAED SFP, as well as the attributes for the information itself. Then the policy is defined by saying under what conditions information is permitted to flow. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.MEDIAT. 242 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes (2) 243 This component identifies the attributes of the users sending and receiving the information in the AUTHENTICAED SFP, as well as the attributes for the information itself. Then the policy is defined by saying under what conditions information is permitted to flow. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.MEDIAT. 244 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (1) 245 This component ensures the TSF enforces the UNAUTHENTICATED_SFP to restrict the ability to delete, modify, and add within a rule those security attributes that are listed in section FDP_IFF1.1(1). This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.MEDIAT, O.SECSTA, and O.SECFUN. 246 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (2) 247 This component ensures the TSF enforces the AUTHENTICATED_SFP to restrict the ability to delete, modify, and add within a rule those specified security attributes that are listed in section FDP_IFF1.1(2). This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.MEDIAT, O.SECSTA, and O.SECFUN. 248 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (3) 249 This component ensures the TSF enforces the UNAUTHENTICATED_SFP to restrict the ability to create or delete rules for security attributes that are listed in FDP_IFF.1(1). This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.MEDIAT, O.SECSTA, and O.SECFUN. Page 64 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 250 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (4) 251 This component ensures the TSF enforces the AUTHENTICATED_SFP to restrict the ability to create or delete rules for security attributes that are listed in FDP_IFF.1(2). This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.MEDIAT, O.SECSTA, and O.SECFUN. 252 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization 253 This component ensures that there is a default deny policy for the information flow control security rules. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.MEDIAT and O.SECSTA. 254 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (1) 255 This component ensures that the TSF provide specific security functions. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.MEDIAT, O.SECSTA, O.SECFUN and O.LIMEXT. 256 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP 257 This component ensures that the TSF are always invoked. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.SELPRO and O.SECSTA. 258 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation 259 This component ensures that the TSF have a domain of execution that is separate and that cannot be violated by unauthorised users. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.SELPRO and O.SECSTA. 260 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 261 This component outlines what data must be included in audit records and what events must be audited. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.AUDREC and O.ACCOUN. 262 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review 263 This component ensures that the audit trail is understandable. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.AUDREC. 264 FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review 265 This component ensures that a variety of searches and sorts can be performed on the audit trail. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.AUDREC. Issue 1.0 Page 65 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 266 FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss 267 This component ensures that the authorised administrator will be able to take care of the audit trail if it should become full. But this component also ensures that no other auditable events as defined in FAU_GEN.1 occur. Thus the authorised administrator is permitted to perform potentially auditable actions though these events will not be recorded until the audit trail is restored to a non-full status. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.SELPRO, O.SECFUN and O.SECSTA. 268 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior (1) 269 This component ensures that the TSF restricts the ability of the TOE start up and shut down operation and the single-use authentication function to the authorised administrator. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.SECFUN, O.LIMEXT, and O.SECSTA. 270 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior (2) 271 This component ensures that the TSF restricts the ability to modify the behavior of functions such as audit trail management, back and restore for TSF data, and communication of authorised external IT entities with the TOE to an authorised administrator. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.SECFUN, O.LIMEXT, and O.SECSTA. 8.3.2 Environmental Security Requirements are appropriate 272 Table 8-3 identifies which environmental SFRs satisfy the Objectives as defined in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.2.1 Objective Security Functional Requirement(s) O.IDAUTH FIA_UAU.4 O.SINUSE FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2 O.SECSTA FPT_SEP.1, FAU_STG.1, FMT_MOF.1(3), FMT_SMF.1(2), FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2 O.SELPRO FPT_SEP.1, FAU_STG.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2 O.AUDREC FAU_GEN.1, FPT_STM.1 O.ACCOUN FAU_GEN.1, FPT_STM.1 Page 66 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 Objective Security Functional Requirement(s) O.SECFUN FAU_STG.1, FMT_MOF.1(3), FMT_SMF.1(2), FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2 O.LIMEXT FMT_MOF.1(3), FMT_SMF.1(2), FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2 O.EAL FPT_SEP.1, FAU_STG.1, FMT_MOF.1(3), FMT_SMF.1(2), FAU_GEN.1, FPT_STM.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.4 OE.LOWEXP FPT_SEP.1 OE.GENPUR FPT_SEP.1 OE.PUBLIC FPT_SEP.1 OE.SINGEN FPT_SEP.1 OE.NOREMO FPT_SEP.1 Table 8-3 Mapping of Objectives to environmental SFRs 273 O.EAL 274 O.EAL is concerned with the TOE being resistant to obvious vulnerabilities. By default O.EAL maps to all the Security Function Requirements. 275 FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms 276 This component ensures that a Single-use authentication mechanism is used appropriately in all attempts to authenticate at the TOE from an internal or external network. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.SINUSE and O.IDAUTH. 277 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation 278 This component ensures that the TSF have a domain of execution that is separate and that cannot be violated by unauthorised users. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.SELPRO, O.SECSTA, OE.LOWEXP, OE.GENPUR, OE.PUBLIC, OE.SINGEN AND OE.NOREMO. Issue 1.0 Page 67 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 279 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 280 This component outlines what data must be included in audit records and what events must be audited. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.AUDREC and O.ACCOUN. 281 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps 282 This component ensures that time stamping is enabled. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.AUDREC and O.ACCOUN. 283 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 284 This component ensures that the audit records are protected from unauthorised deletion and modification to the audit records. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.SELPRO, O.SECFUN and O.SECSTA. 285 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior (3) 286 This component ensures that the TSF restricts the ability of the single-use authentication function on the authentication server to the authorised administrator. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.SECFUN, O.LIMEXT, and O.SECSTA. 287 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (2) 288 This component ensures that that the TSF provides specific security functions. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.SECSTA, O.SECFUN and O.LIMEXT. 289 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action 290 This component ensures that before anything occurs on behalf of a user, the user is authenticated via the SGMI client operating system to the TOE. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.SINUSE, O.SECSTA, O.SELPRO, O.SECFUN and O.LIMEXT 291 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action 292 This component ensures that before anything occurs on behalf of a user, the user's identity is identified via the SGMI client operating system to the TOE. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.SINUSE, O.SECSTA, O.SELPRO, O.SECFUN and O.LIMEXT. Page 68 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 8.3.3 Security Requirement dependencies are satisfied Functional Component Dependencies SFR(s) in Security Target meeting Dependencies FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1], FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FDP_IFC.1 See note below regarding FMT_SMR.1. FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1], FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FDP_IFC.1 See note below regarding FMT_SMR.1. FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1], FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FDP_IFC.1 See note below regarding FMT_SMR.1. FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1], FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FDP_IFC.1 See note below regarding FMT_SMR.1. FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1 See note below regarding FMT_SMR.1. FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 See note below regarding FMT_SMR.1. FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 See note below regarding FMT_SMR.1. FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 NONE NONE FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 Issue 1.0 Page 69 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST Functional Component Dependencies SFR(s) in Security Target meeting Dependencies FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_STG.1xvi FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1 FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3 FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3 FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3 FPT_RVM.1 None None FPT_SEP.1 None None FPT_STM.1xvii None None FIA_UAU_SERV.1 xviii FIA_UAU.4 FIA_UAU.4 FIA_UAU.4xix None None Table 8-4 Mapping of TOE SFR Dependencies 293 The security functional requirements are hierarchical and may satisfy the dependency. 294 FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, and FMT_MOF.1 have a dependency on FMT_SMR.1. For security management of the TOE, as stated in objective OE.PHYSEC and OE.NOREMO only an authorised administrator will have physical access to the TOE, the SGMI workstation and the authentication server. xvi FAU_STG.1 is a security requirement for the IT environment. xvii FPT_STM.1 is a security requirement for the IT environment. xviii FIA_UAU_SERV.1 is an explicitly stated requirement. xix FIA_UAU.4 is a security requirement for the IT environment. Page 70 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 Human users, including authorised administrators can not access the TOE, the SGMI workstation or the authentication server remotely from the internal or external networks. The dependency on FMT_SMR.1 is therefore regarded as satisfied. 8.3.4 IT security functions satisfy SFRs 295 Mapping of Section 6 IT functions to SFRs (Section 5.1 and 5.2). IT Function Security Functional Requirement(s) Identification and Authentication 86 FIA_UAU_SERV.1 Management and Securityxx 87 FMT_MSA.1(1), FMT_SMF.1(1) 88 FMT_MSA.1(2) , FMT_SMF.1(1) 89 FMT_MSA.1(3) , FMT_SMF.1(1) 90 FMT_MSA.1(4) , FMT_SMF.1(1) 91 FMT_MSA.3 92 FMT_MOF.1(1) , FMT_SMF.1(1) 93 FMT_MOF.1 (2), FMT_SMF.1(1) 94 FMT_MSA.3 Audit 95 FAU_GEN.1 96 FAU_GEN.1 97 FAU_GEN.1 98 FAU_SAR.1 xx FAU_GEN.1 Table 5-2 is applicable to FMT_SMF.1, and FMT_MOF.1 (1), (2) Issue 1.0 Page 71 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 99 FAU_SAR.3, FAU_SAR.1 100 FAU_STG.4 Protection of TOE Security Functions 101 FPT_SEP.1 102 FPT_RVM.1 103 FPT_RVM.1 User Data Protectionxxi 104 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 105 FDP_IFC.1 (1), FDP_IFC.1 (2), FDP_IFF.1 (1), FDP_IFF.1 (2) 106 FDP_IFC.1 (2), FDP_IFF.1 (1) 107 FDP_IFC.1 (1), FDP_IFC.1 (2), FDP_IFF.1 (1), FDP_IFF.1 (2) 108 FDP_IFC.1 (1), FDP_IFC.1 (2), FDP_IFF.1 (1), FDP_IFF.1 (2) 109 FDP_IFC.1 (1), FDP_IFC.1 (2), FDP_IFF.1 (1), FDP_IFF.1 (2) 110 FDP_IFC.1 (1), FDP_IFC.1 (2), FDP_IFF.1 (1), FDP_IFF.1 (2) 111 FDP_IFC.1 (1), FDP_IFC.1 (2) 112 FDP_IFF.1 (1) , FDP_IFF.1 (2) 113 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 114 FDP_IFC.1 (1) 115 FDP_IFF.1 (1) xxi FAU_GEN.1 Table 5-2 is applicable to FDP_IFF.1 Page 72 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 116 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 117 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 118 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 119 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 120 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 121 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 122 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 123 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 124 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 125 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 126 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 127 FDP_IFF.1 (1) 128 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 129 FDP_IFC.1 (2) 130 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 131 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 132 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 133 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 134 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 135 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 136 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 137 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 138 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 139 FDP_IFF.1 (2) Issue 1.0 Page 73 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST 140 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 141 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 142 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 143 FDP_IFF.1 (2) 144 FDP_IFF.1 (2) Table 8-5 Mapping of IT Functions to SFRs 296 To perform searches and sorts on the audit database the administrator will be able to use the Symantec Gateway Management Interface (SGMI) Logfile icon. This is to meet FAU_SAR.1. In the event of audit storage failure, exhaustion and / or attack the TOE will stop all connections through the TOE and so the amount of data to be lost is none. So that requirement FAU_STG.4 is met. 297 Once the audit trail becomes full, the TSF drops all connections through the TOE. Therefore the maximum amount of audit data to be lost is zero. 298 Table 8-5 demonstrates that the IT security functions map to TOE Security Functional Requirements provided by the TSS. Each of the IT Security Functions maps to at least one TOE security function, and all the TOE Security Function Requirements are covered. Therefore by implementing all the IT Security Functions, the TOE Functional Requirement is met. 8.3.5 IT security functions mutually supportive 299 The mutually supportive nature of the IT security functions can be derived from the mutual support of the SFRs (demonstrated in Section 8.3.3), as each of the IT functions can be mapped to one or more SFRs, as demonstrated in Table 8-5. 8.3.6 Justification of Explicit Requirements 300 The explicit requirement FIA_UAU_SERV.1 has been specified to address the requirement for the TOE to invoke an authentication server to authenticate any human user's claimed identity when using FTP or Telnet prior to gaining access to the TOE. The single-use authentication mechanism is part of the IT environment. 8.3.7 Strength of Function claims are appropriate 301 The SOF claim made by the TOE is SOF-medium. 302 Products such as the Symantec Enterprise Firewall are intended to be used in a variety of environments and used to connect networks with different levels of trust in the users. A number of deployments are possible. The Strength of Function of Page 74 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 SOF-Medium for the TOE will be appropriate to a number of deployments, in both government and other organisations. 8.3.8 Justification of Assurance Requirements 303 EAL4 is defined in the CC as “methodically designed, tested and reviewed”. 304 Products such as Symantec Enterprise Firewall are intended to be used in a variety of environments, and used to connect networks with different levels of trust in the users. A number of deployments are possible. The EAL4 assurance level, augmented with ALC_FLR.1 will be appropriate to a number of deployments, in both government and other organisations. 8.3.9 Assurance measures satisfy assurance requirements 305 Assurance measures in the form of deliverables will be produced to meet EAL4 assurance requirements, augmented with ALC_FLR.1. 306 Table 8-6, below, provides a tracing of the Assurance Measures to the assurance requirements that they meet. From the table it can be seen that all assurance requirements trace to at least one assurance measure. 307 The assurance requirements identified in the table are those required to meet the CC assurance level EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.1. As all assurance requirements are traced to at least one of the assurance measures, the identified assurance measures are sufficient to meet the assurance requirements. It is also asserted that the assurance measures have been produced with EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 in mind and as a consequence contains sufficient information to meet the assurance requirements of the TOE. Issue 1.0 Page 75 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST Assurance Measures Assurance Requirements Met by Assurance Measure The implementation and documentation of procedures for the development of the TOE. Included in the procedures are: • The use of an automated configuration management system to support the secure development of the TOE, with user restrictions. • Procedures for authorising changes and implementing changes. ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation • Procedures for tracking problems and rectification of problems. ACM_CAP.4 Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_SCP.2 Problem tracking CM coverage The implementation and documentation of procedures for delivering the TOE to a customer in a secure manner. ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification Documentation provided to the customers instructing the customer how to install and configure the TOE in a secure manner. ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation and start- up procedures The implementation and documentation of procedures for the life-cycle model used to develop the TOE. ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model Page 76 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 Assurance Measures Assurance Requirements Met by Assurance Measure Functional Specification for the TOE describing the TSF and the TOE's external interfaces. ADV_FSP.2 Fully defined external interfaces System Design for the TOE providing descriptions of the TSF structure in the form of subsystems and the functionality of each subsystem. ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design Various source code modules for Symantec Enterprise Firewall. ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF System Design for the TOE providing descriptions of the TSF in the form of modules. ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design The documentation of the correspondence between all the TSF representations in specifically provided deliverables. ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration Documented Security Policy Model ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model Documentation provided to the customers instructing the customer how to configure the TOE in a secure manner. AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance No specific user documentation is relevant as there are no non- administrative users. AGD_USR.1 User guidance Issue 1.0 Page 77 of 78 8 July 2004 Ref.: T462\ST Assurance Measures Assurance Requirements Met by Assurance Measure The implementation and documentation of the physical security procedures to ensure the secure development of the TOE. ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures The implementation and documentation of procedures for tracking and rectifying flaws. ALC_FLR.1 Basic Flaw Remediation The implementation and documentation of the tools used to develop the TOE. ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools Documented correspondence between the security functions and tests. ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage Documented correspondence between the High-level design subsystems and tests. ATE_DPT.1 Testing: high-level design The implementation and documentation of the test procedures including expected and actual results. ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing Independent Testing Resources ATE_IND.2 Independent testing Misuse Analysis is performed and documented to ensure that the guidance documents supplied are sufficient to ensure that the TOE can not be used in a insecure manner. AVA_MSU.2 Validation of analysis Page 78 of 78 Issue 1.0 Ref.: T462\ST 8 July 2004 Assurance Measures Assurance Requirements Met by Assurance Measure Strength of Function Assessment of the authentication mechanism is performed and documented to gain confidence in the security functionality of the TOE. AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation Vulnerability Assessment of the TOE and it's deliverables is performed documented to ensure that identified security flaws are countered. AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis Table 8-6 Mapping of Assurance Measures to Assurance Requirements