Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 16FMV1483-18:1
Dokument ID CB-015
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HEMLIG/
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2017-03-09
Country of origin: Sweden
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report Lexmark MFD NoHD
Issue: 1.0, 2017-mar-09
Authorisation: Imre Juhász, Lead Certifier , CSEC
Report Distribution:
Arkiv
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report Lexmark MFD NoHD
16FMV1483-18:1 1.0 2017-03-09
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
4.1 Usage Assumptions 7
4.2 Environmental Assumptions 7
4.3 Clarification of Scope 7
5 Architectural Information 9
6 Documentation 12
7 IT Product Testing 13
8 Evaluated Configuration 15
9 Results of the Evaluation 17
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 19
11 Glossary 20
12 Bibliography 21
Appendix A Scheme Versions 22
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 22
A.2 Scheme Notes 22
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report Lexmark MFD NoHD
16FMV1483-18:1 1.0 2017-03-09
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the firmware of Lexmark’s Multi Function Devices
(Printers): Lexmark CX725 and XC4140. The TOE running on one of the supported
specified hardware models constitutes a Multi-Function Printer (MFP).
Firmware version:
ATL. 030.079CC: CX725 and XC4140
Conformance is claimed to PP Identification: 2600.1, Protection Profile for Hardcopy
Devices, Operational Environment A, version 1.0, dated January 2009 with the includ-
ing packages:
 PRT, SFR Package for Print Functions,
 SCN, SFR Package for Scan Functions,
 CPY, SFR Package for Copy Functions,
 FAX, SFR Package for Fax Functions and
 SMI, SFR Package for Shared-medium Interface Functions
The Security Target (ST) claims demonstrable conformance to the Security Problem
Definition (APE_SPD), Security Objectives (APE_OBJ), Extended Components Def-
initions (APE_ECD), and the Common Security Functional Requirements
(APE_REQ) of the referenced PP.
The TOE performs the functions F.PRT, F.SCN, F.CPY, F.FAX, and F.SMI as de-
fined in the referenced PP and claims demonstrable conformance to the augmented
SFR packages defined for each of these functions.
There are five assumptions made in the ST regarding the secure usage and environ-
ment of the MFD. The TOE rely on these being met in order to be able to counter the
six threats, and to fulfill the four organizational security policy (OSP) in the ST. The
assumptions, the threats and the organizational security policies are described in chap-
ter 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.
The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB and EWA-Canada. The evalua-
tion was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version
3.1, release 4, and the Common Methodology for IT security Evaluation, version 3.1,
release 4. The evaluation was performed at the evaluation assurance level EAL3,
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe-
dish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also
accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025
for Common Criteria evaluation. EWA-Canada operates as a Foreign location for
Combitech AB within scope of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certifi-
cation Scheme.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target, and have been reached in agree-
ment with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodology
for evaluation assurance level:
 EAL 3 + ALC_FLR.2.
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The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2016002
Name and version of the
certified IT product
Firmware for Multi-Functional Devices (Printers)
Lexmark CX725 and XC4140
Firmware versions:
ATL. 030.079CC: CX725h and XC4150
Security Target Identification Lexmark CX725 and XC4140 Multi-Function
Printers Security Target
EAL EAL3+ ALC_FLR.2
CCRA recognition for components up to EAL 2 and
ALC_FLR only
Sponsor Lexmark International Technologies S.A.
Developer Lexmark International Technologies S.A.
ITSEF Combitech AB
Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 4
CEM version 3.1, revision 4
Certification completion date 2017-03-15
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3 Security Policy
The TOE consists of eight security functions. Below is a short description of each of
them. For more information, see Security Target [ST]
Audit Generation
The TOE generates audit event records for security-relevant events and transmits them
to a remote IT system using the syslog protocol.
Identification and Authentication
When a touch panel or web session is initiated, the user is implicitly assumed to be the
Guest (default) user. Per the evaluated configuration, the permissions for this user
must be configured such that no access to TSF data or functions is allowed. Therefore,
the user must successfully log in as a different user before any TSF data or functions
may be accessed.
The TOE supports I&A with a per-user selection of Username/Password Accounts
(processed by the TOE) or integration with an external LDAP server (in the operation-
al environment). Smart Card authentication may also be specified for users of the
touch panel.
Access Control
Access controls configured for functions (e.g. fax usage) and menu access are en-
forced by the TOE.
Management
Through web browser and touch panel sessions, authorized administrators may con-
figure access controls and perform other TOE management functions.
Fax Separation
The TOE ensures that only fax traffic is sent or received via the attached phone line.
Incoming traffic is processed as fax data only; no management access or other data ac-
cess is permitted. In the evaluated configuration, the only source for outgoing faxes is
the scanner.
D.DOC Wiping
In the evaluated configuration, the TOE automatically overwrites RAM used to store
user data as soon as the buffer is released.
Secure Communication
The TOE protects the confidentiality and integrity of all information exchanged over
the attached network by using IPSec with ESP for all network communication. Cryp-
tographic keys may be generated by the TOE or pre-shared keys may be entered by
the administrator.
Self Test
During initial start-up, the TOE performs self tests on its cryptographic components
and the integrity of the configuration data.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The following assumption about the usage are made:
A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrators are aware of the security policies and proce-
dures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer’s
guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accord-
ance with those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for mali-
cious purposes.
A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of
their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and proce-
dures.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following assumption about the environment are made:
A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment
that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data
interfaces of the TOE.
A.IPSEC IPSec with ESP is used between the TOE and all remote IT systems with
which it communicates over the network using IPv4 and/or IPv6.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
Four categories of threat agents are defined:
 Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the TOE.
 Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE func-
tions for which they are not authorized.
 Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data in
ways for which they are not authorized.
 Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose the
TOE to unanticipated threats.
The identified threats against the TOE are listed below:
 T.CONF.ALT TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
 T.CONF.DIS TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
 T.DOC.ALT User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
 T.DOC.DIS User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
 T.FUNC.ALT User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
 T.PROT.ALT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
Four Organisational Security Policies are defined.
 P.AUDIT.LOGGING To preserve operational accountability and security, records
that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created,
maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be
reviewed by authorized personnel
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 P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT To prevent unauthorized use of the external in-
terfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE
and its IT environment.
 P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION To detect corruption of the executable code in
the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
 P.USER.AUTHORIZATION To preserve operational accountability and security,
Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner.
Nine assumptions on the operational environment are defined, none of them are to
be characterized as unusual.
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5 Architectural Information
The following TOE model is adapted from the Protection Profile, ref. [PP].
The TOE is comprised of the following subsystems:
Operating System
The Operating System subsystem provides standard operating system services such as
file system, process management, timers and memory management. The memory
management functionality zeroizes buffers in memory upon deallocation.
The Operating System subsystem executes a series of self-tests of the MFP upon each
start-up of the system. This subsystem also maintains the system time, which is used
to insert timestamps into audit records when they are generated.
GUI Manager
The GUI Manager subsystem handles all interactions with local users via the touch
screen and keypad. This subsystem retrieves (from the Object Store subsystem) and
displays the appropriate information on the touch screen and processes input from the
touch screen and keypad. When configuration changes are made, the updated infor-
mation is sent to the Object Store subsystem to be saved and acted on.
User Authentication
The User Authentication subsystem handles all validation of user credentials and au-
thorizations, whether the validation is performed locally or remotely. When creden-
tials or authorization checks are received from the GUI Manager or Web Server sub-
systems, User Authentication retrieves information from Object Store to determine if
local, remote, or PKI validation should be performed.
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Object Store
The Object Store subsystem is responsible for managing the storage of configuration
parameters, forwarding audit records between the generating subsystem and the Audit
subsystem, and forwarding user jobs between the receiving subsystem and the destina-
tion subsystem. This subsystem also maintains a list of pending user jobs.
Audit
The Audit subsystem is responsible for formatting audit information into the standard
Syslog format, inserting a timestamp, and forwarding the audit records to the config-
ured Syslog server. If NTP is configured, this subsystem also interacts with the con-
figured NTP server(s) to maintain the system time.
Network Interface
The Network Interface subsystem is responsible for all interactions with the Network
Interface Card and provides all the processing of network protocol layers that are
common to multiple software subsystems (e.g. TCP, IP, IPSec). This subsystem inter-
acts with remote IT systems via the network protocols. Since cryptography is required
for several of the network protocols to establish trusted channels, this subsystem par-
ticipates in key management functions and invokes the Crypto Library subsystem to
perform cryptographic operations. All communication with remote IT systems is re-
quired to use IPSec.
Print
The Print subsystem processes received print jobs from the network interface, scanner
and fax line (via the Object Store subsystem). Received network print jobs are queued
to be deleted after the print job expiration timeout if they do not contain a PJL SET
USERNAME statement. Audit information is generated as jobs are received, indicat-
ing the job is created. The user jobs are converted to raster images and queued for
printing. The list of user jobs waiting to be printed is communicated to the Object
Store subsystem. Audit information is generated as jobs are completed.
Scan Manager
The Scan Manager subsystem is responsible for controlling the operation of the scan-
ner hardware and formatting the scanned images into an appropriate format. This sub-
system invokes the Operating System subsystem to save the user data in memory. The
format may be an email message with an attachment for scan-to-email operations or
scan-to-fax operations (when fax server is configured), or raster image for copy opera-
tions or scan-to-fax operations (when analog fax is configured). The currently logged
in user on the touch screen is the user associated with the job. Once formatted, the user
job is sent to the Object Store subsystem for delivery to the destination subsystem.
Email
The Email subsystem is responsible for forwarding user jobs to a remote IT system via
SMTP. In the evaluated configuration, the user jobs may have originated from a scan-
to-email operation or a scan-to-fax operation with the fax server configured. The Op-
erating System subsystem is invoked to open the file containing the user data. When
the user job has been forwarded, the Operating System subsystem is invoked to delete
the file containing the user data and zeroize the memory in which the data was stored.
Audit information is generated upon job completion and forwarded to the Audit sub-
system via the Object Store subsystem.
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Web Server
The Web Server subsystem is responsible for providing user access to TOE functions
from remote IT systems via browser sessions (Remote Management Access (RMA)).
This subsystem retrieves (from the Object Store subsystem) and presents the appropri-
ate information for display. When configuration changes are made, the updated infor-
mation is sent to the Object Store subsystem to be saved and acted on.
Fax
The Fax subsystem is responsible for controlling the operation of the fax modem
hardware. For incoming faxes, this subsystem invokes the Operating System subsys-
tem to save the user data as a raster image in memory. Unprocessed data is never ac-
cepted by this subsystem and the evaluated configuration does not permit unprocessed
data received via the fax line to be forwarded out the Network Interface Card. The
touch screen user that releases the held faxes is the user associated with the job. Once
complete, the user job is sent to the Object Store subsystem for delivery to the Print
subsystem.
Crypto Library
The Crypto Library subsystem provides cryptographic algorithm support used by other
subsystems to perform cryptographic operations. The operations supported include en-
cryption, decryption, hashing, message authentication coding, digital signatures and
random number generation.
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6 Documentation
The physical scope of the TOE also includes the following guidance documentation:
 Lexmark Common Criteria Installation Supplement and Administrator Guide
 Lexmark Embedded Web Server Administrator's Guide
 Lexmark CX725 Series User's Guide
 Lexmark XC4100 Series User's Guide
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7 IT Product Testing
Developer Tests
The developer performed manual tests. The developer’s testing covers the security
functional behavior of all TSFIs and SFRs as well as the interactions of the subsys-
tems. The developer’s testing comprised both firmware and all printer models.
Independent Evaluator Tests
The evaluator’s independent tests were chosen to complement the developer’s manual
tests in covering as much of the security functional behavior of the TSFIs and SFRs.
The evaluator repeated developer’s test cases and performed individual and penetra-
tion tests. The tests included:
 TOE Installation
 Identification and Authentication
 Access Control and Management
 Trusted Channel
 Repetition of Developer’s Testing
The evaluator used a similar test configuration as the developer consisting of:
 TOE: CX725 without Smart Card reader
 Workstation: Windows client used to send print jobs to the TOE, open browser
sessions to manage the TOE, and to exchange email with the Email Server.
 Primary Domain Controller: Windows server providing Active Directory, DNS,
Kerberos, GSSAPI, PKI and NTP services
 Email Server: SMTP server capable of receiving email from the TOE and for-
warding it to a user on Workstation
 Syslog Server: Capable of receiving and displaying Syslog messages from the
TOE
 Network Monitor: Used to display and analyse network traffic
 Fax: Analog fax machine
 IP Network
 Phone network
The tests were run manually from the MFP’s touch screen, the Embedded Web Server,
and the workstation. The actual results of all test cases were consistent with the ex-
pected test results and all tests were judged to pass.
Penetration Tests
The following types of vulnerability tests were performed:
 Port scan
 Vulnerability scan
 PNG fuzzing
 LDAP+GSSAPI authentication down negotiation
 IPSec down negotiation
 IPSec scanning
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Port scans were run after installation and configuration had been done according the
guidance documentation. The purpose was to check that no unexpected ports were
opened unfiltered and no unexpected services available. The Nmap (www.nmap.org)
port scan tool was used. Four different modes were used: TCP Connect, TCP SYN,
UDP, and IP protocol scans. All possible 65535 ports were scanned for TCP/UDP.
A scanning tool for network vulnerabilities were run. No high severity issues were
found.
A fuzzing tool were used to randomly change the content of a PNG image. The fuzzed
images were sent to the MFP for printing.
It was verified that all traffic to and from the Primary Domain Controller was using
IPSec in ESP mode. It was also verified that no down negotiating to weaker algo-
rithms than specified for the trusted channel, [ST] table 18, is possible.
The IPSec protocol were scanned using an IKE/IPSec scanning tool to reveal unspeci-
fied primitives, key lengths, etc.
Search in public sources did not revealed any exploitable or residual vulnerabilities in
the TOE including its third party software libraries.
All penetration testing had negative outcome, i.e. no vulnerabilities were found.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
In the Security Target [ST] section “1.10 Evaluated Configuration” there are 29 stated
configuration options that apply to the evaluated configuration of the TOE. These con-
figuration options need to be set correctly in order to use the evaluated version.
Dependencies to Other Hardware, Firmware and Software
The TOE is the firmware of an MFD. The MFD hardware must be one of the models
supported for the firmware versions specified for the TOE. To be fully operational,
any combination of the following items may be connected to the MFD:
 A LAN for network connectivity. The TOE supports IPv4 and IPv6.
 A telephone line for fax capability.
 IT systems that submit print jobs to the MFP via the network using standard print
protocols.
 IT systems that send and/or receive faxes via the telephone line.
 An IT system acting as the remote syslog recipient of audit event records sent
from the TOE.
 LDAP server to support Identification and Authentication (I&A). This component
is optional depending on the type(s) of I&A mechanisms used.
 Card reader and cards to support Smart Card authentication using Common Ac-
cess Card (CAC) or Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards. This component is
optional depending on the type(s) of I&A mechanisms used. The supported card
readers are:
 Identive Cloud 2700 F & Identive Cloud 2700 R readers
 Omnikey 3121 SmartCard Reader,
 Any other Omnikey SmartCard Readers that share the same USB Vendor IDs
and Product IDs with the above readers (example Omnikey 3021),
 SCM SCR 331,
 SCM SCR 3310v2.
Excluded from the TOE Evaluated Configuration
The following features of the TOE are outside of or not allowed in the evaluated con-
figuration.
 Support for
 Optional network interfaces.
 Optional parallel or serial interfaces.
 USB ports on the MFPs that perform document processing functions.
 Support for AppleTalk.
 Other I&A mechanisms than Internal Accounts, LDAP+GSSAPI on a per-user ba-
sis, the Backup Password mechanism, and Smart Card authentication.
 Other eSF, Java applications, than “eSF Security Manager”, “Smart Card Authen-
tication”, “Secure Held Print Jobs”, “Smart Card Authentication Client”, “PIV
Smart Card Driver (if PIV cards are used)”, “CAC Smart Card Driver (if CAC
cards are used)”, and “Background and Idle Screen”.
 Fax forwarding.
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 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
 Internet Printing Protocol (IPP).
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family
Name
Short name (includ-
ing component iden-
tifier for assurance
families)
Verdict
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Life-cycle support ALC PASS
Authrisation controls ALC_CMC.3 PASS
Implementation representation CM Coverage ALC_CMS.3 PASS
Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.2 PASS
Development ADV PASS
Security Architecure description ADV_ARC.1 PASS
Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.3 PASS
Architecual design ADV_TDS.2 PASS
Guidance documents AGD PASS
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: Basic design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
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Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - Sampling ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.2 PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None
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11 Glossary
CAC Common Access Card
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security,
document describing the methodology used in Common Cri-
teria evaluations
CM Configuration Management
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
GSSAPI Generic Security Services Application Program Interface
I&A Identification & Authentication
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
ISO International Standards Organization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to
operate within a evaluation and certification scheme
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MFD Multi-Function Device
MFP Multi-Function Printer
NTP Network Time Protocol
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PJL Printer Job Language
PIV Personal Identity Verification
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
SMTP Simple Mail Transport Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
ST Security Target, document containing security requirements
and specifications , used as the basis of a TOE evaluation
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
USB Universal Serial Bus
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12 Bibliography
[CCp1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1, version 3.1, revision 4, September 2012 CCMB-2012-09-001
[CCp2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2, version 3.1, revision 4, September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-002
[CCp3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3:, version 3.1, revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-003
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 4, September 2012, CCMB-
2012-09-004
[ST] Lexmark CX725 and XC4140 Multi-Function Printers Security Tar-
get, Lexmark International, Inc., 2017-01-16, document version 1.5
[PP] 2600.1, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Envi-
ronment A, dated January 2009, version 1.0
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Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme has been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
1.19 2016-02-05 None
1.19.1 2016-03-07 None
1.19.2 2016-04-28 None
1.19.3 2016-06-02 None
1.20 2016-10-20 None
1.20.1 2017-01-12 None
1.21.2 2017-02-27 None
A.2 Scheme Notes
Scheme Note 15 - Demonstration of test coverage
Scheme Note 18 - Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target
In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has ex-
amined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system. The
changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista QMS 1.20.1”.
The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.19 to the current QMS 1.21.1, there are no
changes with impact on the result of the certification.