Hypori Virtual Mobile Infrastructure Platform 4.2.0 Client (iOS) Security Target

Version 1.0 February 10, 2021

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1. Security Target Introduction

This section identifies the Target of Evaluation (TOE) along with identification of the Security Target (ST) itself. The section includes documentation organization, ST conformance claims, and ST conventions.

The TOE is the Hypori Client (iOS) component of the Virtual Mobile Infrastructure Platform version 4.2.0 provided by Hypori, LLC.

The Security Target contains the following additional sections:

- Security Target Introduction (Section 1)
- TOE Description (Section 2)
- Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
- Security Objectives (Section 4)
- IT Security Requirements (Section 5)
- TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
- Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)
- Rationale (Section 8).
- Appendix: iOS APIs (Section 9).

1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification

ST Title - Hypori Virtual Mobile Infrastructure Platform 4.2.0 Client (iOS) Security Target

ST Version – Version 1.0

ST Date - February 10, 2021

TOE Identification - Hypori Client (iOS) 4.2.0

TOE Developer – Hypori, LLC.

Evaluation Sponsor – Hypori, LLC.

CC Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017

1.2 Conformance Claims

This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:

This ST is conformant to the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 2019-03-01 [PP_APP_v1.3].

The following NIAP Technical Decisions apply to the security target or the evaluation assurance activities.

- <u>TD0561</u>: Signature verification update
- TD0554: iOS/iPadOS/Android AppSW Virus Scan
- <u>TD0548</u>: Integrity for installation tests in AppSW PP 1.3
- <u>TD0544:</u> Alternative testing methods for FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
- <u>TD0521:</u> Updates to Certificate Revocation (FIA_X509_EXT.1)
- <u>TD0510</u>: Obtaining random bytes for iOS/macOS
- <u>TD0498</u>: Application Software PP Security Objectives and Requirements Rationale
- <u>TD0495</u>: FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 Test Clarification
- TD0486: Removal of PP-Module for VPN Clients from allowed with list
- <u>TD0445</u>: User Modifiable File Definition

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- <u>TD0444</u>: IPsec selections
- <u>TD0437</u>: Supported Configuration Mechanism
- <u>TD0427</u>: Reliable Time Source
- <u>TD0416</u>: Correction to FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Test Activity

The following NIAP Technical Decisions are list on the NIAP website, but are not applicable to this evaluation:

- <u>TD0543:</u> FMT_MEC_EXT.1 evaluation activity update
- <u>TD0540:</u> Expanded AES Modes in FCS_COP
- <u>TD0519</u>: Linux symbolic links and FMT_CFG_EXT.1
- <u>TD0515</u>: Use Android APK manifest in test
- <u>TD0473</u>: Support for Client or Server TOEs in FCS_HTTPS_EXT
- <u>TD0465</u>: Configuration Storage for .NET Apps
- <u>TD0435</u>: Alternative to SELinux for FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
- <u>TD0434</u>: Windows Desktop Applications Test

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.

• Part 2 Extended

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.

• Part 3 Extended

1.3 Conventions

The following conventions have been applied in this document:

- Security Functional Requirements Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
 - Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST, iteration is indicated by a number in parentheses placed at the end of the component. For example, FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1 requirement, (1) and (2).
 - Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an assignment within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [*selected-assignment*]).
 - Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [*selection*]).
 - Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., "... all objects ..." or "... some big things ..."). Note that 'cases' that are not applicable in a given SFR have simply been removed without any explicit identification.
- Other sections of the ST Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.

1.3.1 Terminology

[PP_APP_v1.3] provides definitions for terms specific to the application software technology as well as general Common Criteria terms. The technology-specific terms are:

- Address Space Layout Randomization
- Application
- Application Programming Interface
- Credential
- Data Execution Prevention
- Developer
- Mobile Code
- Operating System
- Personally Identifiable Information
- Platform
- Sensitive Data
- Stack Cookie
- Vendor

Terms from the Common Criteria are:

- Common Criteria
- Common Evaluation Methodology
- Protection Profile
- Security Target
- Target of Evaluation
- TOE Security Functionality
- TOE Summary Specification
- Security Functional Requirement
- Security Assurance Requirement

This ST does not include additional technology-specific terminology.

1.3.2 Abbreviations

This section identifies abbreviations and acronyms used in this ST.

API	Application Programming Interface	
APNs	Apple Push Notification service	
Арр	Software application	
ASLR	Address Space Layout Randomization	
CC	Common Criteria	
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology	
CTLs	Certificate Trust Lists	
DEP	Data Execution Prevention	
DoD	Department of Defense	
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol	
IPA	iOS App Store Package file	
MDM	Mobile Device Management	
OS	Operating System	

PII	Personally Identifiable Information	
PLIST	Property List file	
РР	Protection Profile	
PP_APP_v1.3	Protection Profile for Application Software	
SAR	Security assurance Requirement	
SCM	Source Code Management	
SFR	Security functional requirement	
ST	Security Target	
TOE	Target of Evaluation	
TSF	TOE Security Functionality	
TSS	TOE Summary Specification	
VMI	Virtual Mobile Infrastructure	

2. TOE Description

After a brief overview of the Hypori Virtual Mobile Infrastructure product, this section describes its Hypori Client (iOS) component, which is the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The description covers TOE architecture, logical boundaries, and physical boundaries.

2.1 Product Overview

In the Hypori Virtual Mobile Infrastructure (VMI) platform, end users running a Hypori Client (iOS) on their mobile device access a virtual Android device running on a server in the cloud. The virtual device on the server contains the operating system, the data, and the applications, using TLS 1.2 encryption to communicate securely with the Hypori Client (iOS). The Hypori iOS thin client application provides secure access to the remote Android virtual device and brokers access between the mobile device's sensors and the applications executing in the virtual device on a Hypori server. The client applications are agnostic to the version of Android executing in the virtual device.

The following diagram shows the Hypori system, including its components and networks. Unlike many software solutions, some of the Hypori servers are installed on virtual servers while others are installed on physical servers.




Figure 1 Hypori Virtual Mobile Infrastructure (VMI)

The Hypori VMI platform includes the following components:

- **Hypori Client:** This is an iOS-based thin client that installs on the end user's mobile device and communicates with the Hypori Virtual Device on the server through secure encrypted protocols.
- **Hypori Virtual Device:** This is an Android-based virtualized mobile device executing on a server in the cloud.
- **Hypori Servers:** This is the cloud server cluster that hosts the Hypori Virtual Devices.
- **Hypori Admin Console:** This is a browser-based administration user interface that is used to manage the Hypori system.

2.2 TOE Overview

The TOE is the iOS-based Hypori Client. The following diagram shows how the TOE interacts with a Hypori Device running applications on a Hypori Server. The Hypori Client is a thin client that communicates only with a Hypori Virtual Device on a Hypori Server and not with other servers or applications.



Figure 2 Hypori Client as Part of VMI Platform

2.3 TOE Architecture

This section describes the TOE architecture including physical and logical boundaries. Figure 3 shows the relationship of the TOE to its operational environment along with the TOE boundary. The security functional requirements identify the libraries included in the application package.




Figure 3 TOE Boundary for iOS Devices

2.3.1 Physical Boundaries

The TOE consists of a Hypori Client application as defined in the Hypori Client installation package. The Hypori Client is an iOS-based thin client that only communicates with the Hypori server. The Hypori server, applications running on the Hypori server, and any functions not specified in this security target are outside the scope of the TOE.

2.3.1.1 Software Requirements

The TOE is supported on iOS releases iOS 12 and iOS 13 (with the exception of iOS 13.1, due to known incompatibility).

2.3.1.2 Hardware Requirements

The TOE imposes no hardware requirements beyond the iOS operating system requirements.

2.3.2 Logical Boundaries

This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:

- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security management
- Privacy
- Protection of the TSF
- Trusted path/channels

2.3.2.1 Cryptographic support

The TOE establishes secure communication with the Hypori server using TLS. The TOE uses cryptographic services provided by the platform. The TOE stores credentials and certificates for mutual authentication in the platform's key chain.

2.3.2.2 User data protection

The TOE informs a user of hardware and software resources the TOE accesses. It uses the platform's permission mechanism to get a user's approval for access as part of the installation process. The user initiates a secure network connection to the Hypori server using the TOE. In general, sensitive data resides on the Hypori server and not the Hypori Client, although the client does store credentials as per section 2.3.2.1.

2.3.2.3 Identification and Authentication

The TOE uses the platform's certificate validation services to authenticate the X.509 certificate the Hypori server presents as part of establishing a TLS connection.

2.3.2.4 Security management

Security management consists of setting Hypori Client configuration options. The TOE uses the platform's mechanisms for storing the configuration settings.

2.3.2.5 Privacy

The TOE does not transmit PII over a network.

2.3.2.6 Protection of the TSF

The TOE uses security features and APIs that the platform provides. The TOE leverages package management for secure installation and updates. The TOE package includes only those third-party libraries necessary for its intended operation.

2.3.2.7 Trusted path/channels

The TOE invokes the platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted data using TLS 1.2 for all communication with the Hypori server.

2.4 TOE Documentation

The TOE includes the following Hypori Client documentation.

- Hypori Virtual Mobility User Guide iOS, Client Release 4.2 v1.1
- Hypori User Guide Common Criteria Configuration and Operation, Version 4.2

3. Security Problem Definition

This security target includes by reference the Security Problem Definition from the [PP_APP_v1.3]. The Security Problem Definition consists of threats that a conformant TOE is expected to address and assumptions about the operational environment of the TOE.

In general, the [PP_APP_v1.3] has presented a Security Problem Definition appropriate for application software that runs on mobile devices, as well as on desktop and server platforms. The Hypori Client is an iOS application running on a mobile device. As such, the [PP_APP_v1.3] Security Problem Definition applies to the TOE.

4. Security Objectives

Like the Security Problem Definition, this security target includes by reference the Security Objectives from the [PP_APP_v1.3]. The [PP_APP_v1.3] security objectives for the operational environment are reproduced below, since these objectives characterize technical and procedural measures each consumer must implement in their operational environment.

In general, the [PP_APP_v1.3] has presented a Security Objectives statement appropriate for application software that runs on mobile devices, as well as on desktop and server platforms. Consequently, the [PP_APP_v1.3] security objectives are suitable for the Hypori Client TOE (iOS).

4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

OE.PLATFORM	The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This includes the underlying operating system and any discrete execution environment provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER	The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN	The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

5. IT Security Requirements

This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.

The security functional requirements have all been drawn from: *Protection Profile for Application Software*, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 [PP_APP_v1.3]. As a result, refinements and operations already performed in that PP are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from that PP and any residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, [PP_APP_v1.3] made a number of refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the CC. [PP_APP_v1.3] should be consulted to identify those changes if necessary.

The security assurance requirements are the set of SARs specified in [PP_APP_v1.3].

5.1 Extended Requirements

All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the [PP_APP_v1.3]. The [PP_APP_v1.3] defines the following extended SFRs. Since these SFRs are not redefined in this ST, readers should consult [PP_APP_v1.3] for more information in regard to these CC extensions.

- FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
- FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
- FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
- FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
- FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
- FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
- FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
- FIA X509 EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
- FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
- FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
- FPR ANO EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
- FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
- FPT API EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
- FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
- FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
- FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
- FPT TUD EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
- FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit

5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the Hypori Client TOE.

Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
FCS: Cryptographic	FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
support	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
	FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials

Requirement Class	Requirement Component	
FDP: User data protection	FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data	
	FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources	
	FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications	
FIA: Identification and	FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation	
authentication	FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication	
FMT: Security management	t FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration	
	FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism	
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	
FPR: Privacy	FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information	
FPT: Protection of the TSF	F FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities	
	FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs	
	FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions	
	FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries	
	FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update	
	FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update	
FTP: Trusted path/channels	FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit	

5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

5.2.1.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services (FCS_CKM_EXT.1)

FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1 The application shall [generate no asymmetric cryptographic keys].

5.2.1.2 Random Bit Generation Services (FCS_RBG_EXT.1)

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The application shall [*use no DRBG functionality*] for its cryptographic operations.

5.2.1.3 Storage of Credentials (FCS_STO_EXT.1)

FCS_STO_EXT.1.1The application shall [invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store
[user TLS client key and server account password]] to non-volatile memory.

5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

5.2.2.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (FDP_DAR_EXT.1)

FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1The application shall [protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1] in
nonvolatile memory.

5.2.2.2 Access to Platform Resources (FDP_DEC_EXT.1)

- **FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1** The application shall restrict its access to [
 - network connectivity,
 - camera,
 - microphone,
 - location services,
 - *[Wi-Fi*,
 - Phone]

].

FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2

The application shall restrict its access to [

• no sensitive information repositories

].

5.2.2.3 Network Communications (FDP_NET_EXT.1)

FDP_NET_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict network communication to [

- user-initiated communication for [connecting to the Hypori server, connecting for help request Webpages hosted in AWS],
- respond to [push notifications from Apple's APNs platform by polling the Hypori server for notifications],
- [application-initiated communication for polling the Hypori server for notifications]

].

5.2.3 Security Management (FMT)

5.2.3.1 Secure by Default Configuration (FMT_CFG_EXT.1)

FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1 The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured with default credentials or no credentials.

FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2 The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application's binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.

5.2.3.2 Supported Configuration Mechanism (FMT_MEC_EXT.1)

FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1¹ The application shall [

• invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and setting configuration options].

5.2.3.3 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [[

- setting configuration options
- applying configuration policies from the Hypori server

]].

5.2.4 Privacy

5.2.4.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information (FPR_ANO_EXT.1)

FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [*not transmit PII over a network*].

5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

5.2.5.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs (FPT_API_EXT.1)

FPT_API_EXT.1.1 The application shall use only documented platform APIs.

5.2.5.2 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities (FPT_AEX_EXT.1)

FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1 The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [**no** exceptions].

¹ This SFR was modified per NIAP TD0437.

FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2	The application shall [not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions].	
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3	The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.	
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4	The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.	
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5	The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.	
5.2.5.3 Integrity for Ins	stallation and Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)	
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The application shall [<i>leverage the platform</i>] to check for updates and patches to the application software.		
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2	The application shall [<i>provide the ability</i>] to query the current version of the application software.	
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3	The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.	
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4 ²	<u>Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can</u> cryptographically verify them prior to installation.	
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5	The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].	
5.2.5.4 Integrity for Ins	stallation and Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.2)	
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1	The application shall be distributed using the format of the platform-supported package manager.	
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2	The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.	
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3 ³	The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.	
5.2.5.5 Use of Third Pa	rty Libraries (FPT_LIB_EXT.1)	
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1	 The application shall be packaged with only [PLCrashReporter-1.2/CrashReporter.framework v1.2 ios-openssl v1.1e Opus Audio Codec v1.1 protobuf v2.5 spice-qtk v2.2]. 	
5256 Software Identi	fication and Versions (FPT_IDV_EXT.1)	
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1	The application shall be versioned with [<i>iOS version information and Hypori internal</i>	
····	versioning scheme]].	
² Modified per TD0561		
³ Modified per TD0561		

5.2.6 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

5.2.6.1 Protection of Data in Transit (FTP_DIT_EXT.1)

FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1⁴ The application shall [

• invoke platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted data with [TLS]] between itself and another trusted IT product.

5.2.7 Identification and authentication (FIA)

5.2.7.1 X.509 Certificate Validation (FIA_X509_EXT.1)

FIA_X509_EXT.1.1⁵ The application shall [*invoke platform-provided functionality*] to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
- The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
- The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
- The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field
- The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [*OCSP as specified in RFC 6960*].
- The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
 - Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.⁶
 - Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the extendedKeyUsage field.⁷
 - OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 - Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the extendedKeyUsage field.⁸

⁷ The Hypori Client does not check extended key usage for Email Protection, since the Hypori Client does not perform email encryption or email signature verification.

⁸ The Hypori Client does not check extended key usage for CMC Registration Authority, since the Hypori Client does not perform Enrollment over Secure Transport.

⁴ The SFR was modified per TD0444.

⁵ Modified per TD0521.

⁶ The Hypori Client does not check extended key usage for Code Signing. The Hypori Client relies on the platform update mechanism. While Hypori signs each installation package with a Code Signing certificate, the platform verifies the certificate and package.

FIA_X509_EXT.1.2	The application shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.2.7.2 X.509 Certificate	e Authentication (FIA_X509_EXT.2)
FIA_X509_EXT.2.19	The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for $[TLS]$.
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2	When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the application shall [<i>not accept the certificate</i>].

5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements in Table 2 are included in this ST by reference from the [PP_APP_v1.3].

Requirement Class	Requirement Component	
ADV: Development	ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification	
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance	
	AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures	
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE	
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage	
	ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates	
ATE: Tests	ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance	
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey	

Table 2 Assurance Components

These assurance requirements imply the following requirements from CC class ASE: Security Target Evaluation.

- ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
- ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
- ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
- ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
- ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
- ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification

Consequently, the assurance activities specified in [PP_APP_v1.3] apply to the TOE evaluation.

⁹ The SFR was modified per TD0444.

6. TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes the security functions:

- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Identification and authentication
- Security Management
- Privacy
- Protection of the TSF
- Trusted path/channels

6.1 Cryptographic support

The Hypori Client makes use of the platform for cryptographic services. The Hypori Client uses platform TLS services for secure communication with the Hypori server, including mutual authentication. The client uses TLS client certificates and the RSA or Elliptic Curve key pairs along with a CA certificate for the server. The user stores these certificates in the platform's key store during installation. The user need not install a CA certificate when the CA is a platform trusted CA.

The TOE relies on the iOS platform to provide all of its cryptographic functionality.

This evaluation is identified on the NIAP Product Compliant List with a reference number 10937, <u>https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Product/Compliant.cfm?PID=10937</u>

The TOE implements the following cryptographic algorithms provided be the iOS 12 operating system.

- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 524
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289

This evaluation is identified on the NIAP Product Compliant List with a reference number 11036, <u>https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Product/Compliant.cfm?PID=11036</u>

The TOE implements the following cryptographic algorithms provided be the iOS 13 operating system.

- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS RSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA256 as defined in RFC 524
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289

For elliptic curve cipher suites, the Hypori Client relies on the platform for elliptic curves. The iOS platform supports NIST curves secp256r1 and secp384r1 and Supported Elliptic Curves Extension for TLS. No configuration is required by a Hypori Client user.

6.1.1 FCS_CKM_EXT.1

The Hypori Client does not generate cryptographic keys. As part of installation, a user adds a TLS client certificate and the RSA or Elliptic Curve key pairs to the platform's key store. The Hypori Client relies on the platform for TLS support. The platform generates all ephemeral TLS keys without direct Hypori Client action.

6.1.2 FCS_RBG_EXT.1

The Hypori Client relies on the platform for cryptographic services. Consequently, the Hypori Client itself uses no DRBG functions.

6.1.3 FCS_STO_EXT.1

Table 3 lists each Hypori Client persistent credential along with how the client uses and stores each credential.

Credential	Purpose	Storage
User TLS client key	The RSA/Elliptic Curve key pairs and the X509 certificate are used for TLS mutual authentication (client side of TLS exchange) that is implemented by the platform.	iOS Keychain
Server account password	Authenticates user to Hypori server	iOS Keychain

Table 3: Persistent Credential Use and Storage

6.2 User data protection

The Hypori Client uses the platform's permission mechanisms to inform the user of hardware and software resources the client accesses. The client presents the required permissions to the user for approval during installation. A user initiates network connections to the Hypori server. In general, sensitive data resides on the Hypori server and is not stored on the Hypori Client. Sensitive data on the Hypori Client is limited to credentials, which the client stores as described in section 6.1. The client does not maintain Personally Identifiable Information (PII).

6.2.1 FDP_DAR_EXT.1

Hypori Client sensitive data consists of user TLS client key and server account password credentials. FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Secrets specifies the platform's iOS keychain for protecting keys and credentials. In accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1, the Hypori Client stores these credentials in the platform's iOS keychain as described in section 6.1.3.

The Hypori Client stores application account options and any cached configuration settings (such as the server's hostname, port, notification properties, and settings to control the client application's behavior for disconnecting, keyboard, access to phone features, and jailbreak checking) provided by the Hypori Server using the iOS Protected Until First User Authentication protection class.

6.2.2 FDP_NET_EXT.1

The Hypori Client relies on user-initiated network communication to connect to the Hypori Virtual Device. The Hypori Client uses remote-initiated network communication to check for notifications and display them to the user when the system is configured to respond to push notifications from Apple's APNs platform by polling the Hypori server for notifications. The Hypori Client uses application-initiated network communication to periodically check for notifications and display them to the user when the system is configured for notification polling. The Hypori Client

relies on user-initiated requests at <u>https://hypori-client-help.s3.amazonaws.com/ios/master/index.html</u> to access the Help webpage and <u>https://hypori.com/support/</u> to request product help and support.

6.2.3 FDP_DEC_EXT.1

At first launch, the Hypori Client presents to the user some of the permissions requested by the application that are needed to operate. A user can accept (or reject) the permissions, but rejecting permissions may cause apps on the Hypori Virtual Device to not function properly. Some permissions are requested by the application only as the feature is required on first use (such as microphone input). Table 5 shows the permissions required by the Hypori Client. Those marked with an '*' are prompted for when the Hypori Client is started for the first time.

Permission	Description
Background Operation	Support background fetch and remote notification features (never prompted for – a user can change this using the iOS settings application).
Camera	Access the mobile device's camera. *
Location	Provide location for authentication and virtual device apps. *
Microphone	Provide audio input for virtual device apps.
Photo Library	Support camera app features.
Notifications	Support notification display features. *

Updates to the Hypori Client may automatically add additional capabilities within each group. A user can accept (or reject) new permissions to complete any update that includes permissions not in the list above.

A user initiates a network connection to the Hypori server by starting the Hypori Client and entering account information. After the Hypori Client connects to the Hypori server, the applications the user accesses run on the Hypori Device in the Hypori server, not on the mobile device. The Hypori Client does not listen on any ports for inbound connection requests. The Hypori Client interacts only with the Hypori server. When a Hypori Device application needs information from a server (such as a map server), the Hypori Device – not the Hypori Client – communicates with the server (which may be an internal, enterprise server).

The TOE does not access any sensitive information repositories as defined by the [PP_APP_v1.3].

The Hypori Client does not maintain PII. Hence, it does not transmit PII over any network.¹⁰

6.3 Identification and authentication

The Hypori Client uses iOS certificate validation services to authenticate the X.509 certificate the Hypori server presents as part of establishing a TLS connection.

6.3.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1

The iOS platform performs certificate path validation in accordance with RFC 5280 as part of the TLS service. It recursively builds certificate chains until a valid chain is found or all possible paths are exhausted. The chain begins at the leaf certificate and ends in the final trusted root certificate¹¹.

¹⁰ The Hypori Client does maintain user credentials. In particular, the Hypori Client transmits a user's account name and TLS client certificate when connecting to the Hypori Server. However, PP APP SW, distinguishes credentials from PII.

¹¹ The iOS platform performs certificate path validation as part of the TLS service. The platform certificate path methodology to manage X.509 certificate trust evaluation is described in the following document:

The iOS platform performs certificate path validation as part of the TLS service. The Hypori Client relies on the platform for TLS services and package updates. Hence, the platform checks extended key usage for Server Authentication, Client Authentication, and Code Signing purposes. The Hypori Client relies on the platform to validate the revocation status of certificates using OSCP capabilities provided by the platform. The Hypori Client does not perform email encryption, email signature verification, or Enrollment over Secure Transport. Consequently, no check is made for extended key usage Email Protection or CMC Registration Authority purposes.

The application uses the platform to validate the revocation status of the certificate using OCSP as specified in RFC 6960.

6.3.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2

The Hypori Client presents the TLS client certificate and key to the Hypori server to authenticate a TLS connection. During account setup, the user identifies which certificate to present for each account. The user selects a certificate from the certificate store. The user can change the selection from the Certificate setting under the Connection Settings page. The TLS client certificate is an X.509 certificate.

The user stores a CA certificate for the server certificates in the platform's keychain during installation. (The user need not install a CA certificate when the CA is a platform trusted CA.) On iOS devices, the Hypori Client uses the iOS platform certificate path validation services with the CA certificate to validate the certificate presented by the Hypori server. The Hypori Client relies on the iOS platform for certificate validation services using OCSP and is configured to fail the connection if the certificate is revoked or the connection to the OCSP responder fails.

6.4 Security management

The Hypori Client maintains account configuration and account state information in an encrypted file in the application's sandbox and uses the iOS platform's cryptographic key store for managing the user's keys.

6.4.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1

Hypori Client credentials consist of user TLS client key and server account password. The Hypori Client installer does not include a default client key or server account password. A user installs a TLS client certificate and private key from a certificate file using the platform's certificate services. A user's IT group provides the user with a server account password. The user is not able to access any TOE functionality prior to installing the TLS client certificate and private key, and entering the server account password.

The application is configured by default with file permissions which protect the application's binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users. The iOS protection classes use the NSFileProtectionComplete and NSFileProtectionCompleteUntilFirstUserAuthentication to protect the application's binaries and data files. See the following link for additional details.

https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/nsfileprotectioncomplete?changes=_5&language=objc

6.4.2 FMT_MEC_EXT.1

The Hypori Client uses the iOS Key Value Store internally to hold account credentials. In addition, configuration options for the Hypori Client are managed and stored remotely on the Hypori Server. The Hypori client caches these policy settings associated with the account in the iOS Key Value Store and updates them on the device when they are changed by the server. The users of the Hypori Client do not have direct access to the account configuration file's contents which is protected and stored according to FDP_DAR_EXT.1.

6.4.3 FMT_SMF.1

For each account, the Hypori Client provides the capability to set the Hypori server IP address, Hypori server port, account name, and TLS client certificate (key). The Hypori Client can enable the Remember Password setting for each

https://developer.apple.com/library/content/technotes/tn2232/_index.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/DTS40012884-CH1-SECTRUSTEVALUATIONFUNDAMENTALS.

account. The operational guidance recommends that the user disable this functionality. The Hypori Client Remember Password setting can also be disabled by policies received from the Hypori server.

The Hypori Client does not require any configuration to use ports and protocol. The Hypori Client does not listen on any ports for inbound connection requests. The Hypori Client interacts only with the Hypori server. When a Hypori Device application needs information from a server (such as a map server), the Hypori Device – not the Hypori Client – communicates with the server (which may be an internal, enterprise server).

6.5 Privacy

6.5.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1

The Hypori Client does not transmit PII over a network.

6.6 Protection of the TSF

The Hypori Client uses security features and APIs that the platform provides. The client leverages iOS package management for secure installation and updates.

6.6.1 FPT_AEX_EXT.1

To enable ASLR and stack protection on the iOS Hypori Client, Hypori builds with the -fPIE -pie and the -fstack-protector-strong flags. Hypori Client does not invoke mmap or mprotect from the iOS SDK.

6.6.2 FPT_API_EXT.1

The Hypori Client uses the iOS APIs listed in section 9 Appendix: iOS APIs.

6.6.3 FPT_IDV_EXT.1

The TOE is the Hypori Client (iOS) v 4.2.0. The TOE is identified and versioned by the Apple App Store version identifiers as well as the internal Hypori build information.

As an example, the Apple App Store will show two variations of the Hypori App version:

- 4.2.1 this form is just a version/release number
- 4.2.1 (40200004) this form is what Apple calls a build number. These values can be seen in the Apple App Store.

The Hypori Client application also provides version information in the application itself (e.g. in the settings UI and the account list UI). An example of the format inside the app is:

• 4.2.1 (402000004-fecd124e) - The Hypori (iOS) Client 4.2.1 version is interpreted as a major.minor.maintenance-release format. The additional information in this format string is Hypori internals specific and relates to a particular software tag used for tracking released builds in Hypori's SCM repository.

6.6.4 FPT_LIB_EXT.1

The Hypori Client package includes only the third-party libraries listed in the security functional requirements.

6.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2

Hypori distributes the Hypori Client as an IPA file for iOS devices. A user may obtain the installation package through Apple App Store or the enterprise IT group of the user. A user obtains Hypori Client updates using the platform's update mechanism or from the user's IT group. Hypori signs the installation package and Apple re-signs it. On iOS devices, iOS will only install a package from the Apple App Store if it has a valid signature from both Apple and the app developer.

The Hypori Client is signed with a unique certificate. It can be delivered via the Apple App Store, MDM, or other enterprise app stores.

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A user can see the current version of the Hypori Client by checking the footer information on all screens.

6.7 Trusted path/channels

The Hypori Client uses TLS 1.2 for all communication with Hypori server.

6.7.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1

The Hypori server is the only trusted IT product the Hypori Client communicates with. For all communication with the Hypori server, the Hypori Client connects to the server using TLS 1.2 provided by the platform. In addition, the server may be configured to request additional authentication parameters such as:

- passwords associated with the client certificate and an LDAP account.
- an RSA SecurID token's generated code.

Transmission of these values to the server is protected by the TLS encrypted communications.

The TOE calls to the platform to leverage this functionality in two places:

- PLIST/"No arbitrary loads" is a mechanism to tell the iOS platform that the Hypori Client will not make any HTTP or non-TLS protected communications. It is set in a PLIST file that is bundled inside the Apple IPA file. The PLIST is not a classic API call, but a mechanism for the Hypori Client to constrain how it can invoke remote services,
- All calls outgoing use NSURLSession which invokes App Transport Security (ATS).

Information on Apple's documentation can be found here:

https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/information_property_list/nsapptransportsecurity?langu age=objc

6.8 Timely Security Updates

6.8.1 ALC_TSU_EXT.1

Hypori provides customers with timely updates. A customer chooses their preferred communication. The Hypori Support Department will notify customers of updates using each customer's preferred communication mechanism. Application changes may be pushed to end users via the Apple App Store like any other application or via an enterprise application store internal to a customer. Typical delivery times for security updates are 5 to 10 business days.

Hypori maintains a Security Portal online. Every customer is registered with the Support Portal. Hypori notifies each customer of a new security report on the Support portal using the customer's preferred communication mechanism. Hypori secures the Support Portal via TLS and user authentication. Each customer contact must log in with their specific credentials in order to see the security reports.

7. Protection Profile Claims

This ST conforms to the *Protection Profile for Application Software*, Version 1.3, 2019-03-01 [PP_APP_v1.3].

As explained in Section 3, Security Problem Definition, the Security Problem Definition of the [PP_APP_v1.3] has been included by reference into this ST.

As explained in Section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of the [PP_APP_v1.3] have been included by reference into this ST.

The following table identifies all the security functional requirements in this ST. Each SFR is reproduced from the [PP_APP_v1.3] and operations completed as appropriate.

Requirement Class	Requirement Component	Source
FCS: Cryptographic	FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services	[PP_APP_v1.3]
support	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials	[PP_APP_v1.3]
FDP: User data	FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data	[PP_APP_v1.3]
protection	FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications	[PP_APP_v1.3]
FIA: Identification and	FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation	[PP_APP_v1.3]
authentication	FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication	[PP_APP_v1.3]
FMT: Security	T: Security FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration	
management	FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	[PP_APP_v1.3]
FPR: Privacy	FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information	[PP_APP_v1.3]
FPT: Protection of the	FPT_AEX_EXT.1 AntiExploitation Capabilities	[PP_APP_v1.3]
TSF	FPT_API_EXT.1.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update	[PP_APP_v1.3]
FTP: Trusted	FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit	[PP_APP_v1.3]
path/channels		

Table 5 Sl	FR Protection	Profile Sources
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8. Rationale

This security target includes by reference the [PP_APP_v1.3] Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives, and Security Assurance Requirements. The security target makes no additions to the [PP_APP_v1.3] assumptions. [PP_APP_v1.3] security functional requirements have been reproduced with the [PP_APP_v1.3] operations completed. Operations on the security requirements follow [PP_APP_v1.3] application notes and assurance activities. Consequently, [PP_APP_v1.3] rationale applies but is incomplete. The TOE Summary Specification rationale below serves to complete the rationale required for the security target.

8.1 Dependency Rationale

The Protection Profile for Application Software [PP_APP_v1.3] contains all the requirements claimed in this Security Target. As such, the dependencies are not applicable since the PP has been approved.

8.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale

Each subsection in Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, describes a security function of the TOE. Each description is followed with rationale that indicates which requirements are satisfied by aspects of the corresponding security function. The security functions work together to satisfy all of the security functional requirements. Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary in order for the TSF to provide the required security functionality.

This section in conjunction with Section 6 TOE Summary Specification provides evidence that the security functions are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements. The collection of security functions works together to provide all of the security requirements. The security functions described in the TOE summary specification are all necessary for the required security functionality in the TSF. Table 6 demonstrates the relationship between security requirements and security functions.

	Cryptographic support	User data protection	Identification and authentication	Security management	Privacy	Protection of the TSF	Trusted path/channels
FCS_CKM_EXT.1	Х						
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Х						
FCS_STO_EXT.1	Х						
FDP_DAR_EXT.1		Х					
FDP_NET_EXT.1		Х					
FDP_DEC_EXT.1		Х					
FIA_X509_EXT.1			Х				
FIA X509 EXT.2			Х				
FMT CFG EXT.1				Х			
FMT MEC EXT.1				Х			
FMT SMF.1				Х			
FPR ANO EXT.1					Х		
FPT AEX EXT.1						Х	
FPT API EXT.1						Х	
FPT IDV EXT.1						Х	
FPT LIB EXT.1						Х	
FPT_TUD_EXT.1						Х	

Table 6 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping

	Cryptographic support	User data protection	Identification and authentication	Security management	Privacy	Protection of the TSF	Trusted path/channels
FPT_TUD_EXT.2						Х	
FTP_DIT_EXT.1							Х

9. Appendix: iOS APIs

The Hypori Client uses the following iOS APIs:

- 1. AVAudioSession
- 2. AVCaptureDevice
- 3. AVCaptureDeviceInput
- 4. AVCaptureMetadataOutput
- 5. AVCaptureSession
- 6. AVCaptureStillImageOutput
- 7. AVCaptureVideoDataOutput
- 8. AVCaptureVideoPreviewLayer
- 9. AudioComponentFindNext
- 10. AudioComponentInstanceDispose
- 11. AudioComponentInstanceNew
- 12. AudioOutputUnitStart
- 13. AudioOutputUnitStop
- 14. AudioUnitInitialize
- 15. AudioUnitRender
- 16. AudioUnitSetProperty
- 17. AudioUnitUninitialize
- 18. CACurrentMediaTime
- 19. CBCentralManager
- 20. CBUUID
- 21. CC_SHA1
- 22. CC_SHA256
- 23. CFArrayGetCount
- 24. CFArrayGetValueAtIndex
- 25. CFAutorelease
- 26. CFCopyDescription
- 27. CFDataGetTypeID
- 28. CFDictionaryGetValue
- 29. CFGetTypeID
- 30. CFPropertyListCreateDeepCopy
- 31. CFRelease
- 32. CFRetain
- 33. CFRunLoopGetCurrent
- 34. CFUUIDCreate
- 35. CFUUIDCreateFromUUIDBytes
- 36. CFUUIDCreateString
- 37. CFUUIDGetUUIDBytes
- 38. CGAffineTransformMakeRotation
- 39. CGAffineTransformMakeTranslation
- 40. CGAffineTransformRotate
- 41. CGAffineTransformScale
- 42. CGAffineTransformTranslate

- 43. CGBitmapContextCreate
- 44. CGBitmapContextCreateImage
- 45. CGColorSpaceCreateDeviceRGB
- 46. CGColorSpaceRelease
- 47. CGContextAddEllipseInRect
- 48. CGContextConcatCTM
- 49. CGContextDrawImage
- 50. CGContextDrawPath
- 51. CGContextFillPath
- 52. CGContextRelease
- 53. CGContextRotateCTM
- 54. CGContextSetAllowsAntialiasing
- 55. CGContextSetFillColorWithColor
- 56. CGContextSetInterpolationQuality
- 57. CGContextSetLineWidth
- 58. CGContextSetStrokeColorWithColor
- 59. CGContextTranslateCTM
- 60. CGDataProviderCreateWithData
- 61. CGDataProviderRelease
- 62. CGImageCreate
- 63. CGImageDestinationAddImage
- 64. CGImageDestinationCreateWithData
- 65. CGImageDestinationFinalize
- 66. CGImageGetAlphaInfo
- 67. CGImageGetBitmapInfo
- 68. CGImageGetBitsPerComponent
- 69. CGImageGetColorSpace
- 70. CGImageGetHeight
- 71. CGImageGetWidth
- 72. CGImageRelease
- 73. CGRectApplyAffineTransform
- 74. CGRectContainsPoint
- 75. CGRectGetMinY
- 76. CGRectInset
- 77. CGRectIntegral
- 78. CLLocation
- 79. CLLocationManager
- 80. CMBlockBufferAppendBufferReference
- 81. CMBlockBufferCopyDataBytes
- 82. CMBlockBufferCreateWithBufferReference
- 83. CMBlockBufferCreateWithMemoryBlock
- 84. CMBlockBufferGetDataLength
- 85. CMBlockBufferReplaceDataBytes
- 86. CMCopyDictionaryOfAttachments

87. CMMotionManager

88. CMSampleBufferCreate

89. CMSampleBufferGetDataBuffer

90. CMSampleBufferGetFormatDescription

- 91. CMSampleBufferGetImageBuffer
- 92. CMSampleBufferGetSampleAttachmentsArray
- 93. CMTimeMake
- 94. CMVideoFormatDescriptionCreateFromH264ParameterSets
- 95. CMVideoFormatDescriptionGetDimensions
- 96. CMVideoFormatDescriptionGetH264ParameterSetAtIndex
- 97. CTCallCenter
- 98. CVOpenGLESTextureCacheCreate
- 99. CVOpenGLESTextureCacheCreateTextureFromImage
- 100. CVOpenGLESTextureCacheFlush
- 101. CVOpenGLESTextureGetName
- 102. CVOpenGLESTextureGetTarget
- 103. CVPixelBufferGetBaseAddress
- 104. CVPixelBufferGetBytesPerRow
- 105. CVPixelBufferGetHeight
- 106. CVPixelBufferGetWidth
- 107. CVPixelBufferLockBaseAddress
- 108. CVPixelBufferUnlockBaseAddress
- 109. EAGLContext
- 110. GLKMatrix3Invert
- 111. GLKView
- 112. LAContext
- 113. MFMailComposeViewController
- 114. NSArray
- 115. NSAssertionHandler
- 116. NSAttributedString
- 117. NSBundle
- 118. NSCache
- 119. NSCharacterSet
- 120. NSClassFromString
- 121. NSCondition
- 122. NSData
- 123. NSDate
- 124. NSDateFormatter
- 125. NSDictionary
- 126. NSError
- 127. NSException
- 128. NSFileCoordinator
- 129. NSFileManager
- 130. NSHTTPURLResponse

131. NSIndexPath

- 132. NSIndexSet
- 133. NSInvalidArgumentException
- 134. NSJSONSerialization
- 135. NSKeyedArchiver
- 136. NSKeyedUnarchiver
- 137. NSLayoutConstraint
- 138. NSLocale
- 139. NSLock
- 140. NSLog
- 141. NSMapTable
- 142. NSMutableArray
- 143. NSMutableData
- 144. NSMutableDictionary
- 145. NSMutableIndexSet
- 146. NSMutableParagraphStyle
- 147. NSMutableSet
- 148. NSMutableString
- 149. NSMutableURLRequest
- 150. NSNotificationCenter
- 151. NSNull
- 152. NSNumber
- 153. NSObject
- 154. NSOperationQueue
- 155. NSPredicate
- 156. NSPropertyListSerialization
- 157. NSRecursiveLock
- 158. NSScanner
- 159. NSSelectorFromString
- 160. NSSet
- 161. NSString
- 162. NSStringFromCGRect
- 163. NSStringFromClass
- 164. NSThread
- 165. NSTimeZone
- 166. NSTimer
- 167.NSURL
- 168.NSURLCredential
- 169.NSURLRequest
- 170.NSURLSession
- 171.NSURLSessionConfiguration
- 172. NSUUID
- 173. NSUserDefaults
- 174. OSAtomicAdd32Barrier

175. SCNetworkReachabilityCreateWithAddress

176. SCNetworkReachabilityCreateWithName

177. SCNetworkReachabilityGetFlags

178. SCNetworkReachabilityScheduleWithRunLoop

179. SCNetworkReachabilitySetCallback

180. SCNetworkReachabilityUnscheduleFromRunLoop

181. SSLClose

182. SSLCopyPeerTrust

183. SSLCreateContext

184. SSLGetNumberSupportedCiphers

185. SSLGetSupportedCiphers

186. SSLHandshake

187. SSLRead

188. SSLSetCertificate

189. SSLSetConnection

190. SSLSetEnabledCiphers

191. SSLSetIOFuncs

192. SSLSetPeerDomainName

193. SSLSetProtocolVersionMax

194. SSLSetProtocolVersionMin

195. SSLSetSessionOption

196. SSLWrite

197. SecCertificateCopyData

198. SecCertificateCopySubjectSummary

199. SecCertificateCreateWithData

200. SecIdentityCopyCertificate

201. SecIdentityCopyPrivateKey

202. SecItemAdd

203. SecItemCopyMatching

204. SecItemDelete

205. SecItemUpdate

206. SecKeyRawSign

207. SecPKCS12Import

208. SecTrustCopyProperties

209. SecTrustCopyResult

210. SecTrustEvaluate

211. SecTrustSetAnchorCertificates

212. SecTrustSetAnchorCertificatesOnly

213. UIAlertAction

214. UIAlertController

215. UIAlertView

216. UIApplication

217. UIApplicationMain

218. UIBarButtonItem

219. UIButton

220. UICollectionViewCell

221. UICollectionViewController

222. UICollectionViewFlowLayout

223. UIColor

224. UIDevice

225. UIDocumentMenuViewController

226. UIFont

227. UIGraphicsBeginImageContextWithOptions

228. UIGraphicsEndImageContext

229. UIGraphicsGetCurrentContext

230. UIGraphicsGetImageFromCurrentImageContext

231. UIImage

232. UIImageJPEGRepresentation

233. UIImagePNGRepresentation

234. UIImagePickerController

235. UIImageView

236. UILabel

237. UILocalNotification

238. UILongPressGestureRecognizer

239. UIMenuController

240. UIMenuItem

241. UINavigationController

242. UINib

243. UIPanGestureRecognizer

244. UIPasteboard

245. UIRectFillUsingBlendMode

246. UIResponder

247. UIScreen

248. UIScrollView

249. UISlider

250. UIStoryboard

251. UISwitch

252. UITableView

253. UITableViewCell

254. UITableViewController

255. UITapGestureRecognizer

256. UITextField

257. UITextView

258. UIUserNotificationSettings

259. UIView

260. UIViewController

261. UIWebView

262. UIWindow

263. UNMutableNotificationContent

264. UNNotificationRequest

265. UNNotificationServiceExtension

266. UNNotificationSound

267. UNUserNotificationCenter

268. VTCompressionSessionCreate

269. VTCompressionSessionEncodeFrame

270. VTCompressionSessionInvalidate

271. VTDecompressionSessionCanAcceptFormatDescription

272. VTDecompressionSessionCreate

273. VTDecompressionSessionDecodeFrame

274. VTDecompressionSessionInvalidate

275. VTSessionSetProperty

276. abort

277. arc4random

278. atan2

279. atoi

280. bzero

281. calloc

282. class_getInstanceMethod

283. close

284. connect

285. dispatch_after

286. dispatch_async

287. dispatch_get_global_queue

288. dispatch_once

289. dispatch_queue_create

290. dispatch_sync

291. dispatch_time

292. exit

293. fclose

294. fcntl

295. fflush

296. fopen

297. fprintf

298.fputs

299. free

300. fwrite

301. gai_strerror

302. getaddrinfo

303. getenv

304. getpid

305. getsockopt

306. glActiveTexture

307. glAttachShader

- 308. glBindTexture
- 309. glBlendFunc
- 310. glClear
- 311. glClearColor
- 312. glCompileShader
- 313. glCreateProgram
- 314. glCreateShader
- 315. glDeleteProgram
- 316. glDeleteShader
- 317. glDeleteTextures
- 318. glDisable
- 319. glDisableVertexAttribArray
- 320. glDrawElements
- 321. glEnable
- 322. glEnableVertexAttribArray
- 323. glGenTextures
- 324. glGetAttribLocation
- 325. glGetProgramiv
- 326. glGetUniformLocation
- 327. glLinkProgram
- 328. glShaderSource
- 329. glTexImage2D
- 330. glTexParameterf
- 331. glTexParameteri
- 332. glTexSubImage2D
- 333. glUniform1f
- 334. glUniform1i
- 335. glUniformMatrix4fv
- 336. glUseProgram
- 337. glVertexAttribPointer
- 338. glViewport
- 339. log10
- 340. mach_error_string
- 341. malloc
- 342. memcpy
- 343. memmove
- 344. memset
- 345. method_getImplementation
- 346. open
- 347. os_activity_initiate
- 348. pipe
- 349. poll
- 350. pow

351. printf 352. pthread_mutex_destroy 353. pthread_mutex_init 354. pthread_mutex_lock 355. pthread_mutex_unlock 356. puts 357. realloc 358. recv 359. sched_yield 360. select 361. send 362. setsockopt 363. shutdown 364. snprintf 365. socket 366. strcmp 367. strdup 368. strerror 369. strlen 370. strtoul 371. sys_errlist 372. system 373. uname 374. usleep 375. vfprintf 376. vm_allocate 377. vm_deallocate 378. vm_remap 379. Write 380. WKWebView