TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
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nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
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TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
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Certification Report
EP-COS V7.0 Plain Version - EPCOSV70a
Sponsor: NXP Semiconductors GmbH
Beiersdorfstrasse 12
D-22529 Hamburg
Germany
Developer: eSmart Systems Ltd.
A-39, Sector-4
NOIDA, Pin Code- 201301
India
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300016-01-CR
Report version: 2
Project number: NSCIB-2300016-01
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 15 February 2024
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 7
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 7
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Evaluation Results 8
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 8
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
Page: 3/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300016-01-CR, dated 15 February 2024
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the EP-
COS V7.0 Plain Version - EPCOSV70a. The developer of the EP-COS V7.0 Plain Version -
EPCOSV70a is eSmart Systems Ltd. located in Noida, India and NXP Semiconductors GmbH located
in Hamburg, Germany was the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is
intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of
the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a contactless integrated circuit chip of machine-readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip)
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control
according to ‘ICAO Doc 9303.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 16 November 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the EP-COS V7.0 Plain Version - EPCOSV70a,
the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the
product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the EP-COS V7.0 Plain Version
- EPCOSV70a are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target,
and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this
certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and ATE_DPT.2 (Testing: security enforcing modules).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
This document was re-issued on 15 February 2024 as version 2 following an update to the ETR to
reference an [ST-lite] for this TOE.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
Page: 6/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300016-01-CR, dated 15 February 2024
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the EP-COS V7.0 Plain Version - EPCOSV70a
from eSmart Systems Ltd. located in Noida, India.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 B1
Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4) 0.7.6
Software
IC Embedded Software (operating system) EPCOSV70a
MRTD application BAC 1.0
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the EP-COS V7.0
Plain Version - EPCOSV70a. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST] or [ST-Lite], Chapter 1.3.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security functionality:
• Self-protection of the TOE and the data stored on the TOE
• The Basic Access Control authorizes the terminal to read the logical MRTD after optical read
of the MRTD
• Protection of the communication channel between the terminal and the TOE regarding
authenticity, integrity and confidentiality
• Preventing inconspicuous identification or tracking of a MRTD.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST] or [ST-
Lite].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be
met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure
as a whole.
The environment in which the TOE is personalised must perform proper and safe personalisation
according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.
The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the data send and read from the TOE.
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2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE architecture can be depicted as follows:
The architecture of the TOE is comprised of the following subsystems:
• NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library
(R1/R2/R3/R4),
• the IC Embedded Software (operating system) Version EPCOSV70a,
• the MRTD application BAC (Version 1.0)
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE) EP-COS V7.0 Plain, dated 30 May 2023 v0.04
Personalization Guidance (AGD_PRE) EP-COS V7.0 Plain, dated 30 May 2023 v0.03
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level.
All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested
explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing
was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used
extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The focused analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
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• For ADV_IMP an implementation representation review is performed on the TOE. During this
attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge gained
from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional) potential
vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack methods in [JIL-AM].
An important source for assurance in this step is the technical report [HW-ETRfC] of the
underlying platform.
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was one week. During that test campaign, 100% of
the total time was spent on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE was tested in the following configurations:
• EP-COS V7.0 Plain Version - EPCOSV70a
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and [ST-Lite] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE, by use of one Site Technical Audit Report. Sites involved in the development and
production of the hardware platform were reused by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number EP-COS V7.0 Plain Version -
EPCOSV70a.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the EP-COS V7.0 Plain Version -
EPCOSV70a, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of
EAL 4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and ATE_DPT.2. This implies that the product satisfies the
security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP_0055].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
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countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>.
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3 Security Target
The Security Target EP-COS V7.0 Plain, Rev 0.8, Dated 09 November 2023 [ST] is included here by
reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
BAC Basic Access Control
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report "EP-COS V7.0 Plain Version - EPCOSV70a"
– EAL4+, 23-RPT-137, version 6.0, Dated 13 December 2023
[HW-CERT] BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V3-2022 for NXP Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC
Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4) from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH, dated 07 September 2022
[HW-ETRfC] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product 7121,
BSI-DSZ-CC- 1136-2021, Version 2, dated 25 August 2022
[HW-ST] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and
Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4), Security Target Lite, NXP Semiconductors,
Rev. 2.6, 13 June 2022, BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V3-2022
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November
2022
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January
2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version
2.6, 02 August 2022
[PP_0055] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control (MRTD-PP), Version 1.10, 25 March
2009, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
[ST] Security Target EP-COS V7.0 Plain, Rev 0.8, Dated 09 November 2023
[ST-lite] Security Target Lite EP-COS V7.0 Plain, Rev 0.8, Dated 09 November 2023
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-
004, April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)